

Assessing Army Support to Joint Task Force Civil Support

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Abstract

The Department of Defense is required to maintain a Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Force (DCRF) at optimum readiness, capable of integrating into a larger interorganizational domestic response operation if needed within the United States. This study analyzes three significant issues caused by the 2014 decision to source the DCRF regionally. The first challenge was the negation of unity of command amongst sourced FORSCOM units while retained by the Service; this left each corps headquarters largely uninvolved. The second issue was a blurring of lines of responsibility between ARNORTH, JTF-CS, and FORSCOM on roles and responsibilities for training and readiness. The third was an unmet need to recognize the DCRF's Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (JRSOI) as a decisive point within a domestic CBRN response operation and to commit resources to practicing it during training. These three issues, if left unresolved, combine to greatly reduce the cohesion between DCRF units prior to mission execution, negatively affect the quality and efficiency of the critical life-saving capabilities they exist to provide, and impede the DCRF's ability to expeditiously flow in from around the nation and become available to help the larger interorganizational effort.

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If the DCRF ever gets called into action, then that means that America just had her worst day.

—MG William F. Roy¹

Many national security professionals characterize today's strategic environment using words such as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. Global competition between state and non-state actors for resources, influence, and leverage within the international order provide the backdrop from which strategic leaders derive national policy. Strategic leaders, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, use terms such as '4+1' to describe the major threats that exist to the United States. Would-be competitors are taking action(s) intentionally below the level of armed conflict in order to gain an advantage over the United States. Nuclear proliferation remains a constant concern.

As this tension and state of constant competition become the new normal, one thing remains constant: the need to "protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life."² Captured as the first pillar of the recently published National Security Strategy (NSS), this is an existential national interest. A worst-case scenario continues to be a successful Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) attack targeting the American Homeland. On the heels of a significant drawdown of military capacity and substantial cuts in Department of Defense (DoD) spending, many difficult choices are being made to figure out how best to support this protection effort. With shifting DoD budgeting priorities and competing focused readiness demands, it is important to thoroughly analyze the impacts of changing how the United States Army sources its Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) requirement in order to prevent an

unintentional weakening of the domestic CBRN response capabilities it is required to provide. “The DoD is identified as a support agency for nearly all of the 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) identified in the National Response Plan. Its component services have large amounts of material and personnel resources that could be brought to bear in response to a disaster.”³

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response

The DoD may be directed to respond to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) event under three possible scenarios. The first is an international event in which either the Department of State (DoS) or DoD are the lead federal agency. The second is a specific DoD CBRN response operation where the DoD is in charge. The third type is a domestic CBRN response in which DoD forces are required to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead federal agency.⁴ One of the designated homeland security missions for DHS is to strengthen national preparedness and resilience. DHS enhances national preparedness, in part, by “building and sustaining core capabilities nationally to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from all hazards.”⁵ In order to meet the requirements of this support to the DHS, DoD maintains a CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE) under the combatant command of NORTHCOM.⁶

The CRE is designed to permit a graduated response in the event that a domestic CBRN event generates requirements that cannot successfully be met by local, county, state, or other federal assets. Three types of National Guard elements comprise the initial responding forces within the CRE. They are the state-owned Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP), and Homeland Response Forces (HRF). The second echelon of

the CRE, if required, is the DCRF. The final echelon of the CRE are the two Command and Control CBRN Response Elements (C2CRE).

