

Strategy Research Project

Accumulation of Degradation Sustainment Force Structure Imbalance

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Abstract

As the Army postures to grow and modernize, it is critical to rebalance the Active and Reserve components Sustainment Force Structure that is required to meet the demands of the combatant commanders. This study will focus on the reasons behind an imbalance of the Army's sustainment and logistics force structure between the Active and Reserve components, through a concept called, Accumulation of Degradation (AoD). It identifies four critical contributing factors of AoD; The Total Force Concept (TFC), budget restrictions, Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, and modularization through the creation of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The impact of these elements on Army sustainment operations include: a logistics force that is not aligned to the current and future threat environment, an inability to rapidly mobilize sustainment units, decreased availability of critical sustainment capabilities such as petroleum distribution, and a heavy reliance on contractor support to bridge the gaps. In addition, it will highlight the implications and provide recommendations needed to achieve better balance in sustainment operations and increase readiness during times of fiscal constraint.

Accumulation of Degradation Sustainment Force Structure Imbalance

The U.S. must restore the readiness of our forces and grow the size of the force...operating at sufficient scale and for ample duration to win across the range of scenarios.

—President Trump¹

Today, the Army is smaller, less modernized, and unable to build logistic formations needed to meet the demands of the combatant commanders. Since 2009, the Active Duty Army reduced its end strength by over 100,000 soldiers, from a height of 566,000 active duty in 2011 to 469,973 in 2017 as a result of drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan.² Continuing resolutions, sequestration, and reductions to the overall Department of Defense (DOD) budget, impacted the Army's ability to maintain a healthy balance of logistical units, leaving critical sustainment enablers at risk.³ Although the effects are Army-wide, this paper will focus on the reasons behind an imbalance of the Army's sustainment and logistics force structure between the Active and Reserve components, through a concept called, Accumulation of Degradation (AoD). In addition, it will highlight the implications and provide recommendations needed to achieve better balance in sustainment operations and increase readiness during times of fiscal constraint.

Accumulation of Degradation is a series of budget-driven decisions over time that created a negative impact on the Army's sustainment and logistics force structure. The results decreased readiness over time, as it either removed or moved spaces "personnel," and resources from existing force structures to build new force structure. The enduring effects caused a fluctuation of Active and Reserve sustainment force structure over time leading to what many leaders consider a sustainment imbalance.

The concept derived from various contributing factors; the budget, senior leader guidance, the Total Force Concept, and the Total Army Analysis. Accumulation of Degradation is essentially the “snowball effect” of many decisions made presumably for the right reason, at the right time and can be thought of as the residual effects of military drawdowns. Budget-driven decisions often accept risk in sustainment and readiness in favor of more immediate force modernization efforts, impacting the Army’s “fight tonight” mentality, as identified by many senior leaders to include the Army Chief of Staff General (GEN) Milley and the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain in Senate hearings.⁴

Accumulation of Degradation on Sustainment Operations

Accumulation of Degradation describes a trade-off process by which force developers create new units and capabilities resourced with the personnel and funds from existing units responsible for maintaining a ready and agile force. Accumulation of Degradation resulted in the Army’s Sustainment Force Structure and Logistic Enablers to shift from the Active Component to the Reserve Component (See Figure 1). The change is a result of several decisions made based on a combination of four drivers: The Total Force Concept (TFC), budget restrictions, Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, and modularization through the creation of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). Each of the four drivers contributes to AoD and can be examined over time during crucial events throughout the past decades; Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Modularity, and today facing future sustainment requirements in support of a Multi-Domain Battle.

Today, the impact of these elements on Army sustainment operations include: a logistics force not aligned to the current and future threat environment, an inability to

rapidly mobilize sustainment units, decreased the availability of critical sustainment capabilities such as petroleum distribution, and a heavy reliance on contractor support to bridge the gaps. Despite these challenges, Army personnel is expected to provide the majority of the logistics support for multiple services, host nations and in multiple domains simultaneously.




