

Strategy Research Project

Utilization of USAR Assets in Response to Hurricane Sandy

by

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United States Army War College
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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

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The United States Army Reserve (USAR), like its active component and National Guard counterparts has responsibilities in the military's mission of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). The USAR has capabilities in place to address these responsibilities, but the utilization of these assets is not optimal. This paper makes recommendations for better utilization of USAR resources within the military's response to various DSCA related organizations. The current USAR manpower structure assigned to the Office of the Chief of Army Reserves (OCAR) and the Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) designed to work DSCA issues is investigated. The plan to train to task with active duty services, National Guardsmen, and other federal and civil organizations is also addressed. Recommendations based on integration and training is presented to streamline the process from notification to implementation of USAR assets in response to a declared emergency.

Utilization of USAR Assets in Response to Hurricane Sandy

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established November 25, 2002, by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in response to the terrorist attacks of 2001. DHS is responsible for protecting the United States and responding to natural and man-made disasters within the United States' borders and surrounding areas.

DHS coordinates comprehensive federal efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate a terrorist attack, natural disaster or other large-scale emergency, while working with individuals, communities, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, local, state, tribal, territorial and federal partners to ensure a swift and effective recovery effort.¹

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was incorporated into DHS effective March 1, 2003, and is responsible for emergency preparedness and coordination of efforts in response to a disaster occurring in the United States that overwhelms the state and local capabilities.² A state of emergency must be declared by the Governor within the state where the disaster occurred and a formal directive must be generated by the President committing FEMA and other federal agencies respond to the disaster. This Presidential declaration must precede any and all FEMA's participation.³ FEMA developed the National Response Framework (NRF) as a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response and responds to disasters and emergencies. The NRF is identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and is built upon a scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structure to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation.⁴ These documents are designed to link efforts at all levels of government, state and federal, Non-Government Organizations (NGO), and the private sector regarding disaster relief efforts. They are intended to capture specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that

range from the serious but purely local, to large scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.⁵ The NRF describes the principles, roles and responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering the core capabilities required to respond to an incident and further describes how response efforts integrate with those of the other mission areas.⁶

The NIMS establishes the comprehensive National approach to incident response.⁷ Incident management refers to how incidents are managed across homeland security activities, including preventions, protection, and response mitigation and recovery.⁸ This framework forms the basis for interoperability and compatibility that will, in turn, enable a diverse set of public and private organizations to conduct integrated and effective emergency management and incident response operations. The NIMS provides the incident management basis for the NRF.⁹

The NRF is constructed on a tiered response hierarchy. The majority of incidents begins and ends locally and is managed at the local level. Local responders are typically called upon initially, and only after their capabilities are overwhelmed are outside agencies requested. The requests for additional resources are forwarded to the private sector and NGOs first.¹⁰ Some additional resources are often provided by neighboring jurisdictions or states through an Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).¹¹ When the local and state resources are overwhelmed, federal support is warranted and the NRF is structured to provide the necessary tiered levels of support. The federal government is poised to respond with increasing or decreasing resources as the conditions at the incident dictate.

United States Army Reserve

The structure of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) supports the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission.¹² The USAR provides Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) along with capabilities in medical, aviation, transportation, engineering, communication, and logistics support.¹³ A FEMA Coordination Officer (FEMACO) position within G-3/5/7 in the Office of the Chief of Army Reserves (OCAR) exists to constantly interface with FEMA leadership and increase communication and coordinate between the USAR and FEMA. All these skills and capabilities are focused through a command structure designed to facilitate DSCA. The FEMACO position is not currently filled with a full time Soldier, resulting in sporadic coverage during the build up to actual emergencies. The FEMACO differs from Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (REPLOs) in that the FEMACO is tasked with monitoring all FEMA regions.¹⁴

The USAR Soldier must maintain his or her proficiency while often holding a full time civilian job. This can place great time demands on certain categories of Reserve Soldiers. It is important to understand the different status categories in which USAR Soldiers can reside. USAR personnel exist in one of two subcategories: selected reserve or Individual Ready Reserve. The selected reserves are further broken down into Troop Program Units (TPU), Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA). It is important to understand the differences between the availability and the accessibility between the AGR and the TPU programs. The AGR personnel are collocated with the unit headquarters and are on duty full time. The TPU Soldier normally attends 48 Battle Assemblies (BA) annually with an additional 14 days for Annual Training (AT). The BA consists of two, four hour (minimum), training periods

per day while the AT days are consecutive and normally occur during the summer months. These BA and AT days are the primary opportunities for collectively training to meet all of the unit's requirements for times of war or national emergency. The individual TPU Soldier cannot exceed 29 days of AT during any given year. If mission requirements demand the TPU Soldier serve more than 29 days, they must be mobilized and placed on active duty orders. This process can be lengthy if not planned for and proactively trained to.

This time in the labor intensive mobilization process was a major inhibitor to reserve component personnel responding quickly to a national demand when the Reserve Component (RC) was a strategic force. Present day leaders recognized this and have tailored training to ensure this is not an issue in today's operational reserves. This training is based on the Army Future Force Generation Model which has effectively and efficiently streamlined post mobilization training requirements.¹⁵ The AGR and Full Time Support (FTS) perform day to day support functions including personnel administration, training, operations, maintenance and supply which enable TPU Soldiers to use their limited training time to concentrate on war time tasks instead of sustainment functions.¹⁶ The FTS consists of AGR Soldiers, military technicians, Department of Army (DA) civilians and Active Component (AC) Soldiers.

