North Korea’s Nuclear Challenge: P₄ Engagement Approach with a Hint of Realism

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The thesis of this paper is that the current U.S. policy toward North Korea has created an imbalance between the objectives and concepts at the strategic level. As a result, the U.S. has not been able to achieve its stated policy objective of denuclearized North Korea. In an effort to secure effectively U.S. national interests, the Obama administration forthwith should reevaluate the policy of “strategic patience” and consider approaches that could ameliorate the imbalance. The strategic environment has changed significantly since Obama took office in 2009. Significant changes in the strategic environment require significant modifications to the current policy. President Nixon in 1972 proactively took steps to seek rapprochement with the communist China—then, and still, a nuclear weapons state—against the Cold War policy of containment. Recently, President Obama made a historic visit to Cuba, once a nuclear weapons proxy state, and made a historic deal with Iran, a member of the axis of evil and once an aspiring nuclear weapons state. The strategic environment is now conducive to a new engagement approach that is proactive, principled, pragmatic, and persistent with a hint of realism.
Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that the current U.S. policy toward North Korea has created an imbalance between the objectives and concepts at the strategic level. As a result, the U.S. has not been able to achieve its stated policy objective of denuclearized North Korea. In an effort to secure effectively U.S. national interests, the Obama administration forthwith should reevaluate the policy of “strategic patience” and consider approaches that could ameliorate the imbalance. The strategic environment has changed significantly since Obama took office in 2009. Significant changes in the strategic environment require significant modifications to the current policy. President Nixon in 1972 proactively took steps to seek rapprochement with the communist China—then, and still, a nuclear weapons state—against the Cold War policy of containment. Recently, President Obama made a historic visit to Cuba, once a nuclear weapons proxy state, and made a historic deal with Iran, a member of the axis of evil and once an aspiring nuclear weapons state. The strategic environment is now conducive to a new engagement approach that is proactive, principled, pragmatic, and persistent with a hint of realism.
North Korea’s Nuclear Challenge: P4 Engagement Approach with a Hint of Realism

The sanctions imposed by the Obama administration are insufficient, and further evidence of a feckless foreign policy; a tacit acknowledgement that this Administration’s ‘strategic patience’ toward North Korea has been a complete and utter failure.

—Sen. Cory Gardner¹

The current U.S. policy on North Korea is referred to as “strategic patience,” which, according to many, including Sen. Gardner, has failed to prevent North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missile programs. The word “patience” implies being tolerant for a long time calmly under provocation and strain.² Indeed the U.S. has been tolerant for a long time, in the face of North Korea’s defiant pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of nuclear technology and hardware.³ North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016. This act was a blatant violation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In the following month, North Korea successfully launched a space launch vehicle that orbited a satellite, which purportedly was a disguised attempt to test its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. The United Nations had immediately passed new resolutions to impose new sanctions on North Korea for its rogue acts. Many argue that if the U.S. stays the course with its current policy North Korea sooner or later will develop an ICBM capable of carrying a nuclear payload that could reach not only Guam and Hawaii but the continental United States. Worse off, North Korea could transfer a nuclear weapon to a violent extremist organization, which then uses it to attack the U.S.

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result, the U.S. has not been able to achieve its stated policy objective of denuclearized North Korea. In an effort to secure effectively U.S. national interests, the Obama administration forthwith should reevaluate the policy of “strategic patience” and consider approaches that could ameliorate the imbalance. This paper proposes one such approach: the P4 engagement approach—proactive, principled, pragmatic, and persistent approach with a hint of realism.

A Brief Background of U.S.-North Korea Relations

United States has been concerned about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program since 1986, when U.S. intelligence reported activities at the plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant at Yonbyon. Although North Korea had joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was not monitoring this activity. In 1993, IAEA accused North Korea of violating the NPT and requested access to its nuclear facilities. North Korea had initially agreed to allow access to IAEA, but changed its mind after announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT. At the height of the escalation, the Clinton Administration considered a preemptive military strike on the North Korean nuclear facilities; however, it never came to fruition. The former President Jimmy Carter, in his personal capacity, met with then-the Dear Leader, Kim Il Sung, and brokered a deal that later served as the basis for the U.S.-North Korea bilateral 1994 Agreed Framework. On October 21, 1994, U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear weapons program in return for international aid, including two nuclear light water reactors (LWR) and heavy fuel oil (HFO). The objective of the Agreed Framework was a normalized economic and diplomatic relationship between the two countries.
Shortly thereafter, on November 28, 1994, the IAEA verified that North Korea had halted construction at two nuclear facilities and that they were no longer operational.\(^7\) In return, on March 9, 1995, the U.S., Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan formed the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) for the purpose of coordinating the provision of the LWRs and HFO.\(^8\) In 1998, the U.S. contributed $50 million to KEDO and about $73 million worth of food to North Korea.\(^9\)

