Leading Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations in the Land Domain

by

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Abstract

Beginning in the late 1990s, the U.S. government began to demonstrate a growing appreciation for the threats posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In near continuous efforts since that time, strategic leaders have developed policy, multiple iterations of strategy, and Joint doctrine to counter WMD (CWMD). At the same time, various proponents throughout the Army developed or enhanced operational, tactical, and technical capabilities to CWMD. While these developments are encouraging, they do not address the Army’s most significant CWMD challenge which is the lack of an effective CWMD program. Specifically, the Army Staff is not optimally organized for this task, the Army lacks a unifying CWMD vision and strategy to guide and synchronize CWMD programs and, operational doctrine lacks the clarity required for the entire force to plan, prepare and execute CWMD. In order for the Army to, “lead CWMD in the land domain” as declared in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army should consider establishing the office of Chief, CWMD at the two star level on the Army staff and him/her with the authorities required to develop, unify and enable a new CWMD program for the Army.
Leading Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations in the Land Domain

The problem of countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) continues to challenge the United States, global community and the U.S. Army. Weapons lethality continues to increase as does the number of countries that either possess or are pursuing WMD. The proliferation of WMD, related technologies, and personnel with the knowledge, skills and abilities to produce these weapons to terror groups adds another dimension to this threat.

In the late 1990s, strategic leaders and policy makers as well as many in the Department of the Army began to demonstrate an increasing appreciation for the threat and took actions to increase U.S. capabilities. At the policy and Department of Defense (DoD) levels, we began to see increasingly refined policy, national and military CWMD strategies and Joint doctrine; these efforts have continued to the present day. In parallel, the Army also increased CWMD capabilities by developing and fielding specialized operational, tactical and technical CWMD capabilities and doctrine. This effort also continues with the introduction of Army Warfighting Challenge #5 which asks the question, How does the Army, “prevent, reduce, eliminate and mitigate the use and effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and chemical, biological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) threats and hazards on friendly forces and civilian populations?”

The strategic and Army initiatives described above while encouraging have created a condition in which we see adequate strategic guidance and highly capable technical forces but there is no comprehensive link between the two. This is largely because the Department of the Army has not established or resourced a clear CWMD
program nor has it organized itself at the highest levels to execute this mission. This condition will continue to challenge the Army's ability to provide CWMD capability to Joint Force Commanders (JFC). The time has come for the Army to move away from this status quo and implement a comprehensive CWMD program that is specifically designed, organized and led to CWMD.

Background and Threat

Although WMD have been present and used periodically since ancient times, three specific instances of their use in the modern era ushered in a new appreciation and respect for their deadly potential. The first was Iraqi use of chemical agents against the Iranian Army during the Iran-Iraq War. The Central Intelligence Agency estimated in 1988, that Iran suffered approximately 27,000 casualties as a result numerous Iraqi attacks. Iraq also used chemical weapons against Kurdish villages during the war. The most notable attacks occurred from 16-17 March 1988 against the inhabitants of the Kurdish village of Halabja. These attacks caused 5000 civilian casualties. Second was the 20 March 1995, Tokyo subway attack by the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo. This attack resulted in twelve deaths, fifty major and thousands of less severe casualties. Following the attacks, a Japanese government investigation revealed that Aum Shinrikyo had also produced enough sarin to kill over 4.2 million people and were pursuing even deadlier WMD technologies to conduct similar attacks. The third significant incident was the 2001 Anthrax attacks against various targets in the U.S. The attacker sent several letters to various people including U.S. Senators that contained anthrax. These attacks ultimately killed five people and sickened an additional 17. They also contaminated “thirty-five postal facilities and commercial mailrooms” and seven buildings on Capitol Hill. The total cost to decontaminate these facilities was $320M.
These uses of WMD as well as contemporary threats left three lasting impressions on U.S. leadership. The first is that WMD are and will remain a threat on the modern battlefield and the U.S. must be prepared to deter or prevent their use and minimize their effectiveness should they be employed. Next, WMD proliferation to terror organizations or weak and failing states is and will remain a threat that the U.S. must proactively confront. Finally, WMD are a threat to the homeland and as a result, government at all levels must be prepared to defend against and mitigate the consequences of WMD.