Figure 1. AoD in Sustainment Operations⁵

Roles of Sustainment Organizations

As the U.S. draws down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, some argue the roles and responsibility of sustainment and logistics organizations in support of the Army Operating Concept (AOC), *Win in a Complex World of 2020 – 2040*, are not as mission critical. The new AOC states the Army must posture and be ready to provide multiple options, integrate our efforts with allies, and operate across multiple domains, which becomes difficult to accomplish without sustainment forces.⁶ As shown in a Government

Accounting Office (GAO) report, “When the Army reduced its end strength, the priority was given to retain combat capability while accepting risk by divesting of Army enabler units.”⁷

Although senior leader decisions to divest logistical units are made given the best choices at this time, they are unable to understand some of the 2nd and 3rd order effects of their decisions have to sustainment missions. As an example, not only does AoD impact its own readiness, AoD effects the Army’s ability to provide assurance and readiness of its allies. Second, commanders can expect fewer resources to execute DOD strategies derived from National policy. This will impact the Army’s ability to rapidly respond to the crisis in support of combatant commanders, prohibiting the ability to scale-up and sustain land forces throughout the conflict and to contingency operations including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. ⁸

Risk of AoD on Sustainment Operations

The decision to divest the Active duty sustainment force structure to the Reserves creates risk in mobilization, readiness, availability, capacity, and capability of sustainment enablers required for the next fight. The risk lies in assuming the capability will be readily available when needed just as if it were in the Active duty. However, this is unlikely to be the case. For example, portions of the 82nd Airborne Division can rapidly deploy in 48 to 72 hours. However, it takes over three weeks for combat loaded M1 Abrams to arrive with enough active duty logistics components to become fully effective. By moving the most critical logistical elements, Petroleum and transportation assets into the Reserve component, this timeline increases to 90 to 120 days until mission effective decreasing the Army’s ability to provide operational reach when setting the theater. As an example, the Army divested 90% of Active component petroleum

sustainment into the Army Reserves creating a gap in petroleum force structure needed within the first 60 – 90 days of a major deployment.⁹ Shortfalls in deployment enablers associated with sustainment in the active component suggest the Army will incur significant risk by limiting the capabilities required to carry out major contingencies. A key mission that enables the U.S. to achieve the strategic advantage.¹⁰ It is critical to reverse or mitigate the eroding concept of AoD on the Army's ability to maintain strategic flexibility and operational reach.

Four Drivers of Accumulation of Degradation Decisions

To mitigate the effects of AoD on organizations responsible for sustainment operations, senior leaders must first understand the strategic environment, including the drivers of AoD. These drivers impact a commander's ability to ensure assets are postured to meet the potential demand. The four drivers of AoD on sustainment operations include: The Army's TFC, the defense budget, TAA and the creation of BCTs.

Collectively, these four drivers created an environment that led to decreased investment in sustainment operations in favor of combat force structure and capability modernizations. While it is necessary to shift personnel and resources during times of military drawdowns to invest in readiness or modernization efforts, the effects of AoD and the resulting imbalance on sustainment forces between the Active component and Reserve component comes with risk.

TFC Drives AoD Decisions

History suggests the Army's TFC, which is a doctrinal concept aimed at conserving the force structure and organize the Reserve Component forces contributed to AoD throughout the last 50 years. Although the main purpose of TFC was to prevent

the President from excessive use of military funds and resources following Vietnam, the long-term effects on the readiness of sustainment units continue today.¹¹ At the end of the Vietnam War, the Army faced a significant decline in defense spending, requiring a re-allocation of resources through the TFC. The concept applied to all planning, programming, manning, equipping and the employment of the Reserve and Active components.¹²

Degradation of sustainment capability following the Vietnam War came at the expense of combat sustainment units, as the Army went from 19 2/3 divisions in 1968 to 13 divisions in 1974. By 1978, the Army realized it had inadequate resources to support a European fight and chose to return to 16 divisions to the active component. However, the decision only returned divisional forces; leaving over 70 percent of combat sustainment forces in the Reserve component.¹³ This policy set the stage for senior leaders accepting risk within combat service support units, creating an AoD to sustainment capabilities at the expense of the future force. Also, creating an overall presumption that the general risk to our national security is too "high" due to a mismatch in sustainment force structure as a result of decisions made not to invest in logistics enablers within the Active component. However, this is often viewed as "mitigated" by senior leaders because of the *Army Total Force Policy*.