From 1994 to 2001, the U.S and North Korea enjoyed a period of relative détente despite several provocative acts, including a ballistic missile launch in 1998 over Japan into the Pacific Ocean. During this period, the U.S. and North Korea broke new grounds in bilateral diplomacy. The former Secretary of Defense William Perry in 1999 led an official presidential envoy to Pyongyang to discuss the then-escalating missile situation. The following year then-Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited Pyongyang to dissuade North Korea from pursuing ballistic missiles and WMD programs in return for uninterrupted economic and diplomatic support. During this time period, the U.S. alone produced over $400 million worth of HFO to North Korea.\(^10\)

Almost a decade-long bilateral engagement between U.S. and North Korea ended when George W. Bush took office in 2001.\(^11\) After the naming of North Korea as part of the axis of evil, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and North Korea deteriorated. The Bush Administration attempted to resolve the North Korean problem by initiating the six-party talks from 2003 through 2008. There was some progress in 2005 when North Korea in a joint statement agreed to stop its nuclear weapons program in return for economic aid and U.S.’ security promises, but the deal fell through
when the U.S. seized North Korean financial assets in Macao. North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006.

Afterwards, from 2007 through 2008, the U.S. resumed the six-party talks with the hope of trying to convince North Korea to dismantle its nuclear facilities in return for economic and diplomatic benefits. During this time, the U.S. removed the Trading with the Enemy Act designation as well as the state sponsor of terrorism designation against North Korea, in return for North Korea’s cooperation. However, in 2009, when disputes arose regarding the nuclear program verification protocols, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors and conducted its second nuclear test. North Korea was now President Obama’s problem.

“Strategic Patience”: Is it Policy or Strategy?

There is no official U.S. government document that spells out the “strategic patience” policy toward North Korea. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) makes a single reference to “strategic patience,” but in a broad context of discussing the challenges the U.S. faces, not specifically regarding North Korea. In December 2009, then-Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, made one of the earliest references to “strategic patience” as the official U.S. policy toward North Korea. At a question-and-answer session with the Croatian foreign minister, after reaffirming the commitment of the U.S. to the six-party talks process and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Clinton said, “[t]he approach that our Administration is taking is of strategic patience in close coordination with our six-party allies ….” Earlier that year, on October 21, Secretary Clinton elaborated on the strategic patience policy: “Within the framework of the six-party talks, we are prepared to meet bilaterally with North Korea, but North Korea’s return to the negotiating table is not enough. Current sanctions will not be relaxed until
Pyongyang takes verifiable, irreversible steps toward complete denuclearization. Its leaders should be under no illusion that the United States will ever have normal, sanctions-free relations with a nuclear armed North Korea." Using a variety of sources, Congressional Research Service summed up the essential elements of the “strategic patience” policy: 1) pursuing North Korea to commit to steps toward denuclearization; 2) within the six-party talk framework; 3) in close coordination with treaty allies ROK and Japan; 4) convincing China to play a tougher role against North Korea; and 5) continuing with the arms interdiction and sanctions regime. Under this policy, the U.S. is willing to seek normalized relations with North Korea, but the condition precedent for this offer is that North Korea first must commit to changing its behavior and to taking significant, meaningful steps toward dismantling its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Having explained the “strategic patience” policy, there is a lingering question as to whether the “strategic patience” policy is really a policy. Richard Yarger explained that “[p]olicy is the expression of the desired end state sought by the government. In its finest form it is clear articulation of guidance for the employment of the instruments of power toward the attainment of one or more end states. In practice, policy tends to be much vaguer. Nonetheless policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end state and its guidance.” Applying this definition of policy, the “strategic patience” policy indeed does articulate that the denuclearization of North Korea is the end state; however, it also articulates the approaches or concepts: pursuing the six-party talks, in coordination with ROK and Japan; convincing China to take a tougher stance; and continuing the arms interdiction and sanctions regime. Regardless of whether it is a policy or strategy,
or any combination thereof, the biggest restraint it places on the employment of options appears to be the condition precedent that North Korea must first commit to denuclearization. This condition precedent, as well as the overly ambitious objective of denuclearized North Korea, is a key source of the imbalance. Before addressing the imbalance, the strategic environment will be explored.

Why Should the U.S. Care?

