


Targeting: Army is Joint in Name Alone

by

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United States Army War College
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Investigating joint and army level policies, field manuals, and theater rules of engagement (ROE) uncovered three main reasons the Army currently must rely on other services to meet joint level targeting requirements: 1) Organizationally the Army is not properly represented at multiple joint decision making forums that approve service effectiveness, training and certification requirements; 2) The Army has doctrine and publication gaps that limits Centers of Excellence ability to include joint requirements into Army publications; and 3) The Army lacks the hardware and software required to connect with joint and interagency targeting and intelligence systems. In this paper I will discuss each of these areas in depth and provide recommendations the Army must adapt to close these gaps.

Targeting: Army is Joint in Name Alone

In June 2008, soldiers from 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division operating in Kirkuk Province Iraq—a hotbed for insurgent activity—encountered a house suspected of storing improvised explosive materials. They immediately started planning a raid for the following day which included targeting the brick-and-mortar structure. The brigade requested one guided multi-launch rocket (GMLRS) precision strike from the division's fires asset pool. The theater rules of engagement (ROE), established by United States Central Command (CENTCOM), required every preplanned target to undergo a collateral damage assessment and complete nine information elements before it could be approved. The nine element target packet, including imagery, was sent from the brigade to the division fires cell twenty-four hours before the intended operation. The division fires cell sent the packet via email to the Combined United States Air Force Central Command Air Operations Center (USAFCENT CAOC) located in Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar for approval. The normal turnaround time from the CAOC to the division fires cell averaged forty-eight hours. In this case, the packet arrived back to the fires cell thirty-two hours after submittal in a completely different format. The packet approved delivering a MK-84, two thousand pound air-delivered warhead against the house, not the requested two hundred pound surface-to-surface GMLRS. The brigade delayed its maneuver plan eight hours waiting for the target approval and was not willing to wait to resubmit the order to change the weapon type. Ultimately the house was completely destroyed by the MK-84 while the requested GMLRS would have only left a hole in the roof.

The same base elements of this scenario must have repeated themselves over fifty times during the course of a one year Iraq tour and still exist in Afghanistan. The 1st

Armored Division Commander regularly asked why an asset the division owned required the CAOC's approval to be employed. The only response available was that CENTCOM's ROE require personnel to complete CENTCOM collateral damage estimation and target packet production certification in order to approve preplanned targets. An investigation of joint and Army level policies, field manuals, and theater ROE uncovered three main reasons why the Army currently must rely on other services to meet joint level targeting requirements: First, the correct Army organization does not attend multiple joint decision making forums that approve service effectiveness, training, and certification requirements. Second, the Army has doctrine and publication gaps that limit the ability of its Centers of Excellence to include joint requirements in Army publications. Third, the Army lacks the hardware and software required to connect with joint and interagency targeting and intelligence systems. In this paper, an in depth discussion of each of these areas will occur and recommendations the Army should adopt to close these gaps will be provided. Understanding the joint definition of targeting and how the Army affixes organizational responsibility for specific capabilities is critical to understanding this paper so let's start with that in mind.

Targeting Definition and the Army Fires Proponent

The joint definition for targeting found in joint publication (JP) 3-60 defines targeting as: "Joint Targeting is a fundamental task of the fires function that encompasses many disciplines and requires participation from all joint force staff elements and components, along with various nonmilitary agencies. The primary purpose of targeting is to integrate and synchronize all weapon and system capabilities."¹ As the definition states, the fires function integrates and synchronizes multiple capabilities and specialties and requires many diverse participants. The Army's

organizational process for assigning capability responsibility to oversee capabilities inherent within subordinate organizations is called the functional proponent management system and is governed by AR 5-22. AR 5-22 “establishes policies, duties, responsibilities, and relationships to include determining doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements with regard to a particular function or branch.”² AR 5-22 assigns the fires functional proponent to the commander of the Fires Center of Excellence (FCOE).³ The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) serves as the higher headquarters and DOTMLPF synchronization authority when multiple functional proponents are affected as is the case in joint targeting⁴. For example, targeting requires intelligence, maneuver, cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and aviation support to understand, train, certify, and meet joint targeting requirements. As described in the opening vignette, the Army relies on the Air Force to meet CENTCOM’s joint targeting requirements due in large part to the gaps between Joint and Army decision making organizational structure.

