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
Operationalizing Theater Campaign Planning through Interagency Cross-functional Teams

by

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Both State Department and Department of Defense leaders have articulated policy and guidance emphasizing the importance of building partner capacity as part of regional security strategies and overall national interests. In addition, the President has set forth policy to strengthen the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity. Yet, the ability to bring the instruments of national power to effective use remains a challenge. The United States must pursue a new approach to better meet a complex and interdependent security environment. The cross-functional teams represented in joint-interagency task forces are a model that has proven its effectiveness toward national security goals in multiple regions and for a variety of purposes. Institutionalizing cross-functional teams in the model of the joint-interagency task force and employing them to link geographic combatant command regional strategies with U.S. Embassy country strategies in the security sector will establish an effective mechanism to integrate capabilities, authorities, and resources of all U.S. Government departments and agencies in key regions, sub regions, or high-risk countries.

Operationalizing Theater Campaign Planning through Interagency Cross-functional Teams

> In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to U.S. safety and security are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of this time. For the Defense Department and the entire U.S. Government, it is also a complex institutional challenge.

> —Robert M. Gates[1]

While serving as the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates identified improving the way the U.S. Government helps other countries better provide for their own security as a national priority and a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership.[2] The Department of Defense translated this policy into defense strategy, moving toward improving the military's ability to work with interagency and international partners as a critical aspect of protecting U.S. security. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review stated "the Department is committed to finding creative, effective, and efficient ways to achieve our goals within our own Department and in our interagency and international partnerships."[3] Realizing current regional military organizations were not ideally organized to achieve the ends associated with this strategy, the Defense Department searched for mechanisms to operationalize this strategy and for methods to integrate activities of all U.S. Government departments and agencies in key regions. U.S. geographic combatant commands increased interagency positions within their staffs yet integration of these activities has not improved.[4]

As U.S. geographic combatant commands translate national objectives into theater campaign plans and U.S. Embassy teams translate these same objectives into integrated country strategies an interagency capability gap arises at the regional and, in some cases, sub-regional levels. This gap causes a lack of mutual support between

country strategies and a shortfall of effectiveness in theater campaign plans. As a result, U.S. Government regional actions are often uncoordinated and disconnected.[5]

The cross-functional teams represented in joint-interagency task forces are a model that has proven effective toward achieving national security goals in multiple regions and for a variety of purposes. The concept of the joint-interagency task force is, typically, illustrated by representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, while other assigned agencies generally include members of the law-enforcement and intelligence communities.[6] Allies and regional partners often contribute resources as well as liaison officers to these task forces and, in some cases, hold leadership positions. If provided the purpose, empowerment, and support required to be successful, establishing cross-functional teams in the model of the joint-interagency task force and employing them to link geographic combatant command regional strategies with U.S. Embassy country strategies in the security sector arena will establish an effective mechanism to integrate capabilities, authorities, and resources of all U.S. Government departments and agencies in key regions or high-risk countries.

The approach discussed here does not seek to alter the organization or responsibilities of U.S. Departments involved in security sector assistance. It suggests authorities and funding solutions provided by executive and congressional actions to empower a proven tool to generate and resource regional approaches in critical areas with emerging security partners. In crisis areas, this tool can develop and support more focused methods to achieve national security ends within individual countries. With the authorities and funding required, cross-functional teams would serve to better coordinate security sector activities throughout the spectrum of partner capabilities by

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facilitating the participation of more developed regional security forces to improve the effectiveness of less-capable neighbors.

Ends - U.S. Security Sector Policy

Both State Department and Department of Defense leaders have established policy that has emphasized the importance of building partner capacity as part of regional security strategies and overall national interests. They have also attempted to change the culture of their respective departments in order to generate interagency cooperation and move toward more effective integration and unity of effort. These leaders agree that the approach to reform and modernize the United States' apparatus for building partner capacity and regional security should be informed by four key principles:

1. It must be agile and flexible

2. It must have access to responsive funding solutions

3. It must maintain persistent interagency presence

4. It must remain a tool of foreign policy

First, the system must move quickly and easily and be susceptible to modification or adaptation. [7] This means organizations that can rapidly act and deal with multiple threats simultaneously. This also means processes that are freed of the patchwork of cumbersome rules and authorities such as those used in Yemen and Libya where the typical interagency approach produced cobbled-together strategies that are excellent illustrations of American security assistance that is not meeting the needs of the United States or its partners. [8]

