FOREWORD


The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related Lessons Learned report, and (4) links to additional reports and other references that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Protection of Civilians available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as civilian practitioners with a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed into conflict environments, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lessons Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title (Topic)
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section. This is used by the author to provide additional personal perspective on the lesson.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account.
in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or to the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. **By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson.** We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor to the SOLLIMS Community of Interest.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products that we provide for the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our web site at [http://pksoi.army.mil](http://pksoi.army.mil) and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [https://sollims.pksoi.org](https://sollims.pksoi.org) to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

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U.S. Army Specialist Joseph Barbato, 2-113th Infantry Battalion, New Jersey National Guard, patrols the streets in the village of Orgun, Paktika Province, Afghanistan, 10 July 2011. The purpose of the mission was to provide security for the Paktika Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which supports stability operations in the village. (isafmedia)
INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the January 2013 edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Lessons Learned “Sampler.” This publication provides an Update on the topic of Protection of Civilians.

Protection of Civilians was the subject of our very first Sampler – published in June 2010. Since that time, the peace and stability operations community has made considerable progress in addressing and documenting the many the issues involved in this complicated subject. The community has published several important resources on protecting civilians over the past 2½ years, including:

- “UN Protection of Civilians (POC) Resource and Capability Matrix for Implementation of UN Peacekeeping Operations with POC Mandates,”
- “UN Protection of Civilians Training,”
- “Conflict Trends: Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping in Africa,”
- “ATTP 3-37.31: Civilian Casualty Mitigation,” and

In this current Sampler, please see the “Related Documents, References, and Links” section, where we have provided links to these and other resources.

Additionally, this current Sampler has been timed to coincide with the publication of another key document: “The Protection of Civilians (PoC) Military Reference Guide” – a collaborative effort between the Stimson Center and PKSOI – due out in January 2013. We hope you’ll find both publications to be “value-added” as you contemplate civilian protection efforts for future missions.

On any given peacekeeping and stability operation, civilian protection may prove vital to mission success. Actions such as command attention, soldier training, lessons learned, and corrective actions aimed at eliminating civilian casualties may become necessities – as highlighted recently during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF):

Eliminating civilian casualties is a difficult task, requiring constant command attention. I expect commanders at all levels to place as high a priority on it as I do. It is a command responsibility to reinforce, refresh and review training of and for subordinates on a regular basis, identify failings and take corrective action.

(COMISAF’s Tactical Directive, 30 November 2011)

Along with OEF, this Sampler highlights a number of recent operations within USAFRICOM’s area of responsibility – offering various insights, observations, and best practices on the Protection of Civilians. Key recommendations from these lessons are captured in the Conclusion paragraph.
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Sampler “Quick Look” – Protection of Civilians

Click on [Read More ...] to go to Sampler topic.

- The imperative of protecting civilians should be at the forefront of every peacekeeping and stability operation. [Read More ...]

- Every civilian protection situation is unique. Every situation involving mass killings/atrocities presents its own unique characteristics with regard to the operating environment, the perpetrators of the atrocities, their motivations, and their actions and behaviors. [Read More ...]

- The protection of civilians is a critical issue in African security… Two of the main challenges to civilian protection in Africa have been: (1) a lack of appropriate resources for peacekeeping and (2) political challenges stemming from insufficient commitment by nations/states and organizations. [Read More ...]

- The Satellite Sentinel Project [Sudan] demonstrated that satellite imagery – in the hands of humanitarian organizations – provides a new way of making the world a witness to major threats to civilian populations. [Read More ...]

- Operation Unified Protector [Libya] demonstrated that NATO can be an effective organization for preventing humanitarian catastrophe – when there is a call for such intervention within its area of interest. [Read More ...]

- The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has achieved notable success in Somalia after 5+ years operating in that country – owing especially to the composition of the force, its training & discipline on reducing civilian casualties… [Read More ...]

- Lessons from Afghanistan suggest that placing a focus on the international force’s operating procedures is insufficient with regard to protecting civilians in cases where the environment has a major insurgent threat. [Read More ...]

- Security for aid workers in Afghanistan continues to pose a major challenge to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). [Read More ...]
Subject: SOLLIMS REPORT – PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

1. GENERAL

Civilian protection efforts have gained considerable momentum over the course of recent peacekeeping and stability operations. United Nations and African Union peacekeeping forces engaged in missions across Africa, as well as the International Security Assistance Force working to bring stability to Afghanistan, have recognized more and more the importance of civilian protection efforts. Accordingly, these international organizations and international forces have implemented an array of new policies, programs, strategies, and tactics for the sole purpose of improving civilian protection and reducing civilian casualties.

This report provides a selection of current lessons from the SOLLIMS database – highlighting the growing importance of civilian protection, its challenges for international forces, and the various actions they have taken to enhance mission success.

2. OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

a. TOPIC. The Imperative of Protecting Civilians (901)

Observation.

The imperative of protecting civilians should be at the forefront of every peacekeeping and stability operation. Although many international missions have not been mandated or sufficiently resourced to meet this imperative, experience has shown that populations can turn against the foreign force (stabilization force) when they perceive that they are not being adequately protected by this force.

Discussion.

Recent stability operations – particularly Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and UN-sponsored operations across several African nations – highlight the importance of dedicating attention and resources to the Protection of Civilians (PoC) and civilian casualty (CIVCAS) mitigation.
- Afghanistan. In mid-2011, U.S./coalition forces recognized that insurgent groups were able to gain strength and that the coalition’s freedom of action could be curtailed as a result of CIVCAS incidents – especially when these incidents were caused by coalition weaponry, when they were highlighted by international media, and when they took on political/propaganda dimensions. Insurgent groups often moved quickly to use these incidents to turn local communities against the coalition. To reverse this trend, General Allen, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), issued a “COMISAF’s Tactical Directive” on 30 November 2011 – calling for a more judicious application of force, Soldier discipline, tactical patience, and regular reinforcement training – guided by Rules of Engagement (ROE). An OEF CIVCAS Smart Card and an OEF CIVCAS Handbook were rapidly produced to facilitate training and awareness across the force. Greater attention was also placed on the use of non-lethal weapons, when such use was feasible. As a result, CIVCAS incidents attributed to IFOR markedly declined in 2012 – improving IFOR’s credibility and enhancing stability efforts. (Refs 1-5)

- Democratic Republic of the Congo. Two major events caused widespread grievances among Congolese citizens in the 2008-2009 timeframe: (1) the mass killing of civilians by the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) in late 2008 when the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) did nothing to intervene, and (2) large-scale civilian casualties, civilian displacement, and mass rapes caused by MONUSCO and host nation forces during their joint operation “2009 Kimia II.” After these events, numerous humanitarian organizations called for an overhaul of MONUSCO’s conduct. In response, MONUSCO took deliberate, innovative steps to rectify matters and alter the public’s perception. It first established Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) to help prevent mass atrocities, instituted Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) at company and platoon levels to support protection activities, and then introduced Community Alert Networks (CANs) around its military bases. Additionally, MONUSCO undertook comprehensive information operations, which proved critical for assuring the public of improved protection measures. (Ref 6)