The Joint Staff charters three different targeting and fires committees/groups where the current Army representatives are not the organizations best suited to act in the Army’s interest. These three committees/groupings are the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee (JFS ESC), the Collateral Damage Working Group (CDWG), and the Military Targeting Committee (MTC). The Joint Staff appoints a lead directorate for each of these meetings. That directorate possesses the authority to establish meeting times and agendas, oversees policy instruction updates (CJCSIs), and serves as the final decision authority when individual services cannot agree. For

example, the Joint Intelligence (J2), is the joint directorate lead for collateral damage estimation (CDE). The J2 gives its sub-directorate, J2 targeting (J2T), the responsibility for running this joint program. The three joint meetings and the Army representation at each will be analyzed next. This paper will highlight the complexity of joint organizations, authorities, and the Army shortfalls in nesting with the joint community. Understanding this complexity, while tedious, is fundamental and necessary to proposing ways to more effectively integrate joint targeting requirements into the Army.

Joint Fires Executive Steering Committee (JFS ESC)

The Joint Staff Command, Control and Communications Directorate (J6) chairs the JFS ESC and has since 2012. The J6 has delegated responsibility for running the ESC to the Deputy Director for Cyber, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Integration (DD C51).⁵ The JFS ESC has three organizational layers that serve as decision entities and action arms. The three groups are the General Officer (GO) executive steering committee, the Colonel (O6) working group and the Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) action officer working group (AOWG). The ESC is chaired by the DD 51 Senior Executive Service (SES) staff member and consists of one or two flag/general officers from each of the services, CCMDs, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and partner nations.⁶ These individuals must possess signature authority for their designated service, agency, command, and nation.⁷ This body validates joint fires capability gaps and approves a Joint Action Plan (JAP) to resolve these gaps.⁸ The O6 working group mirrors the ESC in terms of representation and facilitates the recommendations from the action officer working group to the ESC. CJCSI 5127.01 authorizes the establishment of as many action officer working groups (AOWGs) as needed to solve differing subject matter joint fire support gaps.⁹ Currently

they have two standing AOWGs—the Joint Close Air Support and the Joint Fire Support working groups. The ESC meets twice a year; the Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel working groups meet three times a year.¹⁰ The Joint Action Plans that the ESC approves validate identified gaps and assign service responsibility.¹¹

Successful action plan outputs include memorandums of agreement (MOAs) that signature authorities can sign which standardize joint training and/or assign specific requirements to service entities. An example of this process is the establishment of the joint terminal air controller (JTAC), forward airborne controller (FAC-A), and joint fires observer (JFO) training standards.¹² The ESC published these standards in a MOA utilizing the approved JAP as the framework. The Air Force, Army, Marines, and multiple coalition countries signed the MOA and currently follow the training requirements and meet service training output requirements. The original gap put forward by the Army, identified the inability for ground commanders to access joint fires, and the JFS ESC approved the JAP, published the MOA, and maintains program oversight.¹³

Additionally, the ESC possesses the ability to address changes to joint or service requirements. JTAC, JFO and FAC-A training evolved overtime. Advances in simulation capacity and capability have allowed the services to save resources by reducing the amount of live air required. The ESC met, approved the changes, and updated the MOA.¹⁴ The most important capability the JFS ESC has is the ability to elevate issues that ESC representatives cannot agree upon.¹⁵ When the ESC cannot reach consensus, issues are forwarded to the Operation Departments Tank or Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC) for resolution.¹⁶

The Army's participation in the ESC is delegated by the Army Operations Chief (G3) to the Commander of the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill. The Commanding General (CG) of FCOE attends the bi-annual general officer decision making meetings. The Fort Still G3 tasked a subordinate directorate, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI), to represent both the O6 and action officer working groups. The JACI director attends the JFS ESC O6 meetings while the JACI integration division provides the working-level action officers. After each meeting, Fort Sill generates via its JACI directorate a report on the topics, decisions, and timeline for action which it then forwards, via email, to the Army G3 for situational awareness.

