


Broadening Leaders Through Engaged Institutional Knowledge Sharing

by

Lieutenant Colonel Frank P. Intini III
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2015

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The Army's currently accepted concept of "broadening" leaders focuses on individual development through a series of experiential opportunities. This paper explores the possibility of expanding the concept of broadening leaders and enhancing their ability to adapt to an increasingly complex world through a re-focus on integrating the systems and processes which were established in an effort to make the Army a learning institution. Specifically, it proposes we consider the benefits afforded by the Army's Historical Program, potential areas for greater synergy between several post 9-11 institutions which capture experience-based insights, inculcating historical insights into the training development and reporting aspects of the Unit Training Management system, and further emphasis on "historical-mindedness" and the assets available to achieve it in our revised doctrine. This shift in philosophy reflects a logical evolution in empowered leadership rather than a revolution in leader development and, as such, may be possible through the limited reorganization and repurposing of existing assets with no growth in manpower or materiel.

Broadening Leaders Through Engaged Institutional Knowledge Sharing

We must review the causes of our failures and of our successes to ensure that the lessons which we bought so dearly with our dead not remain locked away in the memories of the survivors.

—General Paul Ely, 1955¹

With the end of combat operations in Iraq in 2010 and the recent termination of combat operations in Afghanistan, the United States is repeating a post-conflict reduction, restructure and repositioning cycle which it has followed after every conflict since the American Revolution.² As with previous cycles, the post-conflict environment provides an opportunity, and perhaps a necessity, to refocus on education and professionalization as a means to mitigate the risks, or at least assuage the fears, associated with the decrease in capacity and collective experiences which coincide with force reduction.³ Indeed, the 2013 Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) is in keeping with historical precedents by directing a “renew[ed] emphasis on developing Army leaders...by expanding the training, education and broadening experience each Army leader receives.”⁴

The Army’s currently accepted concept of “broadening” focuses on individual development through experiences.⁵ This paper explores the possibility of expanding the concept of broadening leaders to enhance their ability to adapt to an increasingly complex world through a re-focus on the systems and processes which were established in an effort to make the Army a learning institution. Specifically, it proposes we consider the benefits afforded by the Army’s Historical Program, potential areas for greater synergy between several post 9-11 institutions which capture experience-based insights, inculcating historical insights into the training development and reporting

aspects of the Unit Training Management system, and further emphasis on “historical-mindedness” as well as the assets available to achieve it in our revised doctrine. This shift in philosophy reflects a logical evolution in empowered leadership rather than a revolution in leader development and, as such, may be possible through the limited reorganization and repurposing of existing assets with no growth in manpower or materiel.⁶

This paper will endeavor to highlight the desired end states in each of the aforementioned areas of concentration and offer a number of options within each area for further consideration and analysis. Army leader development is infused throughout a very complex system of systems and, as such, changes to any aspect of how we seek to develop and empower leaders will have both intended and unintended consequences in other aspects of the Army program writ large. The limited purview of this paper will not allow sufficient analysis to determine the ultimate feasibility, suitability, acceptability, or inherent risk associated with any of the concepts included herein. However, this paper seeks to stimulate thought among stakeholders regarding the potential that exists in innovative methods for improving how we broaden the experiential base of our military and civilian leaders.

The Drivers toward a Focus on Broadening

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s November 2014 memorandum established the Defense Innovation Initiative; an effort to “pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st Century.”⁷ In this memorandum, he identified six focus areas in which he requested innovative thought, one of which was the “integrat[ion] of leadership development practices with emerging opportunities to re-think how we develop managers and leaders.”⁸ Chief of Staff of the Army General

Raymond Odierno acknowledges that the Army's current leader development programs are "already a competitive advantage for our Nation"⁹ but frequently mentions the concept of broadening leaders in an effort to enable them to "understand their environment, learn quickly, make sound decisions, and lead change."¹⁰ In fact, in his opening comments in Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*, General Odierno specifies his eight leader expectations, of which one expectation is "develop bold, adaptive, and broadened leaders."¹¹

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* describes the Army Chief of Staff's concept of broadening as experiential and educational opportunities internal and external to the Army in which officers learn to work and contribute in diverse environments and organizational cultures, the result of which better serves the individual officer and the Army as an institution.¹² By extension, if the Army emphasizes leader access to the collective knowledge of the institution, many leaders may benefit from the experiences of a few. This paper will focus on the extended concept of broadening, and some of the embedding and reinforcing mechanisms available to create lasting cultural change.