National and Strategic Level Responses to Threat

In response to the growing appreciation of the WMD threat, the U.S. government launched a series of CWMD initiatives and programs that began in 1999 and continues to the present day. Congress took the first step by establishing the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction also known as the Gilmore Commission. In 1999, the panel issued the first of five annual reports directly related to shortfalls, gaps and recommended solutions regarding the nation’s ability to respond to WMD both at home and abroad. While each of these reports contributed to the overall appreciation of WMD threats and directly influenced the development of CWMD as a concept within the U.S. Government perhaps none was more influential than the first report that considered modern threats, identified gaps in U.S. capabilities, and called for the publication of a national strategy to address them.

Based on the Panel’s threat analysis, other relevant information that has come to its attention, and the knowledge and experience of its own members, the Panel is convinced that a national strategy to address the issues of domestic preparedness and response to terrorist incidents
involving CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) and other types of weapons is urgently needed.\textsuperscript{11}

The Panel's second annual report reemphasized the need for a national strategy to combat terrorism across the spectrum including a “worst case scenario” marked by the use of WMD.\textsuperscript{12}

Based upon the Gilmore Commission’s findings and recommendations as well as other driving factors, President Bush published the first National Strategy to Combat WMD (NS-CWMD) in 2002 which provided the baseline for U.S. policy on CWMD.\textsuperscript{13} In this document, he stated, “we must accord the highest priority to the protection of the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies from the existing and growing WMD threat.” The strategy proposed to tackle the challenge through the introduction of three CWMD pillars, counterproliferation, nonproliferation and WMD consequence management.\textsuperscript{14} It also drove the Department of Defense (DOD) to take several actions. One of which was assigning U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as the functional combatant command charged with synchronizing planning, coordinating and advocating for DOD CWMD initiatives and capabilities. The second was to create the first National Military Strategy to Combat WMD (NMS-CWMD).\textsuperscript{15} The NMS-CWMD expanded on the three pillars of counterproliferation, nonproliferation and consequence management by adding eight specific mission areas and tasked the “Military Departments (to) develop doctrine, and organize, train, and equip to combat WMD…”\textsuperscript{16} The publication of Joint Publication 3-40, \textit{Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction} also enabled the execution of the NMS-CWMD.\textsuperscript{17}

National level resolve and progress in the CWMD arena continued to advance after the publication of the first national strategies and doctrine. The 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) prominently featured CWMD and announced several practical steps to enhance U.S. capabilities including, the expansion of the U.S. Army’s 20th Support Command capabilities and increased funding for medical countermeasures.\textsuperscript{18} Both the 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategies (NSS) address WMD threats stating, “The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons” and citing “proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction” as a top strategic risk to U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{19} The latest DOD responses to these NSS include the 2014 publication of The \textit{DOD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction} (DODS-CWMD) and the updated version of JP 3-40 \textit{Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction} that provides updated doctrine to enable the strategy’s implementation.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{U.S. Army CBRN and CWMD Initiatives}

The Army also expanded CBRN protection and technical CWMD capabilities in response to the growing threats. These efforts accelerated after 2001 and in many cases occurred in parallel with the strategic initiatives previously listed.\textsuperscript{21} Operational level advances included the activation of the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) and the integration of CWMD in operational plans and exercise programs of a few Army Service Component Commands. Army tactical developments have included increased CBRN protection, activation or enhancement of technical CBRN capabilities and operational CBRN operations doctrine.\textsuperscript{22} A brief examination of these developments demonstrates their utility.