The RC units supporting DSCA generally have Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) every three to six months. An SRP is a process where all Soldiers in the unit are screened medically to ensure they are fit and ready to deploy. Currently the required medical screening is not standardized across all units within the USAR. The SRP should be conducted using the same standards for all Soldiers regardless of whether

they are deploying overseas or remaining in the continental United States. This will significantly shorten the time between mobilization and deployment and enhance the flexibility for leadership to utilize forces because all units will maintain the same mobilization readiness. Unit commanders and FTS have also established an orders request process where the official orders request packets are preapproved and only await final signature to be official. This proactive approach has decreased the time from alert to arrival at an incident site or Point Of Debarkation (POD) to less than 48 hours in many cases. As a result the RC is an effective and efficient option to be used by senior leaders if the request for forces is short notice. USAR Soldiers completing the SRP are able to continue their civilian employment and be prepared to deploy in a very short time frame. This benefits the Army by not having the financial burden of keeping Soldiers on orders but maintains the luxury of quickly mobilizing resources to fill a capability gap.

The National Guard (NG) is similar to the USAR in many aspects but differs in two key areas. First, the Governor of the state can activate NG personnel to State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status in response to a national or manmade disaster. SAD is based on state statute and policy and the Soldiers remain under the command and control of the Governor. Title 32 allows the Governor of a state to order a member of the NG to duty in accordance with United States Code.¹⁷ A key aspect of these two duty statuses is that the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) does not apply. The USAR personnel are Title 10 and the PCA governs many of their actions. The Posse Comitatus Act does not prevent Title 10 military services from supporting the police, nor does it preclude them from enforcing the law but only when ordered to do so by the president. Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 18, authorizes military support for civilian law

enforcement agencies for counterdrug operations and in emergencies involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction. Support for law enforcement agencies may not impair military readiness, and military personnel shall not participate in searches, seizures, arrests, or similar activities unless such participation is otherwise authorized by law.¹⁸ Activation of Title 32 forces to Title 10 status can be done by the President or SECDEF, but they must have prior approval and consent by the state Governor.¹⁹ The primary difference between Title 10 and Title 32 forces reside in which level of government the forces are subordinate. Title 10 forces are subordinate to the federal government while Title 32 forces are subordinate to the state government in which they reside.²⁰ The key to state active service is that Federal Law provides the Governor with the ability to place a Soldier in a full-time duty status under the command and control of the Governor. This is a statutory exception to the PCA and the Governor may use the NG in a law enforcement capacity where the chain of command rests within the state.²¹

The second major difference between USAR and NG units is geographic dispersion. Most USAR units draw from a greater geographical area than the NG units where guardsmen normally live within the state their unit resides. For example, one USAR General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB) has assets in six separate states and personnel that reside in over fifteen states. The fact these resources were geographically dispersed was beneficial when responding to large scale disasters. One such disaster was Hurricane Katrina, where many of the Louisiana and Mississippi NG personnel's homes and families were directly affected by the size and magnitude of the storm. The co-location of NG resources with the destruction caused by the hurricane,

limited the NG's ability to respond with relief efforts. The geographic dispersion of the USAR assets mitigates the possibility of a single event effecting the entire organization.

The United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Army Forces North (USARNORTH) have the responsibility for providing military support to civil authorities within the United States.²² USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning, organizing, and executing all aspects of Homeland Defense (HD) and performing Civil Support (CS) or DSCA missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters. USARNORTH (Fifth Army) provides USNORTHCOM with a dedicated Army Service Component Commander for HD and CS. USARNORTH is a service component of the United States and responsible for homeland defense and DSCA as the joint force land component command of USNORTHCOM.²³ USARNORTH is a multi-component organization consisting of AC and USAR personnel and became a standing Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) in 2008.²⁴

Assigned to USARNORTH are ten permanently assigned Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO) associated with each of the 10 FEMA regions.²⁵ The DCO serves as DOD's single point of contact at the Joint Field Office (JFO) for requesting assistance from DOD.²⁶ Generally requests for DSCA originate at the JFO and are coordinated with and processed through the DCO in time of crisis. The DCO's responsibilities include processing requirements for military support, forwarding mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations through DOD designated channels, and assigning military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated Emergency Support Functions (ESF).^{27,28}

As envisioned in the NRF and NIMS, state and local resources are almost always the first to respond to natural and manmade incidents; when they become overwhelmed

the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) passes a request for additional help to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who manages and coordinates the federal response and recovery activities.²⁹ These activities pertain to Stafford Act events where state and local abilities are overwhelmed and the President has declared the incident a disaster.³⁰ The FCO works with the SCO regarding state and local requirements and coordinates and tasks federal agencies as necessary. The FCO validates the requirements and coordinates with the JFO ESFs to determine if support is available. If local support is not available and DOD resources are required, a request for DOD assistance is processed through the DCO. The DCO analyzes the request and determines if the requirements can be fulfilled with resources already deployed. If the capability exists and is deployed in the area of operations, those units are tasked for support. When capabilities do not exist within deployed units, the DCO forwards a Request For Assistance (RFA) to USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM reviews the RFA and forwards it back to Joint Directorate of Military Support (JDOMS) and an official tasking is issued to alert and mobilize units able to fulfill the desired capability gaps.

