Negotiating Base Access During Crises

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Today the US faces a new era of uncertainty about where, when, and against whom it will militarily engage. Coupling that reality with A2AD and budget-induced re-posturing leaves America in a strategic predicament regarding force projection similar to the one it faced prior to WWII. Current trends suggest that the U.S. will continue to reduce overseas basing as a way to manage reduced end-strength and rising infrastructure sustainment costs. With fewer pre-positioned forces and a political desire to decrease large main operating base footprints, Combatant Commanders will need to gain quick access to airfields, seaports, and basing at the onset of crises. Complicating this strategic problem is the possibility that diplomatic leverage spent for negotiating use prior to hostilities may not result in actual use of bases during hostilities. To these ends, the historical evidence suggests a potential strategic benefit of using the “Lend-lease” concept to inform future policy formulation for contingency basing negotiations. These realities suggest that the U.S. must balance its goal of stabilizing regions through building partner capacity with the need to retain some type of leverage for future negotiations of airfields and ports during actual crisis.
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(5,600 words)

Abstract

Today the US faces a new era of uncertainty about where, when, and against whom it will militarily engage. Coupling that reality with A2AD and budget-induced re-posturing leaves America in a strategic predicament regarding force projection similar to the one it faced prior to WWII. Current trends suggest that the U.S. will continue to reduce overseas basing as a way to manage reduced end-strength and rising infrastructure sustainment costs. With fewer pre-positioned forces and a political desire to decrease large main operating base footprints, Combatant Commanders will need to gain quick access to airfields, seaports, and basing at the onset of crises. Complicating this strategic problem is the possibility that diplomatic leverage spent for negotiating use prior to hostilities may not result in actual use of bases during hostilities. To these ends, the historical evidence suggests a potential strategic benefit of using the “Lend-lease” concept to inform future policy formulation for contingency basing negotiations. These realities suggest that the U.S. must balance its goal of stabilizing regions through building partner capacity with the need to retain some type of leverage for future negotiations of airfields and ports during actual crisis.
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In an environment of increasing pressure on budgets and reduced overseas presence, how will American armed forces gain access to overseas basing for strategic force projection during future conflicts in the twenty-first century? This is not a new problem. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the United States was faced with a similar quandary at the onset of WWII. The post-WWI force drawdown, peace dividend of the 1920s, and the Great Depression had all drastically affected army and navy budgets and force readiness. Political isolationism in the Congress and public disaffection with things military ensured massive resistance to returning American military forces “over there” anytime in the near future. Further, the United States had only recently emerged as a great power and possessed few overseas bases, save for a few islands in the Pacific and the Caribbean, and by the mid-1930s had shrunk its military power to a level on par with some of its Latin American neighbors. What limited forces the country had were based—excepting Hawaii, the Philippines, and some small islands—in the continental United States, leaving American political and military leaders few options for rapid and meaningful overseas force projection. Moreover, air power was still struggling to achieve parity with land and sea power as a military instrument, and although it had noteworthy advocates like Billy Mitchell, remained the denizen of a secondary domain. Today, unlike the 1930s and 1940’s when the world was at the dawn of aviation, technology, the passage of time, and globalization have led to the establishment of thousands of military and civilian air and seaports around the world. For instance, the CIA World Factbook assesses the number of airfields worldwide nearing 42,000 by 2013 (13,500 of those in the United States).¹ By January 2016, the Airports Council International (ACI), an organization that produces the World Airport Traffic Report,
tracked cargo and passenger interchange at over 1,800 commercial airports across 177 countries. In addition, World Port Source claims over 4,900 seaports provide access to 196 countries around the globe. Including the number of capable military airfields, it is highly probable that suitable airfields and seaports would, actually, be geographically situated in order to meet the needs of a Combatant Commander for most potential crises. The question, however, is whether the U.S. can negotiate agreements to utilize these ports and bases when necessary. This problem also highlights the Defense Department’s (DOD) constant dependence not only on interagency support (such as from State) but also on international partners and treaties.

Analyzing how the United States managed to attain requisite overseas basing in order to achieve strategic objectives during WWII may shed light on contemporary challenges facing the DOD regarding basing in future twenty-first century conflicts. This paper will examine how the joint force should gain access to overseas basing before and during conflict while in a political environment of depressed defense budgets and a trend to reduce and re-posture its foreign presence. Specifically, evaluating how the reciprocal support provided through the 1941 Lend-Lease Act impacted U.S. basing during WWII offers a case study with potential implications for American policy and strategy today.