On a day to day basis, the 20th CBRNE Command provides training and readiness oversight of over 85% of the active Army’s CBRN and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capabilities. In war, the 20th CBRNE is charged to provide,
command and control for Army and/or joint specialized CBRNE forces, executes weapons of mass destruction-elimination (WMD-E) and other specialized CBRNE operations, and provides technical capabilities and CBRNE subject matter expertise to joint and Army commanders in order to achieve national combating WMD objectives.23

Since achieving initial operating capability in 2007, 20th CBRNE Command has supported combat operations in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), enabled Combatant Command CWMD planning, exercise programs and operations at home and abroad. Current 20th CBRNE Command activities include support to Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR), Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) support to NORTHCOM, and recovery of chemical warfare material in support of different Combatant Commands.

The integration of CWMD operations as a key component of select Combatant Command and Army Service Component Command plans and exercise programs has created isolated pockets of CWMD operational excellence in the Army. The most notable examples include the bi-lateral exercises ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN (UFG) and KEY RESOLVE (KR) co-sponsored by United States Forces Korea (USFK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK).24 In 2007, USFK expanded the CWMD scope of these exercises from largely passive defense to incorporate the full range of CWMD as described in the NMS-CWMD. U.S. Army North’s (ARNORTH) exercise series VIBRANT RESPONSE provides the second example. A recurring theme in this exercise program is to test the ability of the CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE) to defend the homeland against WMD.25

The Army has also increased its ability to conduct tactical and technical aspects of CWMD operations. Members of the U.S. Army’s CWMD enterprise in conjunction with various force modernization proponents have been and continue to actively identify
and close capability gaps across the spectrum of DOTMLPF-P by using established Joint and U.S. Army systems. These systems have included capabilities based assessments, capabilities needs analysis, functional DOTMLPF analyses and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) et.al. Partnerships with industry and the Joint CWMD enterprise as well as a rigorous campaign of learning have supported these developments. Table 1 highlights key CWMD developments since 2001.

Table 1. U.S. Army Technical CWMD Capability Advances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>No CWMD doctrine</td>
<td>1. Joint Publication 3-40, Combatting WMD published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Up to date Army and Multi-service CBRN and CWMD doctrine published</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>No operational level CBRN unit in the U.S. Army</td>
<td>1. 20th CBRNE Command established at Aberdeen Proving Grounds (APG), MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>No CBRN Brigade in the active component of the U.S. Army</td>
<td>2. 48th Chemical Brigade established at Fort Hood, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>One Technical Escort Battalion, assigned to U.S. Army Material Command</td>
<td>3. One additional Technical Escort Battalion established, both assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Minimal nuclear detection capabilities in the U.S. Army</td>
<td>4. Nuclear Disablement Teams (NDT) established at APG, MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Protection focused CBRN training at CTCs</td>
<td>1. CBRNE BN Task Forces integrated at CTCs, expanded CWMD scenarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Platform specific additional skill identifier courses at U.S. Army CBRN School</td>
<td>2. Multiple specialized training courses developed to enable both CBRN and CWMD operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>M93A1 FOX NBCRV – Foreign produced, contractor supported</td>
<td>1. Stryker NBCRV – Domestically produced, expanded capabilities, organic support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) used for U.S. Army technical CBRN forces</td>
<td>2. CBRN Dismounted Reconnaissance – Sets, Kits, Outfits fielded to technical CBRN forces – program of record</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. Army CWMD Challenges

As demonstrated, national level CWMD policies, strategies and doctrine provide sufficient guidance to CWMD. Army initiatives since 2001 have also provided a wealth of very technically capable forces to enable a niche part of CWMD operations. There is one key missing link, the lack of a well-defined and organized CWMD program at the
Department of the Army level. This shortfall creates several ripple effects throughout the Army that inhibit CWMD operations, including a general lack of clarity and understanding about the differences between CWMD, CBRN, and Protection as well as the lack of an Army CWMD strategy, and CWMD doctrine.

**Lack of Clarity in Army CWMD**

The 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) provides the Army’s policy on CWMD stating, “the Army will lead CWMD missions in the land domain and provide the preponderance of trained and equipped forces to support DoD CWMD efforts in the homeland and OCONUS as part of Joint and interagency requirements.” While this statement is clear, the Army has yet to fully embrace or clarify roles and responsibilities for CWMD. This is not to suggest that the Army has been idle in developing CWMD concepts or capabilities far from it. As discussed above, the Army has developed many conventional and special purpose capabilities over the last several years but these developments have, with few exceptions, been limited to operational, tactical and technical capabilities or doctrine. These developments, while beneficial, do little to clarify Army CWMD roles and responsibilities and have left many in the Army confused about what constitutes CWMD and how it should be accomplished.

