SOLLIMS SAMPLER
Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations

Special Edition July 2015
FOREWORD


The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related Lessons Learned Report, and (4) links to additional reports and other references that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.

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in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [http://pksoi.army.mil](http://pksoi.army.mil) and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [https://sollims.pksoi.org](https://sollims.pksoi.org) to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

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Paktika, Afghanistan (1 June 2011). U.S. Navy Lieutenant Mike Hammond, Paktika Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) information operations officer from Huntsville, Alabama, and Noor Mutaj (center right), Paktika PRT cultural adviser, interact with the education sector working group. This group was part of a 2-day provincial development plan (PDP) review and validation ‘shura’ (consultative assembly). Eight working groups, including sectors like education, public health and agriculture, created prioritized project lists on the first day and then presented them on the second day – crafting Paktika’s 5-year provincial development plan. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ashley N. Avcilila)
INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the July 2015 special edition of the SOLLIMS Sampler. In this edition, we cover Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations, derived from the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Seven cross-cutting principles “apply to every actor across every end state.” These principles are outcome-focused; they serve as overarching themes that should guide all actions/efforts toward desired stability outcomes. The seven principles are:

- **Host Nation Ownership and Capacity.** The key elements of this principle consist of: understanding the local context, fostering ownership, promoting inclusivity, capacity-building, balancing formal and informal systems, careful use of early resources, attention to the role of women, and effective transitions from international to host nation actors.

- **Political Primacy.** Under the basic premise that everything is political, this principle requires: using a “conflict lens,” fostering and sustaining a political process, inclusivity of warring parties and marginalized groups, and effective strategic communications.

- **Legitimacy.** The derivation of this principle is as follows: establishing a bargain between citizens and the government, articulating a clear mandate and authorities, matching resources to goals and delivering a timely peace dividend, adept leadership, accountability and transparency, management of expectations and communication, building constituencies for peace, and ensuring international community engagement.

- **Unity of Effort.** The main elements of this principle involve getting all actors to work together through: a shared understanding of the situation, a shared strategic goal, integration, cooperation and coherence, civil-military cooperation, and recognition of humanitarian space.

- **Security.** This principle – an imperative for other efforts moving forward – rests heavily on the following factors: information, management of “spoilers,” reform of the security sector, and protection of human rights.

- **Conflict Transformation.** This principle focuses on the following complex issues: understanding drivers and mitigators of conflict, reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening mitigators, and building host nation capacity to manage the drivers of conflict through nonviolent means and to support long-term development.

- **Regional Engagement.** This principle is based on: comprehensive regional diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation with neighboring countries and regional structures.

This Sampler of lessons is meant to be used by actors across the range of peace and stability operations – whether contributing to a peacekeeping mission, partnering with other nations on stability operations, or engaging in peacebuilding efforts. Along with the various lessons – which are categorized under the seven principles – this Sampler’s Conclusion offers final thoughts & recommendations, and its Related Documents, References, and Links provides the reader with additional reference material.
## Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations

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Host Nation Ownership and Capacity

a. The "light footprint" of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), combined with a U.S. "whole-of-government" approach, has been an optimal formula for bringing stability to the southern Philippines. The Philippine government's own "whole-of-nation" philosophy has played a tremendous role toward achieving success in this counter-terrorism campaign. [Read More…]

b. With an eye toward transition, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) shifted the role of the UN peacekeeping force (the UNMIL Force) in early 2008 from "leading" the delivery of services (security, reconstruction, social services, etc.) to "enabling" the Government of Liberia to take lead. [Read More…]

c. Strengthening public servants' knowledge, skills, networks and attitudes is key to any improvement in government performance, because it is through public servants that services are planned and delivered. [Read More…]

Political Primacy

a. Whether planning or conducting stability operations, using a "top-down" approach – without considering the nuances of local politics (e.g. those at regional, provincial levels), is bound to utter failure and will most likely cause political / diplomatic "trauma" as well as human suffering and even loss of life. [Read More…]

b. Strategic messaging by intervening forces during information operations (IO) is fundamental for their overall success. Peacekeepers/stability operations personnel must use strategic messaging to inform host nation (HN) civilians and the HN government about their intentions/objectives and the improvements being made. [Read More…]

c. In the wake of violent elections in Kenya in 2007-08 and in the Ivory Coast in 2010, the international community and many national governments & civil society actors have become increasingly aware of the need to place a greater emphasis on prevention of electoral violence. [Read More…]

Legitimacy

a. When conducting peace and stability operations, the principles of justice and reconciliation are critical components in establishing rule of law. [Read More…]

b. In the immediate aftermath of the December 2007 elections in Kenya, violent clashes broke out that threatened the very existence of the country. Besides the successful formal mediation efforts by the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, an equally impressive "civil society response" – based on previously developed civil society peace building capacity – was absolutely critical to bringing about peace to this country in chaos. [Read More…]

c. The development of democratic governments is challenging and will continue to be a struggle for nations well into the future… In a world that continues to reshape borders and work through conflict and security issues while continuing on a path of globalization, democratic governance is the key to future success. [Read More…]

Unity of Effort

a. The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) has its foundation on three pillars, the so-called 3-Ds: Defense-Diplomacy-Development… Similarly, in the United Nations (UN), a comprehensive approach to PSO is coordinated by the major structures of the Secretariat, especially the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). [Read More…]

b. To effectively address conflict, a whole-of-government approach is critical. However, achieving unified action between U.S. Government agencies can be challenging. [Read More…]

c. Through a deliberate "unity of effort" approach, a certain Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a certain Brigade Task Force in Iraq were able to attain tremendous success at fostering economic growth, building civil capacity, and supporting governance efforts within their province. [Read More…]

Security

a. Recent U.S. operations in Iraq and continuing operations in Afghanistan highlight the importance of building effective host nation security forces in post-conflict stabilization efforts. [Read More…]

b. How to create a secure environment? Institutions are important but not sufficient. [Read More…]

c. Burundi’s Security Sector Development (SSD) program is noteworthy for having advanced security sector effectiveness and democratic accountability since its inception in 2009. [Read More…]

Conflict Transformation

a. The engagement of potentially disruptive, sub-national elements, as demonstrated in Afghanistan and Somalia, are cases that illustrate the perils and possibilities for engaging "spoiler groups." [Read More…]

b. The Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute has been able to foster peace in the Philippines and Asia through the formation of peacebuilding leaders who can actively engage their communities to bring meaningful change. [Read More…]

c. Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its "golden hour" (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work. [Read More…]

Regional Engagement

a. The UN Charter does not define precisely the concept of peace operations. Their creation and their development therefore follow an ad hoc and by-practice process rather than adhering to clearly defined standards for UN peace operations… Regional and local actors, eager to regain responsibility for security issues especially within their region, have therefore won a greater place for the initiative than the UN peacekeeping elements. [Read More…]

b. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has achieved notable success in Somalia after 5+ years’ operating in that country – owing especially to the composition of the force, its training & discipline on reducing civilian casualties, the willingness to accept relatively high numbers of friendly/AMISOM casualties, and excellent incentives/pay for AMISOM soldiers/policemen. [Read More…]

c. The growth and spread of gangs in Central America is an issue of immense importance not only to the countries of the region but to the United States as well… While solutions to the problem have proved elusive, a recent regional approach, the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, offers perhaps the best hope yet for an effective approach. [Read More…]
LESSON REPORT

SUBJECT: Cross-Cutting Guidelines for Stability Operations

1. **GENERAL**

The seven cross-cutting principles for stability operations are applicable at the individual, organizational, and systemic levels and are pertinent throughout planning, conduct, assessment, and transitions. These principles have proven their worth across the range of peace and stability operations and across diverse operational environments, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Southeast Asia, or Central America – as evidenced in countless lessons learned in the SOLLIMS database. What follows is a representative sample of lessons learned – highlighting key elements of each of the seven cross-cutting principles: Host Nation Ownership and Capacity, Political Primacy, Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Security, Conflict Transformation, and Regional Engagement.

2. **Host Nation Ownership and Capacity**

Host Nation Ownership and Capacity means that the affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders. Ownership requires capacity, which often needs tremendous strengthening in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) environments.

Dr. Charles Ruffner, Civilian Expeditionary Workforce agribusiness specialist with Agricultural Development Team 4 teaches a class on watershed management at the District Agricultural Irrigation and Livestock (DAIL) compound in Qalat, Afghanistan, 19 November 2012. The Mississippi National Guard ADT4 and Ruffner, who is a forestry professor at Southern Illinois University, teach classes at the DAIL compound as part of a larger International Security Assistance Force initiative designed to help Afghans manage their natural resources more wisely. (U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Lori Bilyou)
2.a. **TOPIC.** Light Footprint and Whole-of-Government Approach – The Southern Philippines (911)

**Observation.**

The "light footprint" of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), combined with a U.S. "whole-of-government" approach, has been an optimal formula for bringing stability to the southern Philippines. The Philippine government's own "whole-of-nation" philosophy has played a tremendous role toward achieving success in this counter-terrorism campaign.

**Discussion.**

In 2002, the United States and the Philippine government agreed to partner against terrorist/insurgent threats growing in strength in the Philippines – specifically Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Various insurgent training camps began appearing in the southern Philippines in the late 1980s and soon became problematic for the Philippine government. These camps were viewed as safe havens by al-Qaeda's leadership – which sent an influx of Al-Qaeda operatives beginning with Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law. Other notorious figures followed, including Ramzi Yousef, the architect of the World Trade Center bombing, and Khalid Sheik Mohammad, cited by the 9/11 Commission Report as "the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks." As Al-Qaeda increased its presence and influence in the southern Philippines, JI and ASG embarked on a series of deadly bombings and kidnappings across the region. To combat this growing threat, the United States stood up JSOTF-P in July 2002, assigning it the mission of supporting partner force operations against terrorist threats, and the Philippine government signed a Military Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA), allowing the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the region.

Significant success has since been achieved. The 5 April 2012 report from the Congressional Research Service, *The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests,* states that Joint military activities have significantly diminished Abu Sayyaf's strength and presence, reducing its size from approximately 1,000 members to less than 400, nearly all key ASG leaders have been killed or captured, and the group's religious mission and appeal have waned. JI leadership casualties are also cited.

Over the past several years, JSOTF-P's mission in support of its Philippine partners has remained constant; however, its activities have been refined, modified, and adapted to meet the needs, capabilities, and political support/enthusiasm of the Philippine government and its security forces. Prominent among political activities has been the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP)-Bayanihan, instituted by the Philippine government in early 2011, which
deliberately focused all counterinsurgency efforts under a single national internal-security strategy. Key to the IPSP-Bayanihan was the "whole of nation" philosophy espoused by President Benigno Aquino, as he introduced the security strategy: "The problems confronting our nation are multi-faceted and complex... a military solution is not enough to completely solve them. Efforts to achieve genuine peace and security must therefore by supported by all."

Through implementation of IPSP-Bayanihan, Philippine military components, police elements, and local officials now routinely meet in Sulu, Basilan, and Zamboanga provinces to discuss activities and share information. Philippine government agency personnel now team with security forces on the F3EAD model (find, fix, finish, exploit, assess, disseminate), participate in joint training exercises, and conduct joint operations with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) forces. Joint operations against suspected terrorists and criminals are deliberately announced/explained to local communities as legitimate, legal, and necessary to rid the countryside of lawlessness and banditry. This message has resonated well with the Philippine populace.

While the Philippine government has harnessed multiple government resources and worked to inform/include local communities, JSOTF-P has focused its support by way of a "light footprint" and a "whole-of-government" approach. At the request of the Philippines government, JSOTF-P has collocated small detachments with its Philippine partners on approximately a dozen Philippine military bases and police camps. In most instances, JSOTF-P has provided operational detachments at military brigade level and police battalion level, however, one detachment supports an infantry division headquarters and another works with the AFP Special Operations Command.

U.S. Army Military Information Support (MIST) teams and Civil Affairs (CA) teams have been integrated with Philippine partners predominantly at tactical levels. The MIST teams have focused their efforts on radio messaging, atmospherics analysis (to gain insights on the thoughts and concerns of the people, particularly about the government and its security forces), and measures of effectiveness, while the CA teams have concentrated on building a self-sustaining Philippine CA capacity. As a result of these efforts, the AFP now has its own CA capability that has proven capable of planning, resourcing, and conducting civic-action programs and engaging local communities, and both the AFP and PNP now possess the capacity to design, produce, and distribute their own informational products.

At the operational and national levels, select JSOTF-P personnel meet on a weekly basis with senior AFP and PNP commanders. What began as routine engagements with PNP commanders soon led to the creation of a weekly PNP National Operations Center meeting at the Manila headquarters, where JSOTF-P members join Philippine counterparts in weekly discussions on appropriate
security topics. Weekly engagements with AFP senior officers are likewise conducted by JSOTF-P leaders, focusing on the fusion of operational requirements with intelligence.

The "whole-of-government" approach has been continuously emphasized on the U.S. side. JSOTF-P personnel meet on a weekly basis with representatives from the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, and JSOTF-P and FBI personnel are collocated in Manila. At three locations in the southern Philippines, JSOTF-P personnel are collocated with members of the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which focuses on training local law enforcement officials. This program and the relationship between JSOTF-P and ICITAP have been extremely productive – evidenced by the successful training of over 1,600 local police officers in the province of Sulu alone in 2011. The "whole-of-government" approach is also embodied in the U.S. Embassy's Mindanao Working Group (MWG). The MWG consists of representatives from across the U.S. Mission and JSOTF-P. It has effectively coordinated, monitored, and assessed U.S. engagements in the southern Philippines over the past several years – achieving U.S. goals and objectives and helping to build Philippine capacity. The MWG has also assisted in linking elements of the Philippine government and the private sector with local communities in the southern Philippines – supporting the intent of the 2011 Internal Peace and Security Plan-Bayanihan: "Efforts to achieve peace and security must be supported by all."

Overall, the "light footprint" and the integration of U.S. Government teammates with Philippine partners (from the strategic through tactical levels) have been an optimal combination for success – bringing peace and stability to the southern Philippines and denying sanctuary to terrorist threats. Ownership/responsibility by the Philippine government and its "whole-of-nation" philosophy have been critical to success as well.

**Recommendation.**

1. In regions where the U.S. and host nation governments have agreed to work together to counter transnational terrorist/insurgent threats, the U.S. should consider application of the JSOTF-P formula of a "light footprint" and a "whole-of-government" approach.

2. Where the U.S. and the host nation government have agreed to cooperate against threats to stability (such as terrorists/insurgents), the U.S. should emphasize host nation ownership/responsibility in protecting its own population – focusing support to the host nation on advice, assistance, training, equipping, and capacity-building.

3. Where the U.S. and the host nation government have agreed to cooperate against threats to stability (such as terrorists/insurgents), the U.S. should
encourage the host nation government to adopt a "whole-of-nation" philosophy – maximizing government agency involvement and reaching out to communities to build consensus against those (terrorist/insurgent) threats.

**Implications.**

If the host nation government does not fully commit to ownership/responsibility for protecting its people (from terrorist/insurgent threats), does not harness its own government agencies, does not strive to inform and include local communities, and does not partner for focused external support, then terrorist/insurgent threats may perpetuate over the years and destabilize entire regions – as happened in the southern Philippines from the late 1980s onward... until the commencement of partnered operations with JSOTF-P and the implementation of IPSP-Bayanihan.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article, "JSOTF-P Uses Whole-Of-Nation Approach to Bring Stability to The Philippines," by Colonel Fran Beaudette, Special Warfare magazine, July-September 2012.

**Comments**


A related news article, which highlights AFRICOM's advocacy of the light footprint approach, is "AFRICOM Will Maintain 'Light Footprint' in Africa," by Donna Miles, U.S. Department of Defense News, 12 June 2012.

Another related article, which provides an example of AFRICOM's use of the light footprint approach through the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) Africa, is "Spartans of Senegal," by Mark Seavey, The American Legion Magazine, 1 December 2012.
2.b. **TOPIC.** Enabling Transition in Liberia through Civil-Military Coordination (773)

**Observation.**

With an eye toward transition, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) shifted the role of the UN peacekeeping force (the UNMIL Force) in early 2008 from "leading" the delivery of services (security, reconstruction, social services, etc.) to "enabling" the Government of Liberia to take lead. The primary measures used by the UNMIL Force in this "enabling" approach were: encouraging all external players to help the host nation (HN) take lead, inserting civilian agencies & HN officials into the approval process and into the full life cycle for all projects & services, and conducting comprehensive information operations to improve the public's perception of the HN government.

**Discussion.**

In January 2008, the UNMIL Force substantially changed its approach to business after recognizing that the Government of Liberia was becoming increasingly dependent on the Force to deliver services to the public. This increasing dependence was contradictory to the Government of Liberia's own Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) – a strategy which had the support of the international community. Through the PRS, the Government of Liberia was supposed to gain the capacity and assume control – particularly at the county level – for the delivery of essential public services, including security, governance, rule of law, and economic and social development. Besides the increasing dependence on the UNMIL Force for service delivery, another assessed problem and threat to civil stability was large concentrations of idle and unemployed youths.

The UNMIL Force, therefore, in January 2008, changed its approach from "leading" delivery of services and reconstruction projects to "enabling" others – especially the HN government – to assume control of them. The UNMIL Force steadily positioned itself into an indirect role – more clearly in support of the civilian agencies. Instead of planning and leading services/projects, the UNMIL Force instead encouraged the coordination and collaboration of the UNMIL civil component, UN agencies, and NGOs. It further encouraged them to collaboratively put the Government of Liberia in the lead of these activities. A goal of the UNMIL Force was to work itself out of a job.

Deliberate actions were taken to ensure that civilian partners were inserted/operating between the UNMIL Force and HN entities – at all levels. At the county level, the UNMIL's Joint County Offices (civilian offices) became the conduits for UNMIL Force assistance to HN county administrators/offices. At the national level, the Offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and Deputy SRSGs took lead for all civil-military coordination (CIMIC) with HN...
government agencies/officials. All requests for military support were now "civilianized" – i.e., being processed by a civilian office. To facilitate full transition, ownership, and sustainability by the host nation, all reconstruction projects began to involve Government of Liberia officials. The UNMIL Force front-loaded HN ownership in the assessment phase of reconstruction and social service projects and pushed/tracked HN ownership through the planning, coordination, and execution phases. For infrastructure projects facilitated by the UNMIL Force's Quick Impact Project (QIP) program – such as the construction of police stations, courthouses, and detention facilities – local contractors were increasingly selected to execute these projects over the UNMIL Force's own engineer units. This allowed HN civilians to take control and created significant opportunities for local employment.

