A Win-Win Design for Pacific Pathways

by

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As Americans, we tend to view situations through our own cultural lens with, sometimes, insufficient consideration of the perspectives or interests of others. Although many countries, to include the United States, are facing similar security dynamics in the 21st Century, each represents a range of historical narratives, experiences, backgrounds, and traditions that have direct impact on their policy and decision-making. In the Asia-Pacific region, each country is pursuing their own path to security balancing U.S. security cooperation with trade and investment links to China. To enhance success, U.S. Army Pacific Pathways design should incorporate, fuse, and balance host nation security cooperation priorities and evolving military roles and missions with U.S. strategic and military objectives in the region. This will help ensure that Pacific Pathways garners host nation domestic support and funding, compliments ongoing diplomatic and economic efforts of the United States, and avoids causing any unintentional negative influences on the strategic objectives of all participants.

Security Cooperation, Partnership, Engagement, Strategic Environment, Allies and Partners
A Win-Win Design for Pacific Pathways

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Abstract

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As Americans, we tend to view situations through our own cultural lens with, sometimes, insufficient consideration of the perspectives or interests of others. Although many countries, to include the United States, are facing similar security dynamics in the 21st Century, each represents a range of historical narratives, experiences, backgrounds, and traditions that have direct impact on their policy and decision-making. In the Asia-Pacific region, each country is pursuing their own path to security balancing U.S. security cooperation with trade and investment links to China. To enhance success, U.S. Army Pacific Pathways design should incorporate, fuse, and balance host nation security cooperation priorities and evolving military roles and missions with U.S. strategic and military objectives in the region. This will help ensure that Pacific Pathways garners host nation domestic support and funding, compliments ongoing diplomatic and economic efforts of the United States, and avoids causing any unintentional negative influences on the strategic objectives of all participants.
A Win-Win Design for Pacific Pathways

As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision--as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future….So let there be no doubt: In the Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century, the United States of America is all in.

−Barack Obama
President of the United States

As Americans, we tend to have a distinct worldview and a solid set of beliefs about America’s place in that world. We view America as having a leading role in shaping the international order based on our principles and our relatively short history as a nation. Naturally, we tend to view situations through our own cultural lens with, sometimes, insufficient consideration of the perspectives or interests of others. When considering the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, it is inappropriate to characterize this vast area of the world as a homogenous entity. References to “Asia” are often made as a matter of convenience, but in reality refer to widely varying peoples and cultures. Although many countries, to include the United States, are facing similar security dynamics and dilemmas in the 21st Century, each represents a range of historical narratives, experiences, backgrounds, and traditions that have a direct impact on their policy and decision-making. Notably diverse political systems, internal domestic security situations, and international outlooks underlie the foundation of each Asia-Pacific nation.

One common consideration for nearly all Asian-Pacific countries is their relationship with China. Smaller powers in the region worry about a more confident and diplomatically assertive China. Although these smaller powers benefit from China’s economic growth, they are concerned with China’s growing military power. Despite the
U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, each country in the region is pursuing its own path to security and many, especially those outside the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty System, want to retain some freedom of action in coping with the evolving U.S.-China relationship.⁷ Although interested in security cooperation with the United States, most are unwilling to jeopardize trade and investment links with China and wish to remain on good terms with Beijing.⁸

The U.S. rebalance policy began as a ‘whole-of-government’ approach, but because the military was the most organized, visible, and easiest to move around, the rebalance appeared, to some, to be focused more heavily on security. Many Asian-Pacific countries regard the U.S. as a vital guarantor of security in the global commons, but in terms of alliance and partnership management, no amount of reassurance is excessive.⁹ If nations lose confidence in the U.S. ability to serve as this guarantor, they could embark on potentially destabilizing security initiatives or become more accommodating to Chinese demands.¹⁰

