Plan Peru: The Application of Lessons Learned from Plan Colombia

by

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The primary goals of U.S. support to Latin America are to promote peace and to improve economic stability. Lessons learned from Plan Colombia and the War on Drugs and Narcoterrorism can be applied to the current threat perpetuated by the Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru. Using a framework consisting of the elements of National Power as viewed through the lens of Culture (C-DIME), the following paper will illustrate how the United States can support Peru in strengthening its national institutions and defeating the SL and its narco-criminal sponsors. This paper analyzes how the principles behind the success of Plan Colombia, rather than the specified practices employed, can be applied in Peru to defeat SL efforts in order to advance U.S. security interests while concurrently enabling host nation efforts to build legitimacy and expand security. Based upon this framework, the U.S. should continue its support of Peru in its endeavors to deter, defeat and demobilize the Sendero Luminoso.

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Abstract

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International crime, to include drug crime and terrorism, go toward ungoverned spaces – Colombia has ungoverned spaces mostly because of the internal civil war, and Peru has ungoverned spaces because the government has not paid attention to them.

—General Barry McCaffrey

In the late 1990s, the Government of Colombia struggled against increased threats from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, or FARC) as the United States was being inundated with narcotics flowing across its Southern borders. Based upon shared interests, the U.S. supported Colombia in its efforts to counter FARC threats and their support to narcotics proliferation through the coordinated efforts of “Plan Colombia” (PC). Through these efforts, the U.S. provided over $6 billion of security and developmental funds over a six-year period (1999-2005), making Colombia third in receipt of U.S. foreign assistance funding behind Egypt and Israel.2

As of 2014, the U.S. has extended over $10 billion to Colombia to support counter-insurgency and narcotics elimination.3 As a result, over 54,000 FARC guerillas have been demobilized, terrorist action has decreased by 71 percent, and criminal activities reduced with murders down by 46 percent, and kidnappings by 90 percent. On the positive side, the Colombian economy has grown by 5 percent annually and their GDP per capita has doubled over the same time period. Equally significant has been the reduction in illicit economy with overall cocaine production reduced 57 percent and the purity of product driven down by 44 percent. In all, PC’s successes have shown that the combined efforts of the U.S. with partners such as Colombia can pay quantifiable, long-term dividends.4
Background to Plan Colombia

The original FARC threat began in 1964 as a Communist grassroots, peasant revolution based on a Marxist-Leninist platform which leveraged popular discontent over the lack of an effective government and services. The FARC grew in strength and numbers from 3,000 members in 1982 to over 18,000 by 2002, while garnering support from narcotics producers by enabling an increase of cocaine producing land to swell from 30,000 to 150,000 hectares. Their Socialist message and narcotics linked efforts expanded throughout neighboring countries in Latin America, giving birth in 1980 to the Communist Party of Peru (Partido Comunista del Perú) and the “Shining Path” (Sendero Luminoso; or SL). In similar ways, the SL utilized a Communist-Maoist ideology to assert control in under-governed areas as they replaced hated Peruvian “bourgeoisies” with their version of a “new democracy.” By 1997, the U.S. as well as their host nations officially listed the FARC and SL as “Terrorist Organizations.” While both groups began with proletarian ideological views, their efforts have metastasized into criminally supported, narcoterrorist insurgencies over the course of the last 30 years.

In Colombia, the Uribe and Pastrana governmental efforts in 2000 attacked the FARC threat using a variety of security-centric approaches including, “Plan Colombia”, “Plan Patriota” and “Plan Nacional de Consolidacion.” Despite Colombian efforts, U.S. leaders noted that FARC numbers increased across both support networks and uniformed, trained guerilla forces. Additionally, the FARC generated so much wealth through narcotics support that what began as, “an egalitarian insurgency later transitioned into a commercial insurgency,” by 2005, with over 90 percent of cocaine bound for the U.S. originating in or moving through Colombia. To increase host nation effectiveness, Plan Colombia sought to enable mutual U.S.-Colombian success in
combatting narcoterrorism through a combined security assistance and counternarcotics effort that expanded drug eradication while incentivizing alternative replacement agricultural crops and local economic programs across Colombia.\textsuperscript{11} Once eradication efforts succeeded, political and security forces re-established control and governmental services were introduced into FARC controlled areas under operation, “Accion Integral.”\textsuperscript{12}

Throughout PC, the primary goals of U.S. efforts were to prevent the cultivation and distribution of narcotics while enhancing security and promoting economic stability. Concurrently, Colombia developed and synchronized similar goals with the addition of ending drug trafficking and increasing security.\textsuperscript{13} The overall success of PC was based not upon U.S. direct efforts but rather upon formulating a common, host nation developed strategic vision, combining and aligning resources from multiple departments and agencies across both governments while leveraging U.S. interagency support to its fullest extent.\textsuperscript{14} Ultimately, PC was a success because the plan enforced and enabled the goals of the host nation as truly a “Colombian” plan backed selectively, yet robustly by U.S. support.