Success toward transition was also achieved through forging a close relationship between CIMIC and information operations (IO). When development projects were ongoing and measurable progress achieved, corresponding IO messages were developed and delivered. The intent was to shape public perception – that these development projects enhanced future stability and security for Liberians, even if the UNMIL Force was drawing down. The message conveyed that HN assets would be able to sustain these projects and services. To strengthen this message, the UNMIL Force would put Liberians visibly in the lead at project/service sites. The UNMIL Force would visibly involve HN military and police on all CIMIC projects – transferring the public trust gained by the UNMIL Force to the Government of Liberia. This was especially important for rural areas not being reached by news media. Here it was much more effective to visibly involve local leaders/opinion-makers in the physical execution of projects. The UNMIL Force also took steps to bring HN personnel (military and police) into UN CIMIC courses (including instruction on assessments and project management) – further contributing to HN capacity building and transition.

Significant progress was made by the UNMIL Force in Liberia since 2008 through the utilization of the "enabling" approach – across the various sectors of stability operations. In the security sector, the UNMIL Force was able to instill in the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) an ethos of public service and sensitivity to civil society through a number of civil action projects, joint workshops with civil society organizations, and leadership seminars on security-related issues. In the economic stabilization sector, the UNMIL Force was able to provide vocational skills training to over 8,000 ex-combatant and youths, ran agricultural training model farms for thousands more, and supported the Liberian Ministry of Public Works in its management of road rehabilitation projects. In the justice sector, the UNMIL Force helped build local capacity through joint execution of numerous Quick Impact Projects and through oversight of contracts' work on others. Finally, in the social welfare sector, the UNMIL Force was able to provide "on the job" training of Liberian medical personnel during medical outreach programs, as well as to mentor schoolteachers during education assistance programs.
Recommendation.

1. During peacekeeping and stability operations, it is recommended that military forces/peacekeepers conduct civil-military coordination with an eye on transition and an "enabling" approach – "civilianizing" military assistance and building the capacity of the HN government to deliver essential public services.

2. It is recommended that civil-military coordination activities be closely tied to information operations – to build positive public perceptions of the HN government and public confidence in its ability to provide/sustain security and other essential services.

3. It is recommended that civil-military coordination activities extend beyond capacity-building and information operations: CIMIC should place HN government officials and institutions "visibly" in the lead of service delivery and reconstruction efforts – in public/open forums – to further expand/strengthen public trust and confidence in the HN government.

Implications.

If military forces/peacekeepers do not have an eye on transition from the outset of peacekeeping and stability operations, and if they do not have a strong "information operations and confidence-building campaign" to contribute to transition, then they could find themselves playing "catch-up" when drawdown/redeployment approaches. Also, the HN government might fall short on capacity to sustain the delivery of essential public services. Negative public opinion could result, which could lead to renewed instability.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "Civil-Military Coordination and Transition Management: The UNMIL Experience," by Christopher Holshek in Conflict Trends, Issue 3, 2011.

2.c. TOPIC. Strengthening Public Services in Post-Conflict (603)

Observation.

Strengthening public servants’ knowledge, skills, networks and attitudes is key to any improvement in government performance, because it is through public servants that services are planned and delivered.
Discussion.

The success of government in post-conflict society depends on the performance of the public service in providing critical services to the population and restoring trust and confidence in governance. This is because the public service constitutes the heartbeat of any government. Public servants pervade the entire sphere of government action. They are schoolteachers, medical practitioners, judges, court workers, police officers, military men and women, agricultural extension workers, road constructors, forestry officers, administrative officials, parliamentarians, finance officers, planners, etc. They are engaged in every facet of government activity, but most of them work directly with citizens, whom they represent the face of government. Therefore, the quality of public servants in terms of knowledge, skills, attitudes and networks can make or break public trust in a post-conflict government.

Post-conflict public administration situations are not always similar. The public services break down in different ways, depending on the nature of the conflict and the conditions present afterwards. Consequently, countries will face different challenges in rebuilding their human resources capabilities, and experience gained in one situation may not be relevant in another. For example, in South Africa after the fall of the apartheid regime, the institutions, systems, structures and even personnel of the public service were in place and intact. But they did not reflect South African demographics, as the white minority were vastly overrepresented.

The South African situation was different from the one in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, when most public servants were killed. Most of the rest, particularly those implicated in genocidal acts, escaped into Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) carrying files, records and other movable public service assets. When these exiles returned to Rwanda, they took over public offices in an unauthorized, uncoordinated manner. These new self-declared officials had to be removed and the vacancies filled in an orderly fashion. By the time the new regime settled in, knowledgeable and skilled personnel were unavailable, and the public service's systems and institutions, along with equipment, office space and logistics, were severely lacking.

A somewhat similar situation existed in Timor-Leste after 1999. An estimated 7,000 Indonesian civil servants had fled the Territory after Indonesian rule collapsed, and institutions and public records were destroyed or removed. This left a void throughout government because Indonesian officials had formerly occupied most of the technical and management positions. There had been limited development of Timorese skills in administration and governance. Also, whereas some of the Rwandans who returned after the genocide were eager to work and reconstruct their country, the Indonesians who fled Timor-Leste had little interest in returning. When the United Nations took over the administration of the Territory, there was no such thing as the Timor-Leste public service.
Initially the United Nations had to rely on Member State volunteers, as new Timorese civil servants were being trained.

Uganda had a very different problem after the civil war that ended in 1986. Uganda's post-conflict public service was overstaffed; bloated by redundant positions with overlapping functions. The system was also plagued by poor remuneration, moonlighting, extensive corruption and uncommitted personnel. These examples illustrate the wide variation in human resource capacity in post-conflict countries. Not surprisingly, then, approaches to strengthening human resources within the public service will vary from country to country. Where a substantial number of personnel have been inherited from the outgoing regime, the task may be simply to change employees' attitudes towards the new government and towards serving the public. Such was the case in Uganda after 1986. In situations such as Rwanda, where the public service has been flooded by returning exiles without the necessary education, skills or experience, then massive immediate retraining is required, not only to transmit knowledge and skills but also to cultivate a sense of togetherness and a shared work ethic. In a situation like Timor-Leste or Kosovo, where United Nations personnel from different countries and cultures constituted an interim public service, the initial concern is to help everyone work together harmoniously in a new environment that is often insecure.

**Recommendation.**

1. The quality of public servants is crucial to the recovery of a post-conflict government and the trust that people have in it. This makes capacity-building in the public service essential for post-conflict recovery. Strengthening public servants' knowledge, ethics, skills, networks and attitudes is key, because it is through public servants that government services are planned and delivered, critical innovations conceived and realized, needed reforms carried out and trust in government restored.

2. The nature of the conflict, the levels of violence and destruction, and the conditions that emerge after the conflict determine the state of human resources in the public service. Reconstruction efforts must be tailored to the specific situation.

3. Reconstruction efforts should proceed from an accurate count of a country's public servants and an accurate picture of their knowledge and skills. Because employee censuses are expensive, they should be planned to fit within the overall strategy for developing human resources in the public service. In addition, censuses should be designed for congruence with the local context to ensure that the government has the capacity to effectively use the data collected.

4. It is highly desirable for oversight of the recruitment process to be managed by independent bodies such as civil service commissions to avoid cronyism,
nepotism, and other forms of favoritism. But because it takes time to create and develop such institutions, interim measures need to be devised to address the immediate challenge of recruiting competent personnel. If merit-based recruitment is introduced early, there is a greater chance of limiting patronage and other harmful practices and instead ensuring a well-functioning public service.

5. Violence takes a toll on civil servants not only in terms of their numbers, but also in terms of their behavior and motivation. To rebuild the ranks of qualified personnel, it is not enough to remedy skills deficits and knowledge gaps. Efforts must also be made to restore integrity, ethics and professional conduct in the public service.

6. Diversity within the population should be reflected within the public service. If both men and women, as well as members of all ethnic, religious and other groups, are actively included in the government, then conflict is less likely to erupt. A representative, merit-based, service-oriented public service can provide a model for participation, inclusive decision-making, reconciliation and social cohesion, and proactive peacebuilding.

7. Most post-conflict countries lack the financial resources to pay public servants adequately, and reliance on foreign aid and technical assistance is unsustainable in the long term. Donors thus need to work strategically with post-conflict governments to help them develop pay management and incentive systems that will attract the requisite personnel without overtaxing the budget.

Implications.

1. The security situation will have to improve or be at a level so that public servants can conduct their work in relative safety in order to be effective. This will be important if public servants have been killed or driven off from their homeland.

2. Heavy external support will be needed for countries that have undergone devastating violence and upheaval. Host nation governments will likely not have the means and resources to organize, train, and mentor public service personnel following a conflict.

3. Foreign nations will take on many functions of government the longer it takes for host-nation public servants to fill positions in government and become proficient. People’s attitudes, confidence and support in their government will be partially affected by who is actually serving their needs. The tipping point is that stage when the consensus is that their own people are serving their needs instead of foreigners.
4. Foreign nations will have to recognize and accept that the resulting public service may not be the one they desire because of ethnic, cultural, or social factors. The key will be to train people to professional and ethical standards.

**Event Description.**


3. **Political Primacy**

Political Primacy means that a political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility of forging political agreements.

Nili, Afghanistan. Members of the High Peace Council from Kabul traveled to Nili to meet with Daykundi’s Provincial Peace Council and local leaders, and formally integrate them into the national peace planning. The Afghanistan High Peace Council assists the government and the Afghan people in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. “The peace process brings together the insurgents and the people and gets rid of the fighting,” said Muhammad Ishaq, Daykundi provincial peace council member. “We are confident and trust that the governor will make things happen.”
3.a. **TOPIC.** Failure of the Top-Down Approach in Afghanistan (775)

**Observation.**

Whether planning or conducting stability operations, using a "top-down" approach – without considering the nuances of local politics (e.g., those at regional, provincial levels) – is bound to utter failure and will most likely cause political / diplomatic "trauma" as well as human suffering and even loss of life. The Focused District Development (FDD) program used in Badghis Province, Bala Morghab district, Afghanistan in 2008 was a perfect example of how a "top-down" approach that neglected local political nuances led to significant failure and can easily be called an operational debacle.

**Discussion.**

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghan National Security Forces, and the Afghan government attempted to conduct FDD in the Bala Morghab district in 2008 without coordination/consultation with local authorities. FDD was an ISAF police training program developed at the national level and intended for implementation throughout Afghanistan. The intent of FDD was to train and deliver Afghan National Police to select districts, with the aim of improving local security. Afghan national authorities chose Badghis Province because of its relative tranquility, thinking that delivering a new police force would be easy to do and would provide good publicity. However, no one informed the leaders or the people of Bala Morghab that they should expect delivery of a new police force. No one informed the leaders or the people of Bala Morghab that this new police force would require a facility to house the individual policemen, their equipment, and to act as the base ops facility. In addition, the Afghan National Security Forces with coalition force advisors intended to occupy a local old cotton factory to use as an interim facility.

As part of the whole program, ISAF, Afghan National Security Forces, and the Afghan government planned to refurbish a certain bridge in the Bala Morghab district during this same timeframe. In the minds of the ISAF and Afghanistan national leadership, a bridge capable of supporting higher capacity was needed to accommodate growing traffic demands on the "Ring Road" – a project intended to improve transportation throughout peripheral districts of Afghanistan. However, no one asked the leaders and people of Bala Morghab if they wanted or needed such a bridge. More importantly, no one told the leaders and people of Bala Morghab that they would need to shut down their existing bridge for 2 years (during refurbishment), even though the district's marketplace was located at far end of this bridge. No one conducted coordination and planning with the leaders and people of Bala Morghab for the construction and placement of a temporary bridge – envisioned for use during the 2-year timeframe. No one thought to take into consideration what the leaders and people really needed or wanted the FDD to focus on. As it turned out, what they really wanted was for
construction to resume on a certain mosque – a construction project (originally funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development) that had stalled two years earlier. Besides the mosque construction project, Bala Morghab representatives had also identified poverty, poor economic conditions, and lack of opportunity/jobs as their main concerns in 2007. These concerns were not addressed by national ministries.

In advance of delivering the new/FDD police force, the Afghan National Security Force dispatched a small security force to assess road conditions into Bala Morghab – in the Spring of 2008. During its movement to Bala Morghab, however, this security force was attacked by insurgents and never reached Bala Morghab as planned. Later, in July 2008, ISAF's Regional Command-West and Afghan National Security Forces proceeded with plans to send a brigade-size force to implement FDD – a force consisting of an Afghan Army brigade with U.S., Spanish, and Italian mentors. Chatter about enemy activity in the Morghab Valley and along its main (and only) route had markedly increased prior to the force’s deployment date. Tellingly, during the convoy toward Bala Morghab, the brigade-size force was ambushed by an insurgent force. One U.S. soldier and two Afghan National Army soldiers were killed, and a dozen ANA and several U.S. personnel were wounded. Shortly thereafter, at the first 'shura' (consultative assembly) held between local leaders and coalition force personnel, the senior Afghan villager stated "We didn't know the Russians were coming back."

In the following days, occupation/seizure of the old cotton factory in Bala Morghab by government & coalition forces, expansion of that "base" onto the surrounding land, and force protection operations & patrolling around the "base" generated further friction. At first, local farmers submitted dozens of land claims for compensation. These complaints rapidly compounded – resulting in hundreds of claims for compensation for crop damage, irrigation rights, and land use. In spite of this local friction, and against innumerable logistical challenges, government & coalition forces were able to complete the construction of a forward operating base (FOB).

In November 2008, the Afghan National Security Forces decided to deliver 13 new trucks to equip the new Afghan National Police contingent in Bala Morghab. However, at this point, Italian leaders had issued an order forbidding any personnel or equipment from moving northward along the route to Bala Morghab. That order resulted in there being no coalition participation or support for the Afghan Army convoy. Nonetheless, the Afghans proceeded. In late November 2008, this Afghan Army convoy was ambushed by insurgents – approximately 10 km short of their FOB – suffering heavy casualties. Losses to the Afghan Army were 17 killed, 20 wounded, and 24 captured. Of the 13 new vehicles, only 2 made it to the FOB.
Efforts to refurbish the bridge by the market of Bala Morghab and to install a temporary bridge somewhere nearby likewise ran into opposition. The debate over where to site a temporary bridge became the subject of intense local debate and drama. Elders and powerbrokers knew that the installation of a temporary bridge would shift power to landowners in that vicinity. Hard feelings developed over land tenure, over the "rights" of ISAF and the government to use "illegally acquired" land & property, and over the continued "occupation" of Bala Morghab. Eventually an agreement was reached on a location to erect the temporary bridge. However, the elders of Bala Morghab by this point had shifted their allegiances to anti-government forces/insurgents.

Anti-government forces controlled the approach road through the valley to Bala Morghab. Although ISAF was willing to pay truckers five times the going rate, no trucking company would accept the job of driving bridging materials into Bala Morghab - due to several recent insurgent attacks on truckers. In those attacks, trucks had been hijacked or burned, and drivers had been beaten or killed. Ultimately, to get the program moving, ISAF resorted to striking a deal with the insurgents, which was brokered through intermediaries, to provide protection for the transport of bridging materials. Given this agreement, bridging materials reached their destination in Bala Morghab – but only with the permission of, under the terms of, and with the highly evident escort of insurgents.

The temporary bridge was erected in Bala Morghab, with all credit and credibility going to the insurgents. It is unknown how large or small the insurgency was in early 2008 in the vicinity of Bala Morghab, but without a doubt, major mistakes made by ISAF, Afghan National Security Forces, and the Afghan government allowed the insurgency to grow stronger. Those mistakes included:

- Failure to execute a "true" whole-of-government approach. Government agencies/ministries did not take ownership of the bridge project, nor did they lead development at-large in the Bala Morghab area. Coalition forces took lead on the FDD program, and they took on the bridge project as well – in the absence of other government agency/ministry action.
- Failure to shape the environment/population. No efforts were made to contact local leaders and local people about intended government & coalition operations in their area – to try to gain their "buy-in." No information operations were conducted to send positive messages to the people.
- Failure to establish "unity of purpose." No initiative was taken to unite the various actors in planning operations and objectives for the Bala Morghab district.
- Failure to address local land ownership issues. No coordination was made with local authorities and landowners about intended occupation of the old cotton factory, construction of a new FOB, and bridge work – and the cadastral issues associated with them.
• Failure to establish lines of continuity in governance. No thought was given to connect village/district officials to provincial officials to national officials. Participatory governance from the bottom-up was not addressed. Local politics and relationships were neglected.

• Failure to gain the sympathies of the local population. Not enough energy was spent on establishing trust among the village elders. No effort was made toward improving the well-being of the local populace – to address poverty and lack of jobs.

Probably the biggest mistake was the failure to shape the "hearts and minds" of the population. The population was taken off-guard at the outset, opposed all activity as an intrusion, and continued to resist throughout the program because of grass-roots efforts/engagements by the insurgents with local elders and an absence thereof on the part of coalition forces.

**Recommendation.**

The author of "War Comes to Bala Morghab" (see Event Description paragraph below) offers the following six lessons:

1. Do not employ "half-measures" in a whole-of-government approach. Government agencies/ministries responsible for leading various programs in stability operations need to take full ownership of those programs.

2. When executing the "shape, clear, hold, build" strategy in counterinsurgency operations, give primacy to "shaping." It is imperative to know, understand, and motivate the people living in the area of operation. Shaping can smooth the path for other operations and can make it difficult for the adversary to interfere. Shaping should include information operations (IO). Positive IO messages can reduce uncertainty and opposition among the people.

