Improving Security Cooperation with a Practical Whole of Government Approach

by

Mr. Brent G. Bahl
Department of State

Under the Direction of:
Michael A. Marra

United States Army War College
Class of 2016

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-04-2016
2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT
3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Improving Security Cooperation with a Practical Whole of Government Approach

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) Mr. Brent G. Bahl Department of State

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Michael A. Marra
U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. Please consider submitting to DTIC for worldwide availability? YES: ☒ or NO: ☐ (student check one) Project Adviser recommends DTIC submission? YES: ☒ or NO: ☐ (PA check one)

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 6025

14. ABSTRACT
The 2015 National Military Strategy identified strengthening the U.S.' global network of allies and partners as a national military objective. Specifically how to provide security force assistance (SFA) is an Army Warfighting Challenge. However, Geographic Combat Commands (GCC) have conducted security cooperation, including SFA, with varying results. While structural inefficiencies are widely acknowledged, it is unlikely the underlying law will change significantly in the near term. This paper proposes as a practical matter, GCCs should increase cooperation with Ambassadors and better employ the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) to leverage country teams to develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) of the countries receiving the security assistance. This will result in increased and shared situational awareness and unity of effort between the GCC and the Country Team. Security cooperation officers (SCO) should consider adopting a more balanced approach to cooperation and assistance and GCC deploy a Special Operations Command – Forward, if appropriate. These practical measures will result in better implementation of security cooperation.

15. SUBJECT TERMS Country Team, COM, GCC, SDO

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT UU b. ABSTRACT UU c. THIS PAGE UU

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98), Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Improving Security Cooperation with a Practical Whole of Government Approach

(6025 words)

Abstract

The 2015 National Military Strategy identified strengthening the U.S.' global network of allies and partners as a national military objective. Specifically how to provide security force assistance (SFA) is an Army Warfighting Challenge. However, Geographic Combat Commands (GCC) have conducted security cooperation, including SFA, with varying results. While structural inefficiencies are widely acknowledged, it is unlikely the underlying law will change significantly in the near term. This paper proposes as a practical matter, GCCs should increase cooperation with Ambassadors and better employ the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) to leverage country teams to develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) of the countries receiving the security assistance. This will result in increased and shared situational awareness and unity of effort between the GCC and the Country Team. Security cooperation officers (SCO) should consider adopting a more balanced approach to cooperation and assistance and GCC deploy a Special Operations Command – Forward, if appropriate. These practical measures will result in better implementation of security cooperation.
Improving Security Cooperation with a Practical Whole of Government Approach

We knew that the military could not build partner capacity alone. We recognized this activity should be done jointly with State, which has the in-country expertise and understanding of broader U.S. foreign policy goals.

—Secretary of Defense Gates

This paper is about security cooperation, a subject of great importance based on strategic guidance from the 2015 recent National Security Strategy (NSS) to “expand scope of cooperation.” According to joint doctrine, “security cooperation encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (HN).” The 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) guidance reiterates this importance and lists “strengthen our global network of allies and partners” as a national military objective. The NMS subsequently expands this to declare that “security cooperation activities are at the heart of our efforts to provide a stabilizing presence in forward theaters” and “we coordinate with other U.S. agencies and mission partners.” The U.S. Army also recognizes its importance and listed how to provide Security Force Assistance (SFA) as Army warfighting challenge three.

I will establish that security cooperation has a growing role and that it will continue to be important. However, despite the fact that the USG regards it as an important task, for some years numerous experts have described the inefficiencies in how the USG implements security cooperation. I will acknowledge there are several cogent recommendations how to change the system. However, they all focus on structural changes that would require congress to pass relevant law. Given that so far
those structural changes have not occurred, I argue that for now as a practical solution, each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) should examine their current practices and look for ways to make improvements in their current practices while operations continue.

