Lessons inside include:

- Economic Strategy for Harnessing the Private Sector
- Building Effective and Accountable Security Ministries
- Implementing an “Anti-Corruption” Strategy
- “Social Mentoring” – Understanding the People, Engaging Local Groups
- Civ-Mil Cooperation
- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
- Planning for an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Program
- Developing Host Nation Police Forces
- Developing Host Nation Ministers and Ministerial Staff
- The “Essentials” of Transition
Foreword

Welcome to this 1\textsuperscript{st} edition (Summer 2012) of \textit{STRATEGIC LESSONS in PEACEKEEPING \\& STABILITY OPERATIONS!}

This publication is designed to provide senior leaders and their staffs with key lessons – at the strategic level – from recently conducted peacekeeping and stability operations (P/SO).

These lessons have applications for the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense (DoD), and numerous other U.S. Government departments and agencies – including the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

These lessons are based on the analysis of multiple entries within the Stability Operations Lessons Learned \\& Information Management System (SOLLIMS) \textcolor{red}{(https://sollims.pksoi.org)} as well as various reference documents specified under each lesson.

Each strategic lesson is presented in the following format:

- Introduction
- Summary
- Recommendations
- This information may be of interest to: (named organizations)
- References

We hope you take the “Recommendations” as “food for thought” as you engage in the complex business of developing plans/strategies for future peacekeeping and stability operations – and when formulating policies, programs, and resource allocation strategies.

The lessons are meant to be brief – but please let us know if you would like us to provide further information on any given topic.

Thanks for your interest!

Rory Radovich
Chief, PKM Division
U.S. Army PKSOI
- An economic strategy for harnessing the private sector, building a “culture of business,” and sustaining market development is critical for post-conflict environments. [Read More …]

- Building effective and accountable security ministries (Interior and Defense Ministries) is essential for attaining long-term security in conflict-affected nations. [Read More …]

- Developing and implementing an “anti-corruption strategy” is essential for achieving host nation government legitimacy and long-term stability in conflict-affected nations. [Read More …]

- “Social mentoring” – understanding the people, engaging local groups, and encouraging local ownership – must be at the forefront of all stability operations. [Read More …]

- “Civ-Mil Cooperation” – particularly between DoD and USG agencies – is a strategic imperative for successful stability operations. [Read More …]

- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program success is heavily dependent upon the full commitment of national authorities and the empowerment of an overarching executive authority. [Read More …]

- Planning for and resourcing an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) program should provide for maximum cooperation among NGOs and governmental agencies – both military and civilian. [Read More …]

- Developing Host Nation (HN) police forces is an essential element of stability operations – requiring specialized capacity (i.e., trained and ready forces/advisors able to teach/train police skills and behaviors), long-term investment, and locally coordinated programs. [Read More …]

- Developing HN ministers and ministerial staff is an essential element of stability operations. This process requires long-term investment, locally coordinated programs, and in-depth mentoring. [Read More …]

- An analytical review of recent lessons reveals certain “essentials of Transition – key considerations for facilitating hand-off from intervening authorities to the HN government. [Read More …]
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 1: An economic strategy for harnessing the private sector, building a “culture of business,” and sustaining market development is critical for post-conflict environments.

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent publications and lesson reports on economic programs in stability operations (including Iraq and Afghanistan) indicates a critical need for greater U.S. private sector involvement in such operations. This review also highlights the importance of crafting/improving U.S. Government economic strategies and mechanisms to generate greater private sector involvement.

SUMMARY: The failure to deliberately plan and create an environment that encourages business initiatives, employment, and economic growth will tend to sustain dysfunctional economic practices in post-conflict nations. In nations emerging from conflict, a top priority must be to create jobs – to generate employment and consumer spending in the near term. The economic reforms that should follow – which are numerous – should aim at strengthening marketplace activity and developing the host nation’s private sector (Refs 1, 5, 8 & 9).

The U.S. private sector was not extensively harnessed – especially early on – in planning and executing post-conflict economic development for neither Iraq nor Afghanistan. Many U.S. corporate leaders, although willing to launch business ventures in various other high-risk and emerging markets, perhaps lacked a sufficient framework for understanding and assessing the political and market dynamics of Iraq and Afghanistan – critical data for considering and developing similar ventures for those countries (Refs 3, 4 & 6).

Over the past two years, greater U.S. economic investment in Afghanistan has been encouraged and facilitated by the DoD Task Force for Business & Stability Operations, which had previously made positive impacts for the economy of Iraq (Ref 1). The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) (an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) has also made several noteworthy contributions in Afghanistan (Refs 2 & 5).

In contrast, two important U.S. Govt stakeholders for economic development have not been able to play a significant role in stability operations in neither Afghanistan nor Iraq: the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Both organizations bear responsibilities for promoting the integration of U.S. businesses with foreign partners and fostering the integration of host nations into the global economy (Refs 3, 4 & 6).

Finding the “right” foreign partners/entrepreneurs is critical, as is “partner empowerment” through capital and business advisory services – as illustrated by numerous cases in Afghanistan (Refs 1 & 2).
A uniquely positive example of large-scale private sector investment facilitating growth and stability in a conflict-affected state is that of Addax Bioenergy’s involvement in post-conflict Sierra Leone. In this case, a “renewable energy and agriculture project” was carefully designed and implemented under various institutional frameworks to create a “win-win-win” situation for the investor, the local communities, and the national economy of Sierra Leone. A central part of the investment strategy was the inclusion of local communities early on and often (Ref 7).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Establish a U.S. Government mechanism (potentially under the National Security Council) to develop and oversee economic strategies that encourage U.S. corporations to invest in post-conflict host nation communities and businesses – as part of and in support of a more global stability operations program.
- Provide a framework to aid U.S. corporate leaders in understanding, assessing, and operating in the host nations (mitigating risk).
- Include and empower Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, and other financial institutions with this USG mechanism.
- Draw upon the lessons from the Task Force for Business & Stability Operations (in Iraq and Afghanistan) and from Addax Bioenergy (in Sierra Leone) to shape this USG mechanism and associated national economic strategies, processes, and procedures.