3. Operate with "unity of purpose." Unity of purpose must be established early on (during planning) so that the different contributing actors in stability operations can work toward common goals – rather than operate independently. Disparate, uncoordinated operations can lead to friction between actors – and to confusion among the populace.

4. Consider "local ownership" of land in all endeavors. Construction and development activities, which will impact land rights, need to be coordinated with local authorities and landowners.

5. Establish "continuity of governance." Connect village and district leadership to the provincial government, and connect the provincial government to the national government. Work from the bottom up, not top down. Local participation is critical for good governance.
6. Gain the "sympathies" of the people. Sympathies can be a force multiplier. The degree to which people are sympathetic and supportive of one side can multiply the positive effects of actions for that side, while reducing those of the other side.

In addition to these lessons specified by the author, one additional lesson that can be drawn from the Bala Morghab story is:

7. Pay attention to the Intelligence effort. Intelligence should drive/influence operations. Indicators and actual incidents of insurgent activity in/around Bala Morghab were repeatedly reported, yet they were ignored – with dire consequences.

**Implications.**

If the Intelligence effort is ignored, if "shaping" the population is not emphasized, if the "sympathies" of the people are not pursued, and if a "mind-less" top-down approach is used to execute stability operations then, the most probable outcome will be opposition by the populace and increased instability due to greater support to the local insurgency.

**Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article "**War Comes to Bala Morghab: A Tragedy of Policy and Action in Three Acts**," by John Bessler, Prism, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 2011.

**Comments.**

Similar recommendations for engaging local populations on governance and development programs are seen in the following SOLLIMS lessons:

- Lesson 506 – “Improving Local Ownership of Development Process”
- Lesson 604 – “Decentralization for Participatory Governance”
- Lesson 685 – “The Balancing Act of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Need to Involve Local Groups”
- Lesson 693 – “Reconstruction Traps”
3.b. **TOPIC.** Strategic Messaging in Information Operations (874)

**Observation.**

Strategic messaging by intervening forces during information operations (IO) is fundamental for their overall success. Peacekeepers/stability operations personnel must use strategic messaging to inform host nation (HN) civilians and the HN government about their intentions/objectives and the improvements being made. Ultimately, this will help intervening forces improve relations, extend reach, and build public support for the HN government.

**Discussion.**

An analytical review of recent publications on IOs during stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates a critical need for the effective use of strategic messaging during the initial phases of peacekeeping/stability operations. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), al Qaeda accused the U.S. of waging a war against Islam, and it was important to counter this message. In 2007, the U.S. was able to develop and send palatable strategic messages to influence Sunnis and Shi’a extremists. The new strategic messages helped “win the hearts and minds” of Iraqis.

One of the challenges of IOs is that insurgents tend to have a deeper understanding of the culture and local needs of the HN civilians. Thus, the insurgents can often offer a narrative that might appeal to the interests of the HN civilians. As mentioned in the “Introduction,” during OIF, al Qaeda was able to turn elements of the Iraqi population against the U.S. by exploiting fears that the West was at war with Islam. In addition to adding 130,000 more troops to Iraq during the surge, the U.S. refocused the operation’s strategic message. The U.S. defined objectives that were aligned with local Iraqi interests. Namely, the U.S. promised not to prosecute low- to mid-level Iraqi insurgents. Also, the U.S. helped the Iraqi government gain legitimacy by training its military forces to police themselves. Additionally, the U.S. sent a strong signal to the Iraqis that the U.S. was committed to Iraq’s stability. Iraqis responded, and by late 2007 the country was considerably more stable.

Similar to pre-surge OIF, U.S./coalition force strategic messaging in Afghanistan has struggled to win widespread support among the Afghan population. Two main objectives of the U.S./coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have been to: 1) dismantle an al Qaeda stronghold, thereby providing security to Afghans and preventing the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorists to plan future attacks, and 2) to stabilize Afghanistan through bolstering a semi-democratic government and providing economic opportunities, ultimately to improve the Afghans’ quality of life. The latter objective is part of a concerted effort to “win the hearts and minds” of Afghans, thus enervating the influence of
extremist elements. Unfortunately, the U.S./coalition forces have been unable to persuade many Afghans to side with the U.S.-backed central government.

In addition to the strategic messaging challenges in Afghanistan, the U.S./coalition forces’ strategic messaging in Pakistan has been unable to generate widespread support among the Pakistani population. Pakistanis tend to oppose the U.S./coalition forces use of airstrikes against the Taliban and the use of Pakistani military bases and transit routes for supplying NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. Consequently, the approval rating of the U.S./coalition forces in Pakistan is tied for last among all nations. The abysmal approval rating of the U.S. is partially due to coalition forces’ strategic messaging conflicting with Pakistan’s Islamic values. Thus far, the U.S./coalition forces have not effectively distinguished between what Pakistan considers Pakistani Taliban members vice Taliban extremists. This has hampered the U.S./coalition forces’ ability to fight Afghan Taliban members who cross the border to Pakistan.

Although strategic messaging has largely failed during the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the international community was able to effectively use strategic messaging in a different region/Liberia, to buttress support of the new government after the civil war. The United Nations (UN)/international forces incorporated development projects – legitimizing the new regime in messaging by emphasizing the importance of the Liberian governments’ role in nominating and implementing the projects. Citing “Liberian-led” efforts helped to generate enthusiasm and support for the new government.

**Recommendation.**

To improve strategic messaging during IOs the U.S./coalition forces should:
1) send clear and consistent messages to the HN, 2) operate with the whole of government, and 3) respect cultural norms.

1. The U.S. must be prepared to counter insurgents’ strategic messaging with clear and consistent strategic messaging. For example, the U.S. failed to offer a compelling strategic message to Iraqis before the surge. During the surge, the U.S. was able to align its strategic messaging with the interests of the Iraqi people. The new strategic message helped act as a catalyst for the Sunni Awakening. During future peacekeeping/stability operations, the U.S./coalition forces should try to anticipate enemy combatants’ strategic messages and prepare potential responses/counters. The Department of State (DoS) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are best positioned to promote strategic messages that pertain to economic development and governance. The Department of Defense (DoD) should be the primary intermediary with the HN on strategic messaging that pertains to security. Although agencies will focus on the strategic message that most closely aligns with their skill sets, they must still be able to explain the other agencies’ intentions/objectives. Moreover, in the event that an agency accidentally
undermines the strategic messaging of a different department, it is important to acknowledge the mistake quickly. The political fallout of being caught lying outweighs the fallout of admitting the mistake from the onset.

2. During IOs, the U.S./coalition forces must support the strategic messages with actions. Namely, if the U.S./coalition forces strategic message promises to improve the quality of life for HN civilians, then USAID, private development agencies, the U.S./coalition supported-HN government, and the DoS must be prepared to implement development projects at the local level – even in potentially dangerous areas. If the U.S./coalition forces fail to meet their promises, it undermines HN civilians’ confidence in the mission. The IO in Liberia was successful in part because UN/international forces were able to meet the expectations of the local HN population.

3. The U.S./coalition forces must try to work within the culture of the HN. The U.S./coalition forces must tailor some policies to meet the needs and interests of the locals in the district in which they are working. To overcome insurgents’ asymmetric information advantages (i.e., insurgents will likely understand the HN culture better than peacekeepers/stability operations personnel), the U.S./coalition forces should partner with the HN government. The HN government can help overcome the cultural information gap between the HN civilians and U.S./coalition forces. For example, strategic messaging in Liberia was more effective because the international community put Liberian government members at the forefront of development projects. They were better suited to address local concerns than foreign stability operations personnel.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on the following references:

- “Political & Military Components of the Surge in Iraq,” SOLLIMS Lesson 808
- “Operation Moshtarak Lessons Learned,” SOLLIMS Lesson 644
- “Observations from COIN Emersion course with Pakistan at Ft Leavenworth 1-10 Nov 2010,” SOLLIMS Lesson 692
- “The man with no plan for Pakistan,” Sadanand Dhume, American Enterprise Institute, 28 June 2012
- “The ‘Essentials’ of Transition,” SOLLIMS Lesson 867
- “Failure of the Top-Down Approach in Afghanistan,” SOLLIMS Lesson 775
3.c. **TOPIC.** Preventing Electoral Violence (820)

**Observation.**

In the wake of violent elections in Kenya in 2007-08 and in the Ivory Coast in 2010, the international community and many national governments & civil society actors have become increasingly aware of the need to place a greater emphasis on prevention of electoral violence. Several other recent cases – South Africa, Guyana, and Ghana – show that smart, targeted measures can have a highly positive impact on reducing and mitigating election-related tensions and violence.

**Discussion.**

Elections in post-conflict African nations have sometimes served as triggers for both regional and national level violence and instability. Contributing factors have been numerous. Harsh rhetoric used by political party leaders and their supporters, as well as by a biased media, have often heightened tensions, demonized opponents, and created an environment in which violence was apt to occur. When and where citizens had low levels of trust in the integrity of the electoral process or in the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) overseeing the process, this became another motivator for complaints and a factor behind electoral violence. Also, in areas/communities where government security institutions had limited authority/influence, or where militias, separation movements, or criminal gangs had a strong presence, the likelihood for electoral violence proved to be significantly higher.

Four case studies of elections in African nations reveal that smart, targeted measures - aimed at strengthening local and national infrastructure for peace (I4P) – had a significant, positive impact on preventing and/or reducing violence during election timeframes. Those cases were South Africa (1994), Guyana (2000), Ghana (2008), and even violence-affected Kenya (2007-08).

In advance of South Africa’s 1994 elections, the National Peace Accord of 1991 put into place a key measure that targeted/focused on community-level involvement in reconciliation and dispute resolution activities. Through this measure, in all eleven regions of the country, Regional Peace Committees were established. These Regional Peace Committees then oversaw the establishment of Local Peace Committees throughout the vast majority of towns and villages. With this wide network of peace councils, relevant stakeholders were given multiple avenues to raise any issues related to the electoral process, to then cooperate on resolving these issues/disputes, and to also develop and implement measures to prevent conflict. The end result was far less violence in 1994 than had been anticipated three years earlier.

In 2000, Guyana was able to conduct its first ever violence-free election. Primary factors contributing to this success were the early establishment of a Media
Monitoring Centre, a Code of Conduct for the Media, and a broad-based "Social Cohesion Programme" – supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The "Social Cohesion Programme" was especially effective; it included a national dialogue process, networks of mediators to address national issues before and during the elections, networks of mediators to reduce tensions within local communities, and a number of agreements forged among the political parties to ensure fair and free elections.

Similar election success occurred for the country of Ghana in 2008. Here, the early establishment of a National Peace Council played a major role in ensuring peaceful elections – at both the national and local levels. The National Peace Council set up multiple forums for dialoguing with societal groups, including political parties, and to peacefully manage many complex differences and disputes among them. In many cases, discreet meetings were held with stakeholders to defuse the most sensitive issues and/or rising tensions. The incorporation of key religious leaders in the National Peace Council and in the forums proved to be very helpful in resolving the disputes and reducing tensions.

At the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008, major post-election violence broke out in Kenya, after the announcement of the election results by the Electoral Commission. This violence claimed 1,300 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. However, far less violence was evidenced in districts where a District Peace Council had been established than in those districts where none had been set up. These local peace councils quickly stepped up to manage inter-community disputes and tensions during and after the elections and to contain and mitigate incidents of violence.

These four cases provide only snapshots of electoral violence successes in African countries, but more importantly, they indicate that small, focused measures – involving societal groups and dispute resolution programs & councils – were keys to reducing any tensions leading up to the elections and to mitigating electoral violence.

**Recommendation.**

The authors of the article "A Way Forward to Peaceful Elections" (see Event Description below) offer the following recommendations:

1. Start early. Analysis, planning, and implementation of measures for the prevention of electoral violence should begin 24-48 months in advance of elections.

2. Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). Standing capabilities in the form of peace committees, joint operating centers, and trained mediators can all help to address tensions and prevent or reduce cases of violence.
3. Effective, early, and joint analysis is critical; scenario planning can help. Analysis should be carried out early in the following four categories: (1) structural/primary causes of instability and root causes of conflict (e.g., deep-seated inequalities between ethnic groups), (2) other/secondary drivers of conflict and instability (e.g., hate speeches), (3) election-specific causes (e.g., lack of trust in Electoral Management Bodies), and (4) conflict handling capabilities (e.g., national, state/county, and district/community capacities for preventing and mitigating violence).

4. Development of national strategies helps. All relevant ministries and state and non-state actors with mandates for elections, peace building, or dealing with possible violence should be included in developing national strategies for elections.

5. Take a "Governance and Electoral Cycle Approach." Electoral system reform, political party reform, constitutional reform, and legal reform can all contribute to reducing the likelihood of electoral violence.

6. Use social media and media campaigns to raise people’s awareness of the costs and impacts of violence and to promote violence-free elections.

7. Engage, mobilize, and empower the broad majority of the population to actively participate in peaceful elections.

8. Train and prepare police and security forces to use non-violent responses for election scenarios.

9. Set up effective early warning and critical incident mapping systems for elections – in order to map developing situations where tensions are escalating, allowing for rapid and appropriate responses.

10. Prepare governmental and civil society peace capacities – from local peace teams to networks of mediators – to engage in emergent and actual cases of violence.

11. Establish coordination mechanisms among the many different actors involved in peace building and electoral support.

Implications.

If steps are not taken early to address the potential for electoral violence, the consequences may be severe – including large-scale casualties, destruction of infrastructure, and loss of investment in the host nation. Social conflicts (along ethnic, religious, regional or other lines) may deepen and spiral into further violence, threatening gains made in governance, security, and stability.
Event Description.

This lesson is based on the article "A Way Forward to Peaceful Elections," by Paul van Tongeren and Kai Brand-Jacobsen, New Routes, 1/2012.

Comments.

A related lesson which emphasizes the importance of civil society groups/committees in nations with rising social tensions and clashes is SOLLIMS Lesson 702 – “Civil Society Capacity and Action for Peace Building – Kenya.”

A related article which presents a multifaceted approach for prevention and mitigation of election-related violence is "A Three Layered Approach to the Prevention of Electoral Violence," by Sead Alihodzic, New Routes, 1/2012.

4. Legitimacy

Legitimacy has three facets: the degree to which the host nation population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; the degree to which the government is accountable to its people; and the degree to which regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the mission mandate and the host nation government.

Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan (6 Sep 2012). Members of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat, discuss issues pertaining to the new stand up of the Shafafiyat Committed established in zone 707. Shafafiyat Committees have been established in Afghan National Police (ANP) zones throughout the country as an anti-corruption tool, to ensure transparency and foster trust with the people. (Photo by Captain Genieve David)
Observation.

When conducting peace and stability operations, the principles of justice and reconciliation are critical components in establishing rule of law. It is important, however, to assess what constitutes justice and the challenge of balancing justice with reconciliation between (or amongst) belligerents. Police play an essential role in setting conditions for adequate justice and rule of law.

Discussion.

As is often the case in extremely unstable regions, individuals with power both within the state and outside of it can turn justice and rule of law on their ear. Regardless of how a conflict starts, the reconciliation between parties is a precursor to building peace and stability. The process towards reconciliation starts with ending violence, followed by an incremental approach towards reshaping attitudes, tolerance for one another, and in the best circumstances, democratic institutions. Along the way however, it is fraught with challenges. Once large-scale violence has been contained, it does not obviate the fact that most civilians are fearful of its return and must learn to coexist with groups and individuals they were recently at odds with. Resolving this fear requires healing, both on the parts of victims and offenders (which can be one and the same depending on the circumstances), which is often achieved by "truth telling" or increased transparency as to what, why, and how things occurred. This is clearly a critical juncture, and peacekeeping forces and various other officials have a crucial role to play in acting as intermediaries in helping to delve out the truth in an unbiased fashion.

Justice is a crucial component to moving forward, but must be wielded in a deliberate and neutral fashion, executed by either the state or a state-sanctioned body. This step is often secondary to building trust between warring parties, and the reason for this is because legitimate institutions must be in place for justice to be effective. Justice in most cultures is best encapsulated with a set of rules that protects the minority rights, is created by an assembly that represents the views of those being subjected to the laws, and is representative of the culture/moral code of those being governed, with those wielding the power subject to the same statutes.

Police are the first echelon of deterrence, enforcement, and accountability for any legitimate justice system. A modern police force must execute a litany of tasks that include search and rescue, community education, counterinsurgency, intelligence, maintaining order, conducting investigations, border security, and the list goes on. This multitude of tasks roughly falls across a continuum with security on one end and safety/community development on the other. The challenge for many police organizations is to recognize which of these functions
require the most effort and guarding against the propensity to overemphasize security to the detriment of personal liberties.

**Recommendation.**

1. The ideal resources to garner public support for the various echelons of police forces are information and experience:

   - Transparency (information) is a crucial component in establishing a legitimate police force that the public supports. Public support for police is evident when the community feels the police "protect and serve" their interests, and the benefits come in the form of active neighborhood watch programs and community support in reporting illicit activities. When the community feels persecuted by the police, you end up with an "us versus them" model reminiscent of New York City in the 1970s.
   - Experience also plays a critical role. It is estimated that the average police officer requires three years on the job before he or she genuinely understands the local problems and is able to handle them at the appropriate level. This situational awareness is a major contributor in maintaining the trust and confidence of the population.

2. Justice and reconciliation present extremely dynamic challenges with no textbook answer. Each conflict will require emphasizing different initiatives to achieve desired outcomes and significant patience on the part of both warring factions and those charged with creating the conditions for peace.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on course readings/analysis during U.S. Army War College elective course PS 2219 (Peace & Stability Operations – Concepts & Principles) lesson 8, Justice and Reconciliation.

4.b. **TOPIC.** Civil Society Capacity and Action for Peace Building – Kenya (702)

**Observations.**

In the immediate aftermath of the December 2007 elections in Kenya, violent clashes broke out that threatened the very existence of the country. Besides the successful formal mediation efforts by the former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, an equally impressive "civil society response" – based on previously developed civil society peace building capacity – was absolutely
critical to bringing about peace to this country in chaos. The actions of the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) during this crisis of emergent/spiraling violence is a tremendous example of utilizing civil society peace building capacity, mobilizing a larger constituency on short notice, incorporating multi-sector and multi-level actions, and teaming with a parallel formal mediation effort.