Hurricane Sandy

Hurricane Sandy came ashore in the New York City area on October 29, 2012. It was a truly monstrous storm in which forty three New York citizens perished and tens of thousands were injured or forced to evacuate their homes.³¹ Sandy quickly became unofficially known as “Superstorm Sandy” and was the most destructive and deadliest hurricane to hit the United States mainland since Hurricane Katrina in 2005.³² Sandy made official landfall at 2300 UTC on October 29, 2012 as a post-tropical cyclone harboring hurricane force wind gusts.³³ The sheer size of the storm was measured to have a diameter with winds spanning out over 1,100 miles, making it the largest Atlantic

hurricane on record. Estimates assessed the damage caused by Sandy to be in excess of \$68 billion dollars and the direct cause of death for at least 286 people in seven separate countries along the storm's path. The cost of damage in the United States alone was \$65 billion dollars with approximately 73 direct fatalities. Sandy was the second costliest storm to hit the United States in the last 50 years as compared to Hurricane Katrina (\$108 billion dollars in damage) and the third deadliest behind Katrina (approximately 1,200 killed) and Hurricane Agnes in 1972 (122 direct fatalities).³⁴

Hurricane Sandy affected 24 states from Florida north to Maine and as far west as Michigan and Wisconsin. The hardest hit area was in New York and New Jersey where an estimated 25,000 people required temporary shelter and electrical power to over 8.5 million customers was cut off.³⁵ Major transportation networks were blocked due to flooding and debris further inhibiting recovery efforts across the area. The remainder of this paper will focus on the preparation and response of the local, state and federal resources in those areas.

Preparations for the storm started on 22 October when the NOAA National Weather Service issued a public advisory that Tropical Depression 18 (ultimately becoming Hurricane Sandy) had been officially upgraded to Tropical Storm Sandy.³⁶ The next day the European Center for Medium Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) headquartered in Reading, England predicted the storm would intensify and make landfall in the New York City area on the 29th of October. This prediction was accurate and contrary to normal hurricane movement. The National Weather Service (NWS) and the National Hurricane Center (NHC) did not confirm the storm's track as predicted by the ECMWF model until four days later leading to criticism of the NWS and subsequent

forecast model updates.³⁷ As Hurricane Sandy tracked north toward landfall, six separate Governors requested SECDEF appoint temporary Dual Status Commanders (DSC) with the authority over Title 10 and Title 32 forces.³⁸³⁹

FEMA's regional offices in Atlanta, Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston monitored Hurricane Sandy and coordinated with local and state emergency management centers along the east coast.⁴⁰ The Red Cross and other NGOs became energized and reached out to the public with information and advice through a variety of media venues.⁴¹ On 26 October, FEMA deployed Incident Management Assistance Teams to eight states in the northeast United States, including New York and New Jersey, to assist with coordination and proactively deployed liaison officers to emergency operation centers in seven of those states and the District of Columbia.⁴² The President directed FEMA to ensure all available federal resources were being readied to support state and local first responders in potentially affected areas along the eastern seaboard.⁴³ USNORTHCOM became energized and deployed regional DCOs and portions of the Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) in advance of the storm in an effort to validate, plan, coordinate, and facilitate DOD support of FEMA's response operations.⁴⁴ The National Guard Bureau (NGB) mobilized over 61,000 personnel from Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the District of Columbia to coordinate with authorities on site in preparation for Sandy's landfall.⁴⁵ These NG Soldiers were mobilized under Title 32 at the request of their state Governors and USAR resources were not notified to prepare for mobilization.

The President was briefed daily regarding the progress of Sandy and on 27 October directed FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate to continue to bring all available resources to bear to support state and local responders in potentially affected areas along the eastern seaboard.⁴⁶ Administrator Fugate and DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano queried several state Governors to ensure the states had the support they required.⁴⁷ The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)⁴⁸ was activated in the District of Columbia to coordinate the federal response and select ESFs were activated to support requirements at the state level.⁴⁹ National disaster medical response teams were placed on alert and federal medical stations and supplies were staged to expedite deployment to incident sites across the affected area.⁵⁰ NGOs continued to stage relief supplies in conjunction with community partnering efforts.⁵¹

Declarations of emergency for Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, New Jersey and New York were signed by President Obama on October 28, 2012.⁵² These declarations were significant in that it authorized federal resources be provided directly to state, tribal, and local governments engaged in relief efforts.⁵³ Two Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) were prepositioned at Fredrick Maryland consisting of various medical professionals including USAR personnel.⁵⁴ The United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACOE) alerted and mobilized teams to support power generation, debris, removal, and shelter construction efforts.⁵⁵ President Obama signed a pre-disaster emergency declaration on 29 October for Delaware, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania further authorizing federal resources for those states.⁵⁶ This authorized FEMA to identify, mobilize, and provide equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the emergency.⁵⁷ The NGB continued

to activate Soldiers along the anticipated path of the storm and placed approximately 2,000 more Soldiers on duty.⁵⁸

President Obama made disaster assistance available to Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York by declaring those states major disaster areas on the 30th.⁵⁹ FEMA established a National Power Restoration Taskforce designed to expedite relief efforts from DOD and other federal agencies. SECDEF Leon Panetta directed DOD to provide any disaster response resources requested by FEMA.⁶⁰ USNORTHCOM and associated DCO and DCE personnel deployed to streamline DOD support to FEMA.⁶¹ The Governors of the affected states ordered an additional 7,500 Soldiers to duty.⁶² Flooding, debris removal, power grid disruption, communications, and fuel distribution issues, to mention a few, plagued the relief efforts.⁶³

An example of how miss-communication and a desire to help can lead to unwelcome perceptions and confusion can be drawn from events surrounding a fuel distribution and control of unit activity within the DSC's area of responsibility. On 3 November the Director of New York's Title 32 Joint Force Headquarters was notified that President Obama ordered 10 fuel trucks from Title 10 resources to join the relief efforts. These resources were not requested by the Governor, DSC, or FEMA. This created the perception among some that the NG could not complete the mission and had to be supplemented by the active component forces. The next day Title 10 forces landed on Staten Island without the knowledge or approval of the DSC causing even more confusion and duplication of efforts.⁶⁴ Correcting this situation required attention to be drawn away from relief efforts where it was critical. Leadership throughout the

relief organizations identified the benefits realized when units had an opportunity to train together in a controlled environment prior to an actual incident.⁶⁵

