

Landpower the Roman Way for the Twenty-First Century

by

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Abstract

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An option to build landpower for the United States Army in the 21st Century, in austere budget environments, is to glean insights from the practices of the Roman Army. During the Republican and early Imperial periods, the Romans used non-citizen soldiers in the Roman Army. Combined with the traditions and legacy of the U.S. Army and its own history of employing non-citizen troops as allies and within its own formations could result in a more affordable approach to providing land forces.

Landpower the Roman Way for the Twenty-First Century

No major conflict has ever been won without boots on the ground. Strategic change rarely stems from a single, rapid strike, and swift and victorious campaigns have been the exception in history.

—ADP-1¹

Ancient Rome, one of the most enduring civilizations of mankind, a culture that established the first all-volunteer professional army in the world conducted coalition warfare and military campaigns year round across the expanse of her empire.² A culture capable of employing allied formations and then later auxiliary formations, in concert with its legions, fighting and winning wars to meet its security requirements.³

In an era of fiscal limitations the United States must find ways to develop and build landpower to meet current and emerging security requirements. The United States Government cannot afford the size of the Army the current National Security Strategy (NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outline.⁴ The Army has a landpower challenge. The land domain is the only domain, where human beings are capable of living permanently.⁵ In contrast, the space, cyber, air, and sea domains are incapable of supporting human life for extended periods of time.⁶ Landpower is expensive, and has a very visible and physical presence.⁷

Improved technology alone cannot bridge the gap of manpower to requirements. Landpower, as defined in ADP-1 is: “The ability by threat, force, or occupation to gain, sustain and exploit control over land, resources, and people. Landpower includes the ability to impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if necessary. Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in any operational environment. Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development. Address the consequences of catastrophic events, both natural and man-made, to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services. Secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.”⁸

The Romans faced similar problems in meeting their landpower security requirements in both the Republican and in the Principate era.⁹ In the Republican era, their allies/socii formally supplied Rome troops and materiel.¹⁰ In the Principate era, Rome systematically recruited non-citizens and freedmen from its provinces into auxiliary units.¹¹ Equipped and recruited differently, this additional landpower proved unique for its time and to be a valuable strategic resource in Rome's survival and later expansion.¹²

The United States Army experimented with such measures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is time to reexamine the armies of ancient Rome in both the Republican era during the Carthaginian Wars and the auxilia of the middle first century Principate era to glean insights from Rome and see what can be applied to the twenty-first century.

The Roman army arguably established the first professional all volunteer army.¹³ Training, discipline, organization, superior tactical leadership, logistics, and uniformly well-equipped soldiers allowed it to fight and win wars against armies that vastly outnumbered it.¹⁴ G. L. Cheesman estimates that Rome's armies never consisted more than half of the size of its formations of Roman citizen troops.¹⁵ The rest of the army consisted of non-citizen/perengini allied or auxilia soldiers that fought alongside the legions while on campaign and were normally positioned forward on the frontier, during times of peace or when not on campaign.¹⁶ From the First Punic War, through the start of the fourth century AD, Rome relied on its allies and its provincial non-citizens for approximately 50 percent of its landpower.¹⁷ The use of allied and auxilia troops provided the Romans with additional troops and military capabilities that they lacked, at

considerable cost savings.¹⁸ The Romans did not understand grand strategy as we do today, nor did they define it by the four instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME) we use today.¹⁹ The use of non-citizen soldiers either by treaty or by direct enlistment provided Rome direct strategic benefits.

Republican Period

Rome met its landpower shortfalls during the Punic Wars with Carthage through binding treaties with its allies that required them to provide troops to Rome for their mutual common defense.²⁰ The use of these treaties cannot be understated. During Rome's wars with Carthage, it suffered considerable losses and setbacks, most famously from Hannibal.²¹ Despite horrendous losses at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, the Romans rapidly fielded new, trained and equipped armies and repulsed Hannibal that same year in Campania at the Battle of Nola.²² Republican Rome and its Latin allies use of mutually supporting treaties, based on contemporary demographic understanding of the Italian peninsula, never fully mobilized their societies.²³ The strategic implication of not having to fully mobilize allowed Rome and her allies to simultaneously maintain its political structure, sustain commerce and maintain its economy while fighting long wars with Carthage.²⁴ Rome's security treaties allowed it to afford the war with Carthage without straining its political and economic institutions.²⁵

