Lessons inside include:

- Strategic Messaging by Intervening Forces during Stability Operations
- Leader Attributes for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations
- The Imperative of Protecting Civilians
- Attending to the “Human Domain”
- Radiological Hazards during Disaster Relief Operations
- Information Sharing during Disaster Relief Operations
- US Government Framework for Foreign Disaster Relief
- The “Light Footprint” Approach
- “Blue” and “Green” Forces Operating in Tandem
- Resources for Information Gathering and Analysis
Foreword

Welcome to the 2nd edition (Summer 2013) of STRATEGIC LESSONS in PEACEKEEPING & STABILITY OPERATIONS!

This publication is designed to provide senior leaders and their staffs with key lessons – at the strategic level – from recently conducted peacekeeping and stability operations.

These lessons have applications for the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense (DoD), and numerous other U.S. Government departments and agencies – including the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

These lessons are based on the analysis of multiple entries within the Stability Operations Lessons Learned & Information Management System (SOLLIMS) (https://sollims.pksoi.org) as well as various reference documents specified under each lesson.

Each strategic lesson is presented in the following format:

- Introduction
- Summary
- Recommendations
- This information may be of interest to: (named organizations)
- References

We hope you consider the “Recommendations” as “food for thought” as you engage in the complex business of developing plans and strategies for future peacekeeping and stability operations – and when formulating associated policies, programs, and resource allocation strategies.

The lessons are meant to be brief – but please let us know if you would like us to provide further information on any given topic.

Thanks for your interest!

Colonel Robert Balcavage
Chief, Operations Division
U.S. Army PKSOI
“Quick Look”

Click on [Read More ...] to go to full Lesson.

- **Strategic messaging** by intervening forces during stability operations is fundamental for their overall success. [Read More ...]

- Certain **leader attributes** prominently stand out as “keys to success” – frequently cited in strategic leader assessments and lessons learned from recent peacekeeping and stability operations. [Read More ...]

- The imperative of **protecting civilians** should be at the forefront of every peace-keeping and stability operation. [Read More ...]

- Although the “**human domain**” is broad in nature – encompassing the full range of host nation populations, their values, their motivations, and their behaviors – recent stability operations highlight the importance of focusing attention on specific elements / population groups. [Read More ...]

- During Operation TOMODACHI – conducted by U.S. Pacific Command from 11 March to 1 June 2011 in the aftermath of Japan’s earthquake/tsunami disaster – decision-making by U.S. Joint commanders proved difficult with regard to issues involving **radiological hazards**. [Read More ...]

- Although significant progress has been made over recent years with regard to **information sharing** between civil and military actors engaged in HA/DR operations, much work remains to be done. [Read More ...]

- Recent HA/DR operations – in the Republic of Georgia, Haiti, and Japan – have validated the need for the U.S. Government to establish/design a standardized **framework for foreign disaster relief**. [Read More ...]

- The **“light footprint” approach** (small units/teams partnering with host nation forces and building host nation capacity) has proven to be an effective option for bringing about stability in nations dealing with insurgent threats. [Read More ...]

- Coordination mechanisms are imperative when a “Blue” Force (UN peacekeeping force) and a “Green” Force (foreign national force or regional organization force) are operating in tandem. [Read More ...]

- It is imperative that forces deployed on stability operations have sufficient **resources for “information gathering and analysis”** throughout the force structure – and especially at lower levels. [Read More ...]
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 11: Strategic Messaging by Intervening Forces during Stability Operations

INTRODUCTION: Strategic messaging by intervening forces during stability operations is fundamental for their overall success. Peacekeepers/stability operations personnel must use strategic messaging to inform host nation (HN) civilians and the HN government about their intentions/objectives and the improvements being made. Ultimately, this will help intervening forces improve relations, extend reach, and build public support for the HN government.

SUMMARY: An analytical review of recent publications on information operations (IO) in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates a critical need for the effective use of strategic messaging during the initial phases of peacekeeping/stability operations. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), al Qaeda accused the U.S. early on of waging a war against Islam, and it was important to counter this message. In 2007, the U.S. was able to develop and send palatable strategic messages to influence Sunnis and Shi’a extremists. The new strategic messages helped “win the hearts and minds” of Iraqis (references 1, 2).

One of the challenges of IO is that insurgents tend to have a deeper understanding of the culture and local needs of the HN civilians. Thus, the insurgents can often offer a narrative that might appeal to the interests of the HN civilians. As mentioned, during OIF, al Qaeda was able to turn elements of the Iraqi population against the U.S. by exploiting fears that the West was at war with Islam. In addition to adding 130,000 more troops to Iraq during the surge, the U.S. refocused the operation’s strategic message. The U.S. defined objectives that were aligned with local Iraqi interests. Namely, the U.S. promised not to prosecute low- to mid-level Iraqi insurgents. Also, the U.S. helped the Iraqi government gain legitimacy by training its military forces to police themselves. Additionally, the U.S. sent a strong signal to the Iraqis that the U.S. was committed to Iraq’s stability. Iraqis responded, and by late 2007 the country was considerably more stable. (references 1, 2)

Similar to pre-surge OIF, U.S./coalition force strategic messaging in Afghanistan has struggled to win widespread support among the Afghan population. Two main objectives of the U.S./coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have been to: (1) dismantle an al Qaeda stronghold, thereby providing security to Afghans and preventing the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorists to plan future attacks, and (2) to stabilize Afghanistan through bolstering a semi-democratic government and providing economic opportunities, ultimately to improve the Afghans’ quality of life. The latter objective is part of a concerted effort to “win the hearts and minds” of Afghans, thus enervating the influence of extremist elements. Unfortunately, the U.S./coalition forces have been unable to persuade many Afghans to side with the U.S.-backed central government. (references 1, 3)
In addition to the strategic messaging challenges in Afghanistan, the U.S./coalition forces’ strategic messaging in Pakistan has been unable to generate widespread support among the Pakistani population. Pakistanis tend to oppose the U.S./coalition forces use of airstrikes against the Taliban and the use of Pakistani military bases and transit routes for supplying NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. Consequently, the approval rating of the U.S./coalition forces in Pakistan is tied for last among all nations. The abysmal approval rating of the U.S. is partially due to coalition forces’ strategic messaging conflicting with Pakistan’s Islamic values. Thus far, the U.S./coalition forces have not effectively distinguished between what Pakistan considers Pakistani Taliban members vice Taliban extremists. This has hampered the U.S./coalition forces’ ability to fight Afghan Taliban members who cross the border to Pakistan. (references 4, 5)

Although strategic messaging has largely failed during the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the international community was able to effectively use strategic messaging in a different region/Liberia, to buttress support of the new government after the civil war. The United Nations (UN)/international forces incorporated development projects – legitimizing the new regime in messaging by emphasizing the importance of the Liberian governments’ role in nominating and implementing the projects. Citing “Liberian-led” efforts helped to generate enthusiasm and support for the new government. (reference 6)

RECOMMENDATIONS: To improve strategic messaging during stability operations, the U.S./coalition forces should: (1) send clear and consistent messages to the HN, (2) operate with the whole of government, and (3) respect cultural norms (reference 7).

- First, the U.S. must be prepared to counter insurgents’ strategic messaging with clear and consistent strategic messaging. For example, the U.S. failed to offer a compelling strategic message to Iraqis before the surge. During the surge, the U.S. was able to align its strategic messaging with the interests of the Iraqi people. The new strategic message helped act as a catalyst for the Sunni Awakening. During future peacekeeping/stability operations, the U.S./coalition forces should try to anticipate enemy combatants’ strategic messages and prepare potential responses/counters. The Department of State (DoS) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are best positioned to promote strategic messages that pertain to economic development and governance. The Department of Defense (DoD) should be the primary intermediary with the HN on strategic messaging that pertains to security. Although agencies will focus on the strategic message that most closely aligns with their skill sets, they must still be able to explain the other agencies’ intentions/objectives. Moreover, in the event that an agency accidentally undermines the strategic messaging of a different department, it is important to acknowledge the mistake quickly. The political
fallout of being caught lying outweighs the fallout of admitting the mistake from the onset. (reference 1)

- Second, during stability operations, the U.S./coalition forces must support the strategic messages with actions. Namely, if the U.S./coalition forces strategic message promises to improve the quality of life for HN civilians, then USAID, private development agencies, the U.S./coalition supported-HN government, and the DoS must be prepared to implement development projects at the local level – even in potentially dangerous areas. If the U.S./coalition forces fail to meet their promises, it undermines HN civilians’ confidence in the mission. The IO in Liberia was successful in part because UN/international forces were able to meet the expectations of the local HN population (reference 6).