This study focuses exclusively on the impacts of the 2014 decision to source the DCRF using a regional construct. But before laying out that assessment, it is necessary to understand the general framework of the DCRF. The DCRF is designed to be a scalable and tailorable task force, capable of supporting a larger interorganizational response that may include the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and other entities. The DCRF provides six core capabilities: identification and detection of contaminants, technical and non-technical search and rescue in a contaminated environment, mass casualty decontamination, medical triage and stabilization, air and ground evacuation, and mission command.⁷ To that end, the DCRF consists of five functional task forces for aviation, medical, expeditionary signal support, logistics, and operations. The operations task force consists of three identical battalion task forces, considered to be the foundational building blocks of the DCRF.⁸

Military support during CBRN response activities are generally considered to flow through a series of six operational phases. Joint Publication 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response*, provides an in-depth description of each phase. The phases may be summarized in sequence by the dominant activity of military forces during each. DoD shapes the environment (Phase 0), anticipates the necessity to respond (Phase I), responds to the affected area (Phase II), operates in support of the lead federal agency (Phase III), assists with stabilizing the situation (Phase IV), and

transitions out of the interorganizational response force once their assistance is no longer required (Phase V).

2012 Mission Analysis and the Road to a Regional Sourcing Solution

In response to published guidance in 2012, the Commanding General of NORTHCOM directed that mission analysis be conducted in order to find ways to improve the Federal component of the CRE for years to come. There were concerns that the current sourcing construct was not optimized to deliver the full complement of required Title 10 capabilities to a designated base support installation (BSI) within the required timelines for the initial force package as well as the secondary force package. Planners were asked to look for ways to improve the efficiency of the domestic deployment process as well as to produce options conducive for a sustained sourcing solution. Sourced units would still be required to work seamlessly together in order to achieve unity of effort, but in a way that would reduce training and operating costs.⁹

During the course of the Mission Analysis, the primary interest of United States Army North (ARNORTH), designated to serve as the Joint Land Force Component Command (JFLCC) by NORTHCOM, was the timely arrival of participating units to wherever the affected area was within the continental United States. Unlike the majority of scheduled military deployments from home station which require strategic lift assets, a federal response to a domestic CBRN incident is activated on no notice and is consequently required to be executed within a matter of hours, versus days or weeks. For sourced units to arrive at the affected area on time, they must be able to depart from home station ports of embarkation (POE) without any type of delay. "The more units sourced from a single installation creates a choke point at the POE, delaying the response time of the enterprise."¹⁰

In addition to providing the required capabilities to the Combatant Command, the primary interest of the dominant service force provider, FORSCOM, was to provide predictability to its supporting corps headquarters. During the timeframe between 2013 and 2015, the Army's I Corps, III Corps, and XVIII Airborne Corps were carefully managing concurrent deployment requirements in support of combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria as well as other deployments in support of the Army's transition to the regionally aligned force construct. Not to be overlooked, this was also the period in which federal budget sequestration began to significantly stress the readiness and planning for the three Corps. A DCRF activation will require the release of up to the equivalent of a full brigade combat team to NORTHCOM in a matter of hours. FORSCOM approached the mission analysis from a perspective of trying to disperse the volatile effects of an immediate deployment of that magnitude as much as possible.

Three sourcing courses of action were identified and considered. The first was the status quo sourcing construct in place for Fiscal Year 2014, in which units were sourced without any Senior Commander linkage from a pool of whatever was available. The second option involved sourcing the preponderance of the DCRF units from within the same infantry brigade combat team from a major installation along the Eastern Seaboard. The third course of action featured a regional sourcing solution, designed to draw roughly one third of the DCRF support package from each of the three contributing U.S. Army Corps.¹¹

The regional sourcing solution was ultimately approved and scheduled to achieve initial operational capability in 2016 and full operational capability in 2017.¹² From the

onset of implementation, this sourcing solution seemed to address the primary concerns of all major stakeholders. The distributed nature of the participating Title 10 units rendered moot the ARNORTH planners' concerns of log-jammed ports of embarkation and the potential for causing delayed enterprise response. By deliberately structuring the response force in a way that includes one battalion- sized task force from installations on the West Coast, one from America's Heartland, and one from the East Coast, ARNORTH felt that it was now postured to provide uniform geographic coverage in the event of a response throughout the Nation.