The treaties that Rome and her allies forged applied strategic thought into the organization of the armies that it fielded.²⁶ The evidence on the exact details are not as complete as they are on later auxiliary formations, but the general understanding is that the allied units closely resembled Roman formations in fighting techniques, organization and equipment.²⁷

A Roman legion or Latin equivalent ala's organization and equipment reflected individual wealth of the soldier arranged in what is commonly referred to as a manipular legion.²⁸ Cavalry/eques possessed the most wealth, capable of equipping and up keeping themselves, and a horse (or horses).²⁹ These numbers, while not large, played a vital role for the army in security, reconnaissance and pursuit.³⁰ The legion core consisted of three ranks of ten maniples divided into, hastati (lightly armored infantry with sword and pilum), principes (medium armored infantry armed with sword and pilum) and the triarii (heavy armored infantry with sword and spear).³¹ In addition to the core of the legion, a number of the poorest allied and Roman citizens, classified as velites, served as light infantry skirmishers, armed with javelins, sword, a metallic helmet, and a small shield.³² A maniple at full strength was 120 men, consisting of two 60-man centuries.³³ 3600 men comprised a Roman legion or an allied ala with 30 full maniples at full strength, not accounting for velites and cavalry.³⁴

The allies of Rome also supplied the army with unique capabilities that Rome did not have, or was not very proficient in assembling. Archers and slingers comprised the two most notable deficiencies during the Punic Wars.³⁵ The allies presented Rome the strategic opportunity to adjust or tailor the composition of its forces to be more capable at defeating its threats.³⁶ Roman armies before Cannae traditionally consisted of 15% light infantry; with the rest of the infantry units classically defined as heavy infantry.³⁷ After Cannae, the composition of light infantry doubled to 30%.³⁸ No written record specifies why this happened, but speculating, the tactical requirement to skirmish and fix Carthaginian forces, in order to maneuver heavier infantry formations into a position

of advantage is likely. Expanded use of light infantry skirmishers contributed to Roman victories at Nola in 216 BC and Trasimene in 217 BC.³⁹

Allied units internally led themselves as a general rule, and a practice that was largely incorporated into auxiliary formations until the middle of the first century AD.⁴⁰ Externally, Roman Praefecti remained in overall command of both Roman and allied troop formations.⁴¹ What is not known is if allied units exercised independent command authority when detached from the main army in the field or if the dispatched Roman recruiting officers in the spring/summer sent to recruit/recall allied troops, due to treaty obligations, served in this role.⁴²

Mutual supporting security benefitted Rome and her allies in a time of crisis.⁴³ Such security undoubtedly increased commerce and technological discoveries. The system worked. Despite overtures from Hannibal and Carthage, no Latin allies of Rome, during all three Punic Wars, ever defected to Carthage.⁴⁴

Principate Period

Rome met its landpower requirements during the Principate with the use of its legions and auxilia. Augustinian reforms by 43 AD formally integrated the Roman auxilia into the Roman war-machine.⁴⁵ Augustinian reforms formalized the process and the use of non-citizen troops for the Roman army.⁴⁶ Rome's conquests of the last 125 years or the Republican era, culminating in the consolidation of the Italian peninsula, with all allies formally becoming Roman citizens made a lot of the treaties and support requirements for allied troops obsolete.⁴⁷ The bulk of allied Italian troops formally integrated into the legions.⁴⁸ Augustus' military reforms concentrated on the non-citizen troops that had been recruited or hired during Julius Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, as well as the following two Roman civil wars that ended in the defeat of Marc Anthony and

the establishment of the Principate.⁴⁹ Rome formally absorbed the provincial, non-citizen troops into the Roman army and financially supported them.⁵⁰ Rome assumed the responsibility of leadership, organization, capabilities, and benefits.⁵¹

The auxilia supported Rome with capabilities it could not internally provide itself, and at less cost.⁵² Capabilities that Rome specifically recruited were cavalry, light cavalry, slingers, archers, mounted archers and sailors.⁵³ In addition, infantry and mixed infantry cavalry units served not only for large-scale military operations, but patrolled and policed the frontier maintaining order and providing Roman leadership with valuable intelligence and situational awareness of its borders.⁵⁴