In 2008, Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates understood budget cuts were imminent despite a growing requirement to maintain a ready force. The existing TFC needed to adapt to the 21st-century wars the Reserves and National Guard have been operating. Secretary Gates understood the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan included a fully integrated Reserve and National Guard. According to Gates, "The operational

demands placed upon the Active component require Reserve component integration as a paramount component of national security including key sustainment functions."¹⁴

To achieve this balance, Secretary Gates established a policy for managing the Reserve Component by assigning specific responsibilities to the service secretaries.¹⁵ These responsibilities included ensuring force rebalancing is conducted adjusting to a right force mix which considers both Active and Reserve capabilities and capacities.¹⁶ To successfully meet the demands of the National Security Strategy and future wars, all three components, the Active, Reserve, and National Guard needed to be balanced. However, the policy did not synchronize the procedures or roles of how each component would do this. Although this was likely done to improve flexibility across the components during times of war and peace, it leads some to speculate whether or not sustainment functions balance in a way that did not diminish readiness. To further implement and synchronize a Department of Defense Directive (DODD) Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force, by Secretary of the Army John McHugh issued Army Directive 2012-08, to facilitate the integration of the Army's Active Component and Reserve Component as the *Army Total Force Policy*. The directive states:

DOD policies require the military departments to organize, man train and equip their active and reserve components as an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring, and sustainable capabilities. The Total Force must be part of Army strategy and planning to fulfill national military needs.¹⁷

Secretary McHugh synchronized the total force to ensure it was organized, trained, sustained, equipped and employed adequately to support combatant commander requirements.¹⁸ Accomplishing this remains a tricky balancing act to ensure the combatant commanders requirements are being met, specifically to meet the

demands of a Multi-Domain Battle construct. To achieve the correct balance, all DOD services are directed in U.S. Title 10 to “define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program of the United States associated with the national defense strategy.”¹⁹ However, in a report to the Secretary of Defense in 2014, discovered the Army over the past five years have not assessed or made specific recommendations on what the right mix of Active and Reserve force structure is needed to meet current and future national defense needs as directed.²⁰ The ATRP remains in effect today impacting how Army addresses what the proper Active and Reserve force mix is one contributor to AoD on sustainment operations.

Budget Drives AoD Decisions

A primary influence and factor within the AoD concept are how DOD budget directly impacts senior leader decisions on risk. Each key event is a period of several choices; requiring senior leaders, and force development planners to adjust Army force structure. Most adjustments during these critical events caused a fluctuation of Active and Reserve sustainment force structure over time leading to what many leaders consider a sustainment imbalance.

The Army endured many force reductions and shrinking budgets while fighting wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. These budgetary constraints impacted how future sustainment units were created, causing an accumulation of bill payers to build combat power for the Combatant Commanders. The *Budget Control Act of 2011* (BCA), signed into law by President Obama, intended to reduce the overall budget deficit by imposing restrictions on spending, commonly known as “sequester.”²¹ Additionally, three other pieces of legislation were signed into law that further extended mandatory

sequestration, and slightly raised caps on defense and non-defense discretionary spending to offset the significant degradation to the DOD: The *American Tax Payer Relief Act* FY2013, The *Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013*, and *Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015*. All three resulted in prolonging sequestration until FY2021 despite a growing force requirement for missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. The budget restraints created a "hollow force," one that appears to be mission-ready on paper, but has several shortcomings particularly in sustainment operations that become evident when the force is called upon to conduct a wartime mission.²² General Odierno points to the effects of sequestration as the reason for increased reliance on the Reserve component for sustainment operations.²³ This is likely because moving sustainment operations to the Reserve component was viewed as a cost-saving measure that was cheaper to maintain.

TAA Drives AoD Decisions

In addition to TFC and budgetary constraints, TAA also plays a role in AoD by reducing the Army's ability to provide critical sustainment functions. Through the TAA process, which links strategy, force structure, and resources; "bill payers," or non-critical units, are identified as means to create new units and capabilities eliminating less critical ones.²⁴ Therefore, existing units deemed non-critical, bear the greatest impact of AoD since these units are targeted first to make room for competing requirements. Army force structure and budget also greatly influence this process. TAA helps Army leaders identify force requirements, and resource the future force structure required to support the Combatant Commanders' in executing the National Military Strategy and the Unified Campaign Plan.²⁵

The TAA process looks seven years ahead to determine the correct number and type of units that are required by the Army. As an example, in December 2017 the Army Structure Memorandum was signed and written based off of TAA 20-24. The Army begins each TAA cycle starting with the Army Structure Memorandum as guidance, and uses the most recently established TAA planning data, contributing to AoD. The end product determines the Army's force structure position for the Program Objective Memorandum Submission.²⁶ Within the TAA process, each cycle is a condensed snapshot in time, based on guidance from senior Army leaders. These regulatory requirements were previously developed over a two-year period; however, it was modified in 2003 to just ten months.²⁷ Reducing the TAA timeline complicates decision-making. By accelerating the process, the risk, 2nd and 3rd order effects on sustainment capabilities are difficult to assess with accuracy.