USAR Involvement

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 enabled the use of USAR resources for DSCA during a crisis within the United States. For operations surrounding Hurricane Sandy, the new authorization gave leadership the flexibility to expand specialized capabilities for domestic disaster relief. The extent of USAR participation for Hurricane Sandy response was limited to primarily 48 Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) from the Army Reserve's Joint Special Troop Support Command, three Quartermaster (QM) detachments, AGR/TPU Deputy Defense Coordinating Officers (DDCOs), two helicopters, and utilization of a variety of facilities across the affected area. This request for these capabilities fell short of exercising the full resources of the USAR available to the DSC. The EPLOs were based out of Salt Lake City, Utah and acted as the subject matter experts in DSCA. The DDCOs supported their primary DCOs regarding RC issues with responsibilities described earlier. The QM detachments originated from a geographically dispersed area and consisted of elements from the 401st QM detachment based in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, the 410th QM detachment based in Jacksonville, Florida, and the 431st QM detachment based in Kinston, North Carolina. These QM soldiers provided critical water purification and de-water support efforts in the hardest hit areas along New York City's southern most barrier islands in the borough of Queens. Throughout the relief effort these QM detachments worked directly for the 19th Engineer Battalion, an AC engineer command based in Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Only this small cross section of available capabilities residing in the USAR were utilized in support of relief efforts, and as these relief efforts continued local and state response teams were becoming overwhelmed. More capabilities shortfalls arose and the role of Title 10 forces increased. To demonstrate how certain USAR capabilities were readily available but not requested, consider the aviation support. A staging area was established at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JBMDL) which is under jurisdiction of the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC).⁶⁶ A Brigade Headquarters for USAR aviation support is located on JBMDL but no requests for support were ever received. This BDE controls two General Support Aviation Battalions (GSABs) and a fixed wing battalion with resources in close proximity to the incident area.⁶⁷

A lesson learned from Hurricane Katrina was to identify potential USAR facilities for possible staging areas.⁶⁸ MG William Razz, the Commander of Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JBMDL), supplied staging and billeting areas for the New York City Fire Department (NYCFD) and NG units. "These staging areas were critical to safely operate, to continue to bring in additional resources, and maneuver those resources to the most beneficial positions for fighting fires" said NYCFD spokesperson Frank Dwyer.⁶⁹ One particular fire destroyed 111 houses in Breezy point, New York and would have likely been much worse if the NYCFD could not have staged out of JBMDL. These capabilities merely scratch the surface of those available and ready residing in the USAR facility network. USAR facilities are located in all fifty states of the United States and support training in times of peace, war, and natural or manmade disasters. The geographic displacement of USAR facilities and personnel significantly reduced the

risk of a single event prohibiting the response of critical resources. These facilities are often underutilized by active component and NG units because of the reliance of these organizations to their own infrastructure.

After Action Reviews

After Action Reviews (AAR) from the private sector, New York City government, NGB, USNORTHCOM, and Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) were researched to identify areas to improve USAR involvement.⁷⁰ Various actions were completed efficiently and effectively during the relief efforts and included the coordination between the Defense Logistics Agency Energy (DLA Energy), state and local governmental agencies, and the USAR facilities command at JBMDL.⁷¹ Communication and anticipation of future requirements lead to a team effort supporting a staging area for over 300 fueling assets, vehicle and equipment maintenance, defueling operations, life support, latrines and an operations center for fuel distribution.⁷² DLA's after action review emphasized how DLA Energy and USAR facility personnel worked closely together with state and local authorities with a unity of effort focused on mission completion.⁷³ The local utilities took numerous pre-emptive actions to minimize the negative impact on the area hit by Sandy by protecting and preserving their infrastructure, but ultimately over 140 miles of overhead lines, 1,000 utility poles, and 200 transformers were damaged in the electrical grid. Areas identified by civilian companies needing improvement included communication between government agencies at all levels to minimize duplication of efforts causing delays in diagnosing the cause of the supply disruptions.⁷⁴

First responders identified an inability to move workers throughout the incident area due to debris closed transportation corridors. Many state and local assets could

not move freely within the state and outside resources had difficulties crossing state lines.⁷⁵ USAR resources based outside the incident area could have expedited movement of personnel and equipment from unaffected facilities to staging areas such as JBMDL and supported state and local assets. The larger equipment must still be transported by large aircraft residing in the USAF, but the USAR has a multitude of ground and air assets already trained to transport personnel and equipment to an incident site across the United States within 24-48 hours of notification.⁷⁶ This mission has been practiced repeatedly in support of JTF-CS and Defense CBRNE (Chemical, Radiological, Biological, Nuclear, and Explosive) Response Force (DCRF) missions.⁷⁷ Utilization of USAR assets would enhance the responsiveness of mutual assistance based out of a USAR facility supporting FEMA. Con Edison and the Moreland Commission appointed by the Governor of New York, Governor Andrew Cuomo, both documented the many complications placed on first responders due to the vastness and level of devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy.⁷⁸ It was noted that Hurricane Sandy greatly diminished the ability of state and local governments to assist with staging, prepositioning and other services which could have accelerated restoration once the storm had passed.⁷⁹ Due to the predicted severity of the storm utilities within the region kept local crews in their own territories to address local issues, further placing reliance on resources from outside the storm's reach.⁸⁰ Additional resources were readily available within the USAR structure but were not requested or employed.