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- National Economic Council (NEC) Director / Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
- Department of State – Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
- Department of Defense – Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation
- United States Agency for International Development – Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade
- United States Chamber of Commerce – Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)
- Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) – Global Business Development Division / Export Finance Group
- Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) – Investment Funds Department

REFERENCES:
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 2: Building effective and accountable security ministries (Interior and Defense Ministries) is essential for attaining long-term security in conflict-affected nations.

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent publications and lesson reports on Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs in stability operations occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that there is a need to shape host nation (HN) security ministry counterparts from the outset. Strategic action to shape the HN security ministries is but one vital component of rebuilding the entire security enterprise.

SUMMARY: In post-conflict interventions, building the capacity of the Interior and Defense Ministries must be a priority effort of SSR. It is imperative that a strategy be developed early on for understanding, improving, and tracking these ministries – which are responsible for overseeing national police/internal security forces and national defense forces. Key elements of such a “ministerial shaping strategy” can be gleaned from the United States’ struggle to reform Iraq’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Here, U.S. failure to make a comprehensive assessment of the MOI, to develop a vision for the MOI, and to send a cadre of trained/experienced advisors to mentor & partner with senior Iraqi ministers perpetuated a dysfunctional MOI and delayed progress to establish security (Refs 1 & 2).

In contrast to shortfalls in Iraqi SSR, the U.S. Department of Defense went to great lengths to specifically address building capacity for Afghanistan’s security ministries in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) – through the creation of the
Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program in 2009. This program carefully paired senior-level DoD civilian specialists/advisors with select officials in the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoI. For the first iteration of the MoDA program, 17 senior DoD civilians deployed in the summer of 2010, were embedded into the MoD and MoI, and advised Afghan officials on specialized areas such as logistics, financial administration, and human resources (Refs 2 & 3). The pay-off was significant: “an absolute game-changer,” according to the top U.S. training officer in Afghanistan (Ref 4). Due to the success of that initial wave in helping to shape/improve processes & procedures, and with the support of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, there are now over 60 such advisors in Afghanistan – shaping the national security ministries and facilitating lasting effects through ministerial manpower development programs (Refs 2, 3 & 5).

Analysis shows that the national security ministries and the national security forces must grow/develop simultaneously – through recruiting commands, training commands, leadership programs and policies put into place & monitored by the ministries. Along these lines, extending ministerial reach and advisory assistance beyond the national level – to provincial and local levels and to fielded units – is a necessity. During OIF, an effective method for extending reach was the ‘circuit rider’ model – where national level advisors took deliberate steps to visit lower levels every 6-8 weeks (Refs 2, 3, 6 & 7).

Finally, analysis shows that security ministries must be shaped through development of effective & accountable internal processes to reduce the impact of corrupt actors. National ministries are a start point, yet the whole security sector must be shaped simultaneously for success (Refs 2, 6 & 8).

RECOMMENDATIONS:
- Institutionalize the MoDA program in DoD.
- Build a “ready capacity” by maintaining a pool of trained/ experienced advisors not only in DoD, but also in other departments/agencies – personnel who could be deployed at the outset of future stability operations – to help shape HN ministries.
- Beyond embedding the advisors at the national level, establish procedures to extend advisory assistance out to lower levels.

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of Justice – Office of the Deputy Attorney General
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- United States Agency for International Development – Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade
- Department of the Treasury – Office of International Affairs
- Department of Agriculture – Foreign Agricultural Service
FINAL THOUGHT/QUOTE:
“One reality is that we came to the table too late. Our military and contract work in both nations [Afghanistan and Iraq] would have been greatly enhanced if we’d had a civilian program like this [MoDA] in place from the very beginning. That’s why we need to institutionalize this capability, so that in the future, we can be on the ground in year one.”

LTG William B. Caldwell IV
“Advisory Program Marks One Year”
American Forces Press Service,
U.S. Department of Defense, 12 August 2011

REFERENCES:
(2) “SOLLIMS Sampler – Building Capacity,” PKSOI, 12 January 2012
(7) “Rule of Law Activities: Lessons Learned,” Thomas Dempsey, PKSOI Perspectives, 30 July 2009

STRATEGIC LESSON Number 3: Developing and implementing an “anti-corruption strategy” is essential for achieving host nation government legitimacy and long-term stability in conflict-affected nations.

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent publications & lesson reports on the challenges of corruption (and efforts to address corruption) during stability operations indicates that there is a need to develop a comprehensive “anti-corruption strategy” from the outset. This review also highlights the importance of taking a holistic approach to fighting corruption through the inclusion of key host nation (HN) institutions and major donors. Requirements for transparency, for communication to the public on how resources and finances are being managed, and for anti-corruption education for both HN civil servants and foreign nation stability practitioners (civilian and military) are also apparent in this review.
SUMMARY: Little regard was given to addressing corruption in Afghanistan during the 2002-2006 timeframe, with adverse consequences for both HN governmental legitimacy and stability operations in general (Refs 1-4). Thanks to the work of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its partners, an Anti-Corruption Roadmap was published in April 2007. It included a comprehensive assessment of corruption in Afghanistan and a number of recommendations on how to effectively fight it. Principal causes of corruption were identified: inflows of international assistance and insufficient accountability, inadequate systems to detect/prosecute/punish corrupt practices, patronage networks, and the opium economy. That UNDP roadmap/strategy led to the following positive developments: establishment of a High Office of Oversight and Anti-corruption (HOO) by the Afghan government in August 2008, publication of an “Anti-Corruption Strategic Plan” by HOO, creation of a Complaints Office and a Fraud Investigation Unit in the Ministry of Finance, and the integration of anti-corruption training into leadership training programs for Afghan civil servants (Refs 4 & 5).

