Designing the Next Base
Realignment and Closures
Organizational Structure

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Abstract

With shrinking budgets and force structure, the Department of Defense (DoD) has requested congressional authority to conduct another round of base realignment and closures (BRAC) in fiscal year 2019. Multiple stakeholders, both inside and outside the DoD, influenced by BRAC history and representing competing objectives, are critical players in an already complex environment. Developing the appropriate organizational structure armed with the proper analytical guidance is essential to a successful BRAC analysis. Instead of building upon historical BRAC examples or currently existing organizational structures, the three frames of operational design can assist the DoD in exploring alternative structures for the next BRAC. Framing the operational environment allows the Department of Defense to understand the current and desired environments. Accurately defining the problem provides insights on how to achieve the desired endstates. Developing operational approaches for organizing the BRAC analytical groups can produce structures that are noticeably different from previous BRAC efforts.
Designing the Next Base Realignment and Closures Organizational Structure

Since 1988, the Department of Defense (DoD) has conducted five rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) at a combined cost of $68 billion with an estimated annual savings of $12.5 billion. The DoD has requested another round of BRAC for 2019, but every attempt since 2005 has met with significant congressional resistance. The mere mention of BRAC creates angst throughout all levels of government and local communities. If and when Congress finally authorizes the next BRAC, the DoD must be as effective as possible in developing and recommending infrastructure changes. Determining the proper mix and structure of analytical teams is an early, critical step in conducting an effective BRAC that meets the needs of the DoD and demands of Congress. Establishing a basic structure upon which DoD can build the BRAC analytical effort will allow rapid transition in a time critical process.

The DoD is a team of teams within the military departments, joint staff, defense agencies, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, BRAC may require new organizational structures throughout all levels that coordinate their efforts over several years. Operational design, described in Joint Publication 5.0, provides a framework to help the Department of Defense organize for the next base realignment and closure effort and can illuminate opportunities other than shifting from the last known point.

Operational Design

Although Joint Publication 5.0 (JP 5.0), Joint Operation Planning, doctrinally applies to the joint staff, military commands, and services, it can still provide a reasonable method for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the BRAC organizational structure. At a minimum, the joint staff can leverage design to evaluate the environment and provide recommendations to the Secretary regarding modifications.
to the designation and structure of joint analysis groups. At the maximum, the service and joint analytical teams can use operational design within the BRAC process to develop, analyze, and provide infrastructure recommendations.

First, framing the operational environment allows the Department of Defense to understand the current and desired environments. An examination of the current infrastructure status frames the potential gains for DoD while historical reduction efforts highlight the civil-military landscape. Previous BRAC efforts provide insights into potential organizational structures for the next BRAC.

Next, accurately defining the problem provides insights on how to achieve the desired endstates. Analyzing previous structures based on control and analytical focus helps understand potential future organizational structures. A simplified comparison helps scope a problem statement focused solely on the organizational effort.

Finally, developing operational approaches for organizing the BRAC analytical groups may produce structures that are noticeably different from previous BRAC efforts. Building upon existing structures and concepts, such as domains, joint functions, and defense infrastructure sectors can provide valid starting points for the organizational structure to achieve future BRAC objectives.

Understand the Operational Environment

The statutory BRAC, as authorized by Congress, provides the primary guiding document for infrastructure reductions. Little has changed from the initial legislation in 1988\(^2\) to the most recent version in 2005.\(^3\) While the legislation directs the establishment of a commission and the process for providing recommendations to the President and Congress, internal organization of the Department of Defense is at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.
The National Security and National Military Strategies both provide guidance which help the Department of Defense understand the operational environment and its potential effects on the BRAC process. Both provide threat overviews and descriptions of the current and future environments. These documents and many others can provide the basis for the Secretary of Defense’s initial strategic guidance to the military services and defense agencies.

