Synchronizing Army CWMD Efforts: A Way Forward

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The Army's approach to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) is not properly synchronized to adequately support National and Defense security objectives. The Army stakeholder groups and processes for CWMD are varied, complex, and not properly nested. There are three non-medical proponents that provide the bulk of the expertise for CWMD efforts; this, combined with the Army Medical Department's efforts, the responsibilities the Army holds in the Chemical Biological Defense Program, and its associated RDT&E infrastructure, challenge the Army's ability to produce a coherent and consistent CWMD strategy that can be understood by all stakeholders and leveraged in pursuit of resources in defense processes. The absence of one single synchronized Army CMWD strategy prevents the development of appropriate capability and capacity in ground forces to achieve strategic CWMD goals. Proper designation of a general/flag officer on staff as the CWMD synchronizer, appropriately enabled with existing staff, combined with streamlining of non-medical proponency under one authority, would go a long way to correcting this shortcoming and deliver ground forces capable of countering dynamic threats.
Abstract

The Army's approach to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) is not properly synchronized to adequately support National and Defense security objectives. The Army stakeholder groups and processes for CWMD are varied, complex, and not properly nested. There are three non-medical proponents that provide the bulk of the expertise for CWMD efforts; this, combined with the Army Medical Department's efforts, the responsibilities the Army holds in the Chemical Biological Defense Program, and its associated RDT&E infrastructure, challenge the Army's ability to produce a coherent and consistent CWMD strategy that can be understood by all stakeholders and leveraged in pursuit of resources in defense processes. The absence of one single synchronized Army CWMD strategy prevents the development of appropriate capability and capacity in ground forces to achieve strategic CWMD goals. Proper designation of a general/flag officer on staff as the CWMD synchronizer, appropriately enabled with existing staff, combined with streamlining of non-medical proponency under one authority, would go a long way to correcting this shortcoming and deliver ground forces capable of countering dynamic threats.
Synchronizing Army CWMD Efforts: A Way Forward

In a recent report, *Strategy-Policy Mismatch*, RAND researchers argued that "DoD [Department of Defense] does not consider the counter-WMD mission important enough to drive military capacity and capability."\(^1\) On the other hand, the report holds that the last two administrations have made countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) the highest-priority objective of national security and military strategy.\(^2\) Additionally, there has been great effort by the Department in developing the ways to successfully achieve the strategic ends through the development of "doctrine, CONOPS [Concept of Operations], and organizational templates."\(^3\) The report concludes that "there is little comparable evidence, however, that DoD has adequately considered the means that may be required to address these missions."\(^4\) The lack of attention and resourcing toward the development of adequate means fails to address the risks posed by WMD and to adequately align defense resources with national security priorities.

Addressing the means available for CWMD operations sufficiently is critical to the Army, "whose force capacity and capabilities—properly resourced—are essential to the task."\(^5\)

This mismatch of national strategy and policy with the means available has significant implications for the Army. The Department of Defense has defined success in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) as the accomplishment of the three ends identified in the Defense Department's Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). These are: that no new actors obtain WMD, that those possessing WMD do not use them, and that, if actors use WMD, their effects are minimized.\(^6\) The Defense Department is tasked to assist in achieving these ends in the Homeland as well as all over the globe. This daunting task relies on a variety of capabilities from across the services. However, the Army owns key and significant roles
in the deterrence necessary to preventing the use of WMD, and possesses the bulk of the forces capable of minimizing the impacts if deterrence fails.

In order to accomplish the Department's defined ends toward Countering WMD, the Army faces a number of challenges that stem from the way in which it is organized. Currently, the technical oversight and advocacy for different facets of the CWMD effort is spread among four proponents across three major commands. Second, there are a host of capabilities under a number of commands in both the institutional and operational forces conducting a variety of efforts that result in individual solutions to problems which do not contribute to a coherent Army strategy for achieving Department of Defense objectives. Finally, and most significantly, there is no single office assigned to integrate and synchronize CWMD functions across the Army, nor is there an office sufficiently manned to achieve that objective.

There are a number of inherent organizational challenges for the Army to overcome in order to successfully resource CWMD efforts. One of these challenges results from the complexity in which WMD efforts are discussed and worked through. The CWMD structures and processes are extremely complex and require discussions, coordination and planning across the Department of Defense, Joint Force and Interagency.

