Inter-American Defense Board: Human Domain and the 7th War Fighting Function

by

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Class of 2014

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Using the examples of the human domain and the seventh war fighting function this study demonstrates the utility of U.S. multilateral defense partnerships to support and achieve U.S. national security objectives. Specifically, this paper argues that for the U.S. military, multilateral military organizations such as the IADB serve to advance US defense policy interests in the region; establish and deepen mil-mil relationships through programs such as the Regionally Aligned Force; and leverage security cooperation to position the United States as the partner of choice for friends, allies, and fence sitters, while deterring adversaries.
Inter-American Defense Board: Human Domain and the 7th War Fighting Function

Epigraph: If the Inter-American Defense Board did not exist, the international community would be seeking to create an organization to fulfill such a function in today’s uncertain environment.

—Lt. Gen. Juarez de Paula Cunha, Brazil
IADB Director General, 2011-13

Should the United States, through DoD, seek to strengthen support for multilateral military organizations such as the Inter-American Defense Board? Using examples demonstrative of the human domain and the seventh war fighting function, this study will highlight the utility of U.S. multilateral defense partnerships to support and achieve U.S. national security objectives. Specifically, this paper underscores and affirms the importance of working within multilateral international military organizations such as the Inter-American Defense Board.

Multilateral defense organizations like the IADB demonstrate with stark clarity the benefits and force-multiplying effects of phase zero engagement when considered in light of the human domain and the seventh war-fighting function.

The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) is an example of a multilateral defense organization that serves a variety of purposes aligned with the U.S. National Security Strategy and the U.S. National Defense Strategy. However, the IADB has been criticized by political opponents in the Western Hemisphere because of the left-leaning nature of modern Latin American political alignment and the perceived inability of the IADB to “get anything done”. The historical reasons for this opposition and fear of political militarization stem from interventionist episodes across the hemisphere during the late 20th century. Overcoming these sometimes justified anti-military sentiments will take time, patience and effort as countries of the Western Hemisphere move beyond
reactionary sentiments toward a more tolerant and appreciative society that recognizes the value and benefit of transparent military forces under civilian control in modern democratic societies.

The Organization of American States serves as the parent organization of the IADB; politically, most civilian diplomats recognize the benefit of having a transparent multi-lateral military organization under civilian control to discuss common challenges and propose courses of action to confront these challenges. However, several countries of the hemisphere remain opposed to the IADB due to antipathy to military governments in their own country’s past and also because of their current political alignment counter to the United States.

The purpose of this paper is not to defend or justify past transgression, nor to provide arguments for more or less military emphasis or to advocate for “militarization” of U.S. foreign policy in Western Hemisphere countries. Rather, this study will demonstrate that for the U.S. military, multilateral military organizations such as the IADB serve to advance U.S. defense policy interests in the region; establish and deepen mil-mil relationships through programs such as the Regionally Aligned Force; and leverage security cooperation to position the United States as the partner of choice for friends, allies, and fence sitters, while deterring potential adversaries.

Using the examples of the human domain and the 7th war fighting function, this study will demonstrate the utility of U.S. multilateral defense partnerships to support and achieve U.S. national security objectives. Specifically, this paper addresses the importance of working within multilateral international military organizations such as the Inter-American Defense Board. During the past decade, the Inter-American Defense
Board has transformed its operating functions and structure to better address significant defense and security challenges facing the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

The Inter-American Defense Board

The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) is the oldest continuously serving multilateral defense organization in the world. It was founded on March 30th, 1942 in order to provide a common defense for the Americas during the Second World War. As such, the IADB is unique in that it predates the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949), the Organization of American States (1948) and the United Nations (1945) – political and military organizations devoted to work through diplomacy to maintain international peace and security, and to promote democracy and rule of law. The IADB charter similarly provides for maintenance of international peace and security through common defense.

The original purpose of the IADB was to prepare “the American Republics for the defense of the Hemisphere by developing studies and recommending measures required for its execution…(to serve as) a permanent military organization and whose resolutions paragraphs stipulated that; the Republics in the Hemisphere have declared solidarity to the extent that an attack against any of them shall constitute an attack or threat against all of them; that a permanent military organization is indispensable to study and address the challenges that affect the Western Hemisphere; that the Inter-American Defense Board has proven to be a forum for the exchange of different perspectives, addressing problems and formulating recommendations related to Hemispheric defense and to foster close cooperation between the military, naval and air forces of the American Republics.”¹ The Inter-American Defense Board consists of