The service secretaries and chiefs are able to influence and shape military guidance that directly internal policies and procedures. Their most visible inputs come during annual posture testimonies to Congress where each senior leader has testified for their respective service’s need for another round of BRAC.4

Why DoD needs BRAC

Given recent resource constraints and competing priorities, the military services face tight budgets, with potential for further fiscal constraints under the Budget Control Act of 2011.5 In his March 2015 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter repeatedly committed the DoD to more efficient and accountable defense spending, using derivatives of “efficient” 10 times and “accountable” 12 times.6 Excess infrastructure inefficiently consumes fiscal resources for maintenance, utilities, and manpower that could be leveraged against higher priorities. BRAC authorization provides a method for achieving infrastructure efficiencies.

Even though the DoD identified 24% excess infrastructure in 2004, the 2005 BRAC only reduced the infrastructure by 3%.7 Recent testimony by the Army estimates 25% excess infrastructure while the Air Force estimates 30% excess.8 The Navy, neither as specific nor emphatic, is supportive of a future BRAC.9 The DoD does not
have hard numbers comparing current infrastructure with requirements, but overall, DoD estimates it can eliminate about $2 billion of excess infrastructure, with an upfront cost of $6 billion.\textsuperscript{10}

The Department of Defense has asked for another BRAC round in 2019, which would begin in fiscal year 2017, but Congress’s reaction to that proposal has yet to materialize.\textsuperscript{11} However, Congress sent a clear signal with the 2016 Omnibus Spending Bill in Section 8132 by stating, “None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to propose, plan for, or execute a new or additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round.”\textsuperscript{12} Likewise, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act restricts BRAC-like actions, but it also directs the DoD to complete a 20-year personnel structure plan, conduct a threat assessment, and take inventory of its infrastructure. These three actions were the first steps to the previous BRAC rounds and could signal an increased willingness of Congress to authorize BRAC for 2019.

Congressional reticence tends to anchor on the BRAC 2005 results, which show an annual recurring savings of $4 billion at a cost of $38 billion. This ten year break-even point was much longer than originally estimated by the DoD, due both to lower savings and higher costs.\textsuperscript{13} Contrasting this with the previous four rounds which, in total, cost just under $30 billion for an annual recurring savings of $8.5 billion and a four year break-even point, it is easy to understand congressional concerns.\textsuperscript{14} Potential lost constituent jobs further complicates BRAC authorization during even-numbered election years.

There are mechanisms through which the DoD could forward closure recommendations for congressional consideration, but Congress has made it difficult by
prohibiting expenditure of funds on BRAC-like actions. Congressional efforts to foster a BRAC compromise, such as directing military value considerations, limiting the DoD’s ability to examine all locations equally, and attempting to prevent DoD from using BRAC as a transformation tool have also failed. Even without restrictive language, the legislative history works against the closure of any defense infrastructure, making it difficult, if not impossible, without BRAC authorization.

Lacking BRAC authorization, the DoD has sought other ways to reduce their infrastructure costs. For example, as the Army reduces from 490,000 active duty Soldiers to 450,000 over the next two years and rearranges units, it has moth-balled buildings which it no longer needs. While this provides for some minor cost avoidance in maintenance and utilities, it does not produce the long term labor and infrastructure savings that would likely result from closing an entire base. Current laws allow the DoD to selectively close bases as long as it provides notification to Congress. But notification allows sufficient time for Congress to develop and deploy a counter-argument. Competing priorities, service parochialism, and politics provide impediments to all but the smallest of closures.

The BRAC authorization should include essential elements that would make it an effective process that promotes fairness and avoids many of these impediments. Considerations of lessons from past BRAC rounds drove inclusion of: a comprehensive analysis of all installations, not just those services desire to close; a logical process that includes community input and independent commission review; an independent commission with the power to alter, add, or reject recommendations; insulation from politics by not allowing line item vetoes by Congress or the President; and, a legal
obligation to implement the commission-approved initiatives. In their supporting 2015 budget testimonies, each of the service secretaries and chiefs reiterated the fairness and effectiveness that a future BRAC authorization would provide.

Prior to the first BRAC, political influence dictated defense infrastructure actions. From 1977 until 1988, section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, limited DoD’s ability to close installations through an array of restrictive requirements. Although the Secretary of Defense had unlimited authority to close installations, the closure actions undertaken prior to 1977 were politically skewed against the non-presidential party at the time. Since 1990, Congress has provided a relatively consistent set of statutory guidelines for conducting BRAC. By mitigating political parochialism, the statutory BRAC process has emerged as an objective method for reducing excess domestic defense infrastructure. With BRAC authorization, Congress provides a more objective, transparent process for decision-making.