The answer to this question should lead to the determination and articulation of the interests at stake. A good starting point to address this question is the top U.S. strategy document, the 2015 NSS. The President identified four enduring national interests, as he previously had done in the 2010 NSS: 1) the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; 2) a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; 3) respect for universal values at home and around the world; and 4) a rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.18

The threat that North Korea poses, which is addressed more in detail in a separate section, affects all four enduring U.S. national interests at varying intensity levels. First, not only does North Korea’s nuclear weapons and proliferation threats risk the security of the U.S. homeland but of the two treaty allies in the region as well—ROK and Japan.19 This interest is in the “vital” category of intensity because threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and U.S. allies constitute the number one strategic risk in the 2015 NSS.20

Second, North Korea’s transnational criminal activities, including the production of super notes (fake U.S. $100 bills) and counterfeit U.S. consumer products, such as
cigarettes, affect the growth of U.S. economy. The intensity level of this interest is in the “important” category because North Korea’s transnational criminal activities, if unaddressed over time, would eventually affect the U.S. economy. Third, North Korea continues to commit systemic human rights abuses, thereby flagrantly showing disrespect for universal values. The intensity level of this interest is in between the “peripheral” and “important” categories because, although North Korea’s human rights violations do not pose a direct threat to the U.S. security or economy, they could ultimately affect the international system. Last, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs violate U.N sanctions, which affect the stability of a rules-based international order that promotes peace, security and opportunity. This interest is in the “important” level of intensity because North Korea’s violations of U.N. sanctions directly threaten the stability of the rules-based international system.  

Of the four enduring interests, the first one involving the security of the U.S. is worth discussing further since it is in the “vital” category of intensity. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the congressionally-mandated, top Department of Defense (DOD) strategy document, elaborates and stresses the significance of the North Korea’s threat. It specifically spells out North Korea’s long-range missile and WMD programs, in particular nuclear, as a “direct threat” to the U.S. One of the U.S.’ primary concerns regarding the “direct threat” is whether North Korea has the ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead small enough for a rocket that can exit and reenter the atmosphere. In the March 9, 2016, edition of the Rodong Sinmun, the North Korean state-run newspaper, North Korea claimed to have developed a miniaturized warhead, showing a photo of Kim Jong Un standing behind a figure supposedly depicting a small
Although there is no credible source that has verified such a claim, there may be a scintilla of corroboration in that the Defense Intelligence Agency and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), as well as the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), have made statements that North Korea may indeed have such a capability. Now that the “so what” question has been addressed, the next step is to cast a wide net to paint the picture of the strategic environment relative to the articulated interests.

What is Happening in the Strategic Environment?

This section addresses the major forces and trends, including assumptions, relationships, and interactions, in the global and domestic environments in an effort to identify strategic factors that influence the development of options. The starting point of scanning the external environment is understanding the adversary.

Know Thy Enemy: North Korea

On February 12, 2016, Secretary Carter submitted to Congress, pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, a report entitled, “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” According to that report, North Korea’s perception of the security environment has not changed substantially in the past couple of years. The Kim regime faces both internal and external threats and does not trust nearby countries including China and Russia. North Korea’s strategic goal is the Kim family regime survival. North Korea’s strategic national security objectives are to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state; to maintain deterrence; to co-develop its economic and nuclear weapons programs; to reinforce the military-first national policy; to tightly control communications, borders, movements, and trade; and to reunite the Korean peninsula under its terms. In addition, according to that report, North Korea’s national strategy is to use its military
power to engage in coercive diplomacy, with the objective of gaining political and
economic concessions. An integral part of this coercive-diplomacy strategy is its
nuclear and ballistic missiles programs, which the Kim regime views as necessary in
order to maintain a secure and effective deterrent and to survive. Given North Korea’s
strategic and existential goals, it would be logical to assume that the Kim regime will
never give up its nuclear weapons—this is a key strategic factor.

Know Thy Enemy’s Friend: China

China is North Korea’s existential ally; that is, without China’s support, North
Korea would not survive. North Korea’s existential dependence on China dates back to
the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 when China’s intervention prevented North Korea’s
destruction by the U.N. forces. Today, China is still North Korea’s lifeline. China, the
world’s second largest economy, is North Korea’s largest trading partner and primary
source of food, fuel, arms, and energy. China and North Korea’s relationship,
however, is not a one-way street. If China were to stop supporting North Korea, the
latter would surely collapse, and this would go against China’s goal of maintaining
stability in North Korea. While many China experts posit that China’s primary reason for
preventing North Korea’s collapse is to avoid a flood of North Korean refugees from
crossing the border, Victor Cha, the former director for Asian Affairs at the National
Security Staff and a prominent scholar on North Korea, believes otherwise. According to
Cha, the main reason China seeks a stable North Korea is the economic development
of its two northeast provinces—Jilin and Liaonin. These two provinces share the 870-
mile border with North Korea, and their primary sources of economic activities come
from North Korea. Together, Jilin and Liaonin are responsible for 62 percent of all
Chinese-North Korea joint ventures. Given China’s recent stock market turmoil in
January of 2016 and slowly declining economy, it appears that China has all the more reason to ensure stability in North Korea.

