Landpower and Coercion

by

Colonel Kevin P. Wolfla
United States Army

United States Army War College
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The evolving discussion of Strategic Landpower has tended to build on lessons learned through more than a decade of prolonged stability operations, which crowds out analysis of other common uses of landpower, particularly coercion. Coercive strategies will play an increasingly important role in securing national interests as the U.S. rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, where landpower proved vital to successful U.S. coercion during the Cold War and continues to serve as a deterrent there. Airpower and seapower may have more strategic agility than landpower, but coercion theory would suggest their agility makes them a weaker signal, both to adversaries and allies, of commitment and a willingness to escalate or de-escalate as necessary. As U.S. land forces remain stationed in and operating throughout the Asia-Pacific region, strategists and planners should do more than rhetorically state the deterrent value of force posture, presence, and security cooperation activities, and examine the most effective ways to leverage landpower for both compellence and deterrence.
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To inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing directly; it can only make people behave to avoid it.

—Thomas C. Schelling

For military professionals and security policy makers in the 21st century, the mention of military coercion likely calls to mind the image of aircraft and missiles. Airpower proponents find proof of its coercive potency in the concessions made by Saddam Hussein after Operation Desert Storm and Slobodan Milosevic after Operation Allied Force. Modern precision weapons permit finely tuned pressure on an adversary and relatively short response times facilitate escalation control, all while limiting the numbers of potential U.S. casualties, making air strikes increasingly the preferred instrument for coercion. The only question for some remains whether airpower coerces best by denying the adversary’s military goals, as suggested by Robert Pape, or by decapitating or separating the adversary leadership from its power base, as advocated by John Warden. Yet few airpower enthusiasts would go so far as to claim that it alone can deter or compel an adversary in any situation. Indeed, Desert Storm and Allied Force suggests airpower coerces best in combination with the credible threat of landpower, and given the ascendance of insurgencies and hybrid threats that complicate targeting from the air the need for coercive landpower to complement airpower will likely increase.

Following the initial flurry of activity when the Strategic Landpower Task Force published its seminal white paper in 2013, the subsequent discussion and debate of the nature and implications of Strategic Landpower seems paradoxically to have cooled down precisely at the time that conflict in the land domain had once again heated up in
Ukraine and the Middle East. Perhaps these crises demonstrate the enduring relevance of landpower, obviating the need for a debate of its theory. More cynically, the tapering off of the Strategic Landpower discussion may instead reflect that, following the completion of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), landpower proponents have simply begun a period of quiet reflection in preparation for the next round of debates before of the next QDR. Regardless, one aspect that went under evaluated in the flurry of earlier articles and papers was the employment of Strategic Landpower explicitly for deterrence and compellence. To be sure, many writers alluded to the deterrent value of Strategic Landpower, but few attempted even a superficial exploration of landpower’s potential contributions to coercive strategies. In a notable exception, Robert Chamberlain enumerated some of the coercive advantages of employing landpower in a strategy aimed at China that he dubbed “containment-lite.”

Scenarios abound for exploring the utility of landpower for deterrence or compellence involving the U.S., China, and any number of other regional actors, but Chamberlain focused on the broad aspects of a realist approach to foreign policy and did not examine the details of landpower employment through the lens of coercion theory.

This paper will attempt to remedy the neglect of Strategic Landpower’s role in military coercion by 1) exploring the relevance of conventional coercion today, 2) applying theory to establish critical factors for successful deterrence and compellence, and 3) assessing the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of landpower for deterrence and compellence. Given the heightened interest in America’s current and future role in the Asia-Pacific, the region will serve as the backdrop for this paper in both the historical
underpinnings of coercion theory, and the potential for applying landpower in future coercive strategies.

Coercion’s Enduring Relevance

Diplomacy, information, and economics have natural limits on their ability to influence the choices of other states that may harm U.S. interests. By threatening the use of force, however, coercion combines the diplomatic, informational, economic and military levers of national power to pursue national security goals through ways short of general war. Despite the term’s negative connotation, coercion, when used most effectively, includes positive inducements as well as threats, but it is the threat that ultimately causes the change in the target’s behavior. One of the earliest proponents of modern coercion theory, Thomas Schelling noted, “It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice….” Schelling famously introduced the term compellence as the obverse of deterrence, with the former intended to cause one’s opponent to act, and the latter to prevent one’s opponent from acting. He also used the term coercive diplomacy to describe situations where the military strategy is subsumed under the foreign policy strategy and the coercive action-reaction-counteraction plays out in place of diplomatic negotiations. Alexander George later used the term quite differently to describe a practice where threats of force merely contributed to the larger diplomatic effort rather than superseding it.

When strictly considering the military aspects of coercion or coercive diplomacy these nuances may be distinctions without a difference. Once the national leadership decides upon a coercive strategy, the military provides the force to carry out the threat. Likewise, while perhaps useful for considering specific activities and operations, the
distinction between compellence and deterrence may be unnecessary in most cases. “Both actions ultimately boil down to inducing the adversary to choose a different policy than it otherwise would.” Unless specified otherwise, throughout this paper coercion is used to describe both.