- Third, the U.S./coalition forces must try to work within the culture of the HN. The U.S./coalition forces must tailor some policies to meet the needs and interests of the locals in the district in which they are working. To overcome insurgents’ asymmetric information advantages (i.e., insurgents will likely understand the HN culture better than peacekeepers/stability operations personnel), the U.S./coalition forces should partner with the HN government. The HN government can help overcome the cultural information gap between the HN civilians and U.S./coalition forces. For example, strategic messaging in Liberia was more effective because the international community put Liberian government members at the forefront of development projects. They were better suited to address local concerns than foreign stability operations personnel. (reference 6)

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of Defense – Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of Agriculture – Foreign Agricultural Service
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of State – Bureau of Public Affairs
- United States International Development Agency – Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs

REFERENCES:
(2) “Political & Military Components of the Surge in Iraq,” SOLLIMS Lesson 808
(3) “Operation Moshtarak Lessons Learned,” SOLLIMS Lesson 644
(4) “Observations from COIN Emersion course with Pakistan at Ft Leavenworth 1-10 Nov 2010,” SOLLIMS Lesson 692
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 12: Leader Attributes for Peacekeeping & Stability Operations

INTRODUCTION: Certain leader attributes prominently stand out as “keys to success” – frequently cited in strategic leader assessments and lessons learned from recent peacekeeping and stability operations.

SUMMARY: Leadership in peacekeeping and stability operations at the strategic & operational levels is complex business, with no single set of attributes applying to all leaders or all situations. The following leader attributes, however, are often mentioned as being contributory to success:

- **Visioning.** Visioning is the competency for envisioning a preferred – and achievable – outcome (strategic or operational outcome) and articulating it in a word picture so that others involved in the peacekeeping/stability operation are inspired to support it. (references 1-3)

- **Mapping the environment.** Mapping the environment entails the leader’s ability to understand his position relative to national interests, authorities, objectives, available resources, socio-cultural factors, and risks. Mapping contributes to visioning. (references 1, 4)

- **Cross-cultural savvy.** Cross-cultural savvy encompasses the ability to understand and respect cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. A leader with cross-cultural skills is comfortable interacting with and leading joint, international, interagency, & inter-organizational entities. (references 5-8)

- **Interpersonal maturity.** Interpersonal maturity includes the willingness and ability to share power, to build relationships and consensus, to resolve contentious issues, and to employ the art of negotiation over extended timeframes. (references 5-8)

- **Unity of effort and purpose.** Unity of effort and purpose consists of focusing diverse efforts of agencies and actors involved in the operation on common goals/objectives and toward the purpose of building capacity in the host nation government and society. (references 2, 6-8)
• **Strategic communication.** Strategic communication refers to the competency and means by which the strategic or operational leader communicates intentions and keeps internal and external audiences informed of the vision and actions being taken to achieve it. (references 2, 8, 9)

• **Determination toward the vision.** Determination toward the vision is the quality of steadily moving forward – with commitment, hard work, patience, and endurance – despite difficulties and setbacks occurring throughout the peacekeeping/stability operation. (references 1, 5)

There are countless examples in which the above-cited leader attributes were contributory to highly successful operations. Likewise, there are numerous examples in which failures occurred due to the absence of such leader attributes being demonstrated. What follows are just a few examples:

“General Petraeus’s achievement (January 2007-September 2008) in Iraq was to push his thoughts down to the lowest level so that everyone on the ground knew what was expected of them, leaving little doubt as to the mission and tasks.” [Visioning] (reference 1)

“The first problem confronted by the Baghdad South Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) was lack of operational direction (i.e., lack of State Department leadership and planning). No definitive guidance was provided to ePRT team members by way of the Embassy, the higher echelon Baghdad PRT, or the Baghdad South ePRT’s leadership....Without [mapping the environment] and being able to dovetail operations into a larger, more comprehensive operational plan, the resulting effect was to support a number of "look good" projects....Unfortunately, these projects did more to destabilize this fragile region than to stabilize it.” (reference 10)

“In Somalia, for example, shortcomings in leader interpersonal maturity and cross-cultural savvy did, in fact, lead to a loss of popular support, low troop morale and the eventual withdrawal of the UN mandate. Similarly, fragmentation of group unity can prove disastrous for peacekeeping and stability operations. Efforts in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia all fell victim to uncoordinated, unsynchronized activities by the various actors, that hindered the overall mission’s goals.” (reference 7)

“Whereas U.S. civil-military cooperation (between the Department of Defense, State Department, and other U.S. Agencies) had not been effectively established or practiced during Operating Iraqi Freedom over the course of previous years, the senior military officer and the senior State Department officer on the ground in 2007 – General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker – possessed the keen ability and the willingness to closely and continuously partner on U.S. operations – bringing exceptional unity of effort and oversight for implementing the President’s guidance. This leadership team ensured that military and civilian contributions were well placed, synchronized, and closely
tracked – to meet the overall aim of an American (and Iraqi) political solution – a stable, capable, and legitimate Iraqi government.” (reference 11)

“In the case of Kenya, the efforts of Ms. Dekha Abdi and the other four leaders of Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), and the parallel work of Mr. Kofi Annan and the African Union's Panel of Eminent Personalities, were absolutely critical in grabbing the attention of the Kenyan people and in mobilizing multiple sectors of society for peace building [through strategic communication].” (reference 12)

“Seeing a golden hour for peace building [in Liberia] upon the exile of President Taylor, the United Nations, the United States, and certain key leaders immediately focused their engagement on Security Sector Reform (SSR).... [Their] persistence gave a reassuring message to the Liberian government, and to all Liberians, that disarmament, demobilization, and peace building were moving forward and that momentum would be maintained....The UN, U.S., and certain key leaders in country also stood firm on keeping the November 2005 elections on schedule. This resulted in the first female head of state for Africa (Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson), but more importantly resulted in a new, legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of all Liberians – a new government to establish the rule of law.” [Determination toward the vision] (reference 13)

RECOMMENDATION: Leadership “success attributes” should be incorporated into pre-deployment training seminars – for senior leaders preparing to serve on peacekeeping/stability operations.

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G3
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of Agriculture – Foreign Agricultural Service
- USAID – Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)

REFERENCES:
(4) “Social Mentoring – Understanding the People,” SOLLIMS Lesson 789
(5) “Strategic Leadership Competencies,” by Leonard Wong at al., United States Army War College, September 2003
(6) “Strategic Leadership Competencies for Peacekeeping Operations,” by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson Mendes Lauria, 2009
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 13: The Imperative of Protecting Civilians

INTRODUCTION: The imperative of protecting civilians should be at the forefront of every peacekeeping and stability operation. Although many international missions have not been mandated or sufficiently resourced to meet this imperative, experience has shown that populations can turn against the foreign force (stabilization force) when they perceive that they are not being adequately protected by this force.

SUMMARY: Recent stability operations – particularly Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and UN-sponsored operations across several African nations – highlight the importance of dedicating attention and resources to the Protection of Civilians (PoC) and civilian casualty (CIVCAS) mitigation.

