Building Security: A New Strategy for Global Infrastructure Development

by

Lieutenant Colonel Trenton J. Conner
United States Army

Under the Direction of:
Professor Richard Coplen

United States Army War College
Class of 2018

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
This paper proposes a whole-of-government strategy to strengthen the strategic security of the United States. The strategy for building security through global infrastructure development seeks to protect the current international order by ensuring strategic access to the global commons and partner nations, improve capabilities for military force projection, and improve stability in nations of interest by promoting prosperity. The proposed infrastructure development strategy uses construction or upgrades of dual-use economic infrastructure to maintain strategic access for the United States, set theaters of operation, and enhance military-to-military relationships in support of Geographic Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans. Further, this strategy calls for government and industry partnerships across interagency and intergovernmental boundaries to achieve cooperatively developed goals. Additionally, this strategy provides a creative way to counter growing Chinese and Russian influence. Successful implementation of this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development should lead to greater economic and military power for partner nations while extending U.S. influence, military reach, and opportunities for economic growth.
Abstract

This paper proposes a whole-of-government strategy to strengthen the strategic security of the United States. The strategy for building security through global infrastructure development seeks to protect the current international order by ensuring strategic access to the global commons and partner nations, improve capabilities for military force projection, and improve stability in nations of interest by promoting prosperity. The proposed infrastructure development strategy uses construction or upgrades of dual-use economic infrastructure to maintain strategic access for the United States, set theaters of operation, and enhance military-to-military relationships in support of Geographic Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans. Further, this strategy calls for government and industry partnerships across interagency and intergovernmental boundaries to achieve cooperatively developed goals. Additionally, this strategy provides a creative way to counter growing Chinese and Russian influence. Successful implementation of this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development should lead to greater economic and military power for partner nations while extending U.S. influence, military reach, and opportunities for economic growth.
Building Security: A New Strategy for Global Infrastructure Development

The United States released its most recent National Security Strategy in December 2017. It describes an “America First” approach to foreign policy.\textsuperscript{1} To support this approach, the United States requires a new supporting strategy to build economic infrastructure within partner nations to satisfy multiple strategic interests. The United States also needs to compete with a rising China and intransigent Russia. The United States also possesses the political and economic power to improve the stability and prosperity of other countries. A way to achieve these multiple goals is through the construction of dual-use, transportation and logistics-related economic infrastructure. Increasing the flow of commerce for developing nations is essential to their economic growth. Transportation and logistics infrastructure also is important for the deployment and sustainment of military forces. Furthermore, government initiatives that improve or expand commercial opportunities will attract a host of commercial interests across multiple business sectors.

This paper proposes a whole-of-government strategy to strengthen the strategic security of the United States. The strategy for building security through global infrastructure development seeks to protect the current international order by ensuring strategic access to the global commons and partner nations, improve capabilities for military force projection, and improve stability in nations of interest by promoting prosperity. The proposed infrastructure development strategy uses construction or upgrades of dual-use economic infrastructure to maintain strategic access for the United States, set theaters of operation, and enhance military-to-military relationships in support of Geographic Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans. Further, this strategy calls for government and industry partnerships across interagency and
intergovernmental boundaries to achieve cooperatively developed goals. Successful implementation of this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development should lead to greater economic and military power for partner nations while extending U.S. influence, military reach, and opportunities for economic growth. To demonstrate the potential efficacy of this strategy, a consortium of American companies recently outbid a Chinese company to build the largest port in Georgia along China’s “belt and road” route to Europe. American companies can compete and win against state-controlled Chinese corporations.

Before proceeding to the methodology of the paper, as well as for the sake of clarity, the definition of key terms used throughout the paper is important. The first term is economic infrastructure. For the purposes of this paper, economic infrastructure is defined as the systems and facilities which enable the flow of commerce. Examples include ports, airfields, rail systems, and highways; other complementary examples include communication and data systems which support the flow of the information component of global supply chains. Second, dual-use economic infrastructure constitutes those portions of economic infrastructure that are both militarily and commercially useful, including the examples cited above. Of note, economic infrastructure is part of a broader regional, and global system. These systems interconnect actors with and enhance the global economy.

Important military definitions include theater opening or, “The ability to establish and operate ports of debarkation (air, sea, and rail), establish a distribution system and sustainment bases, and facilitate port throughput for the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces within a theater of operations.” Setting the
theater,” as described in U.S. Army doctrine, includes “whole-of-government initiatives such as bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreements to allow U.S. forces to have access to ports, terminals, airfields, and bases within the area of responsibility (AOR) to support future military contingency operations.” Finally, ‘strategic access,’ though not defined in joint doctrine, is the ability of the United States to project diplomatic, military, and economic power into another country and through the global commons.

