More Faces, More Places, Without More Bases:
Communicating Pacific Pathways

by

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United States Army War College
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More Faces, More Places, Without More Bases: Communicating Pacific Pathways

We have to have more faces, in more places, without more bases.

—General Vincent K. Brooks

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) directed the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and required the Department of Defense (DOD) to “whenever possible…develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” Pacific Pathways 2014 (Pathways) provided an innovative and efficient Army response to the DSG requirement. But because the Army was then struggling to define its post-Iraq and Afghanistan roles, its Pacific Pathways proposal was not well received in the 2013 strategic information environment. The weak economy, record national debt, and public weariness from the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts exacerbated the Army’s attempts to affirm its relevance. According to a Department of the Army (DA) Army narrative study, the Army has historically struggled to justify its relevance during peacetime. Effectively communicating the Pathways concept within the Army, to the joint and interagency communities, to political leaders and to the public proved to be a virtually impossible task – so difficult that the concept would almost fail before it could begin.

This Strategy Research Paper uses open source information, primary documents, and interviews to examine how USARPAC leaders and staff communicated Pathways. It demonstrates that, despite challenges, USARPAC effectively communicated the Pathways concept. The paper reviews the strategic information environment in the late summer and fall of 2013, provides an overview of the situation, and analyzes implementation of the Pathways communication strategy. It concludes
with recommendations on how to communicate future iterations of Pathways more effectively. This paper does not consider Pathways communications directed at international audiences or Information Operations (IO) in support of Pathways.

The Army in 2013 struggled to convey a clear narrative explaining its role as the primary element of US Landpower. Historically, the Army has “adopted multiple mottos and slogans for different audiences and purposes,” resulting in inconsistent messaging and muddled brand recognition. The national security community has recognized the Army’s narrative issues, especially after the DOD published the 2012 Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept. ASB emphasized Air Force and Navy weapons capabilities to counter emerging Anti-Access / Area Denial capabilities in the Asia-Pacific – it hardly mentioned an Army role. ASB found a receptive audience because it reflected an “emerging meme in U.S. national security – that land wars soon will be passé and the future is about long-range strike weapons and advanced warships.” The same blog then noted that “there is growing concern inside the Army that the narrative in Washington already is being seized by advocates of naval and air warfare, and that the Army has yet to put forth a coherent vision of how land warfare fits in the picture.”

The Army developed the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept during the same period. Under this concept, continental US forces would align with overseas Geographic Combatant Commands to support their training, exercises and deployments. The 2013 Army Posture Statement addressed RAF, stating

Regional alignment will provide Geographic Combatant Commands with mission-trained and regionally focused forces that are responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation activities.”
At the 2014 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Convention, General Brooks, the USARPAC Commander, reported that Pathways “is an expression of Regionally Aligned Forces.”

In contrast to the Army’s narrative problem, many cite the Marine Corps as an example of successful “branding and marketing.” The Army narrative study further noted that Washington observers believed that the Marines had a “strong, positive” narrative that resonated, specifically in regard to Pathways. In fact, the study further noted, many objected to the Army’s proposed role: “The Army is encroaching on the traditional Marine Corps mission by operating from ships and rebalancing to the Pacific (Pacific Pathways).” Also at the 2014 AUSA convention, retired Lieutenant General Guy Swan lamented the issues with the Army narrative: “It’s such a difficult story to tell… it does not resonate like airplanes and battleships and aircraft carriers,” to which the reporter added, “…or ‘A Few Good Men.’”

Finally, consider the relevance of the doctrinal definitions of communication in understanding this information environment. Although many in the military use the term “strategic communication” to refer to all communication efforts at the strategic, operational and even tactical levels, in accordance with joint and Army doctrine it is a national-level effort “focused upon effectively communicating national strategy.” Consistent with this doctrine and once established, the USARPAC Pathways communication team developed a commander’s communication strategy for Pathways, not a strategic communication plan.

USARPAC experienced major changes in 2013 that affected its ability to plan, prepare, and execute Pathways effectively. General Vincent K. Brooks assumed
command of USARPAC on 2 July, 2013 as its first four-star commander since 1974.\textsuperscript{19} In the words of an Army reporter, GEN Brooks’ assumption of command symbolized “the continued rebalance for the United States in the Asia Pacific region.”\textsuperscript{20} With General Brooks came significant headquarters reorganization designed to increase the operational focus of the staff. Directly related to communication, GEN Brooks created a new Strategic Effects Directorate (FXD) by consolidating all of the “soft power” staff sections into one Directorate.\textsuperscript{21} Additionally, the USARPAC Public Affairs Officer (PAO) approached retirement, effectively leaving the command without a senior Public Affairs (PA) advisor until June 2014.\textsuperscript{22}

Shortly after arriving, General Brooks saw an opportunity to use exercises more efficiently. He believed properly synchronized exercises could support the USPACOM and USARPAC Theater Security Cooperation Programs in accord with the Army’s RAF concept.\textsuperscript{23} Further, these exercises would operationalize mission command from USARPAC through I Corps and the 25\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division to exercise units across the Pacific.\textsuperscript{24} General Brooks then discussed the nascent “Exercise Pathways”\textsuperscript{25} concept, as it was originally called, with the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) Commander, ADM Locklear, and with the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Odierno, thereby initiating the external coordination process.\textsuperscript{26}

The USARPAC staff’s small initial Pathways planning team then began to outline the formal coordination requirements in a draft Warning Order.\textsuperscript{27} The finished order would direct the USARPAC staff to coordinate the Pathways concept with Hawaii-based Army and joint organizations for comment and refinement.\textsuperscript{28} Notably, the draft order did not require coordination with any interagency organizations, specifically the
Department of State (DOS), its Ambassadors, or the embassy country teams in the
countries identified to host Pathways exercises. It also did not address coordination
with the political and military leaders of the countries identified to host Pathways
exercises. Because the Pathways concept envisioned modifications to how USARPAC
participated in existing exercises, and because each exercise already had its own
planning cycle involving the host nations, the staff did not identify an early need for
formal external coordination. The prevailing thought was that Pathways was simply a
“different way of doing what they were already doing.”