A Cultural Change will be Necessary

The desire to conduct introspective study has historically been greater for defeated armies. Author James Corum begins his analysis of the German military transformation during the interwar period with an important observation; "Since a defeated army has more incentive to study the lessons of the war, many German officers began to write histories, memoirs, studies and articles filled with criticism and support of wartime leadership, tactics, and strategy."¹³

Although more challenging, it is in the United States Army's interest to establish a culture of introspection and constant self-analysis without having to suffer a defeat, tactically or otherwise, as an incentive. Several historians I have interviewed during the research of this paper have argued that our current military culture does not emphasize the proper collection of data to support anything more than anecdotal, tactically-focused after action reviews and fails to conduct the analysis necessary to derive operational to strategic insights from our experiences. As a result, the Army often falls short of "learning" from insights we have already discovered at a cost of treasure and human life.

This phenomenon is not uncommon, nor is it surprising to organizations which struggle to learn from insights. Many organizations, to include the United States Army, have embraced the concept of knowledge management as a method for sharing best practices across the organization. Indeed, the premise behind knowledge management is valid; "a conscious strategy of getting the right knowledge to the right people at the right time and helping people share and put information into action in ways that strive to improve organizational performance."¹⁴ However, knowledge management has not, in its implementation, been a complete solution to collecting and sharing insights across the Army. Authors Carla O'Dell and C. Jackson Grayson Jr. offer four common reasons why even organizations which aggressively pursue the universal sharing of knowledge and best practices have failed to achieve expected levels of success.¹⁵ The first barrier to success is what they termed the "ignorance," which suggests, particularly in large companies, individuals with information are unaware of others who need it, and individuals who need information are unaware of others who have it. The second

barrier is the inability of individuals or teams to implement newly acquired information due to resource or other constraints. The third barrier relates to whether or not the strength of the relationship between the source and recipient is sufficient to encourage the transfer and acceptance of knowledge. Finally, researchers found that the process of knowledge transfer moved surprisingly slowly across institutions—over two years in some cases—even in organizations seeking to distribute best-practices.¹⁶ Anecdotally, these challenges exist within the Army and have hindered efforts to share insights across the institution through the Army's Lessons Learned Program. Author Marc S. Efron suggests a reason why organizations fail to achieve the expected benefits of knowledge sharing is because knowledge is gained through personal experience or through direct contact with individuals with personal experience.¹⁷

To further complicate the matter, the sharing of best practices is only one aspect of how the Army must capitalize on institutional knowledge. We must also seek to achieve the ability to apply insights to unfamiliar situations and anticipate how our actions will affect complex geo-political systems, particularly in a world which senior Army leaders view as increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. Indeed, the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept arguably creates an even greater need for the Army to establish a culture of seeking and sharing insights at the tactical through strategic levels. Through the sharing of institutional knowledge, the Army can mitigate the risks associated with the rapid deployment of units to engage or augment outside of their assigned regions.

If the authors are correct, the Army's efforts to share institutional knowledge must go beyond the creation of a database for knowledge seekers to peruse of their own

accord. The Army writ large would need to “know what it knows,” understand the benefits and limitations of applying the shared insights to new experiences, and readily and rapidly share and accept insights with and from others. Army War College Commandant Major General William E. Rapp further suggests the development of an appreciation for insights and historical perspectives in the Army’s culture would be necessary for any program seeking to bring historians into a more prominent role in operational planning and leader development.¹⁸

Professor John Kotter’s eight-stage change framework highlights the importance of senior leader emphasis in any effort to change organizational culture.¹⁹ Indeed, in order to reasonably expect a cultural change that establishes historical-mindedness, the Army senior leadership, particularly the Army Chief of Staff, the Training and Army Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Forces Command (FORSCOM) Commander, must communicate collective sense of urgency and vision toward that end. Ironically, there is a historical precedent for trying to establish the culture this paper proposes. Leader development education prior to World War II relied heavily upon the study of history, a practice that was largely abandoned after the war. In 1971, General Westmoreland established a committee to review the value of history in leader development; the committee ultimately determined that historical-mindedness contributes to “broadened perspective, sharpened judgment, increased perceptivity and professional expertise.”²⁰

To meet the need for broadened leader development through historical-mindedness, this paper suggests four focus areas through which the Army can employ embedding and reinforcing mechanisms that will fundamentally alter the Army’s culture

to support learning from institutional knowledge as a matter of practice. Furthermore, this paper recommends the employment of all four of these modifications to existing programs in a mutually-supportive manner in order to achieve a synergistic effect.

