The present volume was written as a supplement to series of monographs authored by Casey Wardynski, David Lyle, and Mike Colarusso of the Army’s Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis and published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College from 2009 to 2010. In those monographs, Wardynski, Lyle, and Colarusso adumbrated an officer corps strategy based on the theory of talent management. This volume aims to provide a historical context for their discussion of an officer strategy (and for what has passed for such a strategy in the past). Like the earlier monographs, this volume is organized around the functionally interdependent concepts of accessing, developing, retaining, and employing talent. Each chapter will take the reader up to the point where the earlier monographs began their story, which generally falls in the timeframe of the late-1980s and early-1990s.