Army Senior Leader Diversity: A Systems Analysis

by

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Army Senior Leader Diversity: A Systems Analysis

It has been 67 years since President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981 to integrate the United States Armed Forces “without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.” However, African-American officers today remain underrepresented in the Army’s senior ranks compared to their ethnic proportion of the American population. The Army’s leaders have acknowledged this long-standing problem, and they have made significant efforts to increase diversity throughout the officer corps. However, significant diversity deficiencies persist at the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel, reducing the pool of African-Americans competing to attain the general officer ranks.

Extensive research on the factors contributing to suppressed general officer diversity coalesces around four causes: disparities in education between white and black officer recruits, inadequate mentoring of and networking for black officers, and both conscious and unconscious racial bias among white senior Army officers. Researchers have made a strong evidentiary case for these conclusions. Thus, Army mitigation strategies have developed accordingly. Yet, the dearth of black senior officers persists, suggesting an insufficient appreciation of this complex problem.

This paper applies systems thinking to the problem of achieving sufficient African-American diversity among the Army’s senior officers. As background, the paper will make the case for racial diversity in the Army’s senior ranks and provide a synopsis of systems thinking and terminology. Next, it will examine officer demographics to identify specific African-American diversity suppression trends. Finally, taking these trends as a system outcome, the paper will identify the contributory system components and interactions and suggest ways to mitigate their effects.
This thesis argues that previous research on diversity suppression in the Army’s senior officer ranks has been less than comprehensive – focused mainly on institutional factors with little regard for the contributing individual and socio-cultural factors and resulting in less effective mitigation strategies. Collectively, these institutional, individual, and sociological factors comprise an inadvertent “diversity suppression system” manifest in three stages:

1. Black Army officer representation, at and above lieutenant colonel, is chronically less than blacks’ representation in the Army’s enlisted ranks and in the general American population.

2. The fact of African-Americans’ underrepresentation in senior Army leadership is perceived by mid-level African-American officers as evidence of institutional exclusion, making retention beyond lieutenant colonel less attractive than civilian career options.

3. Accordingly, mid-level black officers voluntarily leave the Army, further reducing the diversity of the senior leader candidate pool and exacerbating African-American misperceptions that promotion to those higher ranks is racially exclusive.

This more holistic understanding of diversity suppression will produce mitigation strategies with real potential to make the Army’s senior leaders more representative of the soldiers they lead and the public they serve.

The Importance of Senior-level Diversity

The American people, currently serving soldiers, potential enlisted and officer recruits, and today’s national security environment all demand and deserve an Army as diverse as the country it serves. When President Truman issued Executive Order 9981
on July 26, 1948, integration became a provision of the contract between the people of the United States (the principal) and the military profession (the agent) wherein the people provide their sons and daughters to Army leaders who, in return, mold them into young soldiers and lead them to ensure the security of those fathers and mothers and the nation as a whole. Integration is, thus, a social imperative. The Army (and its sister military services) must be ethnically representative of the American people. It provides a visible sign, to the United States and to the world, that the American military is committed to the principles of individual freedom and equal opportunity.

As with any principal-agent relationship, the terms of this contract are revisited periodically, and where the military is found to be deficient, the American people may impose additional oversight controls, typically through Congress. Recent policy decisions by the Secretary of Defense regarding homosexuals serving in the military and women filling combat positions are examples of the American public’s continuing efforts to maintain a volunteer military that reflects its values and important aspects of its composition. Ultimately, the American people can withdraw their trust from the military if they believe the profession no longer represents their interests. The paucity of black officers in Army senior leadership is, therefore, a matter of serious concern for the stewards of the Army profession.

In addition to the client-imposed requirement to integrate the Army at all levels, the current and future national security operating environments demand a high level of cognitive diversity, which is more likely attained by ethnically diverse military leaders and staffs. While it is important to note that race and other forms of identity diversity do not directly correlate to cognitive diversity, a growing body of research indicates that an
ethnic- or gender-diverse group is more likely to produce a wider range of perspectives, interpretations, heuristics, and predictive models than an ethnic- or gender-homogenous group. This cultural and experiential diversity contributes to enhanced group creativity, analytical acumen, and judgment – essential tools for addressing the challenges of today’s complex national security environment.

If the American people and the strategic environment comprise two strong external arguments for the importance of Army senior leader diversity, then the intramural arguments are equally compelling. African-Americans comprise fully 18 percent of the Army’s enlisted ranks – six percent higher than their proportion in the civilian population. This means that an inordinately large African-American enlisted rank and file continues to be led by an officer cadre that is disproportionally white.

This fact belies the Army’s professed commitment to equal opportunity for all soldiers, creating a credibility gap that can strain the trust relationship between these soldiers and their leaders. That trust between leaders and soldiers is, according to the Army’s Chief of Staff, “the bedrock of our profession.” Therefore, the Army must exemplify diversity through the highest levels of its leadership, or risk its reputation as one of the nation’s most meritocratic institutions, with concomitant effects on soldier morale and retention.