Agencies within the federal government conducted numerous AARs designed to optimize future responses to disasters. One such AAR was conducted for the Assistant Secretary of Defense Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs on January 10,

2013.⁸¹ This AAR revealed that DOD was limited as to its ability to access the Total Force.⁸² FEMA's philosophy of "Go Big, Go Fast, Go Smart" was adopted by DOD which has the responsibility to ensure all available capabilities are postured to respond rapidly and effectively.⁸³ DOD acknowledged it needs to take additional steps to get even "smarter" by making investments in pre-planning and exercises.⁸⁴ Comments were voiced stressing the importance of "hands on" involvement by DOD in close coordination with FEMA counterparts and making effective use of liaison personnel to ensure better communication and coordination with civilian authorities to prevent them from becoming overwhelmed upon DOD's arrival.⁸⁵ The AAR also identified a need for a concerted; deliberate planning effort involving the Total Force that should be undertaken region-by-region to develop DOD Regional Response plans.⁸⁶ The NG also expressed concern about the lack of utilization of Title 10 reserve capabilities stressing the advantages of their involvement in exercises to minimize confusion while maximizing resource utilization.⁸⁷

This DOD AAR was also designed to incorporate innovative and effective defense support efforts into current practices and procedures, identify gaps and develop action plans to fill those gaps, and identify lessons learned.⁸⁸ Two areas identified by the USACE were leveraging capabilities through coordination and synchronization forward, and the need to continue to clarify support relationships of Title 10 (active component and USAR) forces in support of the NRF.⁸⁹ HQDA identified an issue with the activation (10 USC 12304a) of Non-NG forces and the need for detailed implementation guidance in support of domestic emergencies.⁹⁰ ARNORTH recognized a problem regarding rapid access to RC forces and a recommendation to explore a

means of executing rapid Theater Opening Force Package capabilities for DSCA.⁹¹ USAR involvement was not evident in the attendance records for the AAR proving a missed opportunity for valuable insight into the USAR resources that were prepared but not utilized.⁹²

AARs were also conducted by the NY Dual Status Commander and the Commanding General of JTF-CS.⁹³ The assistant adjutant General-Army for New York Army National Guard (NYANG), BG Michael Swezey, was designated as the DSC in NY for Hurricane Sandy relief efforts. The DSC has, as the name implies, a dual chain of command. Title 10 forces must understand this concept and appreciate the associated authorities. The DSC reports through the state TAG to the Governor and through Northern Command to the President.⁹⁴ BG Swezey maintained a continuous dialogue, necessary to ensure integration of forces with MG Pat Murphy (Title 32, NY TAG) and LTG Bill Caldwell (Title 10 Commanding General for ARNORTH). All levels of command stressed the importance of not being caught short of resources. Some Title 10 resources were positioned at JBDML as a contingency for unforeseen events, which created friction between Title 10 forces assisting Title 32 forces. The AAR noted when Title 10 forces are employed vice NG forces it is perceived the NG failed to respond satisfactorily.⁹⁵ This is a systemic problem and must be corrected if Title 10 forces are going to be seamlessly integrated with the NG when responding to a domestic event.

There are numerous legal issues associated with Title 10 forces conducting operations without proper approval after the initial 72 hours from emergency declaration when requested by local civilian authorities.⁹⁶ BG Swezey envisioned that participation by Title 10 forces in large DSCA related exercises will expose personnel to those legal

limitations.⁹⁷ That would reduce the risk of legal miss-steps during an actual DSCA response. BG Swezey made the observation that a system needs to be found to place a boundary around a domestic emergency area and to put all Title 10 assets within that zone under the control of the DSC.⁹⁸ He also appreciated the advantages for Title 10 forces to be held in close proximity to the event but outside the AOR, to facilitate rapid response when needed while ensuring a stable staging area citing the situation at JBMDL.

MG Jeff Mathis, JTF-CS CG, was designated the commander of the Title 10 Joint Coordination Element (JCE) from ARNORTH and arrived at JBMDL to oversee Title 10 relief forces.⁹⁹ The DSC and JCE commanders discussed role and responsibilities concerning Title 10 utilization upon arrival at JBMDL.¹⁰⁰ JTF-CS also perceived the NY TAG was concerned which component the Title 10 forces were drawn from.¹⁰¹ MG Mathis made two recommendations to help streamline the USAR support in the event of an unplanned emergency; standardization of mobilization prerequisites and revising the Disaster Response Fund verbiage to include CONUS operations.¹⁰² It was also noted by MG Mathis how the working relationship between the USAR aviation assets and the JTF-CS was seamless because of the familiarity between the organizations gleaned from extensive exercise involvement.¹⁰³

Recommendations

USAR Soldiers identified to support DSCA operations should maintain the same pre-mobilization status of those deploying overseas. Up to date immunizations, physicals, training certifications, family care plans, completed orders request templates, and basic Soldiers skills must be maintained. There must be one set of pre-mobilization requirements to which all service members must adhere. This will reduce confusion as

to which units can be activated for what type of response. Funds are available for additional Inactive Duty Training (IDT) periods to train USAR Soldiers regarding DSCA and medical related tasks. These funds supplement the 48 BA's and can be used at the discretion of the commander to enhance readiness. The lack of a standardized pre-mobilization process to support DSCA related events inhibits the CCMD's and the DSC's ability to identify which forces can quickly be mobilized to support relief operations.

The response to Hurricane Sandy demonstrated the need for all organizations to work together as early and as often as possible prior to an actual incident. This fact was realized by all levels of responders and must be addressed. There are numerous large exercises throughout the year involving disaster response training. Title 10 and 32 organizations must use every opportunity to train together in the most realistic environment. Greater involvement in national level disaster response exercises, such as Vigilant Guard¹⁰⁴, will reduce confusion and redundancy of effort when units respond to an actual DSCA event.