In addition to the complexities within the CWMD environment, even the term 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' has become politicized—used by politicians, pundits, the entertainment industry, and others in order to assist with the accomplishment of individual agendas. In an effort to create at least a common definition, Title 18 Section 2332a of the Federal code defines a “weapon of mass destruction” as the use of a
weapon constructed from: toxic or poisonous chemicals, disease organisms, a radiation release to a dangerous level, or a destructive device (e.g. bombs, grenades, mines, and missiles). This definition is broad, as it includes the anticipated CBRN hazards, as well as a host of devices with relatively moderately sized explosive content.

(With the publication of the most recent edition of JP 3-40 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2014, the term "Combating WMD" was replaced by "Countering WMD." For all practical purposes, and due to the recent nature of the change, these terms are used interchangeably throughout this study.)

For the Department of Defense, Weapons of Mass Destruction are but one of a variety of threats which the DoD is charged to protect the public from. However, "prevent[ing] the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction" remains one of the eight security objectives identified in the National Security Strategy. Adversaries, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, continue to attempt to improve their capability to deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction while others (i.e. non-state actors in Africa and the Middle East) are actively seeking to possess these capabilities to improve their relative standing and power.

The Army has a number of proponents that have a role in identifying capability gaps and DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) solutions to address the threats in this mission area. Not only are a number of capability developers involved, there are separate training and leader development efforts among these varied proponents. The existence of multiple efforts presents challenges for the Army Staff to provide sufficiently capable forces to Combatant Commanders for CWMD operations.
CWMD operations remain an operational mission area of interest to the maneuver, fires, and logistics communities. However, because of the history and legacy that has shaped the Army's personnel construct, the Army depends on three non-medical personnel skills for expertise in planning and conducting CWMD operations: CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) specialists from the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel from the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, and Nuclear and Counterproliferation (Functional Area 52) Officers. The proponent for CBRN personnel is the Commandant of the U.S. Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Explosive Ordnance Disposal management falls under the Logistics Branch and specifically, the Chief of Ordnance at Fort Lee, Virginia. The Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officers in Functional Area 52 are managed by the Director of the United States Army Nuclear and Counter Weapons ofMass Destruction Agency (USANCA) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. USANCA is a Field Operating Agency (FOA) for the Army G-3/5/7.

A fourth area of specialists is critical to success in countering these types of weapons, and in particular in mitigating their impacts; this fourth group is medical personnel. The Army's medical specialties fall under the management of the Army Medical Department (AMEDD); the six medical branches ultimately work for The Surgeon General (TSG) and her office (OTSG). These four proponents work under different chains of command, and only two of the four fall under the oversight of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Due to the disparity of work provided by these four proponents in identifying resourcing shortfalls for the technical forces supporting CWMD
operations, the associated risk analyses and prioritization of requirements competing for limited resources is critical to providing adequate capabilities for Army forces.

In addition to the four proponents’ efforts toward closing gaps in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Army possesses key assets in its institutional and operational forces that contribute to the deterrence necessary to preventing the use of WMD. Apart from the large investment in global deterrence, the Army also provides the bulk of the forces capable of minimizing the impacts if deterrence fails. The Army contributes the largest portion of America's capacity and the armed forces' ability to counter weapons of mass destruction through its vast homeland defense architecture (both the reserve component forces and the on-call active force), the active component 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Command (comprised of a large portion of the Army's available Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Nuclear Disablement forces), as well as other general purpose and specialized capability which support CWMD operations.

While the Army plays key roles in all three of the objectives of the National CMWD strategy, it is generally a supporting effort for the first two ends. Other elements of national power are the key to fully achieving these first two goals. The Army provides support to the intelligence community to help prevent the proliferation of technology. Secondly, the Army’s role in deterrence is vital to preventing use of these destructive weapons. However, if used, the Army is central to limiting weapon's effects of employment against our homeland, partners, or forces.
The Army has allocated a significant amount of force structure to mitigate any effects of Weapons of Mass Destruction globally. In the Homeland, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) plans provide for a CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE) comprised of a layered approach of National Guard, Active, and Reserve forces, predominately Army, which are on-call to assist the local, state, and federal first responders and emergency managers in mitigating the impacts of an event. Outside the United States, the Army provides staff elements and forces to assist the Combatant Commanders with protecting their forces and assisting allies and partners when needed. Army support to Combatant Commanders takes the shape of staff assistance through CBRN, EOD, and Functional Area 52 staff members, who assist with planning and crisis response. Additionally, there are other Army CBRN and EOD forces allocated forward under the command of Combatant or Sub-Unified Command Commanders like the 23d Chemical Battalion in Korea. Apart from these conventional capabilities, the Army supports U.S. Special Operations Command's efforts to Counter WMD through allocation of Army force structure with units such as Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). No other service can provide the amount of personnel and capability against Weapons of Mass Destruction to the Combatant Commander provided by the Army.