Finally, this credibility gap also affects potential officer recruits, exacerbating the challenge of creating a more diverse officer corps. Whether it is the curious college student, the eager cadet in the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps (ROTC), or the second-year cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point (USMA), they all expect the Army – perhaps more than any other American institution – to be in
compliance with the long-standing mandate to be entirely racially integrated. The lack of diversity at the Army’s highest and most visible echelons is, therefore, inimical to its efforts to access the best candidates from an ever-shrinking pool of eligible recruits. Indeed, the nearly all-white visage of Army leadership implies that its commitment to equal opportunity is aspirational, rather than achieved, and thus not a level playing field for minority applicants. As retired (African-American) General Johnnie Wilson put it, “It’s hard to tell young people the sky’s the limit when they look up and don’t see anyone [who looks like them].”

It is, therefore, clear from external and internal perspectives that the Army must continue its efforts to improve the diversity of its senior ranks. To ignore the problem is to commit a breach of contract with the American people, diminish the Army’s cognitive advantage in a challenging operational environment, break faith with its soldiers and discourage potential recruits. Given the Army’s failure, thus far, to adequately address senior officer diversity, systems thinking provides another approach.

Synopsis of Systems Thinking

*Systems thinking* is a cognitive framework that helps to explain complex phenomena (or outcomes) by considering the contributory components and the interactions between them. The “system” may be defined as the bounded interaction of components producing a particular outcome. Systems which involve or principally affect people are called *social systems*, and when individual persons act as system components, they may be referred to as “actors.” Typical social system components may include individuals, social groups or classes, or government institutions. The
actors and other social system components typically interact within the bounds of personal, social or institutional principles or policies.\textsuperscript{12}

Social systems are predominantly characterized by complexity, interactivity, openness, and equilibrium. Complexity is manifest in the system’s potential to produce outcomes that affect the actors within that system. Additionally, each actor simultaneously operates in, and is affected by, multiple systems. For these reasons, many social outcomes are inadvertent, and one cannot ascribe design or intent to a social system prior to observation and analysis. Interactivity describes the interrelations of actors and other components within a system as generally cooperative or competitive. Cooperative interactions tend to produce predictable outcomes while competitive interactions have lower predictability. Finally, social systems are said to be open, meaning they react to information and motivation from elements outside of the system under observation. These external stimuli can affect the actors or the interactions within the system, thereby influencing system outcomes.\textsuperscript{13}

System equilibrium is the state in which all system components have attained, through interaction with other components and the environment, sufficient energy to maintain their position in the system. In social systems, this “energy” is normally either achievement or approbation. System components achieving less than the requisite energy are motivated to conduct additional competitive interactions to resolve the achievement or approbation deficit. Components receiving excess achievement or approbation tend to interact cooperatively with other system components to raise the system’s aggregate energy level.\textsuperscript{14}
With this brief background in systems thinking, this study will proceed to identify and analyze diversity suppression outcomes, actors and interactions. The focal system of this analysis is diversity suppression. The actors are African-American and Caucasian Army officers and the Army’s officer management policies.

The Demographics

How widespread is the diversity deficit within the Army's officer corps? The most recent demography on African-American officers in the Army conveys good news and bad news. In 1994, African-Americans represented 11.2 percent of the Army officer corps. That proportion has now increased to 13.5 percent, slightly exceeding the 13.2 percent proportion of African-Americans in the general population. This diversity percentage is more than double that of the Marine Corps and the Air Force and nearly two-thirds greater than the Navy’s numbers.

This is certainly an encouraging development for the Army – a return on the institution’s 20-year investment in diversity management. It should be noted, however, that transitory factors may account for some of the two-percent improvement, such as the Army’s increased popularity due to the 2007-2011 recession and the military’s recruiting surges in support of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over the same period. Despite this laudable aggregate improvement, officer diversity by rank reveals a less rosy picture.

Table 1 reports the percentage of white and black Army officers, by rank, for the years 1994, 2007 and 2014. The table also shows the percentage changes (deltas); for example, in 2007, 74 percent of all majors were Caucasian, and 12.6 percent of all majors were black. This demography indicates a 0.4 percent decline (shown as
underlined and floating) in black majors compared to black captains in the same year.

Figure 1 graphically depicts these black officer deltas, highlighting the recurrent declines among lieutenant colonels and colonels.

As Table 1 shows, African-American second lieutenants represent only 8.8 percent of all Army second lieutenants – far less than their 13.2 percent portion of the general population.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, black officers are least represented at this most critical career point: entry into service. Moving up the ranks in the table from second lieutenant to major, African-American representation increases from 8.8 percent to 15.4 percent of the same-rank population. However, this substantial spike – the largest contribution to the Army’s impressive aggregate diversity level – is primarily due to decreases in white officer representation at these ranks, not from additional African-Americans entering the officer corps; the Army officer corps is a closed personnel system, rarely accessing new officers above the rank of second lieutenant.\textsuperscript{20} The ranks of greatest concern, from a diversity perspective, are lieutenant colonel and colonel.