This paper uses the U.S. Army War College’s Strategy Formulation Framework (SFF), which provides national security practitioners with a method for developing strategy recommendations to meet national policy objectives. Effective use of the SFF requires a strategist to clearly understand the global security environment, the equities of domestic and international stakeholders, and strategic interests and guidance.

The SFF starts with national purpose or moral basis of the country. In terms of the United States, this purpose is grounded in the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and ideals originating during the founding of the country. National purpose flows to national interests and the level of intensity. The explanation of the SFF states, “Objectives are derived from national policy and from a detailed consideration of United States’ national interests by category and intensity against the backdrop of issues, trends and challenges (threats and opportunities) that affect those interests.”

The SFF then looks at the policy objectives or ends of strategy. The strategist next develops concepts or ways that use resources, or means, to achieve the previously identified ends. The SFF states, “At the grand strategic level, the ways and means to achieve U.S. core national interests are based on the national leadership’s strategic vision of what America’s role in the world should be to safeguard these national
interests.” The SFF requires a risk assessment to ensure the derived strategy is suitable, acceptable, feasible, and addresses multiple types of risk. Finally, strategy, once implemented, requires continuous assessment for success, failure, or any modification.

Figure 1. Strategy Formulation Framework

President Trump’s National Security Strategy articulates his vision for the nation: “...a world of strong, sovereign, and independent nations, each with its own cultures
and dreams, thriving side-by-side in prosperity, freedom, and peace – throughout the upcoming years.”

Prosperity, freedom, and peace require security, commerce, and governance.


The proposed strategy for building security through global infrastructure development by improving dual-use economic infrastructure in partner nations supports all four of these strategic interests. First, establishing or improving infrastructure in partner nations enables rapid force projection of U.S. military expeditionary operations, should the need arise. In addition, this supports the U.S. desire to fight enemies beyond its borders. Establishing infrastructure in partner nations, as described below, also promotes stability and economic prosperity, increases partners’ national revenue, and potentially strengthens their militaries with additional discretionary spending abilities.

Second, this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development in partner nations promotes American prosperity because it encourages construction and initial operation by U.S. companies. The strategy is flexible allowing for the expansion of long-term opportunities either in line with strategic or commercial interests. Companies may add U.S. citizens expatriate employment opportunities abroad and earn additional revenue from U.S. government and other international sources. Contracts to U.S. companies, acting as prime vendors, would enable subcontracting to partner nation and third-country companies, thus building institutional
and intellectual capacity in the target region. It is also important to consider the long-term improvement and upgrade opportunities required to maintain infrastructure over time. The development of enduring corporate relationships provide opportunities for all members of the supply chain. Finally, the logistics industry, like others, tends to operate in clusters. This means more and new facilities will be required to keep up with increasing throughput requirements, leading perhaps to additional investment opportunities.

Third, the strategy for building security through global infrastructure development in partner nations preserves peace through strength by solidifying alliances and building partner capabilities. As the National Security Strategy describes, the United States must develop new concepts to protect the homeland, advance prosperity, and preserve peace. This complementary strategy for building security through global infrastructure development provides a concrete concept for the United States to reassert itself in the geopolitical sphere and compete against China while securing U.S. global lines of communication.

Finally, establishing or improving infrastructure in partner nations offers another method for advancing American influence worldwide. Diplomatically, the negotiations process provides participants the opportunity to engage in meaningful and mutually beneficial discussions. From an informational perspective, the United States demonstrates concerns for the stability and prosperity of its partners. Militarily, this strategy encourages military-to-military engagement, interoperability, and other opportunities for security cooperation. Economically, this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development leads to increased revenues for both U.S.
companies and partner nations. The construction of economic infrastructure in partner nations increases the U.S. influence along all instruments of national power.

One may ask, "Why is all of this necessary?" The answer lies in countering geostrategic and regional activities of great power rivals and improving economic opportunity for commercial industry and partner nations.