JACI's history and role in the Army community is unique. First, no other Center of Excellence in the Army has an organization like JACI. In 2003, the FCOE CG, established the directorate in order to meet growing concerns that the fires community was not training or executing joint requirements.¹⁷ Originally designed as an advisory element to the Fort Sill CG that focused on emerging joint requirements, JACI morphed into a training, doctrine approval, and joint meeting representative. However, JACI is not empowered to speak for any Army force proponent or the Army staff.¹⁸

The Army's representation and integration into the JFS ESC is robust, but is inadequate on two measures. Notably for the Army, the meetings to be addressed next in this paper, the Collateral Damage Working Group and the Military Targeting Committee, do not feed into the process leading up to the JFC ESC. This causes disjointed and incomplete recommendations to the ESC. And furthermore, since only one functional proponent attends the meetings, the Army is vulnerable to missing opportunities and key decisions needed to better integrate joint targeting into the Army.

The CDEWG is the next meeting covered and highlights the inadequacies the Army faces.

Collateral Damage Estimate Working Group (CDEWG)

The Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate J2 chairs the CDEWG and has done so since 2002. The J2 delegated responsibility for running the working group to its subordinate cell, the Deputy Director for Joint Intelligence Targeting (J2T). The CDEWG has two organizational layers, one external to J2 and one internal, both of which serve as decision-making entities and action arms. The two groups are the external Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTTCG/ME) and the internal Joint Intelligence Targeting cell (J2T). CJCSI 3160.01a, dated 12 October 2012, serves as the charter for the working group and describes service, combatant command, interagency, and joint responsibilities. The working group itself lacks execution authority and funnels all decisions to J2T and JTTCG/ME, depending on the subject matter, for final approval. Any technical weapon recommendations are forwarded to JTTCG/ME while all doctrine and training recommendations are sent to J2T.¹⁹ The CDEWG charter, the document that lays out the authorities and members, has been in draft form since 2006.²⁰ The bi-annual working group is chaired by the Air Force's representative to the JTTCG/ME and at minimum is attended by representatives from each service and J2T. The six minimum attendees serve as the voting members for the working group when decisions are made.²¹ If agreement cannot be reached by the voting members, the chair makes the decision. Once the working group offers a recommendation the final authorities are held by the two joint agencies described earlier. Any technical weapon accuracy updates or new weapon accuracies are given to the JTTCG/ME steering committee for final approval. Doctrinal and training requirements changes are made

through J2T and signed off on by the J2. The three areas that this working group and decision bodies control that affect all the services and combatant commands are the weapon effectiveness estimation tables, CJCSI 3160.01 updates, and CDE hardware/software approval. No interaction or approval authority occurs between the CDEWG and the JFS ESC at the Joint level and the Army utilizes FCOE and JACI to serve as its representative just like the JFS ESC.

To date there is no standing order or directive that mandates anyone in the Army attend the CDEWG. The Army representative, because they understand the importance, is an Army targeting Chief Warrant Officer from the FCOE JACI directorate. 131A targeting warrant officers are assigned at the corps, division, and brigade levels within the Army. They experienced firsthand the difficulties inherent in relying upon on the COAC to make operational CDE calls. The challenges they experienced drove them to research the joint standards and attend the working group in 2005. The first time they attended the meeting they became the Army's representative and still act in that capacity. CDE affects multiple Army proponents and, as is the case with the JFS ESC, JACI warrant officers lack the authority and capability to speak for them.²² An instance of this occurred during the fall 2013 CDEWG. The working group needed to vote on a much anticipated Navy-developed CDE automation software suite called DECIDE. This software automates the collateral damage estimation process eliminating human error and reducing certification training timelines. The Army representative was asked to vote on the software but lacked the authority, so the Army lost its vote. The value of the software and applicability to the Army is not the dilemma. Any software put on an Army system requires a certificate of net worthiness (CON) and the authority to operate (ATO)

before it can operate on the Army domain. The Army proponent for CON and ATO approval is the commander of the Signal Center of Excellence, not FCOE.

Military Targeting Committee

Since its inception in 1994, the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate (J2) has chaired the Military Targeting Committee. The J2 appoints the chairperson for all the committee meetings which occur three times a year.²³ The committee's scope focuses on joint targeting and targeting intelligence issues. Issues relating to target data basing and product standards, targeting training, systems that support targeting, policy, and doctrine are all covered by this committee.²⁴ The committee has a chairperson, executive members, and associate members.²⁵ This committee encompasses the whole of government, Department of Defense, and coalition partners. Committee executive members include service representatives, joint staff directorates, combatant command J2 targeting chiefs, and United Kingdom Ministry of Defense and Australian Defense Force Headquarters representatives.²⁶ The associate members include among many others: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. The MTC chairperson and executive members have voting privileges that associate members do not.²⁷ The committee's mission is to identify gaps and issues and develop an action plan called the military action plan (MAP).²⁸ The MAP assigns a lead organization, establishes a timeline, and assigns prioritization for each gap or issue. Integration with the other joint committees is loosely defined in the CJCSI. JTCG/ME maintains associate member status and the committee informs the JFS ESC when required—something which has never occurred.²⁹ The MTC is a powerful body that brings all the important players together requiring the Army to send personnel capable of speaking for multiple Army