Furthermore, the arraying of enterprise units throughout the country in this way, prevents the possibility that a single natural disaster or targeted attack could delay the preponderance of NORTHCOM's response capability from arriving to an affected area on time. In addition, Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), the division-level command and control node for DCRF forces under ARNORTH, began to actively plan for this geographic coverage. Planners adopted the notion that the location of the CBRN event would determine which Battalion Task Force arrived first. Furthermore, the proximity of the affected area to the home station(s) of the initial responding Battalion Task Force could determine its mode of transit. It was now reasonable to conclude that the nearest battalion just might arrive faster by driving itself to the designated BSI rather than waiting for strategic lift assets needed in order to fly in.

By sourcing the DCRF in this way, FORSCOM successfully diffused the volatile impacts of a no-notice DCRF activation across three subordinate Corps headquarters. It fulfilled the supported Combatant Commander's requirements while simultaneously preserving as much predictability as possible for the supporting Corps.

Second Order Effects of Regional Sourcing

There are numerous positive features about the regional DCRF sourcing construct as discussed above. This study will analyze three significant challenges its implementation causes as second order effects. The first challenge is the negation of unity of command amongst sourced FORSCOM units while retained by the Service; this left each corps headquarters largely uninvolved. The second issue was a blurring of lines of responsibility between ARNORTH, JTF-CS, and FORSCOM on roles and responsibilities for training and readiness. The third was an unmet need to recognize the DCRF's Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (JRSOI) as a decisive point within a domestic CBRN response operation and to commit resources to practicing it during training. These three issues, if left unresolved, combine to greatly reduce the cohesion between DCRF units prior to mission execution, negatively affect the quality and efficiency of the critical life-saving capabilities they exist to provide, and impede the DCRF's ability to expeditiously flow in from around the nation and become available to help the larger interorganizational effort.

How did this happen? The calculus used during the command directed mission analysis in 2012 focused on optimizing efficiencies across the entire CBRN Response Enterprise during its movement towards the BSI and the affected area. Phase II, or the 'Respond' Phase, involves deployment of DCRF forces to key theater nodes and to the Joint Operational Area (JOA) in order to "save lives, minimize human suffering, and maintain public confidence."¹³ Time is certainly of the essence. However, the strategic logistic and transportation benefits of the selected geographic sourcing solution came at the cost of simple unity of command and clarity of roles and responsibilities at the operational and tactical levels during earlier operational phases. During Phase 0, the

'Shaping' Phase, the strategic level objectives which include planning, conferences, and exercises with interagency partners remained unaffected. The operational and tactical objectives, however, centered on preparing the designated supporting units "in order to ensure readiness conditions are sustained for execution of CBRN response operations" and "building command relationships" were significantly impinged.¹⁴

Unity of Command Negated below the level of Forces Command (FORSCOM)

Prior to assessing the issues caused with unity of command, it is imperative to understand how unity of effort and unity of command are related in a domestic CBRN response environment. As one of the 12 current principles of Joint Operations, *unity of command* is defined as a condition wherein "all participating [military] forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose."¹⁵ This condition applies across all of the participating military forces in an operation but does not account for interagency or interorganizational coordination during a domestic CBRN response. In this case, rather, achieving unity of effort is of paramount importance. *Unity of effort* is defined as "coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure."¹⁶ Unity of effort is so important that it is one of the five guiding principles that establish doctrine for the National Response Framework (NRF).¹⁷ The inherent nature of DCRF forces operating in support of other agencies and/or organizations during a domestic CBRN response requires an explicit understanding of how to achieve 'unity of effort' without being able to achieve 'unity of command.'

Next, it is instructive to understand how and when command relationships change for DCRF units throughout the mission. Active Component units are allocated to

NORTHCOM, but Service-retained, for a minimum of two years when supporting the DCRF mission. The first year, aptly named the 'Road to Readiness,' begins when a sourcing decision is made in May. It includes all progressive training activities from initial JTF-CS orientation and academics through a DCRF external evaluation. The Road to Readiness concludes some 13 months later when those units assume the mission in June. The second year, referred to as the 'Road to Response,' begins with mission assumption in June and includes the twelve-month period when that DCRF unit remains on call and is postured to deploy.