As USARPAC refined the Pathways concept and coordinated it within select
elements of the joint community, its leaders attended the 2013 AUSA Convention in
Washington, DC. General Brooks spoke during the convention and referred obliquely to
Pathways, “We intend to put into motion a pathway of activity (for the Army) into multiple
countries for extended periods of time, linking a series of events and exercises on a
variety of topics.” His comments did not attract mainstream media coverage; only a
small number of DOD and defense-related websites covered the story. Two reporters
requested interviews with USARPAC after the convention: an Army Times reporter and
a Washington Post reporter. The USARPAC PA staff was still coordinating these
potential interviews when initial Pathways planning culminated with a decision brief to
General Brooks on 1 November, 2013.

Leading up to the decision brief, GEN Brooks provided additional guidance that
clarified the Pacific Pathways concept; subsequent planning documents and media
articles repeated several of his statements. This decision brief marked the point at
which USARPAC considered Pathways “approved,” although USARPAC had not
briefed the concept to all joint and interagency stakeholders, most notably the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P) and the DOS. In addition, because only a portion of the USARPAC staff conducted the early planning,35 there was not yet a fully developed and approved communication strategy to support Pathways, nor had the newly assigned USARPAC Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) yet seen the entire Pathways concept.36 To understand Pathways more fully, the FPA asked for an update, after which she realized there was “going to be a problem in the region because of the host nation notification and coordination requirements.”37

The first of a series of Pathways public relations problems occurred in early November 2013, marking the point where communication, in the words of one PA officer, “went sideways.”38 USARPAC briefed the Sergeant Major of the Army on Pathways during a visit to Hawaii. In a subsequent meeting with soldiers at Schofield Barracks, he responded to a question on the Asia-Pacific rebalance,39 beginning with, “I just came out of a great brief on Pacific Pathways.”40 He then expounded on the Pathways concept. The Honolulu Star-Advertiser reported his comments in a 7 November, 2013 article entitled “Army Weighs New Pacific Deployment Strategy.” Stars and Stripes repeated the story on 8 November.41 The articles publicized Pathways before USARPAC had fully coordinated it with the joint, interagency, and multinational communities.

Shortly after the articles on Pathways were published, the USARPAC staff met with the Army Times reporter for a Pathways interview. During the interview, the USARPAC Exercises Director presented the Pathways concept using approved themes, messages and content.42 As the interview continued and the discussion included
specific countries, exercises, and timelines, the PA representative felt that the details were not appropriate for release because there was not yet approved Public Affairs guidance on Pathways.43 Because of this, the interim USARPAC PAO requested that the Army Times delay publication of the article so that USARPAC could fully coordinate the concept and provide updated information to the reporter.44 The interview raised the awareness of Pathways across the USARPAC staff, and highlighted the challenge of developing a new concept like Pathways, specifically when to transition from a small planning team to the entire staff.

The USARPAC staff then informed its leadership of a potential Pathways communication crisis due to the pending Army Times article, which prompted the command group and communication staff to develop and implement a strategy to mitigate any potential fallout. The strategy centered on accelerating Pathways coordination to ensure USARPAC informed all stakeholders before publication of the article.45 The Security Cooperation Program (SCP) Director socialized the Pathways concept paper with affected country Defense Attachés, Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), USPACOM, OSD-P and DOS for official review, comment and feedback.46 The USARPAC command group personally briefed key joint and interagency leaders and sent briefing teams to local commands to get ahead of the expected 16 December, 2013 Army Times article.47 Late November also marked the point when the entire PA Staff began to work on proposed Pathways Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and to expand the existing Pathways communication strategy. The PA staff had no awareness, however, of the OSD-P and DOS implications in the Pathways communication strategy.48
By early December OSD-P expressed support for the Pathways concept, but had concerns about its policy implications, budgetary impacts, and sensitivities in the region. OSD-P wanted to see the USARPAC Pathways PAG, and DOS and White House leaders wanted USARPAC to provide briefings before the *Army Times* published its article. On 9 December, 2013 the USARPAC communication team completed its communication strategy. It specified draft objectives and messages and themes, which, if approved, the USARPAC PA staff would use to develop the requested PAG (see Figure 1). OSD Public Affairs (OSD-PA) and USPACOM PA officers disagreed with the need for a USARPAC Pathways PAG because Pathways was still a concept. They specifically feared that approval of a PAG could be misconstrued as *de facto* OSD approval of the overall USARPAC Pathways concept. Both offices recommended that USARPAC proceed instead with a “Respond to Query” (RTQ)-only PAG. The RTQ-only PAG would consist only of a holding statement, questions and answers, and points of contact.
Pacific Pathways links together previously planned bi-lateral exercises and engagements under a new unit deployment concept.

