

# Strategy Research Project

## Security Force Assistance: Meeting Challenges of the Future

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## Security Force Assistance: Meeting Challenges of the Future

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### Abstract

The United States military has gained a significant amount of experience, knowledge and best practices from conducting Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. The Department of Defense (DOD) must ensure that the lessons learned from conducting SFA will be captured and be able to be regenerated the next time we are faced with conducting SFA on a large scale. This paper provides an overview of SFA and consists of four main sections. The first outlines the role of security force assistance in stability operations; the second is analysis of SFA using the construct of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF); the third is SFA effectiveness in recent operations and the fourth is SFA regeneration for future needs.

## **Security Force Assistance: Meeting Challenges of the Future**

The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan—that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire—anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates<sup>1</sup>

The current situation around the world and the national interests of the United States requires focusing on the importance of improving the ability to conduct Security Force Assistance (SFA). The United States has been involved in SFA for the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. It encompasses all activities formerly consolidated under the term “military training and advisory assistance.” SFA is intended to be a U.S. means to develop, within a host nation, an enduring capability to establish and maintain security, provide legitimate governance, and foster development programs that address root grievances.<sup>2</sup> The United States needs to ensure the lessons learned from conducting SFA in Iraq and Afghanistan are captured and used to ensure successful conduct of SFA operations in the future.

This paper provides an overview of SFA and consists of four main sections. The first outlines the role of SFA in stability operations; the second is analysis of SFA using the construct of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF); the third is SFA effectiveness in recent operations and the fourth is SFA regeneration for future needs.


## The Role of SFA

SFA plays a vital role in support of successful stability operations. SFA is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as department activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.<sup>3</sup> As stated in the National Military Strategy, security cooperation activities are at the heart of our efforts to provide a stabilizing presence in forward theaters. These activities build relationships that serve mutual security interests. They also develop partner military capabilities for self-defense and support to multinational operations. Through such activities, we coordinate with other U.S. agencies and mission partners to build cultural awareness and affirm relationships that increase regional stability.<sup>4</sup>

SFA plays an important role in protecting the national interests of the United States. The military component of national power can be used in the form of SFA to assist Host Nations (HN) in establishing an effective security force that is capable of providing a secure environment. SFA supports the professionalization and sustainable development of the capability and capacity of a HN Foreign Security Forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions, and those FSF that are part of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). SFA can be used during any phase of an operation and across the range of military operations.<sup>5</sup>

The United States has been conducting SFA in various forms ever since the Spanish-American war but most predominately since World War II.

Figure 4. Historical U.S. Security Force Assistance



Source: Adapted from Scott G. Wuestner, *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm*, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2009, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>.

Figure 1. Historical U.S. Security Force Assistance

With most of the conflicts, SFA has been an integral part in determining the success of each operation especially in the recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A long history of conducting SFA should lead to a strong understanding of how to best conduct SFA and gain knowledge and understanding from lessons learned. This does not seem to be the case when examining the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. After a conflict has ended, a significant downsizing of the military typically occurs in order to reduce the number of personnel and costs of maintaining a war time military. When the downsizing occurs, the military tends to focus on the primary war fighting functions and other tasks like SFA tend to not become an area of focus. This constant

flux of peacetime drawdowns and wartime ramp ups causes the military to lose some of the experience gained from previous conflicts and requires the force to relearn how to conduct tasks such as SFA.

Many great ideas of how to properly conduct SFA have come from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. These ideas were typically developed after much trial and error and in some cases came at a high price. The ad hoc approach to SFA efforts during persistent conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan has been, at best, inefficient and slow. To a degree, the United States has developed effective approaches for specific contingencies, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the delays in finding effective ways have come at a high price and have postponed, if not compromised, mission success.<sup>6</sup> After gaining the knowledge of SFA in the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would not be wise to push SFA to the back seat and forget the lessons learned so we don't need to relearn them for the next conflict.