The Council of Delegates

The IADB Council of Delegates is the principal deliberative body of the Inter-American Defense Board. The Council of Delegates is composed of senior defense officials, active duty military or civilians nominated by each country’s Minister of Defense. The Council meets regularly to discuss matters of common interest in defense and security, to advance multilateral cooperation and collaboration in confronting a wide
variety of defense and security challenges that face the countries of the western
hemisphere. In 2011-12 the IADB Council met monthly to resolve routine administrative
matters such as the nomination of new member state representatives, budget approval,
and to coordinate specific meetings, events and conferences for the Council’s
deliberation on topics such as the Inter-American Defense System and civil-military
relations at the hemispheric level.3

The Secretariat

The IADB Secretariat consists of a multinational staff similar to the headquarters
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Unlike the forces assigned to NATO, the IADB
does not have an “operational” mission, except under very specific circumstances. The
Secretariat’s two divisions are the Sub-Secretariat for Advisory Services (SAS) and the
Sub-Secretariat for Administrative, Conferences and Logistics Services (SACS). The
Secretariat of the IADB serves as the permanent executive body that performs the
support to the member states and the Organization of American States as directed by
the Council of Delegates.

The Sub-secretariat of Administrative, Conference and Logistics Services, as its
name implies, performs the administrative and logistics functions for the Council of
Delegates’ monthly meetings, special events, and conferences. The Sub-Secretariat of
Advisory Services performs the work of writing IADB reports to the OAS; planning,
coordinating and conducting multilateral tabletop exercises in support of OAS and IADB
directed activities such as military support to civilian authorities in disaster response;
conducting multilateral hemispheric seminars on the Inter-American Defense System;
compiling an annual report to the OAS on military confidence building measures
supported by member states; support to the Conference of Defense Ministers of the
Americas; and coordination of multilateral humanitarian demining missions in the hemisphere in support of member states border dispute resolution.

The strategic importance of the Secretariat can be noted with its far reaching hemispheric network that stretches from the political level at the Organization of American States to the most senior military and defense leaders with the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas. Additionally, the IADB Secretariat by its very nature as a multinational staff serves as a prime example of collaboration and cooperation among member states militaries. Multinational service members from sergeant to lieutenant general interact on a daily basis, sharing best practices, military experiences and serving to further build confidence among member states. For the United States, the IADB is of strategic importance precisely because of its multinational character and because it provides member states an opportunity to interact and cooperate.

The Inter-American Defense College

The Inter-American Defense College, headquartered at Fort Leslie J. McNair in Washington DC, is the educational arm of the Inter-American Defense Board. Established in 1965, the IADC exemplifies the best of multi-lateral defense education as instructors, staff and students from more than 20 of the hemisphere’s 34 countries participate in graduate level education of the hemisphere’s senior defense and security practitioners both in and out of uniform. The IADC annually graduates approximately 80 high-ranking military, civilian and security sector students with a Masters in Defense and Security Studies. The far-reaching impact of the IADC at senior strategic levels can be noted with its distinguished graduates among who are included the ex-president of Chile, Mrs. Michelle Bachelet J., and the current president of Guatemala, His Excellency Mr. Otto Pérez Molina.4
Current U.S. Support to the IADB

The United States currently supports the IADB with both funding and personnel directly from DoD to the international organization of the IADB. The United States also supports the IADB indirectly through its annual contributions to the Organization of American States. As mentioned above, the IADB receives a large portion of its annual “operating” budget from the OAS Secretariat. Recently, the IADB’s portion of the OAS budget has been shrinking from its cold war high in excess of $5M to 2013-14 total of $125,000.00. Because this budget is insufficient to meet all the IADB’s operating costs (approximately $2 million dollars annually including Council, Secretariat and College), the IADB relies heavily on voluntary contributions from member states to assign personnel and provide administrative and logistical support to assigned personnel from member states’ ministries of defense and through their diplomatic missions.

These contributions or “assistance in kind” activities account for the vast majority of support to the IADB as a whole. The U.S. provides as many as 80 officer and enlisted personnel directly to the Inter-American Defense College to support the educational mission of the IADB. The U.S. also indirectly provides support to the IADB through the nomination of its official delegation to the Council of Delegates. The U.S. delegation is led by the deputy director Joint Staff J-5, a U.S. general or admiral and his staff of up to ten or more IADB U.S. delegation members. As such, when considering all the assistance in kind contributions of all the member states’ ministries of defense, the IADB actual annual cost is estimated at more than $20 million dollars.

