Downsizing: Are the Right People Leaving and Staying?

by

Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Jackson
United States Army

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6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Jackson United States Army

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel Robert A. Harney, Jr. Director of Army Heritage Education Center

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Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Jackson
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Colonel Robert A. Harney, Jr.
Director of Army Heritage Education Center
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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During every past interwar period in our nation’s history there has been a drawdown of forces at conflict termination. However, the current interwar period falls during a time of persistent global conflict. Domestically, the armed forces are challenged by smaller budgets. These foreign threats and domestic political challenges have combined to create a requirement to properly execute a personnel drawdown that must be able to respond to today’s threats and be prepared to defeat tomorrow’s adversaries. As the Army downsizes to 440,000-450,000 active duty Soldiers, key questions remain as the Army marches towards this number. Is the drawdown being done correctly? Are the right people leaving and staying? Post separation board analysis suggests that some population subsets (based on commissioning source, branch, ethnicity, etc.) were more susceptible to involuntary separation than others. This paper offers assessments on whether the right people are staying and leaving. It also offers an assessment if this drawdown is being executed correctly. Lastly, it offers recommendations on how to obtain greater parity across all commissioning sources so that the entire officer corps can be strengthened.
Downsizing: Are the Right People Leaving and Staying?

Today’s problems come from yesterday’s solutions.

—Peter Senge

Author and lecturer Peter Senge's quote above about today’s problems having their roots in yesterday’s “solutions” is relevant to the discussion of force reductions. It is no surprise that in past interwar periods during our nation’s history, we have seen a drawdown of forces at conflict termination. However, the current environment has our nation drawing down forces in the midst of persistent global conflict which can potentially place our national security interests at risk. Therefore, in order for the Army to remain ready the architects of the current drawdown have the difficult task of correctly performing environmental scanning in order to attain the right force mix. For both the current interwar period and for the future force, this environmental scanning and subsequent actions will require senior leaders to balance the triad of force structure, readiness, and modernization. This paper will focus on the merits of the first in that triad—force structure.

In the majority of past interwar periods the military was not fully prepared for the next war as a result of personnel force structure decisions made during previous interwar periods. Therefore we must ask ourselves, as our government and the Army are currently going through the budget reductions and force drawdowns, is this current drawdown is being executed with the future in mind or are we only solving a problem for today. When thinking in time, it is vital to our national interest that we get this drawdown right for fear that today’s solution may become a future problem which could place our nation and our national interests at risk.
This paper asserts the current drawdown process, although not a perfect process since certain demographics were more susceptible to separation, is an overall suitable and fair means to reduce an all-volunteer force. This paper also asserts that the Army may have broken faith with a key segment of the officer population— those who answered the call to officership when the Army needed additional manpower to fill the officer corps and were commissioned through Officer Candidate School (OCS). I will develop and support this thesis by analyzing post-separation board trend data and strategic communications from Army senior leaders, including the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The scope of this paper is limited to junior and mid-grade officers (O1-O4) in the post-Operation Iraqi Freedom and post-Operation Enduring Freedom time frame. This paper does not focus on reduction measures for colonels, lieutenant colonels, or enlisted service members in the current drawdown period.

This paper opens by providing the reader with a historical perspective on drawdowns during past interwar periods, information on Army drawdown policy, and information on the Army’s plan to implement the drawdown of captains and majors in 2013. This paper then assesses the results of the force reduction measures on this population and the implications to the current and future force by evaluating whether the right people are staying and leaving and whether or not the drawdown was performed correctly. This paper concludes by offering recommendations in the event further reductions in personnel endstrength will be needed.

Past Drawdowns during Interwar Periods

In the interwar period of every war in American history, less our most recent combat operations, drawdowns were consistent with releasing draftees and volunteers
from their military obligation. In World War II, Army leadership made assessments on the correct size of the post-war force then developed plans “for a peaceful demobilization.”3 In June 1947, the Army had downsized from a force of over eight million to an Army land domain force of 591,000 and an Army air domain force of 306,000.4,5 This 93% reduction in force took place over a five year period.6 This rapid downsizing was not balanced and resulted in issues that affected Army readiness. In particular, the loss of soldiers in the force sustainment career field resulted in widespread equipment readiness deficiencies. One report even characterized many active Army units as being understrength and were considered “shadows of the efficient organizations they had been at the end of the war.”7

This rapid and unbalanced drawdown resulted in the “initially weak US military response” to aggression on the Korean Peninsula in June 1950.8 Soon the Army would hear the battle cry of “No more Task Force Smiths” as US engagement with North Korean forces proved the United States was not prepared for war. Aside from the equipment deficit against a determined North Korean foe, U.S. forces lacked combat experienced leaders. Instead of being an organization with seasoned leaders, Task Force Smith was emblematic of the larger Army and was comprised largely of inexperienced Soldiers, many of whom had recently just completed initial entry training.9 The important lesson learned here is that it is critical to keep combat-experienced leaders in the force.

In President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell speech, he warned of the military industrial complex. In the years that followed, this speech would be used as a “rallying cry for opponents of military expansion.”10 Although the military did not rapidly expand
after Korea, unlike post-World War II, the Army did not undergo steep drawdowns after Korea.\textsuperscript{11}

In the 1970s during the Vietnam War, the Army instituted force reduction measures known as the Reduction in Force (RIF). This Title 10 reduction authority is considered an involuntary drawdown measure. The goal of the RIF was to eliminate poor performers from service. However “the process was applied unevenly and, although the Army eliminated some ‘deadwood,’ a significant number of good soldiers were released and many substandard soldiers remained on active duty.”\textsuperscript{12}

Then-Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams received Secretary of Defense approval to shift Soldiers from Army headquarters and instructional units.\textsuperscript{13} In many ways this resembles current methods of force structure realignment as Army headquarters take a 25% cut.\textsuperscript{14} Additionally during the 1970s, General Abrams leveraged use of the National Guard and Army Reserve in reducing personnel while attempting to retain capability. General Abrams technique was to use round-out brigades for “late-deploying active duty divisions” and by moving many operational support and force sustainment functions to the Army Reserve.\textsuperscript{15}

In today’s paradigm the force mix ratios of active to Army Reserve and National Guard forces is still a relevant issue on the table as strategic leaders try to balance the triad of force structure, modernization, and readiness. While some see using part time forces as a way to reduce costs (war on the cheap), this can also be viewed through the lens of readiness. When asking Army Reserve and National Guard forces to perform a role or mission previously identified for the active component, there should be an
expectation of a degradation in capability of performing the mission or an increase in the

time needed to train up and accomplish the mission.