The Army has attempted to keep up with changing threats through organizational changes. In its continued attempts to adapt to a changing environment, the Army has included its CBRNE forces in transformation, and both EOD and CBRN forces have seen significant change over the last 15 years. With our enemies' increasing use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) during the counterinsurgencies in Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army Ordnance Corps has expanded the EOD force structure by nearly 280% from 2002 to 2013.\textsuperscript{15} The Army Chemical Corps recently obtained approval for a new Force Design Update for the majority of CBRN forces in October of 2014. This effort standardizes the basic company and battalion structure and incorporates additional capability.\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, the creation of the 20th CBRNE Command within the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in 2004 and its expanded role in CWMD operations was identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).\textsuperscript{17} These are but a few of the adaptations to the Army Force Structure designed to counter and mitigate the effects of Weapons of Mass Destruction over the past 15 years.

In addition to organizational change, the Army has attempted to address training shortfalls through modifications to individual and collective training methods. The Army has taken on the preponderance of CBRN training requirements for the Joint Force with the co-location of the all of the CBRN Service Schools at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. While all of these schools are now co-located and make use of the same or similar facilities, the School is not Joint and the Services still maintain their own oversight of their respective curriculum. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training has moved one step beyond CBRN training with all EOD personnel attending the Naval School Explosive Ordnance Disposal at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida as part of their Service Course Curricula. For FA 52 qualification, newly selected officers attend the U.S. Army Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer Course at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. This course is administered by the Defense Nuclear Weapons School under the oversight of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) with USANCA performing its Service and proponent roles.

While individual training remains based on (and resourced by) the proponent that the Soldier belongs to, collective training is more closely coordinated. The mission in the Republic of Korea has resulted in focused collective training in CWMD, particularly WMD Elimination, and has forced cooperation and planning by a number of Army functions. The maneuver and protection functions have been forced to work out ways to plan and train together in order to accomplish mission objectives. The efforts in the Korean Theater, combined with the consolidation of U.S. based CBRN, EOD, and Nuclear Disablement Teams (NDT) under FORSCOM and the 20th CBRNE Command, have resulted in a number of exercises where complex CWMD scenarios involve a variety of Army units. Arguably the most significant efforts toward multi-echelon training in complex environments have occurred at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) at Fort Irwin, California and Fort Polk, Louisiana. The incorporation of task organized CBRNE Task Forces into Brigade Combat Teams rotations helps the force identify a number of gaps and provides a forum for experimentation at the tactical level. Participation in these Army G-3/5/7 managed and funded CTC rotations have been occurring since January 2014.

In addition to providing operational forces for the Combatant Commanders, the Army possesses institutional assets that either support the operational force or provide unique strategic capabilities. In addition to the Major Range and Training Facility Base (MRTFB) for Chemical and Biological Defense, West Desert Test Center at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, the Army has three labs (U.S. Army Medical Research Institute
of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (MRICD) and the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC)), all of which provide critical capabilities which reside nowhere else globally. Additionally, the Army sources the research, development, acquisition, fielding, and life-cycle support of chemical and biological defense equipment and medical countermeasures through its Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD).¹⁸

The oversight of these diverse bodies is shared across the Army with two of the labs under the supervision of The Surgeon General, one under Army Materiel Command, and the MRTFB under the Army Test and Evaluation Center (ATEC). The JPEO-CBD falls under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology ASA(ALT). In addition to the Army Service Component Commands and FORSCOM, which control the operational forces, these additional diverse commands contribute to the Army’s capacity to deliver the Nation’s ability to counter WMD.