- Ivory Coast. In late March 2011, the forces of competing presidential candidates (incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and opposition leader Alassane Ouattara) fought without restraint and without any respect for international humanitarian laws – in spite of the presence of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) – resulting in civilian massacres in several towns, as well as maiming, rapes, and other atrocities. The UN was widely criticized for not acting to stop the carnage. UNOCI troops have since been labeled as “foreign invaders” by former president Gbagbo, who has called on supporters to target them, resulting in increased violence against UNOCI. Discredited and condemned by half the population, UNOCI remains ineffective – without adequate resources to enforce the peace agreement or to protect civilians, even though it is mandated to do both. (Ref 6)
- Somalia. In late 2010 and early 2011, during intense urban operations conducted by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against the Al-Shabaab Islamic group – primarily in the capital city (Mogadishu) and in southern Somalia – over 1,000 civilians were killed, 6,000+ were injured, and well over 100,000 were displaced. In early 2011, AMISOM’s presence began to be questioned by many Somalis – due what they perceived as indiscriminate shelling (artillery and mortar fire) of populated areas by AMISOM, compounded by aggressive propaganda efforts from Al-Shabaab. After receiving directives from both the African Union and the UN, AMISOM quickly instituted an array of new measures in the May-July 2011 timeframe for the sole purpose of preventing civilian casualties and enhancing respect for International Humanitarian Law. Key AMISOM actions were the adoption of an Indirect Fire Policy, the establishment of a cell to track incidents of civilian harm, and specific training on how to avoid civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur. Significant progress has since been made by AMISOM with respect to CIVCAS mitigation, resulting in rising public support and notable mission success. (Refs 6-8)

Recommendation.

1. Mission/Command emphasis. Ensure that PoC and CIVCAS mitigation are designated as priorities for future peacekeeping and stability operations. (Refs 4, 9)

2. Resources. Ensure that peacekeeping and stability forces are adequately resourced to protect civilians. (Refs 10-12)

3. Training. Ensure that peacekeeping and stability forces receive pre-deployment training on PoC and CIVCAS mitigation. (Refs 4, 7, 10-13)

4. Discipline. Ensure that leaders instill discipline in Soldiers, guided by ROE, for purposes of PoC and CIVCAS mitigation. (Refs 4, 7)

5. Non-lethal weapons. Incorporate the use of non-lethal weapons into CIVCAS mitigation strategies. (Ref 5)

6. Partnering and community involvement. Involve host nation security forces and local communities in PoC efforts. (Refs 4, 6)

7. Information operations. Conduct comprehensive information operations to keep the public informed of PoC and CIVCAS mitigation efforts. (Refs 1, 6)

Implications.

Host nation populations can quickly turn against the foreign force (stabilization force) if they perceive that they are not being adequately protected by this force.
Event Description.

This lesson is based on the following REFERENCES:


b. **TOPIC.** Information Gathering, Intelligence, and Threat Analysis for Civilian Protection (699)

**Observation.**

Every civilian protection situation is unique. Every situation involving mass killings/atrocities presents its own unique characteristics, with regard to the operating environment, the perpetrators of the atrocities, their motivations, and their actions and behaviors. Likewise, every atrocity situation requires a tailored response. Information-gathering, intelligence, and threat analysis are therefore critical functions to set the stage for all civilian protection operations, as well as to provide situational awareness to commanders and their forces throughout those operations.

**Discussion.**

Peacekeepers cannot protect civilians without developing accurate threat assessments of who is committing the atrocities, how they are doing it, what is motivating them to do it, and how they are supported. In most peacekeeping cases in Africa, a host of violent actors have been present within the operational area. Among them are armed groups, militias, and criminal gangs – each having their own particular agendas and patterns of behavior. In Africa at least, militias and criminal gangs have been the most responsible for the commitment of mass killings and other atrocities against civilians. In Rwanda’s genocide, for instance, the bulk of the atrocities were carried out by militias and criminals.

To gather this information about violent actors, as well as other data on the operating environment, peacekeepers in Africa have attempted to tap an array of sources. Those sources include members of the local population, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), relief agencies, security firms, and host nation security forces.

An excellent example of deliberate/systematic information-gathering to provide awareness for a peace operation is the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (MONUC’s) Joint Protection Teams. These teams are comprised of civil affairs, human rights, and child protection personnel, often supported by interpreters. More than 80 of these teams were deployed to MONUC bases in North Kivu during the first six months of 2010. Deployed for up to five days at a time, these teams had the roles of gaining an understanding of conflict dynamics, creating links between MONUC and the local population, collecting data on local environments, and providing early warning of any perceived/assessed threats.
They provided a wealth of information to support MONUC planning and execution.

A certain type of threat that has been common to Africa is one termed the "opportunistic rebel group." This is an insurgent organization that enjoys access to a substantial flow of economic endowments – either domestic resources or those provided by an external patron. The economic endowments provide the means for, and serve as the catalyst for, the group to initiate violent acts/campaigns. The "opportunistic rebel group" recruits individuals who are interested only in short-term material gains (and a perpetuation/cycle of short-term material gains), rather than having interest in supporting any particular ideology/cause. The "opportunistic rebel group" is more likely to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence than other threat groups in African scenarios. A prime example of an "opportunistic rebel group" was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone – which was responsible for over 40,000 violations/atrocities suffered by victims between 1991 and 2000. Generally, when dealing with the "opportunistic rebel group," proactive forms of coercion have been the only means to stop their activities.

Another type of threat that has been common to Africa has been the host nation governments, armed forces, and security forces. For example, Congolese government forces have committed as many, if not more, abuses against civilians than the rebel groups have. In mid-2009, a MONUC human rights team developed a list of 15 Congolese Army members with records of gross violations of human rights – documented by MONUC over several years time. Since many of these perpetrators belonged to the 213th Congolese Army Brigade, MONUC suspended further support to that particular brigade. Another striking example of host nation violations has been that of the Government of Sudan and its armed forces – which have been plaguing UNAMID's civilian protection efforts and have been committing atrocities/killings for the past several years.

It is often a tremendous challenge for peacekeepers to identify, analyze, and track the multitude of threats within their operating environment. In eastern DRC alone, there are 20 armed factions which MONUC attempts to keep visibility on. Within Darfur, UNAMID has identified over two dozen armed factions. The potential list of threatening actions/behaviors to track and analyze includes: offensive overflights/bombings, violence from host nation groups, violence between threat groups, shootings of civilians, physical assaults against civilians, harassment of civilians at checkpoints, harassment along routes of travel, violations against civilians in and around IDP camps, violations against civilians at markets, the capture of and the destruction of civilian property, gender-based violence, and the recruitment and use of children.