The dramatic cuts on the heels of the Vietnam War were later adjusted by a
combination of senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders, congressional action, and
the efforts of President Reagan which resulted in a buildup of military forces during the
Cold War. This buildup contributed to the fall of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{16} As a result of the
Warsaw Pact no longer being the primary threat to national security, this led the United
States to pursue a “peace dividend” which ushered in reduced defense budgets and
planned decreases in endstrength. This peace dividend from the demise of the Warsaw
Pact resulted in strategic leaders planning a 30% personnel cut in the Army which
would have resulted in the smallest active Army force since 1939 at 535,000 Soldiers.\textsuperscript{17}

Strategic leaders remapped force structure requirements in 1987, which set the
stage for disagreements between senior Army leaders and Congress on the right size
for the Army. The Chief of Staff of the Army argued for a force structure of 640,000.\textsuperscript{18}
This debate was postponed by the onset of Operation Desert Shield.

In the period following Operation Desert Storm, voices renewed the discussion of
cutting forces from the Army. This time, the debate had a new angle—winning through
air power.\textsuperscript{19} This debate would resurface again throughout the small wars and hostile
actions that occurred during this period (e.g. Kosovo, Sudan). Following this period the
Army would be set at 495,000 active duty Soldiers and 10 active divisions.\textsuperscript{20}
Endstrength would eventually fall down to its low point in 1999 at 479,426 in the active
duty force.\textsuperscript{21} This would constitute the lowest troop levels since before World War II.\textsuperscript{22}
When compared against current drawdown models, the Secretary of Defense’s
projected drawdown estimates have the Army drawing down between 440,000 and 450,000. If achieved, this would create the smallest Army troop endstrength since 1940.23

Another relevant fact when assessing past drawdowns against the current drawdown is the matter of what I call congressional bargaining chips. Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon Sullivan put it this way when he described the environment of downsizing during his tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army:

Most of the forces being inactivated were in Europe, not in someone’s congressional district. The communities feeling the heaviest impact of downsizing were not part of “main street America” so the dislocation suffered by soldiers and their families had minimal impact on America’s social and economic fabric.24

This is perhaps the reason Congress has overwhelmingly pursued personnel reductions as a means to reduce costs as opposed to cost savings that could be gained by base alignments and base closures.

General (Retired) Sullivan also draws another stark difference between past drawdowns and today’s drawdowns in that there were capabilities that Armies of the past had that could be cut without adversely affecting the force during interwar drawdown periods. One such capability that was reduced during General (Retired) Sullivan’s tenure was the Army’s chemical and nuclear capability. In his words the Army “went out of the chemical and nuclear weapons ‘business.’”25

As the Congressional Research Service points out, “the rapid and poorly planned demobilization of Army forces in the past had a deleterious impact on morale, terminated many aspiring military careers, and released significant numbers of military personnel with limited transition assistance.”26 Over the decades, Congress has steadily made programs available to departing service members to ease their transitions
back to civilian life. During the post-Cold War force reductions, Congress provided a number of force shaping levers, incentives, and tools to create desired endstrengths.\textsuperscript{27} Although these levers were available, they were not successfully employed during periods of downsizing. One such example is following Operation Desert Storm’s reductions in force during the early to mid-1990s, a flood of talented Soldiers departed service.

Before transitioning to the current post-Iraq/Afghanistan drawdown policy and plan, a few lessons can be gleamed from history: 1) the Army is rarely prepared for the next fight as a result of manning decisions that are based on incorrect assumptions and improper environmental scanning during the previous interwar period; 2) the current drawdown is unlike any other in history—external threats still pose a risk to national security, budget battles on Capitol Hill compound drawdown decisions, and there are no true peace dividend programs that can be cut or bases that can be closed to save money; and 3) there is no demobilization of draftees—instead we are downsizing from an all-volunteer force for the first time in recent history. Even though Operation Desert Storm was conducted in the era of the all-volunteer force, there were still draftees present amongst active duty service members.\textsuperscript{28}

Post-Iraq/Afghanistan Department of the Army Drawdown Policy

“What goes up must come down” is a phrase often related to the stock market, airplanes, or baseballs. In this case this phrase is relative to force endstrength. In 2010, the Army’s endstrength authorization was temporarily increased by 22,000 Soldiers in order to meet operational needs.\textsuperscript{29} When combining the 22,000 to the “27,000 active permanent endstrength reductions that start[ed] in 2015, this represent[ed] a reduction of 49,000 active duty troops from FY 2011 levels.”\textsuperscript{30} In
repeated discussions with policy makers and administration officials, the current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno, has communicated that 450,000 active component Soldiers are required in order to meet operational demands that support our national security strategy.31

Current reductions in force are needed so that the Army can meet congressionally mandated endstrengths by FY 2019.32 As a result of this reduction the Army is in the midst of conducting a series of reduction boards that were authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