Additionally, initial efforts were taken to build-up a watchdog capability of civil society actors and the media – to provide visibility on money flows. Such transparency and “access to information” for the public have been cited as key elements of anti-corruption strategies in other post-conflict nations, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia – whereby an active citizenry was able to hold public officials accountable for the allocation, utilization, and management of resources (Refs 4, 5 & 6). Recognizing that vast sums of donor resources were a known contributor to corruption, the UNDP brought together the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Union, and various individual nations in formulating the anti-corruption roadmap – which rightly stressed oversight & accountability of aid (Refs 4, 5 & 7).

Along with the UNDP, another key player in anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan has been the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)-Shafafiyat, established by the Department of State in late 2010. CJIATF-Shafafiyat has made notable inroads on reducing corruption – working closely with the HN Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Defense, along with a number of other partners – by tackling corruption & organized crime issues during forums, helping its partners develop governmental reforms, and encouraging anti-corruption training for not only HN civil servants, but also for foreign nation stability practitioners (civilian and military) (Ref 8).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- The Department of State, working with other USG stakeholders, should develop an “anti-corruption strategy” as part of the overall stability and reconstruction strategy, from the outset of future stability operations in which the U.S. is involved. This strategy should incorporate the participation of key HN institutions and major donors.
• In execution, it may be prudent to establish a Combined Joint Interagency Task Force chartered with influencing and developing rule of law activities throughout the HN – with emphasis on anti-corruption efforts.

**THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:**
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of Justice – Office of the Deputy Attorney General
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of the Treasury – Office of International Affairs
- United States Agency for International Development – Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade
- Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Shafafiyat

**REFERENCES:**
(1) “Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan,” Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), February 2012
(2) “References” collection on the SOLLIMS Counter-Corruption Portal
(4) “SOLLIMS Sampler – Fighting Corruption,” PKSOI, 11 April 2011

**STRATEGIC LESSON Number 4:** “Social mentoring” – understanding the people, engaging local groups, and encouraging local ownership – must be at the forefront of all stability operations.

**INTRODUCTION:** An analytical review of recent publications and lesson reports on stability operations points to the importance of investing in “social mentoring” during both planning and execution of operations. This review also highlights the importance of bottom-up approaches, “shaping” the people at the local/community level, and gaining their buy-in.
SUMMARY: To ensure success in stability and counterinsurgency operations such as those conducted in Afghanistan – where there is a plethora of ethnic groups, tribes, sub-tribes, clans, etc. – U.S./coalition forces must invest in understanding, engaging, and co-opting local groups (Refs 1-10). U.S./coalition forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have experienced major shortfalls at times in cultural understanding. Evidence of the need to understand the people and their sensitivities is the fall-out/backlash from two recent incidents in Afghanistan – urination on dead bodies (Jan 2012) and the improper destruction of Qurans (Mar 2012). Failure to “know” the people, “shape” the people, and gain their trust/sympathy has also led to cases of operational failure, increased instability, and loss of life. A prime example is the case of the Focused District Development Program Morghab District, Badghis Province, Afghanistan – whereby Afghan government officials and coalition planners took no account of the concerns of the people and instead pushed a national police program and a transportation project onto the local community – resulting in armed resistance, conflict, and fatalities (Ref 2).

Calls to address shortfalls in cultural understanding and situational awareness have emerged over time in Afghanistan – first with Operational Needs Statements for the Human Terrain System (HTS), and later with recommendations for making intelligence more relevant. Once the HTS was established in 2007 and Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) began to filter into Iraq and Afghanistan, situational and cultural awareness for commanders began to improve. HTTs on the ground, with support from two stateside HTS Reachback Centers, were able to gather and present data to commanders about the various social and cultural aspects of many local population groups and the drivers of their behaviors (Refs 3 & 4). While the HTS was gaining traction, traditional intelligence systems in Afghanistan were still seen as failing the needs of senior U.S. decision-makers – according to a January 2010 paper co-authored by the U.S. Army’s senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan. His bottom line recommendation was a call to shift emphasis from solely threat-focused (“red”) information to gaining greater (“white”) information on population centers, groups, and leaders (Ref 5).

Likewise, understanding, engaging, and including local groups – at the community/village level – has repeatedly been cited as paramount for effective reconstruction activities (Refs 1, 2, & 6-8). In the first years of reconstruction in Afghanistan, several governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN agencies, and financial institutions laid out plans and proposals for economic reconstruction without consulting local communities on their needs and priorities – with poor results. Over time, when teams were deliberately dispatched to local communities to identify their needs – e.g., the U.S. National Guard’s Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs), teams from the World Bank-led National Solidarity Program, etc. – greater successes were achieved, because local villagers then invested resources in, and took ownership of, projects (Ref 7). The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) (an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) operated much the same way in
successful economic stabilization programs in both Afghanistan and Kosovo – conducting detailed studies of the private sector early on and partnering with local groups and entrepreneurs.

Understanding and engaging local communities was key to success for CIPE, the ADTs, the National Solidarity Program, and also for certain Afghan NGOs, such as the Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) and the Sanayee Development Organization (SDO). Outcomes of such local programs included expanded development activities, greater community cohesion, and lower levels of violence (Refs 6, 7, & 11).

Besides direct engagements with local communities (to discern their needs and involve them in reconstruction activities), the dissemination of positive themes and messages through information operations (IO) has also been cited as critical for “shaping” the people and garnering their support (Refs 10, 12 & 13).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Continue to resource the HTS.
- Incorporate HTTs in the planning and execution of future stability operations.
- Emphasize the collection and analysis of “white” information to better understand the people.
- Employ programs that focus on the needs of local communities and on ensuring local ownership (e.g., ADT programs, National Solidarity Program, etc.).
- Establish robust systems for IO.