During a DCRF unit's two-year period of allocation, NORTHCOM is only guaranteed to assume operational control (OPCON) of it for two major training events.¹⁸ In practice, this occurs briefly each Spring for the external evaluation and each Fall for a major sustainment training event. In the event of an actual domestic CBRN event, NORTHCOM assumes OPCON of DCRF units only after they arrive within the JOA. OPCON is further delegated to ARNORTH and quickly to JTF-CS once units complete JRSOI. While at the BSI, JTF-CS may reconfigure the task organization of the DCRF based upon the exact scenario it is responding to and how quickly units are able to arrive. Upon completion of the mission and departure from the JOA, NORTHCOM relinquishes OPCON back to the Service.¹⁹ This is important to understand because the typical DCRF unit will remain under its normal home station command relationship for roughly 22 out of the 24 months spent within the Road to Readiness and Road to Response.

The move to a regional sourcing solution for DCRF in 2016 effectively set conditions where the lowest common denominator for participating DCRF units each

year was actually FORSCOM. The resultant tensions and friction points in unity of command are best understood when examined through the four different vantage points of FORSCOM Headquarters, the Corps Headquarters, JTF-CS, and the participating units.

From the FORSCOM perspective, the main challenge was to figure out how to generate buy in from the multiple Corps commanders and their respective staffs for this mission. By design, each of the corps headquarters was responsible for fragments of the force package, but none could be appointed as accountable for the whole set; a set that spent the majority of its time in a service-retained status. In practice, the Corps who organically owned the brigade headquarters, dual hatted as the DCRF Task Force Operations Headquarters, could be counted on to step forward in order to anticipate pointed lines of inquiry from the FORSCOM Commander prior to mission assumption. But this was a personality-based phenomenon; not one rooted in process or directive. By late 2015, the DCRF was comprised of 83 distinct units from 33 different camps, posts, or stations within the continental United States.²⁰ Some of those units were as small as squads or teams.

To further complicate matters, FORSCOM's span of control needed to be double that of one year's worth of DCRF units due to the overlap between the current year's Road to Response and the next year's Road to Readiness. For example, Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 DCRF units were working through their pre-mission training progression and certification while the 2015 DCRF units were actually on the mission. FORSCOM was responsible for both, but unable to delegate authority down to any single Corps Commander to provide unity of command at the operational level. Corps Commanders

were required to sign certification memoranda for all of their units preparing to assume the DCRF mission, but tangible evidence of command emphasis in many cases seemed lacking. They were simply not built squarely into the process.²¹

The Corps perspective is also important to consider. After 2014, several of the same Corps headquarters were rotating between home station and their own deployments as Combined Joint Task Forces. This was the case during the 2016 VIBRANT RESPONSE External Evaluation when the Task Force Operations Commander answered directly to the FORSCOM Commanding General because the organic Corps Headquarters was deployed. Despite FORSCOM's proactivity in dealing with three different Corps' training calendars and JTF-CS' enduring flexibility, inevitable scheduling fratricide takes its toll on DCRF unit availability for the two major collective training events per year. As an example, the Task Force Operations headquarters was largely absent from the 2016 SUDDEN RESPONSE Exercise because it was concurrently tasked to support a Corps Warfighter Exercise. Designed as the pre-eminent sustainment collective training event during the Road to Response that year, units from around the country deployed to Fort Hood to find out that their functional higher headquarters within DCRF would not be able to participate in the training event.