Another interest of China in ensuring stability in North Korea is maintaining a buffer with ROK, a venue for U.S. military presence and influence. If destabilization of North Korea causes ROK to unite the Korean peninsula under its terms, China would then share its massive 870-mile border with a U.S. proxy state. This in China’s view would threaten fundamentally its national security interests. Gauging China’s relationship with North Korea would not be complete without discussing China’s relationship with ROK.

In 1992, after the end of the Cold War, China abandoned the strict “one-Korea” policy and normalized diplomatic relations with ROK by signing a joint communique, in which the two countries agreed to establish “enduring relations of good neighborhood, friendship, and cooperation on the basis of … the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” Since then China and ROK have developed a robust economic relationship. China is ROK’s largest trading partner and ROK is China’s fourth largest. This normalized relations between the two nations is a key strategic factor.

China’s interaction and relationship with the two Koreas may shed some light on what appears to be China’s slowly changing attitude toward North Korea. First is China’s voting record on the UNSC regarding North Korea. China consistently has voted against any resolution regarding North Korea’s human rights violations. For example, on December 10, 2015, the UNSC convened to consider a provisional agenda
on the human rights violations in North Korea. China was first to speak against the
UNSC adopting the provisional agenda—“China” is always opposed to intervention by
the Council on issues concerning the human rights situation in any country.” China
voted against the adoption of the provisional agenda. However, when it comes to North
Korea’s nuclear weapons testing and satellite launches, China’s voting record on the
UNSC has been exactly the opposite.

To date China has voted in favor of all five UNSC resolutions (UNSCR) that
condemn and impose sanctions against North Korea: UNSCR 1718 after North Korea’s
first nuclear test in 2006; UNSCR 1874 after the second nuclear test in 2009; UNSCR
2087 after the first satellite (failed) launch; UNSCR 2094 after the third nuclear test in
2013; and UNSCR 2270 after the fourth nuclear test and second satellite launch in
2016. Of all the UNSCRs, the most recent one deserves some attention.

On March 2, 2016, the UNSC issued UNSCR 2270, the toughest sanctions
regime yet, which supposedly fills the gaps in the previous UNSCRs. For example, the
UNSCR 2270 bans North Korea’s natural resource exports, North Korea’s major source
of income; creates a presumption that cargo going in and out of North Korea by air,
land, and sea is suspicious and subject to inspection; requires states to expel North
Koreans who aid North Korea’s weapons program; and, perhaps most significant,
requires states to close down North Korean financial institutions in their territories.
As with the previous UNSCR sanctions, these tough provisions are meaningless unless the
member states implement them through their domestics enforcement processes. China,
in particular, has been the source that vitiated the UNSCR sanctions by supporting
North Korea.
Since the issuance of UNSCR 2270, however, China has shown some signs of taking concrete steps to implement the sanctions regime. For example in March of 2016, China prohibited a North Korean cargo freighter from berthing at the Rizhao port in northeastern China. This ship, the Grand Karo, is one of the 31 vessels that China’s Ministry of Transport blacklisted few days after the UNSC issued UNSCR 2270.\(^ {39}\) In the financial sector, on the day the UNSC issued the UNSCR 2270, Dandong Bank, located in the largest Chinese-border city of Dandong, across Yalu River, halted all cash transfers to North Korea.\(^ {40}\) A couple of days later, four of the largest Chinese state-owned banks—the Bank of China, Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank and Agricultural Bank—have halted cash transfers, both yuan and dollar, to North Korea.\(^ {41}\)

While China’s prompt enforcement actions are encouraging, whether they will continue is another issue. In 2013, promptly after the UNSC issued UNSCR 2094 for North Korea’s third nuclear test, the same four banks had halted cash transfers to North Korea, but few months later they resumed their business with North Korea as usual.\(^ {42}\) Given China’s national interests in a stable North Korea, as articulated above, it appears as if China may soon revert back to its original position; however, this unprecedented support of the U.N. sanctions regime is a significant strategic factor. There is one more friend of North Korea that is not talked as much as China, but wields considerable potential for influence—Russia.

**Know Thy Enemy’s Friend: Russia**

When it comes to North Korea, Russia does not receive much attention and exposure like it once used to before and during the Cold War. After all, it was the Russians, who occupied the northern half of the Korean peninsula when World War II
had been over in 1945. It was also the Russians who groomed and installed Kim Il-Sung as the premier of North Korea, which it formally recognized in 1948. Although Russia may appear to be an insignificant stakeholder in North Korean matters, Russia holds a key position both in the six-party talks framework and, more importantly, on the UNSC as a permanent member. Geopolitically, Russia shares with North Korea a meager 12-mile border, whereas with China a massive 2,600-mile border, the fourth largest in the world. Furthermore, unlike China, Russia does not have that mutual relationship with North Korea that is based on maintaining security and economic growth on either side of the border. However, like China, Russia is concerned with maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula.