#### SFA DOTMLPF-P

SFA activities will be conducted primarily to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the Department of Defense may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country's security forces or supporting institutions.<sup>7</sup> "DOTMLPF-P" stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). DOTMLPF-P is a way to examine an issue looking in detail at each one of the functions to determine if and what capability gaps exist.

When large scale operations arise such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the joint force must have the ability to reach back to lessons learned and knowledge to apply to future

large scale SFA operations. The importance of collecting and historically documenting the analysis of SFA operations using DOTMLPF-P is critical to being able to regenerate the capability in the future. In effect, the joint force can leverage these lessons learned in the design and employment of future SFA organizational structures and functions. Applying these lessons learned may provide measurable and cost efficient ways for Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) to strengthen key strategic partnerships through innovated, low cost, and small-footprint approaches that enable the joint force to employ its advisory skills and capacity effectively.<sup>8</sup>

A significant amount of information is readily available in regards to SFA using DOTMLPF-P. The focus of this paper is not to individually examine each area but rather offer significant findings and suggestions to change specific areas. One of the more valuable lessons learned is the organization of the SFA. This paper will examine the SFA organization at the strategic, operational, tactical level and across the phases of military operations (Phase 0-V). When focusing on Phases 0-II (Shape, Deter, Seize the Initiative), there must be close coordination between the Department of State (DoS), Country Teams and the joint force to be able to plan, prepare, execute and assess a low cost viable option for SFA operations. The joint force forms SFA organizational structures and carries out SFA activities based on DoS/Country Team acceptance and approval at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to develop the capability and capacity of Partner Nation (PN) security forces in order for the PN security forces to provide for their own security, support US strategic interests, or participate as a partner in regional security.<sup>9</sup>

One of the recommendations for an organization to support the SFA operations is the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF). The Army defines Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) as: 1) those units assigned or allocated to combatant commands, and 2) those service-retained, combatant command-aligned forces prepared by the Army for regional missions. They are drawn from the total force, including the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve.<sup>10</sup> This is a great concept but is not very feasible due to the already shrinking size of the military as well as the already high training requirements. The RAF concept, however, increases the operational tempo of the U.S.-based troops and correspondingly increases annual operating costs.<sup>11</sup>

SFA operations in Phases III-V (Dominate, Stabilize, Enable) include challenges different than what is faced in earlier stages. Historical perspectives from Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate that planning, execution, and assessment of operations within Phase III (Dominate), Phase IV (Stabilize), and Phase V (Enable Civilian Authorities) to some degree must happen simultaneously and not sequential – albeit a lesson learned that was late in the process within these two separate theaters of operations.<sup>12</sup>

No matter when the decision is made when major hostilities end, it is critical to employ SFA early in order to quickly and effectively transition to stability of the operating environment. The employment of SFA is typically not a linear one, especially in the Afghanistan and Iraq environments. SFA was often being conducted at different levels throughout the area of operation due partially to the fact that other areas had higher levels of security than others and FSFs were better equipped and trained. In effect, these efforts allowed a monopoly in the use of force to achieve layered security and then transition these security gains (as appropriate) to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF)

and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). These efforts enabled the civilian authorities in Iraq and Afghanistan to effectively govern and administer the ISF and ANSF.<sup>13</sup> It is critical that planning be conducted early in order to generate security forces that are able to work in cooperation with the joint force SFA organization and provide security while allowing for the reduction of U.S. force structure and costs.

### SFA Lessons Learned

During the recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq several key lessons were learned concerning SFA and the importance of HN involvement. Some of the lessons learned discussed in this paper are the Army's augmented BCT concept, actions needed to guide Geographic Combatant Command and service efforts, detailed planning and information access to guide effort of advisors, and a plan to capture advisor experience.