force modernization proponent organizations.³⁰ For MTC representation, the Army once again turns to JACI and more specifically Army targeting warrant officers. JACI's assigned 131A targeting officer publishes minutes after each meeting highlighting the decisions made during the meeting that are outside of his authorities. The minutes are sent from JACI through the FCOE CG to the Army G3 via email. Meeting after meeting occurs without proponent Army organizations adopting the training, equipment, and doctrinal decisions.

The joint standard for electronic target development is another illustration of how the Army is not meeting joint standards. The lack of a joint standard was brought to the MTC by CENTCOM.³¹ The MTC-driven MAP outlined software, training, and doctrinal gaps. The gaps affect Army signal, intelligence, and fires proponents. JACI, the Army's representative, attended each of the meetings but abstained from voting on items that affected signal and intelligence functions. In accordance with the MAP, the J2 published CJCSI 3370.01 in September 2011. The CJCSI established minimum standards for target system analysis products, electronic target folders, supported target materials and target lists.³² Additionally the CJCSI established service responsibility that the intelligence, signal and fires proponents must adopt. All three joint level meetings utilize CJCSI's to inform the services about joint requirements which brings up the next gap the Army faces.

Joint and Army Publication Gaps

Throughout this analysis of organizational structure, the Chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff Instructions (CJCSIs) continually surface as the established joint policy which dictates service requirements. The Joint Staff utilizes CJCSIs in combination with joint doctrine. The CJCSIs tied to targeting are: CJCSI 3160.01 (CDE), CJCSI 3370.01

(Target Development), and CJCSI 3505.01 (Target Mensuration). These CJCSIs are referenced and nested with JP 3-60, JP 2-0, and JP 3-09. The Army has no equivalent instruction policy document and to date has not implemented any of these CJCSIs into Army regulations, pamphlets, or doctrine. Joint and Army doctrine is not prescriptive by design so the joint staff developed these instructions as a mechanism to standardize training, certification, and equipment requirements for the services to follow. In an interview of Fort Sill's chief of doctrine, LTC Terry Braley noted that FCOE concluded that CJCSIs were not recognized by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) as legitimate Army doctrine sources and thus not requirements.³³

In order to understand the ramifications of not implementing CJCSIs, examine the example of CDE instruction CJCSI 3160.01. The Director of the Joint Staff, signed the updated CJCSI on 12 October 2012.³⁴ The opening pages of the instruction list all the changes the new release directs services, combatant commands, and service components to implement. New minimum collective standards for operational CDE capability and refined joint training standards for CDE are included in the update.³⁵ More specifically the updated instruction directs services to identify, track, and assign CDE-certified and qualified personnel to serve in specific operational and instructor billets.³⁶ A thorough DOTMLPF analysis across multiple Army proponents such as fires, signal, and intelligence is required to determine how the Army will meet these joint requirements. Doctrinally the army utilizes the DOTMLPF analytical framework to identify, assess, and document new requirements.³⁷ None of this occurred, resulting in the Army only minimally meeting a portion of this straight-forward requirement. JACI does maintain a spreadsheet to keep track students that attend and meet minimum

certification testing standards. However, Army students receive no additional skill identifier and are not tracked by the Army's assignment managers. Additionally, this does not qualify personnel to conduct CDE calls when operating in combatant command regions. CJCSI 3160.01A mandates the Army track geographic command qualified CDE personnel and no one in the Army has that list.³⁸ As mentioned before, CJCSI 3160.01 published this requirement in 2012 and the Army has yet to react primarily because it does not recognize CJCSIs.