The general state of confusion about CWMD has also been exacerbated by the conflation of the terms CWMD with CBRN. If one accepts the notion that CWMD is CBRN then it becomes logical to assume that CBRN staffs and CBRN forces alone are the logical choices to plan and execute these operations. While these elements will always play an integral part of CWMD planning and execution, they are not capable in and of themselves for the full range of CWMD operations; this requires a multi-
functional approach. Keith Sloan and Elizabeth Felling echoed this assertion in their article, *CWMD is not CBRN*;

As with Unified Land Operations, successful execution of CWMD missions as defined in both the National Strategy to Combat WMD and the DoDS-CWMD, requires all six warfighting functions be employed: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The doctrinal binning of CBRN operations into the protection warfighting function (WfF) (discussed below) further confuses general understanding about CWMD operations.

**Doctrine**

Joint CWMD doctrine (JP 3-40) clearly describes CWMD and how to conduct CWMD operations. This doctrine is clearly nested with both strategy (DODS-CWMD) and policy (NMS-CWMD/DODS-CWMD); this is not the case with CWMD in U.S. Army doctrine. While the Army produces vast amounts of lower level CBRN and CWMD enabling doctrine, capstone and supporting operational doctrine do not adequately define CWMD or sufficiently clarify Army roles and responsibilities for CWMD operations.

The confusion with respect to Army roles and responsibilities for CWMD begins in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 1-0 *The Army*, which identifies “counter weapons of mass destruction” as a joint mission. It further states “…the Army is a vital contributor to the joint force” and “in several missions land power is decisive.” While these statements are true they can be interpreted to mean that the Army can achieve success in the CWMD arena by contributing niche capabilities to the joint mission as opposed to owning the mission in the land domain.

Operational doctrine reveals a similar lack of clarity regarding Army organizational responsibilities for CWMD operations. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP)
3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, does not acknowledge the requirement to conduct CWMD although it does highlight the requirement to “provide support for domestic CBRN, and high-yield explosive incidents.” The first mention of a requirement to conduct CWMD is found in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* which cites CWMD as an “example of an operation” and refers the reader to JP 3-40 CWMD for further reference. ADRP 3-0 also provides the first case where we see, CBRN operations tethered to the protection warfighting function (WFF). While this makes sense for the protection aspects of CBRN operations it has contributed to the general state of confusion about CWMD throughout the Army as discussed above.

ADRP 3-37 *Protection* adds to the confusion by not clearly differentiating between CWMD and CBRN operations. ADRP 3-37 states, “CBRN operations include the employment of tactical capabilities that counter the entire range of threats and hazards,” and then uses terms from the NMS-CWMD to describe those operations. This has led many in the Army to view the terms and the concepts of each to be synonymous which in turn perpetuates the notion that CWMD is CBRN and fits neatly into the Protection WFF.

Operational and tactical operations doctrine including FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations* (2014) and FM 3-96 *Brigade Combat Team Operations* (2015), only partially address aspects of CWMD. For example, FM 3-94 describes operational and tactical CBRN unit capabilities, CBRN operations and elimination operations. FM 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team Operations* echoes these themes but provides more detailed information on how to plan and execute tactical operations like WMD elimination and passive defense but does not describe the concept of or the
requirement to plan and execute CWMD operations. The lack of clear language in this doctrine reinforces the myth that CWMD operations are by default a protection function and responsibility.