The successes for both partners over the past 15 years speak for themselves. Large numbers of FARC members have demobilized, coca production has been reduced and replaced with legal crops, and economic stability and civil security has improved under the Santos Government. The lessons learned from the PC experience of the U.S. “War on Drugs” can be applied to the current emerging narco-insurgent threat in Peru. This paper analyzes how the principles behind PC’s success, rather than the specified practices employed, can be applied to enable efforts led by the Peruvian
government to defeat the SL in order to advance U.S. security interests while concurrently enabling the host nation’s expansion of legitimate governance and sustainable security. Using the elements of U.S. national power, as focused through the lens of Culture (C-DIME) as an analytical framework, the following paper will illustrate how partner nations can employ the principles of Plan Colombia to strengthen Peruvian institutions while defeating the Sendero Luminoso and its narco-criminal sponsors.

Such efforts are of major strategic significance for both our countries. In the next ten years, expanded coca cultivation in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) and Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro River Valleys (VRAEM) will be the greatest threat to Peru’s survival in security, poverty, and trade areas. As narcotics producers have now made Peru the number one producer of coca in the world, continued increased drug flow threatens U.S., European and Latin American allies’ relations and support for Peru. While the government has made great strides in crop reduction in the UHV, the VRAEM poses an even greater threat from local criminals and cocaleros (coca farmers) in these vast under-governed and forested jungle areas controlled by the SL. Finally, Peruvian efforts cannot continue to expand given the lack of internal resources, and will require similar U.S. and international support similar to those of Plan Columbia to defeat the continuing narco-insurgency.

Culture

Oscar Arias, the President of Costa Rica from 1986-1990 and 2006-2010, stated in his book *Culture Matters* that “Latin Americans hold on tight to pain and searing, preferring a certain [difficult] present to an uncertain future. The obstacle blocking development is the fragility of the Latin American commitment to democracy.” His words illustrate that culture exerts a paramount impact on the daily lives of Latin
American’s in two distinct ways: class separations influenced by wealth and prosperity, and the lack of governmental services for those in need. This cultural aspect frames Peruvian cultural stratification, inhibitors to success, and responses to threats. More importantly, culture is a primary aspect of the operational environment that combined Peruvian and U.S. efforts must consider in framing mission success.\textsuperscript{18}

As compared to other countries in Latin America, Peru suffers from a distinct “stratification of the masses” including a large class living in poverty, a limited middle class, and a small elite class that lives in extreme wealth.\textsuperscript{19} This vast disparity of affluence, coupled with cultural despondency and a downhearted past plays into the hands of the Maoist ideologies advocated by the SL. This pessimistic view is fully accepted by the people who live in the jungles and regions separated from the capitol city, and who rarely receive assistance, security or basic necessities from the government. In all, they see little care demonstrated by their government as they provide for their own well-being through their own initiatives.

During PC, the military focused on deterring and defeating the FARC in rural areas by persuading the population to eradicate coca and to accept the outpouring of assistance from the government, thereby reversing the cultural perception of governmental callousness and disenfranchisement. In identifying the emerging rural SL threat by 2007, the GoP employed the lessons of PC by creating the “Comision Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas,” or National Commission for Development and Life Without Drugs (DEVIDA) which garnered popular support for reducing drug production through providing agricultural incentives (and punishments) along with public services to outlying villages and towns through extending the reach of
the Policía Nacional del Perú or Peruvian National Police (PNP) and the Ejército del Perú or Peruvian Army (EP) to local areas. With limited support by United States Agency for International Development (USAID), DEVIDA focused developmental efforts on areas separated from government control to build support for legitimate governance and dissuade narcotics use and illicit crop cultivation. The GoP’s expanded actions reversed cultural perceptions by reminding the people that their government is interested in their well-being and security which garners their support and participation in rejecting SL efforts.

As in Colombia, Peruvian approaches to countering insurgent efforts and narcotics cultivation in the UHV and VRAEM have been designed around the cultural background, biases and history of the local people. They illustrate how lessons from PC have been interpreted and tailored to empower a truly political-enabler approach that puts the emphasis on the “carrot” as compared to the “stick” in reversing local perceptions of the GoP.