Capitalizing on the Benefits Afforded by the Army's Historical Program

The Army History Program encompasses all of the historical activities within the active Army, the Army National Guard of the United States and the U.S. Army Reserve in its mission to preserve, critically interpret, disseminate and teach military history, provide historical advice and stimulate historical-mindedness across the Army and the Nation.²¹ Among the uses of military history specified in Army Regulation 870-5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*, the three of greatest significance to this paper are “providing historical support in decision making,” “supporting leadership and professional development,” and “preserving the institutional memory of the Army.”²²

These requirements translate into three focus areas within the Army History Program defined by the following endstates: 1) the provision of historical information and perspective during the conceptual aspects of operational design and mission planning, 2) the influencing of military culture to actively seek insights from historical examples in order to effectively translate those insights into appropriate behavioral modifications in the training and operational environments and 3) the proper collection and archiving of unit information that is of significance in order to perpetuate the benefit of institutional learning.

According to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 1-20, *Military History Operations* – Military History Detachments “deploy and are assigned to all levels of command in a joint operations area to include the senior Army command or Army component command to the brigade combat team (BCT) level.”²³ The publication further

explains that this distribution is designed to ensure historical expertise, support, and collection capabilities are available to commanders at all levels.²⁴ However, the Army currently has 27 Military History Detachments (MHD), only one of which is in the active component. Of the remaining 26, 19 are in the Army Reserves and seven are in the Army National Guard.²⁵ This population and distribution of MHDs does not support the concept of providing one detachment to every deployed command down to the BCT-level, much less to provide continuous historical support to mission planning and decision making during training. Therefore, the number and availability of MHDs and Army Historians is arguably insufficient to effectively promote historical-mindedness across the Army. As of February 2015, the Human Resources Command identified 318 individuals across the Army who possess the 5X identifier.²⁶ However, former Field Chief for the Center for Military History (CMH) Mr. William Epley notes that most of the active duty historians are concentrated at history and educational institutions such as the Center for Military History, the Army War College, and the United States Military Academy and not within the MHDs.²⁷ Army Heritage and Education Center's Research Historian Dr. Michael Lynch agrees, and further suggests that the majority of these individuals are concentrated at a few history and educational locations and largely do not offer sufficient direct contact with operational units to effectively incentivize operational units to seek insights from history while developing their plans.²⁸

Under the current program, a master's degree in history is required to receive the 5X additional skill identifier. This requirement is a limiting factor to the number of individuals available to accomplish the requirements outlined in AR 870-5. However, the

Army Historian Program may provide the foundation for a broader concept that enables greater reach and effectiveness.

An option for consideration is the expansion of the current Army Historian Program to establish an additional duty position for individuals with an education in history in units down to the battalion-staff planning sections. Ideally, the Army would accomplish this in a manner that does not require an increase in personnel numbers, particularly during the post-conflict environment that eschews growth, and in a manner that does not make progress vulnerable to force reductions. If the Army modified the existing Army Historian Program to allow select individuals with a bachelor's degree in history to receive the 5X identifier, the Army could generate a larger population of individuals with a recognizable background in history to serve in additional duty unit historian positions and maintain organizational history programs as mandated by regulation.²⁹ Although greater research would be necessary to identify and address the associated force management considerations, preliminary research shows that the United States Army Cadet Command (USACC) is currently managing 1,413 cadets who have declared History as a major. This number represents four percent of the total Reserve Officer Training Corps enrollment of 33,899 students.³⁰ By comparison, the Army uses earmarked scholarships to incentivize the migration of students into the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields. As a result, USACC is currently managing 8521 students in these fields, 25% of their total population of declared majors.³¹

What is significant from this data is that, without any monetary incentive, History ranks 5th among the 930 majors listed by the USACC G2 with the most popular major,

criminal justice, claiming 3,841 or 11 percent of the total declarations.³² Furthermore, these numbers are only representative of the population within the USACC. If we consider graduates from other officer-producing institutions and the Non-commissioned officer and warrant officer populations with college degrees in history, the number has the potential to be considerably higher.

Since these individuals are identified by an additional skill identifier and not a separate MOS, the officer would retain the ability to serve within his or her basic branch while also providing the necessary attention to the myriad responsibilities and capabilities identified by AR 870-5 and ATP 1-20. Furthermore, these individuals are already organic to the unit and do not represent an easy “target” for force reduction numbers during periods of fiscal austerity.