According to the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, continued pressure on the defense budget will result in reduced force structure in the immediate future. This creates a strategic challenge that the Chairman summarizes as, "How will future Joint Forces with constrained resources protect U.S. national interests against increasingly capable enemies in an uncertain, complex, rapidly changing, and increasingly
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review addresses this force structure challenge by stating that the U.S. will deploy forces forward and rotationally to ensure global security and that it will rebalance its global posture to meet current and future challenges. The document also implies that certain bases will have to be shuttered, however. For instance, the Department of Defense released its European Infrastructure Consolidation report in 2015, where it revealed plans to close fifteen sites and installations across Europe along with slight reductions in force posture.

The military problem here, as stated in the Department of Defense's Joint Operational Access Concept, is “the essential access challenge for future joint forces …to be able to project military force into an operational area and sustain it in the face of armed opposition by increasingly capable enemies when U.S. overseas defense posture is changing.” It goes on to state that one of the most critical challenges facing future employment of the joint force is operational access, which will depend on pre-conditional shaping of the operational area through a coordinated interagency approach. While it is clear that land component forces will have to conduct forced entry operations in order to secure basing within contested anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environments, it will also be important for Combatant Commanders to quickly secure access to air and sea ports near the operational area to project combat power in support of entry operations and to ensure global agility.

The Chairman’s Capstone for Joint Operations provides eight key elements to globally integrated operations; the third element describes components for global agility. It states that speed of events will “place a premium on swift and adaptable military responses,” and that operational reach will depend on “smarter positioning of forces”
through greater use of “rapid expeditionary basing.”\textsuperscript{8} Global agility, as a critical component for the movement and maneuver warfighting function, “requires adequate transportation capabilities and the ability to quickly open sea and air ports in or near the operational area.”\textsuperscript{9} To do this, the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) calls for consideration of a variety of forward basing options which constitute critical access for deployment and logistics. Consequently, forward basing provides a force multiplier that proportionally impacts the ability to project combat power. However, since A2AD-capable enemies put forward bases at risk, where possible the joint force will employ from ports of embarkation.\textsuperscript{10}

Further complicating this dilemma is a move to operate from an increased number of locations, on smaller footprints than previously accustomed, with the goal of achieving flexibility and survivability. When forward basing is required, the joint force has the option to break away from consolidated main operating bases into several dispersed locations, thereby presenting the enemy with the difficulty of an increased target set. However, taking into account the increased logistical burden of scattered locations, the JOAC describes a third option which includes a similar method of small dispersed operational footprints, but instead specifying that they be more primitive in nature. As a result, utilizing austere “remote or abandoned airfields, ports, or other military or civilian facilities provides greater flexibility for the joint force while simultaneously decreasing vulnerability and logistics demands.”\textsuperscript{11} Following this theme, the Air Force Future Operating Concept states that it will project combat power from small-dispersed bases with streamlined logistics. It intends to rely on international partnerships through multinational engagement and security cooperation. It also
stresses the importance partner engagements play in securing access to basing and infrastructure during crisis. While highlighting the capability to project combat power from U.S. bases to anywhere on the globe, short-range platforms used for precision strike, discrete entry points into cyberspace, and special operations will continue to require forward basing.12

Assuming a reduced permanent overseas presence coupled with the joint force concept of employing forces from point of embarkation and small dispersed forward basing near the area of operations, the number of locations that Combatant Commanders will have to obtain during future conflicts is likely to increase. To meet this demand commanders are encouraged to shape conditions prior to hostilities through a coordinated interagency approach.13 The Joint Operational Access Concept continually stresses the importance of conducting security and engagement activities such as “bilateral and multinational exercises to improve multinational operations…missions to train, advise and equip foreign forces to improve their national ability to contribute to regional access; negotiations to secure basing and transit rights…and support agreements.”14