The gap in Army related to CJCSIs is not all about the written requirements to which the Army does not adhere. It includes a general lack of understanding by the joint community of who in the Army is responsible for targeting as evidenced by the following example of CJCSI 3370.01. The Army, unlike the Air Force and Navy, places responsibility for targeting on the operational community, not the intelligence community. The Army trains field artillery targeting warrant officers (131As) from the brigade through functional command levels. CJCSI 3370.01, target development, identifies the Air Force targeting center (AFTC) and the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and assigns to them specific target development requirements.³⁹ The only Army organization mentioned in the CJCSI is INSCOM and the 1st Information Operations Command, neither of which possess service level responsibility for targeting.⁴⁰ The Army has not assigned a proponent for targeting under their force proponent system, leaving the joint community and CJCSI 3370.01 without an Army entity to assign targeting responsibility.⁴¹ This gap results in the Air Force and Navy leading joint targeting efforts across combatant commands. Failure to meet joint standards and exclusion from joint responsibilities thus alienates the Army. The joint meetings and

CJCSI's each identify hardware and software requirements needed to meet joint targeting requirements; a fact that leads to the Army's third gap.

Hardware and Software Shortfalls

The gaps mentioned above cannot be fully understood without addressing the targeting hardware and software challenges. Typically leaders reading this portion of any analysis start cringing when material gaps emerge, especially in our current fiscal environment. The good news for the Army is that money and new material are not the answer. The joint community, working primarily through the Naval Strike and Warfare Center's funding, research and development program has certified imagery, collateral damage, weaponeering, and targeting software. It is owned by DOD and therefore free for use by the Army once NETCOM approves the software.

The primary joint-approved software packages available are the digital precision strike suite (DPSS) and the automated collateral damage assessment suite (DIEE). No one in the Army trains or employs DIEE. JACI downloads DPSS for training only and consistently runs into CON and ATO certificate challenges that are required by the Army's Network Enterprise Command (NETCOM), a subordinate command to the Signal Center of Excellence, for any software to run on the Army's network. JACI found a work around by utilizing certificates from United States Special Forces Command (SOCOM) to run its entire digital precision strike training program but that work around does not allow for course growth throughout the Army.⁴² An example of this recently occurred at Fort Bliss.

The 1st Armored Division Artillery (DIVARTY) had to suspend its newly established precision targeting course due to the refusal of its installation network engineers to approve the SOCOM ATO that JACI utilizes. DIVARTY leaders

consistently called JACI, but JACI is powerless to affect NETCOM. The minimal joint training the Army does conduct utilizes software the Army has not approved—a definite recipe for disaster. The Army needs must determine what software for targeting and collateral damage they want to utilize and then dictate what hardware it will operate on. The Naval Warfare and Strike Center network engineers have repeatedly offered to work with Army network personnel to no avail. The Army can fix these shortfalls with nearly no monetary output. This paper identified three major areas: joint targeting meeting representation, CJCSI and doctrine gaps, and hardware and software shortfalls. Each of these areas have clear solutions that are presented for consideration.

Recommendations and Conclusion

In a recent speech, the Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno stated:

As I look around the world today, I ask how the Army can contribute across the full range of operations in order to prevent conflict, shape the environment for the combatant commanders to ensure access to build partner capacity, and then, if necessary, win. Maintaining a highly trained and professional all-volunteer force is the number one priority; moreover, we have to develop leaders who can operate in complex environments. I want to sustain the advantages we have now, and I think that we have an asymmetric advantage both in our noncommissioned officers and officers and in their ability to operate in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.⁴³

The asymmetric advantage that General Odierno mentions does not exist in joint targeting. In its current configuration, the Army relies on the Air Force and Navy to meet joint and combatant command targeting requirements. As I described earlier, the improper representation at joint level meetings, not recognizing CJCSIs in Army doctrine, regulations or publications, and hardware/software gaps are directly responsible for this problem and must be solved.

In November 2012 during a TRADOC quarterly future session, General Odierno asked TRADOC how observations, insights, and lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan were being incorporated into doctrine, training and leader development.⁴⁴ In response to that question and with the realization the Army lessons learned process was not providing the answer- TRADOC established a new initiative called the rapid infusion process (RIP). Some of the gaps covered in this paper were included in this process in November 2013 and are being wrestled with by multiple proponent organizations across the Army. Adopting the recommendations in this paper would close the current joint targeting RIP process gap and ensure the Army meets current and future joint targeting requirements.