How BRAC Works

BRAC legislation, as published in the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, requires the Secretary of Defense to establish a data baseline by developing a 20-year force structure plan, develop a threat assessment, and conduct an inventory of all infrastructure. The Secretary of Defense must then provide recommendations to an independent commission based on evaluation criteria which heavily weights military value as the primary consideration.

The independent commission next reviews the recommended actions for consistency with the force structure plans and selected criteria. The commission conducts public hearings, receives testimony, visits site, and analyzes data to weigh the merits of the DoD recommendations. The commission can reject, change, or add new
recommendations, but to do so it must find that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force structure plan or selection criteria. Once it reaches a decision, the commission forwards its recommendations to the President.

The President can either approve or disapprove the commission’s findings and cannot independently select portions as the best or most affordable. If disapproved, the commission has an opportunity to revise and resubmit the report. If the President does not approve the revised report, then the BRAC process ends without taking any infrastructure actions. Otherwise, the President forwards either the approved original or revised report to Congress for final action.

Presidentially approved recommendations become binding at the end of the congressional review period if Congress takes no action. While Congress is bound by the same all-or-nothing requirement as the President, members must reach a joint resolution \textit{disapproving} the recommendations in order to prevent implementation of any recommendations. If the recommendations make it through the entire process they become binding with a legally obligated completion suspense date.

The over-arching organizational structure and relationships between the Department of Defense, the commission, the President, and Congress have been consistent throughout the various BRAC rounds. But the Department of Defense has organized itself differently within each to conduct the basic analysis and develop recommendations for infrastructure changes. While there is little to no documentation for the formative stages for internal organizing efforts, a brief examination of the strategic guidance, group charters, and resulting organizational structures provide insights into the processes used to design those organizations.
Previous BRAC environments included a wide range of internal and external stakeholders. Within the Department of Defense each of the military departments must meet their Title 10 requirements to man, train, and equip the force consisting of nearly 3 million active, reserve, National Guard, and civilian employees. Members of Congress, another set of stakeholders, represent their constituents, yet more stakeholders, many of whom live in communities which benefit from local military infrastructure. Each of these stakeholders can have multiple, competing objectives which drive their views and desired outcomes of any future BRAC, and each has opportunities at various points within the BRAC process to offer their perspectives.

BRAC 1988

As the first of all BRAC rounds, 1988 was a formative process for the DoD, but the commission report provides very little insight into the DoD organization. Given the comments from a commissioner, the Honorable Thomas F. Eagleton, it appears that the services were initially uncooperative with the first BRAC process. “The cooperation with the Commission’s efforts varied significantly from service to service. The Air Force ultimately gave its cooperation. The Army begrudgingly gave its reluctant cooperation. The Navy stonewalled and got away with it.”

But the commission’s internal organization, consisting of six functional task forces, bears resemblance to a jointly aligned thought process. The ground, air, sea, training and administration, depot, and “all other” task forces demonstrated an elegantly simple organizational structure to achieve BRAC objectives.

BRAC 1991

After BRAC 1988, the services and defense agencies sought to better manage BRAC recommendations by being active participants rather than to leave it to the
commission to analyze and act alone. The next BRAC iteration saw a transition from commission-run functional task forces to a DoD-run analysis focusing on the services and defense agencies. While the DoD policy memoranda provide guidance to the secretaries of the military departments and the defense agencies, the DoD report from BRAC 1991 provides recommendations from only the three service secretaries. The process guidance memoranda also describe the role of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistic as the single point of contact for BRAC within the DoD.\(^{27}\) Additionally, the DoD established a BRAC Steering Committee to review recommendations prior to forwarding to the Assistant Secretary (see Figure 1).\(^{28}\)

![Figure 1. BRAC 1991 Organizational Structure\(^{28}\)](image)