Complicating the issue of Corps buy-in, a significant portion of the training and certification required for DCRF units prior to mission assumption is very prescriptive in nature and highly technical. ARNORTH is tasked by NORTHCOM to execute its Training, Exercises, and Evaluation Program (TEEP) in accordance with the NORTHCOM Commander's training guidance.²² It is unusual for non-deployed forces to be subject to a Combatant Commander's training guidance. And unlike the vast majority

of other deployments that it supports, neither the Corps nor FORSCOM are structured to contain the subject matter expertise necessary to conduct the required pre-mission training. Gaps in technical training are filled by specialized trainers from ARNORTH and one of its subordinate organizations, the Civil Support Training Activity (CSTA).²³ This necessary outsourcing of training further contributed to the corps' seemingly phlegmatic approach to the DCRF mission.

Similar to FORSCOM, JTF-CS planners must maintain working relationships with two entire sets of DCRF units at a time: those sourced against the current year and the those sourced against the next year. The service-retention of those units combined with the difficulty of FORSCOM to delegate command and control to a single corps headquarters, creates an environment where JTF-CS often unofficially communicates directly with units at multiple echelons in order to plan and prepare for the major collective training events within the TEEP. When this communication is not properly socialized with FORSCOM, tension results.²⁴

The impacts of this disunity of command are compounded at the tactical level. Working relationships between fellow DCRF units and command relationships between lower and higher echelon DCRF task force headquarters are built on the strength of commanders' personalities and their ability to coordinate outside of formal channels. A clear-cut example of this dysfunction comes in the form of expectations for collective training prior to the culminating external evaluation. The combatant commander expects the DCRF battalion commanders to be able to ensure that each of their supporting technical companies has completed a litany of requirements prior to starting collective

training and evaluation, however, there exists no formal command authority between these units prior to their arrival and task organization by JTF-CS at the BSI.²⁵

Regional sourcing of the DCRF accidentally shaped the training and readiness environment to compel the participating units and the organic headquarters who support them to work together in ways completely outside of formal authority channels. Strength of character and a common commitment to the cause over the last several years have masked the difficulty created by subjecting these military units into an arrangement where they must achieve unity of effort without enjoying the simplicity of unity of command. That is not supposed to happen within the United States Military.

The Bifurcated Nature of a DCRF Train Up

The second major issue is the clear delineation of roles, responsibilities, and equities for training during the Road to Readiness and the Road to Response. The culminating training event (CTE) each year during the Road to Readiness is the VIBRANT RESPONSE (VR) Exercise. “VR is a USNORTHCOM-sponsored joint exercise used to confirm the training and readiness of DCRF and C2CRE command and control.”²⁶ It serves as the DCRF units’ external evaluation. The companion exercise during the Road to Response the following year is the SUDDEN RESPONSE (SR) Exercise. “SR is an annual command post exercise for JTF-CS to test procedures and collaborative efforts while activating the DCRF allocated forces.”²⁷ SR is a sustainment training opportunity normally scheduled to occur between six and nine months after the DCRF assumes the mission. This exercise often mitigates the effects of key personnel turnover sustained across the DCRF during the Summer months since mission assumption.

The importance of these two major annual exercises cannot be overstated. There are no shortages of key stakeholders who arrive in force to participate, each with differing equities. FORSCOM and corps representatives focus on the usual mission command systems of the brigade and battalion task force headquarters. JTF-CS officials focus on the units' ability to come together quickly, form as a task force, remain modular for the sake of operational flexibility, move towards the response location, and conduct effective linkup with the appropriate civil authorities. ARNORTH contractors focus on the highly technical aspects of chemical/radiological decontamination and urban search and rescue. CSTA contractors focus on ensuring that Title 10 forces understand how to navigate through the processes required within the Incident Command System (ICS), a component of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) used during domestic CBRN response. Finally, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) staff officers are focused on the experimentation with and adherence to the Army's current CBRN doctrine.

When not carefully synchronized by the exercise host, competing training objectives between stakeholders derails significant training opportunity for the intended training audience. 'Observer controller overmatch' can (and often does) leave participating DCRF units in complete confusion. Due to the geographic dispersion of DCRF units and the non-concrete nature of their mission task organization, these culminating training exercises are often the only two times within 24 months, that they have the opportunity to train together.