Current Joint Operation Planning doctrine recommends, “through all stages of planning for campaigns, contingencies, and crises, Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and subordinate Joint Force Commanders (JFC) should seek to involve relevant USG departments and agencies in planning process.” In addition, the interagency nature of the theater campaign plan (TCP) developed by the combatant command means the TCP ought to be aligned with other USG efforts. However, while this is the ideal, in practice there are often lapses that diminish the overall effort.

Strategic planning done by the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) informs the TCP and “should complement and support State’s broader foreign policy objectives.” Specifically regarding DOS and USAID planning, each U.S. Embassy, led by the Chief of Mission (COM), drafts an Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), which reflects a whole of government approach with input from the interagency members of the country team. The ICS is an overarching strategy describing USG policy priorities and objectives. It also identifies the means by which the USG will use diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools to achieve the objectives over a period of the next three years. In Washington, D.C., a Joint Regional Strategy (JRS) is prepared by each geographic bureau that guides priorities and resource allocation, also over a three year period.
GCCs are also recommended to “take full advantage of all resources to coordinate the TCP,” including the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT), to help align the CCDR’s plan with the Ambassador’s goals.\textsuperscript{12} In a U.S. Embassy, the SDO/DATT is the COM’s principal advisor on defense issues and is the defense attaché and chief of the security cooperation organization (SCO), if there is one present.\textsuperscript{13} SCO is the generic name for the DOD organization that has the primary responsibility for working with the host nation on security cooperation and security assistance programs. The SCO is typically co-located with the U.S. embassy and is on the country team. “The chief of the SCO is responsible to four authorities: the Ambassador, the SDO/DATT, Commander of the GCC and Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).”\textsuperscript{14}

Despite these doctrinal admonitions, in common practice the degree of interaction between the CCDR, his staff and the relevant Ambassador and country team is often inconsistent. Although many factors contribute to the inconsistency such as levels of USG funding for a country, contingency operations in other parts of the theater that compete for finite resources and attention, often times a significant factor is personality. The individual personalities of the SDO/DATT and the CCDR are key factors. How they engage with each other and with the Ambassador, and to a lesser extent the Partner Nation’s Minister of Defense, have a tremendous impact on the success of the overall security cooperation effort. Inadequate interaction at this level can lead to the GCC’s incomplete understanding of the circumstances in the partner nation, which then results in a security cooperation program that is less effective than if interaction were better.\textsuperscript{15}
GCCs should consistently work closely with U.S. Embassy country teams to implement security cooperation. The CCDR optimizes this by establishing and maintaining a partnership with the U.S. Ambassadors to the countries in the GCC’s area of operations (AOR). The best mechanism currently available to the GCC to ensure this
occurs is the SDO/DATT, because he is already on the country team and reports to both the CCDR and COM. The SDO/DATT can greatly contribute to the GCC’s situational awareness of the country receiving security assistance.

As one SDO/DATT stated, “my success as a Senior Defense Official was a function of my credibility with the U.S. Ambassador who knew the Combatant Commander had confidence in me as both his representative and the Secretary of Defense’s representative. Equally as important was the personal relationship that I helped foster between my Combatant Commander and my Ambassador.”17 One on one meetings when possible, supplemented by regular secure video teleconferencing will facilitate the relationship. Sincere interaction at this senior level will foster GCC senior staff establishing and maintaining working level relationship with their counterparts among country team members that will be useful and productive.

Specifically, when drafting the GCC country plan, the GCC staff should work closely with the Embassy’s SCO. In addition, if the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) deploys a special operations command – forward (SOCFWD), a small, tailored operational-level command and control (C2) element, to the country, it can be another useful link between the country team and GCC. If they have not, the TSOC should consider deploying one.18 The SDO/DATT, SCO and SOCFWD if present, each have connections to both the GCC and the relevant U.S. Embassy. Better leveraging of them by the GCC will result in increased and shared situational awareness and unity of effort between the GCC and each Country team, improving implementation of security cooperation integrated with the broad categories of U.S. foreign aid administered by the DOS.
What is Security Cooperation?