More Combat Forces Drives AoD Decisions

During modularity, the Army's guidance was to create additional BCTs, and for this to occur, other units became "bill payers." In his testimony to Congress, General Milley stated the Army made the decision "to take a risk when meeting current operational requirements while maintaining a ready force for major combat operations."²⁸ The ready force, in this case, opted for combat capability instead of maintaining a logistics and sustainment capability in the Active component. Sustainment operations became the bill payers for the new BCTs which result in the degradation of sustainment operations.

As the Army warfighting BCT formation was redesigned, the Army sustainment unit design and its support to the BCT had to change as well. The AoD of sustainment force spaces from the BCT redesign left substantial sustainment gaps. Although the

mission and requirement for sustainment within the BCTs did not change, the decision of how to support the BCT did, and it came with a price. With changes to the BCT structure came significant changes within sustainment. For example, both the Armored and Infantry brigade combat teams traded their organic sustainment capability to maintain a more light, agile formation. As a result of decisions like this, units experienced decreased capacity in fuel distribution and storage and eliminated troop transport capability. This degradation of capability was an assumed risk which passed onto the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB).

Supporting early entry capabilities for a Multi-Domain Battle, and a "fight tonight" scenario is the result of planning efforts which began in 2012. The 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance was the foundation for the Training and Doctrine Command Strategic Plan (TSP). The TSP created solutions to design the future Army force in 2020. The future fight is no longer a three-dimensional threat, air, land, and sea. Warfare today is five-dimensional, (space, cyberspace, air, land, maritime), where sustainment warfighters must fight, maneuver, and sustain successfully against a near-peer adversary in the 2020-2040 timeframe. Guidance during the designing of the Army of 2020 led to force reductions in Active component petroleum units as a trade-off for more capable and agile BCT. The decisions made during this time contributed to an AoD of sustainment capability available to provide bulk petroleum support to today's Army Operating Construct. AoD continued to have its effects to the force, according to a GAO report, "In 2016, the Army prioritized retaining combat units, as well as other segments of its force structure when planning to reduce its end strength to 980,000

Soldiers and as a result, will take proportionately more position reductions from its enabler units.”²⁹

Implications of Accumulation of Degradation on Future Sustainment Operations

Balanced Active and Reserve sustainment forces are required to sustain combat forces over various nodes, through multiple terrains, and pulling from numerous suppliers to provide the supported commander options, and the freedom of movement. For the past 18 years, the Army predominantly focused warfighting based on a modular force. It enjoyed a robust force structure over established forward operating bases, across maneuverable terrain, and with a non-disrupted supply chain. The Army’s transition to a modular force in 2004 has allowed leaders to understand better what the sustainment’s role will be in the future fight and the impact it will have on maintaining the ability to “fight tonight.”

Sustainment Capability for 4 +1 Adversaries

The *2017 National Security Strategy* (NSS) identifies 4+1 adversaries to guide readiness efforts. Although, it is unlikely the U.S. will directly engage with China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea in the near-term, budget requirements for sustainment operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria continue.³⁰ Since the Reserve component is providing a bulk of the sustainment support to these ongoing operations, the decision made to place roughly 70% of the logistics enablers in the Reserve component is likely not curbing defense spending as was originally intended, it is simply shifting it.

No “Fight Tonight”

To develop the logistical support structure needed to enable a "fight tonight" against the 4+1 adversaries in contested environments the Army must consider moving 15% of sustainment force structure back to the Active component. By accomplishing

this, it will likely increase the Army's ability to meet the growing demands on sustainment forces in a "fight tonight" scenario. As an example, in Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL) distribution, by increasing POL force structure by 1,909 spaces, roughly 10%, a total of nine POL sustainment units back into the Active component, would increase early entry POL capacity by 96% mitigating a million gallon per day distribution deficit.³¹ Current, modeling shows a significant gap on day one of a major operation that is not mitigated until the first 90 days in theater when Reserve forces arrive.³² Defending a "fight tonight" scenario refers to a unit's readiness or ability to provide sustainment operations within hours. According to an Army War College study, the Army is the executive agent responsible for over 41 of the 84 enabling and logistical tasks required to support two or more services.³³ These critical tasks include providing significant functions such as the management of overland petroleum distribution, land-based water resources, and the Defense mortuary affairs program, just to name a few.³⁴

A "fight tonight" scenario and how to sustain combat forces past 30 days is a challenge for even the best military planners. With over 70% of sustainment functions residing in the Reserve component, the Army will likely be unable to execute a "fight tonight" concept. Additionally, given the decentralized nature of sustainment operations, Army logisticians will be further challenged when providing dispersed expeditionary support over multiple domains and for more than one service with little notice. Moreover, this type of action requires a rapid response, often to austere locations supported by a logistical formation capable of supporting a regionally aligned, globally Active force based primarily in the continental U.S.