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G2
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- United States Agency for International Development – Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade

REFERENCES:

1. “Planning Considerations for Military-Political Engagement in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 669
2. “Failure of the Top-Down Approach in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 775
3. “Improved Situational Awareness from Human Terrain Teams,” SOLLIMS Lesson 776
5. “Afghanistan: Making Intelligence Relevant,” SOLLIMS Lesson 680
6. “Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 529
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 5: “Civ-Mil Cooperation” – particularly between DoD and USG agencies – is a strategic imperative for successful stability operations.

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent publications and lessons learned reveals that “civ-mil cooperation” – though often challenging to build and sustain – is absolutely essential for executing the complex work of stability operations. Employment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), leaders’ emphasis on “unity of effort,” and the use of unclassified information-sharing systems have all proven to be key enablers for building/sustaining civ-mil cooperation on several recent stability operations.

SUMMARY: Despite recognition by the U.S. military, U.S. Government civilian agencies, and non-governmental organizations of each others’ importance in achieving success on stability operations, numerous obstacles to “civ-mil cooperation” persist – owing largely to their differences in missions and organizational cultures (Refs 1-3). The U.S military and its partners, however, have come to recognize that the “comprehensive approach” (an approach that brings together the efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities based on commonly understood principles and collaborative processes, towards a shared goal) can help overcome those cultural obstacles and lead to mission success.

During the January 2007 to December 2008 timeframe In Iraq, deliberate execution of the comprehensive approach was critical to achieving stability and laying a strong foundation for host nation governmental legitimacy and transition.
Likewise, since late 2009 in Afghanistan, deliberate attention on the “comprehensive approach” by a small interagency (IA) team at U.S. Embassy Kabul – the Civ-Mil Plans and Assessments Sub-Section (CMPASS) – has helped to focus civ-mil relations across the board in Afghanistan toward a singular goal – building Afghan capacity. CMPASS, comprised of State Department and U.S. military members, has been in continuous collaboration with the USAID Stabilization Unit, has worked closely with ISAF – the Afghan Assessments Group, the Commander’s Initiative Group, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Stability, and others – to ensure that civ-mil plans and perceptions are mutually shared, and has played a central role in all Interagency Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills – synchronizing planning and resource allocation toward meeting the objectives of the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan (Refs 8 & 9).

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the employment of PRTs has been a quintessential example of the necessity for interagency cooperation. Throughout the first years of employment in both theaters, hard lessons were learned with regard to IA member selection, integration, training, command & control (C2), planning, and conduct of operations with adjacent & higher maneuver forces. Over time, improved pre-deployment training, information-sharing (between PRTs & maneuver forces), integrated planning (incorporating civilian and military components), C2 adjustments, and emphasis on “unity of effort” contributed to greater efficiencies in PRT operations and greater effects for host nation governance, development, and stability – both in Iraq and Afghanistan (Refs 2 & 10-14).

Finally, recent stability operations – particularly the humanitarian assistance / disaster relief operations conducted in Haiti and Japan – have validated the need for unclassified information-sharing platforms to facilitate civ-mil cooperation and maximize situational awareness (Refs 2 & 15-18).

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Institutionalize the PRT either as an Army or Joint organization. Although the IA positions in the PRT most likely would not be filled on a permanent basis, they should be filled at least for training events.
- Consider aligning a number of PRTs to geographic regions – perhaps in parallel with regionally aligned brigades.
- Codify the PRT training program.
- Emphasize “unity of effort” in all pre-deployment training activities and all planning efforts.
- Designate unclassified information management systems/architectures (e.g., SOLLIMS, APAN, etc.) to support stability operations (especially for, but not limited to, humanitarian assistance / disaster relief operations) – so that military, IA, NGO, and multinational participants can share and collaborate on unclassified (not sensitive) information.
THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G3
- Department of the Army – Deputy Chief of Staff, G6
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- USAID – Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade

REFERENCES:
(2) SOLLIMS Sampler – Civ-Mil Cooperation, PKSOI, 3 April 2012
(3) “Ensuring Civ-Mil Integration & NGO Input in USG Peace & Stability Operations,” SOLLIMS Lesson 423
(4) “Civil-Military Cooperation, Comprehensive Approach, and Force Protection,” SOLLIMS Lesson 734
(5) “Comprehensive Planning within Task Forces and PRT Operations,” SOLLIMS Lesson 447
(6) “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI, October 2009
(12) “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Regional Command-East (Operation Enduring Freedom-VIII),” COL Sean W. McCaffrey, 23 March 2009
(13) “PRT & Brigade Task Force Unity of Effort,” SOLLIMS Lesson 749
(15) “Whole of International Community for Foreign Disaster Relief,” SOLLIMS Lesson 700
(16) “Haiti Earthquake Response – Information Collection, Sharing, and Management,” SOLLIMS Lesson 681
(17) “Operation TOMODACHI Findings,” USPACOM J71, 26 September 2011
(18) “Operation TOMODACHI AMC Lessons Learned,” Army Materiel Command (AMC), 28 July 2011
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 6: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program success is heavily dependent upon the full commitment of national authorities and the empowerment of an overarching executive authority

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent publications and lessons learned reveals the importance of establishing a national-level DDR program at the outset of stability operations, garnering the full commitment of national authorities for program resourcing and implementation, and empowering an overarching executive authority to direct the program. Regional initiatives that meet the spirit/intent of the program should be encouraged, rather than stifled. Amnesty – even if temporary – can be a major motivator for former combatants.