First, a driving factor for this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development is countering the geostrategic actions of the greatest threat to U.S. security and economic interests, China. Regarding China, the recent *National Defense Strategy* states,

China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce its neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.\(^{13}\)

China launched its “one belt, one road” in 2013. As described by *The Economist*, the initiative “…involves China underwriting billions of dollars of infrastructure investment in countries along the old Silk Road linking it with Europe. The ambition is immense. China is spending roughly $150bn a year in the 68 countries that have signed up to the scheme.”\(^{14}\) China also currently possesses economic stakes in multiple strategic port locations throughout the world. As described in *Foreign Policy*,

A pair of deep-pocketed Chinese [and state-owned] behemoths, Cosco Shipping Ports and China Merchants Port Holdings, have gone on a buying binge of late, snapping up cargo terminals in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic rim. Just last month, Cosco finalized the takeover of the terminal in Zeebrugge, Belgium’s second-biggest port, marking the Chinese firm’s first bridgehead in northwestern Europe.\(^{15}\)
These acquisitions build on China’s existing world-wide network of ports to enhance its economic reach and protect valuable sea-lanes should the need arise. Given China’s militarization of man-made islands in the South China Sea, it is not unreasonable to assume China could militarize these ports if necessary. Through its state-owned companies, China possesses interests in Brazil, Namibia, Australia, and recently acquired 51% interest in the port facility Piraeus, Greece.\textsuperscript{16} China also established its first foreign military operating base in Djibouti. China also funded and constructed a major deep-water port in Gwadar, Pakistan at the convergence of three of the commercially important regions of the world, the Middle East with its vast energy resources, Central Asia, and South Asia.\textsuperscript{17}

Russia also is a clear rival and its recent actions compel the United States to act to reassure allies and deter further hostile Russian actions. The \textit{National Defense Strategy} also addresses Russia’s goals:

Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the challenge is clear.\textsuperscript{18}

In March 2014, Russia unlawfully annexed Crimea through military means. Since 2014, Russia has conducted military operations against Ukraine to promote instability in the country and gain territory to expand Russia’s buffer zone against NATO. The Baltic States and Ukraine remain at risk of further Russian aggression through both overt and covert means. Vital U.S. national security interests require the United States to reaffirm its leadership within NATO, to ensure NATO’s cohesion and credibility, and to protect NATO allies and interests in Eastern Europe. To meet these requirements, the United
States must take further action to set the European theater for potential action against Russia. The strategy for building security through global infrastructure development through the construction of economic infrastructure responds to the threats posed by Russia below the threshold of war.

The next important reason to execute a strategy of improving economic infrastructure is that it promotes stability in unstable environments. As the Cato Institute reports,

…openness to the global economy can provide the infrastructure a developing economy needs for growth. Foreign capital can finance more traditional types of infrastructure, such as port facilities, power generation, and an internal transportation network, just as British capital helped to finance America’s network of canals and railroads in the nineteenth century. But just as importantly, multinational companies can provide an infrastructure of what could be called “enabling services,” such as telecommunications, insurance, accounting, and banking.¹⁹

Economic infrastructure supports licit economic growth by increasing the flow of goods and service into and out of a country. In addition, improving operations of certain infrastructure improves the control of illicit economic activities. Things like customs, security, transportation documentation, and other controlling activities assist in limiting the flow of illegal operations and could help reduce corruption. Construction, operation, and maintenance of economic infrastructure like ports, airfields, terminals, and the telecommunications networks supporting them generates sustainable employment opportunities and improves human capital. Building human capacity that provides meaningful training and work encourages a stable environment and offers an alternative to crime.

This proposed strategy for building security through global infrastructure development also supports the interests of myriad stakeholders. There are three major
categories of stakeholders: U.S. industry, the U.S. government, and partner nations. With President Trump’s “America First” policy, the most important stakeholder is the United States. Construction of economic infrastructure affects broad domestic and international commercial interests across multiple sectors of industry. These include the construction industry, the logistics and transportation industry, industrial maintenance, and material suppliers among others. Multiple departments, commands, and agencies of the U.S. government also are involved with planning and execution of this strategy. Finally, partner nations and their willing support are critical for creating long-term infrastructure improvement projects and mutually supporting relationships.

Significant commercial interests exist in the development and operation of economic infrastructure. Although beyond the scope of this paper to catalogue all of the potential stakeholders in the domestic and international markets, myriad commercial interests exist in the construction, operations, and maintenance of ports, rail facilities, telecommunication and road networks. There are significant U.S.-based, multinational corporations specializing in these types of projects. Bechtel is one example. Additionally, companies like Ports America or APM Terminals likely would be interested in operating new ports and expanding their global reach. It will be important for government stakeholders to work with appropriate industry partners to ensure the successful construction, operation, and maintenance of new or improved facilities. The economy of the United States would be among the primary beneficiaries of this strategy.