Mr. Epley recalls that his organization repeatedly presented an initiative to add historian positions codified by the 5X additional skill identifier to division or higher structures during the Table of Organizational Equipment (TOE) and Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) reviews between 1997 and 2005, but failed to secure approval.³³ The barrier to success, according to Mr. Epley’s recollection, was the concern that the addition of the code to those positions would unduly restrict Human Resource Command’s ability to assign officers without the necessary qualification to staff positions.

Although receptive to the concept of a program expansion as proposed in this paper, Mr. Epley cautions that an expansion of the Military Historian Program may not produce the desired effect of bringing a historian’s perspective to the tactical staff. He submits that the current requirements of having a master’s degree in history are “just

about right” as they provide both the appropriate level of academic rigor and sufficient historical background to enable the individual to be a qualified advisor to a commander and staff on the value and context of historical insights.³⁴ MG Rapp also cautions that the expansion of the Army Historian Program by reducing the entry level requirements for Army Historians may have unintended consequences. He suggests that an undergraduate degree in history does not automatically correlate to a desire or aptitude to serve in the capacity of a unit historian. His observation calls into focus the risk that a rapidly expanded program might incur- poor performance by individuals who are either not committed to or not competent in the tasks associated with a unit historian could undermine leader perceptions of the inherent value of historical-mindedness and cause leaders to dismiss the program.³⁵

These concerns may be addressed through a progressive historian training program that coincides with the officer’s regularly scheduled Professional Military Education (PME). A supplement to the PME would enable historians at all levels to learn the responsibilities and resources available at their level to better support both the Military History Program and the historical support to the unit commander. Additional research beyond the purview of this paper would be necessary to determine the feasibility of this concept.

MG Rapp offers the consideration of an alternative approach for capturing the value of historical-mindedness at the tactical level. Specifically, he suggests leveraging the capabilities of technology to create virtual access to historians who have been specifically given the mission to directly support the force.³⁶ Through the use of communications technology, the existing population of historians may be able to meet

the needs identified in this paper from their current locations, if their mandate is increased to include this wider mission. This proposal would provide units with access to historians of a known quality, who are more likely to promote the concept of “historic-mindedness” in operational units without the challenges associated with expanding the current Military Historian Program and the human resources challenge of populating each organization with a qualified historian. This approach does not insert individuals with a history background into the unit, and therefore does not reap the benefit of having an assigned member of the staff who seeks to consistently inject the multiple perspectives associated with historical-mindedness into staff planning actions. Instead, it would rely more heavily upon the other cultural influences suggested in this paper to generate the necessary desire to connect with historians for that perspective. Additional research would also be necessary to determine if the number of participating historians would be able to support the demand created by unit training and operational deployments.

Creating Synergy among the Institutions that Capture Experience-Based Insights

Army Regulation 11-33, *Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP)* identifies the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) as the “the conduit between units, proponents, HQDA, and the JIIM communities... for all matters relating to the ALLP.”³⁷ It further directs that other agencies within the Army who collect insights within their organizations “will forward [observations, insights and lessons] collected (or valid lessons learned they identify) to CALL for analysis, dissemination and archiving.”³⁸

Unfortunately, the regulation belies the complexity of the post- 9/11 growth of the Army’s insight collecting community. Center for Army Lessons Learned Program Manager David Futch provides a larger picture of the community involved in the

collection and dissemination of insights. He emphasizes the fact that CALL is only one of many institutions which support the Army's Lessons Learned program. He highlights the important roles of the Centers of Excellence, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the Rapid Equipping Force, and others as important contributors to the institutional knowledge of the Army.³⁹

However, these institutions do not operate directly for a common command, as evidenced by the Training and Doctrine Command organizational chart (see Figure 1.)⁴⁰ The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) and Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) are separate entities under the TRADOC Commanding General, whereas CALL is currently located under the Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE).




Figure 1. TRADOC Organizational Chart

This presents two issues for debate and resolution. First, is CALL located at the right level, and does it possess the necessary authorities to adequately choreograph the unity of effort task for which it is charged? Second, until recently, CALL has largely focused its collection, analysis and dissemination efforts at the tactical-level.⁴¹ Arguably, none of the aforementioned institutions place sufficient focus at the strategic-level to provide the necessary insights for senior leaders to benefit from institutional knowledge. Furthermore, if CALL is charged with expanding its purview to incorporate strategic insights, the organization will necessarily require adjustments to its culture and procedures.