Lieutenant colonel is the rank at which most officers attain 20 years of service and retirement eligibility. Accordingly, this is the point at which most will decide either to continue serving – and thus compete for promotion to colonel – or to retire from military service. Of course, colonels comprise the pool from which brigadier generals are chosen. As Figure 1 indicates, these two ranks – lieutenant colonel and colonel – are points of substantial decline in black officer representation.

As these demographics show, African-American officers are leaving the Army at approximately 20 years of service, thus removing themselves from the pool of potential general officers. This pattern is persistent and resistant to gains in aggregate diversity.
Thus, the pathology of diversity suppression is revealed. It begins with an African-American officer recruit intake that is significantly lower than white recruits from the general population, and it ends with a smaller cohort of black officers competing for the Army’s highest ranks. This pathology begs the question: What factors along the officer career path combine to produce this undesirable outcome? The Army personnel life cycle provides a framework for identifying these factors.

Table 1. Army Officer Demographics by Rank and Race

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<td></td>
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<td>Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Officer</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>3,460</td>
<td>3,661</td>
<td>3,476</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>7,951</td>
<td>7,668</td>
<td>7,383</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>-4.2%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>11,713</td>
<td>11,627</td>
<td>11,951</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>1,984</td>
<td>2,489</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>21,111</td>
<td>19,009</td>
<td>20,449</td>
<td>3,258</td>
<td>3,553</td>
<td>3,762</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>7,027</td>
<td>5,713</td>
<td>9,390</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>7,453</td>
<td>7,196</td>
<td>6,237</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
</tr>
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Figure 1. Black Officer Promotion Deltas (from Table 1)
A Framework to Categorize Barriers to Diversity: The Army Personnel Life Cycle

The Army uses a five-staged personnel life cycle to describe the processes that shape an officer’s career. The 2011 final report issued by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) characterizes the stages as Eligibility, Outreach and Recruiting, Branching and Assignments, Promotion, and Retention. At each of the four stages preceding Retention, both structural and perceptual barriers can suppress diversity, cumulatively resulting in the Army’s failure to retain black officers to serve as senior leaders, which is precisely the demographic pathology at issue. RAND researchers Dr. Sheila Kirby, Dr. Margaret Harrell and Dr. Jennifer Sloan, writing in *Armed Forces and Society*, define structural barriers as institutional “prerequisites or requirements that exclude minorities to a relatively greater extent than to non-Hispanic whites.” They characterize perceptual barriers as individual “perceptions, attitudes or beliefs that lead minorities to think that they cannot or should not pursue…a job or career option.” These barriers, where found within the Army personnel life cycle, will constitute system components interacting to suppress African-American officer diversity. An examination of the barriers and mitigation strategies within each stage follows.

Stage 1: Eligibility

The Army identifies potential recruits from among the general population during the Eligibility stage of the personnel life cycle. The criteria for officer eligibility are age, citizenship, education, height and weight, medical fitness, moral character and completion of a commissioning program.
Barriers

Within the eligibility stage, education emerges prominently as the foremost structural barrier, disproportionately affecting African-American eligibility for commissioned service. For the 18-24 years age group, African-Americans represent 20 percent of the general population. However, African-Americans possessing a bachelor’s degree represent only eight percent compared to whites in this age group.  

The single perceptual barrier within the eligibility stage is knowledge of and aspiration for military service. Kirby et al. address this barrier in their research on why minorities don’t join special operations forces (SOF), research which they believe has application to the officer corps, other military subsets and civilian organizations that deal with the issue of minority representation. According to their research, “…minority discussants tend to have less knowledge of SOF than do their majority peers.” Furthermore, the majority discussants were far more likely than minority subjects to have a SOF member visit their high school or community and a higher probability that they “idealized” SOF when they were children.

Mitigation

Since a bachelor-level education is necessary to receive an officer’s commission, strategies to mitigate this structural barrier must focus on increasing the number of African-Americans who attain bachelor’s degrees. The Army’s ROTC and West Point scholarships are examples of well-established programs that address this structural barrier by incentivizing both education and military service. Additionally, the Army’s Junior Reserve Officers Training (JROTC) program provides military orientation and education to 314,000 cadets in over 1,700 high schools nationwide. But clearly more
needs to be done. Of course, mitigating this structural impediment is not the sole responsibility of the Army or the Department of Defense.

Increasing African-American educational attainment must be a national priority addressed by a coalition comprising students, families, local communities and governments, the Department of Education, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Congress, and the Office of the President of the United States. Progress in this area involves engaging very early at the student, family and local government levels to encourage and enable minority child access to and successful completion of pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, primary and secondary education levels. More importantly, the black community must reverse its cultural adhesion to anti-intellectualism by responding to educational achievement with family and community approbation, instead of apathy or derision.