While an established concept, over the years DOD has used a number of terms to describe the various aspects of cooperation. As previously noted, JP 1-0 describes security cooperation (SC) as the umbrella term for all DOD activities designed to encourage and enable international partners. In relation to other aspects of steady state activities, “SC has an overarching functional relationship with SA, FID, SFA, SSR and all DOD security related activities.”

Security Cooperation Framework

Figure 2: Security Cooperation: How It All Fits Together

One of the most familiar aspects of security cooperation is security assistance (SA). “The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) vest authority for the sale or grant of USG-origin defense articles, services, and technical
data with the President. Executive Order number 12163 granted the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security the power to provide consent to these transfers."21 Title 22 authorizes SA, DSCA to administer it through the SCO in the embassy, and the DOS funds it and exerts general control. Included in SA are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and International Military Education and Training (IMET).22

Another component of security cooperation is foreign internal defense (FID). Doctrine defines it as “the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.23 The security cooperation effort in Greece from 1947 to 1949 that provided $600 million in economic and military aid along with civilian and military advisors was the U.S.’s first FID mission of the Cold War.24

Despite the fact that the Army lists Security Force Assistance (SFA) as an important task in its warfighting challenges, currently there is no current Joint Publication on the topic. However, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Security Force Assistance, a pre-doctrinal publication, defines it as “the set of DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and supporting institutions.”25

The Georgia train and equip program (GTEP), conducted by the European Command (EUCOM), is a recent example of a SFA operation. An agreement between U.S President Bill Clinton and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze created the GTEP and gave it a priority status in both the USG and the host nation, Georgia. The
multi-year program produced several light infantry battalions that subsequently deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan as coalition forces. A Rand case study described the GTEP as “U.S. government security cooperation at its best.”

Note that while SFA and FID are both components of security cooperation, “SFA activities serve other purposes beyond internal defense.” The GTEP operation illustrates this difference between the broader SFA and FID, which focuses solely on the partner nation receiving assistance. In the case of GTEP, after U.S. forces trained and equipped the Georgian troops, their government deployed those troops outside of Georgia itself to participate in coalitions.
The U.S. military actually conducts SFA with a partner nation. However, given the DOS is the lead U.S. foreign agency and Congress has mandated by statute that the COM direct and supervise all activities in country, he is also involved in coordinating SFA in his country.
Related to the COM’s role, several bureaus in the DOS also play important roles. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) implements the Leahy Amendment, which prohibits the provision of U.S. assistance to foreign security units implicated in gross human rights violations. DRL does this by vetting potential recipients of U.S. military training and assistance for such violations.\textsuperscript{32}

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is responsible per the AECA for compiling an annual report, commonly called the Javits Report, with the assistance of DSCA. This report lists projected U.S. sales and licensed commercial exports of military equipment and services to other countries above a set dollar threshold during the current year.\textsuperscript{33}
Another task under security cooperation, and often conducted concurrently with security force assistance, is security sector reform (SSR). Joint Publication 3-07 defines it as the effort to improve the way a government provides safety, security and justice. It encompasses civilian, law enforcement and military elements and requires a whole of government effort also including intergovernmental organizations.\textsuperscript{34}

Past Successes

Over the past decades, the U.S. has conducted various aspects of security cooperation with numerous successes. A notable example is the Greek Civil War from 1947 to 1949 where unity of effort between embassy and advisors was the key factor to success, which “effectively reformed Greece’s security sector and enabling the Greek government to eliminate an insurgency with only a few hundred non-combat troops under the Ambassador’s control.”\textsuperscript{35} In Colombia, from 2001 to the present, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Special Operations Command Southern Command (SOCSOUTH) successfully conducted a building partner capacity operation with the Colombian military, transforming it from a barracks based reaction force to a military that was able to rescue three American hostages without direct U.S. participation. The improvement in the Colombian military also resulted in the insurgents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) agreeing to a ceasefire and entering into peace talks in 2012.\textsuperscript{36} As noted previously, the GTEP has been a very successful SFA operation.