Cheesman classically defined Auxilia as light infantry, but this is an inaccurate description based on more recent research by Saddington, Goldsworthy and Haynes.⁵⁵ Roman auxilia infantry is best described as multi-purpose infantry. Rome equipped its auxilia infantry similar to a legionary citizen soldier with two key exceptions; the pilum and the scutum.⁵⁶ The pilum, a heavy short ranged throwing javelin, capable of easily punching through an enemy's shield and armor, forcing the shaft to bend on impact, rendering the shield useless until removed and caused considerable tissue damage when striking the human body.⁵⁷ The scutum, a large curved shield, rectangular in shape by the first century AD, that wrapped around a legionary, giving him considerable protection not only by the coverage of the device, but by the reflective kinetic qualities of its shape in absorbing blows.⁵⁸

The absence of the pilum and scutum placed the auxiliary infantry soldier at a tactical disadvantage in melee combat or on an open field against a comparative legionary force.⁵⁹ The absence of the pilum and scutum for a smaller oval shield called a

clipeus and javelin allowed for the auxilia infantry to be more mobile on an open battlefield or in mountainous or forested terrain.⁶⁰ The ability to maneuver more freely than legionary cohorts, while still considered heavily armored in comparison with their foes, proved decisive in the front ranks at the Battle of Mons Grapius and in Trajan's Dacian campaigns.⁶¹

The Roman army retained critical core competencies. The Roman legions retained all combat and civil engineering skills. Josephus, a contemporary writer of the day, only specifies Roman legionaries constructing roads, bridges, building fortifications, digging mines to breach fortifications, and earthen obstacles.⁶² Julius Caesar in his accounts only mentions legionaries accomplishing this task.⁶³ The archeological record presently only shows evidence of Roman legions building roads, bridges and other civic engineering projects.⁶⁴

Artillery was another capability uniquely retained by the legions. Used primarily in siege warfare, Tacitus and Josephus only mention legionaries using artillery.⁶⁵ Archeological findings show many metal ballista, catapult, and onager frames having legion markings on them, but none indicating ownership by an auxiliary unit.⁶⁶

Strategically, this allowed Rome to have a tactical advantage over its auxiliary cohorts in the event of a large-scale mutiny. Perhaps the experiences of the Social Wars influenced Augustus and Roman commanders to put tactical and operational safeguards in the event of a mutiny or uprising.⁶⁷ The two most notable auxiliary uprisings of the first century AD was the Cherusci-Germanic revolt of 9 AD, led by its Chieftain Arminius, who was also a former auxiliary cohort commander; and the Batavii revolt of 69 AD led by Julius Civilus.⁶⁸

Auxiliary cohorts comprised of soldiers with either Roman citizenship, awarded Roman citizenship, or of freeborn Italian birth served in particular volatile areas of the world, such as Judea, or further east where stationing a legion was infeasible, yet a high degree of trust was required with men of equivalent social standing of a legionary.⁶⁹ Dennis Saddington postulated that the placement of a legion or a legionary detachment risked being misinterpreted as a provocative or bellicose gesture to the Parthians, Rome's sole existential threat in the first century.⁷⁰

Rome initially recruited, and stationed auxiliary units in their home provinces led by their own tribal leaders. Disasters such as the Pannonia uprisings and the Varian Disaster of 9 AD across the Rhine changed this policy, so that by 43 AD, as a general rule, leadership at the century/centuria level and above was by Roman citizens. In addition, Rome no longer stationed auxilia in their home of origin provinces and deployed them throughout the Empire.⁷¹

Rome equipped and salaried its auxiliary soldiers but to a lower standard than its legionaries.⁷² While there is debate between academics such as Cheeseman, Saddington, Goldsworthy and other notable Roman scholars on the exact amount of pay the individual auxiliary soldier received, the record clearly indicates that regardless of the amount, they received less pay than their contemporary legionary counterpart.⁷³

Drilled, trained and disciplined just like the legionary, the auxiliary foot cohorts and cavalry ala served at a significant cost savings.⁷⁴ Lower wages to a modern twenty-first century military recruit might appear to be a challenge to recruiting, but in the first century AD, the promise of a salaried wage, shelter, food and clothing proved a significant benefit by itself.⁷⁵ The deferred benefit of Roman citizenship to the soldier, to

one wife and any children from that specific marriage was also an extremely powerful incentive allowing for upward social mobility in antiquity.⁷⁶