Dr. John H. McWhorter, a linguistics professor and political commentator, describes anti-intellectualism as one of three collective post-emancipation pathologies of black self-image (the other two are victimism and separatism). Of anti-intellectualism, McWhorter writes,

The belief that blacks and school don’t go together has its roots in slavery’s refusal to let blacks be educated. But it gained strength in the mid-1960s, when black separatism rejected traits associated with whites as alien, and black students, in this spirit, began teasing their fellows who strove to excel in school as “acting white,” a much harsher taunt than merely dismissing them as nerds.  

McWhorter, herein, describes one element of a community-based value system with strong influence on black children. Having internalized these values, the children become engaged in a confrontation on two fronts: an internal cultural identity struggle
and an external battle to succeed academically despite myriad educational disadvantages.

Mitigating the “knowledge and aspiration” perceptual barrier is a matter of engaging African-American youth, early in their lives, with accurate information about what it means and what it is like to be an Army officer. Targeted television and online advertising, and visits by black Army officers to elementary and middle schools and to community events will help to incline minority youth toward selfless service in general and military service in particular. It will also encourage curiosity regarding the profession of arms, which will lead minority children to active inquiry and research on military officership.

For the Army, the importance of achieving satisfactory diversity within the pool of eligible officer candidates cannot be overstated. The perceptual findings of this stage, taken in combination with the structural education barrier, paint a clearer picture of why African-American Army officer accession is chronically and substantially lower than black enlisted accession and the proportion of African-Americans in the general population.

Stage 2: Outreach and Recruiting

This critical stage begins with a pool of eligible officer recruits ends with induction (known as *accession* in the military) of the Army’s newest officers. The military operates on a closed personnel system in which very few officers are accessed above the rank of second lieutenant. Therefore, the demographic diversity of accessions directly influences the potential demographic diversity of future senior leaders.31
Barriers

A potential structural barrier at this stage is the neglect of two-year colleges and vocational schools by Army outreach and recruiting programs. Since cadets must have a bachelor’s degree to be eligible for accession, recruiters regard institutions awarding associate degrees as secondary in their outreach strategies. Unfortunately, such neglect potentially excludes many African-American candidates who are otherwise qualified and, with sufficient information, encouragement and financial assistance, might pursue a four-year degree and an ROTC commission. According to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission’s 2011 report, more than 60 percent of black, non-Hispanic college students attended a two-year university, and approximately eight percent of these students will transfer to a four-year institution. This eight-percent cohort represents an untapped market for potential African-American ROTC recruits.

The perceptual barrier at this stage is the black student’s consideration of military officership as a viable career option. Contrast this perceptual challenge with that of the eligibility stage wherein knowledge of and aspiration to military service was passive. In this stage, the question is whether or not eligible African-Americans are actively seeking information about a career as an Army officer. Here, Kirby, et al. found that “significant others” – family members, teachers, coaches, pastors – have substantial influence on the career decisions of young people. In black communities, these trusted advisors are more likely to have military experience as an enlisted soldier or only indirect knowledge of the military through a friend or family member – neither of which is conducive to advice about becoming an Army officer.
In either case, the perspective of these community elders is likely also affected, to some degree, by the black consensus opinion of the Vietnam War. Scott Gartner and Gary Segura call this type of consensus opinion *modified sociotropism*. They define it as a sociological phenomenon in which “individuals are affected by societal experience with an issue, but their perceptions of that experience are shaped by available proximate information … [taken] with differential confidence [(bias)].”\(^{34}\)

The black community consensus opinion on the Vietnam War is overwhelmingly negative in its assessment of the African-American soldier’s experience. This assessment is hewn from the context of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and supported by salient (if selective) statistics. For example, African-Americans represented 11.1 percent of the U.S. population but accounted for 12.4 percent of the U.S. casualties in Vietnam. Compare this with 9 percent African-American casualties during the Korean War when blacks made up 10 percent of the U.S. population.\(^{35}\)

The black consensus opinion of the Vietnam War shaped the perspectives of many young African-Americans who are now the elders and the trusted advisors in many black communities. Although general public opinion of the military has since turned substantially in favor of the profession of arms, a significant remnant of this consensus opinion remains, portending that when young minorities reach out to their community elders, they may find themselves being discouraged from pursuing a career as an Army officer.

In fact, referring to special operations forces, the data from Kirby et al.’s study suggested that “these role models may actively discourage minority youth from considering a SOF career, either by actively selling their own military career choice, or
by speaking negatively of SOF. Here, the outlines of a vicious cycle begin to appear. There are relatively few African-American career officers and retirees to advise minority officer prospects, and community mentors often provide an inaccurate if not jaded picture of the Army, which may discourage young minorities from joining the officer ranks.