**BRAC 1993**

The BRAC 1993 saw the first documented creation of joint and cross-service working groups. First, the services were instructed to work with the Health Affairs Base Closure Joint Service Working Group to share and integrate potential health infrastructure recommendations (see Figure 2).\(^{30}\) Second, each of the services was
assigned a depot maintenance mission to chair while cooperating with the other services to integrate proposals with cross-service input.\textsuperscript{31} However, the final DoD BRAC report indicated that there was insufficient time to review all of the inter-service possibilities.\textsuperscript{32} Recognizing the value of jointly evaluating common functions, the 1993 BRAC Commission recommended that the next BRAC develop procedures for considering joint and common functions between the services.\textsuperscript{33}

![Figure 2. BRAC 1993 Organizational Structure\textsuperscript{34}]

**BRAC 1995**

Although the Secretary of Defense reported that evaluation criteria for the 1995 BRAC would be the same as 1991 and 1993, the DoD integrated a much broader organizational structure for the 1995 BRAC by including five joint and cross-service working groups in addition to the services and defense agencies.\textsuperscript{35} While similar to the BRAC 1993 Health Affairs Working Group and service-led depot maintenance groups,
the BRAC 1995 working groups did not report or coordinate through the services, but instead reported directly to the Secretary of Defense’s senior representative for BRAC.

The Secretary of Defense tasked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security to oversee the BRAC process. Several supporting groups emerged in the BRAC 1995 governance structure (see Figure 3): the BRAC Review Group which provided oversight and policy for the entire process, the BRAC Steering Group which assisted the review group in exercising its authority, and the Economic Impact Group which evaluated how recommendations might affect local communities.36

Figure 3. BRAC 1995 Organizational Structure37

BRAC 2005

The BRAC 2005 ushered in a revolution for both the purpose of base realignments and the BRAC organizational structure. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that BRAC should support the DoD’s transformation efforts. Although
the organizational structure had been present, Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that previous BRAC rounds had not conducted joint examinations of common functions. In his April 2003 guidance, Secretary Rumsfeld defined transformation as:

...a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.  

This echoed Secretary Rumsfeld’s earlier November 2002 guidance for BRAC 2005 in which he directed the military departments to seek opportunities for greater joint activity.

Secretary Rumsfeld designated an Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the policy making and oversight body for the entire BRAC 2005 process (see Figure 4). Subordinate to the IEC, the Infrastructure Steering Group was tasked with overseeing the joint and cross-service working groups. While not in a supervisory position over the military departments, the Infrastructure Steering Group maintained explicit authority to issue policies and direction within the department.

Secretary Rumsfeld also vested the Infrastructure Steering Group with two advantages which promoted both a protective barrier against service parochialism and a system for considering innovative options. First, he gave the joint and cross-service working groups first choice of functions to analyze and only gave the services their unique functions. Second, he directed the Infrastructure Steering Group to develop a broad series of options for all groups to consider, and only the IEC, not the analytical groups, could modify or reject recommendations. These directives fostered a
transformational mindset and framed the analysis for the Department of Defense differently from previous BRAC rounds.

There is extensive documentation critical of the final BRAC 2005 recommendations and resulting implementation. The savings resulting from infrastructure closures while significant, were quickly offset by the substantial costs of transformation. BRAC 2005 is the key factor for congressional reluctance, which is well founded since BRAC processes have tended to evolve over time, and inclusion of transformation-focused guidance is likely in future BRAC rounds.

![BRAC 2005 Organizational Structure](image)

**Figure 4. BRAC 2005 Organizational Structure**

European Infrastructure Consolidation

The European Infrastructure Consolidation (EIC), conducted 2013 through 2014, focused solely on defense infrastructure in Europe. The EIC was not a legislative action and therefore gave DoD latitude to develop structures and processes but did not have protections from political agendas. Although similar to previous BRAC rounds, many of
the elements and requirements were sufficiently different during EIC to preclude any
direct comparisons between their results. However, its recent occurrence supports
examining the EIC organizational structure and analytical groups for insights.

The EIC governance structure in Figure 5 appears almost identical to BRAC
2005, but there are subtle differences beyond the obvious reduction in the number of
joint cross-service working groups. Most significantly is the addition of a Senior Steering
Group which receives recommendations from not only the joint working groups, but also
from the three service-specific working groups. By placing the Senior Steering Group in
hierarchy above the services, there is an additional layer of review and coordination
prior to proceeding to the executive council level. Although there was no formal
equivalent to the Infrastructure Executive Council, the existing defense processes and
meetings provided similar interactions at the Deputy Secretary level prior to Secretary of
Defense review.