Coercion has been a prominent feature of international relations since antiquity, and no region of the world holds more potential for its application today than the Asia-Pacific. When the National Security Strategy (NSS) and QDR point to the imperative of securing U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, observers reflexively conclude this aims to counter the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a rising global power, China in particular competes with the U.S. for regional influence and control, sometimes pursuing interests directly opposed to America’s. While sudden crises requiring immediate coercion have proven the exception rather than the rule in recent decades, both sides continually engage in general coercion. The mutual coercion occasionally comes into sharp focus surrounding issues like ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan and arms sales to Taiwan. The perennial possibility of a clash between the world’s two greatest powers predictably has led to a proliferation of informed policy recommendations that range from containment to accommodation to variations in between.

While both the U.S. and PRC governments have agreed that direct confrontation benefits neither side, that does not rule out the possibility of conflict between one of them and other regional actors, or confrontation between regional actors that involves neither the U.S. nor China. Alliance commitments might compel the U.S. to respond in some cases, but even when none of the parties in a conflict are allies, overwhelming
interests may lead to U.S. military action. Both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm all stand as precedents for the U.S. entering conflicts that did not involve treaty allies. In Asia today, potential flash points, including India-Pakistan, India-China, and China-Russia might once again impel U.S. military action.\textsuperscript{19}

Many of the longstanding disputes in the Asia-Pacific appear intractable, yet parties to these disputes, as elsewhere throughout the world, have historically employed warnings and threats in attempts to persuade their adversary before resorting to war. Escalation and ultimately eruption of conflict remain ever-present risks, yet when mutual coercion persists, it does so out of each side’s belief that the other side will yield before crossing the brink.\textsuperscript{20} And although five regional powers apart from the U.S. possess some nuclear weapons capability,\textsuperscript{21} coercion in Asia will most likely remain below the nuclear threshold, whether because of the nuclear taboo or because of the unproven effectiveness of nuclear coercion.\textsuperscript{22} The persistent use of conventional coercion by regional actors pursuing limited aims makes it reasonable to presume that conventional deterrence and compellence will remain essential to U.S. strategy and statecraft in Asia for the foreseeable future. Alexander George summed up governments’ perennial motivation to coerce, as well as the risk coercion subsequently entails:

It must be recognized that coercive diplomacy is a beguiling strategy insofar as it offers an attractive possibility for achieving one’s objective without having to rely on force. However, the very act of engaging in coercive diplomacy strengthens one’s commitment on behalf of the objective, engages further one’s reputation and prestige, and makes it difficult not to take additional action if the effort to intimidate the opponent fails.\textsuperscript{23}

Strategists and planners must certainly account for the possibility and mitigation of failure in their risk assessment of any future attempts at coercion in Asia or
elsewhere, but the “beguiling” chance for success without war makes understanding the theoretical underpinning of coercion all the more essential.

Coercion Theory

Though historians have chronicled the practice of coercion for millennia, modern coercion theory has its origins in the Cold War and developed primarily in the context of nuclear deterrence between the two superpowers. Bernard Brodie referred to this nuclear deterrence as “basic deterrence,” and early on noted its exceptional nature due to the catastrophic implications of failed basic deterrence. Alexander George and Richard Smoke termed nuclear deterrence “strategic deterrence,” which they further distinguished from both deterrence of conventional limited war and deterrence of conflict below limited war, or *sublimited* deterrence. As early as 1974 George and Smoke identified the weakening of the bipolar competition that underpinned strategic deterrence, and they pointed to the need for further development of theories for *limited* and *sublimited* deterrence. Patrick Morgan has more recently noted that since the end of the Cold War, while the nuclear powers have retained their nuclear deterrent largely as a hedge against the resurgence of major conflict, deterrence today occurs almost exclusively below the nuclear threshold, adding further emphasis to the need for consideration of effective conventional coercion.

Yet deterrence is only half of the coercion equation and, as David Baldwin noted, “From a purely semantic standpoint, any deterrent threat can be stated in compellent terms and any compellent threat can be stated in deterrent terms.” This paper will likewise approach coercion holistically, setting aside nuclear factors altogether to explore landpower’s potential role in conventional coercion, and, rather than adopting the less common categories of *limited* and *sublimited* deterrence, instead will borrow
from Patrick Morgan’s later definitions of deterrence types to differentiate *immediate* coercion from *general* coercion. Immediate coercion “concerns the relationship between two opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it.”

General coercion “relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack.” These distinctions have straightforward and important implications for the ways and means applied to a given coercive strategy.