Auxiliary infantry and dismounted cohorts consisted of 480 men (quingenaria) at full strength, broken down into six separate centuries of 80 men. Led by a Tribune of the equestrian class, or an elevated centurion of the first order, leadership at the century level required Roman citizenship in this modular design.⁷⁷ The Roman army selected limited number auxiliary infantry, cavalry and mixed cavalry-infantry cohorts to one thousand men units (milliaria).⁷⁸

Tribunes of the equestrian class almost exclusively led auxiliary cavalry ala, subdivided into fourteen turmae of 32 men.⁷⁹ The decurions individually led a turmae possessing parity in status as a legionary or auxiliary centurion.⁸⁰ In both cases, Roman citizens led at the century/turmae level and above. What is not clear, however, is how many auxilia soldiers promoted into the centurionate/decurionate if possessing or earning Roman citizenship during service.⁸¹

The above discussion on the task organization and purpose/equipment of auxiliary units may initially appear to be very tactical in nature, but Rome employed them with critical strategic thinking. The Romans were very cautious to ensure that the ratio of socii/auxilia never exceeded the number of citizen legionary soldiers in the event of a revolt or mutiny.⁸² Rome also retained key critical core competencies such as combat engineering, artillery, and heavy infantry critical to its security from both external and internal threats.⁸³ Never organized above the cohort or battalion level, with exception to Civilus's mutinous army in 69 AD, Rome employed auxiliary units on the first line of the battlefield and in exposed locations along the Roman frontier.⁸⁴

Rome's use of allies and auxilia formations provided capabilities key to its survival and military success. Rome preferred auxiliary and socii to legionary units in specific instances⁸⁵. The use of these formations provided Rome with critical military capabilities at a significantly reduced cost on its society while providing a means to inculcate new and loyal families into its society with its deferred benefits system.⁸⁶

American Experience

The U. S. Army experience has employed provincial and non-citizens into its service. The employment of Native Americans as scouts, guides and light cavalry dates back to the 1600s with Pequot the War.⁸⁷ Native Americans provided mixed results through the American Civil War for a number of reasons, but trust, prejudices, cultural understanding, and a failure to define what specific capabilities/requirements the U.S. Army required all contributed.⁸⁸

It was not until 1866, that Congress formally authorized the recruitment of over 1000 Indian Scouts, with a ceiling of 25,000, at the urging of COL Philippe De Regis Trobriand to serve as scouts, translators and for fighting opposing Native American tribes.⁸⁹ Led by Regular Army officers, the use of Indian Scouts reaped mixed results.⁹⁰ Officers that attempted to convert Indian Scouts into formalized army cavalry achieved disappointing results, to include Indian Scouts mutinying.⁹¹ Frontier officers, such as BG George Crook, experimented with less traditional methods and cavalry formations with Indian Scouts and discovered they excelled at supporting regular army units when not constricted to traditional military organization and roles of the day.⁹² Crook recruited some of the wildest Native Americans he could find, further exploiting his success with the employment of Indian Scouts.⁹³ Indian Scouts possessed the range and wealth of experiences to assist the Army in pursuing and finding hostile Indians as well as being

psychologically disturbing to hostile Indians.⁹⁴ The Apaches, in particular, had long believed that their inner bastions impregnable, only to find them being discovered and ransacked by Indian Scouts working with Regular Army cavalry.⁹⁵ BG Crook's cultural understanding of Native Americans proved crucial in gaining the respect of his Indian Scouts, whose assistance proved decisive in the pursuit and surrender of Geronimo.⁹⁶

The U.S. Army in 1902 established the Philippine Scouts; led by American officers, the Philippine Scouts played a vital role in the internal and external security of the Philippine Islands up to its independence in 1946.⁹⁷ Extremely effective in counterinsurgency, the Philippine Scouts demonstratively contributed to an American victory during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902.⁹⁸ Employed similar to Crook's Indian Scouts, the Philippine Scouts successfully infiltrated Emilio Aguinaldo's base camp and captured Aguinaldo, the insurrection leader.⁹⁹ The success of the Philippine Scouts grew their authorization to over 15,000 members before the end of the Philippine Insurrection.¹⁰⁰ Native Filipinos served as scouts, police, and auxiliaries, to include the supervision of civil construction projects, such as roads and schools.¹⁰¹ Brigadier General Tasker Bliss' used the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary to reduce resistance and tensions with the Moros.¹⁰² During the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, Brigadier General Clyde A. Selleck employed Filipino troops, Philippine Scouts and Constabulary troops to great effect, rebuffing initial Japanese efforts to seize Bataan, killing over 1400 Japanese soldiers in short order during initial amphibious landing attempts.¹⁰³