**Organization**

The Army has not optimally organized itself to integrate, synchronize or execute CWMD operations. Two specific examples demonstrate this at the Department of the Army level. The first is that the Army has not explicitly assigned the responsibility to lead or integrate CWMD. In General Order 2012-01, the Secretary of the Army (SecArmy) placed the general responsibility on the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) G-3/5/7 charging him to, “ensure the integration of Army capabilities across mission and functional areas.” This order does not specifically designate responsibility for CWMD although it charges the G-3/5/7 to “develop(ing) policy for and act(ing) as the principal advisor to the SecArmy and the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) for space operations, information operations, electronic warfare, cyberspace operations and military information support operations” similarly challenging fields. This omission while seemingly slight is significant because it does not establish CWMD as an Army priority nor does it establish the requirement for the resources required to manage CWMD as a separate portfolio.

In order to close the gap, the HQDA, G-3/5/7 distributed responsibilities for components of the program among subordinate offices including DCS, G-33, DCS, G-35 and the U.S. Army Nuclear and Countering WMD Agency (USANCA), a field operating agency (FOA) that operates in support of the G-3/5/7. The SecArmy also established the Army Council for Combating WMD (ACCWMD) in 2005. The mission of the ACCWMD is to “provide an integrated and cohesive structure to address Army
issues and concerns related to combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD). The council is organized with a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) at the two-star level with representatives from across the Army Staff as well as operating and generating force stakeholders. It also established a Council of Colonels (COC) and policy, capabilities and operations working groups and has a two-year charter that is set to expire in March 2016. While this enterprise has been an effective information sharing venue, it does not possess the requisite responsibilities or authorities to synchronize the efforts of multiple stakeholders across the Army.

The Army’s current force modernization proponenty designations for technical CWMD capabilities hinder the Army’s overall CWMD effectiveness. Army Regulation 5-22, The Force Modernization Proponent System splits proponenty for technical CWMD capabilities into the following categories:

Table 2. Army Technical CWMD Force Modernization Proponents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designated Area</th>
<th>Proponent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical, biological, and nuclear (CBRN) passive defense</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN Consequence Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical WMD Elimination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter WMD – Offensive Operations</td>
<td>HQDA DCS G-3/5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear and Counterproliferation (FA 52)</td>
<td>Director, U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations</td>
<td>Commander, Sustainment Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not specifically designated in AR 5-22 but included to demonstrate the integral role of Army EOD capabilities in CWMD.

There are also a number of other agencies or proponents that contribute to technical aspects of CWMD not included in this chart. Most notably, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) and support agencies like the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA). The lack of a unifying vision and guidance accounts for various
proponents and agencies pursuing different and conflicting agendas. These conflicts often lead to duplications of effort and loss of potential organizational synergy.

These conflicts can also have ripple effects outside of the Army. On 1 March 2016, Congressmen Rick Crawford (AR) testified to the House Armed Services Committee stating, “We have concerns that the Army has been quietly duplicating roles, responsibilities and mission sets of its EOD force into that of the Chemical force.” As a result, he recommended a modification of Title X to, “strike(s) Chemical Corps and insert(s) EOD Corps as a basic branch of the Army.”

Recommendations

In order to maximize its ability to “lead CWMD in the land domain,” the Army must embark on a process similar to that of DoD and the Joint Force; the Army must organize to CWMD, unify the disparate CWMD enterprise, and develop and refine doctrine to enable CWMD across all formations.

Organizing to CWMD

The process of organizing to CWMD requires designating a leader with the responsibilities and authorities to complete the task. It will also require enabling capabilities to facilitate a hefty load of required work. One potential solution is to establish the Office of the Chief of Countering WMD at the two star level on the HQDA staff with responsibilities and authorities similar to those of the Surgeon General, Chief of Engineers or Provost Marshal General. This office would serve as the focal point to integrate and synchronize with OSD, DOD, and Joint processes, develop Army CWMD policy and strategy, and unify the actions of the Army’s CWMD enterprise. To enable these efforts, the Army should consider transforming and enabling USANCA with additional capabilities that may be required to serve as the CWMD integration office for
the Army. This option, while relatively expensive, provides a firm foundation upon which the Army can build the remaining pieces of a CWMD program.