The “optimal” location for CALL appears to be largely a matter of opinion, and opinions vary widely. Some have suggested that CALL would be more effective under the Combined Arms Center or even directly under TRADOC, on par with the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the Rapid Equipping Force, and the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) to facilitate coordination and synchronization. Others submit that CALL should perhaps be at the HQDA or G-3/5/7 to better support the Army writ large. Still others offer that CALL should be located under ARCIC in order to influence how the Army develops the future fighting force.

However, as Combined Arms Group Deputy Director and Supervisory Strategic Planner for the Commander’s Initiative’s Group Bob Kiser explains, the organizational chart does not adequately portray the complex relationships that exist within TRADOC. He asserts that the placement of CALL under the purview of the MCCoE is a calculated strategy; one that allows insights to enter the institution at the locations in which they can have the most immediate effect. Mr. Kiser submits that while placing CALL under

the purview of ARCIC is another potential option, ARCIC's focus is on the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) of the future force. Assigning CALL to ARCIC would certainly influence future force development, but would offer little in the way of enabling rapid changes throughout the Army in a rapid and responsive manner. By contrast, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) is concerned with the immediate DOTMLPF implications to the force and is also the controlling agency for professional military education (PME), doctrine revision, and leader development, among others.⁴² Mr. Kiser further explains that despite its location and appearance on the organizational chart, the MCCoE is not designed in the same manner as the other CoEs, and its unique purpose enables it to support the essential functions that would not otherwise apply to the other Centers of Excellence.⁴³ In its current location, CALL provides insights through the MCCoE and into CAC.

A number of options exist that would enable the Army to provide unity of effort in its insight collection and dissemination. One option is to position all of the current insight collecting agencies under a single headquarters. Since the Center for Army Lessons Learned is charged by Army Regulation 11-33 to serve as the "conduit" between insight collecting agencies across the Army and the JIIM community, it is a logical candidate to serve as a headquarters for all ALLP related agencies. A second option suggests that the consolidation of existing programs into one or more agencies could support greater synergy across the ALLP community while reducing overhead requirements. An example is the potential consolidation of the Center for Army Lessons

Learned, the Asymmetric Warfare Group and the Rapid Equipping Force into a singular entity that is a direct reporting unit to the TRADOC Commander.⁴⁴

A resolution to the challenges of unity of effort and positioning within the organization for each of the entities that contribute to the Army's ability to share institutional knowledge falls beyond the purview of this paper. However, through continued debate, the Army can and must find a solution that creates unity of effort and captures insights at the tactical through strategic levels without sacrificing the ability to respond quickly to the needs of the institutional and operational domains.

CALL has already acknowledged the aforementioned needs and, as per the instructions in AR 11-33, it is currently making efforts to determine how best to provide unity of effort for the lessons learned community. Its current endeavors seek to increase the scope of its collection efforts beyond tactical, to operational and strategic insights as well. However, this paradigm shift presented a number of challenges which CALL is seeking to address through a series of collaborative "synchronization conferences."⁴⁵ Indeed, the list of desired participants for the FY 16 Lessons Learned Synchronization Conference indicates a substantial effort to bring together a community of organizations from across all components of the Army which collect, analyze, or use insights.⁴⁶ Among the desired participants are the United States Army War College and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), both of which are under the purview of MG Rapp. This connection provides a tremendous opportunity to align MG Rapp's vision of employing the intellectual capital that exists within the staff and faculty of the United States Army War College and its affiliated agencies with the Army's need for focused, strategic thought. Through collaboration, it may be possible to

achieve greater refinement of the already established Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) which provides direction for the Army War College, and potentially other senior service colleges, to address strategic issues of paramount concern to the Army's senior leaders in a timely and deliberate manner. As mentioned earlier, the identification of a single organization with the authority to coordinate the Army's lessons learned program writ large would certainly assist in the creation and management of a refined KSIL for dissemination and action at the strategic-level academic institutions.