The bottom line dollar budget of approximately $2 million dollars funds the day-to-day operating expenses of the Inter-American Defense Board. The estimated total cost of running the organization when adding in all the voluntary assistance in kind
support from member states and diplomatic missions, in both personnel costs and administrative and logistical support, even as high as $20 million dollars still is a comparatively cost effective method for the ability to interact within the multilateral organization on hemispheric specific initiatives. When considering the impact of such a relatively minor investment, the return on investment is immeasurable in terms of establishing and deepening close personal contact with foreign partners and allies and creating the conditions upon which the United States can shape and influence events in our own hemisphere.

The Organization of American States

The IADB was officially admitted into the Organization of American States on March 15, 2006 when the IADB’s revised and updated Statutes were unanimously approved at the Thirty-Second Special Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Washington DC. This admittance did not directly subordinate the IADB to the OAS Secretary General however. The IADB maintains its independent character as it is characterized as an “entity” of the OAS rather than an OAS secretariat. This linkage to the OAS serves to more closely align the common political objectives of member states between the two organizations. While the logic seems intuitive, there have been some challenges to linking the OAS and the IADB.

Over the last two or three decades, several member states of the OAS have aligned politically against the interests of the United States. Because the IADB is physically located in the U.S. and has been strongly supported by the United States for more than 70 years, the countries opposed to U.S. policy attempt to use the IADB as a rally cry against their perceived U.S. colonialism and imperialism in the hemisphere. Prior to the adoption of the 2006 Statutes, the IADB in its entirety was led by a U.S.
General or Admiral. The U.S. officer oversaw all three components of the IADB: the Council of Delegates, the Secretariat and the College. In an effort to bring more international participation and legitimacy to the IADB, the 2006 Statutes separated the IADB branches, created the position of Director General, and as a result under the current arrangement the only flag officer leadership position occupied by a U.S. officer is the Director of the Inter-American Defense College.

Perhaps with good reason, the international community saw previously too heavy a U.S. hand in the Inter-American Defense Board. For this reason, at the 32nd General Assembly of the Organization of American States, the United States delegation strongly supported adoption of new IADB Statutes, willingly divesting itself of the two key leadership positions in the IADB: President of the Council of Delegates and Director General of the Secretariat. Since 2006, the IADB has performed its required functions by Statute and through receipt of new tasks issued by the OAS General Assembly. Both the IADB Secretariat and the IADC in the accomplishment of their routine tasks also serve as a tremendous multilateral confidence building measure for the hemisphere’s defense and security sectors.

In serving for over two years as the director of the Sub-Secretariat of Advisory Services (2011-2013), this author can personally attest to the truly multilateral, cooperative and collaborative nature of the Inter-American Defense Board under its new Statutes. As such, it appears that organizations such as the Inter-American defense Board play an increasingly important role in the realization of U.S. national security objectives. In order to apply a cultural lens through which one can see this benefit, it is
important to first briefly examine current doctrinal thought on how the U.S. military sees its role in the “human domain.”

The Human Domain

The Human Domain is currently being debated in defense and security sectors doctrinal discussions as a potential addition to existing domains: Land, Maritime, Air, Space and Cyber. Practitioners and doctrinal theorists alike have recently discussed the importance of human activity and interaction separately and distinctly from the more traditional Land, Sea and Air domains. Critics assert that the Human Domain is not necessarily a separate and distinct domain because the commonality in all domains of modern warfare is indeed the human element. It takes people to operate the systems, weapons, and equipment associated within all the existing domains.

Channeling Clausewitz, Frank Hoffman and Michael C. Davis note that “the fundamental nature of war is a clash of wills between organized socio-political entities.” 7 Because the decision to wage war and the actions taken in war are at their core human decisions, one cannot separate the human element from warfare. Hoffman and Davis rightly state that war is a “profoundly human activity, inspired by human emotions (fear, honor, and interest), guided by human genius and imagination, and conducted by groups and institutions shaped by human leaders and occupied with human actors.” 8

The argument strongly appeals to the base logic that all actions between humans are by their very nature within the realm of human interaction. Applied to the violent extreme of human interaction in war therefore, the human domain becomes a critical component of military planning and conduct of operations. The human domain remains the base component or fundamental foundation for all domains. “Literally no action can
take place in the other domains without human action, and its purpose is guided by the need to influence other humans."⁹

Figure 2. Proposed Joint Domains¹⁰

Emphasizing the importance of human interaction and relationships, General Anthony Zinni (USMC Retired) stated, “We Americans no longer have the luxury of existing as a nation isolated from the rest of the world ... We now have no choice but to engage with many different peoples out there in all their many dimensions; and we can’t do this as outsiders, looking at them through our own lenses, trying to force our thinking on them."¹¹ In this regard, General Zinni correctly and emphatically noted that for the U.S. to be successful in achieving its national security objectives, it needs to work with and through engagement with other nations. General Zinni’s implication argues for a
stronger cultural understanding of the issues and a holistic understanding and appreciation for the lenses through which other countries and people see the United States. Also implicit in this effort is that the U.S needs to not only work bilaterally, but also through multilateral forums.