Second, the regional security apparatus must have access to funding solutions that are responsive and flexible in order to adapt to changing environments. Current

budgeting and programming processes are appropriate and manageable for

predictable, ongoing requirements but are not well suited for dealing with the emerging

and unforeseen threats or opportunities often found in failing states.[9] While these

threats and opportunities are, most often, identified by organizations working within the

region or country in which they emerge, resources are allocated in a very centralized

manner in Washington. Congress and the Executive Branch must authorize field

leaders to shift resources across agency lines to meet new threats.[10] To do this, there

must be effective oversight mechanisms that allow Congress to carry out its

constitutional responsibility to ensure these funds are spent properly but in a more

flexible manner.[11]

Third, the United States must maintain a more persistent interagency presence.

U.S. Government security assistance efforts must occur steadily over the long-term to

provide some measure of predictability for the national security sector and, more

significantly, for U.S. partners.[12] The nation must maintain a presence around the world

through alliances and partnerships sustained by rotational deployments.[13] These

deployments must be supported by smaller interagency structures that can maintain

better understanding of environmental nuances and act quickly. The United States must

also be able to build networks that use its allies' unique capabilities to the fullest

advantage. This can be achieved through small footprints of U.S. interagency

capabilities built to develop a partnering culture.[14]

The fourth and final regional security principle is that, while security sector

assistance plays a significant role in geographic combatant command theater campaign

plans, it is, in the end, a tool of foreign policy. The State Department crafts and

implements foreign policy and, through closer coordination with State, the Defense

Department must enhance theater campaign plan security sector assistance strategies

aimed at building security capacity to support this policy.[15] The State Department and

the Department of Defense must bridge the gap between departmental and embassy-

level collaboration with an organization that ensures that short-term actions are

consistent with long-term goals. The Defense Department must also ensure that foreign

policy is informed with rigorous analysis that allows the State Department to better plan

and act.[16]

      In addition to the departmental-level regional security principles discussed above,

President Obama established policy to strengthen the ability of the United States to help

allies and partner nations build their own security capacity in support of U.S. objectives

through a Security Sector Assistance Presidential Policy Directive (PPD 23). The April

2013 policy directive articulated goals and guidelines to improve the government's

ability to enable partners to provide security and justice for their own people and to

respond to common security challenges through a new approach to security sector

assistance.[17] The goals for U.S. security sector assistance listed in the policy directive

represent goals commonly pursued in theater campaign plans. These are:

1. Help build sustainable security capacity

2. Promote support for U.S. interests

3. Promote universal values

4. Strengthen collective security [18]

Similarly, the policy guidelines set forth for U.S. security sector assistance are representative of imperatives commonly found in geographic combatant command strategies. They include:

1. Foster United States Government policy coherence and interagency collaboration

2. Build sustainable capacity through comprehensive security sector strategies

3. Be more selective and use resources for the greatest impact

4. Be responsive to urgent crises, emergent opportunities, and changes in partner security environments

5. Ensure that short-term interventions are consistent with long term goals

6. Inform policy with rigorous analysis, assessments, and evaluations

7. Analyze, plan, and act regionally [19]

Like the principles expounded by departmental leadership, the policy directive established security sector assistance as a function of foreign policy. The President identified the State Department as the lead agency responsible for the policy and general management of United States Government security sector assistance and directed the Departments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security to participate in interagency security sector assistance strategic planning, assessment, program design, and implementation in order to coordinate the components of their security sector assistance programs with the State Department.[20]

The Challenge - Falling Short of Policy Objectives

The current, Washington-based, interagency system and organization does not support the ability to accomplish the principles discussed above or the policy guidelines set forth by PPD 23. This is due to the centralized manner in which security sector

assistance is coordinated. It is also caused by a gap in collaboration and mutual support

between the regional scope of geographic combatant command and the bilateral focus

of the embassy team. Further, geographic combatant commands, as the DoD

organization charged with planning and executing theater campaigns, are challenged to

coordinate and resource these campaigns under current interagency mechanisms.[21]

The United States must strengthen the capacity to plan, synchronize, and implement

security sector assistance through a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government

process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with our national security

priorities.[22]

The task and associated challenges of synchronizing the multitude of capabilities

and authorities of the United States Government's agencies toward a common end is

not new, nor is it unique to any one department. What has changed most significantly is

the environment in which these capabilities must be effectively applied to meet these

national security goals. Multi-dimensional operating environments involving traditional

and irregular threats as well as terrorism and disruptive technology aimed at

counteracting military superiority will require the U.S. Government to operate within, and

seamlessly shift between, ethnic enclaves in the center of sprawling mega-cities and

austere rural villages.[23] This environment and the threats that exist within it also require

a level of U.S. Government interagency synchronization that outpaces current policies

and authorities. In addition to these challenges, the United States is faced with an

increasingly complex security sector.