The FEMA Coordination Officer (FEMACO) position within G-3/5/7 in OCAR is an underutilized liaison position. Energizing and empowering that officer to constantly interface with FEMA leadership will greatly increase communication and coordination between the USAR and FEMA. The officer should be tasked with coordinating with USAR staffs, joint and inter-service staffs, DA, other federal agencies to further develop the capabilities for response to natural and man-made disasters. This person should be the focal point and the subject matter expert concerning USAR capabilities and doctrine in response to domestic emergencies working closely with regional EPLOs to define

USAR resource availability if warranted. Situational awareness would be greatly heightened within OCAR regarding anticipated demands for USAR assets and utilization of those assets would be streamlined and optimized. The duty station should be located at FEMA headquarters in Washington D.C. to promote full integration and involvement, vice in the G3/5/7 offices as it presently resides. The close proximity between OCAR and FEMA headquarters will allow on demand briefings and situation assessments be given to USAR leadership increasing their environmental awareness and ability to anticipate future requirements. This officer can also use information gleaned from established relationships and co-location with senior FEMA officials to identify incident capability shortfalls.

Regionalization of USAR forces within the continental United States and integrating them with FEMA and NG organizations within those regions will enable RC and FEMA units to train together. Currently the USAR forces are not aligned with any specific region for training or emergency support. If USAR forces are aligned with other DSCA supporting organizations the resulting integration will optimize the unity of effort between state and federal forces when responding to an actual emergency. This will significantly reduce the chances of repeating the mistakes made during Hurricane Sandy relief efforts. USAR leadership must coordinate with USNORTHCOM and the NGB to maximize participation in national or regional exercises and task units within the exercise area to participate. Examples of these exercises are Vigilant Guard and Vibrant Response¹⁰⁵. Regionalization can be divided into a regional structure providing established relationships between Title 10/32 units, enabling response anywhere in the United States. USAR units within their assigned regions can focus training and

participation in disaster response exercises with the NG and other federal agencies. This will increase familiarity with processes and procedures used by potential response partners prior to an actual incident. The regional alignment structure will significantly reduce the risk of a single event destroying a capability and enhance the familiarity between local, state, DOD, and other federal agencies when responding to an actual emergency.

Conclusion

Hurricane Sandy proved to be one of the most devastating natural disasters to hit the mainland United States. Processes defined in the NRF were followed and when local, tribal, and state organizations were overwhelmed the federal government stepped in to lend assistance. The NRF defined the guidelines to ensure unity of effort and command between local, state, and federal agencies. Incorporation of the previously stated recommendations will maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of USAR resources for future DSCA efforts and provide the CCMD and DSC with improved awareness of force capability and availability.

Incorporation of these recommendations prior to Hurricane Sandy would have streamlined the response timeline and greatly reduced inefficiencies. The FEMACO would have identified possible capability shortfalls with existing response efforts and alerted USAR leadership. USAR units selected to fill capability gaps would have completed a standardized pre-mobilization certification prior to their AT, supported a national or regional level exercise, and worked side by side with their FEMA and NG counterparts. The USAR units would have been familiar with the command structure and legal restraints associated with the DSC and DSCA for that region. Established

and practiced lines of communication between the DSC and JTF-CS leadership would have been validated during previous exercises.

No response will be flawless but preparation, practice, and familiarity will greatly improve overall efficiency and effectiveness. MG Visot¹⁰⁶ summed up USAR dedication to support to the Nation in times of disaster at a speech during the International Disaster Conference and Expo, "...it is the creation and fostering of relationships between USAR units and communities that allows the Reserves to use their capabilities to their full potential. USAR is ready to do whatever the Nation asks of them".¹⁰⁷

Endnotes

¹Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016 February 2012, Mission 5, <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-strategic-plan-fy-2012-2016.pdf>, 15, (accessed December 14, 2013).

² Federal Emergency Management Agency, "FEMA". July 22, 2013, *Department of Homeland Security*, <http://www.fema.gov/about-agency>, (accessed January 24, 2014).

³Ibid.

⁴Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework 2013, Second Edition, May 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf, 1, (accessed December 21, 2013).

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., i.

⁷Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System*, December 2008, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf (accessed December 17, 2013)

⁸Ibid., 5.

⁹Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework 2013*, Second Edition, May 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf, 3, (accessed December 21, 2013).

¹⁰Ibid., 5.

¹¹Ibid., 6.

¹²Defense Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA) is the process by which the United States military resources can be used to assist in missions normally conducted by civil authorities.

¹³United States Army Reserve, "America's Army reserve: A Life-saving and Life-Sustaining Force, 2013 Posture Statement", [www.usar.army.mil/resources/Media/ARPS_2013_6-6-13%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.usar.army.mil/resources/Media/ARPS_2013_6-6-13%20(2).pdf), (accessed March 4, 2014), 7.

¹⁴Regional EPLOs (REPLOs) are reservists assigned to the FEMA regions with the same areas of responsibility as their respective defense coordinating officers (DCOs). They may backfill for DCOs who have been deployed. REPLOs direct their efforts toward planning and coordinating defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) activities. They serve as subject matter experts for the regions and their respective services and are highly trained in request for assistance and mission assignment development.

¹⁵U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army regulation 525-29 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 14, 2011), 26.

¹⁶US Army War College, *How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*, (Carlisle, PA, Army War College, July 15, 2013), 7-4.

¹⁷Army National Guard, "National Guard Fact Sheet Army National Guard (FY2005)", May 3, 2006. http://www.arng.army.mil/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publications/News%20Media%20Factsheets/ARNG_Factsheet_May_06%20ARNG%20fact%20Sheet.pdf , 4 (accessed March 30, 2014).

¹⁸John R. Brinkerhoff, "Domestic Operational Law: The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland Security", December 2009, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/10-16/ch_12.asp (accessed March 30, 2014).

¹⁹The Posse Comitatus Act is the United States federal law (18 U.S.C 1385) limiting the powers of the federal government in using federal military personnel to enforce the state's laws.

²⁰Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, *Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, As Amended Through January 7, 2011*, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011) 1689.