Another significant challenge is determining the motivations of the threat groups. Some groups often deliberately target segments of the population for political
and/or economic reasons. For example, in Sudan and the DRC alone, nearly 35,000 civilians have been massacred since 1990, primarily for political and economic reasons/gains. Other threat groups are driven by motivations that range from attempting to capture state power, to trying to gain control of a certain segment of territory, to simply attempting to accumulate material resources.

Along with identifying threat groups and determining their motivations, it has been imperative for peacekeepers in Africa to assess where to provide civilian protection – particularly because the assets available to peacekeepers to carry out civilian protection tasks have been so limited. A positive example, however, in meeting this assessment challenge comes from MONUC, which has developed three protection categories for this purpose:

- "must protect" areas, where MONUC troops should be physically present with a base deployed to the area
- "should protect" areas, where MONUC troops should be physically present if the resources are available, and, if not, MONUC troops should at least conduct regular patrols to those areas
- "could protect" areas, where MONUC troops should carry out patrols, especially on market days

Additionally, peacekeepers in Africa have had the challenge of conducting predictive analysis – assessing which threat groups are likely to commit killings/atrocities, where they would likely do it, when they would likely do it, how they would likely do it, and how (the friendly/peacekeeping force's) potential civilian protection actions and response options would likely affect the behaviors of the threat group(s). What will stop any on-going atrocities? What will deter future killings? Intelligence personnel with analytical skill-sets are best suited for this analytical challenge/task. Typically, peacekeeping forces in Africa have lacked intelligence units and intelligence-gathering capabilities.

**Recommendation.**

1. Establish an information-gathering mechanism prior to conducting civilian protection operations – in order to provide peacekeeping forces and commanders with a full understanding of the operating environment, including information about its threat groups. A model for consideration is the MONUC's Joint Protection Teams (information-gathering teams).

2. Pay particular attention to identifying "opportunistic rebel groups" (during peace operations in Africa) and to tracking their activities. These groups have been the most prevalent in committing indiscriminate killings and atrocities.

3. Make an assessment of priorities for where civilian protection ought to be provided. A model for consideration is MONUC's "must protect", "should protect", and "could protect" areas.
4. Conduct comprehensive and predictive threat analysis. Such analysis should address threat patterns of behavior, assess likely threat activities/atrocities, and analyze the likely effects of friendly/peacekeeping force actions on threat group behavior.

5. Provide peacekeeping forces with intelligence capabilities. Intelligence personnel with analytical skill-sets are particularly important for conducting predictive analysis.

**Implications.**

If peacekeeping forces are not structured with information-gathering assets and with intelligence units/teams, and if peacekeeping forces do not take deliberate steps to assess priorities for civilian protection and to predict threat activities, then civilians within the operating area will not be protected to the degree that they should be.

**Event Description.**

This observation is based on the research paper “Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa,” by Paul D. Williams, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010.

**Comments.**

Two articles which discuss resourcing shortfalls and political challenges to the United Nations-Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), are: (1) "Neglecting Darfur" by Omer Ismail and Laura Jones, Enough, 13 September 2010, found at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/neglecting-darfur and (2) "Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success?", by Abdelbagi Jibril, Human Rights and Advocacy Network for Democracy (HAND) Briefing Paper, Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, July 2010.

c. **TOPIC. Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa (697)**

**Observation.**

The protection of civilians is a critical issue in African security, as there has been tremendous loss of life in conflict zones spanning the continent. Nearly 600,000 civilians have been massacred in 27 African countries over the past two decades. Two of the main challenges to the civilian protection agenda in Africa have been: (1) a lack of appropriate resources for peacekeeping and (2) political challenges stemming from insufficient commitment by nations/states and organizations. Various other obstacles have compounded these two main problems. Concrete strategies and definitive operational guidance for the use of force to enhance civilian protection have not been adequately addressed.

**Discussion.**

In most peace operations in Africa, a lack of appropriate resources has severely hindered peacekeeping forces and their civilian protection efforts. The numbers of troops and police personnel deployed have been far too low in any number of instances/missions. For the African Union/United Nations (UN) Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the actual size of the force was 15,130, whereas the required size should have been about 40,000. For the UN Mission in Sudan, the actual size of the force was 10,025, in comparison to a required size of 40,000. Likewise, for the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the actual size of the force was 6,000, in comparison to a required size of 20,000. In these three cases, the size of deployed peacekeeping force was far below the size of the largest indigenous armed force/threat. When additional forces were requested by UN force commanders on the ground, the UN had great difficulty raising and deploying additional forces, and required numbers were not attained.

Besides suffering from low numbers of peacekeeping personnel, peace operations in Africa have also been handicapped by a lack of specialized units – engineers, medics, intelligence personnel, special forces, interpreters, etc. – as well as by shortfalls in vehicles, communications equipment, and logistical support. A dire example of such deficiencies occurred during the first few days of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. When confronted with a decision over whether to conduct a certain protection mission, Force Commander Dallaire of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) “had to balance the risk of the operation against the fact that UNAMIR had no medical safety net and a lack of ammunition.” 15 years later, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was suffering from similar problems. Likewise, in mid-2008, in the wake of an ambush in Darfur that killed 7 UNAMID peacekeepers and wounded 22 others, Henry Anyidoho, a UNAMIR veteran and the deputy political head of UNAMID, identified the problem as “the failure of the international community to
Another main challenge to civilian protection – besides inadequate resources – has been political challenges arising from various nations/states and organizations not committing to the cause (of peacekeeping and civilian protection). In many of Africa’s contemporary conflicts, the host governments themselves have often orchestrated many of the crimes perpetrated against civilians, have denied entry to peacekeepers, and have obstructed their work. The Government of Sudan would not allow access to its province of Darfur for many years and frequently created major obstacles to UNAMID’s protection activities. In both Chad and the DRC, the respective host governments told the UN to withdraw peacekeeping operations well before their missions were completed, with no other credible local security force in place to protect civilians. Other political challenges have included some governments’ interpreting the peace operation mandate differently than other governments or even to the detriment of the intent of the mandate, differing cultures/values of contributing nations’ peacekeepers, and low risk thresholds on the part of certain national contingents. For instance, during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, a UN force commander expressed his frustration through this cable:

“The [country x] contingent commander has consistently stated he is under national orders not to endanger his soldiers by evacuating Rwandese. They will evacuate expatriates but not local people. His junior officers have clearly stated that if they are stopped at a roadblock with local people in the convoy, they will hand over these local people for inevitable killing rather than use their weapons in an attempt to save local people.”