Regardless of whether pursuing immediate or general coercion, the literature on coercion theory offers several key insights that provide a basic framework for developing effective coercive strategies. The most important theoretical insights relate to mechanisms and instruments of coercion, adversary perceptions, and alliance management. In perhaps the most comprehensive contemporary treatment of military coercion, Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman analyze commonly used coercive mechanisms and instruments in an attempt to provide policy makers with an effective approach to pursuing limited war in the post-Cold War era. Examining numerous historical case studies, they conclude that successful coercion requires both applying the proper mechanisms and instruments to high payoff pressure points and achieving escalation dominance. High payoff pressure points must be more than just things the adversary values, they must also be vulnerable to some combination of coercive mechanisms and instruments. The pressure points must, moreover, be something the coercer can credibly put at risk without too high a military, economic, or reputational cost to himself. Coercion failed to halt the North Korean invasion at the outset of the
Korean War in 1950, at least in part because the Truman administration worried that a rapid, overwhelming U.S. response on the Korean peninsula would escalate into total war with the Soviet Union, and therefore applied insufficient pressure.³⁵

To achieve escalation dominance with conventional coercion, selecting mechanisms and instruments must account for a broad range of response options available to the target. Unlike more predictable and clearly conveyed moves and countermoves up the nuclear escalation ladder, targets of conventional coercion can respond not only with a variety of countermeasures that increase the coercing state’s military and political costs, but also with less perceptible moves aimed at increasing the target’s internal political resilience, thereby negating part or all of the coercing state’s pressure.³⁶ For instance, North Korea’s periodic short range missile launches can serve both to remind the U.S. and South Korea of the heavy price of conflict, and as internally directed propaganda demonstrating the continued strength of the Kim regime.

When states attempt to shape the security environment over extended periods through general coercion, escalation dominance becomes even more difficult to achieve than in crisis scenarios where states opt for immediate coercion, because targets of general coercion have more time to find ways to minimize their costs.³⁷ To the extent that the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific intends to forge a more favorable security environment in the face of occasional opposition, strategies must confront the difficulty of sustaining adequate amounts of pressure against the right targets over time. Although Byman and Waxman focus primarily on cases of immediate coercion, their discussion of common coercive mechanisms and instruments has equal applicability to general coercion. Among their five common coercive mechanisms—power base
erosion, decapitation, unrest, general weakening, and denial of objectives—only decapitation appears to apply exclusively to immediate coercion. While each mechanism has distinct advantages and disadvantages depending on the specific vulnerabilities of the target and the overall political context on both sides, the mechanisms generally work best in careful combination.

Choosing a coercive instrument likewise depends on its effectiveness against the target vulnerabilities, its military, economic, and reputational costs to the actor employing coercion, and the nature and intensity of interests on both sides. Major powers often employ air strikes, nuclear threats, invasions and land grabs, sanctions and political isolation, and support for insurgencies. The first three instruments apply mainly to instances of immediate coercion, while the last two, along with support for a mutual adversary of the target, which Byman and Waxman term "second-order coercion," constitute viable instruments for general coercion. In addition to considering the first- and second-order contributions of various instruments, coercing states should also estimate the instruments’ brute force potential, in the event that coercion fails and general war ensues. Like the mechanisms, coercive instruments work best in combinations of two or more in order to achieve synergy and limit adversary options.

A combination of multiple mechanisms and multiple instruments both increases the cumulative pressure on the target and reduces vulnerability to countermeasures. During the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-1955, the initial U.S. threat of naval intervention to deny the Chinese Communists’ military objective of recovering the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu) proved insufficient to stop the artillery bombardment of the islands. Only after raising the possibility of nuclear strikes, which
would have threatened both a general weakening of the PRC and an erosion of the regime’s military support, did Beijing call off the bombardment and agree to relaxing tensions.\textsuperscript{43} It was the combination of threatening conventional and nuclear strikes as the means for denying, weakening, and eroding the support of the Chinese Communist regime that eventually set the conditions necessary for successful coercion.

In his work on coercive diplomacy spanning several decades, Alexander George ultimately concluded that seven conditions “favor” successful coercion, though no single condition proves sufficient.\textsuperscript{44} Based on his extensive analysis of case studies, George concluded three of the seven appear to have the greatest impact on the outcome, and all of them relate to the target’s perceptions. First, coercion will more likely succeed if the target believes his opponent, the state applying coercion, has more at stake than he does and is therefore more motivated to escalate if need be. The coercing state can sometimes manipulate this perception by only demanding the minimum necessary concessions to secure its own vital interests and limiting demands that threaten the target’s vital interests, or by offering inducements that reduce the target’s motivation to resist.\textsuperscript{45} President Kennedy created this condition through his efforts in 1961 to limit damage to U.S. interests by ensuring Laos remained neutral if and when communist Pathet Lao forces seized power. By first preparing forces to deploy to the Lao-Thai border and later ordering several hundred “civilian advisors” in Laos to don their military uniforms, Kennedy consistently signaled his willingness to directly intervene in Laos. At the same time he lowered the stakes for Moscow, Beijing, and Hanoi by seeking Laotian neutrality, rather than committing to the defeat of the communists, as President Eisenhower had.\textsuperscript{46} In contrast, just four years later, President Johnson initiated the
Rolling Thunder air strikes in Vietnam attempting to coerce Hanoi to stop support for the Viet Cong. That pressure effectively increased the stakes for the communists by signaling U.S. intent for total victory in South Vietnam, thus the coercion failed and the conflict expanded.\(^{47}\)