Finally, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review described the performance of the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) in Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines as a successful model.\textsuperscript{37} In both Colombia and the Philippines, a SOCFWD element deployed by the TSOC to the partner nation played an important role
in improving the ability of the U.S. military to coordinate with the Ambassador and the country team. In the Philippines in addition to their interaction with Armed Forces of the Philippines, Colonel Fran Beaudette, commander of the JSOTF-P, placed his deputy commander and J9 in the U.S. Embassy in Manila in order to work with the country team daily and JSOTF-P leadership met weekly with the Ambassador, DCM and relevant country team members. Similarly, according to Colonel (retired) Greg Wilson, who twice commanded the SOCFWD element in Colombia, its presence not only improved communications, but it also built trust with both the country team and the partner nation. They achieved a degree of transparency and understanding that was not possible when the TSOC was operating just from its headquarters in Florida.38

A common thread to these successful security cooperation operations was the U.S. military made a deliberate effort to work closely with the Ambassador and country team in addition to their focus on assisting the partner nation. They also were able to judge when a potential partner nation was committed as much as the U.S. side was to being successful. There is only one recent successful example of a regional effort and it has been a modest success. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has conducted the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, an interagency security cooperation program under DOS leadership with ten nations in the Sahel and Maghreb, since 2005.39

Recent Setbacks

However, other recent attempts to implement security cooperation regionally have not been as successful. Lieutenant General (Retired) and former Ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry stated, “Our track record at building security forces over the past 15 years is miserable.”40
For example, U.S. military security force assistance directed at Syria has had little success. U.S. President Barack Obama acknowledged in a recent press conference that “the training-and-equip program” run by the DOD “has not worked the way it was supposed to.”\textsuperscript{41} CDR, SOCCENT was also named CDR, Combined Joint Interagency Taskforce (CJIATF) – Syria, but SOCCENT was neither located in Syria, nor working with a friendly partner nation military. The typical country team also no longer existed, although there was a DOS envoy for Syria. They were unable to operate inside the partner nation, so instead they tried to identify and screen Syrian resistance members and then train and equip them in multiple foreign locations such as Turkey and Jordan. However, there were significant difficulties in taking this approach. Some of the U.S. trained fighters surrendered their U.S. supplied weapons and ammunition to an Al-Qaida affiliate in Syria, the Al Nusra Front. Subsequently when the U.S. Congress determined that only “four or five” U.S. trained fighters were actually on the ground in Syria rather than the 5,000 planned for the $500 million that had been authorized, the Administration acknowledged it had failed and closed the U.S. military’s program.\textsuperscript{42} This effort by Central Command (CENTCOM) appeared to repeat some of the same errors they made in 2003 when authorized $97 million of equipment to train and equip Iraqi resistance fighters. At that time, of the 6,000 names submitted by Iraqi opposition groups, the U.S. was able to vet just 622 of them and only 73 fighters completed the training program conducted in Hungary.\textsuperscript{43}

Recent efforts at SFA with Iraq directed by the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq have also had mixed results. An assessment by the DOD Inspector General determined the DOS and DOD disagreed on
the OSC-I mission, described it as not fully integrated into the embassy, noted a SDO/DATT was not designated as required by DOD Directive 5105.75, which also contributed to a lack of clarity and the CENTCOM TCP and Iraq Country Plan were out of date.44 Despite the approximately $25 billion spent on training Iraqi troops up until 2011 and the fact they outnumbered the fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) when attacked, four of the 14 Iraqi Army divisions abandoned their positions and fled Mosul and Tikrit in 2014.45

Similar problems can plague even humanitarian assistance efforts. Some 3,000 U.S. military troops deployed at a cost of $360 million to construct 11 treatment centers at a total cost of $1.4 billion for the Ebola mission in West Africa. However, medical personnel have treated only 28 patients in the centers and nine of the centers have not had an Ebola patient at all.46