In regard to these political challenges, a key shortfall has been the lack of translating peace operation mandates into concrete strategies and into definitive operational guidance for peacekeepers. Planning efforts have lacked good analysis as to who should be protected (in priority), the identification of who/what/where the primary threats are, and the development of appropriate tailored responses for mass killings and other threat activities.

Every civilian protection situation in Africa has been unique, and the conflict zones have been extremely complex and fluid. These conflict zones have been populated by multiple armed groups, militias, and criminal gangs, many of which lacked clear or effective chains of command. In eastern DRC alone, analysts have identified nearly 20 armed factions. In Darfur, UNAMID has identified over two dozen armed factions. These groups have often targeted certain vulnerable population groups, and these groups have often demonstrated distinct patterns of behavior.

Various strategies and tactics can be taken against these groups, including both offensive and defensive. Peacekeepers have rarely employed offensive
strategies in Africa, but one positive example occurred in 2005 when United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) troops conducted cordon-and-search operations which resulted in the forcible disarmament of some 15,000 combatants in Kivus. Defensive strategies have been much more common. One positive example took place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in late November 2006 after Laurent Nkunda’s [National Congress for the Defense of People] threat forces had prevailed against DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) resistance and advanced on Goma, the region’s main city. Through a successful defensive strategy, however, MONUC troops beat back Nkunda’s forces using infantry and attack helicopters, killing 200-400 of his troops, and protected this vital area and its civilians.

Undoubtedly, one of the most dangerous but potentially effective approaches is for peacekeepers to take action to defeat perpetrators. An excellent example of the benefits of this approach occurred in late 2000 when British forces in Sierra Leone defeated a rebel faction known as the West Side Boys. By taking decisive action to rescue a group of British soldiers held hostage and to defeat their captors (elements of the West Side Boys), this action had the added psychological effect of signaling to other rebel groups that the British forces possessed superior firepower and were ready and willing to use it. Within a year, Sierra Leone’s 10-year conflict came to an end.

**Recommendation.**

1. Prioritize civilian protection – by stating exactly which individuals and groups are to be protected under the mandate/mission. Peacekeepers should assign the highest priority to “one-sided violence” – stopping any large-scale massacre (occurring outside of war/combat). Peacekeepers should deploy to "must protect" areas where the threat of massacre is high – such as by internally displaced persons (IDP)/refugee camps or vulnerable settlements – and they should establish a credible deterrent at those areas. The second highest priority should be protecting civilians from falling victim to criminal and unorganized violence carried out by random individuals, bandits, and criminal gangs, especially in areas where such violence has frequently occurred.

2. Send adequate numbers of peacekeepers for any civilian protection mission. One rule of thumb is that between 2 and 10 troops are required for every 1,000 inhabitants within a crisis zone. A second (better) rule of thumb is that the civilian protection force should be at least the size of the largest indigenous armed force. Ensure peacekeepers are adequately equipped with specialized units – engineers, medics, intelligence personnel, special forces, interpreters, etc. – and adequate vehicles, communications equipment, and logistical support, as determined through the planning process for the given situation.

3. Develop accurate threat assessments of who is committing the killing/atrocities, how they are doing it, where they are doing it, and how they are
supported. To gather this information, peacekeepers need to tap local sources, NGOs, and other international agencies operating in the environment.

4. When atrocities take place in a country where peacekeepers are already present, emphasis must be placed on deploying assets to “must protect” areas and on using military power (including, if necessary, military force) to create effects on the ground that stop any ongoing atrocities and deter future ones.

5. When atrocities take place in the absence of peacekeepers, the rapid deployment of sufficient numbers of well-equipped troops who have received individual and collective training on how to conduct protection tasks must be emphasized. However, this assumes that political challenges/obstacles can be overcome, that political will (perhaps in a coalition) can be attained, that the host nation government will act/cooperate appropriately in the interests of the victimized civilians, and that trained and ready forces are available.

**Implications.**

- If civilian protection missions are not adequately resourced (with resources equivalent to the largest indigenous threat force), if the host nation government is not persuaded to support the mandate, and if the peacekeepers have not established clear priorities and deterrents, then civilian protection efforts are not likely to succeed.

- Individual and collective training of civilian protection tasks (with standards) must be a necessity for national contingent peacekeepers; also implicit is the need for these standards to be conveyed to, and practiced by, the host nation government forces.

**Event Description.**

This observation is based on the research paper “Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa,” by Paul D. Williams, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010.

**Comments.**

Two articles which discuss resourcing shortfalls and political challenges to the United Nations-Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), are (1) "Neglecting Darfur" by Omer Ismail and Laura Jones, Enough, 13 September 2010, found at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/neglecting-darfur and (2) "Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success?", by Abdelbagi Jibril, Human Rights and Advocacy Network for Democracy (HAND) Briefing Paper, Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, July 2010.

d. TOPIC. Satellite Sentinel Project: Using Imagery to Protect Civilians (888)

Observation.

The Satellite Sentinel Project demonstrated that satellite imagery – in the hands of humanitarian organizations – provides a potent new way of making the world a witness to major threats to civilian populations. The Satellite Sentinel Project successfully predicted the Government of Sudan's May 2011 invasion of the Abyei region nearly two months before it occurred and provided early warnings to the populations of Kurmuk and the Kauda Valley of pending attacks. The Satellite Sentinel Project also identified multiple mass grave sites in the city of Kadugli and collected and disseminated clear evidence of other crimes against humanity in Sudan.

Discussion.

The Satellite Sentinel Project was launched on 29 December 2010, with a mission to deter a return to full-scale civil war between northern and southern Sudan. From January 2011 to June 2012, in 28 reports, the Satellite Sentinel Project documented, analyzed, and then published reports of activity that constituted threats to civilian populations and violations of international humanitarian law – committed by both Government of Sudan-aligned forces and Republic of South Sudan-aligned forces – across a contested border region.

Two individuals can be credited with conceiving the Satellite Sentinel Project: George Clooney [actor and board member of Not On Our Watch (NOOW)] and John Prendergast [former U.S. State Department official and co-founder of the Enough Project]. They had travelled to Sudan in October 2010 and came back with the idea of humanitarian organizations' using satellite imagery to detect armed threats to civilian populations in Sudan. The initial member organizations of the Satellite Sentinel Project consisted of NOOW, the Enough Project, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, the United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT), Google, and the Internet strategy firm Tellon, LLC.
Upon establishment of the Satellite Sentinel Project, DigitalGlobe (which owned a constellation of three high-resolution imaging satellites) agreed to provide tasked satellite imagery of Sudan as well as analytical support. UNOSAT agreed to lead the analytical effort for the first six months, and Google provided key engineering and software support. Tellon LLC designed an online platform, including the website satsentinel.org, to store and display the imagery and reports.