In 2009, the Army started deploying brigade combat teams (BCTs) to Afghanistan and Iraq that were augmented with advisors to conduct SFA. The augmented BCT was implemented to replace the individual transition teams that operated somewhat independently. This was a significant change to the way that the Army has previously conducted SFA. As the Army continued to deploy augmented BCTs some lessons learned developed. The first lesson learned is reassessing needs and clarifying key requirements such as the appropriate number, rank, and capabilities of advisor personnel; the level of resources and support that the BCT should provide; and how the BCT should prioritize and balance demands associated with the advising mission with the demands of other BCT missions, the Army and theater commanders will enhance the ability of the BCTs to more effectively command and support the advisors.<sup>14</sup> Also, ensuring the composition of the augmented BCT is correct will assist

the Army with selecting the right Soldiers with the right skill sets and training. Lastly, it is important to incorporate the advisors into the BCT early to allow them to attend leadership meetings, become integrated into the organization, and attend training events.

Another lesson learned is that actions are needed to guide Geographic Combatant Command and service efforts in SFA. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study and discovered that the Department of Defense (DOD) broadly defined SFA and responsibilities of key stakeholders but the definition made SFA activities difficult to understand at the GCC level. Further, some command officials stated that they were not clear as to the intent of DOD's increased focus on security force assistance and whether any related adjustments should be made in their plans and scope or level of activities.<sup>15</sup> Without additional clarification, the geographic combatant commands will continue to lack a common understanding, which may hinder the department's ability to meet its strategic goals.<sup>16</sup> Without clear guidance from DOD the GCCs will continue to struggle with the level of effort to place in SFA and it will not get incorporated into their Theater Campaign Plans (TCP) to the extent that DOD may be expecting.

There also needs to be a better system to track SFA activities in the GCCs. An increased ability to track security force assistance activities will facilitate the geographic combatant commands' planning efforts and increase DOD's visibility over security force assistance efforts to ensure that resources are being directed toward identified strategic goals and measure progress in implementing various initiatives.<sup>17</sup>

A third lesson learned is that more detailed planning and improved access to information is needed to guide the effort of advisor teams in Afghanistan. DOD and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have defined the mission and broad goals for Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor teams; however, teams varied in the extent to which their approaches for developing their Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) units identified activities based on specific objectives or end states that were clearly linked with established goals.<sup>18</sup> The theater commander must communicate clearly the end state and objectives of SFA to the brigade commanders then to the advisory teams. Many advisory teams were left to determine the end states and objectives for their teams due to the lack of clear guidance. This resulted in advisory teams having very different end states and objectives that did not follow the theater commander's guidance. The theater commander had a difficult time trying to assess the effectiveness of the SFA due to the differences in the end states and objectives throughout the AOR.

The Army and Marine Corps have developed training programs to increase the effectiveness of the advisor teams but their access to information varied greatly which impacted their ability to be immediately effective when deployed. For example, GAO found that while teams had access to a certain secure network at training sites, only some had access at home station, enabling them to shape their training and mission analysis earlier in predeployment training or after training but prior to deploying. Having limited access to this information prior to arriving in Afghanistan may result in advisor teams needing more time after deploying to maximize their impact as advisors.<sup>19</sup> It is

critical that advisory team have access to the necessary information prior to deployment in order to be effective instead of having to learn while in country.

A fourth lesson learned is that the military needs a system to track the personnel that have SFA training, education, and experience. A key element in conducting SFA missions is being able to identify the right personnel with the right training, education, and experience to execute SFA activities. The Department of Defense (DOD) established a requirement for the services to identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience.<sup>20</sup> The Army and the Marine Corps have developed systems to identify personnel that have SFA training, education but the Army lacks the ability to capture personnel and their SFA experience. Moreover, the Army has not developed a plan with goals and milestones on how it will capture this information. As a result, it is unclear how long it will take the Army to implement DOD's requirement and be able to readily identify the right personnel to serve in the SFA mission.<sup>21</sup>