While one can see the inherent increased difficulty of conducting a security cooperation operation from afar without close coordination with a country team on ground, programs conducted by the U.S. military in the partner nation have also had problems. Doctrine per JDN 1-13 notes, “SFA activities are part of the unified actions of the GCC and require interagency coordination”47 However, due to a poor understanding between the senior military leader and the Ambassador, sometimes this coordination has not taken place. In Iraq from 2003 to 2004, the offices of Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez were located in different buildings and they did not routinely coordinate with one another.48 In Afghanistan, contrary to expectations that Ambassador and retired Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry and General Stanley McCrystal would get along together well due to their common military
background, they did not. Captain Robert Newsom, who from 2010 to 2012 commanded the SOCFWD in Yemen said they were “deeply embedded with the embassy”, but also noted, “there was not a lot of cross-talk with respect to how everybody was seeing things.”

In addition to the previously described intricacies of the U.S. interagency process, there are myriad forces in the partner nation that can have a counter effect on U.S. security cooperation efforts.

![Figure 5: Complexity of Building Partner Capacity](image)

Failure to adequately understand a partner nation’s interests and align U.S. efforts with them is often a cause of poor results. Rosa Brooks, Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2009 to 2011 writing after the Syria Train and Equip Program had been suspended, observed, “we consistently fail to understand that other people want to pursue what they see as their interests and objectives, not ours. We go into complex foreign conflicts with a profound ignorance of history, language, and culture; as
a result, we rarely understand the loyalties, commitments, and constraints of those we train.\textsuperscript{52}

While she was drawing on her experience in DOD, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee described the greater donor and assistance community as having a similar problem. Donors had difficulty comprehending the overlay of politics, power relationships and incentive structures that affect governance and accountability in the nation they were attempting to achieve results. This failure to understand the situation lead them to make assumptions in their planning that were not aligned political realities on the ground, or did not take into account the interaction between formal and informal political, economic and social processes. They noted donors too often applied approaches used in their own country to developing countries, despite the fact they were not suited to the local contexts and challenges.\textsuperscript{53}

According to a recent study by Rand, “U.S. security cooperation efforts will succeed only to the extent that they build on an appropriate understanding of partner-nation goals and capabilities.”\textsuperscript{54} Given these potential pitfalls, what concrete measures can the GCCs, who are the organization implementing security cooperation in the field, take now to improve?

How to Improve the GCC’s Ability to Implement Security Assistance

There are two general approaches to improve the ability of the GCCs to implement security assistance. One approach focuses on Washington DC and the other on the field. There have been numerous papers, hearings and discussions, which have accurately described the bureaucratic obstacles to conducting a whole of government
approach to security assistance. The overwhelming majority of them recommend solving the problems by making structural changes.

In Washington, DC

In 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Richard Lugar, published a report on embassies as command posts in the anti-terror campaign. The report recommended that “Ambassadors should be charged with the decision whether to approve all military-related programs implemented in-country” and with regard to special operations forces, “the Ambassador’s authority over military activities in-country should be made clear.” That would likely require adjustment of authorities under both Titles 10 and 22 of the U.S. code of law.

A year later, Congress included section 1035 in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109-364). This required the President to submit a report including a plan “on building interagency capacity and enhancing the integration of civilian capabilities of the executive branch with the capabilities of the Armed Forces to enhance the achievement of United States national security goals and objectives.” A year after that, during a hearing held in 2008 by the House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, on building partnership capacity and the interagency process, U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter said, “members of congress have been actively discussing possible reforms in the national security architecture.” Regarding such proposals, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report asserted that they could potentially involve significant reform of congressional funding and authorizing responsibilities for national defense, foreign operations, and intelligence.
The executive branch has also made efforts with several recent Presidents attempting to improve the mechanism. In 1997 President William Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, in 2005 President George Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization to supersede that and President Barack Obama recently issued Presidential Policy Directive (PDD) 23, Security Sector Assistance. However, a DOD commissioned study in 1999 found that two years after PDD 56 was published, “little has been done.” Even President Obama’s own Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, commented that the variety of methods the U.S. Government has used to improve the interagency process have had “varying degrees of success.” Thus despite efforts by both the executive and legislative branches to make progress in Washington via changes to the architecture, in the field the structure remains little changed.