The prevalence of this large and diverse Army stakeholder group (e.g. TRADOC, AMEDD, ARSTAFF, JPEO-CBD, FORSCOM, etc.) contributes to a wide range of activities toward addressing perceived shortcomings in CWMD capability. However, this diversity and variety among stakeholders present a number of challenges in the synchronization and coordination of these efforts against the technical nature and devastating effects of WMD. While the challenges in training at the tactical and operational levels are overcome with thoughtful planning and coordination (as demonstrated by commanders in Korea and within FORSCOM, for example), the other elements of the DOTMLP-F are not as easily synchronized. There remain three
significant challenges to accomplishing CWMD synchronization across the Army within the current oversight structure and processes: the number and variety of Army Stakeholders involved; the additional CWMD responsibilities assigned, and the variety of DoD stakeholders and complexity of DoD processes.

In addition to the variety of Army stakeholders working toward CWMD objectives, the Army's role in the Chemical Biological Defense Program challenges the current synchronization efforts. The Army has, by law, the responsibility to act as the Executive Agent for the defense-wide Chemical Biological Defense Program. These Executive Agent (EA) responsibilities include "coordinat[ing] and integrat[ing] RDT&E (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) and acquisition requirements of the military departments…and review[ing] all funding requirements." The Secretary of the Army has delegated his authority to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, who subsequently delegated his authority to the G-8, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)). In addition to providing personnel to support CBDP management, the Army provides a significant amount of the Chemical and Biological technical infrastructure and expertise available to the Department of Defense and Nation, identified previously. The G-8 and ASA(ALT) are responsible for pursuing resources from the Defense managed CBDP account to fill identified and prioritized gaps for all of the Services in Chemical and Biological Defense. The CBDP possesses its own program specific processes and the G-8 and ASA(ALT) staff members are dependent on Army, and specifically G-3/5/7, mechanisms/processes for input.
The inherent complexities within the CBDP (itself only one stakeholder group within the DoD and Interagency CWMD environment), demonstrate the need for the Army to more clearly and consistently communicate objectives and needs for resourcing. Clear communication of Army strategy and prioritization of resourcing requirements with the Department and Defense elements throughout their processes is required in order to properly resource CWMD capability and capacity in ground forces.

Due to the threats that the proliferation of technologies represent, there are a number of actors in the Defense Department who are critical to Counter WMD efforts and with whom the Army Staff must coordinate and synchronize efforts. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense (ASD(NCB)) oversees the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and non-proliferation programs. Additionally, the vast majority of funding for CWMD research and development, materiel acquisition, laboratory infrastructure, testing, and joint training comes from defense-wide accounts administered by the ASD(NCB). The bulk of this funding is from the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) which was established by law in 1993. CWMD requirements funded by these defense-wide funds are managed by the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Defense (JRO-CBRND) in the J-8.

Defense strategy and policy are managed by the Assistant Secretary Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security and executed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for CWMD. U.S. Northern Command and Pacific Command have the responsibility for synchronizing CWMD efforts to protect the homeland within their respective areas of responsibility. U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Special
Operations Command also possess responsibilities for synchronizing CWMD efforts within their respective areas of responsibility. The Defense-wide coordination and synchronization for CWMD operations are conducted by a number of steering groups, working groups, and team events across the Department.

The number of stakeholders within the DoD with a focus on CWMD threats and missions is quite large. The current construct distributes a number of small teams of CWMD professionals across the Department to ensure that the appropriate force is applied to a problem. Additionally, the Army, based on traditional capabilities combined with its responsibilities as the Executive Agent for the CBDP, provide the vast majority of the human capital and infrastructure funded by the CBDP.

The Army's ability to navigate this complex array of participants with one coherent strategy and a clear prioritization of requirements, determines the resources provided to its forces. Disparate opinions, priorities, or vision by any of the various Army elements who interact in the DoD processes of Strategy and Policy Formulation, Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE), Defense Acquisition System, and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) undermine potential resource availability resulting in reduced capability and resident capacity in the Army for CWMD operations.

In order to accomplish the synchronization across the Army currently, the G-3/5/7 is assigned some responsibilities in the CWMD area from two sources: General Orders (GO) 2012-01, the Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army and Army Regulation (AR) 10-16, the U.S. Army Nuclear and
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency. Neither of these documents adequately identify the responsibility for the synchronization of CWMD efforts.