Using the Unit Training Management System to Reinforce the Value of Insights

The Army's Unit Training Management (UTM) program is defined as: "the process commanders, leaders and staffs use to plan-prepare-execute-assess unit training and leader development. UTM also helps identify the resources needed to conduct effective, performance-based training and leader development."⁴⁷

A sub-component of UTM, the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) is the Army's electronic tool designed to help leaders design and develop their unit training plans. It provides tactical leaders with a detailed template that they can tailor to the training needs of their formation while providing "task, purpose, outcome, and execution guidance for each [training] event as well as identifies the task, training audience, Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS), training gates, frequencies, duration of the event as well as the resources required to train each event."⁴⁸ More than simply another available tool, current Army regulations direct commanders to conduct unit training in accordance with the Combined Arms Training Strategy for crew-level through brigade-level training events.⁴⁹

With a modification to the existing software, this program would provide an ability to deliver insights directly to the unit training personnel at the important initial stages of

training development. If approved, a scheduled software update to CATS could include another field which contains insights gathered from various sources regarding each collective training task. Training developers would have access to this information as they are formulating their Unit Training Plan (UTP), and can immediately consider its applicability to the training needs of the unit. By highlighting noteworthy successes and common failures associated with each collective training task, leaders and training developers can incorporate insights or tailor best practices to suit the unit's needs, or devise solutions to address habitual training failures. Scenario-based training events at home station and at the Combat Training Centers would continue to serve as testing grounds for unit solutions.

A possible further improvement to this proposed capability would include a means, within CATS, for units to provide feedback to the appropriate agencies discussed earlier in this paper for analysis, archiving, action and population back into the proposed insights fields in the program. Devised tactics, techniques or procedures which prove to be particularly effective could potentially become incorporated into doctrine.

The discussion regarding the incorporation of insights into the Army's CATS program represents only a cursory acknowledgement of the greater question, how can we leverage technology to get useful information to commanders and staff planners at the right time?⁵⁰ Although the answer to that question is subject to an array of opinions and warrants a separate analysis beyond the purview of this paper, a brief mention is appropriate. Throughout my research, the subject of using technology to assist in knowledge sharing and the promotion of historical-mindedness surfaced repeatedly;

some of the concepts suggested are included in this paper. The near-omnipresence of electronic communication provides Army leaders with tremendous access to volumes of information almost instantly, but that has not, itself, enabled us to “know what we know.” To maximize effectiveness, we need to determine the right amalgam of technology and processes that will enable the institution to distill volumes of information into short, useful insights that leaders can readily access and judiciously apply within the context of a given situation.

Reinforcing the Value of Insights in Our Doctrine

The Army’s doctrinal library presents another opportunity to emphasize the need to seek historical insights in current and future operations. In support of the effort to seek institutional knowledge and historical insights, the Army could revise its doctrine during the next scheduled update to include specific references to “historical insights” when discussing relevant inputs to mission analysis, course of action development, and training task selection, such as those referenced in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*.⁵¹ Although doctrine is not prescriptive in nature, it is an important source to guide performance and develop our leaders. The concept of historical-mindedness can be incorporated into all of the doctrinal publications to different degrees, but three of these publications are particularly well suited to re-enforce the value of an Army culture which actively seeks historical insights in its operations.

Army Doctrine Publication and Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process* are nested with the Army Chief of Staff’s guidance regarding the sharing of knowledge, as evidenced by the “key inputs” in step two of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) depicted in figure 2 below.⁵²

Key inputs	Steps	Key outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Higher headquarters' plan or order or a new mission anticipated by the commander 	<p>Step 1: Receipt of Mission</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commander's initial guidance Initial allocation of time
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Higher headquarters' plan or order Higher headquarters' knowledge and intelligence products Knowledge products from other organizations Army design methodology products 	<p>Step 2: Mission Analysis</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Warning order</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Problem statement Mission statement Initial commander's intent Initial planning guidance Initial CCIRs and EEFI Updated IPB and running estimates Assumptions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mission statement Initial commander's intent, planning guidance, CCIRs, and EEFI Updated IPB and running estimates Assumptions 	<p>Step 3: Course of Action (COA) Development</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Warning order</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> COA statements and sketches <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tentative task organization - Broad concept of operations Revised planning guidance Updated assumptions

Figure 2.

The acknowledgement of the need to incorporate “knowledge products from other organizations” is excellent and serves as a reinforcing mechanism for a learning organization. However, the language may be a bit too restrictive as it appears to focus specifically upon taking best practices from similar organizations with recent experience. For organizations which are operating in an expeditionary mindset, knowledge products from other contemporary organizations may not be readily available. Furthermore, the outputs associated with step 2 of the MDMP do not reinforce the need to seek greater understanding, and the staff could easily omit the step of looking beyond its own collective experiences without any indication of such omission in the list of products.