The Joint Staff charters three different targeting and fires committees/ groups that the directed functional Army proponent, ARCIC, does not attend. Furthermore, the Army is crippled by the governing rules of these meetings that allow them to operate independently of each other in terms of decisions and assigning service requirements. Fixing this problem positively impacts the Army's ability to solve the other shortfalls and prevents the Army from being caught short when future targeting requirements emerge. Surprisingly the organizational challenge is the easiest to fix and would result in a powerful quick win.

In accordance with AR 71-9 and AR 5-22 the Army's architect for aligning joint requirements along the DOTMLPF spectrum is TRADOC.⁴⁵ TRADOC acknowledges this requirement in TRADOC regulation 10-5 and assigns primary responsibility to its subordinate organizations—the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and the CAC.⁴⁶ TRADOC 10-5 describes ARCIC functions in the following manner: ARCIC

designs, develops, and integrates all aspects of the Army into the joint force.⁴⁷ CAC works the Joint lessons learned process and integrates it into the Army's equivalent process.⁴⁸ Neither of these two agencies attend three of the joint level targeting meetings even though AR 71-9 and TRADOC regulation 10-5 give them the authority, capability, and framework to do so. JACI, the current Army representative, is only authorized to speak for the fires proponent. Intelligence, signal, cyber, maneuver, special force, and aviation proponents have joint level targeting requirements that require each of the above proponents to conduct internal DOTMLPF analysis.

At the fall 2012 CDEWG, the group approved updated joint imagery training and certification requirements related to targeting and published them in the 2013 CJCSI 3505.01 update. The new requirements affects intelligence proponent imagery analysis training, software, and certification. A complete DOTMPLPF analysis to determine the training audience, material solution and certification process is required by the intelligence and signal proponents. Sadly, neither the intelligence nor the signal proponent community addressed these requirements due in large part to the lack of notification. When this problem was raised to the ARCIC fires representatives, they simply asked why JACI did not call the other proponents and alert them of updates. JACI tried multiple action officer level calls to the intelligence and signal proponents without result. As noted earlier, the fires proponent lacks the authority and process to direct any other proponent to enter emerging targeting requirements into their DOTMPLF analysis. By regulation, only ARCIC has the authority to speak for the Army and task proponents to do so. In an interview with ARCIC fires cell, they acknowledged the requirement but cited a lack of subject matter expertise as the reason their

organization does not attend⁴⁹. ARCIC is the only Army organization capable of representing multiple functional components across the Army. ARCIC's authorities enable their organization to task multiple proponents to conduct combined DOTMLPF analysis when issues affect multiple areas as they often do in targeting. Once ARCIC attends the meetings, they can work with the joint community to unify efforts and decision making authority across the three targeting-related meetings. The JFS ESC's charter and decision authority structure is currently aligned to represent Army interests and the remaining meetings should flow through that body for all decisions including CJCSI publication rewrites.

The second recommendation addresses the Army's inability to integrate CJCSIs into Army publications. Again, ARCIC can tackle this by utilizing one of two courses of action. The first method would involve working with the joint staff to eliminate CJCSIs. They are not doctrine nor are they regulatory and therefore have no like publication in any of the services. However, this option will involve any uphill battle based on the fact the joint staff utilizes CJCSIs for multiple operational, personnel, intelligence, and maneuver functions, not just targeting. Additionally, CJCSIs allow the joint staff to consolidate all combatant command needs into one publication. This allows the services that serve in multiple combatant command areas to understand standardized joint requirements. It walks the fine line between service and joint training responsibilities found in Title Ten law.

The second, and recommended, course of action would be for TRADOC, ARCIC and CAC to determine how the Army is going to integrate CJCSIs into Army publications and assign proponent responsibility for each of the CJCSI that exist.

Determining what Army doctrine or regulation requires publication and assigning proponent responsibility will enable the army to understand, train and execute joint targeting requirements. Additionally aligning CJCSIs with SMEs would ensure Army interests are properly represented.