In 1990, like China, Russia, then-Soviet Union, normalized diplomatic relationship with ROK for its national interests. The historic summit between the ROK President Roh and Gorbachev in June 1990 resulted in a new beneficial relationship, including a major economic agreement, including a $3 billion loan from ROK to the Soviet Union. This diplomatic maneuver infuriated North Korea. After the Soviet Union dissolved, the relationship between Russia and North Korea grew dimmer, but it eventually normalized again under Putin’s leadership, resulting in Russia becoming a member of the six-party talks framework. Even then, Russia’s true intentions regarding North Korea can be ambiguous. On March 7, 2016, Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued a surprising statement regarding North Korea’s threats of pre-emptive nuclear strikes to protest the combined U.S.-ROK exercise Key Resolve and Foal Eagle traditionally held every year in March. Referring to North Korea, Russia said:

We consider the threatening statements to carry out some kind of ‘preventive nuclear strikes’ against their opponents absolutely
unacceptable. Pyongyang must realize that North Korea thereby definitively pits itself against the international community, providing international legal basis for the use of military force against it, in accordance with the rights of states to self-defense written in the UN Charter.46

While it is unclear what Russia’s true intentions are regarding North Korea, Russia’s mere mentioning of the legitimacy of a possible military strike against North Korea suggests that Russia is very serious and concerned about maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. Russia’s clear and ambiguous intentions regarding North Korea are strategic factors.

Assumptions: Are They Right or Wrong?

Assumptions are important because they can drive policies and strategies.

Indeed, the “strategic patience” policy appears to be based on certain assumptions. One such assumption is the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of economic sanctions. On February 18, 2016, the President signed into law the H.R. 757: North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (North Korea Sanctions Act), which imposes for the first time mandatory sanctions against North Korea, instead of giving the President the option to enforce them. On March 16, 2016, the President issued a new executive order implementing the UNSCR 2270 as well as the North Korea Sanctions Act.47 The ultimate question regarding the sanctions is whether they are effective against North Korea.

North Korea has been the target of economic sanctions for over 66 years. Internationally, the UNSC has been issuing economic sanctions against North Korea since 2006. Domestically, on the other hand, the U.S. has been issuing economic sanctions against North Korea since 1950.48 Despite these sanctions, however, North Korea’s provocative acts, including nuclear weapons and missile development
programs, have not ceased. How long would it take for the U.S. to accept the fact that sanctions are ineffective against North Korea? This is a question that merits serious consideration by this Administration, especially given the fact that the U.S. invaded Iraq in the first gulf war after the UNSC sanctions had been in effect for less than 6 months.

The second assumption is that the Kim family regime will collapse soon. If policy makers really believe in this assumption and accept the associate risks for waiting for such a time, then the patience strategy would make a lot of sense. Indeed, Cha predicted in 2011, two days after Kim Jong-II’s (Kim Jong Un’s father) death, that “North Korea as we know it is over. Whether it comes apart in the next few weeks or over several months, the regime will not be able to hold together after the untimely death of its leader…” The current leader of North Korea is Kim Jong Un, the grandson of the Kim Il Sung, who founded North Korea in 1948. In a couple of years, it will be 70 years since the Kim family has been the ruling power in North Korea. By all accounts, the young, “inexperienced” Kim Jong Un has consolidated firmly his power among the core North Korean leadership and will continue to wield that power for many decades to come. Therefore, this assumption, like the previous one, merits serious consideration as to whether it should enter the strategy calculus.

The third assumption about North Korea that policymakers often talk about is that the leadership, particularly the Dear Leader, is irrational. World leaders, including the U.S., have cast aspersions on the Dear Leader, including the U.S. Senator Gardner, the sponsor of the North Korea Sanctions Act, who most recently called him the “forgotten maniac,” and President Bush who called him a “pygmy” and “spoiled child at a dinner table.”
In a study that analyzed North Korea’s intentions, Andrew Scobell found that North Korean regime is “not irrational and that there is an internal logic to the regime’s words and deeds.” Scobell further found that the North Korean regime genuinely believes and are afraid that the military forces of the U.S. and ROK will attack North Korea. Scobell attributed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime to the North Korean regime’s apprehension. Having examined the key strategic factors and assumptions, the next section discusses the imbalance at the strategic level.

The Imbalance at the Strategic Level

An imbalance between the objectives and concepts at the strategic level can create strategic risks. Generally, the greater the imbalance, the greater the risk of achieving the strategic objective. Therefore, one must continuously monitor how a policy or strategy is being implemented in order to assess its effectiveness against the forces and trends in the constantly evolving strategic environment. The fact that the current U.S. policy has failed to achieve the objective of denuclearized North Korea suggests that there may be an imbalance.