The security sector includes military and civilian organizations as well as

individuals operating at the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels.[24] It

also includes state law-enforcement providers, governmental security, and justice oversight bodies responsible for border management, customs-enforcement, and civil emergencies.[25] Geographic combatant commands struggle to ensure there is credible commitment among all participants to accomplish common goals associated with this diverse set of security sector actors.[26] While burden-sharing through coalition operations is the norm, the United States increasingly identifies more challenges than it and its partners can manage and often finds resource gaps exacerbated due to unbalanced ends, ways, and means.[27]

When executing theater campaigns, geographic combatant commands are challenged to effectively coordinate theater security cooperation activities with other U.S. Government activities.[28] Similarly, the manning of embassies does not include a central staff to support an ambassador in designing and implementing security sector activities with other U.S. Government stakeholders such as geographic combatant commands. There is no selection process to identify embassy personnel with the experience to direct the integrated, multiagency activities required to execute campaigns to further national security sector goals and objectives.[29]

These challenges also test law-enforcement, drug-enforcement, and the wide expanse of the intelligence community. The problem certainly does not lie in a lack of participation of these stakeholders. The United States is the only fully equipped, globally deployed, interagency superpower with some 250 diplomatic missions and a unified military command system that covers all regions of the world, the homeland, and outer space.[30] All instruments of government are deployed and, yet, the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into calculated effectiveness, remains.[31]

The current national security system, as it applies to regional campaigns in support of national strategy, consists of well-developed organizations with weak interagency authorities. As a result, virtually any interagency effort at collaboration remains ineffective as semiautonomous national security organizations easily find ways to resist cooperation they do not like - even when it is directed by the President.[32] This ineffectiveness negatively affects the conditions-setting aspect of theater campaigns. From the perspective of potential partner nations, the United States appears sluggish and difficult to work with which sends the wrong message to allies and emerging partners who, in many cases, seek assistance from other nations instead.[33]

Ways - An Approach toward Campaign Effectiveness

To effectively build sustainable capacity through comprehensive sector strategies and to be responsive to ever-changing security environments, the U.S. Government must be able to pull from the expertise of any government agency necessary to support individual country team and geographical combatant command objectives. Simply put, the nation must develop the plans to protect American interests and strengthen partners in the field where local realities are understood, before Washington agencies bring their inside-the-Beltway perspectives to bear.[34] Tailored and strategically located organizations are required to maintain a persistent presence that reinforces U.S. commitment, understands complex environments, and adapts to changing circumstances with flexible funding solutions.

A Systems Approach

The security sectors of at-risk countries are systems of systems tying together the military, the police, the justice system, and other governance and oversight mechanisms.[35] Forming systems of systems to unify interagency regional campaigns

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will allow the U.S. Government to better plan, synchronize, execute, and evaluate regional strategies and campaign plans that are centered on security sector engagement and development. The ability to understand and act quickly as well as to adapt to different circumstances requires networked cross-functional teams that can quickly use unique departmental capabilities simultaneously across regions and areas of responsibility.

A number of bodies consisting of senior interagency representatives have identified the need for this systems approach. The Brent Scowcroft Center for International Studies' Atlantic Council believes a transformed regional interagency balance will help mitigate risks while ensuring strategy-driven U.S. Government approaches for foreign and defense policy execution that reassures friends and allies and reinforces U.S. commitment to key regions.[36] In their 'National Interest' article *Fixing Fragile States,* Former Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, former Ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and Afghanistan, Ronald Neuman, and former Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral Eric Olson suggested the United States should develop, select, and support a new type of ambassador with more authority to plan and direct complex operations across department and agency lines, and who will be accountable for their success.[37]

The former interagency leaders also recommend a small, separate staff of perhaps a dozen experienced officers, drawn from different agencies, to help the ambassador formulate a plan, monitor its execution to determine if it is achieving its objectives, and recommend adjustments as circumstances on the ground change.[38] While maintaining strong links back to their parent organizations for support and

guidance, such a staff could serve the ambassador in developing and coordinating his or her security sector plans. Given access to funding solutions that are flexible, it could be able to adapt to changing circumstances quickly. It could also maintain a persistent presence that would provide the ambassador, the geographic commander, and other stakeholders with greater understanding of the operational environment.