In his article on preparing U.S. military leaders to successfully operate in multinational settings, Bart Howard notes that modern leaders must be culturally astute in dealing with friends and allies as together they confront common challenges. He contends that the U.S. military is currently adapting to this requirement and “relearning” that is needs to have capable leaders adept in language and cultural awareness to successfully achieve objectives in support of larger national strategic goals. “To better prepare leaders for multinational operations, we must make a concerted effort to train future leaders to be more proficient and comfortable operating in the multinational environment… including developing a keen sense of cultural awareness.” 12

Looking back at history, it is more often than not that the United States has gone to war in a multinational setting – aside from the fact that most wars are conducted against a foreign state. Even dating back to the Revolutionary War, General George Washington and the Continental Congress counted upon support from the French. In the American Civil War, Confederate operations against civilian targets in the northeast were conducted out of and in to a degree supported by Canada. In both World War I and World War II, U.S. forces fought alongside allied nations. The United States military has long recognized the importance of operations in multilateral, multinational and coalition settings. The current joint doctrine states: “Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns as they seek opportunities to promote their mutual
national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and engage in peace operations. US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF).”

Figure 3. Range of Military Operations

Placing the human domain in the context of the range of military operations, one can easily identify how the human element crosses from peace through crisis response and to major operations in war. In the case of multilateral military organizations such as the inter-American Defense Board, the preponderance of activity is aimed at the lower left hand portion of the chart in Figure 3. The U.S. involvement in multilateral defense organizations at the hemispheric level includes collaborative military security cooperation, defense and security sector engagement (and to a lesser extent in the western hemisphere) deterrence. Although, one could argue that because of its existence over the last seventy years, and through the herculean diplomatic efforts at
both the OAS and the IADB, the western hemisphere has largely avoided major state on state conflict, and in fact has been subjected to any nation going to war with another.

Howard also cites the importance of cultural awareness again quoting General Anthony Zinni: “We need Renaissance men and women. We need officers who are part economist, part political scientist, part anthropologist and part all sorts of other disciplines.” 15 Here General Zinni is emphasizing the importance that a lifelong pursuit of liberal education has for senior military personnel required to operate in the multilateral environment. Without a strong appreciation for disciplines outside purely military tactical, technical and operational art, the U.S. will have a much more difficult task of working with multinational partners and allies. General Zinni contends that in the modern globalized context, U.S. servicemen and women need to be adept at working with U.S. allies and partners, understanding the cultural context of the theater of operations, and seeing problems through the appropriate cultural lenses in order to devise solutions to common problems.

What better example of operating in a multilateral environment, utilizing language expertise and working with partner nations on common objectives, often seen through their “lens,” than the Inter-American Defense Board? By itself, however, the fact that U.S. military members serve alongside their hemispheric counterparts at the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College within the “human domain” does not account for achieving U.S. national security interests. Yes, it is beneficial to work and socialize together in the same outfit, but that does not in and of itself translate into furthering any particular national security objective. In order to advance U.S. interests, there needs to be more than just cultural understanding of the
environment, the diversity of multinational partners and being able to converse in a foreign language. To that end, it is necessary to briefly examine another proposed doctrinal change to the U.S. military: the Seventh War Fighting Function.

The Seventh War Fighting Function

The Seventh War Fighting Function, “Influence”, is similar to the human domain, in that it is currently being debated as a new doctrinal term. The function of Influence is complimentary to the existing War Fighting Functions of Mission Command, Intelligence, Movement and Maneuver, Fires, Effects, and Logistics. However, the 7thWfF is somewhat distinct, as its aims are inherently different from the definition of the human domain. The human domain simply characterizes the necessity of operating with and among people. This essay contends that the human domain in conjunction with the seventh war fighting function together provide an opportunity for the United States military to successfully influence key partners and allies in the achievement of mutually beneficial defense and security objectives. While this activity occurs within the human domain, its purpose is to shape and influence the actors with whom and against whom the United States is engaged.