SUMMARY: When a DDR program is established, it is important to designate/empower an overarching executive authority to direct the program. An overarching executive authority is needed to prioritize activities, allocate resources, provide socio-economic support to reintegrating fighters, foster cooperation, harmonize efforts, monitor progress and encourage actors toward proper implementation. The national authorities of the host nation (HN) need to be fully supportive of both the DDR program and its executive authority. Otherwise, the DDR program may stall or fail (Refs 1-4).

Such a lack of national support and consequent failure of DDR has been evident in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) – a DDR program established in mid-2010 – actually experienced significant initial success in the northern part of the country (2010-2011) – where Regional Command-North teamed with Afghan provincial leaders to quickly and aggressively implement this program. Because they took prompt action, rapidly built trust with local leaders, allocated/advanced resources for demobilization and training, provided various employment opportunities, launched comprehensive information operations, and granted amnesty and forgiveness where ever possible, RC-North and its HN partners were able to convince large numbers of combatants to sign up for and process through the program. Amnesty was cited as the greatest motivator, and the prospect of employment named as a contributory factor, in interviews with former combatants. However, the APRP slowed down after the first year of implementation in northern Afghanistan, and it fared poorly across the other regions – primarily because Afghan national authorities deliberately stonewalled the program (Refs 5-9).

DDR played out much the same way in Iraq four years earlier. In the northern part of Iraq, during the 2007-2008 timeframe, Multi-National Division North (MND North) developed its own DDR program – in the absence of any nationally-based
program. Transitioning insurgents/combatants signed a pledge upfront that they would cease attacks against security forces. Under the conditions that they had not participated in any recent attacks and were not identified in any current Iraqi arrest warrants, they were then accepted into the DDR program. In turn, coalition forces pledged to not target these individuals. Instrumental for gaining interest/drawing applicants into this DDR program was the use of information operations (often used in concert with conventional operations). However, DDR program momentum was soon hindered by the lack of national support; without nationally-driven employment programs, options to integrate former fighters back into society were limited, and DDR slowed markedly (Ref 10).

In the case of Liberia, on the other hand, during the aftermath of civil war (2003-04), the United Nations, the United States, and the leaders of Liberia’s transitional government attained success in executing the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) program. Keys to this success were launching the program as quickly as possible, persisting with the program in spite of one early setback (riots at one of the DDRR sites), providing simple monetary compensation for arms/ammunition surrendered, offering transitional employment opportunities to reintegrating personnel/ex-combatants, and granting “temporary amnesty” – a major driver for motivating the former fighters to show up at the DDRR sites. Designation of a National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) as executive agent for the DDRR program and ensuring that this executive authority had the full backing of Liberia’s national authorities were also keys to success (Refs 11 & 12).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Develop a “strategic framework for DDR” that can be utilized in future post-conflict environments. [2006 S/CRS guide (Ref 3) could be used as base document, but requires updating]. Incorporate the following elements into the framework:
  - establishment of a national-level DDR program,
  - assurance of national-level commitment,
  - designation of an overarching executive authority to run the program,
  - space for regional/provincial execution,
  - provision for granting amnesty (e.g., temporary amnesty, conditional amnesty, etc.),
  - development of nationally-driven employment programs, and
  - the use of information operations to inform and influence former fighters/combatants.
- Additionally, designate ministerial advisors from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice to work with the HN executive authority to keep the DDR program on track.
THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of Justice – Office of the Deputy Attorney General

REFERENCES:
(1) “Essential Components of DDR,” SOLLIMS Lesson 589
(2) “USIP-PKSOI Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI, October 2009
(4) “Socio-Economic Reintegration and Livelihoods,” Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), April 2012
(5) “Bottom-Up Approach to Reintegration in Northern Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 778
(7) “Strategic Support to Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2001-2010,” The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), January 2012
(8) “Healing the Legacies of Conflict in Afghanistan: Community Voices on Justice, Peace and Reconciliation,” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), January 2012
(9) “Peace & Reintegration: An Introduction,” CFC, April 2012
(10) “DDR Initiative in Northern Iraq,” SOLLIMS Lesson 774
(11) “Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform,” SOLLIMS Lesson 703

STRATEGIC LESSON Number 7: Planning for and resourcing an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) program should provide for maximum cooperation among NGOs and governmental agencies – both military and civilian.

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent publications and lessons learned indicates that the managing of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) – whether due to conflict operations or natural disasters – will pose significant challenges and place a heavy burden on military forces charged with conducting stability operations. Plans and resources for effectively managing IDP need to be developed early and made readily available to NGOs, Host Nation agencies (if existent and functional), and military forces responsible for DPs. The presence
of IDP can have a significant, negative impact on the operational mission if not properly predicted and planned for; DP camps can easily become a recruiting ground for insurgents; DP camps will quickly consume welfare/humanitarian assistance commodities/quantities, in excess of the need, if not properly managed. For military forces, the ability to work hand-in-hand with NGOs and Host Nation agencies will determine the success or failure of any IDP programs; failure may compromise the operational mission as well.

SUMMARY: Whether conducting conventional “offense/defense” operations, COIN, stability operations, or disaster response/relief operations, commanders can expect that there will be IDP in their operational area that need to be contended with. Staff planning efforts need to acknowledge and predict how significant the presence of IDP will be – the impact on the Head of Mission (HOM) goals, the impact on the deployed forces’ mission and the impact on the societal critical infrastructure – the presence of IDP can quickly and completely disable other operations.