Next, coercion will more likely succeed if the target perceives a sense of urgency to comply with the coercing state’s demand.\(^{48}\) If unambiguous, tangible pressure does not quickly follow the leveling of the threat, the target may not even notice the threat or have to acknowledge the demand. Slow or gradual pressure also affords the target more opportunities to take countermeasures to lessen the pressure or offset its effects on his vital interests. Here the contrast between U.S. approaches in Laos and Vietnam again proves instructive. President Kennedy’s military signaling, combined with statements to the press and diplomacy with the Soviet Union clearly emphasized the requirement for an immediate cease fire between Royal Lao and Pathet Lao forces. Conversely, despite much more intense military pressure in Vietnam, the Johnson administration left it ambiguous how and when he might escalate beyond air strikes, weakening the coercive aspects of using force and simply leading to additional commitments on both sides.\(^{49}\)

Finally, coercion will more likely succeed if the target perceives the actor employing coercion is willing to escalate to levels of violence that the target cannot accept.\(^{50}\) Willingness to escalate may correlate closely with motivation asymmetry, but goes beyond estimates of relative intensity of interests to incorporate estimates of both sides’ domestic political dynamics as well as international audience effects. Misperceiving one’s relative willingness to escalate can cripple a coercive strategy from
its inception. In August of 1958, Beijing suspected that Washington’s commitment to defending the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan might be weak enough that the Chinese Communists could implement an artillery blockade of the Nationalists’ outpost on Quemoy (Jinmen) Island and force Taipei to abandon the island. During the second week of the blockade, the Eisenhower administration not only committed U.S. forces to escort Nationalist convoys to break the blockade, but also implied the U.S. might intervene with nuclear weapons if the Chinese Communists invaded the island. Once the convoys effectively broke the blockade and after the U.S. signaled its willingness to impose unacceptable costs if the Chinese Communists escalated, Beijing could only hope to score minor diplomatic or propaganda victories from its otherwise failed attempt at coercion.51

The first and third of George’s conditions taken together relate to one other important adversary perception: the credibility but conditionality of a threat, or the idea of giving one’s opponent a true choice.52 Without some assurance that the target will not suffer harm even if he concedes to the coercing state’s demands, the target may only strengthen his resolve to resist in the face of what he perceives as inevitable pain. In this regard, by reassuring the PRC as necessary that the U.S.-Japan security alliance will not escalate horizontally to promote Taiwan independence, the allies and Beijing can engage in mutual general coercion that avoids encroaching on each other’s core interests. President George W. Bush entered office with the express intent of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, but his tenure coincided with that of Taiwan’s pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian, as well, initially, as Japan’s staunchly nationalist Junichiro Koizumi. While Bush and his Japanese counterparts pursued
policies to bolster the bilateral alliance, they clearly opposed efforts by Chen to unilaterally change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, thereby reassuring Beijing that the status quo between Japan and the PRC would also continue and that alliance cooperation would remain limited to preserving Japanese security and regional stability.\textsuperscript{53}

Successfully conveying reassurances as a component of coercion has proved difficult under any circumstances, but that the U.S. and Japan have managed to present consistent reassurances as an alliance stands out as just short of remarkable, given the well-understood challenges of alliance management in coercive strategies. Based on declarations in the 2015 NSS\textsuperscript{54} and, more broadly, on the general trend toward collective action to shape some of the most important aspects of the security environment,\textsuperscript{55} the complexities of alliance politics will continue to weigh heavily on U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Fortunately, many of the case studies used to develop coercion theory draw on the U.S. Cold War experience in Asia and prove particularly instructive regarding relevant challenges of alliance management. Thomas Christensen has detailed the dynamics in Asia within and between the U.S. and communist camps during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{56} He noted the challenges faced by both sides from what Glenn Snyder termed the “composite security dilemma,” where actors in alliances have to make decisions not only based on how they believe their adversary will behave, but also how their alliance partner(s) will behave, since no two actors have exactly the same incentives.\textsuperscript{57}