Diplomatic and Political Efforts

Professor Mark Moyar, the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the U.S. Marine Corps University, recently commented that, “a whole of government approach cannot be done successfully in isolation from a security effort.” While cultural considerations frame GoP approaches towards its people, they also influence the diplomatic and political aspects of Peru’s fight against the SL. The general lack of popular trust in governmental agencies and the absence of GoP services in remote areas generate U.S. and international concerns about the government’s effectiveness and ability to protect the populace. The U.S. supports Peru as a representative democratic republic and utilizes multiple development and support approaches by the
country team to assist the GoP in its struggle with narcoterrorism and SL. The U.S. policy in Peru emphasizes political harmony and inclusive, complimentary agency efforts by both governments to ensure mutual success. United States efforts in Peru incorporate a “Whole of Government” approach through the U.S. Mission’s Country Team, developing tailored security assistance efforts combined with developmental support through implementing partners and non-governmental organizations, such as “Spirit of America”, that are working in conjunction with DEVIDA programs to make great strides in the UHV.22

This approach mirrors Clausewitz's notion that one must have a unified governmental front focused on, “what [a senior leader] intends to achieve by war and how he intends to conduct it,” before engaging in an uncertain fight.23 To that end, Clausewitz also noted that efforts by all governments must, “clearly anticipate the necessity to achieve political consensus at home before victory in war [is] possible.”24 One of the overarching concepts that that former Commander of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Admiral James Stavridis promulgated during PC was “the importance of interagency cooperation, public-private partnerships, and tackling corruption,” in accomplishing the goals of both the U.S. and its partner host nation.25 This same approach applied at the national level with the Colombian Government in PC continues to be the cornerstone concept for working with Latin American partner nations such as Peru.

The U.S. Country Team in Colombia learned three important lessons the hard way during PC. First, when U.S. leaders provided $500 million to, “convince farmers to switch from coca to alternative crops, but did not coordinate this campaign with the
[Colombian] government’s broader security strategy.”26 PC experience highlighted that cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and the host nation is crucial to mission success. Second, country team documents dealing with U.S. policy were only cleared through the Colombian counternarcotics unit and not reviewed or approved by the U.S. participating agencies that would implement the policy, such as State Department desk officers, Country Teams program and budget officers, and the Combatant Commands.27 With these agencies left out of the coordination loop, they had no oversight on projects that affected them directly. A final lesson was that the Colombian government struggled with developing their civilian ministries in a manner that they could maintain pace with their Department of Defense (DoD) supported military counterparts.28 During current efforts, the U.S. Country Team and their GoP counterparts have embraced these lessons by focusing on ensuring “intra” as well as “inter”-agency coordination that include all key agencies of both governments. Additionally, both USAID and DoD sponsored ministerial development programs strive to develop a balanced capability across all GoP agencies.

As discussed previously, a political challenge for the GoP is a generalized and culturally based lack of trust from the population.29 The lack of GoP interagency coordination due to stove-piped reporting and an absence of synergy among agencies further exacerbate this lack of trust. In an encouraging Peruvian interagency coordination, the U.S. Ambassador Brian A. Nichols recently formed an intergovernmental “inclusion group” composed of both U.S. and Peruvian agencies to advance President Humala’s desires of “improving Peruvian disaster prevention, readiness, and response, as well as social inclusion.” The group’s work incorporates
USSOUTHCOM’s Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) efforts that delivered over $6 million in completed infrastructure and training projects during FY14. Such partnering by the U.S. team reinforces GoP efforts and demonstrates the shared values of the U.S. and Peru. Much like the Colombian government under Presidents Uribe and Santos, the GoP is taking all necessary steps to address the needs of its population and coordinate agency services to reduce cynicism across historically difficult communities in the UHV and the VRAEM.

These diplomatic and developmental domestic teaming efforts at the Peruvian national level along with USAID assistance to DEVIDA programs have increased PNP and EP effectiveness in conducting civil-military operations under the “San Martin Model” that President Ollanta Humala has touted as “the path to follow in order to achieve drug supply reduction in a targeted area.”