The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 14 years have provided several best practices and key lessons that must be captured and utilized in future SFA operations. Theater Campaign Plans (TCP) must consider and integrate the full spectrum of SFA activities during all phases of planning, execution, and transition (i.e. Phase 0 – V).<sup>22</sup> One of the issues with the planning of SFA activities is the timeline that is initially projected is typically far shorter in duration than the operation actually lasts. Another issue is that there is typically not a good understanding of the operating environment. Not understanding the operating environment causes a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals. Another issue is there is typically not

a well-defined end state or objectives tied to the SFA activities. This makes it extremely difficult to measure the effectiveness of the SFA activities as well as providing unity of effort across the Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Early in the planning process, the integration of Special Operation Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF) must be planned for by the GCC at the theater, region, and country levels. GCC planners must identify the major SOF and GPF roles and responsibilities during each phase of the operation. The SOF and GPF roles can be expanded to cross training which will lead to a better understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations and ways to cover potential gaps. This can lead to an increased capability within each GCC AOR in order to support building partner capacity.

#### SFA Regeneration for Future Needs

The world continues to be an unstable environment that continues to challenge the U.S. national interests on a daily basis. The number of failing states continues to increase and provides additional opportunities to violent extremist organizations (VEO) to take a foot hold in areas that are unable to provide security to the populace. There is no doubt that SFA plays a significant role in protecting our national interests around the world. During this period of time, the military is downsizing and is continuing to see a reduction in funding. The DOD must decide how much of a role SFA is going to play in the future while facing a fiscally constrained environment. Beginning with the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 appropriations, the Department began absorbing significant impacts from the \$487 billion, ten-year cut in spending due to caps instituted by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The BCA also instituted a sequestration mechanism requiring cuts of about \$50 billion annually. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 provided modest immediate relief from sequestration, but unless Congress acts, annual

sequestration cuts are set to resume in FY2016. To protect the security interests of the United States most effectively while recognizing the fiscal imperative of deficit reduction, the President's FY2015 Budget reduces projected defense budgets by about \$113 billion over five years compared to levels requested in the FY2014 Budget. The President's Budget provides a balanced and responsible path forward given continuing fiscal uncertainty. It reflects the strict constraints on discretionary funding required by the Bipartisan Budget Act in FY2015, but it does not accept sequestration levels thereafter, funding the Department at about \$115 billion more than projected sequestration levels through 2019.<sup>23</sup>

This reduction in funding will impact the military's ability to conduct both full spectrum operation (FSO) and also focus on the growing need for SFA operations. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.<sup>24</sup> With a limited budget and reduction of force across DOD, a strategic approach to the right force to be able to conduct FSO and SFA must be carefully considered. Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, who oversees the Army schools and research institutes at Leavenworth, said the proposals would create a dedicated unit of trainers who could be assigned to each of the commanders of the worldwide regions."<sup>25</sup> There is conflicting information coming out of the government concerning the future use of SFA. The importance of SFA is not being refuted but the way that it will be conducted with limited resources is being challenged. The Army's plan of using the RAF to assist the GCCs in

conducting SFA activities is a great concept but doesn't go far enough to cover the growing SFA requirements. There is simply not enough force structure to allow adequate time to conduct the RAF mission, train for Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) and continue to train and remain proficient in SFA missions.

There have been several other proposals for organizing SFA that range from one end of the spectrum to the other. The Advisor Corps advocated by Nagl is a force of 20,000 personnel, broken down into 750 teams of 25 advisors each. The corps would have three divisions with eight division advisor teams, each with five subordinate brigade advisor teams, which in turn, would each have five battalion advisor teams. The corps commander would have the dual role of being responsible for the doctrine, training and organization for the advisor mission as well as being an adviser to combatant commanders for SFA or even as the senior advisor to a host nation Ministry of Defense.<sup>26</sup> Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement cautioned against units designed for specific operations, using stability operations in their example as, "the creation or integration of new capabilities must not relieve combat commanders of responsibility for the overarching stability operations."<sup>27</sup>

COL Scott G. Wuestner, former Chief of Operational Integration at the Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle Barracks, PA has forwarded an alternative Army force structure, the Security Advisory and Assistance Command (SAAC). The SAAC would be a subordinate element of TRADOC under the Combined Arms Center and would be responsible for SFA doctrine and advisor training. Under the SAAC, the Military Advisory and Assistance Command (MAAC), would operate as a "deployable MNSTC-I" supporting a GCC by "executing Security

Assistance operations (FMS, IMET, MTTs, etc), developing partner nation Title 10 capabilities – legal and legislative authorities – foster interagency operability, in addition to combat advising.”<sup>28</sup> Many of these proposals for SFA structure and organization require a varying amount of resources in order to accomplish. Risk must be taken into account when deciding how to accomplish the future SFA requirements. During this time of reduced funding and personnel reductions across the DOD, there will be very little support for increased force structure and increased funding requirements for conducting SFA.

