Army War College - Publications News

Book Reviews

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:10:00 GMT

Book reviews Spring 2026

Strategic Rivalries: How Are They Won?

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:09:00 GMT

This article argues strategic rivalries—distinct from general strategic competition—are best understood as contests in which states prioritize weakening a specific opponent’s capacity to compete. It departs from existing work by critiquing the Joint Concept for Competing’s narrow definition and by emphasizing rivalry termination as a central but understudied dimension. Drawing on decades of international relations scholarship and historical datasets of interstate rivalries since 1815, the article analyzes how rivalries end and identifies strategic preclusion as a proactive approach for winning them. Its insights offer policy and military practitioners guidance for shaping competitive strategies short of war.

Spezialpropaganda: The East German Military’s Covert Information-Warfare Program

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:08:00 GMT

This article details the East German military’s extensive, innovative covert-propaganda program, which was designed to influence West German attitudes for almost two decades during the Cold War. Unlike existing scholarship that primarily addresses intelligence-led disinformation, this study uniquely analyzes military-led information warfare. The article uses previously classified East German military records to examine capabilities and tactics ranging from fake conscription notices to radio broadcasts. The findings offer contemporary US military planners and practitioners insight into the complexities of integrating information-warfare capabilities, measuring the effectiveness of propaganda, and understanding adversarial influence campaigns, with direct implications for current Joint Force planning and doctrine.

Risk Decision Making and Intertemporal Choice: Lessons from the Taiwan Strait

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:07:00 GMT

This article argues that domestic and political factors may incentivize US presidents to use risky military options to resolve crises quickly, though high costs or threats to long-term vital interests can overcome leaders’ natural tendencies to focus on the present. Recently declassified documents from President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration allow a detailed examination of how US leaders balanced risks over time during the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The findings inform policy recommendations to enhance military planning and enable military advisers to communicate long-term risks more effectively to political leaders.

Imitating US Doctrine Cost Europe Its Heavy Combat Power

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:06:00 GMT

This article argues that Europe’s loss of heavy combat power is primarily the result of doctrinal shifts influenced by the United States, rather than underfunding alone. Unlike existing research that focuses on defense budgets or burden-sharing, this study isolates the opportunity costs of adopting US-based expeditionary and counterinsurgency doctrines. Using force structure data for Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (1990–2022), it conducts a counterfactual analysis of lost tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and heavy artillery pieces. The article shows that Europe’s shortfalls are doctrinal as much as fiscal and highlights the relevance of maintaining balance in future doctrinal choices.

Successful Large-Scale Combat Operations Require Artificially Intelligent Breaching Munitions

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:05:00 GMT

The US Army must invest in artificial intelligence–enabled breaching munitions to succeed in large-scale combat operations. This article combines existing technologies to propose a new capability the Army does not currently possess. It lays out the current state of breaching materiel, identifies additional technology available, and proposes combining multiple pieces of existing technology to create improved breaching munitions for the Army’s use. This new capability will require practitioners and policymakers to enable the creation of artificial intelligence systems through acquisition and tactical experimentation.

Strategic Theory and Clausewitz’s Trinitarian Test

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:04:00 GMT

Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity represents a qualitative test for strategy in both theory and practice. With the trinity, Clausewitz transforms competing influences into a mark of mark of theoretical quality. Synthesizing several translations of Clausewitz’s On War and interpretations by experts such as Hew Strachan, Antulio J. Echevarria II, and Frank G. Hoffman, this article suggests that Clausewitz believed that good theory encompasses and accounts for all fundamental forces of war, whereas bad theory emphasizes the extremes of one force. The trinity compels mandatory considerations for students of theory, war planners, and practitioners.

Approaching the Military as a Profession Through the Clausewitzian Trinity

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:03:00 GMT

The Clausewitzian trinity (people, government, and military—or passion, reason, and chance) can enhance existing scholarship and discussions about military professionalism by emphasizing the fundamental purpose of military forces. Specifically, managing chance incorporates elements of reducing uncertainty and applying creativity as individuals develop coup d’oeil. Junior personnel manage chance by reducing cognitive load while enhancing cognitive skills needed to quickly assess battlefield conditions as they progress to becoming senior leaders. This article contrasts these ideas against the various roles assigned to civil-military forces in the Clausewitzian trinity to emphasize professionalism in developing military leaders.

Legacies Worth Considering: (Re)examining the Assumptions behind Denial Strategies

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:02:00 GMT

Contemporary analyses of denial strategies risk conceptual confusion because they neglect the legacies of two distinct traditions: coercion versus control. This article explores the two traditions’ legacies from a broader perspective. It shows how neglecting those legacies contributes to conceptual confusion concerning operational conduct and strategic affairs in the South China Sea. The article facilitates smoother communication between and among civilians and military members involved in operational planning, which is essential if the United States and its allies want to combine military and nonmilitary instruments in future operations.