U.S. Army Pacific Pathways offers one approach to providing this reassurance to partners in the Asia Pacific region. In addition to building relationships and enhancing interoperability between military units at the operational level, it is a strategic way to build and maintain confidence in U.S. security commitments to the region. Although there are no prohibitions, vis-à-vis Chinese relations, on participation in Pacific Pathways, the design of the security cooperation programs included on the Pathway need to support the strategic political position of each country to ensure they are nested with, and complement, each country’s ultimate interests and objectives in the region.¹¹
To enhance the concept, Pacific Pathways design should incorporate, fuse, and balance host nation security cooperation priorities and evolving military roles and missions with U.S. strategic and military objectives in the region. This will help ensure that Pacific Pathways garners host nation domestic support and funding, compliments ongoing diplomatic and economic efforts of the U.S., and avoids causing any unintentional negative influences on the strategic objectives of all participants.

Beginning with Japan, this paper will provide a brief look at the regional security concerns, security cooperation priorities, and evolving military roles and missions of five Asia-Pacific countries projected on a future Pathway and three that currently are not. Combining this analysis with underlying regional concerns about the U.S. rebalance to the Pacific, the paper then offers future design considerations for Pacific Pathways to advance common security cooperation priorities, nest training with host nation evolving military capabilities, integrate with other interagency partners, and drive demand signals for future resource allocation.

Japan

Japan’s consideration of constitutional changes and proposed revisions to the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines indicates a transformation in the country’s security outlook as well as its view of Japan’s place in the international security arena. Facing serious security threats from China’s recent expanded maritime and airspace claims, particularly in the Senkaku Islands, as well as North Korean aggression, the Japanese government perceives broad public support for taking steps to strengthen its defense.\textsuperscript{12} Japan’s Dynamic Defense Force concept includes strengthening the defense of offshore islands, enhancing U.S.-Japan security cooperation, increasing engagement with South East Asian countries, and participation in global security objectives.\textsuperscript{13}
Incorporating the Japanese Self Defense Force’s (SDF) variety of new roles and missions into the operational design of Pacific Pathways promotes this transformation.

The Japanese 2005-2009 Mid-Term Defense Program established a Central Readiness Force comprised of mobile and special units underneath one command that oversees deployments and mobile operations focused on countering offensive operations on one or more small southwestern islands. Viewing a potential power vacuum created by the departure of 9000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa, Japan’s Ministry of Defense accelerated efforts to enhance capabilities to respond swiftly and seamlessly to attacks on offshore islands. Initiatives included improving SDF rapid deployment ability, boosting exercises on offshore islands, and introducing and enhancing ground SDF amphibious operations capabilities. Japan appears to be moving away from heavy Cold War military platforms and toward more agile and flexible equipment adaptable for peacekeeping, disaster relief, and other rapid reaction requirements. The SDF focus on speed, strategic mobility, and strategic reach ties directly to Japan’s concern for security of outlying island territories. Force structure changes and the procurement of lighter equipment illustrate a new strategy to replace regional brigades and divisions with rapid deployment, airborne helicopter, and amphibious brigades. The SDF is also pursuing new Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical reconnaissance vehicles, amphibious assault vehicles, lightweight self-propelled artillery and MV-22 Ospreys.

In the event of external aggression, Japan expects robust support from the U.S. in its defense. To support the dynamic defense concept, Japan’s training priorities for security cooperation are joint and amphibious operations; missile defense and chemical protection; joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities to
include the use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA); cyber and space cooperation; improved interoperability; and joint military exercises defending offshore islands. Japan seeks to increase shared use with the U.S. of new training facilities on Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. One of these locations may prove to be a valuable stop for a Pathway to work with both the U.S. Marines and our Japanese allies. However, the Army must take caution in planning military exercises on or near disputed territory as the Government of Japan or SDF may wish to involve the Army in exercises that may be counter to U.S. national interests. This point reinforces why planning and decision-making for these types of combined military training exercises require diplomatic input and interaction with the U.S. Department of State.