Yet, the document does caveat that those agreements may not be honored during crises, so commanders should consider options based on current access.15 Even that premise could be over-presumptuous, as evidenced by America’s inability to utilize its existing access in Turkey prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, or in Saudi Arabia during certain times of Operation Southern Watch and later Enduring Freedom when the U.S. enjoyed an overwhelming force advantage. How much harder will it be if the belligerents are near peer competitors? Also, the difficulty associated with predicting
exact locations during planning operations compounds the problem of negotiating the right locations prior to conflict. Moreover, the Combatant Commanders could expend significant resources securing access rights for locations selected by planners (prior to crises with unknown contexts) that may not prove acceptable or suitable during an actual contingency. While this does not imply all phase zero efforts would prove fruitless, it does suggest that commanders could still face the challenge of identifying and negotiating access to bases, airfields, and ports immediately prior to or at the onset of hostilities. Fortunately, history offers several compelling cases that can assist contemporary commanders and their staffs in thinking strategically about such a contingency. Perhaps the most useful one is Lend-lease, the great program most famous for economically propping up the battered allied countries prior to America’s entry into WWII. The other side of this program—the overseas basing rights granted by these countries to the U.S. in exchange for its economic help—offers numerous insights into the nature of attaining and effectually utilizing foreign bases at the beginning of wars.

One of America’s greatest global efforts before and during WWII was the Lend-lease program. This policy resulted in building partner capacity, provided access to bases in foreign lands, and arguably prevented early defeat of a few allied nations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the “Act to Further Promote the Defense of the United States” (Lend-lease Act) into law on 11 March 1941, officially ending U.S. neutrality without a formal declaration of war. The law authorized the President authority “to sell transfer, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise dispose of, to any such government” whose defense was vital to U.S. security. Trucks, airplanes, jeeps, and a
host of other war-related materiel began to flow across the Atlantic to the beleaguered
countries standing up to Axis aggression. While a majority of Lend-lease activities
occurred in Europe (3/5 of the aid went to Britain alone), a significant investment was
also directed to support Eurasia and Latin America. Its purpose in Eurasia was to build
partner capacity in order to mount future second fronts in the Soviet Union and China,
thereby helping to suppress German and Japanese advances. Iran received lend-lease
materiel to shore up its role in maintaining a vital logistics route for transporting lend-
lease goods to Russia. Additionally, the U.S. provided materiel support to Latin
American nations to strengthen the defense of North America. “Over the course of the
war, the United States contracted Lend-Lease agreements with more than 30 countries,
dispensing some $50 billion in assistance [equivalent to $647 billion today].”18

Probably the most strategically valuable aspect of the Lend-lease program was
the concept of reciprocal benefits, often referred to as “reverse lend-lease.” The Lend
Lease Act was built on earlier “cash and carry” methods associated with the 1939
Neutrality Act and early 1941 “Destroyers for Bases” agreement with Great Britain. The
latter, arguably the genesis for reverse lend-lease, was an exchange of aging WWI-era
U.S. Naval vessels for a string of airbases in the Caribbean and Latin America to be
used in a potential push to Africa as well as to protect America’s southern border.
Simply put, reverse lend-lease provided U.S. forces with foreign-supplied logistical
support at deployed locations, construction of facilities and bases, and access to foreign
ports and airfields in exchange for U.S. material support. It is estimated that reverse
lend-lease provided the U.S. with approximately $600 million in military construction
directly before and after U.S. entry into WWII; $60M and $20M were provided just by
Australia and New Zealand respectively for labor, use and construction of airfields. This potential for the U.S. to gain access to existing bases or host nation-funded construction of new ones enabled a prewar isolationist America to posture forces around the globe in a way that permitted the country to mount strategic and operational offensives much earlier, and more effectively, than it would have otherwise.

Great Britain received the greatest amount of support from the U.S. Lend-lease program ($31.4 billion). The United States' initial intent for lend-lease support to Britain was to bolster their ability to contain Nazi aggression and prevent—or forestall—the need for direct U.S. involvement, but it also provided a means for acquiring key locations for the defense of North America. Moreover, the U.S. received access for basing in Latin America, was provided bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda, and received turn-key air bases (along with logistical support) within England itself. In addition, the British Commonwealth nation of Canada provided over $1 billion in materials and services to include 75% of the construction costs associated with U.S. occupied defense facilities within its borders. At first, the idea of transferring war materiel to the Allies, even Great Britain, seemed to be a bridge too far. However, by summer 1940 the threat had reached a point whereby Britain’s need for naval assets matched the U.S. desire for defensive sites in the Caribbean and Latin America. President Roosevelt, requiring congressional approval, sent a message to Congress in which (along with a supportive legal read from Attorney General Robert H. Jackson) he pressed Congress on the importance of protecting “the Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico and our eastern and Gulf seabords.” On 27 March 1941, the U.S. and Great Britain signed an
agreement to exchange 50 naval destroyers for basing rights in Bahamas, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Trinidad, British Guiana and Antigua. This bases-for-destroyers agreement set the foundation for years of formal Lend-lease between the two allied countries. The negotiated airbases also provided strategic air defense of America’s southeastern flank, preventing a potential Axis bombing approach that could have been mounted by “island hopping” from South America to Cuba.