Pacific Pathways is the deployment of trained and ready Army forces in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Pacific Pathways is another venue for their employment in the Asia-Pacific.

Pacific Pathways is a new model for the employment of Army forces in the Indo-Asia Pacific.

Pacific Pathways demonstrates our commitment to our relationships with all nations in the Asia Pacific.

In partnership with our Ally and partner Armies, US Army forces will create a permissive environment for execution.

USARPAC force posture and OAA that credibly demonstrate a Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

Regional Publics / Media

In the interim, a Washington Post reporter interviewed General Brooks in Hawaii and at Exercise YAMA SAKURA in Japan. Additionally, the Army Times did not publish its Pathways article on 16 December as expected. The delay, whether due to USARPAC’s request or internal turnover on the Army Times staff, actually hurt, rather than helped, Pathways. The Washington Post published its article on 29 December, 2013, and effectively “scooped” the Army Times article. It spun Pathways in a “sensational direction” and it reached a much wider audience than the more factual Army Times article would have.

“Army’s ‘Pacific Pathways’ Initiative sets up Turf Battle with Marines,” was the sensational Washington Post headline. USARPAC expected a general article about the Army and the Pacific rebalance, but the resulting “turf war” theme twisted the...
Pathways narrative. The ensuing controversy added friction to the ongoing coordination of Pathways, especially with the DOS. While the article conveyed some facts, it emphasized an assumed Army conflict with the Marines over missions and roles.55

Shortly after the Washington Post article, in the words of the USARPAC PAO, “a” Marine’s position became “the” Marines’ position56 when the Brookings Institution online blog Up Front published a follow-on article entitled “The Wrong Path in the Pacific.”57 This article reinforced the turf war theme; it implied the Army was seeking to establish an amphibious capability in competition with the Marines. The Army does have an amphibious mission.58 However, the Pathways concept envisioned sealift only to move Army units and equipment from exercise to exercise, not to conduct expeditionary amphibious operations. The Brookings author argued that it was “troubling” that the Army advocated that Asia-Pacific challenges had “to be met with an Army solution.”59 The blog article was more sensational than the Washington Post article. It misconstrued the more efficient movement of Army exercise forces across the Pacific as replication of a Marine Expeditionary Unit mission.60

The day after the Brookings Institution blog article, the Marine Times and Defense News both carried an interview with Marine General John Paxton, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Entitled “Marine Corps not Threatened by Army’s Pacific Strategy,” General Paxton’s remarks demonstrated USARPAC’s prior engagement with MARFORPAC.61 Although the article again mischaracterized Pathways as amphibious, General Paxton remarked “there is plenty of turf for the Marine Corps and the Army to cover.”62 In regard to Pathways, he stated “So do I feel threatened? Absolutely not. Is there a place for all of us? Absolutely.”63 On 27
January, 2014, the *Army Times* finally published the article, “Three-month Pacific Deployments." Coming after the other articles and after USARPAC was able to inform stakeholders of the Pathways concept, its publication was anticlimactic.

USARPAC leaders and the communication team spent November and December 2013 and January 2014 making up for the lack of prior formal coordination with OSD-P and DOS. In Washington, USARPAC leaders countered the “turf war” narrative, asserting that, in the words of one PAO, “the press loves good inter-service rivalry stories, and that is what they sensed with Pathways.” Nonetheless, the episode generated friction between USARPAC and the joint and interagency communities. There were tense emails, phone calls, and VTCs between USARPAC, OSD-P and DOS because they perceived USARPAC was “out there doing things on its own.” While USARPAC leaders focused on joint and interagency coordination, the USARPAC communication team needed a strategy to mitigate the impact of the negative press. According to an OSD-PA officer, “I spent hundreds of hours making phone calls and sending emails in response. We were trying to get a counter-story released to reporters to help recover.”

USARPAC had three options. First, it could implement the December “active” communication strategy, although its approach relied on generic messaging to multiple audiences, rather than tailored messages to designated audiences. Second, USARPAC could refine the December strategy and focus on the media and public in an attempt to counter the negative press. Finally, USARPAC could remain silent and let the negative press subside on its own, risking that it would continue indefinitely. General Brooks chose the latter, deciding to “fight the urge to write articles countering
the Washington Post article…answering the noise with more noise would be counter-productive.” As the former Chief of Army Public Affairs, General Brooks was experienced in dealing with the press. So his decision to pursue the recommended “RTQ-only” strategy succeeded. The echoes of the Washington Post and Brookings articles ceased reverberating by the end of February 2014.

By April 2014 USARPAC felt comfortable enough with the communication situation for General Brooks to respond to questions during the AUSA LANPAC (Landpower in the Pacific) Symposium in Honolulu, Hawaii. When asked about Pathways, General Brooks replied, “Instead of a series of Army units traveling to an exercise for 10 to 30 days and returning home, the new Pathways model would deploy a smaller unit whose ‘nucleus’ will move from one exercise to the next.”