The “San Martin Model” of combining efforts to defeat, deter, and demobilize the SL is considered a success in the UHV region. Specialized programs by DEVIDA such as the “Control and Reduction of Coca Leaf in Upper Huallaga” (CORAH) have eradicated 23,600 hectares of coca in 2013 and 31,206 hectares in 2014, with a goal of 35,000 hectares for 2015. This eradication of illicit coca has been replaced with 1,550 hectares of legal coffee and cacao crops across 41 communities participating in the program. Additional alternative crops being introduced are barbasco root, tobacco, rice, maize, and sugar cane. As a result, cash-crop agriculture in the UHV is no longer synonymous with drug production and terrorism. In all, the holistic approach of coupling eradication with alternative crops can be linked directly to several noteworthy past successes in Colombia.
Based upon prior partner integration lessons, U.S. efforts are focused on supporting and enabling host nation field efforts to identify and counter insurgent and narco-criminal networks. Joint DEVIDA and U.S. initiatives in the Monzon and Upper Huallaga Valley consist of police operations enabled by U.S. Civil Affairs (CA) Military Support Element (CMSE) teams that enable civil efforts. In 2014, U.S. teams supported humanitarian assistance programs as host nation partners, worked with “indigenous communities to strengthen their relationship with the Peruvian government, increase local resiliency, and expand access to government administration and services. Much like programs in Colombia where U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) interacted with the Colombian military and local populations, these teams are working in regions coordinated by DEVIDA to conduct outreach programs to bring services, medicine and police presence to areas otherwise threatened by the SL. In a recent report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Mr. Flavio Mirella, UNODC Representative in Peru highlighted that,

This is the most remarkable reduction rate achieved in the last 14 years, mainly because of significant public investment and the presence of Government entities in the main areas of coca crop cultivation and drug trafficking, eradication actions, and the consolidation and enhancement of alternative development efforts in many parts of the country.

The overall combined political and developmental efforts of the GoP and its field agencies have leveraged experience and lessons from Colombia to inform their own approach to countering narcotics and insurgent threats. Now that the GoP has declared success in the UHV, the VRAEM will become the major regional focus as the last remaining vestige of SL power and narcotics production in Peru.
Information Efforts

The Former Commander of the Colombian Special Forces, Colonel Raul Florez Cuervo asserted that “Information Operations are key not only [designed] to channel U.S. efforts, intertwined with USAID, toward the population, but also to spread the message internally through the government and to convince the population that the proposals from the government are much better than the insurgent - this creates legitimacy.”

Despite the great strides made in the countryside, legitimate governance has been undermined by political special interest groups, counter-government messaging and improved use of social media techniques that have provided the SL with an informational and perception advantage over the Peruvian government. The GoP’s information “fight” against the SL hinges upon the effective distribution of their messages as reinforced by visible, positive political and social action. In support, the U.S. Country Team and SOUTHCOM’s Military Information Support Operation teams are enabling the GoP and security forces to shape and deliver effective pro-GoP messaging in areas threatened by insurgents.

Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman first initiated the insurgency’s core message to members using an ideology utilizing a diverse combination of, “the native socialism of Jose Carlos Mariategui who was the founder of the Peruvian Socialist Party, the works of Mao Zedung, and Incan mysticism and nationalism.” These culturally linked and resonant ideological concepts, coupled with lack of trust in the government and widespread poverty, became a very powerful informational tool used to spread the Maoist message to indulge, persuade and recruit the disenfranchised in opposing a distant, unsupportive government. The SL continues to disseminate such messages through their political branch “Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos
Fundamentals”, or the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights (MOVADEF). This group has operated since 2008 as SL’s political wing to criticize government shortfalls and mistakes in order to secure seats in the Peruvian Parliament. Their messages revolve around the combination of reminding the people of atrocities committed from 1990-2000 by security forces and reiterating criticism of the GoP’s “abandonment” of the rural population over the last 14 years. Such messages and approaches by the SL are strikingly similar to those used by the Colombian FARC, as are the approaches pursued by the Peruvian forces and supported by U.S. SOF efforts.

The poor and disaffected youths in the VRAEM have no venues by which to gather opposing views of the SL. In response, the GoP and security forces are countering SL informational efforts through increased technological and physical presence with U.S. supporting efforts. The police and army work in conjunction with Civil Affairs and information support teams in forward bases to extend GoP presence that reinforces messaging against the SL and narcoterrorism among the local populace. Government security forces conduct joint patrols with local constabularies, consult local resident officials, and conduct medical assistance outreach among the rural communities in order to increase connectivity and demonstrate security provided by the PNP/EP in order to discount SL propaganda and lessen support for narcotics “lifestyles”.