Factors that will play a vital role include:

- Registering and tracking ‘occupants’ of DP ‘camps’ – DP camps are not “come as you like” facilities; they require controlled access. Management need to be tracking arrival, births, deaths (burial grounds, treatment/marking of unidentified remains), and possible marriages – depending on duration of ‘occupation’;
- The ability to search for family members – communications must be available both within and across all camps if multiple camps exist; combined with registering/tracking, priority of effort should be to re-unite families; this is also way to find indigenous “professionals” (Ref 1) to help reconstitute the societal infrastructure and energize economic stability and growth – i.e. business/management, medical admin/doctors/nurses, government services, educators, musicians and other cultural professionals;
- Daily life in camps/Sewage, Water, Electrical Power, Academic, Trash, Telecoms (SWEAT-T) need to be in place; shelter construction, health services, food – storage, security, distribution; status of primary and secondary Lines of Communication (LOCs) – roads, rail, waterways – lakes, rivers, streams, airports;
- Create a safe and secure environment; presence, mission, cooperation of HN, UN, other military or police security forces (SSR concept and implementation); trust and confidence will draw IDP to controlled camps; left with little oversight, DP camps can become “ethnic” camps which may produce or result in “gang-war” phenomenon – may lead to ethnically related mass atrocities.

Some displaced individuals/families may opt to go and live with relatives or friends once they have been uprooted from their homes. Coalition, NGO and Host Nation agencies will lose oversight of these / this group of IDP which often
include much of the ‘talented’ professionals in the displaced community; results in a hindrance to economic growth; absence from the work force keeps them individually and collectively in a state of poverty – counterproductive to coalition and HN goals (Ref 1).

Emigration / “reuniting” is an additional big concern – you cannot just ‘let them go’. Emigration – to what? They may have no ‘home’ to go to – additional need to provide for shelter, water, food, etc during resettlement. Proof of ownership will pose significant challenges as property lines, markers, documentation may have been destroyed. Ensure a safe and voluntary return (Guiding Principles); resettlement plans must preclude the development of religiously based or ethnic cartels that may want to practice “ethnic cleansing”.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
- Develop expectation of the occurrence of IDP; develop programs accordingly;
- Engage / implement IDP programs and resources as soon as possible (during conflict, post conflict, pre/post disaster); form Civ-Mil teams / plan early and often;
- Preposition resources and capabilities (SWEAT-T) within theater whenever possible;
- For conflict/post-conflict related situation, design programs to minimize likelihood that conflict will continue/resume;
- “Understand the situation on the ground” (Ref 4).

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of Defense – USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, and other GCCs
- United Nations – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)

REFERENCES:
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4) “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI, October 2009
5) “Economic Development and Displaced Persons,” SOLLIMS Lesson 456
6) “Humanitarian and Social Welfare: UN Challenges in Darfur,” SOLLIMS Lesson 679
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 8: Developing Host Nation (HN) police forces is an essential element of stability operations – requiring specialized capacity (i.e., trained and ready forces/advisors able to teach/train police skills and behaviors), long-term investment, and locally coordinated programs.

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent publications and lessons learned reveals the importance of developing/improving HN police forces – so that the HN government can adequately transition and take over responsibility for security. By default, the U.S. military has generally assumed the lead role for guiding/shaping/developing HN security (and police) forces during recent stability operations, with other players contributing to varying degrees on these efforts. However, shortfalls in U.S. strategy and capacity to deploy police trainers have hindered U.S. efforts to develop HN police forces and effect transition. As well, failures to involve local communities in police reform have caused setbacks.

SUMMARY: Today there is no single U.S. Government agency with a definitive lead role for conducting foreign police training and assistance, nor in charge of U.S. standing capacity to accomplish same. Instead, numerous agencies become involved in the development, bidding, and awarding of contracts for police trainers when requirements emerge for stability operations. It then takes considerable time to put those contracts into place and yet more time for the contracted trainers to be identified, prepared, and deployed to the area of operation – leaving the U.S. military as virtually the only viable option to assist HN police forces not only at the outset of an intervention, but also for months on end.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) created the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) to train and equip Iraqi police forces. Through contracts, DynCorp International provided 690 police personnel, and Military Professional Resources Inc. provided 192 police personnel, to execute the CPATT tasks of HN police assessment, training, and mentoring. Once contracts were in place, execution proved problematic. The contracted police trainers were often not able or willing to operate in non-permissive areas because of restrictions/ clauses in their contracts. The training of Iraqi police personnel was then confined to the capital city or to secure areas – leaving unsecured, more remote areas of the country without critically needed police trainers and mentors and, most importantly, a HN police force to deal with HN criminal activity.
In both OIF and OEF, contracted training teams often failed to distinguish between "stability policing" and "community-based policing" functions. "Stability policing" takes place upfront in stability operations – to deal with high-end threats such as criminal groups, insurgent/terrorist cells, organized looting, and large-scale riots. Commonly a military force, complemented by "stability police," is required to re-establish local security. In both OIF and OEF, however, the complement of local police forces to assist was not always present, or when it did exist, it was incompetent, corrupt, and ethnically motivated. "Community-based policing," on the other hand, is the police work of finding out what law enforcement problems exist in local communities and helping communities solve them. HN police reform in this area was lacking.

In both OIF and OEF, U.S. police assistance strategy focused heavily on establishing a centralized police academy – where new or recycled (former) police officers primarily received training on basic police/law enforcement skills. These academies did provide a dose of instruction on respect for human rights, acceptable interrogation techniques, rights of individuals under HN laws, and proper police behavior; however, many HN police officers relapsed into their former organizational cultures, values, or attitudes after a few months on the job. A sustained effort to shape the organizational culture of HN police did not occur (Refs 1-3).

In the 2009-2010 timeframe, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) made a concerted effort to embed U.S. advisors with Afghan police and security forces. The shaping of HN police organizational culture was positively impacted by having U.S. and Afghan personnel physically working together. Also, in the fall of 2009, ISAF initiated the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. One aim of VSO was to develop effective local security forces / the Afghan Local Police (ALP) for selected villages of Afghanistan, particularly in remote areas. Special Forces VSO teams achieved numerous successes with this program, especially when they established and leveraged close relationships with the village elders (Ref 4).

