Staying Power: DIME Lessons from the Byzantine Empire’s Macedonian Dynasty

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Class of 2018

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Great empires throughout the annals of history rose and fell, in large part, based on their ability to successfully employ the instruments of national power in a unified expression of will. The persistence of the Byzantine Empire over 1100 years serves as a testament to this fundamental proposition. The empire’s Macedonian Dynasty demonstrated the greatest skill in this particular endeavor. During this time, a colorful and talented collection of emperors, military leaders, administrators and diplomats crafted and executed policies that revitalized a flagging empire beset by external threats such as the Bulgars, Rus, and Arabs and internally fractured by court intrigues, iconoclasm, and the economic desires of a land holding elite. The skillful and integrated exercise of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means resulted in the rapid expansion of the empire east and west, secure borders, robust international engagement, and influence over both friend and foe. As the United States charts its own course in a complex world, the study of the Macedonian Dynasty’s use of national power can be instructive.
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[T]here was a more balanced synergy, in which diplomacy guided by superior information was empowered by capable military forces, while military strength was in turn magnified by well-informed diplomatic action.

—Edward N. Luttwak

A flawed empire finds itself firmly fixed at a strategic crossroads. Beset by enemies on all sides and exhausted by prolonged conflicts, it appeared fractured internally by power hungry rulers, entrenched political elites, and an oppressed working class. As a result, this polity in crisis can tread upon the road to either recovery or ruination depending on the choices made by its leadership. Similar scenarios fill the annals of history. Success or failure in addressing these imperial conundrums inevitably revolved around the effective employment of what are now commonly referred to as the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—in a unified expression of will. Striking the right balance among these instruments in relation to one’s strategic environment represented a complex national security challenge for the Byzantine Empire (330 - 1453 C.E.). The United States of America (1776 - ? C.E.) confronts this same challenge today.

In the history of the Byzantine Empire, the Macedonian Dynasty’s (867-1056 C.E.) nuanced engagement of both friend and foe, the disciplined development and employment of its military, and a largely unheralded display of imperial resilience in the face of multiple existential threats provides an example of instrumental balance and staying power worthy of study and perhaps even emulation by national security professionals. As the United States (U.S.) continues to define its own role in an increasingly volatile world, it is imperative that U.S. leadership examines the
approaches of other empires throughout history to assist in its own development of a strategic vision that preserves its current standing in the world.

Strategic and Historic Context

The Byzantine Empire possesses few rivals in terms of its longevity. Its judicious exercise of all the instruments of national power throughout most of its history set the foundation for this persistence.\textsuperscript{4} Without a doubt, the fortuitous interplay of historical events also played its part. Not surprisingly, the Emperor Diocletian’s decision to split the Roman Empire resulted from the long overdue realization that the political, military and economic burdens of managing such a state exceeded the talent and will of any one person.\textsuperscript{5} Furthermore, the Emperor Constantine’s subsequent relocation of the empire’s capital to Byzantium (later Constantinople) served to centralize state control in a location characterized by near constant strategic tension and opportunity.\textsuperscript{6}

The Byzantine leadership operated in global and domestic environments characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).\textsuperscript{7} Throughout its history, competitors rose in all directions to challenge the supremacy of the Byzantine Empire.\textsuperscript{8} The Sassanids and the Islam-inspired Arabs (i.e. Hamdanid Dynasty (Shia), Abbasid Caliphate (Suni) and Fatimid Caliphate (Shia)) hungrily eyed the Upper Euphrates River Valley and the Empire’s traditional heartland of Anatolia. The Viking Rus viewed the Black Sea as their avenue for expansion into the broader Mediterranean. The Avars, Bulgars, Magyars, and Pechenegs looked south of the Danube River and into the Balkans with a view towards plunder and perhaps a better (more Byzantine) way of life. Normans saw the subjugation of Southern Italy as an opportunity to inherit, by force, part of Rome’s legacy. Conversely, Constantinople’s strategic position on the Bosporus presented limitless opportunities for commerce,
diplomatic intercourse, cultural exchange, and expansion. Internal forces such as the state bureaucracy, the Orthodox Church, powerful guilds, and the landed aristocracy all acted in ways that impacted the strategic direction of the state and by extension its use of DIME. In this VUCA environment, the integrated use of DIME enabled the leadership of the Macedonian Dynasty to excel in the address of complex strategic problems.

While the Byzantine Empire did not produce a National Security Strategy, its leadership relied upon a powerful and pragmatic combination of historical precedence and scholarship to guide its engagement of this VUCA world. This general framework consisted of four overarching principles to include: an understanding of the strategic environment; a regular acknowledgment of the advantages and disadvantages associated with each instrument of national power; a development of strategic options that, at least, considered the range of instruments in some combination prior to execution; and a recognition that the cost and risk of employing the military instrument of national power must be mitigated.

