Strategic Evolution of the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Abstract

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Defending the United States Homeland, allies, and interests against attacks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a vital national interest. As America wrestles with the best way to deter or respond to a WMD attack, the National policy and National strategy to counter WMD has undergone a subtle but significant evolution since the terrorist attacks in America on 9/11. Defending the U.S. from WMD attack evolution can be categorized into two frameworks: Combating WMD (2002-2009) and Countering WMD (2010-Present). These frameworks for national strategy and policy can be traced all of the way through multiple levels of national documents to Army doctrine. The change to countering WMD policy and strategic guidance is generally consistent from National and Department of Defense (DoD) documents. The Joint doctrine and service doctrine is also generally consistent with the National and DoD guidance. Army strategic guidance and doctrine does not reflect some of the changes from the combating to countering WMD framework and should be updated to avoid confusion in the Joint Force and Army leadership.

Background

Weapons of Mass Destruction have been employed for several centuries; the fourteenth century saw the use of plague in warfare in Europe, chemical weapons were used in World War I, and nuclear weapons were employed in World War II. There have been several approaches to employment and defending against weapons of mass destruction, and there have been several different definitions of weapons of mass destruction over the past several decades. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 brought a significant focus to preventing the use of WMD, or failing that, responding to the use of
WMD due to the concern of terrorists gaining access to these devastating weapons and using them on American interests.

President George W. Bush released the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2002, amid escalating tensions with Iraq and North Korea over those countries suspected WMD programs. He declared in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the grand strategy of the United States in 2002, “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.”! This marked a period of time, from 2002 to 2009, that can be thought of as the combating WMD framework period and represented the approach to deterring or responding to WMD attack taken by the Bush Administration.

President Barack Obama gave a speech shortly after taking his oath of office in Prague, Czech Republic. This speech included a discussion of his goal of achieving “global zero”, a world without nuclear weapons. He also spoke about the threat that weapons of mass destruction present to security and safety. The tone set by the Obama administration was significantly softer on the United States use of WMD, but continued the themes of the Bush administration about the dangers that WMD pose to the United States and her allies.² This marked a period of time, from 2010 to present, that can be thought of as the countering WMD framework period and represented the approach to deterring or responding to WMD attack taken by the Obama Administration.

Combating WMD: 2002-2009

There are three strategic level documents that define and describe the framework for combating WMD: The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction published by President George W. Bush, The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 2006 QDR published by the Secretary of Defense. These three documents are generally consistent with each other and reflect a nation that was coming to terms with the spread of WMD and their potential use by terrorist organizations. The framework contains three pillars in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and eight mission areas described in the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. These documents derive significant direction from the NSS published in September 2002 as mentioned in the background above.

**The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction**

President George W. Bush published the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in December of 2002. This national strategy asserts that the gravest danger facing the United States are hostile states seeking or possessing weapons of mass destruction, and that countering weapons of mass destruction is an “integral component of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America.”

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destructions was meant to be a change from the way that the United States had been approaching combating WMD; it included “the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries.”

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction lays out a proactive strategy with three “pillars” of non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and consequence management. This strategy also reserves the right to retaliate to a WMD
attack on the United States with nuclear weapons. The United States will seek the ability to “detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are used.”

The National Strategy to Combat WMD is one of the first documents published as official United States policy that openly discusses pre-emptive actions or the use of nuclear weapons as a response to chemical or biological attack.

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

In February 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD). The NMS-CWMD was a follow on document of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction that was specifically for providing strategic level guidance to the Department of Defense.

The NMS-CWMD defined a strategic end state of “ensuring that the United States, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked by enemies using WMD”. The “ways” of the strategy were outlined as military strategic objectives of defeat and deter WMD use and subsequent use; protect, respond and recover from WMD use; defend, dissuade, or deny WMD proliferation; and reduce, destroy, or reverse WMD possession. These ways are “achieved through eight missions conducted across the combating WMD continuum.” The intent of the framework developed in the strategy is to “provide a construct on which to base deliberate planning, coordination, activities, operations, and capabilities development.”

The Chairman states that the Department of Defense will develop “further capacities to eliminate WMD threats in a non-permissive environment.”
The NMS-CWMD states that the “Military Departments are primarily responsible for organizing, training, and equipping” for accomplishing the military strategic objectives, a direct task to the Institutional Army and Army Service Components of the Combatant Commands.\textsuperscript{11}

The definition of Combating WMD is “the integrated and dynamic activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of counter proliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management efforts to counter WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials.”\textsuperscript{12}

One key measure of effectiveness for the strategic end state was that “allies, partners and U.S. civilian agencies are capable partners in combating WMD.”\textsuperscript{13} This is a different approach than what is presented in the Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction which will be covered in the Countering WMD portion of this paper.