First, not all the stakeholders share the same objectives. The U.S.’ sole stated objective under the policy is the denuclearization of North Korea. This objective is based on the existential national security interest to protect the homeland as well as allies and partners. China, the most influential stakeholder, on the other hand, does not share that objective at the same intensity level. Although China has been on the record for seeking denuclearized North Korea as its objective, its primary interest remains maintaining stability in North Korea. As articulated above, given China’s geopolitical and economic interests in North Korea, China’s interest in maintaining stability in North Korea trumps
its interest in the denuclearization of the same. Secretary Kerry has met with the
Chinese leadership on numerous occasions to request that China take a tougher stance
against North Korea; however, as long as the imbalance in the objectives exists, China
is not likely to change its course. Second, there is an imbalance between the diplomatic
national instrument of power and the limitation imposed by the condition precedent; that
is, that there may be no bilateral engagement or multilateral six-party talks unless North
Korea first shows commitment to denuclearize.

Third, there is an imbalance between the sanctions regime and the policy
objective of denuclearized North Korea. As articulated above, sanctions against North
Korea have been in place for over six decades; however, they have yet to achieve the
objective of denuclearized North Korea. Fourth, there is an imbalance among the six-
party talks engagement framework, multilateral framework, and direct U.S.-North Korea
bilateral framework. In other words, similar to the condition precedent discussed above,
the policy requirement that all negotiations with North Korea occur only in the six-party
talks framework bootstraps other diplomatic options including U.S.-North Korea bilateral
negotiations, as well as multilateral negotiations involving less than six parties.

The strategic risk that all these imbalances have created over the years is
catastrophic—North Korea has developed not only nuclear weapons but ICBMs that are
capable of launching satellites into orbit. The Obama Administration, therefore, should
modify forthwith the “strategic patience” policy in order to ameliorate the existing
imbalance.

Hawkish v. Dovish

Before discussing the P4 approach, it is important to review briefly the two camps
of thought regarding how the U.S. should approach the North Korean problem set—the
“hawkish” and the “dovish.” Discussing these two approaches is important because they represent the either end of the engagement spectrum upon which the P4 engagement approach balances. The first group consists of those who advocate for the hardline, Cold War approach of isolation and containment. The U.S. epitomized this type of approach during the early part of George W. Bush Administration. In his first State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush indicted North Korea as part of the “axis of evil,” effectively ending the bilateral engagement efforts of the Clinton Administration and announcing his new hardline approach. The Bush Administration pursued the six-party talks not for the purpose of normalizing relations with North Korea but for the purpose of coercing North Korea to give up its weapons programs. The hawkish group believes in ever increasing punitive economic sanctions against North Korea and increasing the U.S.-ROK military capabilities to deter North Korean provocation and aggression. Certainly, security cooperation with ROK should continue, to support U.S. security interests not just in ROK but in the region. However, as heretofore discussed, as long as China is going to provide the necessities that North Korea needs to survive, sanctions are not likely to convince North Korea to capitulate.

The second group consists of those who advocate for the carrots or softer approach; that is, normalizing relations with North Korea by increasing economic aid and supporting economic growth. This is very similar to the ROK’s sunshine policy from 1998 to 2007, which sought to bring about peace and stability by trying to enter into a normalized economic relations with North Korea. It was during this period when the ROK and North Korea created the Kaesong Industrial Zone, a collaborative economic development effort in which ROK companies employed North Korean labor force. Also
during this period, ROK and North Korea established the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region, which allowed ROK citizens and other foreign tourists to visit Mount Kumgang in North Korea. The rationale behind the “dovish” approach is that by boosting North Korea’s economy, over time, North Korea could become the next China or Vietnam and become a responsible international actor.

The Balancing Act: The P4 Engagement Approach

Proactive

One of the first steps to correcting the imbalance is getting rid of the condition precedent that there can be no diplomacy, either multilateral or bilateral, unless North Korea first commits to take steps to denuclearize. This restriction, for all intents and purposes, has created a stalemate, which is benefiting North Korea and not the U.S. The U.S. should not just sit idle until North Korea responds. The impetus behind such a restriction could be the old Cold-War era mind-set that the U.S. does not negotiate with rogue regimes. However, it appears that the U.S. is in the process of growing out of that mindset, the prime examples being the recent U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and normalizing relations with Cuba. If the U.S. could enter into a nuclear deal with Iran, a former member of the Axis of Evil club, there is no reason why the U.S. cannot do the same with North Korea. A proactive approach would require the U.S. to take the first step to break the stalemate and to invite North Korea to the discussion table without conditions. Dropping the condition precedent would counterbalance not only the multilateral power of diplomacy but the power of direct U.S.-North Korea bilateral diplomacy. As part of taking proactive steps, the U.S. should consider normalizing relations with North Korea with the goal of establishing an embassy in each other’s capital. If the U.S.’ closest ally, the United Kingdom (UK), has an embassy there, there is no reason why the U.S.
cannot either. The UK embassy in Pyongyang publicly states on its website that it concentrates on two main foreign policy matters: counter-proliferation and human rights, the same two matters that constitute U.S. interests. Opening a U.S. embassy in Pyongyang may serve another U.S. interest; namely, counterbalancing China’s interest in Pyongyang and in the region. Since it would not make sense to open an embassy in a country with which the U.S. is still technically at war, the U.S. officially should end the Korean War by replacing the 1953 armistice agreement with a permanent peace treaty, which is what the Kim family has desired for decades.