South Korea

Another solid U.S. ally in the region, the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) foreign policy focuses on the Korean ‘peace regime,’ the North Korean nuclear problem, and maintenance of the U.S.-ROK alliance. With concerns for North Korean nuclearization and proliferation, what the ROK views as Japan’s militarization, and China’s increasing assertiveness and military modernization, South Korea already has a full plate of security cooperation initiatives with the United States. Focus, therefore, of Pacific Pathways design in this country should remain on implementing already agreed upon activities - or those in active discussion - rather than identifying any types of new or additional initiatives. With the postponement in October 2014 of the transfer of wartime Operational Control of the South Korean military, the U.S. focus remains on developing ROK capabilities to provide leadership and command and control of its military forces as South Korea moves toward wanting a more reciprocal and equitable relationship.
From the ROK perspective, security cooperation training priorities with the U.S. include combined deterrence actions and enhanced defense capabilities. Two areas of particular emphasis are the development of the South Korean Theater Missile Defense system and realistic exercises based on the full range of possible North Korean actions. Valuable exercises are those focused on contingency planning that re-examine respective U.S. and ROK approaches to planning for unexpected developments in North Korea, with the U.S. in a supporting role on the peninsula. The demand signal from South Korea for U.S. security cooperation has been met for the past six decades with U.S. forces permanently forward-stationed on the peninsula. Therefore, it may be challenging to create an additional resource demand signal for Pacific Pathways in Korea for anything beyond existing security cooperation exercises.

The Philippines

As the largest recipient of U.S. security assistance in the Asia-Pacific region, the Philippine government is largely focused on internal threats from the Communist Party of the Philippines New People’s Army, Southern Philippine secessionist groups, and the Abu Sayyaf Group with extremist ties to Al-Qaeda. Furthermore, maritime security is an area of growing concern for the government. Competing territorial claims of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, specifically Scarborough Shoal and Reed Bank, are causing conflict with China over the right to exploit the possibly extensive reserves of oil and natural gas. The 2014 U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) reopens the use of Philippine bases for U.S. forces, but prohibits any permanently based forces in the country. The EDCA addresses interoperability, capacity building, maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) cooperation. Domestically, there is rather significant
opposition to the return of U.S. military forces to the Philippines, spurring a challenge to the Philippine Supreme Court on the EDCA. Considerable political opposition to establishing closer security cooperation with the U.S. also exists within the government making U.S. military presence more difficult to sustain domestically.26

The annual Balikatan combined military exercise included on the Pathway focuses mainly on the counter-terrorism campaign in the Southern Philippines and aims to counter the internal threats that remain the primary security concern for the country.27 However, improvements to the external defense capabilities of the navy and air force also require attention after many years of neglect due to the primarily internal counter-terrorism focus. The Philippine government views improving naval and maritime air patrol as a way to enhance their capability to defend territorial and maritime claims.

Military planners should exercise caution regarding the Philippines based on a gap that exists between the U.S. views of its obligations under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines and Manila’s expectations. In June 2011, a Filipino Presidential spokesman stated that in the event of armed conflict, Manila expected that the U.S. would come to its aid. The U.S. has stated that the treaty does not cover the disputed islands in the South China Sea.28 Therefore, close coordination with the U.S. Department of State must occur for expanded military cooperation beyond the current Balikatan counter-terrorism focused exercise so as not to show unintentional support for a diplomatically unsupported position.

Australia

Not under the direct threat of any country, Australia is concerned that competition between major regional powers may cause broader instability in the region. Hugh White, from the Australian National University, stated that Australia is trying to avoid
committing itself to either the U.S. or China in a possible confrontation and the Australian government says that both relationships are in good order. The Australian government views a close defense relationship with the U.S. as a core strategic interest and wants to keep the U.S. engaged in the broader security of the Asia-Pacific region. These common interests between Australia and the U.S. provide an opportunity to advance joint and multi-lateral Pacific Pathways exercises by including allies and close partners of both countries’ militaries together.

In 2013, Australia hosted a tri-lateral tabletop exercise between Australia, Indonesia, and the U.S. with a HA/DR Scenario (HADREX 2013) at Robertson Barracks, Darwin, Australia. Australia invited several East Asian Summit member countries to participate or observe the exercise with representatives attending from Cambodia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. One of the stated goals of the exercise was to build habits of mutual respect, trust, and cooperation between militaries and nations to minimize the prospect of tension and miscalculation during other events. Although not the type of training that contributes to high-end readiness of Pacific Pathways forces, including one of these exercises on a Pathway builds relationships and trust that may prove useful in future situations in the region.