**Discussion.**

Politically instigated ethnic clashes had been a well-known source of violent conflict in Kenya prior to the elections of December 2007. Ruthless politicians/candidates had often utilized youth militia groups to carry out violent attacks on communities they perceived to be in opposition to their political agendas.

In December 2007, national presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Kenya. Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga were the two leading presidential candidates. In the months and weeks leading up to voting day, opinion polls favored Odinga and his party. Early voting results on 27 December indicated that Odinga had built a comfortable lead. However, this lead gradually eroded, and, as election day passed and two more days passed without a presidential winner being declared, tensions and anxiety among Kenyans gave way to many violent clashes and incidents. Finally, on 30 December, the Electoral Commission of Kenya announced that Kibaki had actually won. With this announcement, Kenya exploded into unprecedented and widespread violence/conflict. 1,300 people lost their lives, and more than 500,000 people were displaced.

Within 24 hours of the 30 December announcement, in the midst of the spiraling violence, a new civil society group called Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) was launched by five prominent Kenyan civil society peace workers and mediators, including two retired general officers. The group's formation was widely announced to the public. Among the CCP's five core leaders was Ms. Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, well known as a founding member of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee. By way of background, Ms. Abdi had worked with a number of women back in the 1993-95 timeframe to address a cycle of violence in the Wajir district of Kenya, where state institutions had miserably failed to provide security. These women took initiative and developed a civil society peace building capacity to address that cycle of violence. They initially engaged the elders of different clans, set up a mediation process, and included formal authorities such as the district commissioner. In 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was established, which broadened participation in the province to include additional government officials, security personnel, religious leaders, NGO representatives, tribal chiefs, and peace advocates. This civil society committee not only brought peace to the Wajir district, but was also used as a model for all districts throughout northern Kenya.
Notably, the districts of Kenya that had such Wajir-like civil society peace committees in place during the aftermath of the December 2007 elections reported far less violence than the districts without such committees.

The CCP, formed on 31 December 2007, immediately drew upon existing civil society peace building capacity and provided a crucial space/avenue for all people to utilize. The CCP’s initial focus was to plead publicly and privately with political leaders and candidates to dialogue, while simultaneously reaching out to all Kenyans. In its very first media appearance, the CCP appealed to all Kenyans to halt the violence and called for calm, peace, and dialogue throughout the country. The CCP leaders invited anyone and everyone interested in peace to come to their location, the Serena Hotel, to join the group.

An Open Forum was born, then, on 1 January 2008. The Open Forum's daily morning sessions became the meeting place for civil society group leaders, politicians, private sector representatives, various professionals, the media, and people from all walks of life. Working committees were developed in the areas of Humanitarian Response, Media, Community Mobilization, Resource Mobilization, and High Level Dialogue. Committee members harvested ideas and suggestions from the people gathered at the Open Forum, developed discussions on those topics, and then produced focused actions. The High Level Dialogue committee soon interfaced with a parallel, formal mediation effort led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Besides the working committees, a web of interrelated groups emerged from the Open Forum: the "Concerned Youth for Peace," "Concerned Kenyan Writers," "Concerned Artists and Celebrities for Peace," "Concerned Women," and several others. Each of these groups and their leaders were deliberately linked to other networks/leaders. The resulting interactions encompassed and connected multiple sectors and multiple levels of Kenyan society.

On 9 January 2008, in just 10 days' time, the CCP released a document entitled "Citizens' Agenda for Peace." This document provided a 7-point agenda for ending the crisis. Among its points were the building of trust and confidence between the (competing) political parties, closure to the elections, and the formation of a government of national unity. On 28 February 2008, the formal mediation process led by Mr. Kofi Annan (and involving the African Union's Panel of Eminent Personalities) produced its own "National Peace and Reconciliation Accord" – which bore a striking resemblance to the CCP document released weeks earlier.

**Recommendation.**

1. Stability operations practitioners should consider building "civil society peace building capacity" in states/provinces prone to conflict. Kenya's Wajir Peace and Development Committee – which included women, government officials, security
personnel, clan/tribal leaders, religious leaders, NGO representatives, and peace advocates – can serve as a useful model for some fragile states/provinces.

2. In conditions of emergent/spiraling violence in fragile states, it is important for respected leaders – internal and external – to take prompt action to mobilize peace building efforts. In the case of Kenya, the efforts of Ms. Dekha Abdi and the other four leaders of CCP, and the parallel work of Mr. Kofi Annan and the African Union's Panel of Eminent Personalities, were absolutely critical in grabbing the attention of the Kenyan people and in mobilizing multiple sectors of society for peacebuilding.

3. In conditions of emergent/spiraling violence in fragile states, it is likewise essential that a space/avenue be provided to the people to vent their frustrations and to develop alternatives to violence. In the case of Kenya, the CCP afforded that necessary space/avenue for positive civil society actions.

4. In peace building and conflict resolution actions, those leading the actions should employ an inclusive strategy – one of maximum participation/representation and transparency. The CCP’s call for anyone and everyone to participate, the daily Open Forum, and the active participation of media in the Open Forum, all serve as an excellent example of an inclusive strategy and the resulting benefits.

5. In peace building and conflict resolution actions, those leading the actions should ensure that participation is extended to multiple levels and multiple sectors of society. In the case of Kenya’s Open Forum, the "reach" generated by linking the various committees and groups to one another bridged the lines of party, tribe, ethnicity, religion, age, and gender.

Implications.

If civil society capacity for conflict resolution is not developed in fragile states, and if respected leaders do not step up in a crisis to use this capacity and to mobilize society for peacebuilding, then conflict can quickly spiral out of control and turn the state into lawless chaos.

The need to get the word out to all countrymen to end rising violence and to join peacebuilding efforts (in times of crisis) implies that mass communication venues/resources are readily available. If they are not, peace building leaders should exhaust all available alternatives in order to maximize information dissemination.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "Inspiring Citizens' Initiative for Peacebuilding in Kenya," by Paul van Tongeren, New Routes, 4/2010.
Comments.

A related article, which also documents the origins of the CCP and its work during the violent aftermath of the December 2007 Kenyan elections, is "Citizens in Action: Making Peace in the Post-Conflict Election Crisis in Kenya," by George Wachira, with Thomas Arendshorst and Simon M. Charles, NPI-Africa and GPPAC, January 2010.

4.c. **TOPIC.** Governance and Democracy (1346)

**Observations.**

The development of democratic governments is challenging and will continue to be a struggle for nations well into the future. However, the importance of democratic governments for the well-being of citizens cannot be overstated. In a world that continues to reshape borders and work through conflict and security issues while continuing on a path of globalization, democratic governance is the key to future success.

**Discussion.**

Governance is hard. Establishing a government that is capable to govern within the framework of a democracy is even harder. In today’s complex world, the U.S. and many other western governments seek a more democratic world with values-based national governments that are freely elected; listen to, support, and respect their constituents; and, provide their citizens opportunity. Opportunity is measured in many forms; some include economic development, improved health and social services, and education. However, opportunity for the “pursuit of happiness” may be the most self-motivating inspiration that a government can provide its citizens.

Re-establishing a government at all levels is extremely challenging. This lesson was learned in Iraq, once De-Baathification was instituted. This wholesale dismissal of the government created instability down to the lowest level of governance within the neighborhoods. While deployed to the east side of Baghdad, my unit was responsible for the suburb of Zafraniyah. Composed of three neighborhoods, Zafraniyah is a mixed industrial and agricultural suburb of the Karadah governance district within Baghdad. Zafraniyah had the ability to thrive economically with initial assistance from the city and national government.

Although elusive for many, the right to a democratic government is seen as a legal entitlement by world organizations and western governments. However,
the right to a democratic government, regularly freely elected by the people, with representation powers, and a voice for the minority, is more than a legal entitlement. It is a human entitlement. This human entitlement is what provides the impetus for self-determination in the establishment of a nation. My experience in Iraq was that many wanted a legitimate government that would take care of their basic needs while promoting opportunity to grow economically. With a stable government, self-determination drives economic success. At my level, it was critical to ensure the local government was functioning and considered legitimate in Zafraniyah. We had to ensure the integrity of a voting process, effective local neighborhood meetings, and that Zafraniyah leadership provided a unified front at district level meetings. As a major hub of potential economic activity, the neighborhoods had to come together to speak with one clear voice at the district meetings to ensure the flow of resources.

The establishment and support of fledgling democracies is very challenging and intensive. This is one of the most critical areas for development, since solid governance feeds the overall national psyche. There are many reasons for the lack of democracy. The most inhibiting is the desire for power – controlling resources to control the population. Power struggles were a constant source of tension at many district level meetings, putting the fledgling democratic process at risk. Many countries that are a democracy for a short time period are most at risk of losing sight of the desire to remain a democracy. This is due to the inherent risks to personal security, the possible lack of infrastructure, and the perceived lack of access to resources – especially formerly provided state resources. Establishing legitimacy is also a major issue for a new form of government.

In Zafraniyah many of the local neighborhood representatives did not trust the district council, the city, or the national level government to provide their basic needs. Bribery was rampant, and there was no system of accountability. There were three critical areas local citizens felt were not getting enough attention. They were: security, water/health, and economic development. In order to establish the credibility of the local government and produce results for the citizens, we began, on a small scale, a city planning process to compile a list of projects required in each neighborhood. Once established the local council held weekly meetings with the public to inform them of the projects and way ahead. When attending district level meetings, the representatives of Zafraniyah briefed their projects with the current status and resources needed to move forward. We then ensured that the neighborhood representatives collaborated, through the district level, with Baghdad government offices to ensure their projects moved forward. Many of the projects included rebuilding of essential infrastructure for the area.

In addition to this process, we recommended that the neighborhoods conduct local elections to ensure fair representation at the district level meetings. This was a long process as it involved developing a plan with the local police for
security during the election process, the establishment of voting sites, and a method of tabulating votes. As well, the local politicians had to develop a way to communicate with a population that was mostly illiterate. Unique to this part of Karadah was the election of women to many of the district boards and as neighborhood representatives. This demonstrated to the local citizens that everyone can contribute to the cause of making their lives better regardless of gender.

Once the local government was established and a process was followed to interact with higher levels of government, more resources began to flow to Zafraniyah. As this continued, many local entrepreneurs started to establish businesses and hiring local people. This began to build the confidence of the local population and an understanding of how a democratic process functions. The local government was seen as legitimate, and conflict among the neighborhoods was resolved locally.

The establishment of a democratic process at the lowest level can build momentum. However, that momentum can be easily lost, especially when the security apparatus begins to falter and opportunities become fleeting. After a generation or so of suffering under a democracy that has lost momentum, it is possible that some will turn back to their previous form of government if they have no sense of a positive future. This is especially true if they had not suffered under the previous establishment. Given this, there is still hope as the economics of globalization continues to move forward.

Democracies will never go away, and the world will continue to have many points of transition and governments. Moreover, citizens will continue to learn that a freely elected government by the people is the best choice for their nation. Iraq has a great deal of potential; it will flourish under the right government, legitimately elected and representative of the people.

**Recommendation.**

1. To ensure the stability, integrity, and legitimacy of national governments, it is important to establish local governance in a manner that is understood by the local population. All U.S. persons involved in this process require an understanding of the local culture and historical animosities, with a solid understanding of how governance functions. For the military, this may require instruction on how to establish local governments and how they tie in to each level of government above the neighborhood or tribal areas. It also means knowing and understanding whom to go to for help. In this case, it was leveraging the Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to facilitate the process and help educate local politicians.

2. Foreign aid to nations that develop government based on democratic values should be increased. Refocus aid away from those that refuse or do not desire
to uphold democratic values with legally elected representation for their people. This can be done at the local level as well as the national level. In repressive countries, devise programs to further the ideals of freedom and democracy though creative means. Enable populations to communicate through various media platforms – to include through the airwaves.

3. On the global platform, point out governments that continue to repress their citizens in open forums; hold accountable those governments that are beginning to slip out of democracy through international pressure. Aggressively use a whole-of-government approach to entice further reform in non-democratic nations. The U.S. cannot do it alone; we must garner the support of international partners, foreign governments, and the NGO community to facilitate the spread of democracy and the necessity of good governance.

**Implications.**

Only when democratic governments are formed will people begin their “pursuit of happiness” – when this occurs they begin to thrive economically. With positive economics, people begin to pull themselves out of poverty. Democracy, economic development, and the reduction of poverty are all interrelated. Democratic governments bring opportunity to those that are without, raise the standard of living of the poor, and empower women. Women form the cornerstone of the family and support their family not just from a maternal aspect but also from an economic basis. The success and survival of the family is critical to the future of a nation. True democracies establish systems that enable their population to better themselves. Global democracy is in the best interests of the U.S. and our democratic partners.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on readings from U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective course PS2206 (International Development) and personal experience.

5. **Unity of Effort**

Unity of Effort begins with the shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.
Farah City, Afghanistan (10 April 2013). U.S. Navy Lieutenant j.g. Matthew Stroup, left, public affairs officer for Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Farah, and Jim Otwell, right, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) field program officer with the PRT, talk with Lal Mohammed Bahari, Farah provincial director of information and culture during a key leader engagement in Farah City. PRT Farah's mission is to train, advise and assist Afghan government leaders at the municipal, district and provincial levels in Farah province. Their civil military team is comprised of members of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of State, and USAID. (U.S. Navy photo by HMC Josh Ives/released)

5.a. **TOPIC. Relationship between Civilian Agencies and the Military in Peace and Stability Operations** (1141)

**Observations.**

The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) has its foundation on three pillars, the so-called 3-Ds: Defense-Diplomacy-Development.[1] The major agencies that represent the 3-Ds are respectively the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Most times, these agencies – but not only these agencies – implement what is usually called a U.S. Government (USG) comprehensive approach to peace and stability operations (PSO). Similarly, in the United Nations (UN), a comprehensive approach to PSO is coordinated by the major structures of the Secretariat, especially the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Both the USG and the UN have considered the best manner in which to develop a relationship between civilian agencies and military agencies for effective delivery of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and stability and security assistance in affected
countries. This lesson will offer some thoughts about civil-military relations within the USG and UN.


**Discussion:**

The core humanitarian principles are the first point to consider in the relationship between civilian agencies – governmental or non-governmental – and the military. As stated by the UN General Assembly – in Resolution 46/182 – humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Hence, in a relationship that involves humanitarian assistance work, civilian agencies and the military must follow guidelines to work together and also respect these principles.

In the visions of both the USG and UN, military means should be employed by humanitarian agencies as a last resort in PSO. In these kinds of operations, usually there are internal fractures in the host nation politics, which is one of the root causes of the conflict. The participation of the military in supporting humanitarian assistance could be perceived as an illegitimate preference to a political or ethnic group to the detriment of other groups which are part of the conflict. So, participation by the military should be required only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required.

An important consideration within both the UN and USG scopes is the disparity in size and resources between civilian and military elements. The military usually has structure, equipment, resources, personnel and capabilities on a much larger scale than civilian agencies. The military can execute its primary mission in PSO – provide a secure environment – and can support operations of other agencies as well. Hence, the military is an important resource which is often available to civilian agencies. This makes the military an indispensable actor in PSO. In consequence, both civilian and military actors must establish links to coordinate their actions where and when it is possible, without spoiling their missions and forms of action.

In addition, most of the armed actors are likely to seek to establish relationships with the civilian population and in many cases attempt to provide them assistance. In some cases, the military forces can provide useful resources and support to the affected country or region, its population, or humanitarian actors. In other cases, the perceived association with an armed actor can compromise the humanitarian efforts and may pose an additional security threat. Dealing with these challenges requires training, appropriate experience, and, in some cases, dedicated staff.[2]
The UN is more averse to the use of the military by civilian agencies, despite many times in which the situation makes the UN call for military support to humanitarian activities in PSO. In the UN vision, humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on military sources. Member States are encouraged to invest in increased civilian capacity instead. The USG’s view differs from that of the UN. The USG stimulates USAID to engage DoD. This approach to the military is important for USAID and also for DoS. The capacity of the military to operate in a difficult environment and provide logistic support can be a valuable resource for USAID and DoS activities. The military may be critical for the accomplishment of development goals and objectives, or at least useful to the success of USAID's and DoS's missions. In many situations, “security, protection, stabilization and reconstruction concerns will drive relationships at strategic, operational, tactical or technical levels.”[3]

In both the UN and USG scopes, there is a particular challenge. Civilian agencies and the military usually interact at the tactical level. Sometimes they coordinate actions at the operational level. They rarely integrate planning and decision-making processes at the strategic level. However, the USG is seeking to increase the interagency integration. As stated in the USG doctrine for interagency operations, the DoD, DoS, and USAID will seek to integrate mutually supportive planning processes to attain U.S. development and security goals. This recent USG doctrine was started by the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56. “This model was used during the Clinton Administration and called on the DC to establish interagency working groups to develop, plan, and execute contingency operations.”[4] Also, according to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, facilitate unity of effort, achieve common objectives, and provide common understanding are some of the foundations of inter-organizational coordination[5] and must be developed from the strategic level to the tactical level.

In the UN, interagency integration is much more difficult than in the USG. The UN structure is much less hierarchal. The UN has a special concern about the relationship between civilian and military actors because of its sensitivity. The UN deals with this issue by seeking implementation of civil-military coordination. The UN's doctrine is stated in a field handbook on civil-military coordination.

While the UN-CMCoord [United Nations Civil-Military Coordination] Officer assigned to the HC/RC [Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator] is responsible for the civil-military relationship at the policy level, other CMCoord Officers and/or MLOs [military liaison officers] may be assigned to coordinate humanitarian efforts at the operational level by their respective organizations.[6]

Support the establishment and sustainment of dialogue with military forces, assist in the development and dissemination of guidelines for the humanitarian community’s interaction with military forces and armed actors, establish a mechanism for the coordination of the UN humanitarian interaction with military
forces and other armed actors, and monitor assistance activities undertaken by the military forces are the UN's guidelines to enhance civil-military relations.[7]

Both the USG and UN have concerns about the chain of command and the possible damage to the legitimacy of the humanitarian and development agencies while working with the military. On the USG side, USAID personnel come under U.S. Chief of the Mission authority and status under Geneva Conventions (as civilians). These U.S. civilian officials should not bear weapons and must not use USAID funds toward disarmament. In a UN-led PSO, all agencies operating in the country report to the Head of Mission.