Military and Security Operations

Colonel Ernesto Sirvas, the current U.S. Civil Affairs Commandant, spent a number of years as a CA officer in Colombia during PC. He observed that while efforts in Peru are not a typical military, “Phase Zero through Phase Five Joint Operational Planning Process [effort], they are a long-term, shaping and engaging process that
requires working closely with the host nation to set the conditions so that in twenty to twenty-five years, a generational change has occurred [within] the population. Just as the informational fight cannot be won in a vacuum, Peruvian security forces understand that overall security and mission success will involve more than just military operations. The “San Martin Model” emphasizes increasing civil security while defeating the SL and narcoterrorism through the use of forward deployed forces conducting focused operations on SL elements. Simultaneously, security forces are providing essential services and outreach to remote populations while encouraging integrated eradication crop replacement programs which build upon the principles of success identified in Plan Colombia.

In the UHV, Peruvian military and police forces demonstrated that they are capable of defeating the SL. Current efforts now focus on extending the “San Martin Model” by employing similar DEVIDA and U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts used in a successful fight in the UHV to the VRAEM. During security efforts in the UHV, the Army worked in conjunction with local and district Police to share information and incorporate best practices in local areas. Along the Ucayali River basin, the “Marina de Guerra del Perú” or the Peruvian Navy (MGP) conduct Civil Military Operations to counter both insurgent and narco-recruitment efforts. Such national-local teamwork leads to an effective, focused rural response that mirrors efforts conducted during PC’s “brown-water navy efforts” as well as Village Stability Operations (VSO) used in Afghanistan by U.S. and Coalition forces.

However, the San Martin Model is just that - a framework for civ-mil interaction to garner support by the populace. Instead of costing the GoP millions of dollars, the
model encourages police, army and supporting U.S. efforts to work closely alongside one another with Peruvian forces always in the lead. This approach also emphasizes that U.S. assistance will focus on improving local military and police skills for the PNP and EP security efforts in remote areas to expand GoP legitimacy through professional conduct and well integrated operations.45 The best example of this process continues to be in the UHV, where CMSE personnel work alongside DEVIDA elements in drug eradication areas as DEVIDA brings services, technical assistance and support to establishing alternate crops, using PC-familiar approaches. Future missions are planned to include U.S. Engineer Battalion assistance in building infrastructure projects funded by DEVIDA.46

Unlike the more mature efforts of PC, the USAID Foreign Assistance Mission structure in Peru is still in the nascent stages of developing its interagency and intergovernmental teamwork focused around counternarcotics and counterterrorism objectives. Although there have been significant achievements over the past ten years, the current mission does not have the monetary support from partnered nations that PC enjoyed. In turn, the GoP is bearing a large financial burden in their own fight against narcotraffickers, terrorists and the SL. Finally, whereas Colombia enjoyed a robust relationship with the U.S. in military support through security assistance and counternarcotics programs, similar supporting relationships and programs with Peru have only just begun.

To this end, CMSE teams are at the lead of regional engagements and active in supporting and expanding GoP community governance and security that encourages a sense of belonging among a population that formerly considered itself abandoned by its
government. In all, CMSE assist and support PNP and EP efforts to reduce negative perceptions and attitudes. By integrating into Peruvian development and security efforts in the field, Civil Affairs efforts are enabling “whole of government” efforts by the U.S. Country Team where defense and development programs are mutually supporting host nation success.47

While the Upper Huallaga Valley is an area of GoP success, the VRAEM presents greater challenges in adapting security lessons from PC. In contrast, the Peruvian Army is not utilizing the same “Hearts and Minds” strategy as in the UHV where coca eradication coupled with GoP improvements in essential services, infrastructure and alternative crop introduction proved to be an effective but very resource intensive approach. According to Colonel David Haro of the Peruvian Navy, the GoP has adopted an earlier version of Plan Colombia-type efforts that focus on coca eradication and capture of the few remaining 300 SL members using security intensive Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts.48 While the MoI focuses on coca smuggling and organized criminal gangs through police action, MoD efforts combat terrorism through army security operations.49 The focus of CE-VRAEM (Comando Especial-VRAEM) Peruvian special operations forces is on active “targeting and attenuation” of the remaining SL members and then the cocaleros in the region.50

While SL numbers in the Southern area of Ayacucho are low, as recently as October 2014 SL elements attacked the regional EP base in a significant show of force.51 The GoP responded by capturing two members of the SL using tactics and procedures similar to those used in PC by increasing security operations enabled by aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to search for and
eliminate the last vestiges of SL presence in the region. Due to the persistent nature of the SL and their attacks on GoP forces, both the MoI and the MoD are paired with the Ministry of Human Rights (MoHR) in order to anticipate and prevent human rights violations such as those that occurred in Peru in the 1990’s. This linkage of the MoHR to security efforts in the VRAEM ensures that security forces act in accordance with well-defined international guidelines. In all, efforts in the VRAEM are similar to those of Peruvian General Arciniega’s forces whereby the PNP countered SL efforts through the assistance of the local populace. General Arciniega’s approach then and now continues to be effective: “If we can persuade the people to join us, the war is won.”