General Orders (GO) 2012-01 gives three responsibilities to the G-3/5/7 from which CWMD can be inferred: "ensuring the integration of Army capabilities across mission and functional areas, developing and coordinating Army protection efforts...[and] providing analysis of national security issues." 24 AR 10-16 is slightly more specific in its tasks to the G-3/5/7 as it tasks the office to "develop Army CWMD policies consistent with national strategy in order to provide trained and ready forces capable of supporting CWMD missions [and] synchronize Army force protection programs." 25

In addition to the tasks delegated to the G-3/5/7, a formal Army Council, established in 2000, at the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, works on the synchronization of issues related to CWMD across the staff. This forum, the Army Council for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (ACCWMD), includes a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), Council of Colonels (CoC), and three working groups (Policy, Capabilities, and Operations). 26 This council is also directed and controlled by the G-3/5/7.

Although the G-3/5/7 has some authorities granted him by these two references, and there is a body (ACCWMD) established to work out issues of concern in the CWMD arena, only the G-3/5/7 has the overall ability to coordinate and synchronize CWMD efforts. With the vast responsibilities of this important position, and the variety of challenges that require the attention of the G-3/5/7 across the spectrum of conflict, CWMD cannot receive the attention it requires under the current construct without specific delegation of authority below the G-3/5/7 himself. The synchronization of efforts
requires formal delegation of authorities or reorganization within the Army in order to ensure that CWMD receives the needed senior consideration to provide adequate synchronization and coordination of efforts across the DOTMLPF domains to ensure that the combatant commanders receive the best and most capable Army resources possible, as there is "no greater responsibility than protecting the American people."  

Closer inspection of the ARSTAFF in the absence of a clear synchronizer reveals that the Army chooses to meet its obligations toward CWMD in a very complex manner. In order to meet the legislative responsibilities for the Secretary of the Army with the aid of the Army Staff of Recruiting, Organizing, Supplying, Equipping, Training, Servicing, and Maintaining, 71 professionals are allocated for work in the CWMD area. This analysis results from a look at Fiscal Year 16 Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). The criteria used in this count are those whose duties contribute directly to the CWMD mission area which includes: Chemical Branch Officers (74A), EOD Specialists (89E or 89D), Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officers (FA 52), and any civilian or other military personnel assigned to sections predominately working on CWMD. In support of the functions of Supplying, Equipping, Servicing, and Maintaining, there are two personnel authorized within the G-4, a total of six within the G-8, and one in The Surgeon General's Office for a total of 9 personnel. Supporting, Organizing, and Training efforts are allocated a total of 22 from the G-3/5/7 and another 40 from its field operating agency the United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA) for a total of 71. While attributing the work done by any one person to a single requirement is overly simplistic, this is done for simple initial accounting purposes. There is overlap in how any of these personnel operate and how coordination must
occur across the staff in order to complete the large number of CWMD related tasks for the Army.

The majority of the personnel providing support to the CWMD mission area reside within the Army G-3/5/7 and its field operating agency, USANCA. The U.S. Army's Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency under the direction of the G-3/5/7 has the mission to provide nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction planning and execution expertise for the implementation of Army CWMD strategy and policy at the Corps level and above in order that the Army meets Joint operational requirements in achieving national objectives to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). USANCA's responsibilities include the requirement to assess Army CWMD capabilities across doctrinal organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) in support of ARSTAFF and in coordination with all Department of the Army (DA) stakeholders.

Currently, the Director of USANCA, while serving as the proponent for FA 52 personnel, is also the Deputy Director of Army Strategy Plans and Policy within the G-3/5/7. This provides one person with responsibility for USANCA as well as the 11-person CWMD section within the G-35. Overall, this person serves in the supervisory chain for 51 of the 71 Army Staff members focused on CWMD.

There are four key defense processes in which The Army must integrate: Strategy and Policy Development, PPBE, the Defense Acquisition System and JCIDS. The Director of USANCA while also serving as the Deputy Director of Army Strategy Plans and Policy can result in seamless integration of Army CWMD interests into
Defense Strategy and Policy discussions. However, the delivery of capabilities presents more challenges.