Commencing work on 1 January 2011, approximately a dozen students and volunteers, led by faculty & staff at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, began logging reports from the field, creating maps, and designing a methodology for systematically analyzing thousands of square kilometers of DigitalGlobe imagery. On 27 January (just three weeks after the 9 January referendum that would lead to the creation of South Sudan), the Satellite Sentinel Project produced its first report, "Evidence of SAF [Sudanese Armed Forces] Deployment to South Kordofan." The report showed an alarming build-up of SAF troops and equipment along the contested border – posing a significant threat to civilians across the border.

Between January and April 2011, the Satellite Sentinel Project documented the continuing build-up of SAF and northern-aligned forces (as well as various deployments by southern-aligned forces) in and around the disputed border region of Abyei. Over the course of seven reports, the Satellite Sentinel Project produced clear indicators that a major SAF invasion into Abyei was imminent. Indicators included the construction of new roadways by SAF engineering units and deployments of SAF infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, main battle tanks, and aircraft. These reports were widely publicized for international audiences. On 19 May, the prediction came true; the SAF invaded and seized control of Abyei town.

After the invasion, the Satellite Sentinel Project proceeded to collect satellite imagery and corroborating field reports indicating the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Abyei town. The Satellite Sentinel Project's assessment concluded that approximately one-third of the civilian dwellings and municipal structures in Abyei town had been razed. Photos showed SAF troops, together with northern-aligned militias, engaged in looting across Abyei town.

In May 2011, the Satellite Sentinel Project identified additional SAF forces massing at El Obeid barracks, in range of Kadugli, South Kordofan. The Satellite Sentinel Project proceeded to warn the international community of the potential for an SAF attack on Kadugli. Within days, on 5 June, the SAF attack commenced – resulting in large numbers of displaced civilians and a horrible fate for many. In July 2011, the Satellite Sentinel Project released satellite imagery and eyewitness reports indicating that mass killings of civilians had taken place – showing the presence of mass graves on the outskirts of Kadugli. In August 2011, the Satellite Sentinel Project released additional satellite imagery that identified three additional mass graves in Kadugli.
After extensive imagery analysis of another area – Kurmuk – the Satellite Sentinel Project issued a "Human Security Warning" in September 2011 for the populations in Kurmuk and surrounding areas. The Satellite Sentinel Project had identified both armored and mechanized infantry units of the SAF within 40 miles of the city, as well as aviation assets within range. It also provided warnings to international audiences of the possibility of indiscriminate bombardment of civilians and disproportionate use of force in this area.

In January 2012, the Satellite Sentinel Project was able to issue a similar warning for populations of the Kauda Valley and the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan. Imagery analysis had indicated that road construction projects had recently been conducted by Government of Sudan-aligned personnel, and additional engineering work was in progress. These road networks & improvements – along with deployments of SAF units in their proximity – followed the same pattern that had been noted prior to the SAF invasion of Abyei back in May 2011.

For both of these developments – Kurmuk and the Kauda Valley – the Satellite Sentinel Project was able to provide advanced warnings to civilian populations, as well as raise awareness and heighten actions among international community members. On a massive scale, the Satellite Sentinel Project engaged in continuous strategic communication to garner the attention of international community members. It sent reports directly to the UN Security Council, the President of the United States, the U.S. Secretary of State, the leaderships of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, other members of the U.S. Congress, and the United Kingdom's House of Lords. It provided bulletins, articles, and a steady flow of information to multiple U.S. and international publishers, including The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, CNN, NBC, ABC, CBS, PBS, NPR, Al Jazeera, and the BBC.

Overall, the Satellite Sentinel Project proved that it is possible for non-military organizations to harness advanced technology (satellite imagery) for the purpose of protecting civilian populations and delivering accurate early warnings. Beyond that accomplishment, the Satellite Sentinel Project also demonstrated that complex issues like mass atrocities can be effectively addressed through a collaborative effort among diverse communities (NGOs, international organizations, academia, industry, etc.) – each contributing their unique assets and capabilities.

**Recommendation.**

1. Department of State and Department of Defense should explore possibilities for coordination, information-sharing, and even partnering with groups like the Satellite Sentinel Project who are undertaking major initiatives aimed at protecting civilians and preventing mass atrocities.
2. Beyond satellite imagery, other platforms with advanced technologies [commercial drones, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), aerostats, airships, blimps, etc.] should be considered for future projects/efforts aimed at protecting civilians and preventing mass atrocities.

3. Department of State and Department of Defense should copy a page from the Satellite Sentinel Project’s playbook on using strategic communication to garner worldwide attention for future mass atrocity preventions situations.

**Implications.**

If Department of State and Department of Defense do not explore possibilities for coordination, information-sharing, and even partnering with groups conducting humanitarian projects aimed at preventing mass atrocities, then U.S. national interests may not be fully realized in such cases.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "Satellite Sentinel Project: Making the World a Witness," by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 18 July 2012.

**Comments.**

Related articles/references/links covering U.S. national interests on mass atrocity prevention include:


- [FACT SHEET: President Obama Directs New Steps to Prevent Mass Atrocities and Impose Consequences on Serious Human Rights Violators](#), The White House, 4 August 2011.


- [Simulation Exercise Examines Atrocity Prevention Board's Role in Preventing and Responding to Mass Atrocities](#), Samane Hemmat, Human Rights First, 17 August 2012.
Observation.

Operation Unified Protector demonstrated that NATO can be an effective organization for preventing a humanitarian catastrophe – when there is a call for such intervention within its area of interest. Operation Unified Protector also demonstrated the importance of integrating multinational partners into such an operation – whether NATO-led or otherwise.

Discussion.

NATO’s Operation Unified Protector prevented an imminent humanitarian catastrophe when Qaddafi’s forces threatened to overrun Benghazi in March 2011. This intervention gave rebel forces time and space to better organize themselves and subsequently drive Qaddafi from power. It also gave the Libyan populace the opportunity to take control of its own destiny.

At the start of this crisis, when European leaders considered their options for intervening (for preventing the infliction of mass casualties in Benghazi), they came to the conclusion that the only viable option with the requisite speed and resources was NATO. The European Union was not a credible possibility. An ad hoc coalition, led by either France or the UK, was not viable; this option was not acceptable to several NATO nations willing to participate militarily. Although there was significant debate and dissension about making this a NATO operation, its members did agree to commit after ten days of discussion – to enforce an arms embargo by sea, to established a no-fly zone, and to adopt a civilian protection mission.

Partners were critical to NATO’s success. The most emphatic voices in favor of NATO leading this effort in Libya were actually not NATO members, but were instead Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Sweden. These three nations wanted to join a NATO-led operation. They already had possessed knowledge of what it would take to participate in a NATO operation, having previously participated in NATO exercises. Four non-NATO nations – Qatar, the UAE, Morocco, and Jordan – ultimately agreed to participate with the NATO political structure on oversight of the operation. Their participation can be seen as a dividend from NATO’s outreach programs to North Africa and the Middle East – the “Mediterranean Dialogue” and “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” Notably, although these partners were brought into the operation, NATO did not conduct a “war by committee” – i.e., it did not fall into the trap of being too slow or indecisive through excessive deliberation/compromise.