²¹Army National Guard, "National Guard Fact Sheet Army National Guard (FY2005)", May 3, 2006. http://www.arng.army.mil/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publications/News%20Media%20Factsheets/ARNG_Factsheet_May_06%20ARNG%20fact%20Sheet.pdf , 4 (accessed March 30, 2014).

²²United States Northern Command, *About USNORTHCOM*, www.northcom.mil/, (accessed March 4, 2014).

²³Ibid.

²⁴U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Force Generation*, Army regulation 525-29 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 14, 2011), 21-31.

²⁵Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework 2013*, Second Edition, May 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf, 42 (accessed December 21, 2013).

²⁶Department of Homeland Security, *Joint Field Office Activation and Operations, Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure, Version 8.3*, 14 (accessed March 3, 2014).

²⁷Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework 2013*, Second Edition, May 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf, 68 (accessed December 21, 2013).

²⁸The ESFs provide the structure for coordinating federal interagency support for a federal response to an incident. The ESFs are mechanisms for grouping functions most frequently used to provide federal support to states for declared disasters under the Stafford Act.

²⁹Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework 2013*, Second Edition, May 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_response_framework_20130501.pdf, 4 (accessed December 21, 2013).

³⁰The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, PL 100-707, signed into law November 23, 1988; amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, PL 93-288. This Act constitutes the statutory authority for most Federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs.

³¹Linda I. Gibbs and Caswell F. Holloway, "Hurricane Sandy After Action Report and Recommendations to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg," May 2013, http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf, 1 (accessed January 13, 2014).

³²David Porter, "Hurricane Sandy Was Second-Costliest In U.S. History, Report Shows" February 12, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/12/hurricane-sandy-second-costliest_n_2669686.html (accessed December 30, 2013).

³³Matt Smith, "Sandy Wrecks Havoc Across Northeast; at Least 11 Dead October 30, 2012, linked from *CNN U.S.* at <http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/29/us/tropical-weather-sandy/index.html>, (accessed December 30, 2013).

³⁴"Weather Underground: Deadliest U. S. Hurricanes of All Time", April 29, 2013 (<http://www.underground.com/hurricane/usdeadly.asp>) *Wunderground.com* (accessed December 30, 2013).

³⁵CNN, "Superstorm Sandy Blamed For at Least 11 U.S. Deaths as it Slams East Coast" October 29, 2012, <http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/29/hurricane-sandy-strengthens-to-85-mp/> (accessed December 30, 2013).

³⁶National Weather Service, National Hurricane Center, *Tropical Depression EIGHTEEN*, (Miami Florida: National Hurricane Center, October 22 2012), <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2012/al18/al182012.public.001.shtml?> (accessed March 30, 2014).

³⁷ Dan Vergano, "U.S. Forecasts Late Arrival Stirs Weather Tempest", October 30, 2012, *USA Today*, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2012/10/30/sandy-hurricane-models/1668867/w>, (accessed December 29, 2013).

³⁸ William Matthews, "Two Hats Are Better Than One", March 2013. <http://nationalguardmagazine.com/article/Two+Hats+Are+Better+Than+One/1341937/149143/article.html>, (accessed December 18, 2013).

³⁹ The dual-status commander concept represents a dramatic shift from past practices that dictated two distinct chains of command for forces responding to domestic disasters. Federal troops who operated under "Title 10" authority reported to one commander, and National Guard members serving under "Title 32," or state active duty authority, to another. The dual-status commander typically is a National Guard general officer who has authority over both Title 10 and Title 32/state active-duty troops. With a Title 10 deputy commander and staff members assigned to provide assistance, dual-status commanders report through both chains while supporting their respective state governors.

⁴⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Hurricane Sandy: Timeline|FEMA.gov", October 28, 2012, <http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline>, 2 (assessed January 1, 2014).

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 3.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 4.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) is a multiagency center that coordinates the overall Federal support for major disasters and emergencies, including catastrophic incidents in support of operations at the regional-level. The FEMA Administrator, or his or her delegate, activates the NRCC in anticipation of, or in response to, an incident by activating the NRCC staff, which includes FEMA personnel, the appropriate Emergency Support Functions, and other appropriate personnel (including nongovernmental organization and private sector representatives).

⁴⁹Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Hurricane Sandy: Timeline|FEMA.gov", October 28, 2012, <http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline>, 9 (assessed January 1, 2014).

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 10.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²Ibid., 11.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴A DMAT is a group of professional and para-professional medical personnel (supported by a cadre of logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide medical care during a disaster or other event. DMATs are designed to be a rapid-response element to supplement local medical care until other Federal or contract resources can be mobilized, or the situation is resolved. DMATs deploy to disaster sites with sufficient supplies and equipment to sustain themselves for a period of 72 hours while providing medical care at a fixed or temporary medical care site. In mass casualty incidents, their responsibilities may include triaging patients, providing high-quality medical care despite the adverse and austere environment often found at a disaster site, patient reception at staging facilities and preparing patients for evacuation.

⁵⁵Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Hurricane Sandy: Timeline|FEMA.gov", October 28, 2012, <http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy-timeline>, 14 (assessed January 1, 2014).

⁵⁶Ibid., 16.

⁵⁷Ibid., 11.

⁵⁸Ibid., 18.

⁵⁹Ibid., 20.

⁶⁰Ibid., 22.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³ Linda I. Gibbs and Caswell F. Holloway, "Hurricane Sandy After Action Report and Recommendations to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg," May 2013, http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf (accessed January 13, 2014).

⁶⁴BG Michael Swezey, Dual Status Commander Joint Task Force – Sandy, NY Army National Guard, telephone interview by author, January 25, 2014.