The Macedonian adherents to these principles included a talented and colorful collection of emperors, military professionals, diplomats, and administrators. Basil I’s improbable “rags to riches” ascent to the Byzantine throne in 867 C.E. heralded an age of visionary leadership, martial prowess, and cultural enlightenment. Lineal heirs like his son Leo VI and his grandson Constantine VII embraced the indelible relationship between scholarship and governance with a vigor that inspired the recodification of Roman law and the publication of comprehensive military and diplomatic treatises. A succession of regent emperors unleashed a lethal army and navy against the empire’s Arab antagonists in manner that left no doubt that the “Byzantine eagle had returned
and it was not in a conciliatory mood.” And through it all, an artistic, religious and literary revival in Constantinople transformed it into a beacon of progress and the envy of the Mediterranean world. When Basil II finally donned the purple and placed the crown on his troubled brow in 976 C.E., few would have predicted an imperial zenith marked by the destruction of Bulgarian state, relative peace with the caliphates, and unprecedented economic growth.

The glorious reign of Basil II “the Bulgar Slayer” ended in 1025 C.E. He and his predecessors left behind an empire nearly doubled in size with secure borders, robust discourse with friend and foe alike, the finest military in the eastern Mediterranean, and a treasury bursting at the seams. So what happened? How in less than fifty years could Basil II’s underwhelming heirs and the Ducas Dynasty squander such a rich heritage? Scholars point to a number of causes including: an absence of information on emergent threats such as the Seljuk Turks in the east and the Normans in the west; the decline of the provincially based theme system of force generation; a drastic reduction in spending on the Byzantine military in combination with lavish expenditures on massive public works; an increased reliance on elite units and foreign mercenaries whose place of duty in Constantinople represented a focus on internal dissent instead of external security; and the simple failure to produce a Macedonian heir and/or appoint a regent emperor after the death of Basil II’s brother and co-emperor Constantine VIII. Some combination of these imperial flaws climaxed on “that dreadful day” of August 26, 1071 at Manzikert where the forces of Alp Arslan defeated an emasculated Byzantine army under Romanus IV Diogenes and began the slow but inexorable decline of an
empire for the ages. However, in an effort to avoid our own Manzikert, examples of the Macedonian Dynasty’s use of DIME can be instructive.

The Diplomatic Instrument of National Power

The Macedonian Dynasty’s martial success should not be interpreted in a manner that minimizes the significant impact the diplomatic instrument of national power played in the success of the Byzantine Empire during this period. With the notable exception of Nicephorus II Phocas who offended nearly everyone during his brief reign, Macedonian emperors and their designees in the state bureaucracy pursued an “activist foreign policy” in which they worked tirelessly to explore, negotiate and consummate agreements that either maintained a valued status quo or created a strategic opportunity. Moreover, Byzantine leaders understood that “[o]perating effectively in the international environment demands an understanding of the various political, economic and cultural factors that influence decision making in other countries.”

Constantine VII’s *De Administrando Imperio* ("On the Governance of the Empire") and *De Ceromoniis aulae Byzantinae* (commonly referred to as “The Book of Ceremonies”) amply supports this assertion. The *De Administrando Imperio* underscores the importance of comprehending the strategic environment with a specific emphasis on the people, history, and geography surrounding the Byzantine Empire. Details include both foreign policy recommendations and preferred methods of engagement for particular states and tribes. An immense tome, the *De Ceromoniis aulae Byzantinae* describes in, at times, excruciating detail, the ceremonial rites and protocol associated with the reception of foreign emissaries to include a number of historical anecdotes. This observance of ceremony in a manner that displayed the power and majesty of the Byzantine State undoubtedly awed visitors to the court and
set conditions for fruitful negotiations.\textsuperscript{20} Collectively both works stand for the proposition that the empire’s external and internal means of diplomatic engagement represent a matter of seminal importance to any head of state or his representative.

With the importance of diplomacy emphasized by the Macedonian leadership in two widely read and highly regarded treatises, it stands to reason that the “Byzantine empire relied less on military strength and more on all forms of persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuade enemies, and induce potential enemies to attack one another.”\textsuperscript{21} In fact, Constantine VII’s own father-in-law and regent emperor Romanus I Lecapenus demonstrated his acumen in all of these techniques.\textsuperscript{22} An accomplished admiral, Romanus I Lecapenus also approached his diplomatic engagements with strategic forethought. His interaction with Tsar Symeon of the Bulgars illustrated both his vision and his talent in execution.