What can take place in Washington and is of near term benefit is coordination between CCDR and the DOS Assistant Secretaries responsible for the respective regional bureaus and the Political Military Bureau. Then, follow up by GCC senior staff such as J5, J9 or the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) if it is active, can be with both the regional bureau and relevant offices such as Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Policy and Planning Team (PPT) and USAID. The DOS Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) can facilitate this at the GCC. This is both complementary to the GCC staff’s work with individual country teams and a realistic practice. For instance, DOS headquarters is the best place to obtain information with a regional perspective such as the Bureau Strategic Resource Plans (BSRP). However, it is unrealistic to depend on
this means as the primary coordination for a GCC. As GCCs are not located in Washington, where the regional bureaus are located, face-to-face communications will be infrequent and relationship building difficult. In addition, there can be differences between a country team and the bureaus in Washington, D.C., and GCC needs to keep in mind the primary role of the COM in country.

In the Field

The best approach is for the GCC to make changes in its own culture and practices in the field that are practical, inexpensive and can produce positive results relatively quickly that will lead to better implementation of security cooperation now. This change requires a two-pronged approach, occurring at the GCC and with the GCC’s representatives in the embassies and country teams, the SDO/DATTs and SCOs. The synchronization and cooperation recommended in the joint doctrine, if practiced, will create unity of understanding, purpose and effort and align to a greater degree the efforts of the GCC and TSOC and the country team. Also if structural change then eventually happens, with cultural change already in place, it will be easier to implement.

As previously discussed, a major factor in poor implementation of security cooperation and especially SFA is failure of GCC planners to understand the situation in the partner nation adequately. This is in large part due to a lack of accurate information and qualified people that can properly analyze it. This information should come to the GCC through interaction with SDO/DATT, SCO and their colleagues in the country team on the US interagency side. Then GCC planners could apply operational design to understand the operational environment more fully.6t

CDRs and senior staff, especially the J5, J9 and the TSOC should consider the following four measures to begin the process of achieving this goal. First, focus on
Ambassadors, their country teams and respective host nations as unique and individual cases. Second, regard SDO/DATTs as their window into the country team and all the knowledge and resources its represents. Third, encourage SCOs to regard training with same importance as equipment. Fourth and finally, consider deploying a SOCFWD element.

Recognizing there are structural shortcomings, the GCC can mitigate them through improving collaboration among stakeholders. Both DOD and DOS are traditional, rank conscious hierarchical organizations, so the CCDR himself should begin by establishing and maintaining a partnership with the Ambassadors. Former Ambassador to Jordan and later Deputy Secretary of State, Ambassador William Burns’ remarked that "I've been really lucky to work with people like (CENTCOM Commander, General) Anthony Zinni, who had a good feel for partnership between military and diplomats. We worked well together and he made us feel like we were a part of the team. I was struck by the high quality of US military leadership. It's important that diplomats and military leaders be straight with one another and cooperate." 62

Lieutenant General (retired) James Dubik noted that in Iraq, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus demonstrated their "unity of purpose" by publishing a joint campaign plan signed by both of them. The development of the plan also brought each of their staffs together and created unity in their subordinates who would implement the plan. 63 Similarly, in Afghanistan, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said he wanted to “ensure the concerted use of all instruments of U.S. power” and although a simple gesture, he and Lieutenant General David Barno located their offices
adjacent to each other in the embassy. Previously in Iraq Ambassador John Negroponte and General George Casey had also established adjacent offices. More recently, Major General Wayne Grigsby remarked that when he first arrived in Djibouti and took command of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa coordination was poor. He responded by making “develop and strengthen the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team” their primary line of effort, which had been a lot of work, but worth the effort. CENTCOM Commander GEN John Abizaid, U.S. Forces Korea Commander GEN John Tilleli, International Security Assistance Force Commander GEN John Allen and later CENTCOM commander GEN Lloyd Austin, each came to the respective embassies I was serving in to brief their campaign plans, prepare for an upcoming key leader engagement with partner nation senior officials or simply have discussions. These visits resulted in significant improvement in follow up working level cooperation between GCC staff and the relevant country team members. The lack of such interaction by commanders of PACOM and EUCOM when I served in embassies in their respective areas were missed opportunities.