The adaptation/implementation JCIDS relies on a number of stakeholders. Their coordination and synchronization is essential for the Army to properly document and plan, program, and budget requirements to fill known, validated, and prioritized gaps. Apart from the variety of proponents and the mixing of defense-wide (i.e. CBDP) and Army funding, stakeholders in this process include the user (tactical and operational Army forces), the Combatant Commanders (Army Service Component Commands (ASCC)), the various Capability Developers, the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) within TRADOC, G-3/5/7, G8, G4, and ASA(ALT), to name only a few. Fortunately, the Defense Acquisition Process is more tightly coordinated, as the ASA(ALT) has oversight of all of the Army Program Executive Offices (PEO), to include the JPEO-CBD.

Unfortunately, while Strategy and Policy Development are postured, aligned with OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) and Joint Staff processes, and synchronized across the ARSTAFF, the same cannot be said of delivery of capability. The delivery of capability that occurs from the coordinated efforts of defining and validating requirements, planning and programming monies, and acquiring materiel lacks proper synchronization. The complexities and dispersion of CWMD stakeholders from across the Army Commands require a more deliberate effort in coordinating and synchronizing the requirements from across the force with the means needed to fill the gaps with a clear and consistent vision of the future. Without these being aligned, the Army can't effectively complete its legislative requirements.
Above the Army, the Executive Branch and the DoD have worked hard to ensure that their efforts are synchronized at the Strategic Policy/Planning level through a variety of studies, publishing National Strategies, and legislative and authoritative direction. The Army has invested a lot of effort to improve force structure and training at the operational and tactical levels. While somewhat stove-piped due to a variety of proponents involved, these are positive steps.

However, in spite of external guidance placing an emphasis on CWMD operations, the Army has spent little effort to address the organizational challenges involved in the oversight, coordination, and synchronization of all of the Army forces and infrastructure focused on CWMD. This includes synchronization of the vast Army infrastructure dedicated to CWMD: Research Development and Acquisition (i.e. labs, JPEO-CBD); testing (West Desert Test Center); individual and collective training (i.e. CBRN School, Combat Training Centers); Leader Development (i.e. Chemical Corps at Fort Leonard Wood, Ordnance Corps at Fort Lee, and FA 52 in Albuquerque); and Force Structure (i.e. Army National Guard, 20th CBRNE CMD, USASOC, ASCCs).

There are a number of ways to establish mechanisms on the Army Staff necessary to effectively synchronize CWMD efforts. These options have a wide variety of potential impacts (both positive and negative) and costs. There are three options with alternatives available within each.

The first option has the greatest potential for positively addressing the challenge of synchronizing CWMD operations. However, it also has the most significant impact and initial cost of the three. This option is to establish a functional staff for CWMD, much like those that exist in our Combatant Commands, Corps, and Divisions. An
establishment of a CWMD office lead by a two-star Major General under the three-star Protection Chief could effectively provide adequate coordinating efforts among the various proponents. Additionally, this office, with the bulk of the manning (including USANCA), taken from the CWMD positions across the staff would have enough capacity to effectively synchronize efforts across the Service with elements such as ASA(ALT), ATEC, TRADOC, FORSCOM, and AMEDD. Additionally, the presence of a Major General would give the appropriate leadership and authority to the office in order to represent Army interests with the OSD and Joint Staffs. The costs of a complete realignment of the Army Staff would be significant and the benefits would be slower to materialize as the informal networks of the new organization would take a while to form.

A second option is to establish or delegate a two-star equivalent (a Major General or member of the Senior Executive Service) position as the CWMD officer, and realign much of the ARSTAFF’s CWMD positions, including USANCA, under this officer. This office would also receive responsibility for the execution of the ACCWMD. There are two likely places to put this office. One option is to place it under the G-3/5/7; a second is to establish a CWMD Officer as a special staff member much like the Provost Marshall or Chief of Engineers. The cost for this option would be a single general officer position.

Considering current efforts to reduce staff manning (in particular the number of flag officers on staff), a more palatable option is delegating the responsibility of CWMD synchronizer to an existing staff member. The impact of delegating the synchronization and coordination of CWMD as an additional duty can be mitigated by properly enabling the new CWMD staff or office which is taken from current authorizations.
There would be little change to traditional staff operations if this function is properly delegated and the responsibility placed under the G-3/5/7. However, due to the variety of elements that are involved in CWMD operations, establishing a separate office could eventually be more effective as a synchronizer since the stakeholders and responsibilities span the entire Army Staff and many of its subordinate commands, which include the Army Medical Department, acquisition apparatus, testing, training, ASCCs, and CONUS forces.