As Pathways operationally transitioned from planning to preparation, the USARPAC communication team and PA staff refined the communication strategy and PAG. USARPAC did not complete its “Communication Campaign” until 24 July, 2014 (see Figures 2-5, below). The campaign briefing notes remarked, “up to this point, we’ve worked at setting the conditions with partners/Allies, PACOM and Army stakeholders. We believe there is no impediment to moving forward…to institutionalize the concept and expand it.”
Communication Objectives:

1. Develop widespread understanding and appreciation for Pathways among all audiences, creating a permissive environment for execution.
2. Increase Ally & partner awareness and understanding of Pacific Pathways and its advantages.
3. Obtain Ally & partner armies commitment to participating in Pacific Cooperation.
4. Inform U.S. and assure regional audiences of USARPAC role and significant contribution to U.S. rebalance to the AOR.
5. Inform US and regional audiences that Pacific Pathways is an efficient, effective model for the employment of Army forces in the Indo-Asia Pacific.
6. Inform internal DOD audiences of this additional flexible, responsive capability for the GCC.

Prepared by USARPAC OCPA

Figure 2. Pacific Pathways Communication Campaign, Objectives.75

Compared to the previous communication strategy, the communication campaign framework added desired conditions, phases, and a new objective (#6, in Figure 2 above). As seen in the concept slide in Figure 3 below, the communication strategy focused on a campaign to bridge between Pathways 14 and Pathways 15, before Pathways 14 ever started. Figures 4 and 5 expanded on the engagement and media plans for the expanded campaign, which incorporated lessons from the preceding Pathways communication efforts.
Communication Campaign Concept

- Shaping efforts thus far have resulted in endorsement/acceptance by other stakeholders and generated public and DOD curiosity which can be leveraged

- Campaign focuses communication efforts during FY 14 and early FY 15 leading to increased awareness and interest (media coverage) in FY15 Pacific Pathways

- Use POP as launch point for communication campaign to inform key decision makers and garner interest in FY 15 Pacific Pathways
  - Campaign launch(AUSA)
  - Drumbeat
  - FY15 Pacific Pathways

- Communication opportunities include targeted KLE; full range of media ops; command information; articles; public engagements/presentations; and exercise DV & media days

Figure 3. Pacific Pathways Communication Campaign, Concept.76

Engagement Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-frame</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep-Oct 14</td>
<td>Base-line understanding of concept</td>
<td>CODELs &amp; Other KL</td>
<td>Theater visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assure; demonstrate value</td>
<td>Allies/partner KL</td>
<td>Exercises &amp; KLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase understanding &amp; demonstrate joint value</td>
<td>PACOM &amp; sister services</td>
<td>Exercises; KLE; Inclusion of Pathways data in leader/staff updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assurance of U.S. commitment</td>
<td>Host nation/Regional publics</td>
<td>Joint Info Bureau activities; Embassies promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency; base-line understanding of concept; necessity of land forces in Pacific</td>
<td>U.S. public</td>
<td>Embed coverage (anticipate low); select press interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct (AUSA)</td>
<td>De-mystify Pacific Pathways; generate more understanding and interest</td>
<td>Beltway; security focused think tanks; Army (writ large)</td>
<td>Leverage AUSA venue and GO travel to D.C.; Press Conf; ILW panel; Select Interviews; Congressional Breakfast; Select Engagements Green Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 15</td>
<td>Peak interest for increased coverage/visit to Pathways</td>
<td>KL; media</td>
<td>Extend invitations; leverage visits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Pacific Pathways Communication Campaign, Engagement Plan.77
Figure 5. Pacific Pathways Communication Campaign, Media Plan.\textsuperscript{78}

The Pathways communication campaign provided a good model for bridging from Pathways 14 to Pathways 15. The intent was to focus communication efforts during Pathways 14, leading to increased interest for Pathways 15. USARPAC characterized Pathways 14 as a “proof of principle” from which to build.\textsuperscript{79} The “RTQ-only” policy was still in effect, however, which authorized only USARPAC to communicate Pathways. With the Pathways 14 unit preparing to deploy from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Indonesia in less than 30 days, I Corps and its subordinate unit PA teams needed to know what to communicate, along with the delegated authority to do so actively.

The USARPAC PAG provided the themes, messages, guidance, and authority for units to communicate Pathways once approved. USARPAC submitted the PAG to OSD-PA for approval after the 24 July, 2014 Pathways Communication Plan brief.
OSD-PA approved the PAG on 20 August, 2014, while I Corps units were deploying to Indonesia for the first Pathways exercise. The PAG contained extensive Pathways background information, statements for public release, themes and messages, an extensive set of questions and answers, and guidance to subordinate PA staffs. In accord with OSD-PA recommendations to garner positive media coverage, the public statements focused on Pathways’ reliance on planned exercises as an efficient way to train Army units, rather than using Pathways to posture Army forces in the region for “crisis response.” Nonetheless, the crisis response theme remained embedded in some of the suggested questions and answers, but the public release portions of the PAG did not emphasize it.

I Corps developed and released its own PAG on 26 August, 2014. It largely mirrored the USARPAC PAG, although it additionally provided links to Facebook sites for the individual Pathways exercises. Both PAGs emphasized to subordinate PAOs and units that all products had to be cleared through the US Embassy PAO in each country prior to release. The late publication of the USARPAC PAG prevented USARPAC and subordinate unit leaders and staffs from conducting timely communication on Pathways and contributed to the potential release of information that did not support the USARPAC communication strategy. USARPAC reserved release authority of the public statement in the PAG; it intended to initiate a fully active PA campaign with its release on 1 August, 2014, but did not release it until 29 August, 2014. Entitled “U.S. Army’s Pacific Pathways Begins,” the release offered an improved version of the public statement from the USARPAC PAG. It emphasized the least controversial aspects of Pathways.
While no reporters volunteered to embed with the Pathways unit, the media, including local Hawaii and Washington state news organizations, published a series of positive articles and videos from September through November 2014. DOD websites carried stories that closely followed, often verbatim, the USARPAC and I Corps PAGs’ themes and messages. Furthermore, the I Corps and 2/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) PAOs addressed an additional domestic audience: the soldiers participating in the exercise and their families. More than half of the 700 soldiers participating in the exercises had never been deployed before. According to the Brigade Commander, “hundreds of these kids were in high school last year.” Unit representatives and exercise planners updated Facebook and exercise websites with stories, pictures, and videos from the Pathways exercises, all of which reinforced a positive Pathways narrative.