Mitigation

To mitigate structural barriers in this stage of the personnel life cycle, Army Recruiting Command should incorporate two-year colleges into their outreach strategy, specifically encouraging minority students to pursue a four-year degree and an ROTC commission. Further, Army Cadet Command should, as the MLDC report suggests, expand JROTC and ROTC to better align with untapped minority markets. Correcting misperceptions of Army officerhood requires that successful African-American officers engage with the youth and the leaders in black communities. Based on the author’s personal experience, this already happens informally, if inconsistently.

A deliberate and sustained outreach effort would dispel outdated community perceptions and replace inaccurate information with the truth about pursuing a career as an Army officer. Of course, the natural remedy to negative community opinions about the Army is more successful officers from that particular community. This is consistent with the modified sociotropic principle that the closer such success is to the community, the more it will influence community members and succeeding generations.

Stage 3: Career Branch and Assignments

Branching is the process of placing an officer into one of the Army’s branches or functional areas. This occurs at accession and again between the fourth and seventh
years of service. The branches and functional areas are categorized as Operations, Operations Support and Force Sustainment as shown in Table 2. Branching is largely based on the needs of the Army, the cadet’s preference, and his or her position on the commissioning source’s order of merit list.

Branches and functional areas under the Operations category were formerly called “combat arms” while those in the other two columns were grouped together informally as “non-combat arms.” These familiar designations do not address an officer’s potential to be engaged by the enemy; “combat arms” simply alludes to the primary mission of those career fields which engage the enemy by fire and maneuver. However, these labels will be useful for analyzing the barriers associated with this personnel life cycle stage.

Branches and functional areas determine the number and type of assignments (job opportunities) available to an officer. Assignments fall into two broad categories -- command and staff. Selection to and successful completion of command and select staff assignments are considered key in determining an officer’s potential for promotion. Thus, branching and assignments fuel an officer’s ascent to the Army’s senior ranks. Given the central role that this career stage plays in growing Army senior leaders, it is prudent to examine the process for race-based demographic patterns.
Race Correlations to Officer Branch

A December 2008 statistical snapshot from the Defense Manpower Data Center indicated that 65 percent of one-star brigadier generals and rear admirals were from combat arms career fields.\textsuperscript{38} Meanwhile, a separate RAND report published in 2009 indicated that white cadets branched into combat arms career fields at 62 percent compared to 42 percent of black cadets.\textsuperscript{39}

Two relevant correlations emerge from these statistics. First, the majority of the Army’s general officers are selected from the combat arms branches, and second, black
officers appear disinclined to pursue combat arms career fields. While the former correlation should not be blindly accepted as traditional, and therefore, appropriate, the latter correlation begs the question: “What is the cause of black officers’ aversion to combat arms career fields?”

Structural Barriers

One structural explanation for the disparate distribution of black officers across the Army’s combat and non-combat arms branches is that many black officers score too low on their ROTC Professor of Military Science (PMS) order of merit list to get their branch of choice. Major Emmett Burke made this argument in his 2002 monograph, “Black Officer Under-representation in Combat Arms Branches.” Burke focused on Army ROTC – by far the Army’s most lucrative officer accession source. He compared the performance of cadets attending historically black colleges and universities (HBCU) with that of their counterparts at non-HBCUs in the key components contributing to order of merit list ranking: on-campus ROTC performance in leadership and military skills, academic performance, and the centralized Leadership Development and Assessment Course (LDAC).

Emmett concluded, empirically, that

- Based on active duty accessions board results, “…a higher PMS score is probably necessary for a cadet to be accessed into a combat arms branch.”
- “White cadets achieved higher GPA scores than HBCU cadets in all branch groups.”
- On the field assessment of military proficiency, an important element of the LDAC evaluation, HBCU cadets did not perform as well as their non-HBCU peers.
in basic rifle marksmanship, land navigation, and the Army Physical Fitness Test.\textsuperscript{44}

These factors negatively impacted HBCU cadets’ placement on the PMS order of merit list compared to non-HBCU cadets, thus structurally impacting their branching prospects.

A second structural impediment is codified in the Military Leadership Diversity Commission’s 2011 report:

The structural barrier related to tactical/operational career fields and key assignments for racial/ethnic minority officers is created by the interaction of two patterns related to accession source. First, non-white officers are less likely than white officers to commission via the Service academies. Second, the Army and the Air Force allocate a larger portion of tactical/operational slots to their Service academies compared with other officer commissioning sources. Therefore, in these Services, commissioning via a Service academy provides an advantage in terms of securing assignment to a tactical/operational career field.\textsuperscript{45}

These two structural career field barriers are de facto assignment barriers. Specifically, “…the lower representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women in tactical/operational career fields means that those servicemembers have fewer opportunities for command.”\textsuperscript{46} In turn, fewer opportunities for command decreases minority potential for advancement to the Army’s senior ranks.