In a recent article examining the so-called “paradoxes” of the human domain and the seventh war fighting function, Grant Martin takes a view from the operational and tactical level that all but discounts the importance of these doctrinal concepts. However, he provides a good definition of what the seventh war fighting function is, “in plain English, the 7th WfF is all of the tasks and systems that military units would need to do or have to influence people.” While somewhat understandable as seen from the tactical and operational viewpoint, the human domain and the seventh war fighting function serve a larger strategic role in achieving U.S. national interests that often
cannot be discerned at lower echelons. Martin’s own definition cites the tasks and systems that military units require to influence people. However, the actual benefits of influence at the strategic level are much broader and have much deeper implications for nations at the geopolitical level.

As such, rather than passively waiting for crisis to occur and then dealing with response efforts to mitigate the effects, conducting “proactive peacetime engagement activities reassures allies and partners, promotes stability and mitigates the conditions that lead to conflict. We base such strategies on the principle that it is much more cost effective to prevent conflict than it is to stop one once it has started.” In order to be proactive and have the ability to shape the “battlespace” or the area in which the United States is engaged diplomatically, economically and militarily, effective use of the human domain is critical in successful employment of the seventh war fighting function precisely to influence key leaders and international players.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Galvin, in his article “Extending the Phase Zero Mindset,” describes the importance of shaping and influence in setting the strategic landscape in favor of U.S. objectives. He describes Phase Zero as a combination of activities at the Geographic Combatant Command level, including but not limited to Theater Security Cooperation programs, Building Partner Capacity programs, as well as political-military and military-military confidence building activities. Taken together, these efforts serve to influence partner nations as they pursue their own national interests, and thereby advance U.S. strategic objectives in the prevention of conflict or mitigation of common challenges. The difficult part of justifying these myriad activities is that it is extremely difficult to prove a negative. In other words, how can one quantify the result of
a non-action? Is the lack of armed conflict between states in the Americas directly attributable to military security cooperation programs in the hemisphere?

Herein resides the difficulty in defining the utility of doctrinal terms such as the seventh war fighting function “Influence.” While it is fairly simple to define the effects of the human domain with regard to the other military domains (Land, Air, Sea, Space and Cyber), it becomes more problematic to define “Influence” as a military war fighting function. In his Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2005 testimony, General James Jones (USMC) stated, “DOD’s Security Cooperation is an important instrument for executing U.S. defense strategy by building defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.”

General Jones alludes to the importance of the U.S. security assistance and cooperation tools as the means available to the geographical combatant commanders to develop relationships with allies, partners and others as a key component of promoting and achieving the larger ends of U.S. national security.

Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth in their article, “Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement,” call for continuing the U.S. policy of deep engagement in the world. They argue that since the end of World War II, the U.S. grand strategy has been to engage foreign states in diplomatic, economic and military areas. They cite the large number of U.S. bases and presence overseas in countries spanning the globe (aside from Iraq and Afghanistan). Their central argument is that engagement and ability to influence is cost effective in terms of potential cost in lives and treasure in major conflicts, and also cost effective in terms of achieving its national
security goals. Deep engagement, they argue, “help(s) maintain an open world economy and give(s) Washington leverage (making) it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats.”  

Again, it is difficult to prove a negative in the multi-faceted human domain of international security and stability. However, it seems that many experts agree that the alternative would be far worse. Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth make a compelling case for the U.S. to maintain its role in the modern era, and argue that deep engagement is one of the primary causes for keeping the international order. “Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential.”

In a recent exercise regarding the seventh war fighting function held at Fort Belvoir, VA in August 2013, Lieutenant General Keith Walker stated, “You have strategic victory when you influence the will of the people, influence the will of security forces, ultimately influence the will of a government.” Fortunately, it appears that the U.S. military seems determined to continue developing the doctrinal concepts of human dimension and the seventh war fighting function as an integral part of U.S. military engagement strategy.