Adding a reference specifically to “historical insights” into the inputs for mission analysis specifically encourages staff officers and Non-commissioned officers to seek

references from the repositories of institutional knowledge for insights prior to moving on to course of action development. Furthermore, although one would be loathe to add any additional requirements to an already heavily-burdened staff, perhaps embedding “historical insights used” as a reportable item in one of the products defined in the key outputs of the mission analysis step, or as a separate product, will encourage the staff to provide historical context to the commander, and how that context influenced the development of the plan.

ADP 7-0 devotes a section to the contributions of the institutional, operational and self-development training domains. Within this section, the publication highlights the value of a self-development program which drives “planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual’s knowledge base...”⁵³ These comments provide an excellent lead to an additional paragraph in this section, and perhaps again in the “leader development” section, that discusses the inculcation historical-mindedness in the professional development of all leaders and the value of learning organizations. Further discussion of these concepts would then follow in the corresponding Army Doctrine Reference Publication.

Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* contains a discussion of how commanders use the operations process to plan, prepare, execute and assess military operations. This section provides an excellent opportunity to describe the value of incorporating historical insights into the planning and preparation sections of both the ADP and the corresponding ADRP.

At the strategic-level, doctrine should reflect the value of historical insights in the conceptual aspects of the Army Design Methodology as discussed in ADRP 5-0 and

further reinforce the use of history to provide context as leaders use the Military Decision Making Process to develop their plans.⁵⁴ In a similar manner, joint doctrine should also reflect the value of historical insights as part of both Operational Art and Operational Design and the framework they provide to guide the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) as described in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.⁵⁵

The complete revision of our doctrine by December of 2015, and future revisions, provide opportunities for senior leaders to place the requisite emphasis on historical-mindedness in the decision-making process at the tactical through strategic levels. Furthermore, by describing the value of historical insights in our doctrine, senior leaders provide a vision for the growth and development of the Army as a learning institution. Author Gary Yukl suggests doctrine is a “beneficial way to incorporate and strengthen institutional memory” but cautions that if not conceived carefully, doctrine can also “stifle creativity and individual initiative in dealing with unique and unforeseen problems.”⁵⁶

Conclusion

The Army’s senior leaders have expressed a desire to broaden the experiential base of its leaders at all levels. However, efforts to achieve this end have focused on affording opportunities for individual leaders to gain a greater range of personal experiences. This paper has argued that a no-cost supplementary program which seeks to channel the collective knowledge of the institution through a collaboration of existing programs would greatly amplify the potential for achieving the desired endstate. Senior leaders, from the Army Chief of Staff, through the TRADOC and FORSCOM Commanders and beyond, must instill a sense of urgency and communicate a singular, clear vision that inspires a cultural change within the Army that values historical-mindedness. Within this environment, we can and must integrate established programs

such as the Military Historian Program, the Army Lessons Learned Program, doctrine, and Unit Training Management in order to understand “what the Army already knows” and synergistically provide useful insights to leaders at all levels. Technology can be a significant enabler in this endeavor, and careful consideration is necessary regarding how we can best integrate processes and technologies to continuously improve the benefits of both. The limited purview of this paper will not allow greater depth or breadth of research regarding the spectrum of possible methods for achieving historical-mindedness. However, its purpose is to re-energize discussions, stimulate thought, and inspire leaders throughout the institution to actively seek improved methods for channeling our collective knowledge and insights to leaders at all levels at the optimal time and place to help them make informed decisions in complex and uncertain environments.

Endnotes

¹ Paul Ely, quoted in Dennis J. Vetock, *Lessons Learned: A History of US Army Lesson Learning* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988).

² Bernard Rostker, “Right-Sizing the Force, Lessons for the Current Drawdown of American Military Personnel,” *Center for a New American Security*, June 2013, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_RightSizingTheForce_Rostker_0.pdf (accessed December 31, 2014).

³ Jason W. Warren, “Insights from the Army’s Drawdowns,” *Parameters* 44, no. 2, (Summer 2014): 6. http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/issues/Summer_2014/4_Warren_Commentary.pdf (accessed 31 December 2014).

⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy*, June 5, 2013, Foreword, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CAL/repository/ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf> (accessed 31 December 2014).

⁵ For an analytical paper discussing the concept of broadening leaders by promoting career paths that balanced traditional Army assignments with immersive experiences in the JIIM environment, see Brian C. Scott, *Broadening Army Leaders for the Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous Environment*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, February 1, 2012).