The two major culminating training events serve as a guaranteed forcing function for training and evaluation at the higher echelons, ARNORTH and CSTA conduct

technical training and certification at the company and platoon level for search and rescue operations, mass decontamination line operations, and CBRN threat reconnaissance operations. They are required to do this in order for the DCRF to be in compliance with interagency requirements during a domestic CBRN response. The greatest single weakness to date in the DCRF Road to Readiness training strategy has been the lack of forcing function in the middle echelon, the Battalion Task force and supposed building block of the enterprise. And as already discussed, the subject matter expertise does not reside within FORSCOM or the contributing corps to plan, execute, or evaluate DCRF training at that level.

The JTF-CS and FORSCOM collaborated on a major effort in 2017 to redesign the DCRF training strategy. The impetus for the major overhaul was to correct a pattern where “the FORSCOM DCRF training requirements are not mandated to the unit level through their higher headquarters, nor scheduled for execution (no forcing function), creating unpredictability in forecasting, resource allocation and lost training resulting in reduced mission readiness and jeopardizing future funding.”²⁸ Rebranded as the DCRF Road to Readiness and Response (DR3), the new plan served three primary purposes. It assigned explicit ownership of all progressive training events to ensure scheduling and compliance. It established a two-year planning template in order to give oncoming units predictability. It further extended that template out to five years so that future corps and division headquarters would know what to expect.²⁹

The DR3 plan has only been in place for about six months at the time of this study. The preliminary feedback is still pending. It is worth noting that XVIII Airborne Corps is significantly involved in the Road to Readiness for the oncoming DCRF in FY

2018. It is unclear at this time if that is a function of the corps commander's personal preference or if it is the result of a structural change taken by FORSCOM. JTF-CS is deploying to each Task Force Battalion's home station to facilitate a proper field training exercise prior to Exercise VIBRANT RESPONSE in which multiple supporting DCRF units are participating. The full impact of this revised strategy will not be realized until the following year when the FY 2018 version of DCRF units has progressed through both years.

The Strategic Importance of JRSOI

The final major issue is the increased importance of conducting a proper JRSOI of the DCRF when sourcing the mission regionally. As many as 83 responding units from up to 33 separate installations will be attempting to converge on a single BSI in a time-constrained and calamitous environment. It is strategically important to conduct JRSOI correctly and efficiently. Not only is it the tangible action which transfers OPCON of those forces from NORTHCOM to JTF-CS, but it is "essential for mission accomplishment and protection of the joint force."³⁰ It accomplishes four other significant actions. It coordinates, synchronizes and tracks the arrival of multiple units in real time. It permits the JTF-CS task organization to be built with unity of command established. JRSOI establishes DoD's participating structure before that structure folds into an interorganizational response effort. Finally, it speeds critical resources into the affected area where American lives literally hang in the balance.

During a domestic CBRN response operation, it is the responsibility for the JFLCC to ensure that assets are in place within enough time to conduct JRSOI. ARNORTH serves as the JFLCC in this capacity for NORTHCOM. As recently as the VIBRANT RESPONSE and SUDDEN RESPONSE exercises conducted in 2015, the

JFLCC did not provide JRSOI support to the arriving units. That critical task was handled either by the advance party of the JTF-CS or by the arriving units, themselves. A significant portion of participating DCRF units' training time was devoted to accomplishing their own JRSOI and departure, rather than replicating how it would work under pressure in a real-world scenario. Regional sourcing already restricts collective training opportunities for DCRF units but diverting some of that limited time to replicating JRSOI compounds the problem. For as decisive an event as JRSOI is, there is great risk in not exploiting every opportunity to practice that activity by the organization(s) who will do it when it counts.

The positive news is that ARNORTH recognized this missed training opportunity and the negative impact it had on participating DCRF units in 2017 and has officially developed a policy to incorporate an Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) in all future CRE exercises in order to acquire critical repetitions and practice in conducting JRSOI.