The 2011 Force Posture Initiative between the U.S. and Australia allows for the forward-stationing of over 2500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, commits to closer cooperation between air forces, and enhances naval cooperation at Her Majesty’s Australian Ship (HMAS) Stirling. The minimal mention of Army initiatives in this document may be due to the already extensive security cooperation between the U.S. and Australian Armies in military training, exercises, education, and intelligence cooperation. Socializing and
synchronizing any Pathways exercise like HADREX 2013 early with our joint partners to clearly articulate the roles of each service and the benefits for all forces involved will help avoid another inter-service debate on roles and missions of the U.S. military in the Pacific. The 2013 Australian Defense White Paper called for closer defense engagement in Asia-Pacific, which continues to grow between Australia and China. A multi-lateral exercise like HADREX 2013 may also present an opportunity to build mil-to-mil relationships with China in a non-U.S. led exercise.

Indonesia

Help with the country's democratic transformation - politically, economically, and militarily – remains at the forefront of Indonesia's expectations of its partnership with the U.S. Internal security challenges including terrorism, separatism, communal conflict, drugs, corruption, and natural disaster continue to threaten domestic stability and are likely to dominate Indonesia’s security environment for the foreseeable future. Over the past several years, external security issues such as illegal fishing, mining, and logging, transnational crime, maritime security, and territorial disputes have emerged as more vital interests for Indonesia. Because the Army dominates the Indonesian Armed Forces – Tentara National Indonesia (TNI) – U.S. Army engagements through Pacific Pathways are the logical fit in Indonesia to build capacity for offensive operations to address internal threats as well as defensive operations focused mainly towards external threats.

The government of Indonesia has struggled, like many others, to fulfill annual national defense requirements, resourcing only approximately 30-40% of Ministry of Defense and TNI requests. Therefore, the Indonesian government views non-military means, such as diplomacy, as a way to defend the country and consequently engages
with over 32 other countries in defense diplomacy - with the top three being the U.S., Australia, and China. This willingness for multi-lateral defense diplomacy with nearly all Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) partners may be an opportunity to leverage multi-lateral Pacific Pathways exercises among these nations with Indonesia encouraging participation in addition to the United States. Indonesia attaches paramount importance to building regional security emphasizing the utility of multilateralism, but also recognizes the growing significance of bi-lateral engagement with major and regional powers, particularly the U.S. and China.\textsuperscript{36} Both the Indonesian Foreign Minister and Defense Chief have suggested that China should be invited to take part in joint military exercises with the U.S. and Australia in order to improve overall preparedness for humanitarian disaster relief.\textsuperscript{37}

Peacekeeping is one of the niche capabilities Indonesia possesses. It was among the top 20 contributors of uniformed personnel in 2010 and the largest contributor among ASEAN countries overall.\textsuperscript{38} Wanting to become the hub for a network of peacekeeping centers in South East Asia, centered on its peacekeeping training center in Sentul, West Java, Indonesia would likely favor a Pacific Pathways security cooperation exercise that continues to build it’s peacekeeping capacity. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister stated that its ultimate goal was to become one of the 10 largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations in the world. Helping to build this capacity through training and resources would meet mutual interests of the U.S., not only to support these types of UN missions, but also to minimize the U.S. signature and footprint in certain regions of the world.
China

China offers a different perspective from a nation that is not presently on a Pathway. President Xi Jinping summarized the Chinese relationship to others in the region stating, “China cannot develop in isolation of the Asia-Pacific, and the Asia-Pacific cannot prosper without China.” China’s stated strategic perspective reflects a desire for a peaceful rise, which is not belligerent, aggressive, or inherently militaristic. U.S. policy supports this position politically. Put a slightly different way, President Jinping also stated in an address to his party’s Politburo that China will “stick to the road of peaceful development, but never give up our legitimate rights and never sacrifice our national core interests….No country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the bitter fruit of harming our sovereignty, security, or development interests.” This description explains some of the more recent actions taken by China, such as the establishment of an expansive Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea, giving its Asian-Pacific neighbors, and the U.S., cause for concern.