In order to complete the picture of influence and human domain activities in helping to achieve U.S. national security objectives, it is necessary to analyze the effects at a strategic level. To accomplish this, a brief examination of how the Inter-American Defense Board can serve as an example of U.S. influence through the human domain is of particular interest.
The IADB, Human Domain, and Influence

As a forum for discussion, deliberation and debate within the Organization of American States, the IADB serves as critical role in providing member states an open forum to discuss military defense and security matters in the hemisphere. Under the auspices of the OAS, some argue the Inter-American Defense Board has regained legitimacy that was earlier weakened as a result of dominance by the United States. With the adoption of its new Statutes in 2006, the IADB took on a new character as a principle defense forum of the hemisphere. It continues to evolve and take on an increasingly larger role in support of strategic leader conferences such as the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas. In each of the last three meetings of the DCMA, the IADB has played a role in the debate. Most recently, the IADB submitted a think-tank type report to the OAS and the CDMA that evaluated the Inter-American Defense System, inasmuch as such a system exists. This report was very favorably received by both the OAS and the CDMA and may serve to further advance common interests and goals in the hemisphere by providing analysis on terms, terminology and demonstrating civil-military linkages in the multilateral framework of the hemisphere.

From the United States perspective, it is abundantly clear that having a seat at the table is one of the primary methods through which a national perspective can be articulated in a multilateral setting. For the United States and its regional partners, the Inter-American Defense Board has served and will continue to serve an important strategic role of providing a valuable forum to discuss defense and security related matters. Additionally, the IADB will continue to play a supporting role to the biennial Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, again demonstrating its utility as a positive and productive multilateral organization. As previously noted, the very existence
of a forum for hemispheric security and defense issues provides a venue through which member states can exchange viewpoints and work together in a collaborative environment. As one evaluates the western hemisphere in an historical context, it can be noted that there have been relatively few state versus state conflicts since the creation of the IADB and the OAS, and with the exception of the brief Cenepa War between Ecuador and Peru in 1995, no state has gone to war with another state in the western hemisphere. While many other factors certainly contribute to the relative peace and stability of the hemisphere, the impact of the IADB is not likely purely a coincidence.

In several cases, however, some member states have simply stopped participating in the monthly IADB Council meetings, perhaps in silent protest against the United States as the default global hegemon or stemming from strictly political antagonism directed at the U.S. and its partners. Member states that have allowed their delegations to atrophy include Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. For these countries, the political decision not to support the IADB was communicated through the Organization of American States. Because of their political alignment to Cuba, and as populist regimes opposed to U.S. policy, these countries have allowed their IADB delegations to slowly dissipate over time by simply not sending replacements for their delegates. Once a delegate’s assignment finishes, his or her position simply is not backfilled. Whether by political design or for lack of personnel, the absent member forgoes their ability to participate in the IADB activities, advocate for their country’s position, and vote on referenda brought to the council.

Relating the ability to advocate and influence in multinational settings, the United States National Security Strategy clearly articulates the country’s enduring national
interests: security, prosperity, universal values, and international order. Of these, the last two clearly imply a requirement to work with the international community to secure U.S. national interests. Promoting universal values and supporting the international order cannot be accomplished from the comfort of a purely domestic and inwardly focused policy. Specifically, the National Security Strategy states that the United States must be actively engaged in the world. “Engagement is the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders. It is, quite simply, the opposite of a self-imposed isolation that denies us the ability to shape outcomes. Indeed, America has never succeeded through isolationism.” Here it has become clear that the ability to shape and influence is indeed a strategic line of effort in support of national security.

In the National Defense Strategy, influence and shaping are also recognized as critical components toward achieving U.S. national security objectives and providing for the common defense. “In cooperation with our allies and friends, the United States can help shape the international environment, the behavior of actors, and the choices that strategic states face in ways that foster accountability, cooperation, and mutual trust. Shaping choices contributes to achieving many of our objectives. It is critical to defending the homeland…” Here again, the importance U.S. participation in multilateral international organizations such as the Inter-American Defense Board exemplifies the manner in which the United States can help to shape the dialogue and influence the outcome of hemispheric events.

The United States, through DoD, should seek to strengthen support for multi-lateral military organizations such as the Inter-American Defense Board. The examples demonstrative of the human domain and the seventh war fighting function cited above in
this study have highlighted the utility of U.S. multilateral defense partnerships to support and achieve U.S. national security objectives. Considered along with additional shaping efforts such as military exercises and professional exchanges, foreign military sales, and the “regionally aligned force” concept, entities such as the IADB demonstrate there is value in working collaboratively in a joint and multilateral organization. The importance of working within multilateral international military organizations such as the Inter-American Defense Board cannot be understated. Multilateral defense organizations like the IADB demonstrate with stark clarity the benefits and force-multiplying effects of phase zero engagement when considered in light of the human domain and the seventh war-fighting function.

Endnotes


3 Ibid., 42-43.

4 Ibid.


6 Ibid.


8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.


12 Ibid.


14 Ibid., I-2.


18 Ibid.


20 Ibid.


24 Ibid., 11.