\textbf{2006 QDR}

The 2006 QDR was written in an environment shaped significantly by the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks on the homeland, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the end of the Libya nuclear weapons program and other terrorist attacks. Lessons learned from these events shaped a strategy that focused the DoD on combating weapons of mass destruction.

The term “Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction” appears in the 2006 QDR. The vision in the 2006 QDR to combat weapons of mass destruction is for “the future force… [to be] organized, trained, equipped, and resourced to deal with all aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.”\textsuperscript{14} The capabilities to combat weapons of mass destruction include the traditional targeting process of find, fix, and
destroy the weapons of mass destruction as well as elimination of WMD “before, during, or after a conflict.”\textsuperscript{15} This focus on the potential consequences of a WMD attack on United States interests lead to DoD requirements within the 2006 QDR primarily focused on warfighting. While partners and whole of government response are discussed within the 2006 QDR, they are not treated with the same level of emphasis that is seen in the 2010 and 2014 QDRs.

Based on the requirements, the 2006 QDR includes the following objective relating to WMD: “The principal objective of the United States is to prevent hostile states or non-state actors from acquiring WMD.”\textsuperscript{16} This principal objective can be interpreted as the ends of the strategy within the QDR. This end nests within the 2002 National Security Strategy.

There were several actions directed by the Secretary of Defense in the 2006 QDR to meet the “ends” of preventing hostile state or non-state actors from acquiring WMD. These are the “ways” and “means” of the 2006 QDR relating to WMD and they include changes to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency responsibilities, 20\textsuperscript{th} CBRNE Command requirements, U.S. forces with advanced technical render-safe skills, capabilities to locate, track, and tag WMD shipments, and finally to funding adjustments within the Chemical and Biological Defense Program.\textsuperscript{17}

The specific direction to the 20\textsuperscript{th} CBRNE Command within the 2006 QDR was “Expand the Army’s 20th Support Command (CBRNE)\textsuperscript{18} capabilities to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid deployment to command and control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions by 2007.”\textsuperscript{19} Since specific units are not
typically named specifically within the QDR, the mention of the 20th CBRNE Command is significant direction directly from the Secretary of Defense to the Army.

The 2006 QDR positioned the Department of Defense to continue a strategy of performing the heavy lifting of defending U.S. interests against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as deterrence, and if deterrence fails, defending against the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Countering WMD: 2010-Present

With a new administration, the framework to defend against WMD evolved from a combating focus to a countering focus. This is a subtle difference, one that has proved to be a challenging change in the community. There are several national and DoD strategic level guiding documents on countering WMD including: the 2010 and 2014 QDR, the Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, and The United States National Security Strategy. These strategic level documents provided direction and a framework that led to the revision of joint doctrine from Joint Publication 3-40 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction to the new Joint Publication 3-40 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Army has also published strategic level guidance on countering WMD including the Army Operating Concept (AOC); the guidance within the AOC has some areas of discontinuity with DoD guidance and doctrine that should be addressed by Army leadership in order to avoid confusion in the Army and Joint Force. Army doctrine also has some of the previously used terminology that should be reviewed for updating to make it consistent with Joint Doctrine and DoD strategy.
The 2010 QDR also recognizes the potentially devastating effects of WMD on United States interests. As in the 2006 QDR, the primary focus of the 2010 QDR is on preventing proliferation of WMD and dealing with the aspects of weapons of mass destruction. The 2010 QDR acknowledges that the ability to create and employ weapons of mass destruction has spread globally, but the ways and means of this strategy include acknowledgement of a whole of government effort and international partnerships.

The 2010 QDR describes the term countering weapons of mass destruction. The posture for the Department of Defense relating to weapons of mass destruction is different in this strategic level document from the previous combating WMD posture. The countering posture recognized the whole of government approach required to address the challenges of weapons of mass destruction. Countering weapons of mass destruction acknowledges the military element of national power as well as the diplomatic, informational, and economic roles relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This strategy requires international and interagency capabilities in addition to the Department of Defense to track, detect, and interdict weapons of mass destruction and this countering posture focuses on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction technology, knowledge and items.20

Specific capability requirements outlined in the 2010 QDR include the ability to “detect, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons.” The QDR also lists deterrence as a key way of countering weapons of mass destruction; deterrence achieve via “…understanding potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials…monitor[ing] and track[ing] lethal agents…and defeating the agents…”21
As in the 2006 QDR, the Secretary of Defense also directed several actions in the 2010 QDR relating to capability and capacity to countering weapons of mass destruction. He directed the establishment of a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters that would be responsible for the planning, training and execution of weapons of mass destruction elimination operations.22 This Joint Task Force capability does not relieve the 20th CBRNE Command from the role tasked in the 2006 QDR. Other direction included “Research countermeasures and defense to nontraditional agents; Enhance nuclear forensics; secure vulnerable nuclear materials; Expand the biological threat reduction program; and Develop new verification technologies.”23 The development of new verification technologies is an example of the interagency cooperation required to execute a countering weapons of mass destruction strategy, as the State Department is a key partner in treaty verification.