Afghanistan. In mid-2011, U.S./coalition forces recognized that insurgent groups were able to gain strength and that the coalition’s freedom of action could be curtailed as a result of CIVCAS incidents – especially when these incidents were caused by coalition weaponry, when they were highlighted by international media, and when they took on political/propaganda dimensions. Insurgent groups often moved quickly to use these incidents to turn local communities against the coalition. To reverse this trend, General Allen, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), issued a “COMISAF’s Tactical Directive” on 30 Nov 2011 – calling for a more judicious application of force, Soldier discipline, tactical patience, and regular reinforcement training – guided by Rules of Engagement (ROE). An OEF CIVCAS Smart Card and an OEF CIVCAS Handbook were rapidly produced to facilitate training and awareness across the force. Greater attention was also placed on the use of non-lethal weapons, when such use was feasible. As a result, CIVCAS incidents
attributed to IFOR markedly declined in 2012 – improving IFOR’s credibility and enhancing stability efforts. (references 1-5)

Democratic Republic of the Congo. Two major events caused widespread grievances among Congolese citizens in the 2008-2009 timeframe: (1) the mass killing of civilians by the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) in late 2008 when the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) did nothing to intervene, and (2) large-scale civilian casualties, civilian displacement, and mass rapes caused by MONUSCO and host nation forces during their joint operation “2009 Kimia II.” Additionally, humanitarian organizations called for an overhaul of MONUSCO’s conduct after these events. In response, MONUSCO took deliberate, innovative steps to rectify matters and alter the public’s perception. It first established Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) to help prevent mass atrocities, instituted Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) at company and platoon levels to support protection activities, and then introduced Community Alert Networks (CANs) around its military bases. Additionally, MONUSCO undertook comprehensive information operations, which proved critical in assuring the public of improved protection measures. (reference 6)

Ivory Coast. In late March 2011, the forces of competing presidential candidates (incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and opposition leader Alassane Ouattara) fought without restraint and without respect for international humanitarian laws – in spite of the presence of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) – resulting in civilian massacres in several towns, as well as maiming, rapes, and other atrocities. The UN was widely criticized for not acting to stop the carnage. UNOCI troops have since been labeled as “foreign invaders” by former president Gbagbo, who has called on his supporters to target them, resulting in increased violence against UNOCI. Discredited and condemned by half the population, UNOCI remains ineffective – without adequate resources to enforce the peace agreement or to protect civilians, even though it is mandated to do both. (reference 6)

Somalia. In late 2010 and early 2011, during intense urban operations conducted by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against the Al-Shabaab Islamic group – primarily in the capital city (Mogadishu) and in southern Somalia – over 1,000 civilians were killed, 6,000+ were injured, and well over 100,000 were displaced. In early 2011, AMISOM’s presence began to be questioned by many Somalis – due what they perceived as indiscriminate shelling (artillery and mortar fire) of populated areas by AMISOM, compounded by aggressive propaganda efforts from Al-Shabaab. With direction from both the African Union and the UN, AMISOM quickly instituted an array of new measures in the May-July 2011 timeframe for the sole purpose of preventing civilian casualties and enhancing respect for International Humanitarian Law. Key AMISOM actions were the adoption of an Indirect Fire Policy, the establishment of a cell to track incidents of civilian harm, and specific training on how to avoid
civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur. Significant progress has since been made by AMISOM with respect to CIVCAS mitigation, resulting in rising public support and notable mission success. (references 6-8)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- **Mission/Command emphasis.** Ensure that PoC and CIVCAS mitigation are designated as priorities for future peacekeeping and stability operations. (references 4, 9)

- **Resources.** Ensure that peacekeeping and stability forces are adequately resourced to protect civilians. (references 10-12)

- **Training.** Ensure that peacekeeping and stability forces receive pre-deployment training on PoC and CIVCAS mitigation. (references 4, 7, 10-13)

- **Discipline.** Ensure that leaders instill discipline in Soldiers, guided by ROE, for purposes of PoC and CIVCAS mitigation. (references 4, 7)

- **Non-lethal weapons.** Incorporate the use of non-lethal weapons into CIVCAS mitigation strategies. (reference 5)

- **Partnering and community involvement.** Involve host nation security forces and local communities in PoC efforts. (references 4, 6)

- **Information operations.** Conduct comprehensive information operations to keep the public informed of PoC and CIVCAS mitigation efforts. (references 1, 6)

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:

- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G3
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)

REFERENCES:


STRATEGIC LESSON Number 14: Attending to the “Human Domain”

INTRODUCTION: Attending to the “human domain” is vital to peacekeeping and stability operations. The following quotes are provided to illustrate what is meant by the “human domain” and why it is essential for planning and executing operations:

- “We must also remember that conflict is a human endeavor, ultimately won or lost in the human domain. The Army operates in this human domain, which is the most important factor in a complex environment.” (reference 1)

- “Simply stated, the lesson of the last decade is that failing to understand the human dimension of conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and political will for the Nation to bear.” (reference 2)

- “A nuanced understanding of the environment [in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere] was often hindered by a focus on traditional adversaries and a...
neglect of information concerning the host-nation population….Because the traditional intelligence effort tended to focus on enemy groups and actions, it often neglected ‘white’ information about the population that was necessary for success in population-centric campaigns such as counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Local commanders needed information about ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics, and economics.” (reference 3)

- “Partnerships with host nation actors should be guided by impartiality, inclusiveness, and gender considerations based on a solid understanding of the local context (to include civil society; private sector actors; and, all ethnic, religious, and minority groups.).” (reference 4)

**SUMMARY:** Although the “human domain” is broad in nature – encompassing the full range of host nation populations, their values, their motivations, and their behaviors – recent stability operations highlight the importance of focusing attention on the following specific elements / population groups:

- **Local leaders/elders.** Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and peacekeeping and civil-military operations across Africa have shown the importance of engaging local leaders/elders and gaining their buy-in on stability and reconstruction efforts. Particularly effective approaches have been the implementation of an “itihad” (“unity”) strategy in OIF to influence community leaders and build consensus, the use of Village Stability Operations (VSO) in OEF, and Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) with local officials in both operations. (references 5-9)

- **Women.** Recent stability operations have shown that engaging women in peace building efforts can pay significant dividends, even in societies where women have had little or no participation in governance. The deliberate inclusion of women’s groups in Liberia and Kenya and the use and expansion of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan provide valuable lessons on engaging women/women’s groups and the derived benefits for the mission. (references 10-13)

- **Youth/young adults.** With challenges ranging from disgruntled youths (lacking education and employment) to youths taking up arms (in militias and extremist groups), the need to address sizable youth populations has come to the fore in peacekeeping operations across Africa, as well as in OEF. Effective approaches have included: engaging established youth groups (Kenya), creating new youth groups/youth “shuras” (OEF), and implementing various post-conflict employment programs – e.g., public works programs (Liberia and Uganda). (references 11 and 14-16)
• **Religious leaders.** From the Balkans to Iraq to Afghanistan, religion has often played a role in fueling conflict between groups within the host nation. It has also been used by insurgents as a basis for violence against coalition/international forces. Engagement with religious leaders has shown to merit attention, particularly if the coalition/international force is resourced with subject matter experts/chaplains and places command emphasis on using them for this purpose, as per II Marine Expeditionary Brigade & the UK contingent in Helmand Province in OEF. (reference 17)

• **Civil society groups.** Civil society groups have proven to be critical resources both for forging peace in a conflict-affected nation and for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The work of the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in Afghanistan and the Riinvest Institute in Kosovo shows that immediate engagement with civil society groups and investments at the local level can lead to host nation capacity for long-term growth and stability. Understanding local culture, societal groups, and how they interact is paramount for this engagement – which the Human Terrain System afforded to commanders/staffs during OIF and OEF. (references 11 and 18-20.)

• **Insurgents.** OIF, OEF, and peacekeeping & stability operations across Africa have shown the criticality of understanding the mindset of insurgents, as well as how insurgents can sometimes be persuaded to change course. Regionally-tailored Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives (bolstered by command emphasis) were able to gain notable success in both northern Iraq and northern Afghanistan – and perhaps could have been used by host nation authorities as foundations for broader programs. Information operations targeting insurgents/combatants, amnesty provisions (temporary/conditional), and nationally-resourced employment programs were shown to be critical for DDR program success. (references 10 and 21-23)

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. U.S./coalition forces engaged in future peacekeeping and stability operations should develop a comprehensive strategy upfront to address the "human domain." This strategy should target six key population groups – local leaders/elders, women, youth/young adults, religious leaders, civil society groups, and insurgents – and should consider use of the following elements:

   • An “itihad” strategy (“unity” strategy)
   • Village Stability Operations
   • Key Leader Engagements
   • Female Engagement Teams
   • Youth group engagement programs
   • Nationally-supported employment programs
• Chaplain/religious leader engagement programs
• Programs designed to engage, invest in, and mentor civil society groups
• The Human Terrain System
• Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs
• Information operations targeting insurgents/combatants

2. U.S./coalition forces should ensure that formations are sufficiently resourced and trained to operate in the “human domain.”