**Recommendation.**

The interaction between civilian and military actors is as sensitive as it is necessary. The USG and the UN share common concerns and have similar approaches. However, the USG is more prone to use military means to support civilian agencies than the UN is. Despite this difference, both the USG and the UN have very good doctrine to regulate civil-military relations. What is missing is to promote, in all agencies, a culture of mutual understanding and cooperation. This can be attained with efforts on education and training of civil and military personnel at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. In consequence, civil-military relations should be taught in all USG and UN educational institutions.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on thoughts which have risen from PKSOI elective classes, U.S. Army War College, May, 2013.
5.b. **TOPIC.** Role of Whole-of-Government Approach in Ending Conflict

(1087)

**Observations.**

To effectively address conflict, a whole-of-government approach is critical. However, achieving unified action between U.S. Government agencies can be challenging.

**Discussion.**

The U.S. Government recognizes that, to effectively end conflict, a whole-of-government approach is essential. The U.S. Government must harness and synchronize the execution of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development (3Ds) to achieve success in effectively transitioning active conflict into stability, and take the necessary steps to prevent violent conflict before it (re)occurs. Each of the departments responsible for the respective functions – Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – views conflict differently, which can create challenges for achieving unified action, but also can result in a more holistic view of conflict if assessments and views are shared between the three.

The DoD considers conflict in regards to an adversary, the conditions that have caused the adversary to choose violence, and how the adversary can be defeated. To assess the environment and the adversary, DoD uses an analytical process called the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), which: 1) defines the total environment, 2) describes the impact of the operational environment, 3) evaluates the adversary, and 4) determines and describes the adversary's potential courses of action. The holistic consideration of the environment uses a Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) systems construct to assess the environment towards identifying the underlying conditions that are contributing to increasing the potential for violent conflict, enabling the Joint Force Commander to develop strategies to defeat adversaries and/or address the underlying conditions.

The Department of State views conflict as fundamentally a dispute between actors who are addressed using diplomacy to establish and develop a dialogue to achieve a reconciliation of differences. DoS leverages its Ambassador's role of Chief of Mission to synchronize whole-of-government efforts at the country level. The focus is on developing and maintaining relationships between parties in order to facilitate dialogue which can either prevent conflict or reconcile parties in conflict. This may require continued engagement over time to enable the shaping of positions or perceptions of what their best interests truly are. DoS uses the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to: 1) evaluate the context of the conflict, 2) understand core grievances and social/institutional
resilience, 3) identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and 4) describe opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.

The U.S. Agency for International Development views conflict as arising from the context or underlying conditions of a country. USAID believes that if you address the underlying drivers of conflict by using development to close the gaps or weaknesses in the societal fabric, conflict can be halted or prevented. The focus in developing projects that address developmental shortfalls is based on analysis of stakeholders, economic analysis, conflict analysis, financial analysis, gender analysis, and environmental analysis – all towards ensuring that a development program will adequately address the need, as well as be economically feasible and sustainable. Over an extended period, developmental aid aims to address the underlying sources of grievance from which violent conflict can arise.

The agencies/departments approach conflict differently based on their organizational culture and function. Because they view the sources of conflict differently, they will adopt different approaches to resolving conflict. This may create friction/conflict when attempting to develop and implement whole-of-government approaches. This friction/conflict can be overcome, however, through effective communication and coordination. While each agency/department uses different methods, they can be synchronized to achieve unified action towards a common end.

The different viewpoints of the agencies/departments can be exceptionally useful in developing a holistic view of the context of conflict, highlighting elements that might have been overlooked by an agency because of its own cultural approach to conflict. This can be essential in developing solutions that resolve the underlying causes of conflict. The key is in developing mechanisms which can integrate the efforts of each agency, recognizing individual strengths, but also recognizing that more can be achieved by working together.

**Recommendation.**

Because each agency (DoS, DoD, USAID) has a unique culture and outlook, the starting point in achieving improved unity of effort is to foster improved understanding of each agency’s role in achieving stability and its unique cultural outlook. Providing opportunities for increased interaction and training between the three agencies, particularly at more junior levels of the work force, could foster improved understanding and more effective coordination in the future.

**Implications.**

Over the last decade of war, much headway has been made in achieving unity of effort, particularly at the tactical level. In order to retain this experience and improve future operations, we must work to institutionalize the lessons we have
learned and create opportunities to further develop relationships to foster improved unity of effort in future operations.

**Event Description.**

This lesson was developed for U.S. Army War College PKSOI Elective Course PS2219A (Peace & Stability Operations – Concepts & Principles).

5.c. **TOPIC.** PRT & Brigade Task Force Unity of Effort (749)

**Observations.**

Through a deliberate "unity of effort" approach, a certain Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a certain Brigade Task Force in Iraq were able to attain tremendous success at fostering economic growth, building civil capacity, and supporting governance efforts within their province. This PRT and Brigade Task Force employed three primary measures in pursuit of "unity of effort": (1) acting as one team, (2) focusing on income-generating "small" projects/enterprises, and (3) demanding local "buy in." Through these measures, the PRT-Brigade "team" was able to continuously strengthen civil capacity and facilitate sustainable economic growth across the province.

**Discussion.**

Operating in Ninewa Province, Iraq, during the 2009-2010 timeframe, "Team Ninewa" was both an unofficial organization and a deliberate approach for "unity of effort" of reconstruction operations. "Team Ninewa" consisted of two primary organizations - the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (Ninewa PRT) (led by the State Department) and Task Force Spartan (TF Spartan) (the 2nd Advise and Assist Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division). Also, the 130th Engineer Brigade's Ninewa Reconstruction Cell (NRC) – responsible for U.S. engineering projects in the province – rounded out the team. These three organizations established "unity of effort" by coming to agreement on a clear vision:

…the vision of Team Ninewa was to work in partnership with the Ninewa Provincial Government and local associations to build economic and governance capacity at the provincial and local levels with an end state of a legitimate, transparent, and representative government capable of delivering essential services, fostering sustainable economic growth, respecting and bolstering rule of law, and providing security for its people.
The challenges to achieving this vision were considerable. Ninewa Province was arguably the most diverse and unstable province in Iraq. Arabs and Kurds had been divided along ethnic lines, and external players had exercised significant influence in the politics of the province. In the southern portion of Ninewa, Sunni Arabs had endured four years of severe drought. Agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources were very limited here. In the northern portion, Kurds had greater water resources, numerous oil fields, sufficient supplies of kerosene, and better agricultural conditions and crop yields. Recognizing these challenges and differences, Team Ninewa worked diligently to build host nation governance capable of delivering essential services and security for all. Team Ninewa opened its aperture for economic development recipients, seeking out new local partners across the province, such as agricultural associations, women's groups, and small businessmen/entrepreneurs.

Three main tenets were followed by Team Ninewa's members throughout their reconstruction operations: (1) acting as one team, (2) focusing on income-generating "small" projects/enterprises, and (3) demanding local "buy in."

**Acting as one team.** Ninewa PRT, TF Spartan, and the Engineering NRC held a meeting every week to discuss, assess, and de-conflict all U.S. government assistance and program-spending within the province. At these "Team Ninewa" meetings, Ninewa PRT had the lead role of articulating U.S. policy and development goals for Ninewa Province. TF Spartan had the lead role in communicating security-related goals and in assessing security impacts of reconstruction initiatives. Together, Ninewa PRT and TF Spartan worked to resolve any conflicts between goals and to set priorities. Besides the weekly "Team Ninewa" meetings, Ninewa PRT and TF Spartan also participated in each other's re-occurring meetings. Such participation/inclusion ensured transparency and enhanced "unity of effort."

TF Spartan wrote the following directive within its mission statement: "provide support to the PRT." In practice, whatever was needed by Ninewa PRT, TF Spartan would help provide. An entire field artillery battalion was placed in "direct support" of Ninewa PRT by TF Spartan. That field artillery battalion's "direct support" included dedicated movement teams, logistical support, security, communications support, and even staff augmentation for the PRT. TF Spartan itself provided the Ninewa PRT with helicopter lift support, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) surveillance support, intelligence updates, Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, and assistance in CERP project packet development.

Additionally, to ensure that the Iraqi government and citizens knew that the U.S. organizations were speaking as one, TF Spartan's leadership no longer held independent meetings with the Ninewa Governor, Ninewa provincial councilmen, or the Mosul Mayor. Instead, TF Spartan would participate in such engagements only through and with PRT Ninewa.
Focusing on income-generating "small" projects/enterprises. Team Ninewa's strategy for economic development was to place emphasis on income-generating "small" projects (vice large infrastructure targets), as well as to push such projects into rural areas. In the village of Tawajena, for instance, where farmers had been engaging primarily in government-subsidized grain production and had also been involved in insurgent support/smuggling, Team Ninewa introduced an inexpensive drip irrigation system, which allowed farmers to switch to various cash crops such as eggplant, melon, tomatoes, and squash. Farmers now had direct control over the price and the market demand for their produce. Results were exceedingly positive – convincing farmers to continue in this line of work, vice their former activities. Another good example of the "small" rural focus was Team Ninewa's frequent provision of greenhouses to small agricultural associations/cooperatives in rural communities. Given one or two greenhouses, an Iraqi agricultural association would lease the greenhouse(s) to its members, and then later purchase additional greenhouses once enough income was received from the leases. Both the agricultural association and its members quickly learned to manage, and benefit from, market-driven incentives and profits. These greenhouse projects created lasting jobs and expanded managerial capacity.

Another small-enterprise program pursued by Team Ninewa was the Ninewa Women's Initiative Program. In this program, Team Ninewa utilized Department of State Quick Response Funds (QRF) to provide training to women's groups on business planning. These women's groups then developed plans for various small businesses, such as catering, laundry, sewing, and internet businesses. Once the women's groups had also developed market studies and budget plans, CERP funds would be utilized to help them establish those businesses, which ranged in value from $7,000 to $10,000.

Large infrastructure targets were not totally eliminated, however, they were carefully scrutinized by the NRC and nested within Team Ninewa's goal setting/prioritization process. Such projects had historically been non-sustainable by and large.

Demanding local "buy in." Team Ninewa demanded local "buy in" for all reconstruction projects. All projects were based upon the ideas and goals of local Iraqis. Due to weak relationships, processes, and communications between local governments and the Ninewa provincial government, however, as well as between the provincial government and Baghdad, local Iraqis often needed U.S. support to gain necessary Iraqi governmental approval and resourcing for projects. Team Ninewa would then help influence the process and the responsiveness of Iraqi governance in such cases – by engaging key leaders/officials at the local and provincial levels and by coordinating higher as necessary to get officials to work the actions.
In all cases, however, if a project did not truly have Iraqi "buy in" – in the form of Iraqi vision, financing, labor, or supplies – then Team Ninewa would not approve any CERP or QRF funding. Team Ninewa insisted that Iraqis provide their "fair share" of resources for all projects. For instance, Team Ninewa would provide materials but not labor, or Team Ninewa would provide training but not financing. In the many instances where Team Ninewa provided greenhouses to agricultural cooperatives, the Iraqi contribution – from the Ninewa Directorate General (DG) of Agriculture – was to provide all training for managing and operating the greenhouses. This "buy in" and fair share methodology helped to ensure that all projects were sustainable.

Overall, the "unity of effort" approach practiced by Team Ninewa led to tens of millions of dollars in savings on projects over the course of the year and to effective use of Defense and State Department funding programs. Moreover, Team Ninewa's "unity of effort" approach translated to exceptional results with regard to economic growth and to capacity building within Ninewa Province.

**Recommendation.**

1. PRTs and Brigade Task Forces / Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) should act in consonance. They should build "unity of effort" from the outset through a common vision. They should act as "one team" in the planning and execution of reconstruction projects. Weekly "team" meetings and participation in each other's meetings can facilitate this teamwork/unity.

2. PRTs and Brigade Task Forces / BCTs should focus reconstruction operations on income-generating "small" projects/enterprises, vice large infrastructure projects. More groups/communities can be reached, and "small" projects are generally more sustainable.

3. PRTs and Brigade Task Forces / BCTs should demand local "buy in" on all projects. When local groups/communities become fully involved in the planning and the resourcing of a project, they gain a vested interest in that project's success and sustainment.

**Implications.**

If PRTs and Brigade Task Forces / BCTs do not operate with "unity of effort", and if they do not emphasize income-generating "small" projects and local "buy in" for projects, then the end-result may be wasted resources on non-sustainable projects. Also, economic growth and governance capacity building may suffer.

**Event Description.**

This observation is based on the article, "Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Military Unity of Effort," by Mark Schapiro and Stephen Petzold, Small
Comments.

Related SOLLIMS lessons which highlight the benefit of small-scale vice large-scale reconstruction projects are:

- Lesson 693 – “Reconstruction Traps”
- Lesson 745 – “Optimizing CERP Practices”
- Lesson 748 – “USDA Agricultural Advisor Work in Afghanistan”

Related SOLLIMS lessons which advocate targeting economic reform efforts at the grassroots level / local businesses / entrepreneurs are:

- Lesson 685 – “The Balancing Act of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Need to Involve Local Groups”

6. Security

Security is a cross-cutting prerequisite for peace. The lack of security is what prompts a stabilization & reconstruction mission to begin with. Security creates the enabling environment for development.

An Iraqi Minister of the Interior Commando stands guard at a polling site in downtown Samarra, Iraq. Iraqi Security Forces stepped up security to provide safety for an election.
6.a. **TOPIC.** The Criticality of Security Force Institution Building (1707)

**Observations.**

Recent U.S. operations in Iraq and continuing operations in Afghanistan highlight the importance of building effective host nation security forces in post-conflict stabilization efforts. In both situations, the U.S. and its coalition partners failed to focus initial efforts on building strong and capable security forces. When efforts did eventually shift to host nation security forces capable of accepting responsibility for sovereign security, much of this effort was focused on tactical capability, rather than ministerial effectiveness. However, as the recent collapse of Iraqi Security Forces against invasion by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in June 2014 demonstrated, institutional shortfalls such as lack of professionalism, poor training, and inability to provide effective logistics can rapidly degrade previous advances in tactical effectiveness. Building effective security force institutions requires commitment of significant time and effort and is in many ways more challenging than building tactical effectiveness. Despite being a difficult task, developing ministerial / institutional effectiveness is an absolutely critical requirement for post-conflict stabilization and should be a major concern from the very beginning for future efforts in building partner security forces.

**Discussion.**

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of security operations were performed by Coalition forces, while the development of small host nation security forces was a relatively secondary effort. Eventually, as withdrawal timelines were developed, the Coalition rapidly increased efforts to develop effective host nation forces and this became first a significant and then the number one Coalition priority. Despite the Coalition realization that strong and capable host nation security forces would be required for effective transition, the majority of effort was focused initially on building tactical capability so that host nation forces could serve as adjuncts for Coalition security efforts. Even the composition of forces favored “tooth” rather than tail. We realized that Iraqi and Afghan forces would eventually have to sustain themselves, but a focus on near-term security priorities rather than long-term capacity building led to development of combat formations heavily enabled by Coalition sustainment efforts.

As the tactical security situations in each theater began to improve under the weight of Coalition troop surges and major expansions of host nation combat forces, effort was shifted to the development of logistics and overall security ministry effectiveness. In both situations, however, Coalition forces found that developing the myriad logistics functions required to sustain an effective fighting force was extremely challenging due to extensive corruption, overly centralized management, and low education levels. Additionally, the ministries of Defense and Interior in both Afghanistan and Iraq were riven by sectarian and ethnic
rivalries, extreme corruption, as well as a lack of competence in the bureaucratic skills required to run large organizations.

However, though the U.S. and Coalition partners were eventually able to focus large numbers of competent advisory teams to develop tactical competencies at the brigade level and below, applying this same comprehensive “blanket” approach to the operational and ministerial level was much more difficult. Ministerial and senior staff advisory positions require senior field grade/civilian equivalent and above personnel specifically trained in both the requirements of advising at this level as well as the culture of the host nation. Personnel have to be prepared to address and overcome challenges such as corruption and sectarianism and must be competent in the skill set required to improve the capacities of [often senior] personnel in host nation bureaucracies. While tactical level tasks could be allocated relatively easily to specific units or Coalition nations, the closer to the “top of the pyramid” at the institutional level, the more difficult this became. Advising at this level requires a unity of effort among interagency and Coalition partners that was difficult to achieve and sustain in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Competing viewpoints, interagency rivalries, and often a hesitancy or inability to provide adequate numbers of trained and competent advisors hamstrung the Coalition.

**Recommendation.**

Security institution building and the development of ministerial/organizational effectiveness in partner security forces needs to be a critical aspect of all future U.S. COIN and stabilization operations right from the start. Overcoming challenges such as corruption and sectarianism and developing an effective bureaucracy that works for the particular needs of the host nation is a complicated and long process. It requires the extensive commitment of senior military and civilian personnel and a unity of effort and purpose across the interagency and Coalition effort. While this is a difficult effort, it is not impossible. Though Coalition efforts to accomplish ministerial efforts were late in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the relevant experience is now present and lessons learned are readily available. It is critical that we collect these lessons learned and properly organize ourselves for the future so that we do not repeat these mistakes and fail to address this critical requirement from the outset of our next post-conflict stabilization endeavor.

**Implications.**

Reforming and developing institutional capacity at the ministry and organizational level is a long and painstaking process. It requires the integration of our western doctrine with an understanding of the particular culture, history, and dynamics of the particular host nation. These solutions cannot be rapidly instituted and need long-running partner advisory efforts to accomplish. Failing to implement reforms at the institutional level will maintain many of the root causes (corruption, sectar-
ianism, etc.) which led to instability in the first place and doom any improvements at the tactical or operational level to eventual failure. Without addressing the structural deficiencies systemic to the overall organization, these shortcomings will slowly eat away at any gains that were previously made. The tactical/operational level may be simpler and attractive to our militaries, but the more difficult institutional issues must still be tackled if we hope to achieve lasting transformation.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the personal experience of the author over five years as an intelligence leader at USCENTCOM, MNF-I, and ISAF tasked with assessing challenges to the development of effective capacity in the Iraqi Security Forces and Afghan National Security Forces. It was further refined by coursework, research, and interviews examining Security Sector Reform during a year of study at the U.S. Army War College.