The Brazilian Division is another example of the U.S. building landpower from alternate means. In January of 1942, the U.S. and Brazil agreed to a defense treaty,

allowing Brazil to be the only South American country to deploy and fight outside of South America during World War Two.¹⁰⁴ The United States agreed to command and lead the 1st Brazilian Expeditionary Force (1st BEF) above the divisional level, and to train, equip, and sustain it as though it were an American infantry division.¹⁰⁵ Brazil agreed to provide the manpower and internal leadership.¹⁰⁶ The 1st BEF arrived in Naples, Italy in 1944 and under the 5th U.S. Army, fought notably at Monte Costello.¹⁰⁷ The 1st BEF operated considerably similar to Republican Rome's use of her socii/allies during the Punic Wars. The 1st BEF allowed American and other allied resources to be reallocated to fight in Northern Europe.¹⁰⁸ The 1st BEF was successful in World War Two, but such a large force being equipped and fielded today is questionable, considering the classified command and control architecture and capabilities a division-sized element requires today.¹⁰⁹

The U.S. Army's experience using non-U.S. citizens continues today in the Republic of Korea under the Korean Augmentation Program to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) started in 1950. KATUSAs comprise approximately 10% of U.S. Army operational forces in the Republic Korea, serving in various capacities, in addition to being personal diplomats for their country, assisting commanders and Soldiers alike with the unique aspects of Korean culture, geography and language. KATUSAs are conscripts and come at nearly no cost to the United States Government. The U.S. Army loans KATUSAs U.S. Army uniforms and personal equipment, provides medical care, and billets KATUSAs with U.S. Army Soldiers.¹¹⁰ At the unit level, they train, function, and operate no differently from their U.S. Army counterparts.¹¹¹

The 2nd Infantry Division is undergoing a further transformation, started in January 2015, becoming the first combined division in the U.S. Army.¹¹² Taking the KATUSA concept forward, the 2nd Infantry Division is further integrated with the ROK Army, including having 30 ROK Army staff officers and the Deputy Commanding General.¹¹³ The 82nd Airborne Division is also presently pursuing a similar combined division concept with the UK's 16th Air Assault Brigade, focused on rapid response missions.¹¹⁴ Like the 2nd Infantry Division, the Deputy Commanding General is an allied officer from the UK.¹¹⁵

The United States Army has a legacy on using non-citizen troops similar in some aspects to both Republican and Imperial Rome, although on a much smaller scale. The Roman *socii* and the *auxilia* serve as models to draw insight from to meet landpower and security requirements in the twenty-first century.

Recommendations

Critical thought must be applied on what capabilities U.S. allies should perform, what capabilities we would want our *auxilia*/American expeditionary battalions to perform and what capabilities we wish to solely retain. The Army and the Department of Defense has the precedent and ability to expand upon employing non-citizen troops to meet its strategic landpower needs, while borrowing several insights from the Roman Republican and Principate experiences with provincial troops.

Evaluate allied force structure; the United States should look to its allies by treaty and take a holistic regional approach evaluating if the right balance of landpower is present. Where there are shortfalls or excess capacity in landpower, those forces should be adjusted with the U.S. and its regional allies mutually agreeing ideally by treaty and what each state will provide for the common defense of each state.

Expand the KATUSA concept globally. Where the United States has permanently stationed forces around the world, allies of the United States should provide approximately 10% of the manpower. A globalized KATUSA concept cuts both personnel and long-term health care costs, while also providing cultural-awareness and interrupters to U.S. Army units.

Reintroduce the “Lodge Act,” Public Law 957 of 1950 and deliberately recruit non-citizens seeking U.S. citizenship into the military and assign them to regionally aligned forces.¹¹⁶ Soldiers recruited under a reintroduced and modified “Lodge Act” would earn deferred benefits, be provided a lowered salary, no dependent medical benefits, and only medical coverage through the Veterans Administration for service-based injuries once the initial enlistment tour expired.¹¹⁷ Soldiers brought in under the revamped “Lodge Act” would only be allowed to serve up to one 8-year enlistment tour, with the path to full U.S. citizenship accelerated and awarded at the end of the enlistment. Post 9/11 GI Bill benefits would also be awarded. A spouse and any children from that spouse would also be awarded U.S. citizenship.