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G3
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)

REFERENCES:
(4) “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and PKSOI, October 2009.
(9) “Rebuilding Schools and Communities in Post-conflict Kenya,” SOLLIMS Lesson 772.
(10)”Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform,” SOLLIMS Lesson 703.
(11)”Civil Society Capacity and Action for Peacebuilding – Kenya,” SOLLIMS Lesson 702.
(12)“Female Engagement Teams: The Case for More Female Civil Affairs Marines,” by MSG Julia L. Watson, Marine Corps Gazette, July 2012.
(14)“Youth Shura Innovation in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 771.
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 15: Radiological Hazards during Disaster Relief Operations

INTRODUCTION: During Operation TOMODACHI – conducted by U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) from 11 March to 1 June 2011 in the aftermath of Japan’s earthquake/tsunami disaster – decision-making by U.S. Joint commanders proved difficult with regard to issues involving radiological hazards.

SUMMARY: USPACOM’s Joint Support Force (JSF) addressed three major lines of operation (LOEs) during Operation TOMODACHI: (1) the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), (2) the military-assisted departure of U.S. citizens from Japan known as “Operation Pacific Passage,” and (3) consequence management operations related to mitigating the effects of the release of radioactive materials. This latter LOE proved to be problematic in many regards. (reference 1)

Following the 11 March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, it took USPACOM’s JSF several weeks to develop adequate mechanisms for real-time situational awareness on radiological contamination and products to aid decision-making. The need to translate a plethora of technical data and information about the situation in Fukushima and the spread of radiation into agreed-upon assessments was a significant challenge. Issues such as the use of different standards to determine what could be considered “safe” levels of exposure to radiation, as well as the reasons for the use of different measurement units, were frequently debated and not always understood by commanders,
staffs, and Japanese counterparts. According to the U.S. Army Japan, “The ever-changing units of measurement were confusing and forced units to decipher their meanings and threat levels. Examples: Rads, CentiGrey, Baqueral, Tetrabaquerals, cpm, ccppm, mRem, mGrey, Milliserverts, and Rem.” Because of the different standards and the many changes in measurement units, the U.S. and Japan ended up implementing different evacuation zones for their respective personnel. (references 1-3)

On the U.S. side, the JSF commander noted that there was no protocol for him to request assistance and mobilize support from other U.S. Government agencies to address such problems as the need to measure and model the effects of radioactivity in the sea – a capability that was limited within the U.S. military. Also, certain U.S. Government agencies did not have a means in place to respond to requests for overseas assistance, nor was there a framework outlining how these agencies were supposed to organize their efforts in support of the Department of State, which has overall lead for coordinating U.S. responses to international/foreign disasters. Although the U.S. Government has a formal framework for coordinating federal agencies in support of domestic disasters – namely, the U.S. National Response Framework – it does not have a similar framework for international/foreign disasters. For its part, the Department of Defense recently published comprehensive guidance for foreign disaster relief operations when it released the “Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below)” in July 2011; however, this handbook fails to address radiological hazards except for one brief paragraph titled “Handling Contaminated Items.” (references 1, 4-6)

Throughout Operation TOMODACHI, risk assessments from radiological plume models conducted by various organizations were often in conflict. These plume models indicated where measurements for radioactive material needed to be taken. The results of those measurements were then used to inform decision-making. The Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DoE), and the Government of Japan (GOJ) were all taking measurements based on their own plume models. It has since been stated in multiple after-action reviews that the U.S. plume models overestimated the risk, causing an over-response by U.S. forces during Operation TOMODACHI, with “unnecessary and time-consuming tasks.” The differences in plume models between the three parties (DoD, DoE, and GOJ) included the basic models themselves, estimated source-terms, plume characteristics, physiology, and locations selected. (references 2, 7, 8)

Another significant problem in Operation TOMODACHI was that DoD and the JSF failed to set protective action levels and standards early on with regard to safe levels of radionuclides (radioactive material) in the air, water, and food. This was due to lack of agreement between the Services and supporting organizations. Standards do exist for the routine use of radionuclides – set by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission – and guidelines for domestic emergencies are
also published. For certain radionuclides (e.g., radioactive iodine), these guidelines provide specific protective action levels as a function of dose. What was found to be lacking during Operation TOMADACHI, however, were consistent DoD-wide guidelines (with protective action levels and standards) and the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) needed to ensure consistent, rapid implementation of appropriate protective actions. (references 3, 4, 7)

Yet another challenge experienced during Operation TOMODACHI involved the use of dosimetry systems/dosimeters. The Services all had unique dosimetry systems for monitoring personnel “occupationallly exposed” to ionizing radiation. The Services also utilized a number of different dosimeters. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) – which all three Services possessed and used – did not provide real-time readings; these devices had to be read under laboratory conditions at a separate location. One dosimeter – the Air Force electronic personnel dosimeter (EPD) – was able to provide real-time readings and a “dose-of-record,” but availability of this device was limited. Another dosimeter – the Army’s optically stimulated luminescence system (OSL) system – was able to provide near-real-time readings, but only if the devices/readers were close to the worksite. This dosimeter was hardly used during Operation TOMODACHI because many of the worksites were within the zone of contamination. If the devices/readers were to become contaminated, the readings would not have been accurate or usable. Overall, all these dosimetry systems/dosimeters were adequate for their designed purpose – occupational dosimetry in a controlled environment – but they all had drawbacks when it came to using them in this particular situation (a Joint disaster relief operation in a radiological environment). (references 3, 7, 9)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. DoD should establish consistent guidelines across the Services for dealing with radionuclides in air, drinking water, and food during an international/foreign disaster relief operation – setting protective action levels and standards. Along with these guidelines, DoD/Services should establish corresponding TTPs for implementation of these guidelines.

2. DoD should establish a single approach (DoD-wide) for plume modeling and radiological risk assessments.

3. DoD should designate a single radiation dosimeter, common measurement units, and common reporting standards – for use in Joint operations in a radiological environment.

4. The U.S. Government should establish a formal framework for international/foreign disaster relief operations, much like the U.S. National Response Framework that applies to domestic disasters. As a starting point, the following paper is provided: “Preparing for Catastrophe: A New U.S. Framework for
5. Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command, J-8, which is listed as the proponent for “Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below),” should update this handbook to address operations in a radiological environment.

6. Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, as well as other Combatant Commands, should provide inputs/expertise on the above recommendations.

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
- Department of Defense – Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3, J-7, J-8
- Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command – Deputy Chief of Staff, J-8
- Department of State – Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance
- USAID – Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
- Department of Energy – Office of Health, Safety and Security

REFERENCES:
(1) “Operation Tomodachi: Lessons Learned in the U.S. Military’s Support to Japan” in LIAISON, volume V/2012, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance staff in collaboration with U.S. Forces Japan and the Center for Naval Analyses, 16 October 2012.
(3) “DoD's Response to Fukushima: Operation TOMODACHI,” Major Jamie Stowe (USAF) and Major Alan Hale (USAF), 10 April 2012.
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 16: Information Sharing during Disaster Relief Operations.

INTRODUCTION: Recent Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations – in the Republic of Georgia, Haiti, and Japan – have validated the need to codify unclassified information sharing systems and procedures to enhance interoperability among stakeholders.

SUMMARY: Although significant progress has been made over recent years with regard to information sharing between civil and military actors engaged in HA/DR operations, much work remains to be done.

Republic of Georgia, 2008. During Operation ASSURED DELIVERY, USEUCOM conducted relief missions to aid some 165,000 displaced persons in the Republic of Georgia – displaced by military conflict between Russia and the Republic of Georgia. USEUCOM was in a support role of the U.S. effort led by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/United States Agency for International Development (USAID). However, unclassified information sharing systems and collaboration tools were lacking. USEUCOM had no visibility of interagency relief supply inventories, no knowledge of relief supplies being made available by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and no awareness of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) relief flights. USEUCOM also lacked a comprehensive Common Operating Picture (COP) of actors and activities at the destination airfield (Tbilisi), which significantly hindered planning and sequencing of relief missions. In spite of these challenges, USEUCOM planners and logisticians were able to arrange delivery of over two million pounds of relief supplies (shelter, food, water, bedding, medical supplies, etc.) by utilizing previously established relationships (with U.S. Government agency personnel), conducting extensive networking and research, and making direct coordination with the U.S. Embassy staff in Georgia. (reference 1)