One expectation that does remain constant is the role of the military is to fight and win our nations wars. With a reduction of force structure and limited resources we must remain capable of decisively defeating our enemy. In today's jargon, the military's job is multifaceted: to shape the global environment through proactive engagement and partnership with friendly nations, to influence our competitors to avoid challenging our national interests, and, if absolutely necessary, to fight and win the next war decisively.<sup>29</sup> The U.S. has provided significant resources to ensuring that its military is the finest in the world and would be a strong deterrent to any other nation state that considers challenging its national interests.

Developing the strongest military in the world has also provided some challenges. Other nation states will not challenge the U.S. in a direct military confrontation. The capabilities of the US military stand as the primary reason we have been forced onto an asymmetric battlefield. The competition's refusal to take us head on forced our transition to a modular counterinsurgency focused force.<sup>30</sup> If we continue to focus solely on being a modular counterinsurgency force, we run the risk of losing the

capability to decisively win the nations wars. It is critical to secure the nations interest and find the right combination of force structure that continues to allow the military to fight and win the nations wars while continuing to provide SFA.

SFA is critical in providing a secure environment in which the people can conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence. The safe and secure environment sets the conditions for the other end states (rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economy, and social well-being) of the strategic framework to be achieved.<sup>31</sup> When conducting the SFA activities and building up the FPF there are some clear limitations to using other forces to protect our national interests. First, cultural differences and the internal politics of the host nation limit the extent to which SFA operations can succeed. Secondly, those same nations that we attempt to build up have to balance their internal politics with the external influences threatening their own emerging sovereignty. Third, building capacity occurs slowly, never quickly. Finally, and most importantly, we must not be so quick to believe that SFA is the wave of the future.<sup>32</sup>

SFA at the tactical level can produce immediate results. SFA at the operational level can buy time and space for a political solution to emerge. SFA as a strategy to achieve our long term national security objectives fundamentally costs us the capabilities that created the necessity in the first place.<sup>33</sup> There has to be balance between the focus on security force assistance and maintaining our combat edge and ability to quickly and decisively win on the battlefield. If we focus too much on SFA activities then our adversaries may attempt to take advantage of our lowered readiness rate and ability to conduct combat operations. If we conduct too little SFA, then we are

faced with the continuing challenges of violent extremist organizations and terrorist networks that will take advantage of a state that is not able to provide security to its population. It is a matter of balance and we will continue to provide assistance to our friends in need. But we must also maintain within our military, the capacity to confront our adversaries directly with offensive combat power when our decision makers fail to achieve increasingly complicated political solutions in an ever more complicated, globalized world.<sup>34</sup>

The GCCs have additional tools that they can utilize to provide to the SFA in their AOR. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) started a program titled the State Partnership Program (SPP) in 1993. SPP has marked over 20 years of successfully building relationships that today include 70 unique security partnerships involving 76 nations around the globe.<sup>35</sup> The National Guard remains committed to maintaining the enduring relationships that SPP provides that help to ensure US strategic access, sustained US presence, and enhanced National Guard and partner country defense and security force capabilities.<sup>36</sup>

The GCC have relied upon the NGB SPP program in the past but not to the extent of its capabilities. A number of Combatant Commanders and senior US and foreign leaders have praised the SPP as an indispensable contribution to regional and global security cooperation. These testimonials highlight the value of SPP in advancing US and Combatant Command security cooperation goals and objectives.<sup>37</sup> The SPP program has proven its effectiveness in supporting national strategic objectives. The program adheres to the security cooperation themes outlined in the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Military Strategy, Defense Strategic