Perceptual Barriers

Chief among the explanations for the disparate proportion of black officers in non-combat arms career fields is that black officers choose branches that provide skills and experience they deem to be directly transferrable to civilian occupations. Implied in this explanation is that black officers do not perceive the Army as a career in itself, but rather as a bridge to a civilian career. Colonel Irving Smith, Director of Sociology at
West Point, agrees. “African Americans have historically used the armed forces as a means of social mobility... a bridging opportunity [to civilian careers].”\textsuperscript{47} Major Ronald Clark, in his monograph titled, “The Lack of Ethnic Diversity in the Infantry: Why Are There So Few Black Infantry Officers in the Army,” cited quantitative findings of a 1999 Army Research Institute “Sample Survey of Military Personnel” that identified civilian sector marketability as the most significant reason many black officers access into branches other than the infantry.\textsuperscript{48}

A second explanation is that black officers have few combat arms role models, reinforcing the notion that combat arms branches are informally exclusive of black officers. On this point, Clark found that “The shortage of black infantry role models is a significant barrier to branch selection, [contributing] to a lack of knowledge about opportunities in the branch.”\textsuperscript{49} Kirby et al.’s study of special operations forces (SOF) states,

\begin{quote}
SOF units have historically been disproportionately white; thus, few minority families and neighborhoods have an SOF tradition. As a result, there are fewer personal role models for young minorities who might become interested in SOF.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

The negative impact of this misperception is recursive. Burke’s monograph cited existing marketing studies and focus groups indicating that “Black [ROTC] cadets were less likely to consider the Army fair and had a negative perception of combat arms branches. These personal attitudes toward service have had a negative influence on [black cadet] performance.”\textsuperscript{51} Kirby et al. lend discussant-based support to the attitudinal aspect of this perceptual impediment. Based on interviews with African-Americans, the researchers found that,
In contrast to both the Navy and the Air Force SOF communities, the Army Green Berets and Rangers are widely perceived to be white organizations with racist attitudes. According to our discussants...this perception is heightened by the southeastern location of many of the Army SOF training facilities and units; discussants mentioned KKK [Ku Klux Klan] signs on the local highways and the racist attitudes of the locals. In addition, many discussants mentioned “the Fort Bragg incidents,” which were incorrectly attributed to Army SOF soldiers.52

Here, emerges another socio-pathology: separatism. Separatism was introduced as contemporary African-American social praxis during the civil rights movement in the late 1960's by militant activist groups like the Black Panthers. Paul Trout summarizes John McWhorter on the manifestations of separatism,

Under the “Cult of Separatism,” expressions of mainstream culture are contumuously rejected as “white”... [S]eparatism [also] encourages blacks to regard themselves as somehow exempt from “general standards of evaluation.” In education, blacks demand lower admission standards and all kinds of "special" exemptions and set-asides as a sort of birth right. But lower standards, McWhorter points out, sabotage black kids by seducing them to lower their own expectations and efforts.53

Mitigation

The order of merit list is an institutional requirement that disproportionately affects black ROTC cadets compared to their non-Hispanic white counterparts. This is consistent with the definition of a structural impediment. However, in this case, institutional mitigation is unwarranted. The OML’s effects on branching and assignments – positive or negative – are largely under the control of the individual cadet; competition determines the outcome. Therefore, ameliorating the order of merit list as a structural impediment requires that aspiring black cadets improve their academic grade point averages, military proficiency scores and PMS assessments. This may not be easy, but is just that simple. The commissioning institution can assist in this effort by briefing all cadets, early and often, on the components and the
importance of the Professor of Military Science’s OML in securing an active duty position in their desired career field.

The second structural impediment, allowing combat arms branches to allocate more of their slots to West Point instead of ROTC, is also easily mitigated. The Army Human Resources Command should craft diversity-aware accession policies that manage and monitor the number of slots apportioned to each commissioning source, so that the Army receives qualified officers at the best diversity intake possible. Meanwhile, congressional, vice presidential and presidential appointments to USMA should also be subject to diversity appraisal and accountability, as the MLDC recommends.54

The fact that African-American officers choose non-combat arms over combat arms career fields is not, in itself, a perceptual barrier. It is a choice not to be infringed upon. However, the Army should try to attract more black officers into combat arms career fields by highlighting the more plentiful leadership and staff opportunities and the technical skillsets (like rotary-wing aviation, cyber and civil engineering) that are directly transferrable to civilian sector careers. Additionally, the Army should craft policy mandating that all commissioning institutions provide comprehensive written information, briefings and one-on-one counseling covering all Army career fields as part of cadet professional development. This training should also point out the historical tendencies of each career field to produce general officers.

Finally, with due deference to the many researchers who have identified the shortage of same-race role models as a significant barrier to black officers entering combat arms branches, this problem, in the opinion of the author, is unworthy of the
prominence it has received. Furthermore, the argument that the dearth of black combat arms officers confirms that these career fields are informally exclusive is fatuous, given today’s equal opportunity protections and the number of enlisted soldiers thriving in combat arms occupations. The lack of role models is not an unfamiliar challenge in African-American society. Indeed, overcoming barriers, of all kinds, to gain access to careers never before held by blacks is a central theme of post-emancipation African-American history.