Haiti, 2010. During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, JTF-Haiti (established by USSOUTHCOM) conducted humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in support of OFDA/USAID. The decisions by Department of Defense (DoD)/USSOUTHCOM to promote the use of unclassified information/products among partners whenever possible and utilize public domain platforms for information sharing greatly facilitated cooperation and coordination of relief activities. USSOUTHCOM leveraged the All Partners Access Network (APAN) and a User Defined Operational Picture (UDOP), allowing partners to post updates, display geo-rectified products, and link into USAID and other governmental and non-governmental sites. JTF-Haiti likewise made a concerted effort to maximize information-sharing on the ground in Haiti and synchronize the
efforts of all partners. JTF-Haiti’s key node was its (30-member) Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, which served as a conduit for bringing different organizations together under one “coordination and collaboration roof” – collecting inputs from USAID, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN humanitarian community, and NGOs. Operating at the unclassified level, JTF-Haiti used commercially available programs such as Google Earth to build a “humanitarian assistance” Common Operating Picture (COP) for its partners and teams down to the tactical level. Outside of DoD, a number of other information sharing communities and initiatives also emerged during the course of disaster relief operations. These included: the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UN OCHA’s) new OneResponse portal designed to facilitate information sharing in the UN Cluster System; a virtual CrisisMappers network sponsored by the Ushahidi company which received over 80,000 text messages about incidents on the ground and plotted the data on an interactive mapping platform; a new interactive website launched by InterAction (an NGO consortium) to map and track NGO projects; and, Google’s introduction of a new “Person Finder” application. (references 2-5)

Japan, 2011. During Operation TOMODACHI, the USPACOM-designated Joint Support Force (JSF) provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief support for the Government of Japan. To facilitate information sharing with other U.S. Government organizations and NGOs involved, USPACOM established the “Japan Earthquake 2011” site on APAN. (USPACOM had also used APAN on previous HA/DR operations.) Within APAN, USPACOM created a special community of users (accessible only by invitation) – the “Virtual Civil Military Operations Center” (VCMOC) – for the purpose of developing and maintaining a Common Operating Picture. Although APAN facilitated information sharing between USPACOM and certain organizations, APAN was not the only unclassified network put to use during this operation. HARMONIEWeb was also heavily utilized and was actually preferred by several organizations that had used it before and were familiar with its features. As it took several days for USPACOM to set up the VCMOC (on APAN) and decide on VCMOC membership, numerous organizations simply continued to use HARMONIEWeb and were reluctant to shift gears to APAN when finally granted access to the VCMOC. USPACOM’s failure to involve all organizations in the VCMOC from the onset of HA/DR operations resulted in an inadequate COP within which all stakeholders could share information. Critical information – such as the activities, status, and whereabouts of UN agencies, NGOs, and the private sector – was not readily available to the JSF or the Japanese. Also, certain classified/sensitive data could not be downgraded and placed on APAN. However, the JSF was able to overcome this issue with a cross-domain solution (Radiant Mercury system) to move such data from the U.S.-only SIPRNET to CENTRIXS-JPN (available to Japanese users). Besides HARMONIEWeb, another popular unclassified website was one set up by Google. Over 300 web developers at Google headquarters in Tokyo established and managed a crisis response site (http://www.google.com/crisisresponse/japanguake2011.html) designed to help
identify and locate missing persons – utilizing photos, maps, shelter locations, news updates, transportation routes, and user tools. This site proved very helpful to JSF planning and search efforts. (references 6-8)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Department of State (in conjunction with OFDA/USAID) should designate one single unclassified information management system for use by all U.S. Government agencies in HA/DR operations, and regularly rehearse its use. APAN would be a leading candidate since it has already been designated as the Department of Defense Unclassified Information Sharing Concept (UISC) system of record (Refs 9-10), it has been used by two Combatant Commands (USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM) in HA/DR operations, and it has 90+ HA/DR communities and 180+ Training & Exercises communities registered.

2. Department of Defense should incorporate unclassified information sharing sites, architectures, tools, and procedures into all HA/DR plans and exercises. Consider connectivity/linkages for tracking the efforts of interagency, international, intergovernmental, NGO, and private sector players (OFDA/USAID, DOS, UN, ICRC, host nation, InterAction, Ushahidi, Google, etc.).

3. Department of Defense should disseminate best practices (to the COCOMs and Services) for HA/DR COP development.

4. Department of Defense should address the needs for logisticians to gain visibility on U.S. Government inventories of relief supplies for foreign disasters and to develop a comprehensive Common Operating Picture of destination airfield actors and activities.

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, G-4, G6
- Department of Defense – Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3, J-4, J-6, J-7
- Department of State – Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance
- USAID – Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

REFERENCES:
(3) “Whole of International Community for Foreign Disaster Relief,” SOLLIMS Lesson 700.
(6) “Information Sharing on Operation Tomodachi,” SOLLIMS Lesson 860.
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 17: U.S. Government Framework for Foreign Disaster Relief

INTRODUCTION: Recent Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations – in the Republic of Georgia, Haiti, and Japan – have validated the need for the U.S. Government to establish/design a standardized framework for foreign disaster relief.

SUMMARY: In the course of U.S. involvement in recent foreign disaster relief efforts, senior leaders have often struggled to gain requisite resources and expertise due to the absence of a standardized set of U.S. Government guidelines and procedures for coordinating interagency support. Although a formal framework exists for coordinating federal agencies in response to domestic disasters – i.e., the U.S. National Response Framework – there is no such framework for foreign disasters. The following cases illustrate this issue:

Republic of Georgia, 2008. During Operation ASSURED DELIVERY, USEUCOM conducted relief missions to aid some 165,000 displaced persons in the Republic of Georgia – following military conflict between Russia and the Republic of Georgia. USEUCOM was in a support role during the U.S. response led by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/United States Agency for International Development (USAID). No framework was available to delineate roles and responsibilities or to provide coordination points at OFDA/USAID and other agencies. USEUCOM logistics planners therefore had tremendous difficulties determining who the legitimate stakeholders were, what the initial relief requirements were, and where to find potential sources of relief supplies. Working through these issues, USEUCOM logistics leaders went directly to the USAID Director at the Embassy in Tbilisi (via phonecon) to gain insights on anticipated needs. USEUCOM logisticians were then able to utilize
existing automation systems/tools to locate multiple sources of supplies – but only from within Department of Defense (DoD). They had no means/systems/tools for identifying relief supply inventories owned by other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, nor did they have any means to gain information on relief supplies available from international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For the most part, USEUCOM relied on established relationships with individuals in other USG agencies to gain awareness on potential sources of U.S. relief supplies. Also, once OFDA/USAID deployed its Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to Tbilisi – seven days into the operation – USEUCOM tapped this resource to gain critical insights on IO/NGO supply activities. (references 1-2)

Haiti, 2010. During Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, JTF-Haiti (established by USSOUTHCOM) conducted humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in support of OFDA/USAID. In its lead role, USAID stood up the Office for Response Coordination in Haiti, led by Ambassador Lew Lucke. From the outset, however, the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and required capabilities of the lead federal agency were not clearly defined. While USAID had broad authority to coordinate U.S. Government response efforts, there was no instruction for subordinate support relationships or for the division of labor. Also, USAID had few personnel on the ground to execute the robust planning required early in the crisis. JTF-Haiti therefore provided planners to USAID and worked to ensure it was enabling USAID as much as possible. The close proximity of JTF-Haiti to the U.S. Embassy turned out to be a critical factor for facilitating a “whole-of-government” response. JTF-Haiti established its headquarters in a vacant lot right next to the American Embassy, which was also close to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) headquarters. This physical co-location greatly simplified/enhanced communication, coordination, and collaboration. Staff working relationships developed quickly, and these relationships paid large dividends throughout the operation. Additionally, multiple liaison officers provided to/from JTF-Haiti greatly aided coordination and unity of effort. (references 3, 4)

Japan, 2011. During Operation TOMODACHI, the USPACOM-designated Joint Support Force (JSF) provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief support for the Government of Japan. In after action reviews, however, the JSF commander noted that there was no protocol for him to use to request assistance and mobilize support from other U.S. Government agencies that were needed to address key problems, such as the need to measure and model the effects of radioactivity in the sea – a capability that is limited within the U.S. military. Also, several U.S. Government agencies did not have any means in place to respond to requests for overseas assistance, nor was there a framework outlining how these agencies were supposed to organize their efforts in support of the Department of State and OFDA/USAID, which have lead responsibilities for coordinating U.S. responses to international/foreign disasters. Additionally, some initial Japanese requests for U.S. assistance went directly from the Japanese
Self Defense Forces (JSDF) to the Department of Defense – and were not channeled through the Department of State. (references 5-7)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The U.S. Government should establish a formal framework for international/foreign disaster relief operations, much like the U.S. National Response Framework that applies to domestic disasters. As a starting point, the following references are offered:

2. Combatant Commands should conduct periodic/annual HA/DR exercises – with key interagency partners – to develop relationships and refine processes and systems for HA/DR operations.