The U.S. also used the Lend-lease program as leverage in direct negotiations for base access in several South American republics. For example, the case of Guatemala provides an example of a foreign nation using its basing assets as leverage for gaining lend-lease support from the U.S. Similar to other lend-lease arrangements, the two countries negotiated two separate agreements, one for the supply of arms and equipment for Guatemalan soldiers and the other to afford the U.S. basing rights in Guatemala. A 22 January 1942 memo from the Foreign Minister of Guatemala, Des Portes, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that President Ubico was requesting support under the Lend-lease program, and was followed up in February with a proposal for $3 million in arms and equipment to outfit 10,000 soldiers. “At one point in the negotiations on the bases, Guatemala proposed making delivery of United States arms a quid pro quo but dropped the proposal when Washington promised a separate agreement to supply arms.” Interestingly enough, the Secretary of State did not respond to the first memo until 18 February 1942, a day after the minister sent a second memo notifying that an agreement for airbases in Guatemala had been reached.

A similar scenario played out in Mexico, beginning in 1940 with U.S. interest in access to Mexican airfields and naval bases. After a year of failed negotiations,
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles blocked lend-lease discussions in August 1941 until Mexico capitulated on use of critical naval ports. That failing to resolve the dispute, Welles decided to re-open channels with Mexico offering terms of an approximate $31 million arms transfer under the Lend-lease program. After hearing of State Department approval for continued lend-lease discussions, Welles received permission for U.S. use of airfields and ports on 24 December 1941. However, some could argue that Mexico finally approved the basing requests as a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which had just occurred.\textsuperscript{29} These bases would provide naval ports, airfields, and radar sites for the defense of Baja and en route locations necessary for ferrying aircraft to Panama for defense of the canal.

The final case for basing in Latin America involved negotiations for access to basing in Brazil, primarily for the purposes of preventing a potential Nazi foothold in South America and ferrying war materiel across the Atlantic to Africa. Lend-lease factored into the negotiation because the U.S. wanted to build capacity in Brazil to secure an alliance and garner ability to build up southern defense forces. For Brazil, the rise of Argentina was one of the underlying factors driving their desire for armament. “If Brazil were to be preeminent in South America, it had to have weapons to counter superior Argentine forces.”\textsuperscript{30} One instance involved an early 1942 negotiation in which, once again, the War Department sought State Department’s support in negotiating a deal, in this case enlargement of air bases and increased troop levels. Yet in this instance Undersecretary Welles would not press Brazil for consideration of the military’s request until the condition of Brazil’s lend-lease support improved.\textsuperscript{31} Both Brazil and the State Department were frustrated with the War Department’s reluctance to send lend-
lease materiel to Brazil (the War Department perceived it would be diverting critical assets from the main effort in the Atlantic). Welles’s resistance broke the impasse, however, and the War Department agreed to send arms to Brazil. The State Department reciprocated by negotiating agreements with Brazil for the requested basing requirements. The final resolution of this interagency dispute had strategic ramifications. The ability to position U.S. forces in Brazil and utilize air bases countered “the primary Nazi threat…the possibility that Germany would defeat Great Britain, drive across Africa, and invade the northeastern bulge of Brazil.” Further, it greatly enhanced America’s ability to provide logistical support to allies in North Africa, thereby reinforcing the overall effort in the European Theater. It was later claimed by the War and Navy Departments that the benefit of the Brazilian bases was worth all the support to the Americas.