2014 QDR

The 2014 QDR continues to use the countering weapons of mass destruction definition used in the 2010 QDR. Much of the strategic direction of the countering weapons of mass destruction focuses on the nexus of terrorism and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.24 It additionally prioritizes countering weapons of mass destruction as part of force distribution in the Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibility and directs the DoD to “remain focused on countering the proliferation and use of WMD” due to the impact that WMD has on undermining global security.”25

The 2010 QDR recognizes the role of the other elements of national power required to counter weapons of mass destruction. The 2014 QDR includes direction to build capacity in the United States Partner nations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This capacity development is intended to reduce the
likelihood that the threat of weapons of mass destruction being used on the homeland.\textsuperscript{26}

The strategic direction states, “Global prevention, detection, and response efforts are essential to address dangers across the WMD spectrum before they confront the homeland.”\textsuperscript{27}

The Secretary of Defense has directed counter terror and special operations capability and capacity in the 2014 QDR, stating, “We will grow overall Special Operations Forces end strength to 69,700 personnel, protecting our ability to…counter WMD, build the capacity of our partners, and support conventional operations”\textsuperscript{28}

The potential environments and threats that the United States may encounter in the future include the potential of WMD. Specifically, “future conflicts could range from hybrid contingencies against proxy groups using asymmetric approaches, to a high-end conflict against a state power armed with WMD or technologically advanced anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.”\textsuperscript{29} Additional threats covered in the QDR include “new ways of developing WMD – such as biotechnology breakthroughs – could make dangerous agents more widely available, potentially presenting fast-moving threats that are very difficult to detect and even more difficult to counter.”\textsuperscript{30}

The 2014 QDR specifically recognizes the danger posed by the North Korean WMD program. The nuclear weapon program in particular is identified as a “direct threat to the United States.”\textsuperscript{31} The commitment of the United States is “maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula”\textsuperscript{32}

The primary difference between the 2010 and 2014 QDR is the focus on Special Operations Forces in the countering WMD role and the partner capacity development
for countering WMD. This focus will have significant impacts to the Army relating to organizational capacity and capability as well as strategic guidance.

**Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction**

In June 2014, the Secretary of Defense signed the Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (DoDS-CWMD). The goal of the strategy is to “ensure the United States and its allies and partners are not attacked or coerced by adversaries possessing WMD.” The strategy acknowledges that the threats that the United States faces are from state and non-state actors that are seeking “to develop, proliferate, acquire, or use weapons of mass destruction.”

The Secretary of Defense provided a prioritization of effort “…focused on preventing acquisition and countering the most likely threats”. This prioritization is a tacit acknowledgement of resource constraints. The strategy emphasizes three actions due to those resource constraints: “early action through pathway defeat, shaping the environment to dissuade actors from pursuing WMD, and cooperating with partners to achieve countering WMD goals”.

The Department of Defense will prioritize “capabilities that counter operationally significant risks and activities that are best executed by the Department”; the other capabilities will be leveraged through U.S. Government partners or international partners. Some example of the leveraged capabilities are contained within the direction for defense strategy and planning, specifically, “DoD will support other agencies and departments, rather than lead responses, to address CBRN hazards that do not typically pose an operationally significant threat, such as nuclear power plant incidents, chemical spills, and disease epidemics.” This prioritization is important from an Army Service perspective relating to its train, man, and equipping responsibilities.
The DoDS-CWMD defines three ends; “ensure that no new actors obtain WMD, those possessing WMD do not use them, and—if WMD are used—their effects are minimized.”\textsuperscript{39} It also has three CWMD lines of effort: preventing acquisition, containing and reducing threats, and responding to crises.\textsuperscript{40} The role of the institutional Army (train, man, and equip) is contained in the strategic enabler for the three lines of effort, “Prepare”. Prepare, according to the DoDS-CWMD, is “the continuous cycle of ensuring that the Department’s capabilities support the CWMD lines of effort.”\textsuperscript{41} The Department (and by law) the Army will “equip and train forces and develop capabilities that can be employed flexibly to shape the environment and respond to WMD threats and use.”\textsuperscript{42}

The DoDS-CWMD defines countering weapons of mass destruction as “efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.”\textsuperscript{43}

The other important thing that publication of the DoDS-CWMD included was direction to rescind the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. This recension was reflected in the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Joint Publication 3-40, which no longer contains the former eight military mission areas and is now framed around the three ends of the DoDS-CWMD.