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of State – Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance
- USAID – Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
- Department of Defense – Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3, J-7

REFERENCES:
(3) “Whole of International Community for Foreign Disaster Relief,” SOLLIMS Lesson 700.
(6) “Operation Tomodachi: Lessons Learned in the U.S. Military's Support to Japan” in LIAISON, volume V/2012, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance staff in collaboration with U.S. Forces Japan and the Center for Naval Analyses, 16 October 2012.
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 18: The “Light Footprint” Approach

INTRODUCTION: The “light footprint” approach (small units/teams partnering with host nation forces and building host nation capacity) has proven to be an effective option for bringing about stability in nations dealing with insurgent threats. It can be argued that the “light footprint” approach has actually been a more effective option in counterinsurgency environments than the use of a “heavy footprint” (large military formations/organizations – conducting operations from multiple bases in the host nation).

- The record shows that the current modus operandi of “going in big” does not work. When it has done so, America has failed in places like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. By way of contrast, there has been considerable success when the U.S. has gone in small to places like the Philippines and Colombia as supporters, trainers, advisors and facilitators rather than as the main effort. (reference 1)

- Inserting large numbers of U.S. forces into someone else’s insurgency is problematic. It raises the specter of imperialism. It creates strong propaganda talking points and recruiting tools for insurgent leaders, and it detracts from the legitimacy of the host government....Large numbers of Americans in foreign, underdeveloped countries can help to create, in David Kilcullen’s apt phrase, the “accidental guerrilla,” who fights not because he or she is a committed ideologue or terrorist, but because foreigners are in his home area. (reference 2)

- U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. (reference 3)

SUMMARY: Use of the “light footprint” approach has achieved considerable success in both the Philippines and Colombia – helping to bring about stability for these nations dealing with insurgent and terrorist threats. This “light footprint” approach has likewise recently achieved many positive results across the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) area of responsibility.

The Philippines. The ”light footprint” of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), combined with a U.S. “whole-of-government” approach, has been an optimal formula for success in the southern Philippines. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report "The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests" states that Joint military activities diminished the
strength of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) from some 1,000 members to less than 400, nearly all key ASG leaders were killed/captured, and the group's religious mission and appeal have waned. In executing this "light footprint" approach, JSOTF-P co-located Special Operations Forces (SOF) detachments with host nation forces on a dozen Philippine military bases and police camps across the southern Philippines. Additionally, U.S. Army Military Information Support (MIST) teams and Civil Affairs (CA) teams were integrated with host nation partners at tactical levels. The MIST teams focused their efforts on atmospherics analysis (to gain insights on the thoughts and concerns of the people), conducted radio messaging, and assessed measures of effectiveness. The CA teams primarily worked on building CA capacity in the Philippine military, which soon became capable of conducting medical, dental, and veterinary civic action programs to aid local communities. JSOTF-P always emphasized a "whole-of-government" approach. Its personnel met on a weekly basis with representatives from the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and the FBI. At three locations in the southern Philippines, JSOTF-P personnel teamed with members of the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which focused on training local law enforcement officials. This teamwork resulted in 1,600 local police officers being trained in 2011 in the province of Sulu. Overall, the improvements in security, information analysis, and CA capacity of host nation forces across the southern Philippines proved critical to the demise of the ASG and other insurgent threats. (reference 4)

**Colombia.** Colombia is another example of a highly successful "light footprint" operation. The single most important element in the Colombian Government’s counterinsurgency strategy against the “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia” (FARC) proved to be the establishment of local security forces. 40-man units – in villages across Colombia – were trained, armed, and equipped as regular/conventional military platoons; they were led by a regular military officer; and, they were progressively fielded to 600 locations across Colombia in accordance with the Joint Command campaign plan. These 40-man local security forces essentially provide a shield behind which governance, rule of law, and economic development could flourish. The United States was instrumental in filling gaps in Colombian military capabilities through materiel, advisors, and tactical training. Embedded advisory teams were typically U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)-led and sometimes included Joint and interagency personnel. Critical to the success of the advisory team effort was the placement of responsibility for training, planning, and executing operations squarely upon the shoulders of Colombian officers and non-commissioned officers: “actively avoiding making clones of the U.S. military and instead working to help Colombians develop and achieve measurable goals and objectives, while retaining their cultural methodology of field operations.” Additionally, the Colombian Government continuously emphasized inclusiveness of local leaders and reassessment of local needs as it successfully executed its counterinsurgency strategy – significantly reducing the size and influence of the FARC nationwide. (references 5-7)
Africa. USAFRICOM has effectively utilized a “light footprint” approach over the past several years to aid multiple nations across its area of responsibility in dealing with insurgent threats. One such mission that has garnered widespread attention is “Observant Compass.” “Observant Compass” was designed to counter the threat of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) across a 4-nation region: South Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In late October 2011, the U.S. Government authorized the deployment of 100 SOF advisors for this mission. This counter-LRA mission includes training, funding, airlift, logistics, communications, and intelligence support.

Another notable USAFRICOM “light footprint” mission involved support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – comprised of forces from Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya. USAFRICOM’s Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) – suited for “light footprint” operations with 200 personnel, organized in 5- to 15-man teams – has provided key training for AMISOM forces, including engineer training, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) training, and training on protection of civilians (PoC). Over the past five years, AMISOM achieved tremendous success – clearing all urban areas of al-Shabaab, drastically reducing its presence in rural areas, and setting the conditions for a new national government to be established. Besides training AMISOM forces, the SPMAGTF also sent small teams throughout 2012 to Botswana, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda to train military units and build/improve their security capacity. (references 8-11).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. DoD should opt for a “light footprint” approach (small unit partnering) in cases where the U.S. military is called upon to assist foreign nations dealing with insurgent threats. Since no two cases are alike, DoD must first endeavor to understand the host nation environment and its “social mentoring” requirements, and then tailor the “light footprint” approach accordingly.

2. DoD should develop, resource, and ensure the readiness of multiple options for future “light footprint” approach contingencies: SOF teams, MIST teams, CA teams, SPMAGTFs, Regionally Aligned Forces (elements thereof), and integrated SOF-GPF teams – as well as combinations of these teams/elements. (references 12, 13)

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of Defense – Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3, J-7, J-8
- Department of Defense – U.S. Special Operations Command

REFERENCES:
(10)”Keys to Success for the African Union Mission in Somalia,” SOLLIMS Lesson 896.
(13)”Expanding Village Stability Operations through SOF-GPF Integration,” SOLLIMS Lesson 968.
(14)”The Case for a light footprint: The international project in Afghanistan,” Astri Suhrke, Chr. Michelson Institute (CMI), 17 March 2010.

STRATEGIC LESSON Number 19: “Blue” and “Green” Forces Operating in Tandem

INTRODUCTION: Coordination mechanisms are imperative when a “Blue” Force (UN peacekeeping force) and a “Green” Force (foreign national force or regional organization force) are operating in tandem. Various operations have shown that if/when these two forces are not aligned under one command, their operations must be planned, coordinated, and synchronized through other means.