The proposed strategy for building security through global infrastructure development should satisfy multiple stakeholders within the United States government. The mission of the Department of State, for example, is to “advance the interests of the
American people, their safety and economic prosperity by leading America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance.\textsuperscript{20} This proposed strategy would require the Department of State to take a leadership role in synchronizing the execution of this strategy. The Department of Commerce would promote the interests of U.S. businesses and Commerce’s Foreign Commercial Service would play a role in the alignment of interested construction and transportation companies with infrastructure projects. Also, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) would be very interested in promoting projects like these in developing nations, in Africa for example, to foster stability and accelerate economic growth. Partner nations recovering from disasters or conflicts would benefit with this strategic approach.

This proposed strategy for building security through global infrastructure development also meets several interests within the US Department of Defense. The immense U.S. economic advantage provides unequaled force projection and logistics capabilities. The United States’ military is globally present and engaged. In 2017, almost 200,000 U.S. military personnel operated in 177 different countries.\textsuperscript{21} The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) operates all strategic, land, air, and sea capabilities for the Department of Defense. USTRANSCOM, along with the large industrial base of the United States, provides the ability to project forces globally within hours and to logistically support those forces over extended periods. At present however, the United States relies on existing infrastructure to deploy and improvements in this area can only enhance U.S. comparative advantage.

Development of dual-use economic infrastructure provides Geographic Combatant Commanders another tool to use in their Theater Campaign Plans.
Construction projects, logistics-related security cooperation activities, or combined exercises using new capabilities provide multiple opportunities to increase partner capacity while setting theaters of operation. The planning and development of new capabilities also provide an additional avenue of military-to-military dialogue and engagement.

An additional stakeholder within this strategy is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps provides engineering expertise in military construction and supports international partners through construction support of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procured construction projects. Currently, the Corps of Engineers supports pier projects in Umm Qasr, Iraq to improve the commercial and military viability of Iraq’s strategic seaport. This little used capability is a critical component of this strategy and will be fully discussed below.

United States and partner nation security interests are a primary consideration when developing “the where” to use this strategy. NATO and Eastern Europe provide an example. The current logistics capacity of Europe, especially Eastern Europe, is a limiting factor for military deployment and distribution operations. These limiting factors require the United States, through NATO, and the European Union to address these challenges in the near term based on Russian actions.

A key element necessary to ensure the efficient movement of supplies and equipment across Europe in support of NATO operations is the upgrading and standardizing of commercial infrastructure. NATO logistics operations rely on the commercial transportation system and its capabilities. Currently, Europe lacks the capacity to move large amounts of heavy military equipment. This capacity requires a
vast interoperable rail network, reinforced bridges, suitable roads, and rolling stock capable of moving armored vehicles to the point of employment.

Eastern Europe is especially in need of such infrastructure upgrades. Lessons from NATO exercises point to many challenges. For example, differences in rail gauges cause problems with the movement of equipment from ports in Germany to the eastern flank of the alliance. Many tunnels and bridges are not wide enough to support the movement of tanks. Tank-hauling commercial trucks are scarce and driving tanks destroys existing roads; moreover, material handling equipment at eastern European ports are not compatible with NATO materials, requiring the forward deployment of equipment to support discharge operations.

Opportunities to implement this strategy exist in Poland, Romania, and the Baltics.

As described, the strategy for building security through global infrastructure development supports national policy objectives. The strategy achieves multiple ends. First, the strategy promotes new or expanded economic infrastructure to enhance stability through improved economic activity. Second, infrastructure projects and associated activities ensure strategic access for the United States and operational access for its military through improved force projection/reception capabilities. Finally, this strategy provides an effective method of competing against growing Chinese and Russian influence.

This proposed global infrastructure development strategy uses three ways to achieve its ends. The strategy promotes infrastructure development in places where little exists---such as places like Western Africa, Iraq, or Yemen. This strategy for building security through global infrastructure development also strives to improve
existing infrastructure to increase interoperability or overcome existing mobility challenges. Eastern Europe is an appropriate example of this. Finally, this strategy seeks to improve the human capital associated with a country and its military through the use of commercial training and/or security cooperation activities, respectively. Each of these ways enable the United States to promote its interests while securing deeper relations with partners. These ways can counter Chinese and Russian activities or set theaters of operation in areas of potential contingency.

Finally, the means enabling the success of this strategy primarily involve different methods of funding these projects. In short, national, commercial, international, and military means are available; however, the Departments of State and Defense must first determine the type and intensity of interests involved. This analysis will affect how U.S. Embassy country team members diplomatically engage partners and stakeholders.