⁶⁵Ibid: Ross James, HDI&DSCA, Hurricane Sandy After Action Review OASD (HD&ASA) Staff Top Ten List: What Worked Well and Needs Improvement; MG Jeff W. Mathis III, Joint Task Force-Civil Support Commanding General, telephone interview by author, January 31, 2014.

⁶⁶The USARC mission is to provide trained and ready units and Soldiers to mobilize in support of the national strategy.

⁶⁷A GSAB consists of heavy lift (CH-47), medium lift (UH-60), MEDEVAC (HH-60), maintenance, and headquarters companies structured to rapidly deploy and be self-sufficient.

⁶⁸The White House, “Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned”, September 15, 2005, <http://www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/Katrina-lessons-learned/>, Chapter 5, (accessed January 14, 2014).

⁶⁹SSG Shawn Morris, “Army Reserve Facilities Bolster Efforts to Combat Hurricane Sandy”, 99th RSC, November 5, 2012.

⁷⁰Joint Task Force-Civil Support acted as the Title 10 coordination element to the DSC in New York and New Jersey.

⁷¹BG Michael Swezey, Dual Status Commander Joint Task Force – Sandy, NY Army National Guard, telephone interview by author, January 25, 2014.

⁷²Terry Shawn, *Fueling East Coast Relief*, (Defense Logistics Agency “LOGLINES”) JAN-FEB 2013, 2.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 136.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 142.

⁷⁶MG Jeff W. Mathis III, Joint Task Force-Civil Support Commanding General, telephone interview by author, January 31, 2014.

⁷⁷JTF-CS and the DCRF are prepared to respond to a catastrophic CBRN event in the U.S. as part of the Federal response in support of state/local authorities. The DCRF is organized into four functional task forces: TF Operations with technical response; TF Medical with medical capabilities; and TF Aviation with aviation lift capabilities; TF Logistics with a primary mission of logistical support to the DCRF. JTF-CS and the DCRF are postured to provide a swift, appropriate response to a no-notice CBRN incident with the trust and confidence of federal, state, tribal and local partners.

⁷⁸Robert Abrams and Benjamin Lawsky et al, Appointed by Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, *Moreland Commission on Utility Storm Preparation and Response, Final Report*, June 22, 2013.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 8.

⁸⁰Terry Shawn, *Fueling East Coast Relief*, (Defense Logistics Agency “LOGLINES”) JAN-FEB 2013, 113.

⁸¹Ross James, HDI&DSCA, Hurricane Sandy After Action Review OASD (HD&ASA) Staff Top Ten List: What Worked Well and Needs Improvement.

⁸²The Army Total Force Policy, signed by Secretary of the Army John McHugh on Sept. 4, 2012, is a milestone in our Army's history. This policy integrates the Army's active and reserve components and represents the realization of the Total Force Concept. The Total Force Policy is also important to the Army because it establishes policy for the integration of the Army's active component and reserve components as a Total Force.

⁸³Ross James, HDI&DSCA, Hurricane Sandy After Action Review OASD (HD&ASA) Staff Top Ten List: What Worked Well and Needs Improvement.

⁸⁴Ibid., 3.

⁸⁵Ibid., 4.

⁸⁶Ibid., 5.

⁸⁷Ibid., 7.

⁸⁸Ibid., 8.

⁸⁹Ibid., 19.

⁹⁰Ibid., 34.

⁹¹Ibid., 35.

⁹²Ibid., List of Personnel Attending DOD AAR on Hurricane Sandy, 10 January 2013, 4:00 PM EST.

⁹³ BG Michael Swezey, Dual Status Commander Joint Task Force – Sandy, NY Army National Guard, telephone interview by author, January 25, 2014.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶A rule-of-thumb time limit of 72 hours exists for immediate response operations. The 72 hours corresponds with the time limit for the response phase (focus is on life-sustaining functions) of a DSCA operation. After 72 hours, the response is generally no longer considered immediate and falls into the category of restoration/recovery, although the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or President may authorize a response for up to ten days.

⁹⁷ BG Michael Swezey, Dual Status Commander Joint Task Force – Sandy, NY Army National Guard, telephone interview by author, January 25, 2014.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹ MG Jeff W. Mathis III, Joint Task Force-Civil Support Commanding General, telephone interview by author, January 31, 2014.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is an appropriation against which FEMA can direct, coordinate, manage, and fund eligible response and recovery efforts associated with domestic major disasters and emergencies that overwhelm State resources pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Through the DRF, FEMA can fund

authorized Federal disaster support activities as well as eligible State, territorial, tribal, and local actions, such as providing emergency protection and debris removal.

¹⁰³MG Jeff W. Mathis III, Joint Task Force-Civil Support Commanding General, telephone interview by author, January 31, 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Vigilant Guard is a multi-state, multi-agency exercise focused on interagency coordination in preparation for emergencies and catastrophic events. The U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau are co-sponsors of the exercise.

¹⁰⁵ Vibrant Response is an annual training event that uses large-scale scenarios to assist units in their efforts to respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear incidents within the United States. The exercise is sponsored by the U.S. Northern Command, led by U.S. Army North, and includes active Army, U.S. Army Reserve, and National Guard forces.

¹⁰⁶Major General Luis R. Visot assumed the responsibilities of Deputy Commanding General (Operations), United States Army Reserve, on 9 June 2012. As Deputy Commanding General (Operations), MG Visot provides oversight of the 16 Army Reserve Operational and Functional Commands throughout the Continental United States, Hawaii, and Germany.

¹⁰⁷MG Luis Visot, Speech to International Disaster Conference and Expo, (IDCE 2013) New Orleans, Louisiana, 9 January 2013, <http://www.usar.army.mil/ourBlog/Pages/BlogPost.aspx?blogpostid=34&blogsitel=/ourBlogInternational>, (accessed December 14, 2013).