An Interagency Model

Currently, U.S. Government representatives and those of other nations share security responsibilities to help address security challenges in their countries and regions. While these groups often share common goals, they are not teams. Unlike groups with common goals, a team is a group of people with a high degree of interdependence working toward the achievement of a purpose or the completion of a task.[39] Within the security sector, interdependence requires the ability to apply expertise, authorities, and funding solutions that reside in multiple agencies for the purpose of strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own capacity.

In his book *Cross-functional Teams: Working with Allies, Enemies, and other Strangers*, Glenn Parker defines a cross-functional team as a group of people with a clear purpose representing a variety of functions or disciplines whose combined efforts are necessary for achieving the team's purpose.[40] The U.S. Government has used cross-functional teams in the form of joint-interagency task forces to find creative and effective ways to achieve national goals and assist in making strategic choices. In Key West, Florida, the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, several law enforcement agencies, and partner nations form Joint-Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South which conducts detection and monitoring

operations to interdict illicit drug trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of

national and partner nation security.[41] In the focused effort to degrade and dismantle

terrorist networks, the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Intelligence

Community maintain a number of JIATFs which have transformed this effort from a

collection of niche strike forces into a network able to integrate diverse elements of the

U.S. Government into a unified effort.[42] Sized to include all or only critical international

and interagency partners, cross-functional teams can address focused security

objectives and can achieve domain awareness critical to supporting the interagency

efforts of U.S. Embassy teams and U.S. geographic combatant commands

simultaneously.

      The cross-functional teams represented in joint-interagency task forces are

successful, primarily, because they are able to extradite critical functions away from the

Washington-based interagency bureaucracy and perform them in a focused and timely

manner to solve complex problems where they occur. The culture, resident in the

JIATFs mentioned above, supports rapid informal problem solving. Communication

among team members is open and candid, the structure is fluid across organizational

lines, risk taking is encouraged and rewarded, and innovation is seen as critical to the

organization's future.[43] In fact, JIATF South has sustained a record of success against

an intelligent, ruthless, well-funded, and adaptive foe that targets the JIATF just as it

targets them.[44] Joint-interagency task forces have demonstrated adaptability and

effectiveness in the regional application of ways and means to support national security

ends.

Institutionalizing cross-functional teams in the model of the joint-interagency task force and employing them to link geographic combatant command regional strategies with U.S. Embassy country strategies in the security sector arena will establish an effective mechanism to integrate capabilities, authorities, and resources of all U.S. Government departments and agencies in key regions or in high-risk countries like Yemen, Libya, or Ukraine. While this effort will require legislative reform, it is necessary to become effective in critical areas and to make decision-making faster and simpler for our partners.[45]

The capacity provided by security sector cross-functional teams would also rebalance instruments of national power in key regions. Today, the United States faces increased risks and missed opportunities to advance U.S. interests because it is focused on the military as the primary government instrument working with allies and partners at the regional level.[46] U.S. security sector reform must move toward a regional interagency balance that improves efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. foreign and defense policy execution and advances U.S. interests when engaging with key allies and partners.[47]

To be more effective, security cooperation activities must move from the overwhelmingly bilateral cooperation model that is currently employed to a regional approach. Regional approaches will allow security sector efforts to focus on common interests and threats among nations in a region and will acknowledge that national borders are of little consequence to historical tribal loyalties, regional pandemics and humanitarian conditions, and transnational issues such as terrorism.[48] Cross-functional teams will not only facilitate regional approaches but also support the core functions of a

geographic combatant command by addressing U.S. interests throughout the region and, when necessary, enabling response to natural disasters and humanitarian crises.