Economic Efforts

The defeat of the SL will take more than just politics, fancy posters and military power. Dr. Paul Kan, Professor of National Security Studies at the United States Army War College, notes that “Traffickers in remote areas [such as the VRAEM] 'fill the gap' in state capacity,” and provide employment where the state cannot. Garnering the support of the people against the SL will require expanding economic programs and opportunities to transform the rural countryside of Peru. The economic efforts required are multi-faceted and involve replacing a narco-economy that threatens the stability of Peru, overcoming poverty that continues to disenfranchise a vast portion of the population, and providing stable economic incentives and programs including international investment to support continued growth across Peru as a whole.

The narco-economy that has developed in Peru over the past decade is based in large part to the success of PC’s counternarcotics programs. In Colombia, the cartels produced a combination of marijuana and cocaine which was easily cultivated, processed and transported to Central America and the United States. Equally large
concentrations of Amazonian forests and isolated areas have made Peru an alternative location for drug production by Latin American cartels. Over the ten years following PC, Peru is now ranked number one in the world for the production of cocaine smuggled into the U.S., Bolivia and Europe. A single dried coca leaf now fetches a price of 4.3 USD, a 30.3 percent increase between 2012 and 2013, as coca leaf production in 2013 reached a level of 121,242 metric tons.

This change in coca cultivation and transport throughout the region is why the SL is now very much a “commercialized insurgency” akin to those efforts supported by the Mexican, Guatemalan, and Colombian cartels. In the same manner that the FARC used narco-funding to support their operations and aspirations of having a seat in the Colombian government, the SL have followed suit by modifying their goals over recent years from one that needed funding to fight the GoP to ones that focused on becoming a voting member of the GoP. The SL can only accomplish such goals by developing patronage and providing services for their “constituents”, and such support is very expensive.

In the VRAEM, current economic factors are perpetuating poverty and creating grievances for SL exploitation. While local employment depends on the “cocaleros” who grow coca for sale to narcotraffickers funding the insurgents, the SL also extorts the population to supply drug workers, provide protection, and coerce support and services. Their methods are analogous to a Mafioso system where minimal security is provided for transporting narcotics to the people, which is more than the GoP can provide in these remote locations.
The base challenge for the GoP is not that poverty exists but rather the circumstances that cause it to continue. A key lesson from PC is that overcoming poverty requires legal crops to provide a steady income and that taxation should be used to fund government essential services, education, and security. Once employment provided by coca and guerrilla fighting is gone, a vacuum is created that leaves the region without a sustainable income. Alternative lifestyle programs must be created to fill these gaps once the enemy has been defeated. Crop replacement coupled with human development is a proven model seen in PC and the San Martin Model that must be used in the VRAEM to yield similar results. Current economic development efforts in the VRAEM continue to struggle due to the lack of holistic methods as the police and army are focused primarily on eliminating the SL and their narco-supporters. It is only through expanding and leveraging economic programs and incentives conducted in other areas that the GoP can defeat the root causes of narcoterrorism, as well as the underlying causes of poverty that empower continued SL influence.

Conclusion

During a recent interview, the former commander of Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), Brigadier General (Retired) Hector E. Pagan reflected on how innovations made during PC might be utilized by Peru for current and future success:

Significant gains were made by assisting the Colombian Government to bring about enough of a tactical defeat to force the FARC to the negotiation table and eventually end the conflict - we can easily surmise that if we helped the Peruvians with a fraction of what we used in Colombia, then we could accomplish the same in Peru.

Past efforts in Plan Colombia have given the U.S. a blueprint for Latin American efforts to work from. The “fraction” of assistance mentioned by Brigadier General Pagan
could readily enable the complete removal of the narcoterrorist threat by the SL and their cocalero partners in the region, thus significantly reducing the amount of narcotics moving across U.S. and European borders. Implementation of a similar strategy to assist the GoP in eliminating the SL threat hinges upon three distinct efforts: implementing a revised political model; developing capable forces to defeat the SL; and providing adequate resources to support GoP counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. Such a holistic U.S. strategy must be evaluated against a variety of factors that require strategic patience, vision, and risk.

From a political perspective, U.S. Country Team efforts in Peru reflect an understanding of the core principles underlying success during Plan Colombia. The element missing from the equation is a developed level of U.S. integration across counternarcotics efforts. The U.S. must better align our national interests and efforts with those of the GoP in order to reach a more shared vision of how best to defeat the SL. Only through leveraging shared vision and sense of purpose can the U.S. and the GoP reach their mutual goal of eliminating the complex narcoterrorist threat from this region of Latin America.