The United States National Security Strategy

The United States National Security Strategy published in 2015 implements the strategic direction in the President’s speech in Prague. The National Security Strategy includes a focus on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing materials due to the grave risk that these weapons and materials represent. Stopping the spread of
nuclear weapons is a critical first step in the ability of the nation to have the reassurance required for the reduction of the United States nuclear stockpile.

There is also a recognition of resource constraint within the 2015 National Security Strategy; “Policy tradeoffs and hard choices will need to be made. In such instances, we will prioritize efforts that address the top strategic risks to our interests: …Proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction…”44 The resource constraints are also reflected in strategic level documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Reviews and the Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Joint Doctrine

Joint Publication (JP) 3-40 (Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction) was published in October 2014. This is the definitive publication for joint doctrine, covering the countering weapons of mass destruction framework. It supersedes the previous JP 3-40 (Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction) and implements the new strategic level guidance from the DoDS-CWMD. The result of this implementation is the removal of the three pillars and eight mission areas that were part of the combating WMD framework.

The three pillars have been replaced in JP 3-40 by “a CWMD construct with three lines of effort (LOEs): prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises. These LOEs are supported by one strategic enabler, prepare.”45 This was done in order to place the focus, in line with the DoDS-CWMD, on the whole of government approach.

In a recognition of the shift to a whole of government approach in countering WMD, JP 3-40 also “describes the relationship between military organizations and
functions to other US Government departments and agencies, and international partners."\textsuperscript{46}

The terror threat is still recognized in JP 3-40 as well as the nation state threat. This updated JP “expands the discussion of proliferation to include the proliferation continuum and proliferation networks.”\textsuperscript{47}

The eight mission areas of the previous construct have been replaced with four activities: Understand the Environment, Threats, and Vulnerabilities; Cooperate with and Support Partners; Control, Defeat, Disable, and/or Dispose of WMD Threat; and Safeguard the Force and Manage Consequences.”\textsuperscript{48}

JP 3-40 also defines weapons of mass destruction as “…chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or devices capable of a high order of destruction and/or causing mass casualties”\textsuperscript{49} as the foundational WMD definition for the Joint Force doctrine. This is important in light of some of the discussion in the AOC and in Army doctrine.

**Army Operating Concept**

The Army Operating Concept recognizes that the Army has a substantial role in the Counter WMD Armed Forces mission as a force provider. It states that Army forces have a requirement to “operate in inhospitable conditions, conduct reconnaissance to confirm or deny the presence of weapons, destroy enemy forces that possess those weapons, and secure territory to contain those weapons until CBRNE units reduce or neutralize them.”\textsuperscript{50}

The Army Operating Concept has a section that discusses proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has added high-yield explosive to the WMD lexicon, as well as including directed energy weapons as a potential WMD of adversaries.\textsuperscript{51}
Unfortunately, this is not supported by Joint definitions and may lead to confusion within the Joint Force if the Army does not define high-yield explosives and gain consensus on that definition within Joint Doctrine.

Finally, the Army Operating Concept has included “Prevent, reduce, eliminate, and mitigate the use and effects of weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives threats and hazards on friendly forces and civilian populations” as the fifth Army Warfighting Challenge; “first order capabilities the Army must possess to win in a complex world”.\textsuperscript{52}

There is no acknowledgement in the Army Operating Concept about the capability of the other departments of the U.S. Government, nor is there an acknowledgement about the capability of NATO or other partner nations. Another significant gap is the lack of an in depth discussion about the terrorism/WMD nexus and the challenges associated with that mission set. Without discussing these capabilities, there may be a significant gap created from not reviewing the direction provided in the DoDS-CWMD as well as the 2014 QDR. Army strategic guidance should address these gaps within the Army Operating Concept in order to avoid duplicating capabilities that may be resident in other departments of the U.S. Government or our allies.