There are also less resource intensive steps the Army should consider. The first requires the Secretary of the Army to explicitly assign responsibility for all aspects of Army CWMD to the G-3/5/7 as was the case with space operations, information operations, et.al., in General Order 2012-01. Although this seems to be a seemingly small step, it would clearly establish an Army staff proponent for CWMD. This action, coupled with transforming USANCA as described above, would provide the resources required to integrate and synchronize CWMD for the Army.

Once macro level reorganization or changes are completed, the Army must address force modernization proponency for the entirety of the CWMD portfolio. In a 2013 information paper, BG Peggy Combs suggested that Army should, “establish a TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM) for CWMD that integrates CWMD capability requirements across all warfighting functions and battle labs,” and that “TRADOC should retain force modernization proponency.” TCMs are chartered to act as “the user’s representative for all matters across DOTMLPF-P and the single point of contact for users to provide feedback and issues for action.” A CWMD TCM, properly organized and resourced, has the authorities required to synchronize DOTMLPF-P proponency issues across Army and Joint stakeholders, support the designated proponent, and organize and focus on CWMD capability development.

**CWMD Strategy**

Once the Army has organized to CWMD, it must consider publishing a strategy to prepare for and enable CWMD operations at all levels. The strategy would provide a common vision for Army-wide CWMD capabilities, guide force development and force
modernization efforts. In a monograph entitled, *Are U.S. Army Capabilities for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction at Risk*, Thomas Westen cites a draft Army CWMD strategy that shows some promise to close this gap. This draft offers the following vision:

The Army will lead CWMD missions in the land domain. The Army provides the preponderance of forces to support DOD CWMD efforts in the homeland and [outside the continental United States] as part of joint and interagency requirements. With agile and adaptive conventional forces, special operations forces and technical CBRN forces, the Army provides a unique mix of tailorable and scalable capabilities to support the full spectrum of joint CWMD operations: from planning and regional support through all phases of combatant commander’ Theater Campaign Plans.

The publication of a CWMD strategy or a variation with minimal delay would enhance the Army’s ability to execute the full spectrum of CWMD operations and serve as a bridge to doctrine and institutionalize Army roles for CWMD operations. In addition to vision described above, an effective Army CWMD strategy would:

- Nest Army CWMD programs with OSD, DOD, and Joint policies, programs and processes
- Define roles and responsibilities for Army CWMD programs
- Provide a vision of future force capabilities that is nested with the overall Army vision and enables force modernization proponent activities
- Provide guidance for doctrine and regulation development or revision
- Establish objective readiness goals for CWMD

In addition to the ideas listed above there is one recommendation that deserves a separate discussion; the need for this strategy to demystify CWMD. While CWMD operations may require some unique tasks, many of the operational and tactical tasks
associated with executing these operations are familiar to the force including, seize, delay, disrupt, neutralize, and destroy et.al. The primary differences between CWMD operations and others are found in different reasons for execution and in some cases different environments. Emphasizing similarities between CWMD and other operations will also increase the likelihood that the force will view CWMD as another operation that requires planning, preparation, execution, and assessment as opposed to an obscure project.

**Operational Doctrine**

The Army’s long term success in CWMD will rely upon effectively incorporating CWMD into both capstone and supporting doctrine. The most important step to achieve this end is for the Army to publish supporting CWMD doctrine that fully describes CWMD operations in a manner similar to FM 3-07 Stability Operations and FM 3-28 Civil Support Operations et.al. This establishes a base for the next step which is to incorporate CWMD operations into the existing body of operational doctrine from ADP/ADRP 3-0 to the lowest tactical levels. As discussed above, there are certain aspects of CWMD already peppered throughout this doctrine but it does not adequately define CWMD nor create an expectation that units will have to execute the full range of CWMD operations. In all cases, doctrine must be clearly establish and explain roles and responsibilities for all WFFs in CWMD operations.