Observers from both the U.S. and China recognize that the military-to-military relationship is the weakest component of the bilateral relationship. The Obama Administration is worried that this will contribute to strategic mistrust or cause miscalculations that will lead to heightened tensions and potentially conflict. Miscalculations resulting in the deadly exchange of fire could lead to further escalation and cause a military crisis that neither side, nor our Asian allies and partners, want. Therefore, engagements and exercises that enhance the ability of the two sides to cooperate are beneficial for this reason alone. Recommended areas of common interest for joint exercises include counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief
Encouraging Chinese participation in a Pacific Pathways exercise focused on HA/DR would present an opportunity to build trust between armies and create a more transparent relationship with a nation the U.S. states is not the focus of its rebalance to the Pacific.

Chinese military modernization continues to progress steadily. The Chinese have actively demonstrated their enhanced maritime and naval force projection capabilities with sea trials of the new aircraft carrier ‘Liaoning’ aimed at protecting its borders, population, sovereignty, and jurisdictional claims. But efforts in the areas of missile and rocket technology, cyber and space warfare, and use of RPAs are also top priorities. Significant organizational reform demonstrates the People’s Liberation Army’s move from a regional structure to a sub-regional structure seeking a more flexible approach with a contingency focus. Although joint U.S.-Chinese exercises in the areas mentioned above are beyond the current planning horizon, our partners and allies in the region are very much focused on countering these capabilities in the interest of their own security. Pacific Pathways exercises designed to build partner capacity in countering these threats would likely draw support from our partners and support overall U.S. interests in the region.

India

As the U.S. rebalances to the Pacific, India has begun to “Look East.” Although primarily viewed as economic in nature, the “Look East” policy forces India to rethink its inward-looking strategic orientation. While unresolved territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, as well as security challenges in Kashmir and Jammu, have driven India’s internal focus, freedom of the seas and maritime security in the Indian Ocean and a concern of a strategic encirclement by China have turned India’s eyes
outward and primarily to their east. The new 10-year Defense Framework signed with the U.S. in January 2015 is more ambitious than the previous agreement from 2005 in its steps to strengthen the bilateral defense partnership and increase the scope and intensity of joint military exercises.\textsuperscript{47} India’s Defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar, opened the door for a potential Pacific Pathways engagement while discussing joint military operations stating, “it was already going on and enhancing it is not a big problem.”\textsuperscript{48}

China’s rapid military modernization has influenced India to accelerate the modernization of its military. Although India is spending considerably more money, relative to what they have in the past, the pace of modernization has been slow due to a low-technology defense industrial base, a lack of adequate funding, and delays in decision-making by the government.\textsuperscript{49} Defense Minister A.K. Antony stated, “new procurements have commenced, but we are still lagging by 15 years.”\textsuperscript{50} With a 1.1 million-soldier army, India is trying to enhance capability without reducing manpower due to large-scale operational commitments to border security and counter-insurgency. Therefore, the Indian Army’s weapons and equipment are bordering on obsolete and the term “night blind” describes most forces due to their inability to operate under darkness.

The former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defense Staff, LTG (R) J.P. Singh, listed the critical capabilities that India sought to enhance as battlefield management systems, night-fighting capability, enhanced firepower, integrated maneuver capability to include self-propelled artillery, assault engineers, combat aviation, and network centricity.\textsuperscript{51} Nearly all of these capabilities are already part of the current Pacific Pathways design and would provide beneficial training and readiness for both armies.
Other security cooperation priorities for India include intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism, enhanced capability for surveillance and target acquisition at night, signal communications, and ISR. India’s goal to achieve joint warfare capabilities supports their desire to undertake more easily joint operations with multi-national forces should the need arise.