Second, the U.S. should support the GoP with additional resources to facilitate a robust counternarcotics effort. Increased U.S. military and counter-drug personnel must be balanced against the “need” assessed by the GoP. Unlike Plan Colombia which began with 500 military and 300 civilian personnel, current U.S. interaction is limited to small teams of Civil Affairs and Military Information Support personnel. Enhancing GoP efforts require a modest increase in current levels that would more than satisfy the requirement and capabilities needed to achieve success in the VRAEM.
Lastly, resourcing counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts in Peru must be restored to previous levels. While USAID is the major actor in U.S. efforts to provide sustainable alternative crops in the wake of eradication efforts, other governance and service development programs are crucial to GoP success in the VRAEM. Without funds to support or to match host nation costs for DEVIDA programs, the long-term stability goals of U.S. and Peru will not be met. Funding for USAID counternarcotics programs in Peru has decreased by $2.1 million since 2011, and overall funding for other programs such as democracy and governance as well as health and education have been reduced by $26.2 million.67 Restoring adequate funding would enable a sustainable strategy for success in Peru, akin to that found in Plan Colombia.

An effective strategy must always consider the ends, ways and means against risk. In this case, what factors should the U.S. examine prior to providing additional support to the counternarcotics and the counterterrorism efforts in Peru? Three key factors require in-depth analysis; resource allocation, advisory support and “surge versus a steady flow” approach for support to Peru.

First, resources must be suitable to support security force efforts along with counternarcotics programs focused on expanded crop eradication and replacement programs in the VRAEM. Restoring USAID counternarcotics funding at or above FY 2011 levels would enable adequate support in areas designated by joint U.S. and GoP priorities that, “directly support Peru’s National Drug Control Strategy, which employs a three-pronged approach of interdiction, eradication, and alternative development.”68

Second, U.S. decision makers to include the President, Congress, and Combatant Commanders should consider manageable and sustainable increases in
advisory and support forces comprised of trainers and advisors for the GoP. The SL has been reduced to a level that the Peruvian Armed Forces can defeat over time. The U.S. must capitalize on the current Peruvian progress thru expanding support for our close Latin American partner enable defeat of the SL and elimination of their protection for narcotics traffickers in a manner similar to that of Plan Colombia.

Finally, a decision must be made as to whether it is feasible to “surge” troops and resources or to utilize a programmed “steady flow” method to support GoP efforts against the SL. Plan Colombia created an environment where personnel and resources were sustained for over a decade. The U.S. would be hard pressed to manage the same endeavor given current SOF personnel levels and the effects of sequestration. Sustained utilization of Joint Combined Education and Training (JCET) missions and Combined Exercises with Peru would provisionally increase U.S. troops in the country. Additionally, programing a modest but steady stream of forces and funding would augment USAID and GoP programs in a cumulative effort to eradicate the SL.

In conjunction with U.S. commitments, Peru must sustain funding for security improvement, eradication programs, and expanding basic services for efforts in the UHV while expanding emphasis in the VRAEM. Peruvian efforts must balance operations across both regions within the limited resources available while ensuring a steady flow of civil assistance to rural areas rather than temporary surges programs and resources. It is only through balancing these aspects that the GoP can achieve mission success and the elimination of the SL.

The experiences of Plan Colombia have shaped the manner in which the U.S. forces focus their support for regional partners in order to accomplish U.S. policy and
strategy in Latin America that promote our national values. Utilizing the principles of success identified in Colombia to develop a "Plan Peru" would combine, as Brigadier General Pagan observed, “our decisive efforts, with the Peruvians in the lead, so they can reach the desired objectives of defeating the Sendero Luminoso, regaining control of the VRAEM and achieving stability so the GoP can take care of its citizens.”

Endnotes


“Colombia’s decline began during the 1980s when leftist insurgencies began to reassert their presence and the narcotics industry grew to prominence. Colombian elites reacted slowly to these threats, increasingly relying on proxies to legitimate state authority – ‘self-defense’ groups and paramilitaries - to fill the voids left by the ineffective armed forces and police. When coca production shifted from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia during the 1990s, the role of narcotics in the overall economy exploded, along with it the power of the insurgents and paramilitaries, both fed by income from drugs. Drug production further highlighted the traditional problems caused by Colombia’s difficult geography and vast ungoverned spaces as national attention focused on hitherto neglected areas in the tropical lowlands of the south and east. Under the combination of a weak central government, an army incapable of standing up to the insurgents, a police force unable to effectively maintain order even in many urban environments, and the ability of the insurgents and paramilitaries to access supplies and weapons from abroad, legitimate state authority imploded.”