The Soviet Union was the second largest beneficiary of the Lend-lease program with an estimated $11.3 billion in financial and materiel support. Overall, the U.S. provided a gigantic amount of supplies, vehicles and military hardware that the Soviet Union could not initially produce. Some sources claim 14-17% of Soviet military aircraft was supplied by Lend-lease, for a total exceeding 18,000. The U.S. also provided a majority of the Red Army’s trucks, icebreakers and other ships for the Soviet Navy, and delivered critical food and medical supplies. For example, an April 1944 report to Congress showed that shipments to the Soviet Union included “8,800 planes, 5,200 tanks and tank destroyers, 190,000 military trucks, 36,000 jeeps,” and significant amounts of food and material supplies. According to one Russian’s perspective:

Our propagandists did a lot of work on the theme of lend-lease. Dozens of books and articles were published in the post-war years from the point of
view that lend-lease was worthless. It was impossible to deviate from the approved text. However, one of those who participated in receipt of lend-lease materiel, General I. P. Lebedev, remembering years long past, remarked openly: ‘In our literature, the activity of American aircraft during combat operations at the front during the war was reduced to an absolute minimum. However, archival materials and memoirs of combat pilots paint a different picture.38

Although Lend-lease in the Soviet example was strategically significant mainly in how it helped stave off the Red Army’s defeat in the summer 1942 campaign, evidence suggests that this effort was partially reciprocated through the use of Soviet air bases and logistical support for those bases. In fact, later attempts by the U.S. to negotiate use of Siberian locations failed to come to an agreement because the USSR leveraged the situation to push for extending the Lend-lease program beyond its natural termination point.39

One successful negotiation enabled a revolutionary method of conducting bomber operations, referred to as “shuttle bombing,” that relied on the use of foreign airfields. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Commissar V. M. Molotov (USSR) agreed to pursue the idea in the 1943 “Most Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference,” a precursor to the Tehran Conference in November 1943.40 The plan was to launch missions from European bases, bomb German targets and land on secret Soviet airfields, then reload for a reverse mission. The key to implementing shuttle bombing was getting approval for airfields and support from the USSR. Fortunately, the importance of Lend-lease was not lost on Stalin or his chief advisors. Shortly after the Soviet dictator had stood and made a glowing toast to the U.S. and its Lend-lease program in Tehran, Colonel Elliot Roosevelt, son of President Roosevelt, met with Stalin in the Kremlin and received approval for airfields in the Soviet Union for shuttle bombing operations.41 The U.S. planned to use six airfields in the Ukraine and establish a
headquarters in Poltava (code named Station 559). In the end, only three bases (Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatin) were ready for operations that began in June of 1944 and continued for the next four months. From these bases, the US was able to conduct Operation Frantic and extend its deep interdiction of Nazi strategic targets. Overall, the impact of Operation Frantic remains contested as some argue that it saved planes and lives and did real damage to the Nazis, while other scholars claim it produced only propaganda. Regardless, it did prove the concept of foreign bases as transient reload points to extend operational reach, a concept that aligns with the future operating concepts being discussed by strategists today.

Iran played a critical role in the Soviet Union Lend-lease program by providing an alternative to the dangerous polar sea route into Russia. The Persian route, as it was termed, ferried over 30% of Lend-lease resources from the U.S. by sea to Iraqi ports and then by train to Iran for assembly and forward movement into the Soviet Union. In the beginning, aircraft were assembled in Basra, but when the airfield became too small for expanding operations, it moved to Abadan Air Base, Iran, where it remained until the end of operations in 1945. For a period of time, the U.S. occupied Iranian land at Amirabad rent-free, even though no treaty or formal agreement was ever made between the U.S. and Iran because operations were assumed to fall within the British agreement.