The experience at JIATF South suggests there are great possible benefits from institutionalizing interagency collaboration, but also indicates the need to proceed carefully with due attention to the variables that are critical prerequisites for high-level performance.[49] In the Pacific, JIATF West applies Department of Defense capabilities in support of interagency operations to identify and disrupt drug-related transnational organized crime threats.[50] Unlike JIATF South, JIATF West does not have control over other agencies' capabilities or focus and concentrates primarily on building the capacity of its partner nations' law enforcement agencies rather than directing interdictions.[51] This not only degrades internal performance but also degrades the organization's ability to enhance the performance capabilities of the greater enterprise. This JIATF does not have a strong sense of purpose and the interagency partners are mostly interested in obtaining resources from JIATF West to support their own programs.[52]

Understanding and paying attention to variables that are critical for high-level interagency performance is, most certainly, possible. The U.S. Special Operations Command benefited from the JIATF South experience when putting together interagency high-value targeting teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior leaders from the command spent several months conducting reciprocal staff visits and information exchanges to determine, understand, and address the variables that would, eventually, dramatically improve special operations performance.[53] If leaders do extract and institutionalize the appropriate lessons, the JIATF South experiment could benefit the nation in ways that extend far beyond the counter-drug mission it successfully

executes.[54] To do this, interagency leaders must understand the core competencies of cross-functional teams and ensure they are developed.

<u>The Competencies of Cross-functional Teams</u>

Cross-functional teams reduce the time it takes to accomplish tasks, especially in planning and development processes.[55] The speed with which cross-functional teams can act is, primarily, due to their ability to identify issues quickly and take full advantage of all the capabilities of their members. Parker attributes their speed to setting clear goals, including all relevant functions, maintaining the ability to conduct many tasks concurrently, and involving all key players from the beginning of a process.[56] This is evidenced at JIATF South where speed is achieved through team members who can make decisions without having to consult their superiors, are free to independently communicate and work with partner nations, and are able to speak on behalf of leadership.[57]

Cross-functional teams also improve an organization's ability to solve complex problems. This is because most complex problems transcend disciplines and cross-functional teams inherently focus an organization's resources on them. [58] In this respect, networked cross-functional teams can address collective regional priorities in support of national objectives identified in policy that are often interpreted differently as they are analyzed through multiple organizational lenses at the department level. The complex problems national security teams such as JIATF South solve often require that they build networks with a diverse set of interested parties to better organize, support, and allow them to draw from a wider pool of expertise and resources.[59]

By bringing together people with a variety of experiences and backgrounds, cross-functional teams increase the creative capacity of an organization.[60] Much of a

team's effectiveness is attributable to external factors related to the broader organization or system within which it operates.[61] Members of cross-functional teams develop new technical and professional skills, learn more about other disciplines, and learn how to work with people who have different styles and cultural backgrounds.[62] Over the long-term, this will benefit all agencies of the U.S. Government as well as regional stakeholders.

Lastly, cross-functional teams promote a more effective effort by identifying one place to go for information and for decisions about an issue or a U.S. partner.[63] An example of this is the tactical analysis teams employed by JIATF South. Tactical analysis teams, which are generally located inside U.S. Embassies or Consulates and consist of one to three JIATF intelligence officers, work on a day-to-day basis supporting law enforcement agencies but are ultimately managed and funded by the JIATF Intelligence Directorate and directly represent the JIATF Director. [64] These teams represent a single point of contact not only for the JIATF but also for U.S. Embassies, the geographic combatant command, and any other stakeholder with interests in the region.

The current national security system has difficulty generating interagency solutions. As veteran national security legislator Ike Skelton noted, "For many years, we've repeatedly heard from independent blue-ribbon panels and bipartisan commissions that, when it comes to collaboration on national security, our system is inefficient, ineffective, and often down-right broken."[65] Cross-functional teams illustrate an effective model that can be applied to regional national security collaboration. History proves cross-functional teams can perform with great effectiveness and invites

emulation, especially in the currently constrained budget environment.[66] Research also suggests that cross-functional team effectiveness is not well-understood and national security executives must be more familiar with factors and conditions that make these teams effective to act upon any recommendation for more of them.[67]

Means - Purpose, Empowerment, and Support

In order to meet national policy objectives, security sector cross-functional teams must have legitimacy. They require a mandate from a higher authority, provided by a clearly sanctioned body that is able to establish national priorities to gain cooperation from required organizations. [68] While the Executive Branch has established policy and Congress has established funding authorizations specific to its pursuit, they have not established the conviction that security sector assistance is a national interest. This conviction and a new model for interagency operations in fragile states would be most effective if it were established by legislation.[69] The success of JIATF South found its roots in strong coordination between the Executive Branch and Congress to address an issue of national interest when, in 1986, President Reagan took a major step toward institutionalizing Department of Defense support for the war on drugs with National Security Decision Directive 221. In the same year, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which established billets on Navy vessels specifically designated for Coast Guard law enforcement detachments in an effort to increase their ability to intercept drug smugglers.[70] Despite these actions, the JIATF did not gain legitimacy until Congress established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and President Clinton gave its director responsibility for organizational structure and budgetary certification.[71] In order to establish a mandate for security sector reform, executive and congressional cooperation is required to develop an organizational

structure that will address critical regions and establish the purpose, empowerment, and support required to legitimize security sector cross-functional teams.