A third option would be to consolidate the specialized non-medical proponencies focused on CWMD operations. In 2006, COL Walk, then the Assistant Deputy Commandant for the Reserves at the U.S. Army’s Chemical School, proposed merging three fields, the Army Chemical Corps, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces, and the Functional Area 52 (Nuclear and Counterproliferation) Officers into one CBRNE (Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and High Yield Explosives) Corps. This merger would better align Army forces for countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) as it would ensure much better synchronization for training, equipping and manning Army forces. There would be some initial costs involved in creating a new branch, but reducing duplication of efforts would generate some long-term savings. This option does help with the challenges of disparate manning, training, and equipping strategies and execution, though it does not address some of the other challenges of ensuring that functions are coordinated across the Staff and with all of the Army CWMD infrastructure (labs, CTCs, etc.). Oversight of these functions would need to be continued by the ARSTAFF.
A slight modification to this third option would be to place all three skills (CBRN, EOD, FA 52) under one chain of command (i.e. Commanding General, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) at Fort Leonard Wood). This would be less costly initially, as it would not require movement of functions or personnel, and could be used as a bridging strategy to get to full implementation of combining the fields into a CBRNE Corps.

Which option is best? The easiest, quickest, and cheapest option would be to identify a single general officer (two-star equivalent) on the Army Staff, provided with many of the current staff positions (i.e. USANCA), and clearly delegated the responsibility to synchronize and coordinate CWMD efforts across the Army. This option provides the appropriate level of rank and experience to ensure coherent efforts, appropriately nested visions and strategies across the four proponents supporting CWMD operations, interaction with the various other Army elements that support the CBDP and other CWMD efforts, and ensures Army forces are properly trained, manned, and equipped to operate in the challenging environment that Weapons of Mass Destruction pose.

Secondly, consideration should be given to consolidation of CBRN, EOD, and FA 52 proponency. Whether this oversight responsibility is given to MSCoE, or these three personnel fields are merged into a CBRNE Branch, current fiscal constraints provide an opportunity to breakdown institutional barriers and prevent tradition from hindering progress, efficiency, and effectiveness.

A combination of the implementation of properly identifying and enabling a general/flag officer for the purpose of synchronizing CWMD operations for the Army,
combined with the consolidation of non-medical proponency, would better prepare Army forces for achieving national and strategic security objectives. The Army's responsibilities in the Homeland and in support of the other Geographic Combatant Commanders are not well served by the current supervisory structures in the area of CWMD. A lack of coherency and synchronization across the staff, acquisition community, Army forces, training centers, and proponents detracts from the development and communication of a clear Army CWMD vision/strategy and weakens the Army's ability to effectively interact and influence Defense Department resourcing in support of Army and all Ground Forces. With only two small changes—clearly designating a CWMD synchronizer on the ARSTAFF and streamlining the proponency governing CWMD expertise—the Army can finally provide the means\(^*\) to ensure that the ends\(^*\) defined by the Executive Branch and Department leadership are achieved.

Endnotes

1 Timothy M. Bonds et al., *Strategy-Policy Mismatch* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), iii.

2 Ibid., 77.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 79.

Following 20 years of serving as an Army Chemical Officer, I was assigned to the Army G-8. During my year on the Army Staff, I oversaw the section that serves as the Executive Agent's Secretariat, often as his representative, to the Chemical Biological Defense Program. This program is a defense-wide account that funds the vast majority of the Defense Department's Chemical and Biological Defense research and materiel. This experience presented challenges as I often represented the Army's interests and those of the other Services in a number of forums to include Program Objective Memorandum (POM) discussions. It was often very difficult to properly represent the Army's interests in defense management processes as the Army's strategy, vision, and prioritization for CWMD lacks clarity. This lack of common understanding among Army stakeholders resulted in missed opportunities in the Department's decision making processes.


Ibid., 372.

Ibid., 293.

U.S. Department of the Army, Army Medical Department Officer Professional Development and Career Management, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-4 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 27, 2007), 5.


Conduct of Chemical Biological Defense Program, Title 50 United States Code 1522, 103rd Congress (November 30, 1993), 306.


22 Conduct of Chemical Biological Defense Program, 306.


35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.


38 Bonds et al., *Strategy-Policy Mismatch*, 77.