For example, if economic stability is the primary purpose, the country team could promote the use of host-nation national funds. The country team could promote the use of loans from the World Bank or other regional development banks. Based upon positive potential economic value, these loans would not become burdensome to the partner nation’s economy. Public-Private partnerships provide another creative means to build or improve infrastructure. Public-Private partnerships are typically long-term agreements between a government entity and a commercial one for mutual benefit. For instance, in 2015, the government of the Ukraine awarded a contract to a private company for upgrades at its state-owned Odessa Sea Commercial Port.25

Another means of commercial investment would be foreign direct investment by United States’ companies. The Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce could
identify opportunities or requirements in other countries and engage with private industry to seek mutually beneficial outcomes. This means also requires partner nation concurrence, as well as diplomatic activity to secure that concurrence.

A primarily military means could be the use of a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case routed through the Army Corps of Engineers as the implementing agency. FMS is a State Department program managed by the Department of Defense. Primarily used for military equipment and training, FMS contains a little used authority for construction. Using FMS as a vehicle for this strategy would place the Department of Defense in the lead. Geographic Combatant Commanders use FMS to achieve objectives in their Theater Campaign Plans (TCP). Using this strategy within the TCP and developing follow-on security cooperation activities can greatly enhance the capacity and capability of partner nations.

The Strategy Formulation Framework (SFF) requires an analysis of the proposed strategy to determine if it is suitable, acceptable, and feasible. The SFF further requires an analysis of the strategic risks associated with the strategy. First, this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development is suitable because it successfully addresses the need for the United States to compete with China and Russia using measures short of war. It also supports the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. The strategy is acceptable because it meets the strategic interests of the United States, and it meets the interests of partner nations, private industry, and internal stakeholders within the United States government. However, cost and profitability, are important considerations during implementation. Finally, this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development is
feasible. There are existing legal authorities, financial institutions, commercial capabilities, and military means to achieve the ends of the strategy.

Although this proposed strategy is balanced across its ends, ways, and means, it does possess external and implementation risk. This strategy aligns with the most recently published *National Security Strategy*. A change in administration would require a reevaluation of the current description of policy objectives. National interests can change and partner nations may not agree to U.S. actions in the future after receiving the economic benefits. Lastly, and fundamentally challenging, is motivating U.S. industry to act geostrategically in the national security interests of the United States. In this area, China has a clear advantage as the Chinese Communist Party governs much of China’s industry. The actions within the “one belt, one road” initiative demonstrate this as Chinese companies buy controlling interests in global strategic infrastructure as discussed previously.

From an implementation perspective, the risks involve financial failure and the necessity for oversight to prevent unintended consequences. The financial institutions involved should be reliable partners or the United States risks a loss of credibility. The U.S. companies involved should possess financial stability and be of solid reputation. Quality management is also important during the construction and maintenance phases as accidents, poor construction, and ultimately deterioration could cast a shadow on the United States.

Failure to adopt a strategy for building security through global infrastructure development could lead to opportunity costs. If the United States does not compete with China and Russia, the United States risks losing influence and jeopardizes the
international order established after World War II. China’s “one-belt, one-road” initiative is clearly extending its influence across the globe. China’s actions in the East China Sea, building islands and contesting shipping lanes, demonstrates its desire to resist U.S. influence regionally. Similarly, Russia is exerting its influence in its near abroad in Eastern Europe. The United States needs to act to counter these actors.

Improving partner logistics capacity and capability is valuable for the United States. Doing so provides economic opportunity and expands markets for U.S. businesses. Improving force projection capabilities reduces future costs of military operations. This strategy for building security through global infrastructure development increases opportunities for cooperation and demonstrates the United States resolve to maintain the current international order by supporting its allies, partners, and friends.

Articulating such a proposed strategy is only a first step. The United States must implement and oversee successful execution of it. The following discussion offers a potential approach for implementing the strategy for building security through global infrastructure development. The National Security Staff should draft an implementation policy for competing with China and Russia below the threshold of war using all the elements of national power in an innocuous way to achieve the enduring national interests within the National Security Strategy. Within this implementation guide are the ends, ways, and means of this paper. This action by the National Security Staff would necessarily align the government to achieve the ends of the National Security Strategy. The Department of State should be the lead agency of this implementation plan with the other departments in support. The Department of State possesses the necessary
diplomatic, economic, and security expertise to bring together the other departments on a strategic, regional, and country level to gain the appropriate coordination.