6.b. **TOPIC.** **Observations on Creating a Secure Environment** (1626)

**Observations.**

How to create a secure environment? Institutions are important but not sufficient. Challenges are numerous and measures of performance sometimes illusive.

**Discussion.**

When the formal security system fails, people appeal to informal groups and ask for protection. In a post–conflict environment, formal and informal power groups compete for the population’s sympathies. It is natural that people seek the best deal. Of course, people pay for service provided, and informal groups become stronger and more relevant. How many people trust informal organizations, paramilitary structures, local militias or local warlords rather than formal structures? Can that be a benchmark for the security level in a society? Or at least an indicator that society, and particularly its security sector, is failing and that it needs an urgent and comprehensive reform?

How to create a secure environment? Institutions are important. Establishment of good institutions requires patience, persistence, a comprehensive (we can call it all-of-government) approach, well-conceived recruiting and training policies for the future civil officials, and active support from international community. It is a long and expensive process. To have all elements in place – military, police, corrections system, intelligence services, and institutions responsible for border
management, customs and civil emergencies – in a divided post-conflict society, internally shattered and overloaded with frictions and disputes, is more than a challenge. Still, it is easier than changing the consciousness and mind-sets of groups whose animosity and intolerance initially led to the conflict. The latter may take a few generations and eventually be unsuccessful. In the short term, institutions can and must play out their roles, but in the long run only true reconciliation and consensus among different stakeholders within a community can ultimately lead to a secure environment.

One of the key challenges and risks involved in developing a professional security sector is the lack of insight into, and the impossibility to accurately assess, the capabilities being developed. Even though committed to assisting in security sector reform (SSR), the primary role of the international community (including the U.S.) is to support governments to build their own capabilities. Assessing or evaluating the level of capabilities reached in a post-conflict period is a challenge in the defense reform process. When it comes to the military, for example, the number of troops, availability of weapon systems, organization and command structure, and even the level of combat readiness, are usually well known facts. However, the willingness and real commitment of troops to defend their country and the fundamental values of the political and social system they live in, as well as provide security to citizens, is sometimes very difficult to estimate. Numbers and figures in tables of personnel and equipment are an indication of potential power, but what is in the hearts and minds of soldiers and their leaders is another matter. I doubt that any of the U.S. participants in Iraqi defense security reform (DSR) had predicted rapid dissolution of so many well equipped and allegedly well trained Iraqi troops, confronted with nothing more than a bunch of paramilitary radical fanatics, regardless of how well organized or highly motivated they might have been.

The military is certainly not the only element of security, but the same reasoning can be applied to police, the judiciary system, or any other structure important for security. After many years spent and tremendous amount of blood and treasure invested, we still cannot be sure how the security structures of a country will respond to challenges they face, once they are left on their own. During SSR and DSR, all agencies and external and internal actors can speak the same language (unity of effort and common understanding), all lines of effort and principles can be implemented in the most rigorous way, recruiting and training policies may be perfect, and yet success can still be missing. In assessing the level of success, measure of performance defined as a number of killed, robbed or raped, even though this might be a good security indicator, sometimes does not help too much.

SSR and DSR must be planned and conducted in accordance with the nature of society, its internal conflicts, and frictions, acknowledging all specifics of societal dynamics. There is no universal recipe. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction is an excellent attempt to find and describe what is, more or less,
common for every conflict, but its implementation has to be adaptive, critical and creative. For me, it seems the only reasonable way ahead.

**Recommendation.**

1. Establishment of good institutions requires patience, persistence, a comprehensive approach, well-conceived recruiting and training policies, and active support from the international community. In the short term, institutions can and must play out their role, but in a long run only true reconciliation and consensus among different stakeholders within a community can ultimately lead to a secure environment.

2. In assessing the level of success, measure of performance defined as a number of killed, robbed or raped, even though this might be a good security indicator, sometimes does not help too much. Finding a way to measure the morale of local security forces might be more important.

**Event Description.**

The discussion represents a personal opinion on the subject.

6.c. **TOPIC. Security Sector Development Program in Burundi** (1553)

**Observations.**

Burundi’s Security Sector Development (SSD) program is noteworthy for having advanced security sector effectiveness and democratic accountability since its inception in 2009. This SSD program is a bilateral program between Burundi and the Netherlands. In five years’ time, this program has increased transparency and accountability in Burundi’s security sector, improved the perception of the security forces (especially the army) among the population, and improved the quality of security service provision.

**Discussion.**

When it was launched in 2009, the Burundi-Netherlands SSD program aimed for transformative change of Burundi’s security sector. At that point in time, which was roughly four years after Burundi’s civil war had ended, a large rift still existed between society at large and the security sector. In many parts of the county, the public harbored strong resentment of the military and especially the police. This lack of trust and confidence in the security sector resulted in people sometimes taking the law into their own hands, with acts of vigilantism and "mob justice." In
order to address this problem, and to advance peace and security for its citizens, Burundi, in conjunction with the Netherlands, embarked on an ambitious SSD program.

The two countries first developed a shared vision of a transparent, accountable, democratically governed, fiscally sustainable security sector capable of delivering security and justice to all Burundian citizens. They also established the following strategic objectives for the SSD program:

- Affirmation of the principles of partnership between the two governments through political dialogue
- Accountability of the security services to civil authorities
- Adherence of the security services to national and international law
- Adherence of the security services to the general principles of public expenditure
- Impartiality on the part of the security services
- Professionalism of the security services

The SSD program managers adopted a highly flexible approach, taking conditions on the ground as their starting point, and then slowly initiating changes/actions (based upon conditions and needs) to progressively achieve the shared vision and strategic objectives. The SSD program began with basic, concrete activities during the first 2-year phase (2009-2011) and focused on building trust and relationships. For example, the program started with small activities such as refurbishing Army kitchens and improving police capacity to maintain communications equipment. Having established credibility by generating tangible benefits for Burundian security actors, the program progressively promoted activities aimed at changing attitudes and behaviors of security actors – such as developing a code of ethics and ethics courses for the police and the armed forces, promoting dialogue among security personnel about the application of the code, and inviting civil society actors to take part in evaluating troops' adherence to ethics norms when dealing with civilians.

By the end of second 2-year phase of the program (2011-2013), the program achieved the following results:

- Important barriers to transparency in the security sector had eroded, and security issues were increasingly acknowledged by many to be the legitimate concern of the full range of Burundian stakeholders, including civil society.
- Dialogue on SSR and specifically governance-related aspects of SSR was occurring more frequently among key stakeholders in multiple forums inside and outside the government.
- The program provided an increasingly inclusive forum for discussion and debate, as key oversight actors (the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman’s Office, and the Auditor General) and key security actors
(the National Intelligence Service and the National Security Council) participated. A diverse group of civil society actors also began engaging on a frequent basis.

- The program made progress in achieving the governance objectives of the SSD's Memorandum of Understanding (signed at the outset of the SSD program between the governments of Burundi and the Netherlands), particularly in terms of strengthening security sector accountability to civil authorities and adherence to national and international law, as well as introducing the concept of financial accountability to the security services.

Overall, there are four primary reasons why the SSD program has been so successful at improving security and justice governance in Burundi: 1) the program has put politics center stage; 2) it has established results progressively; 3) it has prioritized the gradual development of ownership; and, 4) it has matched timeframe with ambition and environment. Synopsis follows:

1) **Putting politics center stage.** The SSD program proactively addressed the "politics" of change at both the national and operational levels on a daily basis. The program established a ministerial-level Political Committee to conduct high-level dialogue between partners; a Steering Committee to approve strategies, projects, and budgets; and working-level Program Management Units to develop, execute, and oversee the projects. As political issues arose – such as certain institutions trying to control change, lessen impacts, or maximize benefits – the Political Committee worked to address and resolve them. Dutch Embassy officials were keen to help the Political Committee and the parties involved in arriving at solutions for contentious issues, and thereby keeping the program moving forward.

2) **Establishing results progressively.** The SSD program developed work plans on a 2-year basis, but was flexible enough to adjust/respond to emerging needs. The program was not tied to objectives that made sense in year one, but were no longer feasible or salient in year two or beyond. The program was not tied to a binding framework, it had a long-term (8-year) time horizon, and relationships of trust were emphasized between the two governments and within the program. Trust-building began through initial delivery of equipment, training, and minor infrastructure improvements. As trust was built, the SSD program progressively moved on to improving the police force's vehicle maintenance system, the police force's counter-terrorism capacity, and the Burundian Army's logistics system, as well as incorporating activities to change attitudes and behaviors of security actors.

3) **Prioritizing the gradual development of ownership.** Responsibility and authority for determining the strategic direction of the SSD program, identifying and developing activities/projects, and then managing SSD program activities have been progressively transferred to Burundian stake-
holders – not just security actors, but also civil society actors. From the outset, the intention was to engage the public / civil society on the SSD program. However, the inclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs) was initially very contentious for many Burundian government officials. To address this challenge, skilled facilitators were brought in to establish dialogue between parliamentarians and CSOs. Besides this dialogue, they demonstrated how this cooperation and ownership had worked in other African countries, they scheduled open houses at military and police facilities, and they encouraged confidence-building activities. Because of this engagement/inclusion, security has gradually become "everyone’s affair" in Burundi.

4) **Matching timeframe with ambition and environment.** SSD's 8-year time-frame has enabled Burundian stakeholders to gradually understand what SSR implies and to adjust attitudes and behaviors so that sustainable change could take root. At the outset, key Burundian stakeholders did not truly understand what the reforms (envisioned by the SSD program) entailed, why they were important, or how to implement a process of institutional changes. Therefore, SSD program managers did not immediately attempt to tackle complex issues such as revising legal/security frameworks or instituting transparent budget management procedures. Instead, the SSD program managers first set out to build trust among actors/stakeholders, and then took steps to educate the senior Burundian political leaders, local government officials and civil society leaders about the importance of transparency, accountability, respect for human rights, roles of actors in creating a safe and secure environment, and so on.

**Recommendation.**

In a post-conflict environment where society at large perceives the security forces as unprofessional, repressive, and corrupt, it is recommended that the host nation government consider "transformative" security sector reform/development, along the lines of the Burundi-Netherlands SSD program, in order to improve/strengthen governance of the security sector. In taking this approach.

1. Put "politics" center stage; i.e., establish mechanisms to address and resolve "political" issues/disputes.

2. Allow flexible programming to meet emerging needs and to progressively achieve results.

3. Prioritize the gradual development of host nation ownership, including civil society ownership.

4. Set a long-term timeframe, to allow ambitions/reforms to be achieved under challenging conditions/environment.
5. Begin with a shared vision among partners at the outset, and set strategic objectives.

6. Utilize an hierarchy of management (e.g., Political Committee, Steering Committee, Program Management Units) to direct, guide, and manage activities at the appropriate level on a continuous basis, with stakeholder involvement at all levels.

**Implications.**

Without security sector transformation and security-governance initiatives in post-conflict situations, and without the involvement of civil society, any existing repressive/corrupt/unprofessional security forces will continue to be at odds with those they should be serving/protecting.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the publication "Lessons from Burundi’s Security Sector Reform Process," by Nicole Ball, Africa Security Brief No. 29, November 2014.

**Comments.**

Related references:


7. **Conflict Transformation**

Conflict Transformation guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening mitigators across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres, where building host nation capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means.
Afghan National Army Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Taheed meets with village representatives of the Afghan border town of Ghurian to persuade them to implement the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program.

7.a. **TOPIC.** Engaging Spoiler Groups in Nations Beset by Violence (1330)

**Observations.**

The engagement of potentially disruptive, sub-national elements, as demonstrated in Afghanistan and Somalia, are cases that illustrate the perils and possibilities for engaging "spoiler groups." They also illustrate the importance of engaging 3rd party states/nations that provide support to the "spoiler groups," with the goal/imperative of ending such support.

**Discussion.**

**AFGHANISTAN.**

Over the years, the Karzai government has pursued a strategy of inducement and coercion towards "spoiler groups."

The results of this policy when dealing with “warlords” have been mixed. At one end of the spectrum are warlord-governors such as Northern Tajik commander Atta Noor. Noor, anchored with a well-financed and well-armed base of power in the city of Mazar-I-Sharif, was tapped by Karzai to be the governor of Balkh Province. Relative autonomy from Kabul allowed Noor to implement an administrative framework that, while lacking transparency and true government oversight, has nonetheless contributed to stability and relative economic growth in the province. Although Noor has exercised his considerable economic power (fueled by trade passing through Balkh's border with neighboring Uzbekistan) to
further self-interests, he has nonetheless simultaneously supported the aims of the state/nation.

In contrast, another of President Karzai’s warlord-governor appointees, Gul Agha Sherzai, fared much worse, ultimately resigning from his post in October 2013. While governing Nangarhar province, Sherzai used his state/provincial financial resources to cement his power and employed coercion against those who opposed him. However, a massive five-day protest against Sherzai erupted within the province in 2013 – with protestors accusing him of illegal land grabs, corrupt practices, embezzlement of development funds, and failure to protect Afghan territory from elements operating out of neighboring Pakistan. In this case, the Afghan central government suffered by its association with a warlord-governor who continued to exhibit corrupt, greedy tendencies, and who failed to protect the interests of the people or the nation.

Besides engaging “warlords,” the Karzai government has also taken engagement oriented steps with regard to the Afghan Taliban and its Pakistani variant. The Karzai government has periodically attempted to bring these groups – minus their most extreme elements (e.g., Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network) – into the peace building process. President Karzai even traveled to Pakistan to meet with imprisoned Afghan Taliban second-in-command Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in November 2013. Karzai’s goal has been focused on providing an avenue for these groups to have a seat at the table for peace negotiations and ultimately to enter the state-building process.

Aligning the goals of the Afghan state and the agendas of the Taliban “spoilergroups” has been extremely difficult. The Karzai government attempted to give the Taliban a voice in the peace building process through the Afghan High Peace Council. During the Doha peace negotiations, the Afghan High Peace Council allowed the Taliban to open an office in Doha (Qatar). However, the manner by which the Taliban opened that office – raising the Taliban flag and banner bearing the name of the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" – conveyed the message that the Taliban still sought to portray itself as the legitimate, alternative government of Afghanistan – challenging the legitimacy of Afghanistan’s existing central government. Karzai and others immediately pressed for the office to be shut down. The Taliban then closed its office and claimed they had been deceived.

Al Qaeda and the Haqqani network continue to operate – with considerable support and safe havens provided by Pakistan – as a destabilizing factor to Afghanistan.

**SOMALIA.**

Similar to Afghanistan, the Somali government has attempted over the years to align its own incentives with those of its opponents.
The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was the most organized and effective opponent of Somalia’s Transitional National Government (TNG) when it was established in 2004. Although the ICU was eventually defeated (by Ethiopian forces) and withdrew to Eritrea, it eventually morphed into the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) and continued to threaten Somali stability. The fledgling Somali government faced the question of whether or not it should engage the ARS in the peace building process, and whether or not it could identify/align any incentives for ARS cooperation. The TNG eventually adopted a policy of inducement to bring ARS members into the peace building process. However, the ARS fractured along moderate and hard-line views. As a result, the Somali government gained ARS moderates as allies and accommodated them into the state system, but then it had to deal with the hard-line factions operating from the periphery.

Members of the ARS who sought to spoil the peace process from the outside coalesced into the fighting force known as Al Shabab. Linked with Al Qaeda, Al Shabab remains committed to revolutionary warfare and government overthrow. In allying with the transnational Salafi movement (extremist Sunnis who believe themselves the only correct interpreters of the Koran, consider moderate Muslims to be infidels, and seek to convert other Muslims with the aim of their fundamentalist version of Islam dominating the world), Al Shabab leaders have signaled their adherence to a political objective that makes engagement exceptionally difficult. Such engagement is even more difficult due to the rise to prominence of Ahmed Abdi Godane within Al Shabab – an extreme hard-line figure with strong ties to Al Qaeda.

Nonetheless, the Somali government has sought to induce members of the Salafi movement into the peace building process. Most notable of these was the integration of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe (one of the founding members of Al Shabab and a former warlord) – appointed 15 May 2013 as the governor of the Juba region. Essentially, the Somali government brought Madobe, as well as the fighters he controls, into the peace building process in a region where he and his men can serve as a counterweight – representing the Somali government – against Al Shabab.

Over the past several years, the Somali government, in conjunction with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has also used military action against entrenched Al Shabab elements – with considerable success. After defeating Al Shabab elements in Mogadishu, AMISOM drove Al Shabab out of its last urban stronghold, Kismayo, in September 2012. Small spoiler groups, backed by Al Qaeda, still remain in rural areas of south-central Somalia. The Somali government, with the support of its allies, continues to employ a coercive strategy of military action against these groups.
**Recommendation.**

In the article upon which this lesson is based (see Event Description below), the author points out that no single set of policy prescriptions is universally applicable for conflict-affected nations. However, he offers four recommendations based upon themes drawn from his case studies:

1. The government (of a conflict-affected nation) should attempt to integrate "spoiler groups" whenever possible by identifying, aligning, and offering incentives for cooperation.

2. If "spoiler groups" splinter into various factions, the government should develop additional incentives targeted/tailored for the various factions, particularly those seen as moderate.

3. If incentive efforts fail and a given "spoiler group" continues in opposition/violence, the government (and its allies) should engage any 3rd party states/nations providing support to that "spoiler group," for the purpose of ending such support. [Note: When "safe havens" are provided by a 3rd party state/nation, this form of support needs to be addressed by the affected government and its allies with urgency and resolve.]

4. If the affected government (on its own, or with support from allies) takes military action against the "spoiler group," that military action should be done in conjunction with policies aimed at inducing the "spoiler group" to become a participant in the peace building process.