Before addressing whether the right people are leaving or staying, it is important to understand the fundamentals of Army drawdown policy and its connection with the U.S. Constitution and law. Army endstrength is managed through congressional appropriations. When compared against the other services, Congress has historically been more involved with Army endstrength management when compared to endstrength management of sister services. This difference has its roots in how our country was founded when threats from a standing army were significantly more dangerous than threats from a sea-based navy, therefore constitutional framers drafted language that allowed it to control the funding stream of the Army to a higher degree than the Navy.33 In modern times, Congress mandates endstrength through the budgeting and legislative processes. To assist the Army with managing endstrength, Title 10 contains personnel drawdown measures, both involuntary and voluntary, that the Army can implement to manage its budget appropriation and associated personnel endstrengths.
Amongst the Title 10 involuntary drawdown tools are the Selective Early Retirement Board (SERB) and the Reduction in Force (RIF). Whereas the SERB allows officers to retire with normal retirement benefits, RIF measures do not necessarily allow for this. The Secretary of the Army has the authority to authorize Officer Separation Boards (OSB) and Enhanced Selective Retirement Boards (ESERB). In the current environment, OSB is a key RIF measure since it is an involuntary separation board for those officers that are not eligible for retirement under SERB. RIF measures can be combined with other service or Title 10 programs, such as Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA), to reduce the personal burden of separation.

The U.S. Congress reinstated ESERB into law as part of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The ESERB grants additional flexibility to service secretaries to draw down their services at a faster rate by lifting some of the restrictions imposed by Section 638 of Title 10 which governs early retirement. One of the restrictions lifted by the 2013 NDAA is the number of times an officer’s records can be considered by a separation board.\textsuperscript{34} In short, the 2013 NDAA increases the number of times officers’ records can be considered for separation. Understanding these policies and authorities is germane to the discussion of personnel drawdowns, particularly in the light that our civilian leadership in Congress plays a key role in determining Army endstrength.

The Post-Iraq/Afghanistan Drawdown Plan

The Army has the congressionally mandated requirement to drop to 490,000 personnel by the end of the 2015 and is projected to be between 440,000 to 450,000 by FY2018. The Army released its drawdown plan for Army officers on December 6, 2013 in the form of Military Personnel (MILPER) Message Number 13-356. This MILPER
focused on company grade officers and was followed by MILPER 13-357 which focused on field grade officers. These messages set forth to reduce certain targeted year groups (YG) of officers. Company grade officers in YGs 2006-2008 and field grade officers in YGs 1999-2003 were considered for separation by either OSB or ESERB. Barring any changes to law, Selective Early Retirement Boards are expected to be a part of Army life until 2019.\textsuperscript{35}

Privacy, compassion, and force protection were key aspects in the plan of how the Army was to notify officers selected for separation. The notification plan was designed for general officers to notify those selected; however, in rare situations this notification was delegated to colonels. But by and large, general officers conducted in-person notifications. Some commands executed notification better than others. This paper will address some of these shortcomings later. This plan was designed to “alleviate the uncertainty for officers considered and not selected” and was executed with great care and compassion by senior leaders across the Army.\textsuperscript{36,37}

Additionally, senior leaders made great efforts to ensure that dignity, respect, and compassion were adhered throughout the notification process. Contrary to the tone of the debate which played out in the media and referred to DOD handing out “pink slips” in combat zones, senior Army leaders executed their notification duty with a plan focused on dignity and respect that highlighted the sacrifice that our young officers had made to the nation.

Elements of the Army’s Military Personnel Management’s guidance included: 1) no lists would be made public\textsuperscript{38}; 2) only Army Command (ACOM) or impacted general officers would receive a listing of selected officers; 3) general officers were required to
personally give notification letters to officers selected for separation; 4) guidance prohibited mailing notification letters to officers; and 5) commands were given a three-day window to execute notifications.39

Another critical component of the plan was to manage expectations of the upcoming process. Senior raters were directed to counsel their officers and inform them of their individual risk on the upcoming OSB and ESERB. To facilitate getting recent assessments of officers’ performance and potential, MILPER 13-356 directed completion of a Human Resources Command-directed (Code 19) Officer Evaluation Report (OER). While this Code 19 OER was designed to create another evaluation report that board members could use to assess performance and potential for officers in junior YGs, it was “not intended to amplify previously documented events (those that occurred outside the rating period).”40 With the drawdown policy established and subsequent drawdown plan in place, it was now time for boards to do their work.

While board proceedings are closed in nature. The results from board actions can be analyzed to show trends that can inform our Army if the process was done correctly and to allow us to consider the implications of the board’s actions. Later in this paper we will highlight some of these trends.

Although this is the plan that Army leaders have envisioned, a lot of unknowns still remain that could radically alter this plan. The most significant unknown is whether or not sequestration will continue. Secretary of the Army John McHugh acknowledged in an interview with Army Times that “under sequestration, the Army could be forced to shrink to 420,000 Soldiers.”41 General Odierno and Secretary McHugh have both expressed caution that a force of 420,000 will not be large enough to achieve its
missions outlined in national security strategy documents. Furthermore, General Odierno and Secretary McHugh have both emphasized that a force of this limited size will limit the Army’s ability to respond to any new crisis which may threaten our national security.

Are the Right People Leaving?

In a future Officer Corps that will be much smaller than today’s Officer Corps, a premium will be placed on character and moral attributes. One of the easier separation selection criteria that separation selection boards can use is derogatory information. Examples of derogatory information include “disciplinary action, relief for cause, cowardice, moral turpitude, professional ineptitude, and/or inability to treat others with respect and fairness, and/or lack of integrity.”

In the case of the captains OSB and ESERB, 36% of those selected for separation had derogatory information in their Army Military Human Resources Record (AMHRR); 35% of those selected had negative evaluations characterized by a below center of mass report card or non-left justified rating. These were the officers that were easily identified for separation by OSB and ESERB board members. However, the next grouping of officers presented more a challenge. The remaining 29% of those selected had non-remarkable files generally characterized by a pure center of mass OER history with few, if any, above center of mass evaluations. This is the group of officers that did good and served honorably; however, good was not good enough.