<u>Purpose</u>

A strong sense of purpose unifies a team and provides direction.[72] Both Congress and the Executive Branch have indicated that security sector assistance and cooperation is a national priority, just as they did with countering drugs and drug related violence. JIATF South translated national priorities into a strong sense of purpose that was encapsulated in an end-to-end concept for addressing the drug problem.[73] Ultimately, the purpose of security sector assistance and cooperation is to improve national security. Security sector cross-functional teams must translate the priorities established by national authorities into a sense of purpose even if they lack the immediate support of their own organizations or other stakeholders. This can be accomplished by achieving the purpose-based objectives of gaining access, improving regional U.S. readiness, building partner capacity and interoperability, strengthening partner relationships, and improving partner nation leadership and ministries.[74]

To serve their greater purpose, security sector cross-functional teams must also be structured appropriately. Structure refers to the "mechanics" of teams and includes team design and its networks. Effective cross-functional teams are designed to accomplish specific tasks, are typically small, and have a strong internal and external communications framework.[75] The JIATF South team structure evolved along with its operational concept. The end-to-end problem-solving approach that follows drugs from production through shipment, interdiction, and prosecution broadened JIATF South's inherently cross-functional approach which required more functional competencies

found in additional partnering organizations and put more emphasis on diverse

intelligence collection and fusion so that actionable intelligence drove operations.[76]

The structure of each security sector cross-functional team should be dependent

upon operational dependency and would, therefore, be different from embassy to

embassy or region to region. They should be as small as possible but must address

critical functions specific to the security sector in which they operate. While team

structure should follow operational concept, there are common structural characteristics

teams should share. To achieve the purposed-based objectives of well-postured,

prepared, and interoperable partners, the executive and legislative branches of

government must consider creating standing operational teams located in U.S.

Embassies or co-located with regional joint task forces where embassy support is not

tenable.

To form the culture and cohesion required to improve regional U.S. readiness

and build partner capacity, security sector cross-functional teams must be standing

teams that are able to achieve longevity in their region and with their partners. Unlike

temporary teams, standing teams do not rely on traditional hierarchal leadership to

address unique but limited problems where a directive leader is required to provide

purpose.[77] Standing teams will also benefit from team culture. While team cohesion is

likely to be more challenging for a temporary team, a standing team will thrive on a

historical team climate and a shared understanding of specific norms, values, and

beliefs within the team.[78]

Operational teams are, generally, located away from organizational headquarters

and bear the primary responsibilities of translating long-term national strategy into short-

term action and resolving relatively specific effectiveness problems.[79] In this manner, security sector cross-functional teams could collaborate, plan, coordinate, and facilitate actions to accomplish objectives in critical regions while maintaining communication frameworks to engage and include parent organizations in regional action and the resolution of any effectiveness problems. A relationship with the geographic combatant command will be necessary to plan, coordinate, and resource a number of these actions. While operating dislocated from geographic combatant commands, the security sector cross-functional team must maintain the relationship and communications required to benefit both organizations. An example of this is, again, JIATF South. Although it is a geographically separated national task force, it is also embedded in the U.S. Southern Command chain of command who, in many cases, weighed-in to provide it more authorities or resources.[80]

Empowerment

In order for a cross-functional team to perform well, it must be empowered with the authority and resources necessary to fulfill its purpose and accomplish its mission.[81] Much like purpose, cross-functional teams must translate national priorities into a sense of empowerment. Teams are empowered to act based on a set of objectives developed jointly by leadership and the team.[82] While some degree of empowerment will follow an established purpose, it is important for security sector cross-functional teams to be empowered by national authorities in order to ensure they receive support from other participants in security sector reform or assistance. For cross-functional teams, empowerment is derived in three forms: structural empowerment, psychological empowerment, and resource empowerment.[83]

Structural empowerment consists of means such as authority and control.[84] Currently, structural empowerment to improve U.S. readiness and build partner capacity resides with the Washington-based interagency bureaucracy. The best path to structural empowerment of cross-functional teams is accountability. Management, in the form of the Executive Branch and Congress, must hold department Secretaries and other stakeholders identified in PPD 23 accountable for their support to the work of cross-functional teams.[85] This can be accomplished through the directed authority and control found in a national plan such as the counternarcotics National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) and the establishment of an executive office such as the ONDCP that has the authority to control organization and funding.