Also noteworthy was the formation of the joint groups within the EIC process. A
replication of the BRAC 2005 structure would have required seven joint cross-service
groups—three more than actually used. Conducted during a time of reducing budgets
and under the looming cloud of sequestration, the Department of Defense severely
limited the ability of services and joint groups to hire contractors to conduct analysis.
While there may have been a desire to expand the team and have more individual
groups, the manpower did not exist to support additional structure.43
When observed in sequence, there is an evolution of the DoD’s organizational approach to BRAC. The two major themes are: 1) more working groups to deal with joint and cross-service issues; and 2) oversight groups to consolidate and de-conflict service and working group recommendations.

Understanding the environments, both current and desired, is important to operational design because it illuminates how the two differ. Multiple stakeholders, historical examples, congressional testimonies, and the BRAC process weave a complex environment. For this paper, the assessment of current and future environments specifically related to the organizational structure are sufficient to move forward with operational design.

The current environment can be described as:

An organization which is aware of potential infrastructure surpluses, but lacks the authorization and structural capacity to provide acceptable recommendations.

The desired future environment can be described as:
An organizational structure with the authorization and capacity to: compile, analyze, and synthesize infrastructure data; determine the infrastructure required for the future force; recognize the disparities between the two; and, develop recommendations which reduce or eliminate any unnecessary surplus infrastructure. 45

These descriptions of the current and desired environments are the key inputs to defining the problem.

Define the Problem

Future organizational structure, while certainly influenced by BRAC history, must consider the categories of issues which the DoD intends to address during the next BRAC round. The BRAC problem can be viewed as a collection of issues which require unique defense infrastructure within the United States. A complete examination of every potential problem that the next BRAC will likely address prior to forming the BRAC analytical structure is not practical. Doing so would be tantamount to conducting a BRAC, would require a significantly robust organizational structure in-and-of itself, and would be well beyond the scope of this paper.

Given the evolutionary nature of previous rounds, it is reasonable to assume that the DoD will not redefine the higher level BRAC relationships between the DoD, independent commission, Congress, and the President. While it is tempting to further anchor on the most recent BRAC organizational structure and make minor adjustments, doing so artificially limits the range of structures available to the DoD. A wider initial aperture allows a better understanding of the complexities and can shape the directives that will form the organization and its analytical mandates. Plotting which group has analytical control against the desired analytical focus provides a useful method to understand some of the key structural considerations. Defining the potential solution space as a 2x2 matrix is a simple technique to understand complexity of the problem.
Joint Control

Beginning with the simpler of the two axes, the Control axis is not about achieving joint or service related results, but about which type of organization conducts and has control over the analysis. At one extreme in Figure 6, only joint working groups exist for BRAC analysis purposes. The level of control can apply to the hierarchical structure as well. In the extreme case, a fully joint controlled hierarchy would consist of joint working groups which develop recommendations and forward those to a Joint Integration Board. The Board has decision authority over all recommendations presented by the joint working groups and de-conflicts any competing issues. Military Departments and Defense Agencies assume leadership roles within the joint working groups, but there are no service or agency specific groups. To reiterate, joint control is not meant to pursue “jointness” – that aspect would be addressed in the objective axis.

![Diagram of Joint Control Hierarchy](image)

Figure 6. Example Joint Control Hierarchy

Service Control

At the opposite end of the axis, such as Figure 7, only service working groups exist. The service secretaries and agency directors maintain their direct line to the
Secretary of Defense while an integrating body helps to resolve any conflicting recommendations and ensure the process is meeting the statutory requirements and higher guidance. Services are encouraged to coordinate their actions and seek efficiencies with each other.

![Figure 7. Example Service Control Hierarchy](image)

Between these two extremes lay an array of joint and service working groups. Even though it is control oriented, we can assume that there will likely be some inherent preference when operating at the extremes of the Control axis. Joint groups will likely gravitate towards joint solutions and service groups will likely explore service specific solutions. An effective organizational structure should include both joint and service groups to provide a wide range of potential options. Guidance documents will need to address the desired analytical focus no matter which group type has control.