Several nations with relatively small military contingents soon turned out to be large contributors. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Norway all contributed
significantly to this operation. At one point, Nordic allies were conducting 25% of all the strike sorties – pulling far more weight than what was expected of them.

NATO did not rely solely on military means to execute Operation Unified Protector. Rather, NATO took a "comprehensive approach" throughout the operation. It took deliberate measures to employ and synchronize diplomatic, information, intelligence, military, and economic capabilities. Early on, NATO secured a UN Security Council resolution authorizing its campaign to prevent mass casualties. Then, NATO rapidly moved to sanction regime change, helped train and arm the rebel forces, worked to cut off Qaddafi’s access to capital, facilitated defections from the Qaddafi camp, and campaigned to boost international recognition of the Transitional National Council of Libya.

On the negative side, NATO wrestled with a number of significant issues and strains. During deliberations leading up to intervention, certain NATO members spoke out against conducting this operation. Others attempted to limit France’s role as overall lead nation for NATO in this campaign. Others would not contribute military forces. The U.S. played a major combat role in the early phase of the operation, but then executed a military “hand off” of sorts to the rest of NATO two weeks into the operation. After this “hand off," however, the U.S. did continue to provide special forces, intelligence, and other vital "key enablers.”

All in all, however, Operation Unified Protector was a success for NATO. NATO prevented a humanitarian catastrophe from taking place. NATO provided the vital firepower and support that allowed rebel forces to topple the Qaddafi regime. NATO backed change for Libya for a more secure, participatory, and prosperous future.

**Recommendation.**

1. Consider NATO (and international coalitions) in the future for prevention of humanitarian catastrophe – if/when imminent – within its area of interest.

2. Incorporate other nations (from outside NATO/the coalition) on operations to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. The benefits from political legitimacy and burden-sharing will generally outweigh the cost of compromise.

3. Incorporate other nations (from outside NATO/the coalition) into peacetime exercises for humanitarian catastrophe prevention, so that lessons can be learned from operating together.

4. Use a comprehensive approach when engaged in the prevention of humanitarian catastrophe.
Implications.

If NATO/another international coalition were to intervene in the future on a given humanitarian catastrophe prevention operation without adding/incorporating other additional willing partners, then NATO/the international coalition would lose an opportunity to strengthen the political legitimacy of intervention as well as lose additional resources/burden-sharing support.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "Learning from Libya: The Right Lessons for NATO," by Damon M. Wilson, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, 1 September 2011.

Comments.

A related lesson which discusses challenges, strategies, and necessities for protection of civilians in Africa is “Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa,” SOLLIMS Lesson 697.

A related article which assesses the UN Security Council's approach to human protection with regard to crises in Libya and the Ivory Coast is "The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect," by Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, International Affairs, volume 87, number 4, July 2011. This article can be found on the Chatham House site: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/176837


Information on NATO's "Mediterranean Dialogue" is available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm

Information on NATO's "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative" is available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm
f. **TOPIC.** Keys to Success for the African Union Mission in Somalia (896)

**Observation.**

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has achieved notable success in Somalia after 5+ years operating in that country – owing especially to the composition of the force, its training & discipline on reducing civilian casualties, the willingness to accept relatively high numbers of friendly/AMISOM casualties, and excellent incentives/pay for AMISOM soldiers/policemen.

**Discussion.**

AMISOM has been the most ambitious intervention in Somalia since the failed U.S. operation of 1993 (the Battle of Mogadishu / "Black Hawk Down"). When AMISOM's initial force of Ugandan soldiers deployed to Somalia more than a decade later, in March 2007, Somalis had long been living in perpetual chaos – without any semblance of formal governance. Communities & neighborhoods across Somalia were dominated by warlords, gangs, and the militant group al-Shabaab. Nearly all of Mogadishu, the capital city, had fallen into the hands of al-Shabaab.

AMISOM's success in bringing stability to this chaotic environment has been nothing short of impressive. By and large, AMISOM has cleared Mogadishu of the presence of al-Shabaab – accomplished in summer 2011. AMISOM has also pushed al-Shabaab out of its last urban stronghold, the port city of Kismayo – accomplished in September 2012. In mid-October 2012, al-Shabaab still maintains control of wide areas of south-central Somalia; however, these are rural areas, and the amount of territory under al-Shabaab influence has been steadily reduced.

Many ingredients have gone into making AMISOM an effective stabilization force: U.S. funding, equipment, and training; European Union Naval Force escorts of AMISOM vessels; United Nations logistical support, food, and housing; an international mandate; and, specific training on how to avoid civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur. Another contributing factor has been the composition of AMISOM: Because the soldiers/policemen of AMISOM are "black Africans" – Ugandans, Burundians, and Kenyans – the people of Somalia have been generally receptive of their presence and motives since the outset of operations.

Two of the most important factors behind AMISOM's success, however, have been: (1) a high tolerance for friendly/AMISOM casualties and (2) outstanding incentives/salaries. The pay for AMISOM soldiers has been about $1,028 per month – funded by the European Union. This salary is more than 10-20 times the income that a soldier/policeman would otherwise earn in Uganda & Burundi – a driving factor for initial and continued service in AMISOM.
With regard to friendly/AMISOM casualties, AMISOM and its participating governments refuse to release death tolls. However, certain Western officials have reported that approximately 500 Ugandans and Burundians have been killed to date, along with an unknown number of Kenyans. This clearly points to a high tolerance for casualties on the part of AMISOM – whose peak troop level is only 17,000 – as well as a high degree of staying power / commitment by AMISOM and its contributing nations.

**Recommendation.**

1. When feasible, tailor the composition of the stability force to soldiers/nations that would be culturally "acceptable" to the people of the host nation (as opposed to soldiers/nations perceived as having no commonality).

2. Provide soldiers/stability forces with specific training on how to avoid civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur.

3. If possible, provide incentives/salaries for stability force soldiers/policemen at a significantly higher rate than they receive in their home country – especially if their stability duties are expected to be hazardous.

4. If possible, gain commitments from participating governments/nations to sustain manpower contributions to the stability force over a number of years – even if casualty rates become high.

**Implications.**

If intervening soldiers/stability forces are not culturally "acceptable" to the people of the host nation from the very outset (due to lack of commonality), then those soldiers face the immediate challenge of breaking through a barrier of perception as "foreign" and "not to be trusted." Moreover, if intervening soldiers/stability forces are not conscientious, trained, and disciplined on reducing host nation/civilian casualties (CIVCAS) throughout operations, any CIVCAS incidents will only further strain relations and adversely affect the mission.