The USARPAC Pathways communication campaign launch event occurred on 14 October, 2014. General Brooks hosted a panel discussion on the “Asia Pacific Rebalance and Pacific Pathways.” The panel included Ambassador Scott Marciel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific. He characterized Pathways as a “Great example of DOD and DOS partnership.” However, General Brooks acknowledged that “We did find that we had gotten out in front of our headlights, communication-wise.” For future Pathways, he continued “We have to be very mindful about not identifying the countries of the Pathway too quickly, not until we finish the coordination. Even though the exercises did exist, the approach is different.” In addition, General Brooks participated in the RAF panel and authored an AUSA
Greenbook chapter, “USARPAC, Rebalanced and Beyond,” in which he highlighted USARPAC contributions to the Pacific rebalance, including Pathways.\(^{89}\)

Pacific Pathways 14 concluded in November and December 2014 with the close of Exercise Orient Shield in Japan, with redeployment of 2/2 SBCT, and with completion of After Action Reviews (AARs). Of the unclassified AAR comments currently available, only two were related to communication. During the I Corps AAR, USARPAC noted “Messaging needs to be developed earlier and better synchronized...at the theater level, we need to be prepared to deal with...and get ahead of counter-narratives.”\(^{90}\) Also, the 25\(^{th}\) Infantry Division recommended “We need more assets to tell the Army story. There were a lot of missed opportunities with the numerous ceremonies through radio, television, publications, etc.”\(^{91}\)

This paper divides the assessment of the Pathways communication strategy into two major parts, the coordination phase and the communication phase. The coordination phase, when USARPAC used focused communication within the joint and interagency communities using personal communications, proceeded with no doctrinal method of assessment. Informally, USARPAC assessed the coordination phase effectiveness using the concept of “resistance.”\(^{92}\) Resistance, or the absence of resistance, attempts to measure the effectiveness of engagements; however it does not address the issue of initiating the right engagements. In the case of Pathways, USARPAC was not initiating the right engagements because the early coordination efforts did not include DOS or host nation leaders.

For the engagements that USARPAC did conduct, there was more resistance at the Action Officer (AO) level than at the General Officer (GO) level. This is not
surprising. In the words of the USARPAC Exercises Director “There was AO-level resistance to Pathways because the Marines were afraid the Army was competing with their mission, USPACOM was suspicious of the Army’s motives, the Department of the Army Staff pushed back, and I Corps exercise planners resisted changing how exercises were planned.”93 But after ADM Locklear, GEN Odierno, and other senior leaders supported the Pathways concept, resistance subsided: “Once the bosses voiced their support everyone thought it was a marvelous idea.”94

In contrast, Major General Pasquarette, the former USARPAC Chief of Staff, noted that he encountered little resistance because General Brooks talked to ADM Locklear early. For example, early in the coordination phase the MARFORPAC Deputy Commander informed General Pasquarette “The Pacific AOR (Area of Responsibility) is a big place and there is plenty of work to go around.”95 General Pasquarette also noted that when he coordinated with the DA staff on Pathways funding, he met no resistance.

During the subsequent communication phase, the PA Soldier Task “Conduct Media Content Analysis” is the standard for measuring the effectiveness of a communication strategy that uses the media. Conduct Media Content Analysis focuses on frequency, context, and tone to analyze media content. Army doctrine defines these as, frequency: “How often was the key message or theme used?”96 Context: were messages or themes “…used as background information, supported the actual intentions or conditions, or directly quoted as the main subject of a media product?”97 Most PAOs refer to the latter two types of context as “echoes” and “reflections.”98 Tone: was the media content positive, negative, or neutral?99 Neither USARPAC nor I Corps conducted formal assessments of their communication strategies.
Because contractors have been hired to conduct media assessments over the past decade plus of conflict, there have been few formal assessments. The Director of the Army Public Affairs Center, citing his own experience in Afghanistan, stated “We actually used contractors to conduct analysis because at the theater level it is quite work intensive.” The Army’s Office of the Chief of Public Affairs also employs contractors to conduct assessments of the “media space.” Because of the trend to use contractors for media analysis and the fact that PAO’s and staffs are constantly communicating, USARPAC and I Corps felt they had neither the resources nor the time to conduct formal assessments of their Pathways communication strategies.

As a formal assessment of a communication strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, the following section provides general observations on the Pathways communication strategy. After reviewing scores of articles related to Pathways, the general impression regarding frequency is that the media repeated sensational headlines and senior leader statements much more frequently than they conveyed PAG themes and messages; in fact, the media never repeated most of the PAG themes and messages. The Brookings Institution headline, “Army on the Wrong Path in the Pacific” is a good example of a repeated sensational headline. This problematic message appeared frequently in other defense and security blogs after Brookings published it.