Vietnam

Even with a shared, common interest in freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce in the South China Sea, wide-reaching differences exist in Vietnam over the role of military cooperation with the U.S. in the broader context of U.S.-Vietnam relations. The leadership of Vietnam has collectively stated that trade and economic cooperation is the anchor of the relationship and the military-to-military relationship should not be the focus for the foreseeable future. This has slowed the pace of security cooperation between the two countries to the frustration of some U.S. military planners. Two key issues that reside within the decision-making authorities of the U.S. Congress with respect to Vietnam are how the U.S. influences and addresses human rights conditions in Vietnam and the restrictions on lethal weapons sales. Vietnam leaders have stated they will not consider bilateral relations normalized until the U.S. makes a decision on lethal arms sales; however, there is currently no precise roadmap for what Vietnam would need to do to lift that ban.

Although Pacific Pathways will not likely involve Vietnam in the foreseeable future, there are areas of common interest where the Army does, and can continue to, build relationships with the Vietnamese military. Vietnam War legacy issues such as Agent Orange, unexploded ordnance, Prisoners of War, and soldiers Missing in Action continue today and offer opportunities for security cooperation. In a 2011 Memorandum
of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation, both countries agreed on regular high-level dialogues and cooperation in the areas of maritime security, Search and Rescue, HA/DR, and peacekeeping.56 Military medicine, and other non-combat training, has also been included in annual engagement activities. Fostering mutual trust and understanding with Vietnam remains a key objective; however, Vietnam seems to prefer remaining independent with little desire for a formal military arrangement with any foreign power.57 Vietnam’s leaders do not necessarily see moving closer to the U.S. military as the simple answer to their security challenges, but instead want to improve their own self-defense capabilities lending heavily to the importance placed on U.S. lethal military sales to Vietnam.58

Although very few nations, if any, in the Asia-Pacific region will turn away from opportunities for engagement with the U.S. military, there are concerns by several governments in the region about the sustained U.S. interest and commitment to the rebalance strategy. First, questions remain about whether the enthusiasm for the Asia-Pacific region will endure beyond the Obama Administration.59 The newly formed 113th Congress, now led by Republican majorities in both houses, brings with it a level of anger and disagreement with current administration policies that some fear will dominate all aspects of both U.S. domestic and foreign politics, making U.S. foreign policy somewhat unpredictable. Therefore, some Asia-Pacific nations are cautious about keeping their strategic options open should the present Congress, or the new U.S. President in 2016, take a different course.60 In 2012, Thailand’s Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, expressed this concern by saying “We wonder whether the U.S. is able to have a sustained engagement in the
region, given its many priorities and given the state of domestic politics within the U.S.”

The Indonesian government and population share this concern. Based on his policies and the time he spent in Jakarta during his younger years, President Obama is widely popular in Indonesia. However, Indonesia strongly opposed the U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and hoped for “a more benign United States after years of a belligerent America under President Bush.” The Indonesian government is watching the 2016 U.S. presidential race very carefully.

The second concern focuses on U.S. fiscal realities. The U.S. debt ceiling debate, the government shutdown in October 2013, sequestration, and defense budget cuts have played out publicly on an international stage. Some feel that the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific could become hostage to these fiscal realities and question how the Department of Defense will ultimately resource the military components of the rebalance strategy. Rhetoric alone is not convincing when such vital national security interests are on the line in some countries. The other economic concern driving skepticism relates to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement that is still not concluded. Presented as the economic centerpiece of the rebalance, many Asian-Pacific countries are watching closely to see how sincerely President Obama fights to seek approval by Congress, thus emphasizing his priority on the issue. Continued doubt of U.S. commitment to the rebalance will likely persist until the TPP is concluded.

The third concern is that the U.S. has placed too much emphasis on the military dimension of the rebalance. A follow-on comment from the Thailand Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs expressed “We’re also a little bit concerned, I think, with the
emphasis on alliances and the military dimension of the strategic rebalancing because that gives an appearance of containment.” This aspect of the rebalance strategy has drawn wide debate on both sides; however, the perception is real and should be considered in the development of the size and intensity of Pacific Pathways force packages. The U.S. Army must maintain a conscious balance between reassuring our partners and worsening regional tensions by our actions since advancing regional stability is the ultimate U.S. end state.