Notably, the composite security dilemma exhibits different dynamics in a multipolar system than a bipolar system. In the former, the alliance dilemma of
cooperating or defecting has roughly equal weight as the adversary dilemma of standing firm or conciliating. In a multipolar system, then, an actor will make choices based on how dependent they are on the alliance relative to how dependent other partners are, how explicit the alliance commitments are, how much the actor’s individual interests are in conflict with the adversary (which may differ considerably from alliance partners’ conflicts), and the recent behaviors of all the actors.\textsuperscript{58} In a bipolar system, once the opposing camps form, defection becomes highly unlikely, making the adversary dilemma dominant, though not eliminating the challenges of alliance management. As unlikely as condominium between the great powers or Finlandization of the lesser powers may be, even the mere possibility of a reduction of tensions between adversaries can appear to other coalition members just as frightening as defection or realignment.\textsuperscript{59}

The salience of the composite security dilemma in Asia today thus depends largely on whether a given potential conflict more resembles a bipolar security construct or a multipolar one. An unambiguous confrontation between the U.S. and China along classic Cold War lines would make an “alliance dilemma” less pressing. The two superpowers would not abandon their allies to realign with the adversary, and both would wield strong incentives to stop their allies from realigning.\textsuperscript{60} Yet, while the U.S. has five treaty allies in the region and several other critical security relationships, these do not constitute a “U.S. bloc.” Likewise, the Chinese have a less formal, but equally diffuse set of regional security relations, so, absent a specific crisis, the region exhibits many characteristics of a multipolar structure. Consequently, during peacetime and even potentially in some third party confrontations, U.S. and Chinese preferences may
be more ambiguous or at least less intense. In that case, the “alliance dilemma” and “adversary dilemma” carry more equal weight and the composite security dilemma pertains.

Ideally, decisions on alliance management ultimately rest with the political leadership, but military policymakers and strategists must appreciate the ramifications of issues that fall within their purview. Overseas force posture and security cooperation policies and strategies that are developed in a non-crisis context potentially have significant impact on instances of immediate coercion. In the bipolar construct, withdrawing troops, even a partial withdrawal, may create a sense of abandonment within an alliance.\textsuperscript{61} Similarly, even under conditions of general coercion, increasing, decreasing, or relocating security cooperation activities can impact the composite security dilemma.

In addition to the theoretical propositions drawn largely from case studies, recent empirical analysis of a robust dataset of instances of military compellent threats has shed new light on theory, identifying factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of successful coercion. Two key findings clarify the importance of adversary perceptions, with specific implications for coercive mechanisms and instruments as well as alliance management. The data shows that states which used demonstrations or mobilizations to signal their willingness to employ force were far more likely to succeed than those that did not.\textsuperscript{62} On the other hand, mutual coercion between states with a history of frequent military threats undermines assurances and perception of threat conditionality to the point that challengers frequently fail to gain concessions from their target.\textsuperscript{63} While more than anecdotal, these strong empirical correlations only touch on a small fraction
of the conditions required for successful coercion. Algorithms cannot yet replace informed judgment in the development of military strategies, so the employment of coercion will continue to depend on a careful consideration of the theoretical propositions outlined above.

Landpower as a Viable Means for Coercion

In light of the preceding theoretical discussion of coercion, one can now begin to answer questions regarding the role landpower can and should play. Specifically, is landpower feasible, acceptable, and suitable for conventional coercion? While there may be disagreement over whether coercion is a policy, an element of foreign policy, a strategy, or an art, rather than use these three criteria to validate the use of landpower, this analysis will adopt them to help illuminate some of the advantages and disadvantages of coercive landpower for strategists to consider.

Whether the U.S. will continue to have the means to feasibly employ landpower for coercion depends on both its capability to credibly threaten an adversary and its capacity to do so for sufficient duration and at sufficient scale. Much of the discussion over the evolving understanding of Strategic Landpower concerns the ongoing debate on landpower’s capabilities in the “human domain” distinct from its traditional role in the land domain. This debate crowds out any discussion of the strategic significance of landpower capabilities for conventional coercion. Analysts and commentators often mention deterrence as one of the desired effects of properly employed Strategic Landpower, yet few provide any details on how to achieve deterrence. Perhaps they take landpower’s coercive capability for granted based on history, or on the continued forward basing of land forces in places like South Korea or Japan. Yet minimizing or
ignoring its future use elsewhere, for deterrence or compellence risks failing to fully consider its strengths and weaknesses, thereby diminishing the capability.

Nonetheless, coercive capability remains inherent in the Army’s doctrinal definition of landpower: “The ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.” While coercion necessarily requires an ability to threaten the target, one can too easily infer this “threat” to be immediate and tactical, either marginalizing consideration of landpower’s strategic potential to prevent conflict, or creating an overly aggressive, escalatory impression when trying to use landpower for general coercion. Conceptualizing it in a way that better articulates its broadest application, including general coercion, the Australian scholar Michael Evans offers an alternative definition: “landpower is the ability in peace, crisis and war to exert timely and sustained influence or control over, or from, land.”