Based on these statistics, satisfactory or good duty performance is not good enough in the current environment and in the foreseeable future as long as the Army continues to draw down. The Army will continue to demand more from its officers in future years.
As outlined in the 2013 Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS), leaders in the future force will “possess emotional intelligence and achieve credibility…[leaders must also] not only [be] prepared for their current position, but also preparing for their progressive responsibilities as well.” This sentence captures the essence of what the right officer looks like for the smaller and more agile future force. In addition to qualities described in the ALDS, the Army cannot afford to have leaders in a smaller force that have shortcomings of character and credibility. This is the reason why separating officers with derogatory information in their files is so important to the Army profession.

Did the amount of time in service play a key role in who was selected? My simple assessment is no, but I do reason that data suggests source of commissioning did play a role in those selected for separation. To be clear, this has less to do with the type of commissioning source (United States Military Academy (USMA) vs Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) vs Officer Candidate School (OCS)). Instead it has more to do with: 1) the type of candidate that was selected for a particular commissioning source; and 2) the quantitative time a candidate was immersed in a rich environment that taught officer culture, values, and traditions.

The main three sources of creating Army officers are USMA, ROTC, and OCS. Each focus on leadership development. However, time available and resources available in the process of developing these future officers is distinctively different when comparing these three commissioning sources. All OCS officer candidates attend a program that is a condensed course focused on leadership that produces officers. As such, OCS has less time to impart academics, officer culture, and military culture when compared against other commissioning sources. On the other hand, USMA and ROTC
generally get younger cadets and have more time to balance academics, officer culture, and military culture over a protracted period of time. This is one reason USMA has seen a lower occurrence rate of involuntary separations due to misconduct.

This is welcomed news for the USMA because this was not always the case. According to a 1990 Congressional Budget Report, at that time “rates of involuntary separation were found to be low for officers across the board, but were somewhat lower for ROTC graduates than from commissionees from either the academies or OCS.”46 The CBO defined reasons for involuntary separation as behavior involving “moral, ethical, criminal, or professional misconduct, [or]…poor performance.”47

As the Army underwent a manpower increase to fuel a new strategy in Iraq called “The Surge,” the Army became innovative in techniques to achieve this increased personnel demand. On the enlisted side, the Army lowered entrance standards (medical, mental, and moral). This was needed because the applicants that had high medical, mental, and moral standards were simply not joining the Army in the quantity needed. As an officer assigned to recruiting duty in the period before the surge, I observed a sharp decline in the amount of fully-qualified applicants showing interest in the Army.

On the officer side, the traditional commissioning sources were simply too slow to meet the demand for new officers. Both ROTC and the USMA require approximately four years to develop a second lieutenant. However, other commissioning sources such as direct commissioning and Officer Candidate School (OCS) can produce officers in a shorter period of time and also at a fraction of the cost. To achieve the increased demand for officers, the Army relied heavily on OCS to produce officers at an increased
rate. Compared against pre-9/11 rates, OCS graduation rates increased from “roughly 400 a year to over 1,500 a year, or more than the graduating class at West Point.”

So did an increase demand for manpower and officer vacancies cause the Officer Corps to lose its standards? What would be the outcome of this surge? Again, as Peter Senge suggests, today’s problems are generated by yesterday’s solutions. As yesterday’s solution was to rapidly increase the officer corps, the problem that we have now is an abundance of officers that has created the requirement to drawdown the Officer Corps.

Another angle of this analysis shows that minority officers in fields with high minority concentrations were selected for separation at a higher rate than their Caucasian counterparts. For example, captains in the Force Sustainment career field (which has a higher concentration of minorities than Operations or Operations Support career fields) had a higher percentage of their populations selected for separation. Separation selection rates from American Indians, Asians, Blacks, and Hispanics demographic groups were 18%, 17%, 21%, and 17% respectively when compared against only 10% of the Caucasian population. From experience as a former human resources professional, I attribute this large cut of African Americans as being attributed to two related facts: 1) logistics branches were over-strength (upwards of 142%) prior to the OSB and ESERB; and 2) as compared to their non-minority counterparts, a higher proportion of minority officers serve in the logistics career field. It is my assessment that the force shaping functions of OSB and ESERB were performed fairly without consideration of diversity demographics.

When analyzing separation board results, one fact is consistent across both company and field grades—officers commissioned through USMA have lower selection
rates than officers commissioned through other commissioning sources. As discussed previously, I opine this is attributable to differences in the selection path, education, and grooming of a USMA officer which is different than other commissioning sources. However, this difference is much more pronounced at the company grade level and less pronounced for field grade officers.

Although service academy graduates have historically attained flag rank at a much higher percentage rate than ROTC and OCS graduates, the significant shift occurred between 1972 and 1990. In 1972, only about 20% of flag officers were from ROTC and OCS combined, whereas in 1990 over 50% of general/flag officers were from ROTC and OCS commissioning sources. Differences in career progression between the three main commissioning sources were indistinguishable in the [Government Accounting Office] report.$^{50}$

Although the Government Accounting Office report cited above notes indistinguishable differences in career progression between commissioning sources, there is still a sizeable difference in the costs with developing officers through the USMA when compared against OCS and ROTC. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost to commission an officer through USMA is eight to fifteen times as much as OCS.$^{51}$

It is fairly common knowledge that the Army gives priority to ensuring that the USMA attains high quality cadre, and rightfully so. But the obvious question is whether the quest to get top tier cadre is inadvertently being done at the expense of other commissioning sources not receiving top tier cadre. When it comes to selecting cadre that will train, develop, and mentor future officers, USMA traditionally receives top quality cadre candidates; however, ROTC produces 60% of the Army’s officers.$^{52}$ When assessing this situation by only looking at the numbers, it would be reasonable to assume that ROTC would get the top tier talent since they are responsible for
developing the bulk of Army officers, but this is not the case. Although outside of the scope of this paper, this fact begs the following question that should be explored in depth by the Army: By weighing top tier cadre talent at USMA over the other commissioning sources, has the Army inadvertently assumed risk in the programs that produce the bulk of Army officers?