[As an example, this was NATO's formula for success for dealing with the Serbian "spoilers" during the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in 1995; military action and diplomatic/policy initiatives were simultaneously utilized (August-November 1995) to bring the Serbian "spoilers" into the peace building process.]

**Implications.**

If the government (of a conflict-affected nation) does not work to integrate "spoiler groups" into its governmental structures (when feasible), and if the government and its allies do not heavily engage 3rd party states/nations to get them to stop supporting "spoiler groups," then instability will persist.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "The Perils and Possibilities of Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," by Andrew Watkins, Small Wars Journal, 7 March 2014. The article is made available by Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license per Terms of Use.
Comments.

Related references:

- "War on the Brink of Failure: 7 Obstacles Stand in the Way of Success in Afghanistan," LTC Daniel L. Davis, Armed Forces Journal, October 2010.

7.b. TOPIC. Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute and Creating Peace through Grassroots Leadership (1191)

Observations.

The Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute has been able to foster peace in the Philippines and Asia through the formation of peacebuilding leaders who can actively engage their communities to bring meaningful change.

Discussion.

The Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) was created by the Catholic Relief Services (in conjunction with the Mennonite Central Committee) in the 1990's after years of conflict in Southern Philippines. It started as a small summer seminar and has grown into a large institute educating hundreds of new peace builders.

"Conflict transformation" is the dominant framework taught at MPI, which administrators say is the most effective methodology for their specific situation. They claim that conflict transformation is ideal for areas in which violence has become the norm, as is the case of the Philippines. They have focused conflict
transformation at the grassroots level – involving civil society leaders, community development workers, local government officials, educators, activists, youth leaders, indigenous peoples, spiritual/religious leaders, and personnel from the security sector.

The three keys to peacebuilding for MPI have been: education, praxis, and reflection. The education component consists of a three-week session where teachers both teach and learn from the participants. The instruction allows the participants to form their own conclusions about peacebuilding. In the praxis component, the participants see if they can put what they have learned into practice. And in the reflection component, they participate in many follow-up activities which gauge the effectiveness of actions that previous graduates of the program tried to implement.

The MPI conflict transformation program has emphasized that peacebuilding requires individual change, and that real strides in peace come when individuals have the desire for permanent change to achieve peace. Moreover, MPI has helped to empower individuals to effect change in their social structures and systems.

Since its inception, MPI has had a myriad of successes. MPI has accomplished 13 training sessions with around 1,665 people from more than 40 countries across Asia-Pacific and elsewhere. MPI training has built a pool of trainers, mediators, facilitators, researchers and advocacy leaders, which has then been replicated in various communities and organizations due to the new graduates returning and providing training. Recipients have largely said that this training has enabled them to deepen their understanding and commitment to peace and justice. Participants of the MPI program have gone on to do things like developing a campaign against ‘rido’ (clan feud) by facilitating dialogue between two warring clans, and promoting interfaith talks between Christians and Muslims across Mindanao. MPI has also inspired numerous other peace institutes to copy the same style/methodology as its own.

**Recommendation.**

1. Regional peacebuilding institutes and seminars should focus on grassroots, individual change and should engage people of all types.

2. Regional peacebuilding institutes should have focused programs adapted for their surrounding culture.

3. In areas with constant conflict, regional peacebuilding institutes should consider using the MPI model of conflict transformation – with its goal of inserting peacebuilding into social structures and systems.
Implications.

Without a concerted effort at the grassroots level to bring peacebuilding into local social structures, conflict will perpetuate in areas with longstanding violence.

Event Description.

This Lesson is based on "Conflict Transformation Training Making a Difference in Asian Communities," by Gabrielle Aziza Sagaral in New Routes, 2/2013.

7.c. **TOPIC.** Lessons from Liberia in Security Sector Reform (703)

Observations.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) actions launched in Liberia at its "golden hour" (mid-2003 to 2005) were absolutely critical for post-conflict recovery and for establishing a viable foundation for further stabilization work. Although every peacebuilding context presents its own set of unique and complex challenges, certain key areas of action addressed within the Liberian security sector may also be applicable to wider peacebuilding efforts, particularly for nations recovering from an abrupt end to a civil war. Key areas of action successfully implemented in Liberia revolved around consolidating the state's monopoly of force, maintaining the momentum of peacebuilding, integrating SSR with DDR, operationalizing human security, and mobilizing networks for peace.

Discussion.

Upon the conclusion of its 14-year civil war, in August 2003, Liberia faced an incredibly difficult situation with regard to post-conflict peacebuilding. From a pre-war population of three million, more than 250,000 people had been killed, and another one million people were displaced or missing. Pillaging, looting, abductions, torture, rape, and other human rights abuses had occurred on a massive scale throughout the conflict period. Most Liberians had lived in constant fear of the military and police forces, not to mention the numerous warring factions. Liberia's infrastructure had been totally destroyed, with no functioning electrical grids, no public running water, no sewage, and no other public utilities. Throughout the capital of Monrovia, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) lived in slums consisting of tin shacks and garbage. After 14 years of violence, chaos, and fear, a pause for peace came about when President Taylor accepted an offer of asylum from Nigeria.
Seeing a "golden hour" for peacebuilding upon the exile of President Taylor, the United Nations, the United States, and certain key leaders/practitioners (including the authors of the attached article) immediately focused their engagement on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

An initial priority was to consolidate the state’s monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law. Probably the most critical action taken in this regard was the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) program, which was implemented by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in a quick, if not hasty, manner on 7 December 2003. Launching the DDRR program quickly, and involving many of the ex-combatants in transitional labor, kept these ex-combatants focused on material gains and employment – rather than on renewing violence. Simple monetary compensation for the arms/ammunition surrendered was a key factor for gaining their cooperation. Another motive for these combatants to show up at a DDRR site was temporary amnesty. Blanket or general amnesty was never issued in Liberia; however, temporary amnesty proved to be vital to the success of the DDRR program. A conscious decision was made – in the interest of disarming and demobilizing armed groups – to postpone the implementation of transitional justice in favor of temporary amnesty, and this approach paid large dividends.

The DDRR program succeeded in disarming and demobilizing 101,449 combatants, and it collected 61,918 weapons and 6,486,136 units of ammunition. Throughout execution of the DDRR program, UNMIL disposed of the collected ordinance, and it worked to seal off Liberia’s borders from outside interference. An early threat to the DDRR program surfaced during a 10-day period in December 2003. Significant riots broke out at one of the DDRR sites (Camp Schefflin), posing a major threat to the UNMIL contingent there. Consequently, UNMIL put a halt to the DDRR program. However, within four months, once additional UN peacekeepers were on the ground, UNMIL re-energized the program and resumed execution in full force. That persistence gave a reassuring message to the Liberian government, and to all Liberians, that disarmament, demobilization, and peacebuilding were moving forward and that momentum would be maintained. The pace of disarmament and demobilization picked up quickly.

Similarly, persistence in "maintaining momentum" kept the crucial 2005 Liberian presidential elections on schedule. In opposition, many senior statesmen, interim government officials, and potential candidates had pushed hard for holding party conventions and for rewriting the constitution in advance of any elections. However, their motives may have been self-serving – to prolong their time in office/exposure, or even to have an opportunity to divert resources (funds from the February 2004 donor conference) for their personal gains rather than for the good of Liberia. Fortunately, the UN, U.S., and certain key leaders in Liberia stood firm on keeping the November 2005 elections on schedule. This resulted in the first female head of state for Africa (Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson), but more
importantly resulted in a new, legitimate government recognized by the vast majority of all Liberians – to establish and uphold the rule of law.

To consolidate a "monopoly of force" for this new government to uphold the rule of law, the UN, U.S., and the authors of this article took the approach of integrating DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The UN worked the "Disarmament" piece – as it systematically disarmed the legacy national military force. The United States simultaneously worked the "Demobilization and Reintegration" pieces, while at the same time restructuring and reforming the force. The entire DDR/SSR program included recruiting, vetting, training, equipping, fielding, sustaining and mentoring the new force. The program also involved constructing new military bases across the country, establishing a professional defense ministry, drafting a national defense strategy, and redesigning the force structure. The point of intersection between DDR and SSR was "reintegration" – the process of reincorporating as many appropriate ex-combatants into the new military as possible. For the select few who were able to pass the vetting process, "reintegration" not only gave them quick employment in the new military, but also served to build trust (between former enemies) and let them become an integral part of the greater Liberian peace-building effort. Due to the downsizing of the new military, however, other avenues for reintegration for most ex-combatants (economic avenues, such as public works programs) had to be pursued.

Likewise, the UN and U.S. integrated DDR and SSR in the transformation of the Liberian National Police (LNP). The highly corrupt, brutal police force that had operated during the Taylor years was, unfortunately, still largely intact after the civil war. Its officers posed a significant threat to the state and to peace. In response to this threat, the United States initially put much a much higher priority and much greater attention on reforming the LNP than on reforming the AFL. The U.S. and UNMIL demobilized (purged) all unqualified policemen, vetted/reintegrated a small number of personnel, conducted extensive recruiting/vetting/training of new police forces, established a new police academy, and developed an emergency infrastructure. UNMIL took on the major role of training the LNP, worked with various international partners to build new police stations and barracks, and equipped the force with vehicles and logistics. Also, efforts were made to increase female representation in the force.

A unique approach taken by recovery leaders and new governmental leaders was the effort to operationalize "human security." The primary focus here was to ensure that the population could gain "freedom from fear" of the military. A number of steps were taken to ensure the new AFL would not appear threatening to the people. As stated earlier, a vetting process was used to screen all of the candidates for the AFL. Secondly, the AFL’s force structure was addressed: its size was made deliberately small, it contained no special units (to preclude any loyalties to a specific person, vice the state), and it was ethnically balanced – with all tribes equally represented. Third, non-traditional training was highly
emphasized, covering the following subjects: discipline, moral judgment, respect for the laws of war, Liberian history, the Liberian constitution, civics, and literacy. Also, Liberians were taught to be the trainers of the AFL, so that they could take stock in professionalizing their own military.

Finally, besides the many SSR and DDR actions to consolidate the state’s monopoly of force, another key short-term action was to "mobilize networks for peace" – for the purpose of counterbalancing networks for war. Conflict-recovery leaders were extremely proactive in promoting the actions of peace-minded groups and in establishing multilateral, national, and nongovernmental webs of people and organizations who wanted a warless Liberia. As nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) trickled back into the country, and as evacuated embassy staff personnel returned, these groups/people were significantly helped by the UN, by the embassies, and by recovery leaders to enhance reintegration and reestablishment of social/support networks. Finally, Liberian women’s peace groups were considerably assisted in networking aspects, as they grew to be active informal groups for promoting local, community-based security systems.

**Recommendation.**

In the immediate aftermath of civil war, when a "golden hour" or "window of opportunity" is presented to lay a foundation for peacebuilding and to impact and include the (former) warring factions, leaders/practitioners should immediately address the following areas of the security sector:

1. Consolidate the state’s monopoly of force to uphold the rule of law.
3. Integrate DDR and SSR in the transformation of military and police forces.
4. Operationalize "human security."
5. Mobilize "networks for peace" to counterbalance the "networks for war."

**Implications.**

If a post-conflict state does not gain a monopoly of force through prompt reform of its security sector, then it will lack the means to uphold the rule of law and may face renewed competition from insurgents, militias, organized crime, and revolutionary movements - who can challenge the state's legitimacy, threaten citizens/communities, and potentially push the state back into wide-scale conflict.
Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "Wider Lessons for Peacebuilding: Security Sector Reform in Liberia," by John Blaney, Jacques Paul Klein, and Sean McFate, a policy analysis brief from the Stanley Foundation, June 2010.

Comments.


8. Regional Engagement

Regional Engagement entails encouraging the host nation, its neighboring countries, and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host nation’s and the region’s security and economic and political development. It has three components: comprehensive regional diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation.

Colonel Juan Diaz, a native of New York City, and Garuda Shield 09. U.S. executive agent, listens intently to a briefing during the first day of academic classes, 11 June 2009, in Bandung, Indonesia, approximately 80 miles from Jakarta. Exercise Garuda Shield 09 is designed to promote regional peace and security in the area. Training focuses on peace support operations, a computer-simulated Command Post Exercise (CPX), a Field Training Exercise, and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance projects. 19 nations participated.
8.a. **TOPIC. Building more Effective UN Peace Operations (1672)**

**Observations.**

The UN Charter does not define precisely the concept of peace operations. Their creation and their development therefore follow an ad hoc and by-practice process rather than adhering to clearly defined standards for UN peace operations. Thus, four generations of missions have arisen from their creation increasing the expectations and the challenges.[1] In parallel to this evolution in the nature of the peacekeeping missions, the nature of the troops deployed has also changed. Indeed, the unfortunate experiences of Srebrenica and Rwanda among others marked the reluctance of the Western major powers to intervene directly on the ground for some conflicts under the United Nations’ flag. Regional and local actors, eager to regain responsibility for security issues especially within their region, have therefore won a greater place for the initiative than the UN peacekeeping elements.

[1] From observation and establishment of buffer zones (1948-1990); securitization and support of political transformations, process of reconciliation, establishment of institutions and organization of elections (1990-1995); missions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (1995-2003); multidimensional missions with broad responsibilities including civil administrative functions and projects of peacebuilding, while making efforts on the protection of the civilian population (2003-present).

**Discussion.**

Despite the international consensus on the fundamental principles[2], the factors[3] and the conditions for success of peacekeeping missions[4], the divergence of approaches to evaluate the effectiveness, and the efficiency of these operations have failed to appear. Technically, the critics focus on the UN bureaucracy, and the forces and resources deployed to explain the lack of success for the UN mission. However, the divergent strategic visions and interests within the international community will remain the first obstacle to more efficient UN peace operations. More broadly, the efficiency and the effectiveness of these missions remain questionable. What are the right measurements and the ways to improve it? Is it about ENDS privileging a durable settlement of peace? Is it about MEANS in an immediate cost-saving (money, risks for the peacekeepers, etc.) perspective? Is it about WAYS in favoring a human or technological approach, a neutral or regional approach, a one or step by step approach? A global agreement on difficulties to evaluate a durable settlement of peace, depending on the perspectives and the time, focuses mainly on WAYS and MEANS.

Discussion about peacekeeping seems to mirror the current debates on the international representation within the UN’s organization and the UN’s operational procedures as well. The question of new technology also reflects this issue. Indeed, while they are most often not deployed by UN TCC nations, the Western countries foster their development and deployment within peacekeeping operations as they are the one to have such capabilities. On the other side, the
countries that provide the bulk of UN contingency forces do not have these technologies available to them, nor do they know how to properly deploy them in support of their routine UN mission operations. In these operations, the emerging powers have however found ways to increase their regional or even international place, especially if the UN representativeness needs to evolve in the Security Council.

As the expectations of the civilian population for safety and protection from harm continues to increase, the standardization of the international response seems to neglect a key factor, that of the significance of the local aspect. Therefore, the UN mandate to always apply impartiality and the realities of being able to deal with the local population, the factors of culture, language, formal and informal rules of law, and local economic situation, have to be maintained in equilibrium – they must be balanced against other factors such as neutrality and absence of local interests. Given this perspective, the increasing involvement and impact of regional response appears to be a more efficient, legitimate and credible way to support the implementation of a durable peace.

The regional response could also improve and facilitate the decision-making process, placing more of the burden on multilateral organizations and major Western powers, especially for the funding and the deployment of advanced technical capabilities through partner building programs. For the international community, by maintaining an impartial perspective, such solutions could, therefore, help to discriminate between the host nation and the collective/partner interests before developing regional militaries for peacekeeping operations. Indeed, besides the fact that by participating in UN peacekeeping operations, this could work to enhance and reinforce their regional or international position among peacekeeping nations, it could also provide several emerging countries the opportunity to train, equip and even maintain a larger force structure at less cost.


[3] Legitimacy, credibility and promotion of national and local ownership.

[4] Existence of a peace to keep, decisive engagement of the region, full support of the United Security Council, and a clear and achievable mandate accompanied by adequate resources.

**Recommendation.**

1. Although it is perhaps too soon to establish definitive lessons learned, the recent African-based peacekeeping operations in the Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Mali could present new models for successful peacekeeping operations.

   - Follow a step-by-step approach involving primarily regional actors, supported by Western powers’ technical capabilities, under a UN resolution
• Work to adapt the burdensome UN logistics system for supporting combat operations to local conditions and requirements
• Improve the clarity in UN mission orders for peacekeeping operations
• Foster greater interoperability and interaction between host nation and UN chains of command
• As much as possible, eliminate UN analytical gaps such as weak intelligence and local awareness capabilities, including lack of language skills

2. The development of different approaches to peacekeeping, like sanctions and special political missions, could also reinforce the application of a global, multilateral and comprehensive approach to achieve the UN’s objective to increase peace and tranquility around the globe.

Event Description.

This lesson is based on readings issued by think tanks like the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), 'Group de recherche IF' (GRIF), Forum for a new World Governance (FnGM), etc., personal operational experience, and classroom discussion during course U.S. Army War College PKSOI elective course PS2219 (Peace & Stability Operations – Concepts & Principles).

8.b. TOPIC. Keys to Success for the African Union Mission in Somalia (896)

Observations.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has achieved notable success in Somalia after 5+ years’ operating in that country – owing especially to the composition of the force, its training & discipline on reducing civilian casualties, the willingness to accept relatively high numbers of friendly/AMISOM casualties, and excellent incentives/pay for AMISOM soldiers/policemen.

Discussion.

AMISOM has been the most ambitious intervention in Somalia since the failed U.S. operation of 1993 (the Battle of Mogadishu / "Black Hawk Down"). When AMISOM's initial force of Ugandan soldiers deployed to Somalia more than a decade later, in March 2007, Somalis had long been living in perpetual chaos – without any semblance of formal governance. Communities & neighborhoods across Somalia were dominated by warlords, gangs, and the militant group al-
Shabab. Nearly all of Mogadishu, the capital city, had fallen into the hands of al-Shabab.