⁶ I am indebted to John Bonin, James Scudieri, Michael Lynch and William Epley for their insights and suggestions regarding the evolution of the scope and framework of this research.

⁷U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, "The Defense Innovation Initiative," memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense, et al, Washington, DC, November 15, 2014.

⁸Ibid.

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy*, June 5, 2013, Foreword, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CAL/repository/ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf> (accessed 31 December 2014).

¹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Army Doctrinal Publication 6-22 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 1, 2012), Foreword.

¹¹Ibid.

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 3, 2014), 12.

¹³ James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 1.

¹⁴ Carla O'Dell and C. Jackson Grayson Jr., *If We Only Knew What We Know: The Transfer of Internal Knowledge and Best Practice* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 6.

¹⁵Ibid.,xi.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷ Marc S. Efron, "Knowledge Management Involves Neither Knowledge Nor Management," in *Leading Organizational Learning: Harnessing the Power of Knowledge*, ed. Marshall Goldsmith, Howard Morgan and Alexander J. Ogg, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 40.

¹⁸ General William Rapp, U.S. Army, Commandant of the United States Army War College, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, February 27, 2015.

¹⁹ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1996), 4-10.

²⁰James L. Collins, Jr., "Foreword," in *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*, John E. Jessup, Jr. and Robert W. Coakley (Center of Military History: United States Army, 1979), xi.

²¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*, Army Regulation 870-5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 21, 2007), 5.

²²Ibid.

²³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Military History Operations*, Army Techniques Publication 1-20 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 9 June 2014), 4-4.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ "MHD History and Mission Overview," briefing slides presentation from the Military History Detachment Course, forwarded by Michael Lynch, Research Historian, United States Army Heritage Foundation, email message to author, February 24, 2015.

²⁶ Beau Carroll, Aviation Branch Future Readiness Officer, Human Resources Command, e-mail message to author, March 9, 2015.

²⁷ William Epley, former Field Chief at the Center for Military History, telephone interview by author, February 24, 2015.

²⁸ Michael Lynch, United States Army Heritage and Education Center Research Historian, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, February 23, 2015.

²⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*, Army Regulation 870-5, 16.

³⁰ Data compiled by the United States Army Cadet Command G2 section as of January 30, 2015, provided by John A. McAfee, Executive Officer for the 2nd ROTC Brigade, e-mail message to author February 5, 2015.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Epley, interview.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Rapp, interview.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Lessons Learned Program*, Army Regulation 11-33, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 17, 2006), 6.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ David Futch, Army Lessons Learned Program Manager, Center for Army Lessons Learned, e-mail message to author, February 27, 2015.

⁴⁰ TRADOC Organizational Chart, linked from the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command website, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/TRADOC%20ORGANIZATION%20CHART.pdf> (accessed February 16, 2015).

⁴¹ Larry Hollars, Facilitation Division Chief, Center for Army Lessons Learned, e-mail message to author, February 27, 2015.

⁴² Robert Kiser, Deputy Director, Commander's Initiative Group, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, telephone interview by author, February 11, 2015.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴ John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, United States Army War College, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, February 20, 2015.

⁴⁵Futch, e-mail message.

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⁴⁷ Combined Arms Center-Training (CAC-T), *The Leader's Guide to Unit Training Management (UTM)* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Training Management Directorate, December 2013), 9.

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⁴⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Training and Leader Development*, Army Regulation 350-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 19, 2014), 1-2.

⁵⁰ Rick O'Donnell, Department of Strategic Wargaming, Assessments, Concepts and Doctrine Director, suggested current and future technologies may be of significant benefit if integrated at the beginning of the concept proposed in this paper, provided by John A. Bonin, e-mail message to author, March 20, 2015.

⁵¹ Narrative sections provide opportunities to further emphasize the need to incorporate the concept of "historical-mindedness" into training and operational planning. For an example, see U.S. Department of the Army, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 7-0, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 23, 2012), 3-3.

⁵² U.S. Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 17, 2012), 2-12.

⁵³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 7-0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 23, 2012), 3.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, 2-6 — 2-11.

⁵⁵ Operational Art, Operational Design, and the Joint Operations Planning Process are detailed throughout chapters III and IV, see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0, (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011). III-1—IV-58.

⁵⁶ Gary Yukl, "Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army and Approaches for Developing Them," in *Out-Of-The-Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations*, ed. James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge and Leonard Wong, (Stamford, CT: JAI Press Inc., 1999), 274.