It is commonplace for prospective USMA faculty instructors to be drawn from amongst the best available officers. There is an exhaustive assignment process to ensure the right officers are being selected for this prestigious duty. In addition to ALDS offering insight into the description of the type of leader that Army is trying to retain, perhaps USMA cadre selection criteria can also offer insight into the type of officer the Army is looking to retain.

In contrast, the same level of scrutiny and investment is not afforded to faculty instructors that will serve in ROTC and OCS cadre assignments. Does this selection process result in a lower quality officer being placed in the important role of educating the future Officer Corps? Not necessarily. The professionalism of individuals selected for ROTC and OCS cadre is still screened, but it is nowhere as exhaustive as the process for USMA cadre. Of course when assessing this aspect through the individual level of analysis, every individual is different, but trends have shown that USMA instructors have fewer adverse disciplinary actions when compared against their ROTC instructor colleagues. This is supported by a limited sampling pool. As a former HRC branch chief, in a one year period my branch had two ROTC instructors disciplined due to severe misconduct. In the same period, no USMA instructors were disciplined. I would suggest that there are factors such as environment and ethical climate of USMA
which foster a higher standard of conduct and discipline that may not be found on college campuses.

When comparing USMA against OCS, did the Army break faith with those Soldiers that became officers through the OCS program? One can argue the answer is yes based on how officers were selected for reduction. Was it that we accepted a lower quality of officer candidate through OCS in order to meet the increased demands of officers during the rapid expansion of the force? Yes, OCS is a very viable commissioning source because it takes fewer resources, in both time and money, to produce an officer when compared against ROTC or USMA. But did our rush to get more officers create a quality gap between OCS, ROTC, and USMA? If you consider the officers that were selected for separation through the Officer Separation Board or Enhanced Selective Early Retirement Board, then the answer is yes. A greater proportion of OCS-commissioned officers were selected by these force shaping boards.  

Referencing Dr. Wong and Dr. Gerras article Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in The Army Profession, should the Army drink from the cup of “leading truthfully?” As Dr. Wong and Dr. Gerras point out, “Leading truthfully dismantles the façade of mutually agreed deception by putting considerations of the integrity of the profession back into the decision making process.” At the time when the Army made the decision to make former-NCOs/OCS officer candidates into second lieutenants, the Army’s deception was that derogatory information was not significant enough to stop the process of turning an NCO into an in-service OCS officer candidate and subsequently a second lieutenant. And in the minds of those Soldiers affected, they were also a part of the deception,
thinking that they had overcome a hurdle and given a second chance. However, for many the OSB and ESERB would again reopen the wounds of Article 15s earned during enlisted service.

So if the Army acknowledges that there were mistakes made in the selection process, is there a means to correct it? While the results of both the OSB and the ESERB could not be appealed by officers, only the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) could void selections. Based on my research, I have not been able to identify a number of OSB or ESERB separation selections that have been voided, but the fact is clear that the SECARMY has voided some separations.

In a letter signed by the Director of Officer Personnel Management Directorate and sent out to selected officers that had their separations voided, the letters state, “the Secretary of the Army has voided your selection by the ESERB due to improper consideration.” What is clear is that an error, rule change, regulation interpretation, legal review, or some other type of action took place which caused the SECARMY to void an undetermined number of officers’ selection for separation. At the time of this writing I’m currently awaiting a response from officials with the Personnel Policy Integrator of Officer Drawdown Boards Office within the Directorate of Military Personnel Management as to why the SECARMY voided selections.

The fact that the SECARMY voided an undetermined number of separations is proof of the fairness of a system that polices itself even after the boards have done their work. This adds to the credibility of the process to ensure that the right people are staying and the right people are leaving during this drawdown.
Are the Right People Staying?

Answering the question “who should leave” was partially answered by stating who should stay as outlined by the ALDS. To gain a further understanding of what the right person looks like, one can start by looking at Army Operating Concept or the Strategic Landpower White Paper authored by the Army Chief of Staff, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Commander of Special Operations Command. Both of these documents speak to the human aspects of the type of leaders that will be needed in a smaller and more agile force. Leaders invested with character, intelligence, and good communications skills that are both critical and creative thinkers are the ones that are needed to stay.

Of the 1,188 officers selected for the FY14 Captain OSB and ESERB, the majority (75%) had less than 15 years of service and would only be eligible for separation pay. The next largest segment selected were those officers that were retirement eligible (14%), followed by officers that were eligible to apply for TERA (7%), and those officers who had between 18-20 years of service and were granted sanctuary in order to retire with 20 years of service (4%).

Overall, the combined captains OSB and ESERB boards selected 12% of those considered. This effectively reduced the captain grade plate from 92% to 86%. From amongst this number, there is a high number of officers commissioned through OCS. This paper will address this later in greater detail. Even with these statistics, the question of whether the right people were selected for separation still remains.

When asking whether or not the right people are staying, one thing is clear—a sizeable number of talented officers departed service in the early years of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army’s problem was that it was “losing its most gifted young
officers.” As author Andrew Tilghman points out, “Of the nearly 1,000 cadets from the Class of 2002, 58% [were] no longer on active duty [in 2007].”