One may argue that taking a proactive approach with North Korea when it has not given up nuclear weapons would be tantamount to rewarding bad behavior and, therefore, would not pass the acceptability test; that is, it goes against the U.S. values. This issue is taken up in the next section.

Principled

Principled engagement requires balancing of values and interests. It addresses the overarching question, “what is the U.S. trying to achieve with North Korea?” Although seeking a denuclearized North Korea is an end state of the current “strategic patience” policy, the overarching U.S. national security interest involved is the protection of the homeland, its citizens and allies and partners. Therefore, if seeking a normalized relations with North Korea could take the U.S. a step closer to achieving that goal, then the U.S. should take that step. Recently, Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., spoke of pursuing a “path of principled engagement with governments hostile to the United States.” She emphasized that engaging regimes that violate international norms or human rights does not mean that the U.S. is condoning their bad behavior; that the U.S. is not aware of the threats they present; and that the U.S. could change
Rather, principled engagement requires using diplomacy as a tool in appropriate circumstances to achieve U.S. national security objectives. For example, she noted that by restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba, the U.S. has strengthened its relations with other governments in the Americas and has placed the U.S. in a position of advantage to improve human rights in Cuba. However, she noted, that does not mean that the U.S. will stop “condemning the Cuban government’s repression of its own people.”

Likewise, seeking to normalize relations with North Korea would serve a greater purpose of improving the security posture on the Korean peninsula. This, however, does not mean that the U.S. would stop calling out North Korea for its human rights violations or for conducting nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests in violation of the UNSCRs. There is a greater chance of correcting the imbalance if the proactive and principled approach is also pragmatic.

Pragmatic

Approaching the imbalance problem from a pragmatic perspective requires a careful examination of the objective in the current policy. As stated above, the end state in the current policy is the denuclearization of North Korea. However, decades of efforts utilizing the national instruments of power plus the UNSCR sanctions have not resulted in the denuclearized North Korea. It is about time to think pragmatically and to modify the objective to something that the U.S. reasonably could achieve. Recently, William Perry authored an article that described the U.S.’ efforts to denuclearize North Korea as a fait accompli. Citing Dr. Sig Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, Perry advocated for modest goals that could be achieved actually. The new goals are the “Three Nos”: 1) no new weapons; 2) no better weapons; and 3) no transfer of
nuclear technology or weapons. He noted that these goals are limited but of “great security value in and of themselves,” which could set the conditions for follow-on efforts to eliminate completely all nuclear weapons in North Korea.

Part of utilizing this pragmatic approach would include recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, convincing North Korea to rejoin the NPT, and teaching North Korea how to become a responsible international actor. Borrowing Thomas Schelling’s ideas, the U.S. should teach North Korea that nuclear weapons are for deterrent use only and is never to be used offensively, and ensure that North Korea knows how to secure nuclear weapons during times of disruption and how to disable the weapons when they get into the wrong hands.

Persistent

The “persistent” portion of the P4 approach requires the complete reversal of the “patience” portion of the current policy. As discussed in the “principled” section, the U.S. should not be fooled into thinking that it could change precipitously North Korea’s behavior. The U.S.’ efforts to employ all of its national instruments of power and to unify them with allies, the U.N., intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, must be persistent. Fifty years had passed before the U.S. and Cuba restored normalized relations. Thirty-seven years had passed before the U.S. and Iran agreed on the nuclear deal, and the two countries still do not have full diplomatic relations. In 1972 President Nixon visited communist China—49 years after Mao Zedong had proclaimed victory over Kuomintang and established the communist regime. After the historic 1972 visit, it took another 7 years for the U.S. and China to establish formal diplomatic relations. Normalizing relations with North Korea likely is to take a long time, but taking the proactive, principled, pragmatic, and persistent
approach may shorten that time much faster than just by staying idle until North Korea makes the first move toward rapprochement.