Control is a relatively simple issue to resolve when compared with determining what will be the focus of the analytical effort. At one extreme of the Objective axis lies the single objective model with a well-defined, easily calculated numerical objective function based on purely objective data. The other extreme is an increasingly
complicated combination of potential multiple objective functions consisting of objective and subjective inputs.

Single Objective Focus

Seemingly the most rational of approaches, it is possible to establish a variable function that optimizes infrastructure for a single objective. The DoD could decide to either minimize excess infrastructure, maximize long-term savings, or maximize return on investment, but would likely not be able to achieve all simultaneously. Unlike the Control extremes, this axis does not have a specific end point, but many potential single objective definitions. All single objective optimization options would disregard all other evaluation criteria in favor of a single output variable, an act that would unacceptably ignore requirements of future BRAC legislation. Given the multiple competing objectives that exist among these options, no single focus could, or should, best describe the problem statement.

Multiple Objective Focus

Much like the single objective extreme, the multiple objective extreme has no specific endpoint. The absolute extreme would be a model that considers everything. More realistically, previous BRAC criteria models provide potential objective functions, such as maximizing military value. More complicated optimization models, such as minimizing the maximum regret across local communities, are possible as well. While they appear to be single objective models, they are actually multiple objective models highly susceptible to manipulation given the underlying diluted value models and inherently subjective nature of the applied weighting systems.49
Figure 8 illustrates the proposed 2x2 matrix; it is only relative—not absolute—and does not reflect any particular scale. Depicted are previous BRAC iterations categorized using this system. A notable outlier, 1988 is shown in the upper left quadrant because of the first commission’s level of control, the reluctance of services to participate in the BRAC process, and the simple guidance executed by the independent commission. 1991 moves significantly towards service control, with very little shift towards multiple objectives. 1993, 1995, and 2005 progress in an ever increasing joint control paired with growing portfolios of objectives. While based on the principles set forth in BRAC 2005, the EIC reverted to more service-centric control and considered a smaller set of objectives.

Also shown are regions which, given the current environment, would likely not be acceptable or feasible for a BRAC organizational structure. Only organizational structures which are feasible, acceptable, and suitable can be considered valid. The JP 5-0 defines an option as feasible if it can accomplish the mission using available resources within the time available. An acceptable option is worth the cost, consistent
with the law, and is militarily and politically supportable. A suitable option is capable of achieving the objectives. Any proposed single objective model would likely not be acceptable because it would require the analytical groups to ignore elements of analysis which hold great importance to one or more stakeholders. Services, as demonstrated in 1988, would likely not accept a purely joint control structure, while legal considerations make a purely service controlled structure unacceptable as well.

The area on the multiple objective end of the focus access is considered “Not Feasible” due to the resources necessary to undertake such and effort. It is not physically possible, nor desirable, to consider every available aspect of analysis and construct a decision model which reflects that complexity in an understandable manner.

Not depicted on the diagram are any areas labeled as “Not Suitable.” Depending on the desired end states, some regions will be more suitable than others for achieving the desired end states. If following the trend of BRAC, the future guidance will likely indicate the most suitable organizational structure will reside in the upper right quadrant with a joint control, multiple objective focus. If Congress is successful in passing legislation that limits the BRAC scope, it could shift the suitable region more towards a single objective focus.

While this matrix assists with understanding the relationship between who controls the analysis and increasing complexity of BRAC rounds over time, these are not the only axes for consideration. Efficiency versus effectiveness is a possible axis, but defining each of these in such a way to make them opposite ends of the spectrum and orthogonal to the control or objective axes would require more extensive
explanation. Ultimately, any comparative matrix must be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of legislative mandates and departmental guidance.

Assuming that Congress authorizes a BRAC, the following problem statement can assist with developing operational approaches.

The Department of Defense has excess infrastructure that continues to draw limited resources away from higher priorities. The Department of Defense must organize in a way to meet the statutory requirements, provide the proper oversight, and conduct the appropriate analysis to best meet the Department’s future infrastructure needs.