From the Editor in Chief

Pentagon News — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 17:01:00 GMT

Welcome to the Spring 2026 issue of Parameters, which consists of an In Focus special commentary, three forums (Clausewitz and Modern Warfare, Operational Considerations, and Historical Studies), and the Strategic Competition Corner.

Article Index, Volume 55, 2025

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:12:00 GMT

Article Index, Volume 55, 2025

Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:11:00 GMT

Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation (Required by 39 U.S.C. 3685)

Book Reviews

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:10:00 GMT

Book Reviews Winter 2025–26

Reframing the Nature of Strategic Competition

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:09:00 GMT

In this Corner, Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, professor of strategic competition at the US Army War College, critiques the essential concepts underpinning US doctrine concerning intrastate strategic competition. In this, his inaugural contribution, Dr. Echevarria discusses the shortfalls in the Joint concept of interstate strategic competition, namely, its failure to capture the true nature of that competition. A more extensive reading of the scholarly literature on strategic rivalry suggests the nature of strategic competition should be reframed to align more closely with the nature of war.

On Lethality: Toward a More Complete Definition and Formation of the Lethality Framework

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:08:00 GMT

This article argues lethality should be conceptualized as a holistic and regenerative process in which adversarial militaries prepare for, adapt to, and sustain the application of force in conflict. Whereas the literature on lethality is widening to include the human war f ighter, attempts to define and measure lethality have proven problematic— a struggle this article seeks to remedy. Drawing on historical, doctrinal, and interdisciplinary perspectives, the authors argue that lethality includes the capacity to kill and elements of learning and adaptation. The proposed lethality framework offers policy and military practitioners a model for assessing and operationalizing lethality in military education, leadership development, and Joint force integration.

Mission Command’s Asymmetric Advantage Through AI-Driven Data Management

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:07:00 GMT

Artificial intelligence can optimize mission command by condensing multisource field data that ascends the decision chain while distilling concise, decision-quality guidance to the tactical edge. Diverging from existing publications, this article positions information asymmetry as a defining pillar of mission command rather than a limitation. This article presents a condensation-distillation framework that manages complexity through data condensation, AI-driven distillation, and conceptual metrics to assess asymmetric information flows. Drawing on military doctrine, algorithmic-warfare literature, and current modernization programs, military practitioners will engage with a systems-thinking perspective, revealing how AI-enabled command and control can enhance decision clarity and reinforce the intent of mission command.

Drones and the Changing Character of War

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:06:00 GMT

Cheap drones have transformed the character of war by creating a “mass effect” that challenges traditional principles of force concentration. Unlike commentary focused on offense-defense debates or ethics, this article explains how Jevons’s Paradox, the Red Queen Effect, and models like Lanchester’s Laws and Hughes’s Salvo Equations underpin this shift. Drawing on lessons from Ukraine, historical theory, and production trends, it explains why the production of cheap “precision mass” is expected to accelerate. For military and policy practitioners, the analysis offers urgent guidance for adapting tactics, procurement, and doctrine to a battlefield dominated by ubiquitous, low-cost drones—before adversaries exploit this advantage.

China’s Securitization of Agricultural Imports: A Case of Economic Statecraft Mixed Successes

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:05:00 GMT

This article argues that the People’s Republic of China’s agricultural import diversification from 1995–2023 reflects a strategic effort to reduce reliance on US and allied suppliers while prioritizing national food security. Unlike prior studies focused on production or consumption, this analysis centers on trade patterns of high-value, strategically critical commodities. Using trade data and policy documents, it assesses shifts in supplier dependency, notably toward Brazil. This research offers policy and military practitioners insights into how food security intersects with economic statecraft, revealing vulnerabilities and strategic choices in global supply chains relevant to deterrence and resilience planning.

Security Implications of the China-Russia-North Korea Triangle

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:04:00 GMT

This article analyzes the evolving strategic dynamics within the China-Russia-North Korea triangle and their implications for global security. It argues that while the strengthened Russia–North Korea relationship poses risks for China’s global strategy and its major economic partnerships, for now, China also derives some benefits from these close ties and considers the risks to be manageable. Drawing on recent diplomatic developments, military cooperation, and regional responses, the article offers a nuanced assessment of how this alignment affects European and Indo-Pacific theaters. The analysis provides US policymakers with insight into the risks of opportunistic aggression and the strategic calculations driving these partnerships.

A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China

Pentagon News — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:03:00 GMT

This article argues that the United States deterrence-by-denial strategy is insufficient to deter China from attempting forcible unification with Taiwan, due to its neglect of ideological and psychological drivers in the Chinese Communist Party’s decision-making calculus. Unlike existing military-centric models, it introduces a hybrid deterrence framework that integrates denial and punishment across domains, coordinated by a Joint Interagency Organization. The article offers a practical model for deterring ideologically motivated adversaries through synchronized, multidomain planning based on coercion theory, behavioral deterrence literature, and strategic documents from US and Chinese sources.