Guidance, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, Department of State Joint Regional Strategies, and Chief of Mission Integrated Country Strategies. The activities enabled through SPP are integral components of the Combatant Commander's theater security cooperation efforts.<sup>38</sup>

Some of the challenges that the SPP faces is a lack of funding available to increase efforts in support of the GCC requirements and the lack of training opportunities available for National Guard Soldiers to remain proficient in SFA. The cost effectiveness, versatility, and enduring focus of the SPP provides the Department of Defense, Combatant Commands, the interagency community, and international partners with the ability to address security challenges today and prepare for a wide range of security threats well into the future.<sup>39</sup> The Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley is already considering increasing the number of training days for National Guardsmen. The National Guardsmen is currently authorized 39 training days per year. The training days are typically divided into a 15 day annual training period along with 24 day of training usually conducted one weekend per month. "Maybe we need to look at changing that ... maybe I should take some of the Guard and significantly increase the number of training days they train in a given year -- maybe 60 to 100 days a year to reduce the response time on the back end when they get alerted and mobilized," Milley said.<sup>40</sup> The increase in training days for National Guard Soldiers will be critical to increasing readiness. The increase in training days must not only be for increasing the readiness of the unit to accomplish the war time mission, but also must be utilized to support training to maintain proficiency in SFA in support of the SPP. With the

downsizing of the Active Army the National Guard's SPP can become an increasing important strategic tool to support the GCC security requirements in their AOR.

With the continued downsizing of the Active Army and the SFA requirements around the world increasing, the Army should consider placing some of the SFA type organizations in the Army National Guard. Placing the SFA organizations in the Army National Guard will not only benefit the Army and help offset the reduction of force structure but will allow the National Guard to further build its capability to support the SPP and ultimately increase the stability of the GCCs AOR. Placing some of the SFA organizations into the National Guard will allow for increased ability to provide SFA during Phase 0 operations as well as allowing the Army to maintain some of the lessons learned, experience, and knowledge gained during the past decade plus of conducting SFA operations.

### Conclusion

The current situation around the world and the national interests of the United States requires focusing on the importance of improving the ability to conduct Security Force Assistance (SFA). With the reduction of funding and force structure, it is critical to find a balance between maintaining our combat ability to quickly and decisively defeat our enemies while still maintaining the capability to perform SFA. The United States has been involved in SFA for the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. It encompasses all activities formerly consolidated under the term "military training and advisory assistance." It is critical that the DOD ensures that the lessons learned from a decade of conducting SFA are captured and retained to the fullest ability in order to be more successful the next time when full scale SFA is needed. SFA is intended to be a U.S. means to develop, within a host nation, an enduring capability to establish and maintain

security, provide legitimate governance, and foster development programs that address root grievances.<sup>41</sup> The United States needs to ensure the lessons learned from conducting SFA in Iraq and Afghanistan are captured and used to ensure that we are successful in conducting SFA operations in the future.

The military is faced with force structure and funding reductions. The concepts of large SFA organizations that require additional force structure and significant resources are not feasible. In order to maintain SFA capability and capacity, the Army should consider adding SFA structure to the Army National Guard. This option provides a cost effective approach to maintaining SFA capability that can be utilized by the GCCs in conjunction with the SPP. The Army National Guard citizen Soldier provides unique civilian skill sets that enhance the effectiveness of SFA. The Army National Guard is feasible, acceptable and suitable to provide SFA in support of the National Security Strategy.

The future of SFA appears to be increasing in a world that is facing an increase number of failing states. With a limited number of resources, sequestration and continued force structure reductions, tough decisions will be needed to ensure that today's military will continue to be the most dominant force in the world while still supporting SFA requirements in support of our national interests.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Robert Gates, "DoD Review of Building the Security Capacity of Partner Nations," memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC, June 18, 2009.

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<sup>4</sup> The National Military Strategy of the United States 2015, 10.

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