AMISOM's success in bringing stability to this chaotic environment has been nothing short of impressive. By and large, AMISOM has cleared Mogadishu of the presence of al-Shabab – accomplished in summer 2011. AMISOM has also pushed al-Shabab out of its last urban stronghold, the port city of Kismayo – accomplished in September 2012. In mid-October 2012, al-Shabab still maintains control of wide areas of south-central Somalia; however, these are rural areas, and the amount of territory under al-Shabab influence has been steadily reduced.

Many ingredients have gone into making AMISOM an effective stabilization force: U.S. funding, equipment, and training; European Union Naval Force escorts of AMISOM vessels; United Nations logistical support, food, and housing; an international mandate; and specific training on how to avoid civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur. Another contributing factor has been the composition of AMISOM: Because the soldiers/policemen of AMISOM are "black Africans" – Ugandans, Burundians, and Kenyans – the people of Somalia have been generally receptive of their presence and motives from the outset of operations.

Two of the most important factors behind AMISOM's success, however, have been: (1) a high tolerance for friendly/AMISOM casualties and (2) outstanding incentives/salaries. The pay for AMISOM soldiers has been about $1,028 per month – funded by the European Union. This salary is more than 10-20 times the income that a soldier/policeman would otherwise earn in Uganda & Burundi – a driving factor for initial and continued service in AMISOM.

With regard to friendly/AMISOM casualties, AMISOM and its participating governments refuse to release death tolls. However, certain Western officials have reported that approximately 500 Ugandans and Burundians have been killed to date, along with an unknown number of Kenyans. This clearly points to a high tolerance for casualties on the part of AMISOM – whose peak troop level is only 17,000 - as well as a high degree of staying power / commitment by AMISOM and its contributing nations.

**Recommendation.**

1. When feasible, tailor the composition of the stability force to soldiers/nations that would be culturally "acceptable" to the people of the host nation (as opposed to soldiers/nations perceived as having no commonality).

2. Provide soldiers/stability forces with specific training on how to avoid civilian casualties and how to respond when they occur.
3. If possible, provide incentives/salaries for stability force soldiers/policemen at a significantly higher rate than they receive in their home country – especially if their stability duties are expected to be hazardous.

4. If possible, gain commitments from participating governments/nations to sustain manpower contributions to the stability force over a number of years – even if casualty rates become high.

**Implications.**

If intervening soldiers/stability forces are not culturally "acceptable" to the people of the host nation from the very outset (due to lack of commonality), then those soldiers face the immediate challenge of breaking through a barrier of perception as "foreign" and "not to be trusted." Moreover, if intervening soldiers/stability forces are not conscientious, trained, and disciplined on reducing host nation/civilian casualties (CIVCAS) throughout operations, any CIVCAS incidents will only further strain relations and adversely affect the mission.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "Africa, West combine to rout militants in Somalia," by Jason Straziuso, posted in Mmegi-online, 19 October 2012.

**Comments.**

A related article is "Uganda-Somalia: UPDF Success is Due to Discipline – Museveni," Africa Defense Journal, 10 April 2012.


Additional information about AMISOM can be found at: [http://amisom-au.org](http://amisom-au.org)

A related lesson stressing the need for peacekeepers to prioritize civilian protection and also discussing situations involving use of force against militant groups is "Challenges, Strategies, and Necessities for Civilian Protection in Africa," SOLLIMS Lesson 697, 15 March 2011.

8.c. **TOPIC. A Regional Solution for Violence and Poverty in Central America (1674)**

**Observations.**

The growth and spread of gangs in Central America is an issue of immense importance not only to the countries of the region but to the United States as well. Increasingly violent, well organized, and diverse, these gangs continue to extend their reach and influence across Central America and beyond, including into the U.S. Well beyond petty crime, drug dealing, and extortion, these increasingly powerful gangs are involved in narcotrafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, intimidation, murder, and assassination on such a scale as to undermine political stability and rule of law, retard social development, discourage foreign investment, and create conditions which fuel the tide of illegal immigration from the region. While solutions to the problem have proved elusive, a recent regional approach, the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, offers perhaps the best hope yet for an effective approach.

**Discussion.**

Simply pick up a newspaper, turn on a television, listen to a newscast on the radio, or scroll through the internet and you will quickly see just how controversial the topic of illegal immigration from Latin America is to the U.S. public. In fact, based on the heated tone in the media, a visitor from Mars may well believe it to be the most important issue of our time.

The basic cause of illegal immigration is simple – the desire for better opportunities to live, work, and support a family. The primary motivator then, writ large, throughout the region is economic opportunity. The personal experience I have in speaking with the several illegal immigrants whom I have known over the years bears this out and adds a further cultural component to the economic reason: that a man must be able to provide for his family (and in Hispanic culture this generally means the extended family). It’s worth noting, though, that, for Central America, the reason is increasingly tied to a desire to escape the violence brought about by the gangs and trans-national criminal organizations (TCOs). Looking to flee poverty or gang and drug related violence and death, immigrants from across Central America are willing to subject themselves to a journey of thousands of miles and full of incredible dangers, to illegally cross the U.S. border and live in constant fear of discovery, imprisonment and deportation.

The perils are continual and varied. The number of kidnappings alone is staggering; one estimate has the rates of kidnappings for those traveling through Mexico as high as 400 incidents involving 22,000 victims per year often with the compliance or involvement of corrupt government officials. Even more shocking is the number of sexual assaults on female immigrants. In the Guatemalan-Mexican frontier region alone, it is estimated that up to 70% of female illegal
travelers will become victims of sexual violence. Worse still, some women and girls will become victims of human trafficking and forced into prostitution. The physical dangers of the journey are no less daunting, as injury and death are commonplace occurrences all along the route north. This is perhaps especially true for those choosing (as so many do) to ride the trains, or 'la Bestia.' And the dangers don’t end upon arrival at the U.S.-Mexican border: in 2009 alone the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service found 417 bodies along the border.

The arrival of a massive surge (estimated between 50-70,000) at the U.S.-Mexican border of unaccompanied minors and young mothers during the summer of 2014 captured the attention of the U.S. and the world. Fleeing gang-related violence, Central American families were making the heartbreaking decision to send their children on a dangerous and uncertain journey in order to save them from the gang violence and recruitment in their native countries.

Seizing on the heightened awareness of the immigration issue, the presidents of Central America’s Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala), working with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), developed a regional plan for addressing the root causes of gang violence and immigration by improving security, increasing rule of law and good governance, and attracting regional and international investment. In short, the plan intends to make the region more livable.

The strategic actions of the Plan of the Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle aim to:

A. Stimulate the productive sector to create economic opportunities

B. Develop social and educational opportunities for the people

C. Improve public safety and enhance access to the legal system

D. Strengthen institutions to increase people’s trust in the State

The plan is unique in that it is was developed by the leaders of the region and not proposed by the U.S., and it requests that the countries of the region be measured and held accountable for progress or lack thereof. While the plan requests U.S. and IDB loans, grants and expertise, the countries themselves pledge to commit much more of their own funding and to making the reforms necessary for the success of the effort.

To date, the plan has been well received by the Obama Administration and by Congress. This is thanks in large part to the demonstrated leadership and commitment which each of the countries has made (specific legal, institutional, and security reforms) over recent months. If properly supported, implemented and monitored, this initiative has the potential to transform the security, business,
and social climate of this volatile region and positively impact efforts to curb crime, violence, immigration and poverty.

**Recommendation.**

1. On the national strategic level, the U.S. should support the Plan of the Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle by providing the necessary funding and expertise required to launch and sustain the effort. The current administration is pledging one billion dollars for 2016, which is pending Congressional approval. If committed, that funding should be closely tied to specific performance measures (such as changes to policies and institutions) and possibly to measures of effects (such as increased enrollment in education and jobs programs, and increased tax collection).

2. A U.S. whole-of-government task force should be assembled to take advantage of the invitation being extended by the three countries of the Northern Triangle to provide expertise in rule of law, governance, taxation, and commerce. As we have learned in recent conflicts and crisis, the go-to teams of the U.S. military and USAID can do many things well – but there are many areas which require bringing other agencies and institutions from across the panoply of U.S. government agencies.

3. On the more operational and tactical levels, U.S. military forces should be committed in increasing numbers to develop partner nation capacity of regional security forces. This important work provides practical experience for our forces in this important region while allowing the U.S. military to continue to be the partner of choice for these regional partners. Our interaction with the regional security forces will allow us to ensure that training is appropriate and proper conduct is integrated throughout all training, helping to create the professional forces required to "take back" sovereignty from gangs and TCOs.

4. Working under the Operational Control of U.S. Southern Command and Special Operations Command South, U.S. Army Military Information Support Teams should be given proper authorities and funding to work with the U.S. Country Teams in the Northern Triangle to develop and implement regional information support operations in support of U.S. and partner nation objectives of the Alliance plan.

**Implications.**

While any student, or even casual observer, of Latin America could easily choose any number of issues affecting the region and the United States, it would be hard to deny the issues of gangs and illegal immigration a place in any top ten list. It could be argued that each issue on its own is a "wicked problem" which will defy easy or satisfactory solutions, and taken together, they interact in such a way as to form a complex adaptive system that feed one another and learn to adapt.
What is certain is that it is in the vital interests of Latin American nations as well as the United States to invest attention and resources on these issues and search for whole-of-government approaches that target not just "downstream" enforcement such as tougher law enforcement, border control, etc., but which also address the root causes of the issues such as poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunities, corruption, lack of governance, and inadequate rule of law.

**Event Description.**

This submission is based on various readings and research conducted for the Introduction to International Development course offered at the U.S. Army War College in conjunction with the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, as well as personal experience.

9. **CONCLUSION**

The cross-cutting guidelines mentioned throughout this lesson report are highly essential and all equally imperative for successful peace and stability operations. Host Nation Ownership and Capacity emphasizes the importance of the host nation taking ownership and driving its own long-term development. Political Primacy illustrates the criticality of gaining political settlement and addressing the major issues/concerns of all conflicting parties and all marginalized groups. Legitimacy stresses the strengthening of relations between the local population and the host nation government and ensuring their continued support of the mission and mandate. Unity of Effort relies heavily on shared understanding, coordination, cooperation, and coherence among external and internal actors. Security calls for the management of “spoilers,” the protection of civilians, and the protection of human rights. Conflict Transformation requires reducing the drivers of conflict across society, building networks of peace, and strengthening sources of resilience. Regional Engagement emphasizes diplomacy and the need to work with neighboring countries and regional organizations toward promoting the host nation’s – and the region’s – security and economic and political development.

The following recommendations are broken down respectively according to the seven different Cross-Cutting Guidelines.

**Host Nation Ownership and Capacity**

- Where the U.S. and the host nation government have agreed to cooperate against threats to stability (such as terrorists/insurgents), the U.S. should emphasize host nation ownership/responsibility in
protecting its own population – focusing support to the host nation on advice, assistance, training, equipping, and capacity-building.

- It is recommended that civil-military coordination activities be closely tied to information operations – to build positive public perceptions of the HN government and public confidence in its ability to provide/sustain security and other essential services.

- The quality of public servants is crucial to the recovery of a post-conflict government and the trust that people have in it. This makes capacity-building in the public service essential for post-conflict recovery. Strengthening public servants’ knowledge, ethics, skills, networks and attitudes is key, because it is through public servants that government services are planned and delivered, critical innovations conceived and realized, needed reforms carried out, and trust in government restored.

- While encouraging and fostering the host nation’s ownership and development, it is essential to understand the local context in regards to ethnic, religious, gender, and other societal elements/factors. Be sure to include women in the recovery process and the host nation’s development.

Political Primacy

- Establish "continuity of governance." Connect village and district leadership to the provincial government, and connect the provincial government to the national government. Work extensively from the bottom up. Local participation is critical for good governance.

- During information operations, the U.S./coalition forces must support the strategic messages with actions. Namely, if the U.S./coalition force’s strategic message promises to improve the quality of life for HN civilians, then USAID, development partners, the U.S./coalition supported-HN government, and the DoS must be prepared to implement development projects at the local level – even in potentially dangerous areas. If the U.S./coalition forces fail to meet their promises, it undermines HN civilians’ confidence in the mission.

- Development of national strategies helps. All relevant ministries and state and non-state actors with mandates for elections, peace building, or dealing with possible violence should be included in developing national strategies for elections.

- While negotiating political settlements, it is important to recognize the unequal distribution of power among conflicting parties, the unresolved issues underlying the conflict, any biases of the participating parties, unrealistic goals the parties might have, and the criticality of establishing effective host nation leadership.
Legitimacy

- Police are the first echelon of deterrence, enforcement, and accountability for any legitimate justice system. Transparency (information) is a crucial component in establishing a legitimate police force that the public supports.
- In peace building and conflict resolution actions, those leading the actions should ensure that participation is extended to multiple levels and multiple sectors of society. Legitimacy/acceptance of the stabilization process and of the host nation’s governance can be generated by linking the various societal groups and committees to one another with common participation and purpose – bridging the lines of party, tribe, ethnicity, religion, age, and gender.
- To ensure the stability, integrity, and legitimacy of national governments, it is important to establish local governance in a manner that is understood by the local population. All U.S. persons involved in this process require an understanding of the local culture and historical animosities, with a solid understanding of how governance functions. For the military, this may require instruction on how to establish local governments and how they tie in to each level of government above the neighborhood or tribal areas. It also means knowing and understanding whom to go to for help.
- Host nation government activity must be made transparent to the population – through media, civil society, and reporting mechanisms. This transparency can serve to prevent corrupt practices from occurring and strengthen the legitimacy/support of government institutions.

Unity of Effort

- Promote, in all agencies, a culture of mutual understanding and cooperation. This can be attained with efforts on education and training of civil and military personnel at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Civil-military relations should be taught in all USG and UN educational institutions.
- Because each agency (DoS, DoD, USAID) has a unique culture and outlook, the starting point in achieving improved unity of effort is to foster improved understanding of each agency's role in achieving stability and its unique cultural outlook. Providing opportunities for increased interaction and training between the three agencies – particularly at more junior levels of the work force – would foster improved understanding and more effective coordination in the future.
- When interagency teams (such as PRTs) are operating in the same areas as Brigade Task Forces / Brigade Combat Teams, they should act in consonance. They should build "unity of effort" from the
outset through a common vision. They should act as one “team” in the planning and execution of stabilization and reconstruction projects. Weekly "team" meetings, and participation/liaison in each other’s meetings, can facilitate teamwork/unity.

- It is important to remember there will always be several actors (NGOs, IOs, etc.) conducting activities to assist the host nation population, and that the relations between/among these actors and with the people are essential for positive end states. Awareness and respect for other actors’ roles and space within a given environment can be an important consideration during planning and conduct of operations.

Security

- Security institution building and the development of ministerial/organizational effectiveness in partner security forces needs to be a critical aspect of all future U.S. COIN and stabilization operations right from the start.
- Establishment of good security institutions requires patience, persistence, a comprehensive approach, well-conceived recruiting and training policies, and active support from the international community.
- When society at large perceives the security forces as being unprofessional, repressive, and corrupt, it is recommended that the host nation government consider "transformative" security sector reform/development, along the lines of the Burundi-Netherlands SSD program. This includes starting with a shared vision among partners, setting strategic objectives across a long-term timeframe, utilizing an hierarchy of management, establishing dispute mechanisms, allowing flexible programming, and prioritizing host nation ownership – including civil society ownership.
- In order to maximize effectiveness of security institutions and forces, establish mechanisms for the timely sharing of information about threats and potential threats – including communication and information-sharing linkages with the local populace.

Conflict Transformation

- The government (of a conflict-affected nation) should attempt to integrate "spoiler groups" whenever possible by identifying, aligning, and offering incentives for cooperation.
- In areas with constant conflict, regional peacebuilding institutes should consider focusing programs at the grassroots level – involving local government officials, community development workers, civil society leaders, educators, activists, youth leaders, indigenous peoples, spiritual/religious leaders, and security sector
personnel – and encouraging them to effect change within their structures, groups, and systems.

- In the immediate aftermath of civil war, when a "window of opportunity" is presented to lay a foundation for peacebuilding and to impact and include the (former) warring factions, leaders/practitioners should consolidate the state’s monopoly of force, integrate DDR and SSR into the transformation of security forces, mobilize networks for peace, operationalize human security, and then maintain momentum for peace and reform.

- Endeavor to create a “sustainable positive trajectory” where the host nation can independently manage the drivers of conflict and sustain conditions for long-term development.

### Regional Engagement

- In light of the recently conducted African-based peacekeeping operations in the Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Mali, consider a step-by-step approach involving primarily regional actors, supported by Western powers’ technical capabilities, under a UN resolution, for similar peacekeeping scenarios in the future.

- When feasible, tailor the composition of the stability force to soldiers/nations that would be culturally "acceptable" to the people of the host nation (as opposed to soldiers/nations perceived as having no commonality), and, if possible, gain commitments from participating governments/nations to sustain manpower contributions to the stability force over a number of years – even if casualty rates become relatively high.

- On the more operational and tactical levels, U.S. military forces should be committed in increasing numbers to develop partner nation capacity of regional security forces. This important work provides practical experience for our forces while allowing the U.S. military to continue to be the partner of choice for regional partners.

- Conduct a comprehensive diplomatic effort that aims to halt any destabilizing actions by the host nation’s neighbors, including the harboring of spoiler groups that conduct cross-border activities aimed at destabilization.

Through wider dissemination of the afore-mentioned recommendations, their consideration in the planning and execution of peace & stability operations, and through leadership emphasis of the seven cross-cutting guidelines, significant impacts will be made during the course of future peace and stability operations.

**10. COMMAND POC**

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Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan (18 January 2015). Leaders from the 201st and 203rd Afghan National Army Corps, Afghan Border Police zones 301 and 402, the 11th Pakistan Army Corps, and a delegation from Resolute Support headquarters met to discuss border security at an event hosted by Train, Advise, Assist Command-East (TAAC-East) at Operational Base Fenty. For the first time in recent years Afghan and Pakistan corps-level commanders met and talked about the mutual benefits of building a cross-border network to root out terrorism and bring safety and security to the region. (Photo by U.S. Army Captain Jarrod Morris, TACC-East)
Related Documents, References, and Links

[Ensure you are logged in to SOLLIMS to access these items.]

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