Between 2003 and 2007, the Army experienced a sharp increase in the rate at which junior military officers (JMO) were departing active duty. In 2003 roughly 8% of mid-career JMOs, those with four to nine years of service, left the Army. In 2007 that rate rose to 13%. Referring again to Senge’s causal relationship between today’s solutions and tomorrow’s problems, this unanticipated exodus of junior military officers that is described above caused senior leaders to assess how we evaluated them, how we compensated them, and what we rewarded them. Evaluations would become masked after officers were promoted to captain, the Army would compensate officers from certain branches with cash incentives to retain them on active duty while others would be offered guarantees of fully funded graduate school, and the Army would reward junior military officers with exceptionally high promotion rates. This institutional cosseting created a multiyear cohort of officers that would continue on a glide path of high selection rates caused in part by low officer inventory. This problem of low officer inventory rates combined with the need for the Army to increase its endstrength to meet operational needs created the need to grow the officer corps. This two-headed problem of low inventory and great demand was the problem of the day. The solution of the day involved creating more officers. This included increasing the throughput of Officer Candidate School (OCS).

However, years later the Army would be required to shrink its force. As seen in Figure 1 below, of captains selected for separation during the FY14 OSB and ESERB, officers commissioned from OCS had a higher rate of selection when compared against
other traditional Army commissioning sources.\textsuperscript{62} Again this illustrates Senge’s idea that yesterday’s solution return and become today’s problem. Whereas the average selection rate was 12%, captains commissioned through OCS had an combined selection rate of 19.2\%.\textsuperscript{63} When assessing commissioning source data only through the lens of company grade officers that were selected for OSB and ESERB, the data supports the premise that officers commissioned through OCS were a stopgap measure that met a need. It can also suggest that OCS attracted a number of candidates that may not have been prepared to have careers as officers. Another perspective may even suggest that those selected for OCS, during the time when our nation needed additional officers, were fully qualified but their service as officers was no longer needed due to force structure changes. I opine that all are true.
When assessing the field grade commissioning source data for those officers selected for OSB and ESERB, the data supports the premise that commissioning sources played a less significant role for field grade officers as compared to company grade counterparts.

![Figure 2. Commissioning Source Data of Majors Selected in the FY14 OSB and ESERB](image)

We’ve addressed commissioning sources. Did other factors such as race play a role in the current drawdown? I opine that we will not fully comprehend the implications on diversity of this current drawdown until a few more years. Even then the analysis may still have inconsistencies.
In David McCormick’s book “The Downsized Warrior,” he conducted an exhaustive analysis of the post-Desert Storm drawdown and its relation to diversity in the Army. At the time his book was published in 1998, approximately four years had elapsed following the Desert Storm drawdown. His conclusion advocated there was “little evidence to suggest that [African Americans were] disadvantaged by personnel cuts” during the drawdown. His thesis was supported by the idea that “the overall representation of blacks in the officer corps [between September 1990 and September 1994] increased slightly.” So the idea that “more” African Americans in the Army was the underlying fact that supported McCormick’s assertion that African Americans were not disadvantaged. Unfortunately his findings were misinformed.

While it is true that the representation of African Americans increased slightly during that period, it was primarily due to “African American representation in the grades of major and lieutenant colonel [which] increased appreciably.” Another contributing factor was that white officers took advantage of voluntary separation programs to exit the service at a much higher rate than minority officers. This resulted in a higher proportion of African American officers staying on active duty while the number of active duty white officers dropped. It is also noteworthy that African American officers in the O1-O3 grades had higher separation rates. This was followed by a period of reduced accessions of African American officers. This combination created a downward turn in the African American officer population.

So does race and diversity matter in our profession of arms? In a word: yes. The fact is that minority officers were selected for separation at a higher rate than their non-minority peers during the last OSB and ESERB. This paper does not suggest,
imply, or recommend that race should be a factor in deciding whether officers are selected for retention or separation. However, I do opine that the high selection of minority officers should not be ignored.

![Race/Ethnic Selection Rates](image)

Figure 3: Race/Ethnic Selection Rates, FY14 Captain OSB and ESERB Combined
Both Figure 3 and Figure 4 indicate that African American officers were selected at higher rates in both the Captains OSB/ESERB and Majors OSB/ESERB. One factor that may contribute to why rates were so high for African American captains is perhaps the fact that African Americans composed 45% of those considered by the ESERB. This is out of tolerance with the actual representation of African American officers across the entire Officer Corps. Even with this said, performance was still the greatest factor in determining selection for either OSB or ESERB.
One stark difference between the captains and majors populations that were considered for OSB and ESERB is in the larger number of former NCOs that were amongst those considered for the Captains OSB and ESERB. This is most likely due to the increase in OCS throughput to meet operational needs. As Figure 5 highlights, 13 officers had derogatory information in their files from their enlisted service. This begs the question of whether the Army’s need for officers during critical years of expansion caused it to lower standards for officers, much like how enlistment standards were lowered to assist with increasing endstrength. If those Soldiers were allowed to become officers, would the derogatory information that occurred during their enlisted years count against them in the future? Conventional wisdom could suggest that once you cross the threshold from enlisted service to officer service, your enlisted time is in the past. However, in reality this is not the case. Army policy is that “punishment under Article 15 or other UCMJ actions in a Soldier's early career (specialist/corporal and below with
fewer than 3 years of service) will not be considered in deliberation” for separation boards. While this policy is specific to E4 and below, the fact is that most in-service OCS candidates come from the NCOs ranks. Looking at the policy above, it can also be interpreted as, any Article 15s received while serving as an NCO shall be considered during future reduction boards.

Between both OSB and ESERB, trends suggest that performance ranging from mediocre to poor was a key factor in determining separation. Regardless of race, officers that had derogatory information or negative evaluations (e.g. BCOM, non-left justified blocks) were more apt to be selected for separation. For field grades, 80% of those selected for separation had derogatory information in their AMHRR or negative evaluations. For African American field grades population, they were on par with the general field grade population and also had 80% that had derogatory information in their file or negative evaluations. The same is true for company grade officers where 71% of the entire population had negative information in their file and of the African American company grade officers 72% had negative information in their files. Therefore if derogatory information is relatively proportionate, the key factor in being selected for separation has to be performance. If this is the case, why was the performance of African American officers so different from their non-minority peers?