African Americans have a prolific legacy of stalwart African-American trail-blazers who made deep and permanent inroads into every facet of entertainment, sports, medicine, law and other career fields, including the military – without role models. This perceptual barrier is insoluble via any institutional approach. The lack of African-American role models must be overcome by African-American officers themselves, who personally aspire, with determination, to become those combat arms officer role models.

Stage 4: Promotion

As with any civilian occupation, promotion is the ultimate institutional validation of a soldier’s performance and potential. However, unlike other occupations, failure to make a promotion cut can render an officer vulnerable for dismissal from service under the Army’s Quality Management or Selective Early Retirement Programs. Promotion, therefore, is a chief indicator of an officer’s prospects for professional success and probably the most accurate predictor of Retention (the fifth and final stage), particularly as officers approach their 20-year career mark.

Unfortunately, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission found that promotion rates for black officers were substantially lower than white officers at the ranks of major
through colonel across all the services, based on data from fiscal years 2007-2009.\textsuperscript{55}

For the Army, black officer promotion rates fell short of the overall average by four percentage points for majors and seven percentage points for lieutenant colonels.\textsuperscript{56}

This problem is persistent. In his 1999 article “Why Black Officers Fail,” Remo Butler cited similar data from officer year groups 1973 and 1974.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{Impediments}

To understand the reasons behind these race-based promotion disparities, the MLDC reviewed the selection board process, officer assignment histories, and performance evaluations for evidence of institutional or individual bias. The MLDC found that the multimember promotion selection boards were designed to ensure that each candidate is considered based on the best-and-fully qualified criterion, without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin in accordance with law. Indeed, Army policy requires the board members themselves to be diverse. This requirement is based on the notion that an ethnically diverse board will more fairly evaluate a diverse promotion candidate pool.\textsuperscript{58}

Regarding assignment histories and performance evaluations, the MLDC was unable to determine if assignments for black officers took them off the due-course path of their career field, making them less competitive for promotion (in contrast to the findings of a 2001 RAND study).\textsuperscript{59} The MLDC’s failure to make definitive findings in this area was likely because they chose to review survey data suggesting the extent to which majority and minority service members \textit{believed} racial bias was a factor in minority officer assignments and performance evaluations.\textsuperscript{60} This flawed approach had no hope of answering the Commission’s question. It would have been better to screen
for and compare the number of key assignments in the service records of majority versus minority officers in the same career fields and promotion year groups.

Given the fact of long-standing, unexplained, race-based officer promotion discrepancies, it is no wonder that a 2009 “Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active-Duty Members” indicated that minority service members were more likely than white service members to believe that racial bias was a factor in their performance evaluations and assignments.61 This perception exemplifies modified sociotropism wherein a single, unexplained fact seems, from the perspective of a social group, to substantiate consensus opinion, regardless of the validity of that opinion, per se. In this case, unexplained promotion disparities between races tend to substantiate African-American consensus opinion that the Army officer corps is racially exclusive. Indeed, if promotion is a chief measure of one’s prospects for professional success, many black officers perceive a clear signal from this unexplained institutional detractor: above the rank of major, blacks are not competing on a level playing field.

Mitigation

It is disappointing that the MLDC did not more aggressively pursue the potential for bias in officer assignments and performance evaluations. This congressionally appointed commission had the appropriate mandate and authorities to provide much needed clarity on this very important institutional blind spot. Unfortunately, their final report, endorsed by Congress, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, managed only to identify racial bias as a possible explanation for the enduring promotion discrepancies between majority and minority officers. Therefore, mitigating both structural and perceptual promotion impediments must begin with a
thorough investigation that yields evidence-based conclusions on this issue. Since the promotion disparities exist across all the services, perhaps yet another congressional commission should be chartered to get it right.

Conclusion

To review, structural barriers are institutional "prerequisites or requirements that exclude minorities to a relatively greater extent than to non-Hispanic whites."62 Perceptual barriers are individual "perceptions, attitudes or beliefs that lead minorities to think that they cannot or should not pursue…a job or career option."63 This paper has identified structural and perceptual barriers at each of the four stages of the Army personnel life cycle that precede the Retention stage. This analysis also shows that these barriers are interacting cumulatively. Sociological phenomena are also in operation, taking unproven or unexplained institutional factors as validation for a black community consensus opinion that pursuing a career as an Army officer holds less potential for success than a civilian sector career. Collectively, these institutional, perceptual and sociological factors (summarized in Table 3, below) comprise an inadvertent system of diversity suppression that produces an Army senior leader class that is significantly and persistently less diverse than the general public and the soldiers they lead.