Next, the Departments of State and Defense should analyze the global environment and prioritize regions for potential implementation to counter Chinese and Russian activities and threats. The Department of Commerce also may contribute to this process based on its analysis of the flow of import and export activities. USAID also plays a role in this process by identifying development opportunities that would assist in the stability of the region. After prioritization of the regions through the interagency process and identification of projects, Geographic Combatant Commands and country teams could then identify opportunities for further prioritization and execution. The evaluation of opportunities should account for economic benefits, military benefits, development benefits, and geostrategic implications.28

Once the interagency process approves a country-level list of projects, country teams would work to gain approval and agreements with the host nation. Country teams would likely determine the appropriate means to apply to achieve the objectives. For example, in a nation like Djibouti, a Foreign Military Sales case funded with Foreign Military Finance funds may be a better option because of Djibouti’s fiscal posture. However, in Poland, a nationally-funded public-private partnership could be more appropriate. There are many variables and country experts are best positioned to determine the most feasible course of action.

The Department of Commerce could further develop relationships with likely industry leaders for infrastructure projects. Companies could competitively bid for government contracts or work directly with the partner nation. This option allows
industry to exercise its abilities and core competencies to the benefit of the nations involved. The earlier industry can be brought into the planning process, the better, as they are better suited to determine the scope and schedule of the project.

A potential model for this activity on a regional level is the former Task Force for Business Stability Operations. Although DOD managed this task force and focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, the concept is sound for broader application. The task force’s mandate included, “development of economic opportunities, including private investment, industrial development, banking and financial system development, agriculture diversification and revitalization, and energy development.” The establishment of a task force selected from elements of the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, and USAID may be an appropriate method of garnering the necessary collaboration to successfully execute this strategy. One task force per Regional Bureau or Geographical Combatant Command could potentially achieve required results. Positioning these task forces regionally assists with country team collaboration; however, the task forces will require offices in Washington, D.C. and potentially within Geographic Combatant Commands to meet broad coordination requirements. It is also important for this task force to use the capabilities of U.S. Transportation Command and the Army’s Transportation Engineering Agency within the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. These Department of Defense commands provide the military expertise necessary to ensure the military usefulness of current and new infrastructure. These organizations possess logistics requirements for contingencies and information on militarily useful global infrastructure.
As a second order consequence of the successful implementation of a strategy for building security through global infrastructure development, Geographic Combatant Commands and their Security Cooperation Offices can identify opportunities to improve the capability and capacity of partner nation forces to improve the flow of forces into their nation in support of cooperative defense agreements. Opportunities could include additional material handling equipment, training for logistics personnel, or combined exercises using existing, improved, or newly constructed infrastructure. Exchanges of military officers or professional military education opportunities for logistics officers would improve military-to-military coordination and execution of contingency operations. A change in the mindset of security cooperation professionals is needed to support this. It is not only important for partner nation security forces to secure themselves through lethal means; logistics interoperability with United States military forces also ensures their security.

Now is the time to implement this strategy. As already discussed, Chinese and Russian actions highlight the timeliness of the strategy presented in this paper. Instability in other regions that threaten U.S. interests reinforce the need to implement the strategy. The United States possesses the political and economic power to counter these actions and reassert its influence and reassure allies. The proposed strategy for building security through global infrastructure development harnesses U.S. power and aligns its government and industry to achieve geopolitical objectives.

In short, the strategy for building security through global infrastructure development by improving dual-use economic infrastructure supports the four enduring interests of the United States. This strategy provides a meaningful way to counter great
power threats and regional instability. The strategy also exercises the powerful commercial economic resources of the United States and encourages entrepreneurialism in the pursuit of strategic objectives. Successful implementation of this strategy leads to greater economic and military power for the partner nation and extends the military reach, economic influence, and prosperity of the United States. Finally, the proposed strategy to improve global dual-use economic infrastructure supports the enduring interests of the United States.

Endnotes


3 This definition is original to the author but is a synthesis of multiple definitions across academia.


5 Ibid., 2-2.


7 Ibid., 88.

8 Ibid., 85.

9 Ibid., 84.


11 Ibid., 4.

12 Ibid., 26.


24 Ibid.


Johnson, “Why is China Buying Up Europe’s Ports?”

Each project will require the development of appropriate metrics to ensure attainment of goals for all stakeholders. These metrics could include economic, military, and financial factors. Further discussion of these metrics exceeds the scope of this paper.