A prominent example showing the dangers of failing to coordinate with local communities is Bala Morghab, Afghanistan. Here, HN authorities, in coordination with Coalition forces, dispatched a new cadre of academy-trained HN police forces to provide a visible security presence in Bala Morghab – unannounced. Local groups resisted in force. Casualties mounted, and instability grew (Ref 5).

A viable option for guiding/shaping/developing HN police forces is to use UN elements. Recent successes include the International Police Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) – complex operations in which the UN elements effectively transformed HN police forces (Refs 6 & 7).
RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Place Department of State in the lead for developing a U.S. strategy for building police capacity for future U.S. interventions.
- In Department of Defense, prepare U.S. military forces (e.g., Military Police elements, Advise and Assist Brigades, Special Forces, etc.) to be able to execute both “stability policing” and “community-based policing” missions.
- Build upon the VSO concept for the purpose of tailoring police reforms to match local conditions/needs (while aligning efforts with the HN’s national programs).
- Strengthen and leverage the UN capacity to deploy police forces for international operations; consider involving U.S. military observers on such police missions.
- Plan and invest for the long haul – to shape the organizational culture of HN police forces for lasting effects (Refs 8 & 9).

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

REFERENCES:

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(3) “Achieving Immediate Developmental Change in Host Nation Police,” Colonel Richard Megahan, Implementing Security Sector Reform: Security Sector Reform Workshop Interim Report, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and PKSOI, 4 December 2008
(4) “Village Stability Operations: Leveraging Elders and Building Local Police,” SOLLIMS Lesson 768
(5) “Failure of the Top-Down Approach in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 775
(6) “The IPTF in BiH,” 2nd Lieutenant Alexis Clement, SFOR Informer #90, 21 June 2000
(7) “Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform,” SOLLIM Lesson 703
(9) “U.S. Military Observers on United Nations Field Missions,” SOLLIMS Lesson 777
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 9: Developing Host Nation (HN) ministers and ministerial staff is an essential element of stability operations. This process requires long-term investment, locally coordinated programs, and in-depth mentoring.

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent publications on mentoring HN ministers during stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that advisors serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) often create a “culture of dependency” within local governments. The “culture of dependency” impedes the transition of governing responsibilities from PRTs to HN ministers and their staffs, thus, undermining the local population’s confidence in their government. This report highlights the need for, and importance of, long-term mentoring of HN ministers.

SUMMARY: One of the challenges that civilian mentors faced during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was that military agencies, which were also conducting ministerial advising, often implemented short-term projects in comparison to the long-term civilian-led projects. Because the military projects tended to be short-term, they would often plan and implement projects independent of the HN ministers. This would undermine the civilians’ attempts to mentor the HN ministers and their staffs. For example, if PRT mentors were encouraging HN ministers to take the lead on a project, the military would often intervene to help. The preemptive role of the military undermined the mentoring of HN ministers and often caused the local population to lose confidence in their HN government. Instead of meeting with their local ministers, Iraqis would go to PRTs to settle disputes, petition the government, and promote new projects (Ref 1).

The U.S./coalition forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have faced similar shortfalls when transitioning governing responsibilities from PRTs to local ministers. Namely, the local HN governments cannot adequately meet their governing responsibilities, such as providing their province with waste disposal, schools, a fair judicial system, and electricity (Ref 2). This causes the HN government and local population to become dependent on the PRTs. To ensure the success of future stability operations, the U.S./coalition forces must partner with local ministers on projects from the onset of an operation. Studies indicate that effective local governments in Afghanistan reduced narcotics trafficking, promoted economic growth, and lowered the prevalence of violence (Refs 3 & 4).

The transition of governing responsibility in Iraq was complicated by five main factors. First, civilians on PRTs were deployed for less than a year. Second, civilians on PRTs were given up to three months of vacation during their tours. The short duration of tours and frequent vacations prevented U.S./coalition mentors from gaining the trust of the local population and monitoring their projects. Third, toward the end of the civilian surge, PRT mentors tried to train HN ministers by giving them long-term projects; the military, however, continued
working on short-term projects (Ref 1). The civilian long-term and military short-
term projects had conflicting objectives. This caused friction between the
mentors and military personnel on PRTs because PRT mentors wanted to hand
off governing responsibility to the HN ministers by assigning them long-term
projects. The military wanted to implement short-term projects that could be
achieved during their tour. To finish the projects quickly, the military often had to
work independently from the HN local government. Many civilian mentors
assailed the lack of coordination between the military and HN ministers, arguing
it undermined the HN government’s ability to self-govern. Fourth, often it was
easier for the U.S./coalition forces to govern the province than let the local
ministers govern themselves (Refs 5 & 6). And fifth, civilian mentors lacked the
leadership skills necessary to run PRTs. PRT civilians, particularly Foreign
Service Officers (FSO), were unprepared to work in war zones because they
lacked combat training.

RECOMMENDATION: To build HN ministerial capacity, the U.S./coalition forces
should: 1) minimize the negative impact of PRT mentors’ vacations during their
tours, 2) start leadership training programs for FSOs, and 3) coordinate military-
and civilian-led projects in post-conflict zones.