While this question is outside of the scope of this paper, the causal factors that led to a disproportionate rate of minority officers being identified for separation is an issue that senior leaders should address. Whether it is a lack of mentorship, development, proper assignment selection, career paths, education, or social engagement knowledge, or other factors, the fact remains that action is needed now so
that the Army can preserve the command opportunity for a diverse future force. If not
addressed now, a potential implication for the future is that the Army will have a shallow
pool from which to select qualified future battalion and brigade commanders from.
Furthermore, this is the same pool from which future strategic leaders will be drawn
from.

Is the Drawdown Being Done Correctly?

A number of critics have indicated areas where this drawdown was not executed
correctly. Some have argued that this drawdown will force too much reliance on the
Army Reserves and National Guard.75 Throughout our nation’s history, the role of the
Citizen-Soldier has morphed over time. From its inception as a militia during the
American Revolution, to federalized activation during the Civil War, to the current Post-
9/11 role, the role of the Reserve and Guard has been critical to securing our nation’s
interests.

Unlike past wars that have relegated the Reserve and National Guard to minor
roles, the past 14 years of combat have placed increasing roles and added stress onto
our Reserve and Guard forces. Therefore, it is unrealistic to believe that there can be a
one for one tradeoff between active duty cuts and Reserve and Guard units fulfilling
roles and missions that were once executed by a robust active force. The fact remains
that most Reserve and Guard forces train for 39 days per year; however, many of our
Citizen-Soldiers dedicate personal time well above 39 days per year of on-duty time in
order to achieve some semblance of training equity to remain on par with their active
component peers. RAND Corporation’s review of the Department of Defense’s
Committee on Civilian Components summarized this point well.
Past US military drawdowns have repeatedly involved greater reliance on reserve forces, yet time and again they have not been ready for combat when they have been called. The message given by the Committee on Civilian Components after World War II is as valid today as it was in 1948. In a prophetic statement, the committee said that reserve forces were of “vital importance,” but “the impression that these forces now contain elements which are ready for combat is a dangerous illusion.”

Others critical of the current drawdown have criticized current reductions in new accessions, citing that it will have adverse effects on the future force. In particular, attention has focused on the need to prevent an “unbalanced reduction in endstrength.”

The United States Air Force provides an excellent case study for how an unbalanced reduction in endstrength can affect the force for many years. During the post-Cold War drawdowns, the Air Force elected to focus retention efforts disproportionately on its career personnel. Consequently, the Air Force elected to focus its endstrength reduction measures using cuts in accessions. The Congressional Budget Office assessed the Air Force’s FY 1991 reductions and offered cautions for implementing the “accessions-heavy approach.”

If force reductions continue maintaining an accession-heavy approach would lead to serious problems. ...In the long term, as the small groups...progressed into the senior ranks, there might be too few to ensure the availability of higher qualified leaders. In the nearer term, continued cuts in accessions would lead to top-heavy forces. ...As senior personnel became more expensive to support, they could find their assigned tasks becoming more elementary.

While there are many ways to reduce personnel strength, there is no perfect way but improvements have been made. As captured by Bernard Rostker in his study of force right-sizing, 1992 Senate Armed Services Committee stated, “The military services do not have an effective tool to reduce active strength in the 15-20-year element of the career inventory.”
Out of the lessons learned since the post-Cold War drawdown in 1992, both senior military personnel and Congress have worked to make the systems better since 1992. A large portion of the cooperation has come in the form of legislation that is aimed to make it easier for the services to activate increased measures to gain flexibility in drawing down personnel. New laws have also added a bevy of benefits to assist service members in their transitions back to civilian life.

Congress has modified Title 10 authorities multiple times to assist service secretaries and to support separating service members. One such modification to Title 10 is a two-month waiver that allows officers that are involuntarily separated to have nine months to get their affairs in order before being discharged.\(^2\)

Another initiative, implemented in 1992, is the Soldier For Life Transition Assistance Program. This program “connects transitioning Soldiers with communities they plan to live in, they can start to build relationships early with local businesses and organizations so their reintegration into civilian life is successful.”\(^3\)

The Army is drawing from lessons learned to help guide the future. In contrast to the Air Force’s post-Cold War accessions-heavy approach, the Army is working to create a balanced approach. In January 2015, Army Secretary John McHugh announced that the Army is considering measures to slow the drawdown in order to mitigate readiness shortfalls.\(^4\) While these adjustments may affect the pace of the drawdown, it will not affect the targeted reduction goal of 440,000 to 450,000 active duty Soldiers.\(^5\)

Another element to assist in assessing whether or not the drawdown is being done correctly is to review how Army leverages the additional authorities that Congress
has given to the service secretaries. One such authority is Section 638 of Title 10, which was mentioned earlier in this paper. A part of the 2013 NDAA, this modification authorized service secretaries to lift the restrictions on the number of times an officer’s records can be considered by a separation board. In short, an officer’s record could go before multiple separation boards. In a statement to Army Times, General Odierno said that the Army would not screen officers’ records, as part of a YG cohort, more than once for a selective release. This change in policy has been adopted after the Army reduced 1,144 captains from YGs 2006-2008, 550 majors from YGs 1999-2003.

Conclusion

It is my assessment is that the Army is doing the current drawdown correctly. Even though officers commissioned through the OCS program were selected at a much higher rate than peers commissioned through USMA or ROTC, the Army should use the lessons learned from OCS officers’ performance during the recent OSB and ESERB to make modifications and future investments in OCS. Understandably, there is no easy way to replicate the results of USMA and ROTC four-year programs within the 19-week OCS program of instruction. However, if adjustments are not made there will continue to be a fundamental gap in the performance of officers commissioned through OCS as compared to their USMA and ROTC counterparts. Perhaps a qualitative surge in cadre is one of the tools that could be employed to close any deficiency gap caused by the four-year versus 19-week program dynamic.