**Developing Operational Approaches**

Determining the proper organizational alignment is critical to ensuring a successful BRAC effort. Developing the operational approach is not separate from either understanding the environment or defining the problem. In fact, both of these previous frames have already provided operational approaches, such as the historical BRAC structures from the environmental analysis and the organizational control examples from defining the problem. None of the structures provided below are the “best” approach. Each of these provides insights to potential structures based on the limited environmental analysis and problem definition previously offered.

Given the BRAC history, analytical control will most likely be neither fully joint nor fully service focused, but a mixture of the two. Services will continue to cite their Title 10 responsibility to man, train, and equip the force. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, as the arbiter of BRAC funding, will cite its responsibility to maintain civilian oversight of the process and integration of the analysis. New environmental elements will provide impetus to add analytical groups that were not present during previous BRAC rounds, such as cyber and homeland defense. While the hierarchical structure may look similar
to the BRAC 2005, the analytical guidance will provide distinct differences in final composition.

Previous BRAC efforts have focused on multiple objective analysis. Without a congressional mandate, any attempts to conduct single objective analysis, such as minimizing break-even time or minimizing excess infrastructure, will remain unacceptable due to the multitude of stakeholders and competing objectives. A multiple objective focus is necessary and must include a balanced approach to include only those elements necessary to inform decision-makers. Previous organizational structures have included some form of joint working groups. Despite lack of documentation, each of the previous BRAC structures appears well thought-out and able to provide timely recommendations. Even 1993 which had difficulty providing timely recommendations to the joint integration groups would likely prove acceptable as the basis for a future BRAC organization. Alternately, organizing the joint working groups around established structures can help flatten out the learning curves associated with building new organizations and time elapsed since the last BRAC. Building on the two basic structures presented earlier, the following approaches provide some alternative hierarchical structures. Potential approaches include:

1. Organizing by domains: air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace;
2. Organizing by joint functions: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment; or,
3. Organizing by defense infrastructure sectors: defense industrial base, financial services, global information grid, health affairs, intelligence, logistics, personnel, public works, space, and transportation.\(^{54}\)
The six basic options for combining the two aspects of control with the three structural frameworks can be further complicated by myriad ways to actually organize the hierarchy. For example, placing the services in a parallel structure inside of a joint control hierarchy, or requiring services to subordinate under the joint working groups are two realistic permutations. Three comparative options which highlight the differences between joint and service control are provided below.

![Figure 9. Joint Control by Domain Example](image)

Based on the domains, this joint control structure in Figure 9 demonstrates the simplicity of the 1988 BRAC commission groups combined with the flexibility to integrate the services and defense agencies within multiple working groups. The services would take key leadership roles in the domain working groups, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, would provide oversight of the process and resolve any conflicting recommendations.
Leveraging the vast analytical structures already present within each of the services, this hierarchy in Figure 10 places the services in charge of their own analysis based on the joint functions. While present, the BRAC Integration Group coordinates within the service working groups across the joint functions but does not have full ability to change service recommendations.

Figure 10. Service Control by Joint Function Example

Figure 11. Joint Control by Defense Infrastructure Sectors Example
While it might seem that the defense infrastructure sectors would provide the most logical framework for an infrastructure analysis, the omission of training and maneuver space, which is added in Figure 11, would likely prove inadequate from a service perspective given their Title 10 mandate to train the force. Otherwise, the clearly delineated roles for each of these sectors within the Department of Defense would allow a more rapid transition to a BRAC analysis if compared to placing the services in charge of each group. The services already have connections into, and would play key roles within, each of these sectors.

Recommendations

As seen in the defense infrastructure sector example, no single approach will likely satisfy all stakeholders. A hybrid combination of these and other potential structures is possible. Given its basic structure which ties to the original intent for BRAC, the joint control by domain example provides a simple, viable option upon which the final organizational structure can grow. The structure can accommodate service equities along with emerging concepts, such as cyberspace operations, without allowing the services to dominate the analytical effort, as would likely happen in the service controlled by joint function example. Unlike the infrastructure sector example, organizing by domain will require a new structure, thereby reducing any prejudicial actions which might accompany an existing hierarchy. A domain aligned organization represents the fundamentals of BRAC and closely reflects the original BRAC commission structure.