At first, U.S. lend-lease material therefore only traversed Iran, but it became readily acknowledged that continued success of the Persian route hinged on the social and economic stability of Iran. “Only slowly did it become apparent that the political, economic, and military health of Iran, essential to the success of Russian-aid
operations, was a matter of life or death for Iran itself; that, in fact, the second objective overshadowed the first; that the problem of Iran was monolithic." As a result, the State Department prepared recommendations concerning the stability of Iran for the 1943 Tehran Conference: how to alleviate hunger, transportation difficulties, and bureaucratic mismanagement. When the U.S. finally approved a specific Lend-lease agreement for Iran in March of 1942, it had two main objectives: first, improve local conditions to ensure the unimpeded flow of material to the Soviet Union, and second, help Iran establish a self-sustaining system of governance. Iran only received a few million dollars in direct support while the majority of material transited through to Russia, but that aid plus the intangible investments returned significant influence for America during WWII and well into the postwar period. That influence only ceased with the deposition of the Shah during the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Another revolutionary bombing approach played out in the famous 1942 “Doolittle Raid” on Tokyo in which bombers were launched from aircraft carriers on a one-way trip. Originally called the Tokyo raids, the plan “involved the launching of medium bombers from a U.S. aircraft carrier…to attack Tokyo and several of the larger industrial Japanese cities; from Japan the planes would proceed 1,200 miles farther across the East China Sea to airfields in eastern China [because they couldn’t land on carriers].” Negotiations were secretly conducted through the China-Burma-India Theater Command to secure Chinese airfields at Kweilin, Kian, Yushan, Chuchow, and Lishui where bomber crews would land and refuel. Chiang Kai-Shek reluctantly approved the mission on March 28, 1942, just days before the planned launch. During this same time,
negotiations were underway to establish a formal Lend-lease agreement between the U.S. and China to furnish supplies, planes, and financial support.\textsuperscript{51} Later, additional Lend-lease negotiations provided the foundation for construction of additional airfields to be used for fighter air support of Chinese forces and to establish a sustained bombing campaign on Japan. These airfields would specifically be used for Operation MATTERHORN, the answer to President Roosevelt’s desire to shore up Chinese morale and strike fear into the Japanese population via direct bombing of their cities.\textsuperscript{52} Originally discussed at the Casablanca Conference, the plan to use Indian and Chinese airfields for long-range heavy bomber operations solidified at the subsequent conferences in Cairo and Tehran. President Roosevelt then sent a secret message to Chiang Kai-Shek requesting, as part of the Lend-lease program, five new airfields be built in the in the Chengtu province to enable bombing of mainland Japan.\textsuperscript{53} While the overall Lend-lease contribution to China ($1.6 billion) paled in comparison to that offered the Soviet Union, it is reasonable to posit that the program helped prevent the early defeat of China and afforded the U.S. strategic basing access earlier in the war against Japan that it would not have had otherwise.

While there are conflicting views on the efficacy of the Lend-lease Act, it clearly provided substantial support to allied powers. It is estimated that the U.S. only received economic payback for 10 cents on the dollar, but the incalculable benefit of the Lend-lease program was military access to strategic basing in locations never before utilized by American forces.\textsuperscript{54} Secretary of State Hull described the value of bases in Brazil, for instance, far exceeding the amount of lend-lease arms shipments, concluding that without them “victory in Europe or in Asia could not have come so soon.”\textsuperscript{55}
The history of Lend-lease on the eve of and during America’s early experience in WWII stands as a testament to the strategic and operational value of negotiating overseas basing rights prior to global crises. Without this program, it is arguable that the United States would have been poorly positioned to combat the German submarine menace in the Atlantic, launch Operation Torch, embark on the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany, and initiate Operation Matterhorn against Japan. If even one of these strategically critical campaigns had been further delayed, or even lost, WWII would have unequivocally lasted longer and cost thousands or possibly millions more lives. The implications for modern policy makers and their strategic advisors are fairly obvious, even in a world where asymmetric, hybrid, and guerrilla warfare are currently in the ascendancy. Such was also the case prior to WWII in most places of the world, and yet the global conventional cataclysm still occurred. Thinking hard about acquiring overseas basing for future strategic contingencies, whether they be small or large wars, should be a priority for today’s strategic leaders.

Current trends suggest that the U.S. will continue to reduce overseas basing as a way to manage reduced end-strength and rising infrastructure sustainment costs in order to maximize its constrained budget for maintaining readiness and modernization efforts. With fewer pre-positioned forces and apolitical desire to decrease large main operating base footprints, Combatant Commanders will need to gain quick access to airfields, seaports, and basing at the onset of crises. An advantage gained from globalization is the number of airfields and seaports already established around the globe. However, while this may drive less of a need to build infrastructure, it does drive a significant requirement for an interagency approach to negotiate use either prior to or
at the beginning of crisis. Complicating this strategic problem is the possibility that diplomatic leverage spent for negotiating use prior to hostilities may not result in actual use of bases during hostilities: the potential that those locations will suddenly not be available or may be poorly located for a particular operation always exists. These realities suggest that the U.S. must balance its goal of stabilizing regions through building partner capacity (e.g. Foreign Military Financing) with the need to retain some type of leverage for future negotiations of airfields and ports during actual crisis. In some ways this is what happened in Great Britain during WWII; lend-lease-type agreements prior to American entry in the war, such as the Destroyers-for-Bases deal, did not exhaust all political capital needed later on to negotiate rights for American Army Air Force bases on the English mainland later on. Skeptics could claim that Britain was a “unique case” in that it was clearly in U.S. national interests to see the Empire prevail against Nazi Germany, but the example still is worth considering today, especially when one regards the tangled alliances and sovereignties of a Western Europe facing possible Russian aggression.