Another consideration is a commitment to ensuring high quality program entrance requirements are maintained, regardless if the Army is required to rapidly increase its endstrength. In some cases during the surge, the Army took on OCS officer candidates that had previously received Article 15s as NCOs. The Army made them
into officers only to separate them years later in the OSB and ESERB. Through this series of actions, it is my assessment that the Army broke faith with officers commissioned through OCS.

The Army is a constantly improving and learning organization. Although outside of the scope of this paper, there is value in the Army conducting a detailed study of the cadre and faculty selection processes for all of its commissioning sources so that greater parity in the quality of officers could be achieved. Furthermore, I recommend that the Army also study cadre selection for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) and how it compares against traditional universities. The issue here is that the Army cannot afford to assume risk with developing only one or two segments of the cadet/candidate population. Regardless of commissioning source, officers will be asked to do more in an ever more uncertain world. Therefore developing the right skills, traits, and attributes across all of the commissioning sources and specialized programs, such as HBCUs, is key to the future force.

History will be the final arbiter in determining if the current drawdown is being executed correctly. Effectiveness of the current drawdown will be measured against how quickly, efficiently, and completely we defeat future threats with a smaller more agile total force. But more importantly, effectiveness of current drawdown methods will be assessed against how well the Army can live up to its strategic security roles to maintain the peace while discouraging threats and adversaries from challenging the US.

As mentioned in my opening thesis statement, the drawdown process is far from perfect, but overall it is a fair system. It is so fair that senior Army leaders have been prepared to make adjustments in the process to correct any shortcomings. This was
evidenced by the SECARMY overturning an undetermined amount of ESERB separation selections.

Although the next war has not happened to permit a true assessment of whether or not the current drawdown is being executed correctly, preliminary data and historical information from past drawdowns point us in the direction that the drawdown is on a glide path for creating a future force that has the potential to be successful. What is abundantly clear is the fact that the current drawdown is pulling from lessons of the past and working across the entire Army enterprise to shape the smaller and better force for tomorrow.

Endnotes


4 Ibid.

5 The U.S. Air Force did not become a branch until September 1947. In June 1947 the air domain forces that would later become the U.S. Air Force were part of the Army.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.


11 Ibid.
12 Feickert, Army Drawdown, 27.
13 Ibid.
14 Odierno, Impacts of Sequestration, 5.
15 Feickert, Army Drawdown, 27.
16 Ibid., 28.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., i.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Feickert, Army Drawdown, 15.
27 Ibid.
29 Feickert, Army Drawdown, 2.
30 Ibid.
31 Odierno, Impacts of Sequestration, 5.

33 U.S Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, clause 12.

34 10 U.S. Code § 638. (Selective early retirement) Section 638c states that an officer may not be considered for early retirement more than once in any five-year period. Changes to the 2013 NDAA temporarily lift this restriction until December 2018.


37 Based on my duty position as a branch chief at HRC and speaking to officers selected for separation under OSB and ESERB, senior leaders exhibited great care and compassion as the Army asked officers to separate from service.

38 Paragraph 6f of Department of the Army Memo 600-2 prohibits separation board findings from being publically released. In this case, the Military Personnel Management Office reiterated this Army policy in their OSB and ESERB guidance.

39 MG Thomas C. Seamands, Director, Military Personnel Management, email guidance to J1s and G1s Concerning SERB, December 23, 2013.

40 Ibid.


43 After multiple unsuccessful attempts to secure official OSB and ESERB trend data from Human Resources Command (HRC) through official channels, I obtained the data through briefing products found on the internet. As a former HRC branch chief, I verified the data found on the internet (hereafter referred to as “unofficial data”) against official HRC-produced products. My findings were that the unofficial data products found on the internet website below are consistent and accurate with official HRC-produced products. The unofficial data was accessed at http://theological-geography.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Officer-Separation-Board-Statistics.pdf on March 9, 2015. All data is unclassified.

44 According to the analysis of the FY14 Captains OSB and ESERB, 71% of the 1,188 officers selected had derogatory information in their AMHRR. Of the remaining 29% (347 officers), 21 had more than one ACOM OER, 76 had only one ACOM OER, and 250 had straight center of mass OERs in their AMHRR.


Ibid.


Analysis synthesized from duty as a branch chief at HRC during post-OSB and ESERB board analysis.


U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Officer Commissioning Programs,” vi.


Analysis synthesized from duty as a branch chief at HRC during post-OSB and ESERB board analysis.


One of my former subordinates was selected by the ESERB and subsequently provided me with a copy of a memo from HRC signed by BG William Gayler (Director, OPMD) with the subject line “Voiding of Selection by the Enhanced Selective Early Retirement Board.” In this memo, BG Gayler notifies the officer that the SECARMY has voided the ESERB selection. However, this letter does not identify what consideration criteria was used as the basis to overturn the separation decision. Emails sent to HRC and HQDA G1’s Personnel Policy Integrator of Officer Drawdown Boards proved unsuccessful in obtaining an understanding why the SECARMY voided some separation selections. In the official response from a field grade officer from the Personnel Policy Integrator of Officer Drawdown Boards office in the Directorate of Military Personnel Management (Army G1), the response was, “I am working with our lawyers to determine what I can publically release on the topic of drawdown. I will contact you as soon as I have confirmation and the way forward with our legal team.” As of March 22, 2015, there has been no reply from this office.

See footnote 42.

Ibid.
58 Tilghman, “The Army’s Other Crisis.”
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 See footnote 42.
63 See footnote 42.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 See footnote 42.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
72 See footnote 42.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 10.
77 Ibid., 5.
78 Ibid., 11.
79 Ibid., 14.
80 Ibid., 14.

82 Vergun, “Senior Leaders.”

83 Ibid.

84 Tan, “Army Leaders.”

85 Ibid.