The next most important step that GCCs can take now is to better leverage the SDO/DATT, who is already a member of the country team. Per a 2007 DOD directive, the SDO/DATT while under COM authority is also subordinate to the GCC with the CCDR or Deputy Commander, GCC the SDO/DATT’s senior rater. They should utilize that dual responsibility to the COM and CCDR through iterative coordination. For example when the GCC is drafting their TCP, especially the theater security cooperation strategy (TSCS) portion, which describes their plan for security cooperation, the
SDO/DATT and the SCO can be of great assistance. They can easily dialogue face-to-face with other offices in the embassy planning foreign assistance.

Being able to leverage the SDO/DATT to better access the experts on the country team is particularly important given the previously described determination that a significant obstacle to implementing security cooperation efforts has been the difficulty planners have had in recognizing and understanding partner nations’ situations and internal dynamics. A Rand study reviewed this deficiency and noted “perhaps most prominent among such obstacles is the difficulty in acquiring reliable information about a partner’s true intentions, composition, capabilities, and internal cohesion – particularly when a partner is a non-state actor that, in an effort to evade the government it is working to undermine, deliberately masks such dynamics.”

Providing this kind of detailed, current and reliable information about a host nation is exactly what the DAO and embassy political section in the country routinely do, and the GCC should leverage their knowledge through the SDO/DATT. From the field they will be able to provide GCC planners located in their headquarters the information they need to develop better plans.

While tactical in nature, there are common frequent missteps made by GCC personnel of an administrative or protocol nature that hurt the overall positive relationship with embassies. There are simple steps the SDO/DATT can take to reduce the chance these mistakes occur if the GCC heeds his guidance. He should review proposed temporary duty (TDY) visits so he can both highlight important ones to the embassy, arrange the appropriate interlocutors for discussions and filter out frivolous trips. Providing advance warning and coordination for a TDY most often results in good
support by the country team, whereas when the embassy first finds out via the DCM seeing an electronic country clearance request (eCCR) it does not, especially if the trip is for a big initiative such as trainers or significant item of equipment. Scheduling public affairs events such as a visit by the Ambassador to a training site and so forth can provide a great boost to a security cooperation program, but requires close coordination with the country team. Relatedly, the GCC should not overuse Title 10 authorities to circumvent the routine country eCCR process. Given the increased emphasis on embassies regarding force protection, need to maintain accountability and have viable plans for personnel recovery, this is no longer just an administrative issue. As a matter of routine the leader of all military TDY groups of personnel should offer to hold a call on COM, SDO/DATT or relevant country team members at beginning of their visit and an out brief at the conclusion. When possible the GCC should attempt to use the same personnel for repeat visits as it not only builds the relationship better with partner nation interlocutors, but also with embassy officers who are usually on two years or longer assignments in country.

GCCs should consider having SCOs adopt the more balanced approach between training management and equipment sales historically taken by some joint U.S. military assistance groups (JUSMAG)s in PACOM. While on the homepage website for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) their listed mission statement refers broadly to “security cooperation”, there is a separate tab for “Major Arms Sales”, but there is no corresponding tab labelled for major training or education programs. Just as the website is oriented towards equipment sales, there has been a corresponding tendency to staff SCO positions in embassies with officers with an
acquisition and technical background and place language-qualified foreign area officers in the Defense Attaché Office (DAO). However, several successful SCOs in PACOM, like the JUSMAGs in Korea and the Philippines, have a significant number of officers who have language skills and repeat tours in country. This fosters their relationships with the officers of the partner nation. Results include the U.S. Ambassador to Korea describing JUSMAG-Korea as being “truly at the very heart of our long-lasting Alliance.”