In the event of a future major conflict, predicting in advance exact locations within the territory of a willing nation poses an extremely difficult challenge. The Department of Defense may need to establish policy to provide leverage for quick negotiation at the onset of conflict (to overcome the environmental and contextual factors affecting pre-conflict basing plans). By establishing a policy that provides leverage for negotiating access during crises, the department could also achieve a more cost effective method for securing access for expeditionary basing in the future. Evidenced by the cases analyzed above, America’s ability to supply a variety of countries with various packages
of weapons, supplies, airplanes, equipment, and ships provided the State and War department negotiators with significant leverage for securing strategically located bases during WWII. Today the US faces a new era of uncertainty about where, when, and against whom it will militarily engage. Coupling that reality with A2AD and budget-induced re-posturing leaves America in a strategic predicament regarding force projection similar to the one it faced prior to WWII. At the onset of that conflict, the U.S. was not forward deployed, nor did it know where bases would eventually be needed. For those locations not taken by forced entry, Lend-lease provided an effective policy means of convincing nations on the periphery of conflict to allow American access. This initiative succeeded because the U.S. was able to offer commodities that those countries wanted, and more importantly because there was policy that provided the War and State Departments the ability to work together to offer those items in negotiations. Great Britain primarily needed ships, Russia and China needed aircraft and materiel, and Latin American countries required assistance in equipping and training military forces. In some cases, the need was more desperate than in others, but the historical evidence suggests America’s ability to meet that need played a definitive role in securing access. In exchange for materiel support, the U.S. gained strategic locations that afforded defense of its continent, logistical advantage for future operations, and global reach needed to target German and Japanese centers of gravity at strategic times in the conflict.

Today, the United States grants certain countries Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) opportunities to build partner capacity and help sustain its own industrial complex. U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs sets policy for the FMS program, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), within the Defense Department, oversees its execution. “The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is the Department of State’s principal link to the Department of Defense. The PM Bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade.” PM’s central activities include supporting U.S. national security interests by managing defense trade and arms transfers, providing security assistance to partners and negotiating base access for US military operations. Clearly, these programs provide significant value in meeting the long-term goals of both the United States and many foreign countries. However, what they do not necessarily provide is a guarantee of future access to basing for American forces. On the contrary, the PM’s efforts could even be counterproductive. If these programs provide nations with a level of support reaching the tipping point of capability-satisfaction prior to America’s need to project combat power, it could reduce American bargaining power when it matters most—during conflict. Therefore, the U.S. government should develop an interagency policy approach to ensure that efforts of DoD and DoS achieve the goals of building partner capacity and sustaining the military industrial complex while withholding enough capability (i.e., types of hardware, upgrades, enhancing options, etc.) to maintain a strong bargaining position for future base access negotiations. Moreover, DoS and DoD should produce a combined strategy to provide partner nations with initial capability while ensuring these departments retain something to offer when conflict arises or appears imminent. This should be accompanied with a correlating policy that enables the DoD and DoS to rapidly access foreign bases and offer
additional commodities when conflict resolution requires strategic basing in foreign countries. To these ends, the historical evidence suggests a potential strategic benefit of using the “Lend-lease” concept to inform future policy formulation for contingency basing negotiations. Further review of current treaty and agreement details would be needed to fully understand current authorities, but such a review may provide the basis for developing a more comprehensive policy that may prove necessary in a future war.

Endnotes


7 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept, ii.


9 Ibid., 8, 12.


11 Ibid., 20.


14 Ibid., 18.

15 Ibid., 19.


17 Ibid.


24 Ibid., 238


29 Yeilding, *United States Lend-Lease Policy in Latin America*, 33-34.

30 Ibid., 229.

31 Ibid., 257.
Ibid., 252, 256-257.

33 Ibid., 231.

34 Ibid., 283.


36 Ibid., 53.

37 Shugg and DeWeerd, World War II: A Concise History, 99.


39 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 693.


45 Ibid., 446.

46 Ibid., 461.

47 Ibid., 456.

48 Ibid., 461.

49 Cate, Craven, and USAF Historical Division, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 438.

50 Ibid., 440.


57 Ibid.