SUMMARY: The following operations are illustrative of “Blue” and “Green” forces operating in tandem.
Darfur/Sudan. The African Union-UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) involved “Blue” and “Green” elements operating together as a hybrid force, beginning 31 July 2007. UNAMID was set up to be a 26,000-strong peacekeeping force – deployed and commanded jointly by the UN and the African Union (AU) and assigned the mission to protect civilians and support the peace process. However, UNAMID proved powerless to provide security and protect civilians during its early years, 2007-2010. This hybrid force was frequently targeted by rebels/militias – particularly the Janjaweed – and its operations were also severely restricted by the Government of Sudan. UNAMID’s greatest deficiencies were limited mobility (due to lack of aircraft), poor logistics capacity, and weak command and control. Its peak strength reached only 18,969 – kept low because the Government of Sudan repeatedly rejected offers from certain countries to contribute troops to UNAMID. At the outset of UNAMID’s formation [essentially a transition of forces from the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) into UNAMID], no mission analysis was conducted, no courses of action were developed/analyzed, no task organization was conducted, and no training was provided for the new missions/tasks. The UN and AU should have planned, organized, and prepared UNAMID personnel according to the mission/tasks, threats, terrain, troops available, time, and host nation factors. Likewise, the UN and AU failed to establish an efficient operations center, had no means to gather information or develop threat assessments, lacked capacity and will to establish/enforce “humanitarian corridors” to facilitate delivery of aid to camps/settlements, and did not prioritize areas for civilian protection – all to the detriment of the mission. (references 1-6)

Sierra Leone. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was deployed in July 1998 to support the return of the democratically-elected government of Sierra Leone. Its tasks included: monitoring the security situation, monitoring disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, and monitoring respect for international humanitarian law. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), had already been operating in Sierra Leone, and it was newly tasked to establish security in the country by flushing out the remnants of the AFRC/RUF rebel groups and to conduct disarmament and demobilization. In December 1998, the rebel alliance launched an offensive to retake Freetown and in January 1999 overran most of the city. This led to the evacuation of most UNOMSIL personnel to Conakry, Guinea. Later in January, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and facilitated the return of the civilian government, while the rebels re-positioned into the surrounding countryside. Throughout 1998-1999, cooperation between UNOMSIL and ECOMOG was hampered by lack of standing coordination and liaison mechanisms, which were never put into place. In October 1999, UNOMSIL was succeeded by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was mandated to assist in implementing the newly established Lome Peace Agreement and its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) plan. Several ECOMOG units were “re-hatted” under the new UN force (UNAMSIL); however, they did not receive any training on
UNAMSIL’s mandate or tasks, nor did they receive training on UN Rules of Engagement (ROE). UNAMSIL was formed with no information-gathering or intelligence capabilities, and, resultantly, was taken by surprise by another rebel offensive in May 2000. Fortunately, decisive action was taken to counter the rebels’ gains. In July 2000, India’s contingent launched Operation Khukri to break an RUF siege of Kailahun, where 222 UN troops were essentially held hostage. Then, in August 2000, British forces likewise quickly intervened in response to another hostage situation involving 11 soldiers – defeating a rebel faction called the West Side Boys. By taking decisive action with overwhelming force, this response had the psychological effect of signaling to other rebel groups that the British forces possessed superior firepower and were ready and willing to use it. Sierra Leone’s 10-year conflict soon came to an end. (references 5-9)

**Haiti.** On 14 January 2010, two days after Haiti’s devastating earthquake, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTCOM) established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) to conduct humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in conjunction with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). From the outset, JTF-Haiti’s leaders and planners worked alongside various counterparts from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), focusing on creating a safe and secure environment. Staffs came together and ensured that both organizations’ priorities and workloads were closely aligned. JTF-Haiti’s "Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center" proved to be the key node for facilitating this coordination, as well as collaboration between JTF-Haiti, the UN, and partners. This JTF-Haiti coordination center closely tracked and synchronized the efforts of JTF-Haiti, MINUSTAH forces, the UN humanitarian community, USAID, and a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It was manned by 30 military personnel, including one general officer. This center, and the bulk of JTF-Haiti, operated on unclassified information systems and used commercially available programs/tools to build a humanitarian assistance Common Operating Picture (COP) – allowing current situational awareness for all partners/participants. Additionally, JTF-Haiti and MINUSTAH provided liaison officers across other levels of their organizations – facilitating extensive coordination and unity of effort. JTF-Haiti also worked closely with the UN’s “Coordinating Support Committee” in Haiti (involving host nation ministers and humanitarian agencies) and helped to streamline coordination procedures – whereby requirements could be raised, validated, and quickly passed to the appropriate organizations. In the first few weeks of relief operations, the greatest challenges raised by the Haitian government involved managing, protecting, and providing aid and services for the vast number (over two million) internally displaced persons (IDPs) – especially for those who settled in areas that were prone to flooding. To address this complex problem, JTF-Haiti and USAID worked closely with the UN and the Haitian government to develop and execute a comprehensive IDP strategy. (references 10-12)
RECOMMENDATIONS:

- **Mission/Command.** When a “Blue” Force and “Green” Force are deployed to the same area, an effective liaison mechanism needs to be created – to ensure coordination across all levels and synchronization of priorities and actions. The creation of a Joint Operations Center (comprised of military and civilian staff from both organizations) is recommended, as well as the exchange of liaison officers across their organizations. Leaders should decide upon roles, responsibilities, authorities, priorities, and division of labor between the “Blue” Force and the “Green” Force.

- **Planning.** Recommend the UN refrain from any hasty establishment of peacekeeping forces (such as the way it quickly established UNAMID out of AMIS, and UNAMSIL out of ECOMOG). The UN should instead plan and tailor forces according to the mission, threat groups, terrain considerations, troops available, time, and host nation factors. It should conduct integrated planning with any regional organization (or nation) providing a “Green” Force to work in tandem with the “Blue” Force. They should plan together for the management of IDPs. (reference 13)

- **Structure/Restructure.** Placing units from a “Green” Force (regional force) under a “Blue” Force should not be undertaken unless leaders deem this necessary. Significant problems are likely to arise when units serving under a regional command structure with a different mandate and rules are “re-hatted” and need to adjust/conform to the UN’s mandate, rules, and standards.

- **Training.** Mission-specific pre-deployment training should include the following topics: mandate/mission, background to the conflict, current security environment, ROE, Standard Operating Procedures, Code of Conduct, personal behavior, cultural training, crowd control techniques, Protection of Civilians, route/convoy security, and integrated planning/operations.

- **Intelligence/Information.** A military information cell should be established within the “Blue” Force headquarters (in the Joint Operations Center) – to serve as the focal point for receiving information/reports on threats and for conducting analysis. The Joint Operations Center should build the COP to enable common situational awareness. “Blue” and “Green” forces should utilize an information-sharing system such as SOLLIMS for collaboration. (reference 14)

- **Use of Force.** A “Green” Force in support of a UN peacekeeping mandate has proven to be an effective deterrent to “spoilers” of the peace – particularly if/when the UN mission itself lacks such a deterrent
capability. The “Green” Force assigned this role must be credible and capable of robust enforcement action. It needs to plan/act in close cooperation with the “Blue” Force.

- **Humanitarian Assistance.** The UN should continue the practice of establishing a Coordination Support Committee (host nation government, UN, and humanitarian agency leaders) and should include “Green” Force participation at committee meetings. "Humanitarian corridors" should be established and enforced – covering the main routes that humanitarian relief agencies use for delivery of aid to major sites/camps/settlements, as well as covering the primary routes that IDPs traverse. These corridors/routes need to be cleared of interference from threat groups.

**THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:**
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
- Department of Defense – Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3, J-5, J-7
- USAFRICOM – Deputy Chief of Staff, J-3, J-5, J-7
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)

**REFERENCES:**
(2) “*Humanitarian and Social Welfare: UN Challenges in Darfur,*” SOLLIMS Lesson 679.
(3) “*Neglecting Darfur,*” by Omer Ismail and Laura Jones, Enough, 13 September 2010.
(4) “*UNAMID Background,*” UNAMID – African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur.
(5) “*Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa,*” SOLLIMS Lesson 697.
(6) “*Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa,*” by Paul D. Williams, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010.
(10) “*Whole of International Community' for Foreign Disaster Relief,*” SOLLIMS Lesson 700.
(12)“*MINUSTAH Background,*” MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 20: Resources for Information Gathering and Analysis

INTRODUCTION: It is imperative that forces deployed on stability operations have sufficient resources for “information gathering and analysis” throughout the force structure – and especially at lower levels.

SUMMARY: Stability operations in Afghanistan and multiple peacekeeping operations in Africa have shown the importance of placing robust information gathering elements at the lower levels, supported by information centers at the operational level and by “reachback” centers at the strategic level.