**Event Description.**


**Comments.**


Additional information about AMISOM can be found at: [http://amisom-au.org](http://amisom-au.org)

A related lesson stressing the need for peacekeepers to prioritize civilian protection and also discussing situations involving use of force against militant groups is "Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa," SOLLIMS Lesson 697.


g. **TOPIC.** Protection of Civilians (PoC) in Somalia and Insurgency Scenarios (902)

**Observation.**

Lessons from Afghanistan suggest that placing a focus on the international force's operating procedures is insufficient with regard to protecting civilians in cases where the environment has a major insurgent threat. Although civilian casualties (CIVCAS) caused by the international force can indeed be reduced/minimized through various command-directed measures – i.e., training, discipline, and the judicious application of force – stability can still be significantly impeded by the perpetuation of civilian harm by others, particularly by the insurgent threat . . . meaning that other options should be considered by the international force.

**Discussion.**

The author of the article "Protecting Civilians While Fighting a War in Somalia – Drawing Lessons from Afghanistan" cites three specific lessons on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in Afghanistan – an environment having a major insurgent threat:
1. **Civilians may care more about the total number of deaths than who is actually responsible.** Although the proportion of civilians killed by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners dropped from 41% in 2007 to 14% in 2011, the number of civilians killed each year actually rose steadily across the same timeframe. For 2007, the number of civilian deaths caused by the use of force/weapons/IEDs stood at 1,523. For 2011, the civilian death count from the use of force/weapons/IEDs was up to 3,021. Studies conducted in 2011 indicated that more Afghans felt victimized by the foreign force's actions than by the insurgents' actions, despite the fact that most civilian deaths (86% of the civilian deaths in 2011) had been caused by the insurgents. This illustrates that stability missions have a strategic problem/challenge when they fail to protect civilians in general, regardless of who is causing the casualties.

2. **Even when territory is successfully seized at minimum civilian costs, it does not necessarily reduce the threat to civilians from insurgents.** In February 2010, ISAF conducted its largest offensive to date, called Operation Moshtarak. Although ISAF cleared and seized the district of Marjah (a major Taliban stronghold in Helmand province, having 80,000 – 125,000 inhabitants) within just a couple of days, Marjah’s inhabitants experienced continuous bombings/explosions, shootings, and Taliban intimidation tactics over the next several months. Six months after Operation Moshtarak began, an opinion poll showed that 73% of the population of Marjah felt more negative about foreign forces than they had one year earlier (when they were under the Taliban’s control).

3. **Even if the threat from insurgents is successfully reduced in one area, it may easily shift elsewhere.** While security has now generally been established in southern Afghanistan after years of ISAF operations against insurgent forces, other areas of Afghanistan (southeastern, eastern, and central regions) have experienced an increase in insurgent activity and civilian casualties. The insurgents’ strategy has been to withdraw from an area when confronted by heavily concentrated forces, then shift efforts to other areas where they intimidate and inflict harm on civilians for the purpose of de-stabilizing those areas. The insurgents then offer security and protection (from further harm), and they thereby establish influence/control over those areas. In the Marjah district, stability eventually was attained through a sizable security presence and continuous patrolling by ISAF, but many other regions and their inhabitants continue to be plagued by insurgent threats/actions.

**Recommendation.**

The author of the article "Protecting Civilians While Fighting a War in Somalia – Drawing Lessons from Afghanistan" offers the following recommendations for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which confronts an insurgent
threat (al-Shabaab) somewhat comparable to what has opposed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan:

1. "AMISOM should expand its definition of protection to include more than reducing the threats posed by their own actions." Although AMISOM should sustain its recent initiatives – i.e., CIVCAS-specific training, increased discipline among soldiers, reparation/mitigation efforts, the adoption of an Indirect Fire Policy, and the use of a CIVCAS tracking cell – AMISOM should also broaden its efforts and work to protect civilians from wider threats (e.g., insurgent IEDs/bombings, insurgent intimidation, and any excessive use of force by the Somalia Transitional Federal Government forces and allied forces).

2. "AMISOM should remember al-Shabaab's strategy of violence against civilians." Since al-Shabaab employs violence against civilians for the purpose of threatening them to later gain influence/control over their regions, AMISOM should consider some form of political accommodation to end the violence (assuming al-Shabaab cannot be completely defeated/eliminated, and assuming al-Shabaab can be reformed/reintegrated) – so long as this accommodation does not compromise recent/ongoing efforts to establish effective host nation governance.

3. "AMISOM should consider the risk of retaliation when planning for the next offensive." Because the risk of retaliation and intimidation by insurgents is high when they have lost/vacated one of their "strongholds," vice when they have lost/vacated some other "contested" area, AMISOM should consider sequencing future operations against the contested areas first and the strongholds last.

Implications.

If AMISOM and its sponsors (the African Union and the United Nations) do not expand their PoC efforts in Somalia, then CIVCAS incidents caused by the insurgent threat/al-Shabaab may go on indefinitely and increasingly – to the detriment of stability efforts.

Event Description.

Comments.

A related lesson which gives credit to AMISOM for getting soldiers trained on how to avoid civilian casualties is "Keys to Success for the African Union Mission in Somalia," SOLLIMS Lesson 896.


A related news release in which AMISOM urges others to reduce harm to civilians is "AMISOM Urges All Forces in Somalia to Spare Civilians," African Union press release, 16 August 2012.


h. TOPIC. Security Issues for Humanitarian Aid Workers in Afghanistan

Observation.

Security for aid workers in Afghanistan continues to pose a major challenge to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Despite renewed attention, progress is not being made. The number of attacks against aid workers in Afghanistan has risen significantly since 2009. Training and education provided to aid workers in advance of missions remains largely inadequate for this environment. In an effort to mitigate risk for their personnel, humanitarian aid organizations have sometimes modified their concepts of operation for delivering aid in remote, potentially hostile regions. Nonetheless, significant issues remain for NGOs both in preparation for, and management of, security requirements in Afghanistan.

Discussion.

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) has reported that attacks by Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) have increased by 51% since 2009, and civilian casualties have risen by 23%. Of note, approximately one-third of civilian fatalities occur during the first three months of employment in-country, implying that perhaps mistakes are being made by newly arrived personnel. The most
common types of security incidents have been: abductions, threats of attacks against aid workers, and actual incursions into compounds and school grounds where aid workers are operating. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), attacks against school facilities with aid workers tripled over a three-year period.

Earlier attacks against humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan led to the development of the “Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan” in May 2008. These guidelines were prepared and adopted by the Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group and were intended to clarify the role of the various actors in Afghanistan and attempt to correct misperceptions about neutrality of aid. Key elements of the guidelines included: (1) the creation of “compliance areas” for humanitarian and military actors to ensure the sustainable access by humanitarians to all populations; (2) a call for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to abstain from humanitarian assistance unless requested (in the case of emergency); and, (3) a request for military actors to stop using white vehicles.