The media repeated memorable statements by General Brooks about Pathways more frequently than it repeated official themes and messages, reinforcing the second concept of context. Frequent GO direct quotes in a positive story appear to be the most effective way to promulgate themes and messages in support of a communication strategy. While DOD websites, media outlets, and publications tended to quote themes
and messages directly from PAGs and press releases, civilian media were more interested in GO statements.

Recommendations

Based on the foregoing review and analysis, this paper offers six communication-related recommendations for future iterations of Pathways. First, perform early stakeholder coordination; second, allow for sufficient overall and communication-specific planning timelines; third, anticipate and preempt counter-arguments; fourth, plan for and resource communication assessment; fifth, focus on communicating the essential selling points to the appropriate target audiences; and, finally, coordinate integrated strategic communication instead of conducting only a communication strategy.

Early Stakeholder Coordination

Pathways planners did not identify all key senior stakeholders early in the planning process or determine when to engage them in the coordination process. Using John Kotter's Eight-Stage Change Process model from *Leading Change*, stakeholder identification and coordination are his second stage task: “create the guiding coalition.” Kotter emphasizes that

Major transformations are often associated with one highly visible individual. No one individual...is ever able to develop the right vision, communicate it to large numbers of people, eliminate all the key obstacles, generate short-term wins, lead and manage dozens of change projects, and anchor new approaches deep in an organization’s culture.¹⁰³

USARPAC only partially identified and coordinated with the required Pathways guiding coalition: USPACOM commander Admiral Keating and Army Chief of Staff General Odierno. Optimally, USARPAC should have included the appropriate senior
level stakeholders at OSD-PA and DOS to gain what Kotter describes as position power, expertise, credibility and leadership.¹⁰⁴

Creating this early guiding coalition of senior stakeholders would have facilitated subsequent coordination with additional stakeholders: the affected US embassy Country Teams, ambassadors, host nation leaders, and the OSD-P, DOS and DA staffs. For future Pathways activities, USARPAC should identify all joint and interagency stakeholders, especially those who should be part of the “guiding coalition.” Then they should brief them early, obtain their buy-in, and involve them in the entire process from concept development through execution.

Planning Timelines

USARPAC conceived, planned, and executed Pathways within one year. USARPAC could have mitigated risk by using a longer planning process, delaying the first iteration until 2015. A longer planning process would have allowed full coordination and perhaps prevented media coverage from getting ahead of the coordination process, which jeopardized the execution of the concept. However, leaders must balance deliberation with establishing a sense of urgency, the first stage task in Kotter’s Eight-Stage Change Process model.¹⁰⁵ General Brooks created a sense of urgency and even crisis among USARPAC and its stakeholders by setting a goal of executing Pathways in 2014.¹⁰⁶ Kotter further advises that “Visible crises can be enormously helpful in catching people’s attention and pushing up urgency levels,”¹⁰⁷ which happened with Pathways.

Nevertheless, future Pathways planning cycles, regardless of duration, should be more inclusive from the onset to ensure effective communication and unity of effort. Additionally and from a narrower PA perspective, USARPAC should tightly control media contacts and advise recipients of pre-decisional briefings of their confidentiality to
avoid early release of information. Bringing the entire PA staff into the process earlier would have facilitated earlier publication of the USARPAC PAG. This would have allowed USARPAC and its subordinate units to communicate Pathways proactively; it would also prevent release of information that foils the communication strategy.

**Counter-arguments**

USARPAC should anticipate counter-arguments early and include them in the Pathways narrative to prevent confusion and lessen controversy. The USARPAC staff should identify counter-arguments by wargaming the coordination and communication process from multiple perspectives and frames of reference. For example, USARPAC could have identified the Marine Corps “turf war” counter-argument by viewing Pathways from the perspective of the Marines or of the media looking for potential inter-service rivalries. Further, USARPAC could have preempted the “turf war” false narrative by communicating that Pathways units were not conducting amphibious operations, but were using sealift assets to move Army units to various training locations. Additionally, critics should be informed that DOD Instruction tasks the Army to “conduct airborne and air assault, and amphibious operations.”

**Assessments**

Neither USARPAC nor I Corps conducted assessments of the effectiveness of their communication strategies. USARPAC should require all PA staffs involved in Pathways to conduct assessments of their communication efforts and then to resource them accordingly (including its own PA staff). In accord with joint doctrine, PA assessment “…is identifying, measuring, and evaluating implications within the operational environment that the commander does not control, but can influence through a coherent, comprehensive communications strategy established by early
integration in the planning process." Assessments of communication strategy require "...monitoring, measuring and analyzing relevant information" such as media coverage and internet content. The aforementioned Media Content Analysis model provides a useful means to conduct PA assessment. If the USARPAC and subordinate PA staffs cannot internally assess the effectiveness of their Pathways communication strategies, they should contract for assessment support or request augmentation to do so.

**Target Audiences**

The various characteristics and “selling points” of Pathways confused the multiple audiences receiving the message. Was Pathways a more efficient way of executing exercises? Was it another crisis response force? Was it a budget-saving measure? Was it a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief force? As USARPAC explanations of Pathways’ missions multiplied, the more it appeared the Army was simply reaching for relevance. General Brooks encouraged the USARPAC staff to “tell the story in ‘plain speak’ and continue to sell the ‘brand’ of Pathways” during a November 2014 meeting.