A less tangible form of team empowerment is referred to by researchers as psychological empowerment and is forged by the conviction among team members that they can excel at their mission.[86] Psychological empowerment requires a track record of performance to establish. It also requires internal and external partnerships in order to flourish. After establishing enduring and productive partnerships with regional law-enforcement agencies, interdictions facilitated by JIATF South increased and the cross-functional team experienced a powerful upsurge in psychological empowerment.[87] As a cross-functional team demonstrates success, empowerment grows through added interest and participation by stakeholders. Substantiating the adage that "success breeds success," other organizations and countries increasingly sought out cooperative relationships with JIATF South.[88] A common byproduct of psychological empowerment is access to additional resources. This is fortunate, as resource empowerment is often a challenge for cross-functional teams.

Corporations such as IBM are routinely able to allocate resources from corporate headquarters into cross-functional teams that are seen as strategic investments for the organization.[89] Despite being the greatest source of empowerment in the near-term, cross-functional teams in the national security system are not typically given the resources necessary to accomplish their tasks.[90] Like structural empowerment, resource empowerment can be garnered through the directed authority and control such as those found in the NICCP and the ONDCP.

Many departmental leaders feel dual-key State-Defense funding authorities that can be adjusted based on strategic and operational requirements have proven effective and should become the standard method to support strategies to build partner capacity through security sector assistance.[91] To be more effective, Congress must extend dual-key funding authorities to the lowest level of interagency collaboration. Blair, Neuman, and Olson recommend that Congress and the Executive Branch authorize field leaders to shift resources across agency lines to meet new threats.[92] This authority would provide security sector cross-functional teams with tremendous empowerment to achieve their purpose.

Just as the NICCP encouraged the Defense Department, Coast Guard, and Customs Service to expend resources through JIATFs, an Executive Branch plan for security cooperation and assistance would encourage agencies to commit additional resources within the security sector.[93] Congressional action to establish an office such as ONDCP would create the accountability discussed earlier by certifying and ensuring execution of resources pledged by stakeholder agencies. The current resourcing

structure, built on priority countries, has not, and will not, achieve the desired regional effects.

Funding solutions must be more selective and must use resources for the greatest impact.[94] A new model that directs funds to regions and countries in support of regional objectives will strengthen the overall regionalized interagency process and achieve better results.[95] Funding processes that support regional contexts will not only support regional effects but also support bilateral interests. This model, placed in the hands of security sector cross-functional teams, would empower them and help them achieve their purpose.

<u>Support</u>

The final organizational condition required for team effectiveness is support. Team support is the set of relations that connect a team to other levels of its members' parent organizations.[96] It is derived by the attitudes and views other organizational members form toward cross-functional teams. Support depends a great deal on whether teams are constructed with the cooperation of the rest of the organization, with the ambivalent noninterference by the rest of the organization, or in the face of opposition from the rest of the organization.[97] Historically, organizational support to cross-functional teams is similar to empowerment in that it is established from the top down until, through performance, all stakeholders become committed to the endeavor. With time there is, in most cases, systemic support in the areas of rewards, recognition, and organizational development and training.[98]

Initial executive and legislative support provided legitimacy and direction for interagency counternarcotics missions by declaring the war on drugs a national

priority.[99] This was not enough to overcome the lack of support that existed under the 'lead agency' system practiced prior to the NICCP and resembled the current security sector system established by PPD 23. Under the 'lead agency' system, the Defense Department reluctantly supported the counter-narcotics joint task forces but, despite controlling an abundance of resources, lacked the cross-functional skills necessary to perform effectively.[100] The challenge of linking resources to skills exists in the current security cooperation and assistance system.

In the counter-drug mission, Washington met the challenge of linking resources to skills by giving a monopoly over the mission and the process to recruit interagency support directly to JIATF South.[101] This articulates the step that is, in most cases, required for a cross-functional team to garner the required organizational support to realize its full potential. Without this support, security sector cross-functional teams will not be able to overcome the obstacles that challenge the effectiveness of the system working to address our nation's security challenges.