Previous analyses and mitigation strategies only addressed parts of this diversity suppression system, with only superficial or temporary effects. This analysis shows that the Army must undertake in a sustained, coordinated campaign of information and engagement to break the cycles of institutional bias, individual misperceptions and community disinformation that sustain the diversity suppression system. The mitigation
tactics suggested in this paper (and called out in Table 3) – improvements in minority education, diversity-aware outreach and recruiting, Army officer engagements in black communities, and thorough, transparent investigations of race-based promotion disparities – comprise a systems-based counter to diversity suppression that could help the Army to, at last, achieve diversity across all its ranks.

Table 3. Barriers and social factors suppressing black officer diversity at colonel and above in each Army personnel life cycle stage – with mitigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Barriers</th>
<th>Eligibility</th>
<th>Outreach and Recruiting</th>
<th>Branching and Assignments</th>
<th>Promotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks 18-24 years old are 20% of the general U.S. population, but only 8% possess a bachelor’s degree compared to whites in this age group.</td>
<td>Neglect of two-year colleges and vocational schools by Army outreach and recruiting programs.</td>
<td>- Many black officers score too low on the PMS OML to get their branch of choice. - Lower representation of racial and ethnic minorities in Operations (“combat arms”) Army branches equates to fewer opportunities for command.</td>
<td>Black officer promotion rates are consistently and inexplicably lower than average.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptual Barriers</th>
<th>Eligibility</th>
<th>Outreach and Recruiting</th>
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<th>Promotion</th>
</tr>
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<td>Black youths have less knowledge of or contact with successful Army officers.</td>
<td>- Black students considering a career as an Army officer are less likely to receive accurate information. - They may be discouraged by black community elders and mentors from pursuing a career as an officer.</td>
<td>- To gain perceived transferrable skills and experience, black officers fill Operations Support and Force Sustainment (“non-combat arms”) branches at roughly twice their representation in the combat arms career fields. - Black officers have few role models in the combat arms.</td>
<td>Unexplained race-based promotion disparities reinforce perceptions by some black Army officers that they will not receive equal treatment and opportunities as they compete for promotion to colonel and general officer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociological Phenomena</td>
<td>Eligibility</td>
<td>Outreach and Recruiting</td>
<td>Branching and Assignments</td>
<td>Promotion</td>
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<td><strong>Anti-intellectualism:</strong> A post-emancipation socio-pathology in which the young black student is socialized to under-achieve academically to conform to the communal norm.</td>
<td><strong>Modified Sociotropism:</strong> A black community consensus opinion that a career as a military officer is not a viable career path for African-Americans.</td>
<td><strong>Separatism:</strong> Combat arms branches and the officer corps in general are informally exclusive of African-Americans. Therefore, the military can only be a bridge to a civilian career -- not a career in itself.</td>
<td><strong>Victimism:</strong> Unexplained race-based promotion disparities confirm apparent systemic institutional racism. Therefore, black officers are at a competitive disadvantage to enter the Army’s senior ranks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Mitigation** | - Increase educational achievement for black students. | - Incorporate two-year colleges into recruiting outreach strategy. | - Aspiring black cadets must improve their academic GPA and overall PMS scores. | Mitigating both structural and perceptual promotion impediments must begin with a thorough Army-wide investigation that yields evidence-based conclusions on race-based promotion disparities. |
| - Develop advertising campaigns and officer engagements to increase information available in black communities. | - Develop advertising campaigns and officer engagements to increase information available in black communities. | - Highlight combat arms-associated leadership and management opportunities and technical skill sets | |
| - Lack of combat-arms role models: Get over it and compete! | |

Endnotes


8 For more information on the shrinking pool of eligible candidates for military service, see MLDC “Final Report,” page 47. In 2009, the Pentagon released statistics showing that 75 percent of young people, ages 17-24, are not eligible to enlist.


11 Ibid.


13 Ibid., 30.

14 Ibid., 10-11.


Department of Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), *Active Army Officer Demographic Comparison* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Manpower Data Center, 2015), 1.

MLDC, “Final Report,” 44.

DMDC, “Active Army Officer Demographic Comparison,” 1.


Ibid.


Kirby et al., “Why Don’t Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?” 525.

Ibid.


Ibid., 57.

Kirby et al., “Why Don’t Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?” 537.


36 Kirby et al., “Why Don’t Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?” 537.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 22.

43 Ibid., 20.

44 Ibid., 30.


46 Ibid.


49 Ibid., 68.
Kirby et al., “Why Don’t Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?” 537.

Burke, “Black Officer Under-Representation,” iii.

Kirby et al., “Why Don’t Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?” 538. The “incidents” refer to two race-based criminal acts by Fort Bragg soldiers. In one case, multiple white soldiers, one of whom declared himself a “skinhead,” attacked and murdered a black couple in Fayetteville, North Carolina in December 1995. In another incident, a black soldier painted swastikas on the barracks doors of six black Special Forces soldiers in July 1996.


Ibid., 76.


Susan Hosek, Minority and Gender Differences in Officer Career Progression (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 104.


Ibid., 78.