Using its own “proof of principle” concept, USARPAC should have described the first iteration of Pathways in its simplest and most important terms. Once the “proof of principle” was clearly and effectively communicated, USARPAC could expand future Pathways selling points. In the words of OSD-PA, “let’s just stick with one idea.” An unclassified I Corps briefing on the Pathways concept contained perhaps the best message on Pathways: “Pacific Pathways accomplishes, more efficiently, what we are already doing, within & in support of existing policy, and with prior agreement of our allies and partners.” This effective one-sentence description, or something very
similar, should have been the key Pathways message from the beginning. General Brooks also reinforced this to the USARPAC staff:

Do not overamplify Pacific Pathways…stay on the key points of Pathways…it is an innovation to what we have been doing for years. We are conducting a routine exercise. This is a PACOM directed event that is sanctioned by the US government. Fight inaccuracy with accuracy.114

With the basic theme established, USARPAC should then address each audience with tailored themes and messages. For example, themes and messages that may resonate within the joint community, such as placing trained Army forces in theater for an extended period, may not resonate as well with Congress, for whom a budgetary savings theme may be more effective. General Brooks also stressed this to the USARPAC staff: “Tailor the message to the country teams and stakeholders. Where possible go direct to the country. Separate the exercise from the operation. Exercise discussions will go through the country teams, but the Pathways operation allows for direct discourse with the country.”115

Although Public Affairs Guidance is not a script, PAO’s should be prepared to incorporate GO “quotable statements” into a “PAG by transcript” to “repeat and promulgate those things that have resonance”116 and increase the likelihood of positive media coverage. For example, an Army Times reporter instantly tweeted General Brooks’ “We have to have more faces, in more places, without more bases” statement during the 2014 AUSA Convention. The reporter than recommended it as the “unofficial slogan for AUSA 2014.”117 The media subsequently used it in several articles.

Integration

USARPAC did not conduct early interagency coordination, which constrained USARPAC and its subordinate commands to use a communication strategy, rather than
integrating PA activities as a component of a larger strategic communication effort in support of Pathways. USARPAC should use the interagency process to coordinate future Pathways and similar concepts to allow a unified and integrated communication effort using strategic communication (interagency), public diplomacy (DOS),\textsuperscript{118} and supporting communication strategies (USARPAC and subordinate commands). Raising communication efforts to the strategic communication level would also make additional military and interagency communication assets (e.g., Combat Camera) available to support Pathways, along with the radio, television, and other outlets recommended in the I Corps AAR.\textsuperscript{119}

Conclusion

USARPAC conceived Pacific Pathways as an innovative and efficient approach to exercise deployments in the Asia-Pacific region. USARPAC developed Pathways at a time when the Army as a whole struggled to tell its story, convey its relevance, and explain its importance – issues the Army continues to struggle with today. By incorporating this paper’s communication recommendations while building on the success of Pathways 2014, USARPAC will be able to support more effectively the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific by providing innovative, efficient, and regionally-focused training to rotating forward-deployed Army and joint forces, all while maintaining or building relationships with key partners across the region. USARPAC is, in the words of Sydney Freedburg, “Reinventing the Army via ‘Pacific Pathways’”\textsuperscript{120}

Endnotes


5 Jeffrey Pool, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OSD-PA), telephone interview by author, December 5, 2014.


9 Ibid.


U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 20, 2014), II-5. “Strategic Communication: The Strategic Communication (SC) process consists of focused United States Government (USG) efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives by understanding and engaging key audiences through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. SC is a whole-of-government approach, driven by interagency processes and integration that are focused upon effectively communicating national strategy.”

The “communication team” eventually consisted of the Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA), Security Cooperation Program (SCP) Director, Information Operations (IO) Director, Exercises Director, the interim Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and their support staffs. COL (R) James Robinson, former USARPAC SCP Director, e-mail message to author, March 6, 2015.

Rumi Nielsen-Green, USARPAC PAO, telephone interview by author, November 14, 2014. “Communication Strategy is a commander’s strategy for coordinating and synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support strategic communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level through the integration and synchronization of all relevant communications activities.” U.S. Department of the Army, Inform and Influence Activities, Field Manual 3-13 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 25, 2013), 2-4.


Rumi Nielsen-Green, USARPAC PAO, telephone interview by author, November 14, 2014; and Joel Gray, Director, USARPAC Effects Directorate, telephone interview by author, November 20, 2014. FXD consolidated Information Operations (IO), Public Affairs (PA), Civil-Military Operations, Security Cooperation Program (SCP), Cyber, etc., into one Directorate.

Rumi Nielsen-Green, USARPAC PAO, e-mail message to author, December 12, 2014.

Mathew F. Bunch, e-mail message to author, November 14, 2014; and Samuel Membere, USARPAC G7 Civilian, interview by author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 13, 2014.


Lisa Carle, USARPAC Foreign Policy Advisor, telephone interview by author, December 11, 2014; and James F. Pasquarette, USARPAC Deputy Commanding General – South, telephone interview by author, December 29, 2014.

The initial planning team consisted of the Exercises and SCP Directors and their support staffs, until it was later expanded to the “communication team” (see note 18). COL (R) James Robinson, former USARPAC SCP Director, e-mail message to author, March 6, 2015.

USARPAC, “Draft Warning Order for USARPAC Exercise Pathways,” 1. Organizations identified for coordination: “DA, FORSCOM (U.S. Army Forces Command), PACOM (U.S. Pacific Command), MARFORPAC (Marine Forces Pacific), SOCPAC (Special Operations Command Pacific), MSCs (USARPAC Major Subordinate Commands) and TECs (USARPAC Theater Enabling Commands).”