The cost of personnel and benefits is one of the single largest expenses for the Department of Defense and the Army.¹¹⁸ TRICARE alone will consume close to 13% of the entire FY 2015 proposed DoD budget.¹¹⁹ The reduction in TRICARE expenses and the inability to achieve a retirement pension provides the DoD immediate savings and expeditious savings years later.¹²⁰ The reduction in mandatory spending for health care and benefits enables discretionary spending to be redirected to other DoD priorities in support of the NSS and QDR.¹²¹

Non-citizens could be formed into battalion-sized units as the modular army “has no mandated size of unit building blocks; module size will vary within each category,” using the “Lodge Act”, as a tool to facilitate the establishment of American expeditionary battalions.¹²² The recruits of these battalions must actively seek entrance and citizenship in the United States. These battalions would build landpower and capabilities at a substantial lower cost. Professional U.S. Army NCOs and officers would lead the battalions, from either the active or reserve component. Regionally aligned and forward deployed, these battalions would provide combatant commanders with forces immediately available in the event of a crisis, build and reinforce partnerships, and deter aggression from states, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and transnational criminals during Phase 0 operations. NCOs and officers assigned to these battalions would gain considerable professional, regional and cultural knowledge.

American expeditionary battalions, in keeping with the spirit of modularity, would be self-sufficient by design for internal day-to-day operations similar to current maneuver battalions and capable of integrating into many, but not necessarily all Army or Marine brigade-sized elements.¹²³ The battalions would also be capable of operating independently.¹²⁴ American expeditionary battalions would require selective recruiting, training, missioning and equipping.

The Romans made very deliberate, strategic decisions to make sure that their auxiliary units did not possess artillery, heavy infantry, civil engineering and combat engineering capabilities in order to retain a tactical and operational advantage over their auxiliary formations in the event of an uprising or mutiny such as the Civilis Revolt of 69 AD.¹²⁵

The United States Army should take heed from the Roman experience and decide which capabilities it wishes to solely possess and which roles it is willing to share and not share. Aviation, direct action capable special forces, rocket artillery, air defense, and intelligence are roles that American expeditionary battalions should not be assigned. Light infantry, traditional special forces, combat and civil engineer, medical, disaster relief and civil affairs battalions would be capable of multiple roles in any geographic region to include assisting the geographical combatant commander in building partnership capacity with other states as well as deterring threats, assisting in natural and man made disasters while indirectly projecting American values through the Soldiers of these battalions.¹²⁶ Habitual working relationships with CONUS based BCTs potentially would reduce the requirement for a third organic maneuver battalion, dramatically reducing personnel costs and expenses.

The Roman *socii* and *auxilia* systems proved strategically important functions to the Romans. These formations and soldiers provided Rome with military capabilities that it did not possess, or required more than it was fiscally capable of affording. The two systems served to expand and inculcate new Romans into the Republic and early Empire indirectly or directly through mutually attractive deferred benefits to non-citizens and freedmen seeking basic security in survival, improved standard of living, and the opportunity for upward social mobility.¹²⁷

The Roman *socii* and *auxilia* systems serve as guide in the twenty-first century to build landpower for the United States Army. Where the United States has its strongest treaties, the force structure should holistically be reexamined and adjusted proportionally where the expertise and experience lies with each allied nation state. All

U.S. Army indefinitely forward deployed/garrisoned units should incorporate the KATUSA model to augment and fill its ranks. The establishment of American expeditionary battalions potentially provides landpower at reduced cost with deferred benefits.

The proposed recommendations, gleaned from the Roman experience, enhance the U.S. Army's history of incorporating non-citizens to meet the United States' security requirements while dramatically reducing the short and far term fiscal costs of maintaining a large professional standing Army that inculcates new citizens into the United States with a legacy of selfless service.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, ADP-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, November 7, 2012), 1-4.

² Adrian K. Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2003), 6-8.

³ John A. Bonin, "Caesar at Alesia," public speech, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 10, 2014.

⁴ Rowan Scarborough "Obama Military Downsizing Leaves U.S. too Weak to Counter Global Threats, Panel Finds," *Washington Times Online*, July 31, 2014, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/31/obama-military-strategy-too-weak-future-security-p/?page=all> (accessed December 15, 2014).

⁵ General Robert W. Cone "Operational Strategic Landpower," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, June 27, 2013.

⁶ Ibid.

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