Operating Enduring Freedom (OEF) – Afghanistan. In mid-2010, after years of inadequate situational awareness, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) senior intelligence officer called for a “sea change” in intelligence operations. Deficiencies stemmed from:

- Traditional intelligence systems in Afghanistan were seen as failing the needs of senior U.S. decision-makers. Those systems emphasized threat-focused (“red”) information and paid little attention to population-focused “white” information (about communities, tribes, groups, leaders, etc.). Stability Operations Information Centers were called for and stood-up at the operational level to support this requirement. Additional analysts were needed at these centers and at lower level units. (reference 1)

- Military commanders and local governmental administrators needed a means to understand the social systems of the various communities and tribes, and also a way to understand and predict how military activities would affect those social systems. (reference 2)

- There was a need to “get dirty” and go down to village level, address tribal, clan, even family level concerns. With no formal model/system in place, “valleyism” was suggested – i.e., gaining an understanding of the political, economical, and cultural drivers within each “valley” and local region. There was a need for intelligence and information centers within CONUS to provide reachback support and help determine how to get “village” issues connected to the national system. (references 3, 4)

- “The best and most useful information was coming from the bottom and not from the top.” (reference 5)
- According to a Joint Doctrine Bulletin, “the volume and diversity of information means that the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) needed an intelligence section of sufficient size and quality able to provide the commander with good situational awareness after the information has been processed and analyzed” – yet the PRT intelligence section’s strength was typically one person. (references 6, 7)

- An example of a hard lesson learned was the debacle in Bala Morghab, Badghis Province: “Pay attention to the intelligence effort. Intelligence should drive/influence operations. Indicators and actual incidents of insurgent activity in and around Bala Morghab were repeatedly reported, yet they were ignored – with dire consequences.” 17 killed, 20 wounded, 24 captured. (reference 8)

**Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.**

- In United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone in early 2000, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) nearly collapsed when the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) kidnapped approximately 500 peacekeepers. With no knowledge of the terrain and unfamiliar with the rebels’ military tactics, type of equipment, and intentions, UN troops were completely taken by surprise. After this crisis, UNAMSIL quickly moved to address this deficiency by creating a Military Information Cell at the force headquarters. The Military Information Cell soon established a broad network of information gathering assets/sources – using troop contingents, military observers, civilian personnel, and public information officers deployed all around the country to gather relevant information. The Military Information Cell was integrated into the Joint Operations Center of the mission, which became the central point of contact for information exchanges, reporting, and analysis. (reference 9)

- In the Africa Center for Strategic Studies research paper “Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations in Africa,” Paul D. Williams provides detailed illustrations of peacekeeping and civilian protection problems that took place during operations in Rwanda (1993-1994), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2001-2010), and Sudan (2004-2010), caused in part by the lack of intelligence resources/personnel. He recommends: “Invest in intelligence capabilities. Peacekeeping organizations need to develop efficient forms of intelligence-gathering. The protection of civilians cannot be accomplished without gathering appropriate intelligence on the operating environment and conducting detailed threat analysis.” (reference 10)

- In the case of the UN’s Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), significant improvements were made through the use of Joint Protection Teams. These teams were comprised of civil affairs, human rights, and child protection personnel, and were supported by interpreters. Over 80 such teams were positioned at MONUC’s bases in North Kivu beginning in 2010. Deployed to the field for days at a time, these teams worked to gain an understanding of conflict dynamics, created links between MONUC and the local population, collected data on local environments, and provided early warning of perceived/assessed threats. They provided a steady flow of reliable information in support of MONUC’s planning and operations. (reference 11)
- In April 2013, speakers at the Challenges Forum Workshop in Entebbe, Uganda, described recent experiences by several United Nations missions to correct and strengthen information gathering and analysis. It was suggested that the challenge for information gathering often begins with flaws in planning and priority setting for missions. The information gathering cycle should be driven through targeted priority information requirements (PIR), yet this is not necessarily a tool understood or used by many senior leaders. In many missions, personnel working in Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs) or Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) have had to work extremely hard with senior managers to elicit actionable PIRs (or “what you need to know?”) from the mission leadership to focus information gathering efforts. (reference 12)

Success Stories / Model Approaches:

1st Battalion, 5th Marines in Helmund Province (Afghanistan). The battalion established mini-intelligence shops at lower/company levels. Every night, the battalion intelligence section hosted "fireside chats," during which time subordinate analysts radioed in from remote positions – relaying information gained over the past 24 hours. Information encompassed patrol debriefings, notes of officers who had met with local leaders, observations of civil affairs officers, and human intelligence reports. At the end of the "fireside chats," the battalion intelligence officer assigned subordinates new Intelligence Requirements (IR) for the next day's activities. The focus of those IR started with conditions of roads, bridges, mosques, markets, wells, and key terrain. It gradually shifted to local leaders and residents and their perceptions. It then shifted further to what were called "anchor points" – local grievances and local personalities, who/which, if skillfully exploited, could drive a wedge between the greater population and the insurgents. Identifying and addressing the "anchor points" (or "local irritants") was instrumental to the battalion gaining success on stability operations. (reference 1)

1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment in Nuristan and Kunar Provinces (Afghanistan). The intelligence shop devoted the bulk of its resources to understanding the social relationships, economic disputes, and religious and tribal leadership throughout the local communities. Using this information, the squadron worked to strengthen traditional power structures supported by elders, and deflated local insurgent activity. Whereas more than 30 American and Afghan soldiers had been killed in the five months prior to the squadron’s tour of duty in Nuristan and Kunar provinces, only three deaths occurred over the next 12 months throughout those areas. Relentless engagement with local elders, leaders, and powerbrokers, and pulsing them on issues and irritants, was absolutely critical to success. (reference 1)

Human Terrain System (HTS) – supporting OIF and OEF. In contrast to the work of intelligence assets/organizations (which were collecting and analyzing threat-focused information), human terrain teams (HTTs) were deployed to conduct "social science" research and gain insights on local population groups – to better enable planning activities and decision-making. The HTTs placed their emphasis on operationally relevant aspects of local
cultures; on the various ethno-religious, tribal, and other divisions within society and their sentiments; and, on the multiple interests of population groups and leaders. The HTS Reachback Research Center (composed of cells at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and at Newport News, Virginia) provided invaluable support to deployed forces – one cell supporting the HTTs in Iraq, and the other supporting the HTTs in Afghanistan. (reference 4)

**Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).** U.S. Army Military Information Support (MIST) teams and Civil Affairs (CA) teams were integrated with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units, predominantly at the tactical level. The MIST teams focused their efforts on radio messaging, atmospherics analysis (to gain insights on the thoughts and concerns of the people, especially about the government and its security forces), and on measures of effectiveness. The CA teams concentrated their actions on building AFP capacity to support the needs of local communities. As a result of these combined efforts, not only did JSOTF-P and the AFP gain far greater situational awareness, but also the AFP developed CA assets capable of planning, resourcing, and conducting civic-action programs for the benefit of local communities – increasing support to the AFP. (reference 13)

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. Establish robust information gathering and analysis mechanisms – focused on the population – to provide forces/commanders of peacekeeping and stability operations with a comprehensive understanding of the operating environment. Models for consideration are highlighted above.

2. Information collected at the ground level – from patrols, CA teams, force protection teams, MIST teams, human terrain teams, reconstruction teams, key leader engagements, etc. – should be given the greatest attention in peacekeeping and stability operations/environments. The preponderance of information and intelligence resources should be focused at this level, with sufficient analysts deployed at this level to manage PIR, IR, collection activities, de-briefings, analysis, and dissemination. Although "tactical" in nature, this information is absolutely vital to the production of accurate "operational" and "strategic" intelligence. (reference 1)

**THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:**
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, G-3/5/7
- Department of Defense – Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-2, J-3, J-5, J-7
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)

**REFERENCES:**

3. "Defining, or Re-defining, the Role of Strategic Intelligence during Stability Operations," SOLLIMS Lesson 753.
(4) "Improved Situational Awareness from Human Terrain Teams," SOLLIMS Lesson 776.
(5) "Intelligence Sharing," SOLLIMS Lesson 602.
(6) "Information Management in Provincial Reconstruction Teams," SOLLIMS Lesson 448.
(8) "Failure of the Top-Down Approach in Afghanistan," SOLLIMS Lesson 775.
(10) "Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa," Paul D. Williams, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010.
(11) "Information Gathering, Intelligence, and Threat Analysis for Civilian Protection," SOLLIMS Lesson 699.

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>COL Jody Petery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Operations Division</td>
<td>COL Robert Balcavage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Lessons Learned Branch</td>
<td>Dan French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons Learned Analyst</td>
<td>Dave Mosinski</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disclaimer: All content in this document, to include any publications provided through digital attachment, is considered unclassified, for open access. This compendium contains no restriction on sharing / distribution within the public domain. Existing research and publishing norms and formats should be used when citing "Strategic Lessons" content and any publications provided.

Contact us at:
usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.sollims@mail.mil
Comm: 717.245.3031
DSN: 242.3031