By essentially trading “influence” for “threat,” this definition expands the utility of landpower beyond its brute force potential for invasion and conquest. Landpower’s unique ability to control certainly underwrites influence and remains the latent threat, but strategists can maximize landpower’s capabilities for both general and immediate coercion by modulating the explicitness of the threat to sharpen its influence. Forward deployed and regionally engaged land forces offer capabilities supporting a variety of coercive mechanisms and instruments. When properly organized, led, trained and equipped, they have the versatility to support second-order general coercion through security cooperation one day, then switching to immediate coercion by threatening to directly deny the enemy’s objectives the next, provided the U.S. military and political
leadership are willing to employ them that way. The combinations of capabilities are virtually unlimited, dependent only on capacity.

In an age of constrained resources, the overall capacity of the U.S. to use landpower for coercion hinges largely on investment decisions for the quantities and organization of specific capabilities to meet requirements across the spectrum of conflict and range of military operations (ROMO). Credible coercion requires a force capable of exerting pressure at the high end, while versatile coercion requires a force that can readily transition from one end to the other and back. In the absence of a crisis, land forces can strike a balance between preparation for the most likely contingencies and steady state demands for general coercion across the globe. However, when an unforeseen crisis arises that focuses some portion of that balanced force on one or the other end of the ROMO, the remainder of the force has less capacity to respond to another contingency, yet that is paradoxically when coercion may be most required in order to forestall or avert the next, potentially overwhelming, crisis. Mitigating this paradox requires ensuring land forces have the capacity to respond when and where coercive landpower proves most suitable to meet Joint Force Commanders’ needs.

Even if U.S. land forces’ capacity remains low or decreases further, working in partnership with foreign land forces can mitigate some deficiencies. Relying on partners naturally carries with it the challenges both of alliance management and second-order coercion. For Asia, some have suggested taking a new and markedly different federated approach rather than adding to the already complex hub and spoke alliance system there. Federated defense would involve getting regional allies and partners to work better together—integration, not just cooperation—sharing capabilities and
capacities in pursuit of common goals.\textsuperscript{74} In principle this could vastly increase the potential landpower capacity for collective coercion, but it would be constrained by the political willingness of each prospective partner and, as described in the discussion of the composite security dilemma, introduces risks that must be addressed when considering its acceptability.

In his risk assessment accompanying the 2014 QDR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, highlights the need for forces that are capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict, postured to deter adversaries, and ready “for both our known commitments and for inevitable surprise.”\textsuperscript{75} He goes on to identify land forces capacity as a notable risk in the QDR force. Taken together, these points suggest the intention to wield credible, versatile coercive landpower capabilities in order to forestall a future requirement to defeat a highly capable adversary with a large land force that the U.S. cannot currently afford.

Given the abundant historical precedents, America’s use of landpower for coercion does not so much pose the question of is it or isn’t it acceptable, but of when and how much is acceptable, based on a particular context. Mutual defense treaties demonstrate the ongoing U.S. acceptance of and commitment to maintaining a landpower deterrent in South Korea and Japan. While strengthening this legacy of Cold War coercion remains the centerpiece of regional security efforts, recent changes to landpower employment have emerged in the region. With no obvious threat to Australia, the plan for rotational basing of Marines on its northern coast\textsuperscript{76} offers strategists a new option in the region capable of both compellence and deterrence, as does the Army’s recently introduced security cooperation program, Pacific Pathways, which will
eventually deploy forces several times a year to train sequentially with multiple regional partners. Where previously the posture of U.S land forces in Asia constituted a deterrent threat, these more flexible combinations of posture and security cooperation suggest a need to update considerations for landpower’s acceptability in compellent strategies.

The first consideration relates to commitment. Perhaps more than any other form of power, employing landpower for coercion requires political courage and resolve, considering the implications not only of failing to achieve escalation dominance and the possible eruption of general war, but also the implications of complete success. Rather than just punishment using air strikes or sanctions, even short of conflict, landpower implies an intent to control the adversary, which may require additional follow-on commitments. If gaining concessions from the target requires the employment of land forces, strategists must consider how the target will respond after they are withdrawn. Likewise, one must anticipate how the successful use of coercive landpower will affect the behavior and expectations of allies and partners. Not least of all, the strategist must consider the constraints of domestic politics. Lukas Milevski summarizes the high political stakes for using landpower.

Control is ownership, and when that ownership rules over the future of a foreign country, it will be closely scrutinized by all, for reasons that may be moral, political, strategic, or educative. Onlookers, even allies and domestic constituents, may disagree on the desirability of the new character of power manipulation.…