The current focus of the Trump administration on domestic security issues, combined with the divesting of sustainment operations suggests that in the near-term, the U.S. plans to reduce its global footprint. However, the restructuring assumes the U.S. will not be challenged with a natural or man-made crisis that will require a rapid Army response in the near-term.

Running on Empty

One of the most critical sustainment functions impacted by AoD is fuel distribution as 90% of the Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant distribution capabilities are in the Reserves, or with defense contractors. Since almost all petroleum sustainment resides in the Reserve component, this presents risks to response time, and deployment readiness, and requires a substantial increase in the budget for the Reserves to be readily trained and available when needed. Reserve component units require at least 60 to 90 days to mobilize and deploy. Today, the Army does not have this luxury and need forces to be ready to deploy in less than ten days. According to a 2015 RAND Study, many of the petroleum units lack significant amounts of their authorized personnel, especially in positions requiring highly technical expertise, like the POL, Quality Assurance System (PQAS) testing teams.³⁵ Also, many of the units no longer maintain real petroleum operational experiences, as contracted services have conducted almost all petroleum handling over the past 14 years.³⁶

The degradation of petroleum units to the Reserve component created a significant early-entry shortfall in capacity while providing Divisional petroleum support. Current modeling indicates a 1.5 million to 3.5-million-gallon deficit gap in POL distribution.³⁷ Such a capability gap impacts the ability to receive and distribute fuel

during early phases of operations, including the establishment of terminal receipt and tactical inland distribution of fuel.

The Army Structure Memorandum Addendum for 2009, TAA 10-15 cycle, provided the guidance which eliminated petroleum sustainment.³⁸ The guidance of TAA 10-15 required the Active component to divest of all Active Petroleum Group Headquarters, Petroleum Battalion Headquarters, two POL Support Companies, two Petroleum Liaison Teams, to create spaces to build the BCT Force structure, while moving the majority of these units to the Reserve component.³⁹ In 2008, Quartermaster petroleum Active duty spaces authorized were 2,349, and following this TAA cycle it was degraded to just 688 Active duty spaces the following year in TAA 12-17, a total reduction of 1,661 Active duty Quartermaster sustainment spaces.⁴⁰ At the time, this created a heavy imbalance of Active duty readily available petroleum groups for the next wartime mission. The reduction resulted in only 10% of the Army's total petroleum sustainment force structure left in the Active component and 90% in the Reserves. As a result, the Army divested itself from strategic and operational level petroleum sustainment with a heavy focus on tactical sustainment.

Reliance on Costly Contractor Support

Tactical sustainment during the start of OIF was heavily supported by rotational units from both the Active and Reserve forces, placing heavy demands on Reserve units. The high demand took the Total Army, both Active components and Reserve components executing at extremely high operating tempos to support fuel operations during OIF and OEF. The high demands combined with the rotational dwell-times limited Reserve petroleum units able to deploy. As a result, petroleum theater distribution became highly centralized and operated by civilian contractors. Resulting in

force developers and planners to question the realignment of sustainment forces within tactical formations.

Accumulation of Degradation on the Battlefield

The environment of military conflicts will most likely be different in the future which will impact how we respond to them. According to Army Chief of Staff, General Milley's statement, "Forces must be prepared to fight in urban environments more frequently." He added, "On the future battlefield if you stay in one place for longer than two or three hours, you will be dead."⁴¹ If this statement proves accurate, the requirement for a mobile command and control headquarters will be required. Currently, the Division and Theater Support Command structure by force design is less than 100 percent mobile, relying on subordinate sustainment transportation assets to help assist and move.