- PRT mentors’ vacations should not be counted toward their mission time.
  Namely, the minimum 12 month deployment should be extended to 15
  months with three months factored in for vacation. Moreover, PRT
  mentors’ vacations should be taken after the 12 month deployment to
  minimize the negative impact of leaving their HN ministerial counterparts.
  Ultimately, this will help PRT civilian members become more effective
  mentors. To continue attracting qualified civilians, additional benefits can
  be given to PRT employees, such as a monetary equivalent to three
  months’ pay if they are willing to forego their vacation.
- The Department of State should institute leadership training programs for
  FSOs. Many FSOs lacked the leadership skills to organize and
  implement projects in a conflict zone. To address this shortcoming, the
  Department of State should adopt leadership training programs similar to
  the ones used by the Army.
- The civilians and military on PRTs should consolidate their community
  building plans to deconflict short- and long-term projects. Within a region,
  civilian and military projects must complement each other so that a
  common objective is achieved. Furthermore, community projects should
  be delegated to civilians or the military based on which branch of the PRT
  is best-suited to complete the project. For example, if a region wants to
develop a water-treatment facility, civilians should work with HN ministers
to plan and implement the project; whereas, the military should help with
security and other short-term projects. The HN component should be the
dominant effort.
It is important to recognize that it is better for the HN to do something tolerably than for the U.S. to do it well.

**THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:**
- Department of Defense – Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- United States Agency for International Development – Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade
- Department of Agriculture – Foreign Agricultural Service

**FINAL THOUGHT/QUOTE:**

“We have seen progress in the capacity of Afghan institutions to provide services; however, the low baseline of Afghan capacity means significant work remains. We recognize that a long-term commitment to governance in areas such as civil service and public administration reform is needed for transition to succeed.”

Ambassador Marc Grossman
U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

**REFERENCES:**

4. “Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations,” SOLLIMS Lesson 504
5. “Sequential Timetables for End Goals in Stability Operations in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 471
STRATEGIC LESSON Number 10: The “Essentials” of Transition

INTRODUCTION: An analytical review of recent lessons reveals certain “essentials” of Transition – key considerations for facilitating hand-off from intervening authorities to the host nation (HN) government.

SUMMARY: Experts agree that there is no specific set of end goals that will fit all Transition situations. However, one prominent goal for Transition is that the post-conflict nation should possess a level of resilience to handle any future setbacks. Such HN resilience requires “success factors” – which primarily revolve around good governance and HN capacity to handle national affairs. “Success factors” include:

- The structure of the government has been agreed to by its society; governance is stable.
- The government is able to provide reasonable, reliable services for its citizens.
- The government is being utilized to solve political disputes.
- The government is able to protect its borders, its citizens, and its national treasures.
- The government has demonstrated an ability to uphold the rule of law.
- The economy is stable; the government is able to provide regulation of the markets.
- The government has gained commitments of support for development efforts (Refs 1-3).

To maximize HN attainment of these success factors, it is imperative that the HN gain control – and gain proficiency – in the many sectors/functions that the intervening authorities (external nations/forces) have been managing. This transfer is a gradual process that requires careful planning by the intervening authorities and then close partnering with HN officials. An excellent example of this process comes from the UN contingent operating in Liberia in 2008. Aiming toward Transition, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) shifted its role from "leading" the delivery of services (security, reconstruction, social services, etc.) to "enabling" the Government of Liberia to take the lead. Primary measures used by the UNMIL Force in this "enabling" approach were: encouraging all external players to help the host nation take the lead, inserting HN officials into the approval process and life cycle for all projects and services, conducting comprehensive information operations (IO) to improve the public's perception of the HN government, and ensuring extensive civil-military coordination throughout the process (Refs 4 & 5).

Extensive civil-military coordination was also central to Transition efforts in Iraq. The Crocker-Petraeus Joint Campaign Plan established key civil-military “coherence” in planning, execution, assessment, and adaptation. Given this strategic guidance for Transition, U.S. military staffs worked jointly with the U.S. Embassy to analyze all lines of operation in effect – determining whether each task, program, project, and relationship run/managed by U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I)
should be terminated, completed, transitioned to the Government of Iraq, or transformed into a U.S. Embassy responsibility. This detailed staff work identified over 1,500 functions/activities for transfer to other (non USF-I) entities. Transition in Iraq was bolstered by a strong signal of U.S. commitment in January 2007, as President Bush announced that the U.S. would help the Iraqi government take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces (Refs 6-8).

Similar signals of U.S. commitment have now been sent for ongoing Transition in Afghanistan. On 2 May 2012, U.S. President Obama and Afghan President Karzai co-signed an “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement.” Then, on 7 July 2012, President Obama officially designated Afghanistan as a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States. Also, on 8 July 2012, during the “Intervention at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan,” Secretary of State Clinton announced major U.S. and international commitments to Transition in Afghanistan – emphasizing sustained economic support and private sector investment. Such strong signals of support and economic pledges are absolutely critical for Transition. They reinforce HN governance/legitimacy and solidify development and stability efforts (Refs 9-11).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Place Department of State in the lead for developing a plan/template for Transitions – which the Embassy Team, in conjunction with U.S./coalition forces in-country, can tailor to specific circumstances. Include “success factors” for host nation resilience in the Transition plan.
- During any given Transition, bring HN officials into the approval process and life cycle for all projects and services, incorporate IO to improve public perception of the HN government, and ensure extensive civil-military coordination throughout transition activities.
- At the national level, work closely with the international community, and send strong signals of support for the HN government and HN society.

THIS INFORMATION MAY BE OF INTEREST TO:
- Department of State – Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
- Department of Defense – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

REFERENCES:
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(2) “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” USIP and PKSOI, October 2009
(3) “Interagency Handbook for Transitions,” COL Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, 4 November 2011
(4) “Enabling Transition in Liberia through Civil-Military Coordination,” SOLLIMS Lesson 773
(5) “SOLLIMS Sampler – Transition to Local Governance,” PKSOI, 26 October 2010
(6) “Iraq’s Lessons for Transition in Afghanistan,” LTG James M. Dubik (Ret) and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, 15 November 2010
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(9) “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” 2 May 2012
(10) “Remarks with Afghan President Hamid Karzai – by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,” 7 July 2012
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(15) “Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of War,” Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), 15 June 2012

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

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