The second consideration, not wholly divorced from the first, relates to cost, both in the potential for casualties and in the financing of operations. In theory coercion can be reduced to a cost-benefit model, but not without acknowledging the many shortcomings of applying rational decision making models to state decision making.
Yet national leaders debating whether and how to use military force can much more easily estimate costs than benefits, particularly discrete quantities of manpower and materiel. The benefits of coercion—the target’s concessions—are likely much harder to quantify, particularly if they are an action, or worse, the ceasing of an action. So, without elaborate efforts to quantify all factors in the analysis, the cost-benefit equation pits a subjective valuation of the benefit against an objective estimate of the costs. For strategies of general coercion intended to maintain long term pressure on the target, the objective landpower costs will continue to accumulate, while the subjective benefit will remain constant, or perhaps even decline in perceived value if observers begin to assume after many months or years that conditions will not change. South Korea has seen the slow, steady withdrawal of the U.S. ground force deterrent for several decades at least in part because North Korea has not demonstrated a credible and urgent threat of invasion. In the absence of an imminent crisis, posture and security cooperation initiatives like the Marines’ rotational forces and the Army’s Pacific Pathways will continue to face questions of their acceptability. These doubts have been and may continue to be offset by framing security cooperation as a routine tool of peaceful diplomacy, but preparing land forces strictly for military diplomacy may leave them un- or underprepared for coercive contingencies, and therefore less suitable for achieving strategic objectives.

As with acceptability, history has shown landpower to be generally suitable for coercion, but the theoretical factors outlined above permit a critical evaluation of specifically under what conditions landpower might be more or less suitable. Threatening to employ landpower signals a high degree of motivation because of its
implications for commitment and cost mentioned above. Not as responsive as air or naval power for punishing a belligerent adversary and often viewed as a force of last resort in many crises, landpower therefore has become the ultimate expression of resolve to both ally and adversary. Yet landpower’s unique ability to “take” from an adversary\(^{81}\) can raise the stakes for the target and undo the perception of asymmetric motivation. U.S. land forces in South Korea create different perceptions in the North Korean regime than land forces in Japan create in either Beijing or Pyongyang. Therefore, landpower must be employed in a way that does not unnecessarily threaten the target’s vital interests\(^{82}\) and that offers assurances of conditionality.\(^{83}\)

In general, landpower does little to instill a sense of urgency in the target to concede to the coercing state. Except at a fairly small scale, or when employed within or adjacent to its homeland, landpower lacks sufficient rapid, strategic mobility to respond to an unforeseen crisis quickly enough to limit the target’s ability to take diplomatic, military, or domestic political actions to mitigate the long-fused threat. Moreover, once deployed, the cost of sustaining landpower overseas permits the target to hope it can outlast the coercing state.\(^{84}\) Forward postured or rotationally deployed U.S. land forces at least partially offset the first of these two limitations, though their effectiveness will depend on the scale of coercive threat required for a given scenario. It remains critical, then, for the U.S. to sustain access to places like Okinawa, northern Australia, and, increasingly, the Philippines in order to have a coercive landpower option like the one the Kennedy administration threatened during the Laos Crisis of 1960-1961, when Marines prepared to deploy from Okinawa to the Lao-Thai border.\(^{85}\) Otherwise, initiating the mobilization of land forces in the continental U.S., particularly in conjunction with
strategic mobility assets, may have some, though much weaker, coercive effect by signaling intent to escalate.

The advantages and disadvantages of landpower for achieving escalation dominance differs between immediate coercion and general coercion. In immediate coercion, escalation dominance depends less on the nature of landpower than on stakeholders’ willingness to employ it. Human costs factor heavily in the decision to introduce U.S. land forces into a crisis, so an adversary can discount the likelihood of landpower escalation, particularly when no vital interests are at stake or national leaders oppose an escalation. With general coercion, on the other hand, if the U.S. has already deemed land force employment acceptable in a low-risk environment, an adversary escalation will more likely cause a U.S. counter escalation. Otherwise, withdrawal of ground forces may subject the political leadership to accusations of “cutting and running.” Moreover, failing to reinforce troops under fire likewise may increase political costs to a point where it outweighs the increased risk of casualties and the increased costs of sustaining a larger land force.

With respect to coercive mechanisms, landpower acts by threatening direct attack or supporting an insurgency in combination with other coercive instruments to achieve the greatest effectiveness. Merely by threatening invasion, landpower on its own has limited ability to weaken an adversary, deny its military objectives, or separate a regime’s leadership from its power base, because the time and resources needed to employ landpower make escalation dominance more difficult. However, by introducing a landpower threat as an escalation to ongoing air strikes, embargo, or blockade the threat increases from sanctions and punitive strikes to limited war, and the target regime
leadership must consider the possibility not only of losing that war, but also the possibility of losing its ability to govern. Landpower by itself can constitute the primary coercive instrument by supporting insurgency to either weaken the target state, erode the target regime’s power base, or deny its military objectives. But this approach may incur high political costs, particularly due to the uncertain degree of control over the insurgents.

Finally, U.S. landpower has distinct advantages for managing the composite security dilemma inherent in coercive alliances and coalitions. This advantage results in part from the galvanizing power that the commitment of U.S. land forces will likely provide to a coalition. In turn, this serves to reassure the target that U.S. interests are most likely to predominate rather than those of a lesser coalition member that might have more aggressive intentions toward the adversary. Risk to the U.S. of entrapment by a lesser ally does not entirely disappear, but because employing landpower signals such strong commitment, when an ally appears willing to drag the U.S. into unnecessary conflict, then withholding, scaling down, or redirecting landpower support can signal disapproval to the ally and reassurance to an adversary.