Peru is another country of concern. The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) insurgency is also designated as FTO by the US government. During the 1980s, the SL was a very powerful and aggressive Maoist revolutionary movement. It was significantly weakened in the 1990s with the capture of its leader Abimael Guzman. However, in 2001 and 2002 terrorist acts committed by the group increased from previous years. The SL was allegedly responsible for a March 2002 car bomb across from the US Embassy in Lima, the capital. Ten Peruvians were killed, including security personnel protecting the embassy. Eight SL members remain in custody for the bombing. After the beginning of 2003, however, there was an estimated 15 percent reduction in terrorist acts committed by the Sendero Luminoso. In December 2005, the month in which Mao Tse-tung’s birthday is celebrated, 13 Peruvian policemen and one Ashaninka Indian were killed in two ambushes in the Departamento ccallero de Huancayo, 316 kilometers from Ayacucho, the birthplace of the Maoist revolution in Peru. In order to stop the increasing instability, and regarding the next presidential and legislative elections in April 2006, President Alejandro Toledo decreed a state of emergency (including military offensive operations) for 60 days in six ccalleras (coca growers) provinces where the SL was operating. In the last three years, the US government reduced the aid to eradication of the coca leaf plantation in Peru from $116 million to $97 million.; Charles R. DeWitt, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, The Rise and Development of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, USAWC Military Studies Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 5, 1992), 12.


12 Gilberto R. Perez, SOUTHCOM SCJ7, email message to author, January 12, 2015.


The objectives of Colombia and the United States differ in some aspects, although there is a significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and economic development because it contributes to regional security in the Andes. The primary objectives of Colombia are to promote peace and economic development, increase security, and end drug trafficking. Both
U.S. and Colombian objectives have also evolved over time from a strict counternarcotics focus to encompass counterterrorism activities.

14 Coomer, “Drug Traffickers”.


“Inequality delegitimizes the political system, gives rise to antisystemic social movements and political actors, and sets the stage for bitterly polarized social conflict and a zero-sum “fight for shares.”


21 Mark Moyar, Counter Insurgency Expert, Author and Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the U.S. Marine Corps University, telephone interview by author, January 19, 2015.


27 Coomer, “Drug Traffickers”.

28 Mark Moyar, telephone interview by author, January 20, 2015.

29 Arias, “Culture Matters,” 2-I.


31 Ibid., email message to author, December 11, 2014.


39 Colonel Raul Florez Cuervo, Commander of the Comando Unificado de Operaciones Especiales, interview by author, January 30, 2015.


Hernandez, “An Application of Foreign Internal Defense.”


“In the case of the UHV, Civil Military Operations have maintained the ground gained through eradication and the entrance of State entities into once under-governed areas. Civil Affairs supports and expands community governance and security committees that provide a sense of belonging to a population that considered itself abandoned by its government.”

Ibid., email message to author, December 11, 2014.


Kevin A. Nieto, Captain, US Army, Civil Affairs – Civil Military Support Element – Peru, email message to author, “Presentation was obtained by CMSE 815 on 15 DEC 2014 During a Key Leader Engagement with Senor Luis Rojas Merino, Secretario Técnico, CODEVRAEM,” January 4, 2015.


“A coalition of human rights organizations reports that during 2000-2008, an estimated 20,000 were killed by paramilitary, guerrilla, and state forces, and more than 2 million persons were displaced. Most of the displaced took shelter in precarious camps around larger cities. Other reports put the number of internally displaced at more than 3 million, with another 500,000 Colombian refugees and asylum seekers outside the country.”


Paul Kan, United States Army War College, interview by author, January 27, 2015.
Arias, “Culture Matters,” 2-1.

“The enemies of the people in the region are hunger, ignorance, inequality, disease, crime and environmental degradation. They are internal, and they can be defeated only through smart public policy, not a new arms race.”


A combination of Special Forces liaisons and trainers from the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Civil Military Support Elements from the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) and Military Information Support Operation teams from the 4th Military Information Support Operations Group (Airborne) as well as trainers from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and instructors from the 75th Ranger Regiment should be leveraged in a “Plan Peru”.


Ibid.

“Our relationship with Peru should focus on planning, development and national strategy. It is a matter of combining our decisive efforts, with the Peruvians in the lead, so they can reach the desired endstate of defeating the Shining Path, regaining control of the VRAEM and achieving stability so the government can take care of its citizens.”