**Risk**

Adopting the recommendations discussed above provides ways for the Army to move from the declaration, “(the) Army will lead CWMD in the land domain” to a program that delivers this capability to the Joint force. If these or similar recommendations are not adopted it is likely that the Army will continue to advance in
the technical aspects of CWMD like those associated with specialized CBRN and technical forces as a result of largely independent initiatives of various proponents. The Army will also likely retain isolated pockets of CWMD excellence like those seen at 8th U.S. Army, U.S. Army North and in select CTC rotations but remain challenged across the force to execute the entirety of the CWMD mission portfolio. The Army’s various force modernization proponents will also likely continue to pursue different and conflicting agendas and programs that are not tied together by a unifying concept or vision. Although the current commitments and the resource constrained environment may challenge the appetites of some in the Army to adopt all of the recommendations, inaction should not be an option. Accepting and implementing even part of the recommendations provided above will go a long way towards mitigating risks.

Critics note two primary objections to these recommendations. The first is that change is not required because the Army’s current enterprise approach to CWMD is adequate. This argument may be valid when it comes to operational, tactical and technical CWMD developments but loses steam at the Department of the Army level where a lack of CWMD organization, CWMD strategy and CWMD doctrine have not postured the Army to lead CWMD in the land domain. The second objection is that the recommendations are too expensive for the current resource constrained environment. Some also contend that accepting these recommendations would come at the expense of other necessary programs or capabilities. While this may be true to a point, national policy clearly establishes the primacy of CWMD. The time has come for the Army to build a program that enables it to lead CWMD in the land domain.
Conclusion

In order for the U.S. Army to meet the ongoing threat posed by WMD both at home and abroad it must embrace the entirety of the CWMD mission as outlined in policy guidance and national and DOD strategies, accept its role as the leader of CWMD in the land domain and develop the strategy and doctrine to enable CWMD operations. Ongoing efforts to improve the Army’s CWMD capabilities, like the campaigns of learning associated with Army Warfighting Challenge #5 are laudable and will continue to add capabilities at the operational, tactical, and technical levels. However, these efforts do not address perhaps the most significant gaps which are insufficient organization, lack of a CWMD strategy and sufficient doctrine to enable the Army’s overall CWMD program. While there will never be a panacea or simple solution to solve the ever-evolving WMD threat, taking the recommended actions will better posture the Army to CWMD in the near and long terms.

Endnotes

1 Joint doctrine defines WMD as “chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon,” U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, as amended through June 15, 2015), 260, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (accessed September 30, 2015).

Countering or Combating WMD (CWMD) is defined as “efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joint Publication 3-40 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 31, 2014), GL-5.

2 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army Operating Concept Win in a Complex World (2020-2040), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, October 31, 2014), 32.
This section provides a brief, unclassified description of relatively recent WMD use and current threats that have shaped U.S. national leader understanding and appreciation of the same. While detailed examination of threat is always useful, it is not required here. Interested readers have access to vast amounts of open source material and classified information is available for those with sufficient clearances. A more extensive discussion of current unclassified threats can be found by following the link below. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd (accessed February 29, 2016).


The Aum Shinrikyo cult used only a small portion of the sarin that it possessed to conduct the Tokyo subway attack. In addition to Sarin, the cult was also actively pursuing conventional arms, biological, and even nuclear capabilities. Advisory Panel, First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 46-47, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS16552 (accessed January 17, 2016).


Advisory Panel, First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 54-56.

Advisory Panel, Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, December 15, 2000), 54-56,

Ibid., 2.


Specific mission areas include: Offensive operations, Elimination operations, interdiction, Active defense, Passive defense, WMD consequence management, Security cooperation and partner activities, Threat reduction cooperation. Ibid., 7.


Ibid., 52.


SSG Keith Anderson, “Army North Conducts Vibrant Response Incident Exercise,” October 2012,


Ibid., 3-5.

Ibid., 3-8.


41 Ibid.


46 McHugh, *Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army*.


48 McHugh, *Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army*.


The 2010 version of the National Security Strategy (NSS) states, “there is no greater risk to the American people than weapons of mass destruction.” The 2015 NSS states “proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction,” is one of eight top strategic risk that will guide prioritization efforts. Obama, National Security Strategy, (Washington, DC: White House, May 2010), 4; Obama, National Security Strategy (2015), 2.