Multiple opportunities, as well as a few challenges, for the future design of Pacific Pathways emerge from this brief analysis and several trends appear across the region as foundational to the concept’s effort. Opportunities exist in four broad categories – building joint capabilities; nesting with evolving military capabilities, roles, and missions; leveraging common interests for multi-lateral exercises; and building the capacity of niche capabilities across the region. With each opportunity come challenges, and these also fall into four general groups – gaining diplomatic input to enhance a coordinated whole-of-government approach; clarifying the extent and limits of U.S. commitments in future disputes; potentially emboldening regional actors to be more assertive; and justifying funding for additional U.S. military presence in areas with existing forward-stationed troops.

Similar to the U.S., many nations are looking to enhance joint capabilities through force restructuring, acquisition, and modernization. With maritime security quickly rising to the top of many nations’ priorities, one may immediately focus resources on naval partnership in this area. However, this maritime security priority presents a great opportunity to make Pacific Pathways a joint operation beyond military airlift and sealift
to get to each location. A scenario or exercise that included both on and offshore training partnerships would truly test the interoperability of not just multi-national forces, but our own joint forces, while reassuring our allies and partners in the critical area of maritime security.

Evolving militaries like India and Indonesia, as well as those militaries taking on new roles and missions like Japan’s and South Korea’s, offer opportunities for Pacific Pathways to build capacity and capability where these militaries need it most. To meet a wide array of missions from integrated maneuver, ISR, and signal communications to military medicine, humanitarian relief and training for headquarters elements, the composition of each Pathways task force will not be the same and, at times, should consider subordinating a few of the U.S. unit’s training objectives to those of the host nation. As long as there is mutual benefit in the long run to both organizations, this type of compromise seems prudent. Close coordination with country teams and synchronization with Regional Bureau Strategies and Country Plans far in advance of planned execution will ensure the coordination of desired training objectives from both the U.S. and the host nation. Interagency coordination is critical for those countries with which we have less mature diplomatic relations to ensure Pacific Pathways enhances a coordinated whole-of-government approach.

Identifying where diplomatic and security ties are strongest between our allies and partners will help identify those countries with which to pursue tri-lateral or multi-lateral Pacific Pathways exercises. Currently, the U.S., Australia, and Japan continue to build on a growing relationship as well as the U.S., India and Japan. Strong bi-lateral ties between two other U.S. allies or partners presents an opportunity for the U.S. Army
to participate in an exercise on a Pathway that is not historically U.S. led. An example would be the Australian led HADREX in 2013 vice an exercise like Balikatan or Cobra Gold known for U.S. leadership. Leveraging ASEAN focused security meetings provides another way to promote multi-lateral engagement such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting, ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multi-lateral Meeting, and ASEAN Military Intelligence Meeting. 68 Socializing the initiative and opportunities in multiple venues with different members of the ASEAN Defense Ministries and militaries, may build more widespread support for multi-lateral engagements.

The final category of opportunity focuses on building niche capabilities of certain countries to benefit the region as a whole and support larger U.S. initiatives. Training on a Pathway that mutually supports the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative - a joint endeavor between the DoD and the Department of State - may drive a demand signal for resources and draw other elements of the interagency into the initiative. There is precedence for this as the U.S. has paid to train and transport Indonesian personnel and equipment to Lebanon through the Global Peace Operations Initiative and Vietnam conducted its first International peacekeeping deployment under this same initiative in 2014. 69

The primary challenges to Pacific Pathways require interaction with the Department of State, congressional leaders, and host nation governments for resolution. First, the Army must gain diplomatic input to the greatest extent possible prior to planning, coordinating or committing to specific types of training events. As mentioned above, this is particularly critical for those nations with whom we have less
mature or strained diplomatic relations. Agreements made at the military-to-military level should enhance a coordinated, whole-of-government approach and complement U.S. positions, actions, and initiatives in the political, economic, and informational realms.