Plus a Hint of Realism

There were at least two known occasions when the U.S. considered striking nuclear facilities in North Korea—in 1994 during the Clinton Administration and 2003 during the Bush Administration. The U.S. has not conducted such an attack because it fails the suitability test. If the U.S. were ever to strike North Korea militarily, North Korea likely would retaliate and cause Korean War II. According to Gary Luck, a former USFK commander, another war on the Korean peninsula would approximately kill 1 million people, cost the U.S. $100 billion, and cause $1 trillion worth of industrial damage. Given this risk, preemptively striking North Korea is not a suitable option.

Whereas, a hint of realism would support the continuing with the U.S. military strategy as delineated in the 2014 QDR and the 2015 National Military Strategy by continuing the building of alliance with ROK and Japan, including security cooperation and assistance. Security assistance, in particular the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment to ROK, could serve a dual purpose: to deter North Korea and to counterbalance China’s interest in the region. It should be noted that both China and Russia object to the deployment of THAAD to ROK because of the radar’s ability to look into their sovereign territories. The U.S. should use this as a bargaining chip. In fact, in February of 2016, Secretary Kerry said in a joint news conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister, "if we get to denuclearization [of North Korea], there's no need to deploy THAAD."

Finally, in the realist tradition of the Melian dialogue, the U.S. should issue a declaratory policy that the U.S. will use military force if North Korea proliferates any of
its nuclear weapons or missiles that an adversary could use to attack the U.S. Before issuing such a policy statement, the U.S. should proactively coordinate with China, Russia, ROK, and Japan to relay the limited and defensive nature of the policy. This option is suitable because of the existential nature of the proliferation threat against the U.S. and under the universal principle of self-defense recognized in the U.N. charter.

Conclusion

The Obama Administration’s “strategic patience” policy, although it has a different name, does not differ significantly in substance from the Bush Administration’s “contain and isolate” type of policy. The current policy is in essence a policy of status quo. Given North Korea’s rapid advancement of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, the U.S. no longer could afford to maintain the policy of status quo. The strategic environment has changed significantly since Obama took office in 2009. Significant changes in the strategic environment require significant modifications to the current policy. President Nixon in 1972 proactively took steps to seek rapprochement with the communist China—then, and still, a nuclear weapons state—against the Cold War policy of containment. Recently, President Obama made a historic visit to Cuba, once a nuclear weapons proxy state, and made a historic deal with Iran, a member of the axis of evil and once an aspiring nuclear weapons state. The strategic environment is now conducive to a new engagement approach that is proactive, principled, pragmatic, and persistent with a hint of realism.

Endnotes


3 It is now public knowledge that North Korea has proliferated nuclear technology and materials to Iran, Pakistan, and Syria. See Dafna Linzer, “U.S. Misled Allies about Nuclear Export: North Korea Sent Material to Pakistan, not Libya,” Washington Post, March 20, 2005; Seymour M. Hersh, “A Strike in the Dark,” The New Yorker, February 11, 2008, 58.


5 Ibid., 5.


9 Rubin, Dancing with the Devil, 113.


11 Ibid.

12 Chanlett-Avery et.al., North Korea, 5.


16 Chanlett-Avery et al., *North Korea*, 6.


19 Ibid., 2.

20 Ibid.

21 The 2015 NSS mentions North Korea three times: first, in the context of assuring the U.S.’ security commitments to allies and partners; two, in the context of preventing the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and three, in the context of enhancing stability and security as part of the U.S.’ rebalancing effort to the Pacific. Ibid.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 5.

29 Ibid., 6.

30 Ibid.


33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 331-332.


38 Susan Power, “Explanation of Vote at the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270 on DPRK Sanctions,” March 2, 2016, http://usun.state.gov/remarks/7160 (accessed March 12, 2016). In this remark, it is particularly interesting how Power recognized the role of China. She said, “[i]n particular, the United States would like to recognize the leadership of China, which has worked closely with us in negotiating this extremely rigorous resolution.” Ibid.


43 Cha, The Impossible State, 347.

44 Ibid., 354.

45 Cha notes that Yeltsin was almost totally indifferent toward relations with North Korea. Putin restored the relationship between Russian and North Korea through personal engagements with then-the Dear Leader, Kim Jong-II. Ibid., 359-366.

46 This block quote shows the savory nature of each word the Russians artfully and tactfully used. In all fairness, Russia, in this informational maneuver, also denounced the U.S. and ROK for holding an exercise that involve 17,000 U.S. troops, four times more than the previous year, and 300,000 ROK troops, as well as unprecedented show of force including U.S. aircraft and naval vessels; nuclear-powered submarine, the USS North Carolina; and the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS John C. Stennis. “Russia Condemns ‘Unprecedented’ U.S.-South Korea


52 Andrew Scobell, “North Korea’s Strategic Intentions,” in *Challenges Posed by the DPRK for the Alliance and the Region* (Washington, DC: Korean Economic Institute, 2005), 83.

53 Ibid.


60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.


64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