Conclusions

It may appear obvious that landpower, like all forms of military power, must have some role in conventional coercion, but simply asserting landpower’s potential does not guarantee its effectiveness. In order to advocate how landpower should be used for coercion, proponents must first consider what makes U.S. landpower useful. More than any other coercive instrument, employing landpower signals a firm commitment and strong motivation to escalate further if necessary. Airpower and seapower have inherent agility to rapidly threaten an adversary, but that agility allows them just as easily to
withdraw. The effort and cost of deploying and sustaining landpower overseas, along with the risk of larger numbers of casualties, demonstrates a political willingness to accept that cost and risk, potentially for extended durations.

Landpower’s disadvantage in strategic mobility also suggests it can be more useful for general coercion than immediate coercion. The static nature of forward based landpower places obvious limits on its deterrent value, particularly in a theater as large as the Asia-Pacific. Yet many, if not most current operations intended to demonstrate a U.S. presence are often conducted by air and naval forces that only linger briefly. The wide variety of land force security cooperation activities conducted throughout the theater, especially exercises, offer the best tools for general coercion, but strategists should think beyond the benevolent aspirations of partnership building and more deliberately weave coercive threads into security cooperation plans.

Finally, landpower’s signal of commitment can prove useful to stabilize alliance and coalition behavior in a way that reassures the adversary of the conditionality of the threat. As the U.S. government increasingly prioritizes its relations and activities in the Asia-Pacific region, avoiding great power war with China hinges as much on managing U.S. alliance relationships as it does on the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship. Japan and South Korea host large U.S. deterrent forces, but policies and strategies must ensure U.S. forces do not become hostages of the allies’ interests. Policy makers must understand how to manipulate the composite security dilemma and be willing to alter longstanding approaches to land force posture, presence, and security cooperation if the risk of doing “business as usual” outweighs the reward.

Endnotes


8 Chamberlain, “Back to Reality.”


10 Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 3.

11 Ibid., 69-72.

12 Ibid., 32.

13 George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 5.


21 The other Asia-Pacific nuclear weapons states are Russia, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan.


23 George, Forceful Persuasion, xv.


26 Ibid., 32-34.


30 Ibid.

31 The coercive mechanisms and instruments roughly correspond to the more popularly used terms ways and means. The more commonly used mechanisms include eroding the target regime’s support base, spurring popular unrest with a regime, regime decapitation, weakening the target country as a whole, and denying the target’s military success. The major instruments consist of air strikes, invasions and land grabs, threat of nuclear attack, sanctions and international isolation (via military embargo or blockade), and support for an insurgency. Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, 27-28, 50, 88.


33 Ibid., 30.

34 Ibid., 44.


37 Ibid., 40-42.

38 Ibid., 50.

39 Ibid., 87-88.

40 Ibid., 82-85.

41 Ibid., 120.

42 Ibid., 85.

43 George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 288-292.
George’s complete set of conditions is clarity of the objective, strength of motivation, asymmetry of motivation, sense of urgency, adequate domestic and international support, opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation, and clarity of the terms of settlement. George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 75.

George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 77.


George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 78.


George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 79.

George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, 363-367.

Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 74.


Christensen, *Worse Than a Monolith*, 1-17.


Ibid., 471-475.

Ibid., 487.

Ibid., 484.

Ibid., 487.

Ibid., 487.


Ibid., 187.

Army strategists and planners commonly use these three criteria to test the viability of an option. “Feasibility, Suitability, and Acceptability (FAS): Once potential strategy options are
identified, each option must be examined to determine feasibility (Do we have the means to execute the ways?), acceptability (Does it have necessary constituent support? Is it legal? Ethical? Worth the cost?) and suitability (Will it achieve the objectives?). This evaluation process, often described as a “FAS test,” enables the strategist to evaluate the likelihood of success for each option and to select that strategy deemed most likely to attain the objectives with available means and in an acceptable way.” United States Army War College, National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2014): A-5.

65 George, Forceful Persuasion, ix; Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 1-2; George, Forceful Persuasion, xi; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 34.


71 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3.

72 Cone, Operationalizing Strategic Landpower, 8.

73 Oxford Dictionaries Online defines Federate: (With reference to a number of states or organizations) to form or be formed into a single centralized unit, within which each state or organization keeps some internal autonomy. Oxford Dictionaries Online, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/federate (accessed January 21, 2015).


75 Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 59-60.
76 Ibid., 24.


78 Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares,” 11.

79 Ibid., 14.


81 Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares,” 7.

82 George, Forceful Persuasion, 77.

83 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 74.

84 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 100-101.


86 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 136.

87 Ibid., 100-102.

88 Ibid., 117-120.

89 Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith, 4.