Recommendations

Of the three significant challenges discussed in this study, there are exploratory solutions for two of them currently in progress. In 2017, ARNORTH and JTF-CS maximized collaboration with FORSCOM to redesign and assign specific roles and responsibilities during all facets of the 'Road to Readiness' and the 'Road to Response.' As of this report, that progressive training model is one third of the way through its first iteration. It will need to be assessed and studied through completion of the second full year before considering further amendment. 2017 and 2018 also mark the first time that an ESC will be provided by ARNORTH to conduct JRSOI for DCRF units participating in both major training exercises. This provides a degree of realism for DCRF units and

allows JTF-CS to focus on establishing its own initial operating capability (IOC) rather than role playing as the JFLCC. It will further test and expose any friction points in ARNORTH's ability to establish a BSI node in a very restricted amount of time. In addition to providing real world JRSOI for DoD disaster relief from 2017 Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, this is an extraordinarily positive step for ARNORTH to obtain valuable practice in performing this function. Contributions from the designated ESC are now codified in the 2017 version of JTF-CS operational plans.

The major remaining challenge is how to fill the mission command role for DCRF units below the level of FORSCOM while they remain in a Service-retained status. "FORSCOM's current core methodology places the responsibility for certification, confirmation, and validation of each battalion task force under their respective corps chain of command. FORSCOM then designates one Corps Commander as the responsible commander for the culminating training event."³¹ As a service provider, FORSCOM is ill equipped to manage 83 units for DCRF readiness and training without the benefit of a general officer headquarters providing mission command at a lower echelon. Sourcing one brigade's worth of units from across three Corps continues to challenge those units' ability to coordinate and exercise mission command while service retained. If regional sourcing remains in place, then FORSCOM should figure out an enduring process to designate one of its subordinate Corps headquarters to act as a facilitator during the 'Road to Readiness' as well as the training portions of the 'Road to Response.' It must enable that Corps headquarters and the DCRF function taskforce headquarters with the means to exert formal authority over subordinate DCRF units from other Corps with respect to DCRF training and readiness requirements.

Furthermore, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must continue to look for ways to include an orientation to Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations and interorganizational support in the professional military education (PME) for field grade and flag officers. This will socialize the unique challenges and operating conditions inherent in these types of missions where the military must contribute to unity of effort without enjoying unity of command.

Conclusion

The DoD remains committed to doing its part in defending the Homeland from those who seek to threaten it. NORTHCOM, ARNORTH, and JTF-CS continue to facilitate a learning environment across the DCRF community of interest in order to capitalize on valuable lessons learned and to improve the manner in which DoD provides support to a domestic CBRN response within the larger DSCA umbrella of operations. As significant sources of tension are identified, planners work together to recommend changes in order to provide sustainable sourcing solutions at an acceptable level of risk to the mission and risk to the Force. The 2014 decision to regionally source the DCRF requirement across three supporting Corps is sustainable but has room for improvement. Half way through its first scheduled year at full operational capability, FORSCOM, ARNORTH and JTF-CS are working diligently to resolve the unintended effects.

The next chapter will require creative thought on how to mitigate a significant procedural gap in oversight and command influence below the level of FORSCOM. It is imperative that supporting Corps headquarters be involved in the process, especially when their forces are on alert to protect the Homeland. Army units, when properly equipped and trained will excel in an interorganizational environment, framed on the

backdrop of unity of effort. Sourcing those units from a construct within DoD that denies them unity of command for the majority of their time as Service-retained makes this critical mission much more difficult to prepare for. The Service owes it to these units and to the Nation to provide this unique capability at the most optimum level.

Endnotes

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¹⁰ Johnny Lairsey, Planner, U.S. Army Northern Command, email interview by author, January 4, 2018.

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¹⁶ US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 12, 2017), V-1, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf (accessed January 20, 2018).

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