A CCDR emphasis on the SCO’s role in broader security cooperation will pay dividends. In SOUTHCOM several recent Military Group – Colombia (the title of the SCO in that country) commanders were personally selected by the SOUTHCOM commander and subsequently achieved excellent performance reviews.

If there are significant special operations forces activities planned, such as training of partner nation forces, the GCC and TSOC should deploy a SOCFWD. As previously noted they played a valuable role in security cooperation successes in both Colombia and Philippines. Deploying a joint task force (JTF) into a forward area like AFRICOM’s CJTF-HOA in Djibouti is another solution to improving coordination with country teams.

Obstacles to Implementation of These Practical Measures

The physical distance between GCC headquarters and the country teams, despite modern video conference technology, has been and will continue to be an obstacle to building closer relationships. Recommend the GCC use its relatively larger budget, pool of personnel and means of transportation for visits with the country teams as often as possible. Again, the in-country presence of SDO/DATT, SCO and SOCFWD if present, who are have strong links to the GCC, can help mitigate. Likely based on their training at service staff colleges, military planners are typically uncomfortable with
the DOS and USAID practice of minimal reliance on doctrine and emphasis on personal experience and ad hoc relationships dependent on individuals. The DOS and USAID officers assigned to the GCCs, such as the POLAD, can assist in familiarizing GCC staffers with their offices’ organizational culture. For example, the relationship between a COM and country team and their regional bureau can vary with COM. GCC planners must recognize that possibility and take it into consideration when planning as appropriate.

Country team members may not be familiar with or even skeptical of “military” assistance, with even some Ambassadors expressing concern that with the growth of military activity it has become difficult to monitor them. The SDO/DATT and his team should make an effort on behalf of the GCC with country team members to explain the military’s emphasis on security cooperation. This is especially important with regard to public diplomacy sections and USAID field offices overseas, who typically have had less experience than political sections interacting with the military. However, USAID has made changes too and on the homepage of their Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (CMC) it states in bold-faced letters “it is USAID policy for its personnel to cooperate with DoD.” CMC is quite active in helping to align development and defense efforts and they are involved in outreach and educating others about USAID.

Conclusion

This paper described the important role that security cooperation has in national security strategy. There have been both successes and setbacks in carrying it out and shortcomings exist in the structural mechanism for implementing security cooperation. However, while there are many recommendations about how to make changes to the architecture, so far they remain theoretical and there is no indication that will change in
the near future. Given that setting, I argue GCCs can themselves take measures in how they implement it on ground, in country, that will improve results. An additional advantage is that most of these recommendations will not require additional funds.

In order to change how GCCs implement security cooperation now, CCDRs and their senior staff should routinely engage with Ambassadors and their country teams. They should leverage the SDO/DATTs and SCOs and through them the relevant members of the country team, especially the Political, Political-Military and Public Diplomacy sections and USAID Field Offices. In his biography of Robert Komer, U.S. Army War College Professor Frank Jones described Komer’s efforts to implement the Carter Doctrine. Jones noted that while the doctrine focused on the military instrument, it relied on DOS leadership and U.S. diplomats in the region to support it. Jones continued, “….this is where personal relations are critical. Good relations are forged by working one-on-one with a counterpart and ensuring strategy meets other individuals’ concerns. When it does not, the strategist must adjust it to meet those circumstances.”

Endnotes


5 Ibid., 10


8 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), II-35.


10 Ibid.


15 LTC Chris Muller, previously SDO/DATT, U.S. Embassy, Dominican Republic, interview by author, January 6, 2016.


17 Muller, interview by author.


23 Ibid., viii


28 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Force Assistance, viii.

29 Ibid., III-12, figure III-2.

30 Ibid., II-3.

31 Ibid., I-13, figure II-1.


34 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 29, 2011), Appendix C.


U.S. Congress, Senate, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, 12.