This domain based structure is not without some risks. Key to effective analysis will be alignment of the analytical guidance - the structure must reflect the legislative requirements and departmental guidance else the organization will struggle to meet objectives it is ill-designed to accomplish. Services must assume active leadership roles
in the domain groups to avoid the uncooperative issues associated with the 1988 BRAC commission. Disagreement with the overall structure and roles could delay early analytical efforts and would negatively impact an already tight timeline. Finally, the structure must consider including areas which do not neatly fit into the domains, such as medical and laboratories, to ensure the final analysis provides valid results.

Conclusion

BRAC will not fail without operational design, but it could face significant challenges without a thoughtful process which considers options outside of BRAC history. The DoD could waste precious time organizing and adjusting – time better spent conducting analysis. Missing the legislative deadline is not an option, and the DoD should allow the maximum time to avoid issues similar to 1993 when it ran out of time to consolidate recommendations. When Congress eventually approves the next round of base realignments and closures, the Department of Defense will need clear vision of how it will control the analysis and how it will focus its analytical efforts. While previous BRAC rounds provide insights to potential future BRAC organizational structure, simply shifting from the last known point may not achieve DoD’s desired results. The limited time frame for analysis makes mid-course organizational corrections difficult, so getting the organizational structure correct from the beginning is essential to success. Multiple stakeholders encourage any potential organizational structure to consider a wide range of competing objectives, and the future environment, both internal and external, will likely be more complex than the last. The operational design process can assist the DoD in capturing and understanding the complexities of the next BRAC environments and provide insights into potential operational approaches to the organizational structure.
Endnotes


17 Serbu, “With or Without BRAC, DoD’s Footprint is Shrinking.”


Conger, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, 14.

For example, the Army has maintained a consistent message throughout years of congressional testimonies, best summarized by Under Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment Katherine G. Hammack who recently stated BRAC is “...the best and proven method to address excess infrastructure, in a cost-effective, transparent, and equitable manner”. Hammack, Statement before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate.

Robyn, Statement Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies, 4.

Ibid.

Ibid., 5.

This section is a summary of pages 10 through 13 of Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, “Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC),” briefing slides.


34 Constructed from U.S. Department of Defense, Base Closure and Realignment Report (1993) There is no specific diagram of the organizational structure in the report.


36 Ibid., 5-2.


40 BRAC 2005 was tied to the Global Defense Posture Realignment which greatly reduced the overseas posture in Europe and moved a substantial number of units to the continental United States.

The information in this section comes from the author’s personal experience as the European Infrastructure Consolidation lead action officer for United States European Command.

During the early organizational efforts, discussions included the possibility of a fifth joint working group focused on operations. As the proposed lead, United States European Command would have defined the requirements for conducting current and future operations at defense infrastructure sites in Europe. As the other joint working groups refined their analytical boundaries, there remained sparse room for the operations joint working group to conduct non-repetitive analysis. The Senior Steering Group approved an organizational structure which did not require an operations working group, freeing USEUCOM manpower to participate in the other working groups and define the steady state and surge requirements used by all other groups.

Constructed from author’s memory.

The desired environment statement does not include specific aspects of the organization to allow latitude in developing approaches to bridging the gap between the current and future environment. Congressional authorization is included in the desired future environment because it is essential that legislative authority exists before DoD begins any BRAC activities.

It is important to maintain this distinction. If this axis is misinterpreted as a measure of a final recommendation’s “jointness,” then it would not be orthogonal to the Focus axis because “jointness” is often correlated with, and sometimes defined as, efficiency.

Author’s construction.

Author’s construction.

As an example of a diluted value model, the Army’s Military Value model during the 2005 BRAC included 40 attributes, many of which were further decomposed into multi-dimensional measures. The more attributes and measures, the less weight each one carries; less weight equates to less impact and importance to the overall model. See Matthew Lee et al., 2005 BRAC Attribute Analysis (West Point, NY: Department of Systems Engineering, United States Military Academy and Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Infrastructure Analysis, April 5, 2006).

Author’s construction.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, GL-10.

Ibid., GL-4.


55 Author’s construction.

56 Author’s construction.

57 Author’s construction.