<center>Conclusion</center>

It is critical that the United States adapt to emerging strategic and fiscal twenty-first-century realities and take advantage of its strategic assets and resources by restructuring for a more effective, forward-deployed regional approach to national security.[102] The approach described above does not seek to realign or alter the organization or responsibilities of geographic combatant commanders or aspects of other U.S. Government departments involved in security sector assistance. It seeks to empower these departments with the ability to apply capabilities in a focused manner across geographic and departmental boundaries to improve the specific security sectors

of critical partners or regions found in a complex environment. It also seeks to enable them to better coordinate and synchronize actions across departmental and geographic boundaries. Sized to include all or only critical international and interagency partners, cross-functional teams can address focused security objectives and can achieve domain awareness critical to supporting the efforts of U.S. Embassy teams and geographic combatant commands simultaneously

Empowered with authorities and funding solutions generated by executive and congressional actions, security sector cross-functional teams can provide regional approaches in critical areas with emerging security partners such as East Africa or the Baltic States while other, more focused teams, work to achieve national security ends in regional crises spots such as Somalia or Ukraine. More importantly, cross-functional teams in these locations would better synchronize actions across regions and bring available interagency capabilities to bear in support of geographic combatant command and embassy objectives while ensuring they are coordinated and mutually support national security ends.

With the authorities and funding required, cross-functional teams can also serve to better coordinate security sector activities throughout the spectrum of partner capabilities. Teams working in areas such as East Africa or the Baltic States would not only be able to bring capabilities found in regional partners to bear in crises areas but also be able to pull from more capable partners such as NATO to maximize regional effectiveness or access. This ability extends beyond military capabilities to law-enforcement or internal security functions that align more precisely with federal constabulary forces commonly found in Europe in the manner that JIATF South has

facilitated law-enforcement relationships to focus capabilities against the narcotics trade.

The JIATF South experience supports the observations that organization should not be left to chance and the national security system must understand how to create effective cross-functional teams.[103] The security environments of critical regions require interagency solutions and rely on these valuable lessons for effective collaboration. The continuing threat in multi-dimensional operating environments that stem from fragile states with weak institutions, high rates of poverty, environmental challenges, and deep ethnic, religious or tribal divisions will require continued complex political, economic and military operations.[104]

Both State Department and Department of Defense leaders have articulated policy and guidance that has emphasized the importance building partner capacity as part of regional security strategies and overall national interests. The President has set forth policy to strengthen the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity in support of U.S. objectives through a Security Sector Assistance Presidential Policy Directive. Congress has established dual-key State-Defense funding authorities that can be adjusted to support strategies to build partner capacity through security sector assistance. Yet, there have been few significant changes in the ineffective approach to operations in the field despite innumerable opportunities to learn lessons from both successes and mistakes.[105]

The perceived lessons of U.S. security assistance experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have not improved the U.S. Government's ability to develop security sector in critical regions. What has been missing from the dialog is an assessment of the very

inefficient system under which the United States attempts to help other countries address the factors that threaten their security using a system that guarantees allocated resources do not produce the results they could and should provide.[106] The complex and interdependent security environment upends the antiquated U.S. approach toward foreign societies and cultures.[107] Building systems and capabilities to meet these challenges can increase the effectiveness of security sector planning and execution and reduce the possibility that the United States may be required to directly intervene in response to instability.

The cross-functional teams represented in joint-interagency task forces are a model that has proven its effectiveness toward national security goals in multiple regions and for a variety of purposes. Institutionalizing cross-functional teams in the model of the joint-interagency task force and employing them to link geographic combatant command regional strategies with U.S. Embassy country strategies in the security sector arena will establish an effective mechanism to integrate authorities and resources of all U.S. Government departments and agencies in key regions or high-risk countries.

This process, however, cannot be left to chance. Experiences associated with existing cross-functional teams suggest there are great benefits possible from institutionalizing interagency collaboration but also indicates the need to proceed carefully with due attention to the variables that are critical prerequisites for performance.[108] National security leadership must proceed deliberately to ensure cross-functional teams formed to work toward more effective security sector cooperation and assistance, have a clear mandate, approach solutions holistically, and build robust

networks to establish the purpose, empowerment, and support required to be

successful.

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