Second, the Army must seek as much clarity as possible on the extent of U.S. commitment and obligation in the region, as well as the limits of likely U.S. involvement in potential future disputes. This will “avert a setback in U.S. relations with regional nations due to perceptions of unfulfilled expectations.” The third challenge relates to the second in that the U.S. must avoid, through either words or actions, getting drawn into exercises too closely related to ongoing territorial or other disputes by nations who seek to use U.S. presence and partnership to back the legitimacy of their claims. Strengthening the capacity and capabilities of smaller powers in the region assumes some risk of emboldening them to challenge their adversaries more assertively and could unintentionally increase their expectations of U.S. assistance in a crisis.

The final challenge relates to justifying resources for Pacific Pathways. It is tougher to justify additional funding, beyond that already allocated for long-running annual exercises, when the Pathway moves through a location where U.S. forces are already forward-stationed, such as Japan or South Korea. If a premise for Pacific Pathways is that its method of forward-presence provides positive benefits without the large costs associated with extended overseas presence, then United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) must articulate the additional benefits of Pacific Pathways to convince the DoD to pay for both forward-stationed and forward-presence forces in the same location. Under current fiscal constraints, the use of both types of forces in the same location may not gain traction. USARPAC should consider prioritizing locations
without forward-stationed or forward-deployed forces to support the logic of the methodology’s cost savings.

The demand for U.S. military involvement throughout the world is not diminishing, and certainly not in the Asia-Pacific region. No amount of reassurance is excessive when it comes to our allies and partners, and nothing solidifies commitment like the presence of U.S. Soldiers. Incorporating, fusing and balancing host nation security cooperation priorities and their evolving military roles and missions into the Pacific Pathways design will enhance its success. Understanding the perspectives of the Asian-Pacific countries in Pacific Pathways planning will ensure the mission is politically supportable within the host nation’s security strategy and could help garner U.S. interagency support as a complementary part of a whole-of-government rebalance to the Pacific.

Endnotes


7 Ibid., 24.

8 “Southeast Asia Skeptical of U.S. Pivot,” 3.

9 Denmark, “ROUNDTABLE: Regional Perspectives,” 38.


14 Medeiros, Crane, Heginbotham, Levin, Lowell, Rabasa, Seong, Pacific Currents, 53.


17 Ibid.


20 The term ‘peace regime’ was used in the 2005 Joint Statement from the fourth round of the Six-Party talks to describe a mechanism or framework for a peaceful coexistence and mutual prosperity between the two Koreas. It acknowledged the many unresolved political, diplomatic, and national security issues that contribute to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. See Medeiros, Crane, Heginbotham, Levin, Lowell, Rabasa, Seong, Pacific Currents, 252.


27 Ibid., 252.


29 Denmark, “ROUNDTABLE: Regional Perspectives on US Strategic Rebalancing,” 41.


31 Denmark, “ROUNDTABLE: Regional Perspectives on US Strategic Rebalancing,” 38.


35 Ibid., 167.


38 Laksmana, “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile,” 170.


Medeiros, Crane, Heginbotham, Levin, Lowell, Rabasa, Seong, Pacific Currents, 7.


Ibid.

Ibid., 3.


Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Poling, A New Era in U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Deepening Ties Two Decades after Normalization, Report of the CSIS Sumitro Chair
for Southeast Asia Studies (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 2014), VIII.

54 Ibid., 12.


57 Ibid., 13.

58 Ibid., 12.

59 Laksmana, “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile,” 178.


62 Denmark, Sukma, and Parthemore, “Crafting a Vision,” 42.

63 Schriver and Takahashi, “Managing Expectations in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 2.

64 “Southeast Asia Skeptical of U.S. Pivot,” 3.


69 Ibid., 14 and Laksmana, “Indonesia’s Rising Regional and Global Profile,” 170.


71 Ibid., 9.

72 Karbler, “‘Boots on Our Ground, Please!’: The Army in the Pacific,” blog entry.