For an illustration of this we will analyze the joint CJCSI 3505.01 which covers target coordinate mensuration and certification and program accreditation. Target coordinate mensuration provides precise grids utilizing the best imagery the DoD owns to personnel employing coordinate seeking munitions. The DoD program lead and accreditation authority is the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. These authorities allow the NGA to mandate training, software, and hardware standards for combatant commands and services. CJCSI 3505.01 states, "Due to its importance as a critical function in targeting, personnel who conduct target coordinate mensuration must be certified to do so."⁵⁰ Services that want a target mensuration program are required accreditation by the NGA.⁵¹ These two requirements straight out of the CJCSI are against how the Army trains, accredits, and certifies organizations, units, and individuals. Commanders, not staff, certify individuals for combat. ARCIC working through TRADOC must determine if this current instruction works for the Army. If it does not then, changes are required. The Army needs a target coordinate mensuration program and to establish a proper one, ARCIC must lead a multiple proponent DOTMLPF analysis that will determine what personnel need the training, the equipment required for training and execution, and the training and certification standards the Army will adopt. The ARCIC-led DOTMLPF analysis would include the third recommendation as well since it involves the same proponents.

The third recommendation involves ARCIC tasking the fires, intelligence, maneuver, aviation, and special force proponents to conduct combined DOTMLPF analysis determining the personnel in each specialty that require collateral damage, target refinement, and target development training within the Army. Part of this task must look at all Army occupational specialties including the rank structure. This analysis will determine where the training and certification will take place and what training resources are required. Current training requirements are determined at the unit level which violates Army training regulations and does not meet joint force training and certification requirements. Six of the ten active component Army divisions have created their own training and certification programs which partially meet joint requirements but are not resourced or tracked by TRADOC, causing multiple problems such as the one created by the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum.

Out of operational necessity, Fort Drum established a precision targeting program with JACI's assistance in 2012. The program trains collateral damage estimation and target refinement in accordance with joint CJCSI-mandated standards utilizing contracted civilians. Fort Drum utilized operational wartime funds to purchase the required instructors. Those funds are no longer available and Fort Drum is struggling to keep the program alive. A proper DOTMLPF analysis led by ARCIC would solve 10th Mountains Division's problem. ARCIC, working with TRADOC and its proponents, would determine if the training will occur during Primary Military Education (PME) or outside PME via a functional course. Functional course training, the current method the Army utilizes, is largely taught by expensive contractors and requires substantial TDY budgets. The training analysis will take all these factors into

consideration and the output will resource and institute the training. The Air Force and Navy conducted their own analysis and determined a need to establish a service targeting center—something the Army must do.

Establishing an Army Targeting Center at Fort Sill would provide subject matter expertise to ARCIC and targeting support reach back to operational units. The Navy and Air Force maintain targeting centers that directly feed into joint and combatant command targeting efforts. The Air Force Targeting Center (AFTC) at Langley Air Force Base is manned by four hundred and fifty personnel and conducts target material production training for the entire Air Force, provides targeting program oversight, and connects in with national, joint, and combatant command targeting agencies. The much smaller Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at Fallon Air Force Base is the Navy's targeting center. Manned by one hundred twenty personnel it trains target material production, target program oversight, and provides reach back capability to national, joint and combatant command targeting agencies. Additionally NSAWC can deploy forward with carrier strike groups if operational requirements emerge.

Establishing an Army Targeting Center would provide interface capability with Air Force and Navy targeting centers and national level targeting communities like the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Additionally, the center would provide interface with the Defense Intelligence Agency's Modernized Intelligence Database (MIDB), for Army joint targeting interests. Finally, the targeting center would provide the joint targeting subject matter expertise to ARCIC and CAC when they attend the joint meetings as required. This recommendation will take time, analysis and, organizational energy to implement but is necessary. The Army

cannot emphasize joint operations in its strategic message if it does not understand, adopt, and execute joint targeting standards. Adopting these recommendations would close the identified gaps and ensure future joint targeting requirements are in line with Army interests and executed within joint standards.

The beginning of this paper showcased one tactical level problem the Army encountered conducting combat operations. Empowering Commanders, at echelon, to employ organic and joint level assets is fundamental to their ability to successfully accomplish the mission. Army tactical units, in combat, will figure out a way to get the job done and will seek to bypass any perceived or real barricade to the mission. Multiple tactical level units, in Iraq, utilized the troops in contact (TIC) notification in order to employ weapons of their choosing. TIC negates joint level CDE and target packet approval requirements in CENTCOM. This reality caused unacceptable levels of collateral damage and imposed tighter weapon release authority over tactical level units. The Army should not let this problem continue and address the joint targeting shortfall or it will remain - joint in name alone.

Endnotes

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²⁶Ibid.

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