Despite the fact that, in the words of the SCP Director, “GEN Brooks clearly understood that patience and interagency coordination were the main requirements, and that anything outside of the process would distract from the real work at hand.” COL (R) James Robinson, former USARPAC SCP Director, e-mail message to author, March 2, 2015.

“GEN Brooks and USARPAC had unfettered access to decision makers...for these exercises in Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan. GEN Brooks, in the course of normal engagement in Jul and Aug of 2014, built relationships with the Defense Ministers from Japan and Malaysia. Concerning Indonesia, the TNI (Indonesia National Defense Force) agreed to move a major exercise, Garuda Shield, from June to October 2014 to facilitate the aviation engagement. In short, these countries were aware of this concept and signaled their support...It was my assessment the State Department received different signals from their country contacts and that we needed time for a convergence of our perspectives to happen.” James Robinson, e-mail message to author, March 15, 2015.

Lisa Carle, USARPAC Foreign Policy Advisor, telephone interview by author, December 11, 2014.


Samuel Membere, USARPAC G7, “B4 Guidance,” e-mail message to author, November 23, 2014. Some of the most notable statements by GEN Brooks that he would repeat and that
the media would cover: “We are working to change the way Army forces are employed in the Pacific; Pacific Pathways will visibly display the adaptive nature of the Army;” and, “We can no longer afford to build C-1 units and then put them on a shelf to be used only in the event of war.”

35 In the words of the former SCP Director, “We began staffing the Pacific Pathways draft concept as soon as we had something to offer (23 November 2013). There were known risks in moving before the concept and supporting requirements were fully developed but we knew the earlier discussion on Pathways began, the higher probability of success.” COL (R) James Robinson, e-mail message to author, March 15, 2015.

36 The FPA reported to USARPAC in September 2013. Lisa Carle, e-mail message to author, March 9, 2015.

37 Ibid.

38 Jeffrey Pool, telephone interview by author.

39 Rumi Nielsen-Green, e-mail message to author, December 12, 2014.

40 Ibid.


42 Matthew Kelley, former USARPAC G7, e-mail message to author, March 10, 2015.

43 Rumi Nielsen-Green, e-mail message to author, December 12, 2014.

44 Ibid.


46 In the words of the SCP Director, “This task took more than email. We worked the phones, leveraged senior leader engagement and held multiple meetings.” COL (R) James Robinson, former USARPAC SCP Director, e-mail message to author, January 7, 2015; and James Robinson, e-mail message to author, March 6, 2015.

47 Samuel Membrere, interview by author.

48 Rumi Nielsen-Green, e-mail message to author, December 12, 2014.


50 Ibid.

Interview with confidential source, December 9, 2014.

Rumi Nielsen-Green, e-mail message to author, December 12, 2014, and Rumi Nielsen-Green, e-mail message to author, November 20, 2014.


Ibid.

Rumi Nielsen-Green, e-mail message to author, November 20, 2014.


Aaron Marx, “The Wrong Path in the Pacific.”

Ibid.

James F. Pasquarette, telephone interview by author.


Ibid.


James F. Pasquarette, telephone interview by author.

Jeffrey Pool, telephone interview with author.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Brooks also believed that “Airing out differences in the press would exacerbate institutional barriers to communications,” and that “It was critical that those with equities had their say and that it was incumbent upon USARPAC to listen and fully consider their
perspectives and concerns.” James Robinson, e-mail message to author, November 26, 2014; and James Robinson, e-mail message to author, March 2, 2015.

70 Rumi Nielsen-Green, e-mail message to author, February 23, 2015.


74 Ibid., slide 2 speaker notes.

75 Ibid., slide 2.

76 Ibid., slide 3.

77 Ibid., slide 6.

78 Ibid., slide 7.

79 Ibid., slide 2.

80 Jeffrey Pool, e-mail message to author.


86 Vincent Brooks, “Pacific Pathways,” public panel presentation, AUSA Convention, Washington, DC, October 14, 2014,

87 Ambassador Scott Marciel, “Pacific Pathways,” public panel presentation, AUSA Convention, Washington, DC, October 14, 2014


92 Rumi Nielsen-Green, telephone interview by author, November 20, 2014.

93 Matthew Kelley, former USARPAC G7, e-mail message to author, January 7, 2015.

94 Ibid.

95 James F. Pasquarette, telephone interview by author.


97 Ibid., 3-118.


100 Richard McNorton, Director Army Public Affairs Center, telephone interview by author, 10 December 2014.

101 Alayne Conway, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, e-mail message to author, February 24, 2015.

102 David Johnson, I Corps PAO, telephone interview by author, November 17, 2014.


104 Ibid., 57.

105 Ibid., 35-6.
“B4 (GEN Brooks) knew that if he allowed Pathways to run the normal gauntlet of interagency staffing and DOD budget processes it would never see the light of day. It is a fair criticism to say that there were mistakes, missteps and miscalculations but the bottom line is that when you do something as ‘radical’ as Pathways was at the time, you are going to break some China.” Matthew Kelley, former USARPAC G7, e-mail message to author, March 9, 2015.


Ibid., III-29.


Jeffrey Pool, OSD-PA, telephone interview by author.


Ibid.

Rumi Nielsen-Green, e-mail message to author, February 23, 2015.


Public Diplomacy: “Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.”

25th Infantry Division, “Executive Summary, Pacific Pathways 14 I Corps AAR,” 5.