The reduction of headquarters elements is another example of AoD on capacity and capability. The accumulation of personnel and equipment has degraded the ability for the headquarters element to move on the battlefield quickly. By relying on an already over missioned and heavily tasked divisional sustainment brigade for support further degrades the overall mission. What drove this change was an Army directive signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Odierno and Secretary of the Army John McHugh, directing a Focus Area Review Group (FARG) to conduct bold and executable recommendations. The FARG directed the Army to "reduce Army Headquarters (Both institutional and operational, at the 2-star and above levels) in the aggregate by 25 percent."⁴² This reduction accumulated spaces and further degraded many operational headquarters, but its effects on the Theater Support Command was profound.

The FARG directive impacted the Theater Support Command's overall capability to plan and conduct operations. In 2010, the TSC authorization of 440 assigned spaces atrophied over the next seven years, as the accumulation of 88 spaces leads to the degradation of 20 percent, to its current authorization of 353 spaces.⁴³ The accumulation of 88 spaces became bill payers for combat force structure within the BCTs leaving the TSC with no change in doctrinal mission, a decrease of 19 field grade logistics officers to company grade officers, reducing the expertise and experience necessary for a TSC in a time of war.

The degradation of the 88 spaces became a risk, or an assumption that the TSC would be augmented by 99 Reserve Soldiers as "additional staff capability" according to ATP 4-94, Theater, and Expeditionary Sustainment Commands. The additional staff capability, in this case, would consist of a Petroleum Liaison Team, a Theater Movement Control Element, and a Railway Planning and Advisory Team, all augmenting the Support Operations and Distribution Management Center within the TSC.⁴⁴

Accumulation of Degradation Mitigation Recommendations and Conclusion

Today, the Army is the smallest it has been in decades and sustainment force structure remains imbalanced. Over the past two decades if senior leaders could have seen or realized the snowballing effects AoD to the Army's ability in conducting critical sustainment missions, specifically in setting the theater, and the ability to project and sustain national power, today's force structure would be different.

The Army is going to grow 17,000 soldiers within the next year, and it is critical to understand and apply the concept of AoD when growing the force. As a result of several decisions made based on a combination of four drivers: The Total Force Concept

(TFC), budget restrictions, Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, and modularization through the creation of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The TAA process is the one area with the most potential to mitigate or reverse the eroding effects on sustainment force structure.

The TAA process should conduct a Multi-Year Holistic Review (MYHR), over a five to ten-year period, covering multiple TAA cycles using the concepts within the AoD as a lens. An MYHR TAA cycle review would identify an imbalance in force structure before it happens. Currently, Army Regulation AR 71-11, Total Army Analysis does not direct or suggest this type of analysis or review should occur and needs to be updated to reflect this concept. However, within each TAA cycle, some analysis is conducted. As an example, a Force Feasibility Review (FFR) which is conducted to determine the affordability and executability of the proposed force structure. This can inform force developers a quantitative review of their specific branches, without providing the residual effects to the entire force. In addition to the FFR, HQDA G3/5/7 conducts several modeling scenarios against multiple threat-based wartime plans. However, this is conducted only during the TAA cycle being worked and not against past cycles. Instead, the Army should require this to occur annually before publishing the guidance for the next TAA cycle.

The MYHR using AoD as a lens would show leaders how the accumulation of “bill payers” were used to eliminate force structure highlighting a potential degradation of a capability or capacity giving leaders an opportunity to correct this oversight. Similar to the Petroleum example in 2006. Or the accumulation of 88 spaces from the TSC and how they became bill payers for combat force structure, leaving a gap in leadership and

planning within the TSC today. Secretary of the Army, Dr. Esper spoke to the 2018 U.S. Army War College Class in March and described how the new Futures Command would be a no-growth new organization. He explained the new structure was going to be built from many other Headquarters, to include Army Material Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and a few others. This is Accumulation in action. The Army may not understand if this results in degradation to the overall force structure. However, looking and reviewing how the new command pieces together are worth discussing.

By reviewing and analyzing accumulation of degradation and the effects, it has created to the total force, as a result of making "the best of several not so good choices" can be of use. First, it will help discover trends and gaps in niche capabilities outside of just sustainment units, which are either only in the Reserves or potentially imbalanced. An example, many Army biological detection units, Theater Engineer Commands, and Civil Affairs Commands reside only in the Reserves. Ultimately, understanding AoD, and by enforcing an MYHR will help balance and prevent the divestment of Active duty sustainment force structure to the Reserves mitigating risk in mobilization, readiness, availability, capacity, and capability of sustainment enablers required for the next fight.

Endnotes

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