One of the main drivers behind the increase in attacks since 2009 seems to be a perception by AOGs that humanitarian aid workers are, for the most part, no longer “neutral” parties. Humanitarian aid workers have often become associated with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), which is known for its support of projects run by President Hamid Karzai’s government – opposed by many AOGs. Also, some rural Afghans have accidentally or purposefully not distinguished NGO staff members from other private and military actors transiting their areas. In some cases, confusion arose because non-NGO actors had used vehicles resembling NGO vehicles, with similar paint (white), which then caused misidentification by AOGs. In other cases, rural Afghans and AOGs had not previously seen NGO workers operating in their areas, and when they then encountered NGO workers entering their areas, they would view them as unwelcome intruders.

According to ANSO, the keys to guaranteeing NGO safety are for NGO workers to promote the perception that they are indeed “neutral” and for them to improve their understanding of local cultures and traditions. NGOs have, for the most part, elevated the need/priority for providing security training and preparedness (including cultural awareness) to their personnel prior to their working in a potentially hostile area such as Afghanistan. NGOs have also stressed the need for neutrality. Due to funding limitations, however, security training for workers has mostly been limited to basic security briefings – vice actual hands-on training. Hands-on training would be the preferred method, since it provides the realism and rigor needed for individuals to physically learn and practice skill sets applicable to various (dangerous) scenarios.

Besides the marginal training (i.e., briefings) given to their personnel, many NGOs have employed a number of additional security measures to address the
challenges of the Afghan environment. These include: hiring local unarmed security guards, conducting risk assessments, taking steps to mitigate risks identified, and consulting with international companies for advice on security management issues. One new phenomenon recently employed by NGOs in Afghanistan has been “remote management” of projects. Under this concept, rather than send out their own workers to operate in remote, potentially hostile areas, NGOs coordinate with national staffs or implementing organizations and request that they instead send out personnel to those areas to execute the humanitarian aid projects. This, however, puts the aid organizations at a great distance from those receiving the aid, may result in misperception and mistrust, still requires a means to address security of those delivering the aid, and still presents dangers for the aid organization's workers who need to periodically direct and check the aid efforts in remote areas. Under this "remote management" concept, therefore, NGO security plans still need to incorporate security assessments, measures, resources, and training.

**Recommendation.**

1. Revisit the “Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan” to determine what has/has not been effective. Determine what additional measures, if any, can be taken to clarify the role of actors in Afghanistan, promote neutrality of aid workers, and contribute to their safety.

2. Use the Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group as a forum where incidents contrary to the “Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan” can be raised and addressed.

3. Given that approximately one-third of humanitarian worker fatalities occur during the first three months of their employment, newly operating personnel should be more closely managed and checked by supervisors during their initial period in-country.

4. Advertise the “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) eCentre” (training center in Tokyo) – which provides a one week course of real life simulations covering checkpoints, hostile crowds, minefields, etc. – across/among humanitarian aid organizations for their consideration as an opportunity or model for pre-deployment training.

**Implications.**

- If the “Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan” are not revisited, and preventive and protective measures are not improved, then the trend of increased attacks against humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan will likely continue.
- If attacks and fatalities on civilian aid workers continue to rise, and if they are used by AOGs to propagate a “success story” or “strength” among the local populace, then such a continuation of violence and propaganda could be detrimental to peace and stability operations.

- If NGOs do not identify and allocate resources to provide hands-on training opportunities for their personnel – to allow them to build their skill sets for potentially dangerous scenarios they may encounter in countries like Afghanistan – then those personnel will not be adequately prepared to act in such situations, and the probability of negative consequences will increase.

**Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article “Humanitarian Security in Afghanistan,” by Rens de Graaff, Erin Foster, and Stefanie Nijssen, Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), 5 August 2010.

**Comments.**


3. **CONCLUSION**

Recent stability operations – particularly Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and UN-sponsored operations in several African nations – have shown the importance of dedicating attention and resources to the Protection of Civilians (PoC) and civilian casualty (CIVCAS) mitigation.

Key lessons for protecting civilians include:

- Ensure that PoC and CIVCAS mitigation are designated as priorities for future peacekeeping and stability operations.

- Ensure that peacekeeping and stability operations are adequately resourced to protect civilians.
• Ensure that peacekeeping and stability forces receive pre-deployment training on PoC and CIVCAS mitigation.

• Ensure that leaders instill discipline in soldiers, guided by ROE, for purposes of PoC and CIVCAS mitigation.

• Incorporate the use of non-lethal weapons into CIVCAS mitigation strategies.

• Involve host nation security forces and local communities in PoC efforts.

• Keep the host nation population informed of PoC and CIVCAS mitigation efforts.

• Conduct comprehensive and predictive threat analysis. Such analysis should include threat patterns of behavior, assess likely threat activities/atrocities, and analyze the likely effects of friendly/peacekeeping force actions on threat group behavior.

• Determine where civilian protection efforts should be focused. The framework of “must protect,” “should protect,” and “could protect” areas—used by the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)—can be a starting point for this assessment.

• When atrocities take place in a country where peacekeepers are already present, emphasis must be placed on deploying assets to “must protect” areas and on using military power (including, if necessary, military force) to create effects on the ground that stop any ongoing atrocities and deter future ones.

• Gain an awareness of private sector groups undertaking initiatives aimed at protecting civilians and preventing mass atrocities in a given region (like the Satellite Sentinel Project’s efforts in Sudan).

• Consider tapping advanced technologies (satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicles/drones, airships, aerostats, etc.) if possible, to enhance PoC efforts.

• Use a comprehensive approach (including departments/agencies of the U.S. government, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, multinational partners, and private sector entities) when engaged in the prevention of humanitarian catastrophe.

• As appropriate, expand civilian protection efforts to address threats posed to civilians by insurgent IEDs/bombings, insurgent intimidation tactics, rogue force actions, etc.
• Coordinate with humanitarian aid organizations on a regular basis to discuss incidents affecting their safety/security and ideas/measures for improvement.

• Consider the following measures for civilian protection plans:
  
  o Joint protection teams.
  o Community liaison assistants.
  o Community alert networks.
  o Indirect fire policies.
  o Civilian casualty tracking, analysis, and response cells.
  o Specific training on how to avoid civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur.
  o Reinforcement training.

Through wider dissemination of the aforementioned lessons on protecting civilians, through their inclusion in training events and leader education programs, and through senior leader emphasis, significant impacts can be made during the course of future stability operations.

4. **COMMAND POC**

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Related Documents, References, and Links

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SOLLIMS SAMPLER

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