As pointed out earlier, the current administration’s National Security Strategy guidance implementation and the DoDS-CWMD has shifted the emphasis of Countering WMD missions from defense against the use of weapons of mass destruction to finding and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction. This emphasis also includes direction to look for whole of government solutions as well as partnering with other nations to stop the proliferation of WMD. The AOC provides the same shift in focus from
defense to finding and preventing the use of WMD. The Army Operating Concept additionally re-scopes WMD to include directed energy weapons and explosives.

**Army Countering WMD Doctrine**

Army doctrine recognizes that the joint force commander will not “execute military operations in isolation”. It states that “unified action requires the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of government activities…and nongovernment entities with military operations.”

This recognition is clearly within the strategic guidance found within the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Department of Defense Strategy to Counter WMD as well as the guidance found within JP 3-40.

WMD strategic documents and doctrine include the terms chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (often abbreviated with the acronym CBRN). CBRN is not a synonym for countering WMD nor WMD. CBRN is often described as an environment, while countering WMD is most often a mission for the Department of Defense. FM 3-11 makes a key distinction between WMD and CBRN hazards: “WMD refers to the actual weapon, while CBRN refers to the contamination or effects resulting from the employment of WMD and from the dispersal of CBRN materials”.

Army doctrine contained in FM 3-11 Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations (which includes elements of countering WMD) still includes the former guidance within the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction relating to the eight military mission areas. As noted in the section on joint doctrine, those eight military mission areas have been superseded by the four countering WMD activities.

Army doctrine related to counter WMD will need to be updated to bring it in line with the new strategic level guidance of the Department of Defense Strategy to Counter
WMD as the National Military Strategy to Counter WMD has been rescinded. This update will require multi-service participation as the current doctrine is multi-service. This update will avoid confusion in the Joint Force and ensure that planners are operating from the same framework when developing plans for the Joint Force Commander.

Conclusion

As America has wrestled with the best way to deter or respond to a WMD attack, the National policy and National strategy to counter WMD has undergone a subtle but significant evolution from combating WMD to countering WMD since the terrorist attacks in America on 9/11. These two frameworks, Combating WMD (2002-2009) and Countering WMD (2010-Present) represent a shift to more of a whole of government, resource constrained approach to defending U.S. interests from WMD attack. The two frameworks for national strategy and policy can be traced all of the way through multiple levels of national documents to Army doctrine.

The 2006, 2010, and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews have all included the threat that weapons of mass destruction pose to the United States homeland and United States interests abroad. These three strategic level documents identify the same ends, but the ways and means of the strategies relating to weapons of mass destruction have evolved over time based on differences in administration philosophies. This evolution reflects the realities of changing administrations and the ever complex and changing world environment.

The change to countering WMD policy and strategic guidance is generally consistent from National and Department of Defense (DoD) documents. The Joint doctrine is also generally consistent with the National and DoD guidance. Army strategic
guidance and doctrine does not reflect some of the changes from the combating to countering WMD framework and should be updated to avoid confusion in the Joint Force and Army leadership.

Army strategic guidance should address the gaps within the Army Operating Concept relating to U.S. Government, NATO, and partner capability to counter WMD. Some of those capabilities are captured in the section on DoD CWMD capabilities. This gap can be addressed in the working group that is addressing Army Warfighting Challenge number five (countering WMD), especially if that working group includes contacts with other organizations within the Joint Staff.

The definitions of WMD within the Army Operating Concepts should be in line with Joint and National level strategic documents. The addition of high-yield explosives and directed energy weapons into the WMD lexicon is not helpful, and will not be well understood within the joint community.

Army countering WMD doctrine should be updated in order to capture the new strategic guidance found within the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Department of Defense Strategy to Counter WMD as well as joint doctrine. Some of the updates required will be removing the eight military mission areas and three pillars and replacing the construct with the new lines of effort and the 4 new activities in JP 3-40 in order to avoid confusion in the Joint Force.

Endnotes


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 3.


7 Ibid., 5-6.

8 Ibid., 5.

9 Ibid., i.

10 Ibid., 17.

11 Ibid., 18-19.

12 Ibid., 29.

13 Ibid., 17.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 33.

17 Ibid., 52.

18 The Army designated the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) as the 20th CBRNE Command in 2015.

19 Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review (February 2006), 52.

20 Ibid., 68.

21 Ibid., ix.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

25 Ibid., 21.
26 Ibid., vi.
27 Ibid., 16.
28 Ibid., xi.
29 Ibid., vii.
30 Ibid., 7-8.
31 Ibid., 4.
32 Ibid., viii.


34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 5.
39 Ibid., i.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 9.
42 Ibid., 9.
43 Ibid., 17.


46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., xii-xiii.
49 Ibid., I-1.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., 32.


54 Ibid., 1-7.

55 Ibid., 2-4.