Prior to Romanus I Lecapenus’ ascendance, Tsar Symeon, who was raised in Constantinople and a Christian, skillfully maneuvered himself, through military and diplomatic means, into a position where his own claim to the Byzantine regency might be realized.\textsuperscript{23} Frustrated in this goal by Romanus I Lecapenus’ own political maneuvering, Tsar Symeon subsequently launched a campaign that took his army up to the very walls of Constantinople. In an effort to compel acquiescence to his claim, Tsar Symeon faced three diplomatic counters by Romanus I Lecapenus. First, the promise of gold, titles, and influence convinced Tsar Symeon’s Serbian allies to align themselves with the Byzantine Empire.\textsuperscript{24} This rearward threat to his already extended lines of communication placed his entire army in jeopardy. Second, any investment of Constantinople’s seemingly impregnable walls was further complicated by the city’s
ports on the present day Sea of Marmara. Without a blockading fleet, Constantinople could receive both reinforcements and resupply unhindered and the Fatimid Caliphate possessed the only navy capable of challenging the Byzantine fleet. In this too, Romanus I Lecapenus thwarted Tsar Symeon with his successful negotiation of a treaty with the Fatimids wherein he promised both regular payments and favorable trade concessions in return for their neutrality.\textsuperscript{25} Third, Tsar Symeon’s aggression against his fellow Christians drew the ire of the Pope, the Patriarch, and the faithful throughout the region.\textsuperscript{26} And in a public performance worthy of an Oscar, a simply attired and relic bearing Romanus I Lecapenus presented himself to an armored Tsar Symeon beseeching him, “What reason will you give to God for the unjust slaughters? If you do these things for the love of wealth I will sate you excessively in your desire... .”\textsuperscript{27} Whether by design, simple frustration, or a genuine guilt, Tsar Symeon received a suitable “offering” from the emperor and quickly turned his bellicose attentions toward the nascent Kingdom of Croatia. In this manner, Romanus I Lecapenus finally secured a long term peace in 924 C.E. through a persuasive combination of diplomatic guile, faith and finance.

This unmitigated diplomatic success in the west enabled long overdue military action and freedom of maneuver in the east. Romanus I Lecapenus ordered John Curcuas, one of the Byzantine Empire’s most gifted generals, to conduct offensive operations against the Abbasid controlled Kingdom of Armenia. Armenia was not only the ancestral home of the regent emperor’s family, it was also an invaluable recruiting ground for arguably the best infantrymen in the Byzantine army.\textsuperscript{28} John Curcuas’ violent execution of Romanus I Lecapenus’ intent resulted in a complete victory that ensured
Armenia’s place in the Byzantine sphere of influence until the disaster at Manzikert in 1071 C.E. Building on his success, John Curcuas then liberated Hamdanid held Melitene in 934 C.E., a contested population center whose location made it an ideal forward staging base for operations into the Upper Euphrates River Valley. Lastly, John Curcuas’ position in the east facilitated his response to a Rus expedition on the Black Sea. Here a combination of the Byzantine navy’s use of its technologically superior Greek fire and John Curcuas’ timely arrival on the Bithynian coast resulted in the complete destruction of the Rus force. In the same vein, an orchestration of emperor’s diplomatic initiatives and a general’s bold military actions dramatically improved the security of the empire.

Lesson Learned

In the Byzantine conception of statecraft, diplomatic discourse often provided the safest and least costly approach to support strategic decision-making. In peace and war, Macedonian leaders personally engaged in nuanced diplomatic overtures and properly resourced a system that collected and disseminated information relevant to the achievement of their national aims. Most importantly, as demonstrated by Romanus I Lecapenus, the Macedonian Dynasty also understood the importance of diplomacy as it related to the other instruments. Quite to the contrary, the current U.S administration appears to be reinforcing an ongoing trend of neglect towards the Department of State and the Foreign Service in general. The recent firing of the Secretary of State, the continued vacancy of key Department of State positions, the absence of ambassadors in key partner states such as the Republic of Korea, and the mass exodus of Foreign Service personnel diminishes a critical capability in the United States’ exercise of DIME. This lack of resourcing likely limits the administration’s options while placing a
greater burden on other departments. In a 2013 National Security Council meeting, then General James Mattis stated "[i]f you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately." The recent publication of now Secretary of Defense Mattis’ 2018 National Defense Strategy amplifies the need for robust diplomatic engagement when he writes "[r]einforcing America’s traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength."

The Informational Instrument of National Power

Throughout its long history, the Byzantine Empire fully embraced the informational instrument of national power. In fact, its success was attributable, in large part to “a sustained ability, century after century, to generate disproportionate power from whatever military strength could be mustered, by combining it with all the arts of persuasion, guided by superior information.” In fact, a number of scholars describe the city itself as a beacon of imperial prestige whose immense size, sublime architecture, and advanced public works overwhelmed lord and layman alike. Situated at the center of the Mediterranean world, the ability of the Byzantine state to collect, disseminate, and manipulate information to its own ends enabled the adroit exercise of national power in ways incomprehensible to its competitors. The Macedonian Dynasty demonstrated this information dominance through faith and fury.

The Orthodox Church and its conversion efforts expanded the influence of the empire far beyond its physical borders. As a general proposition, the Byzantine Emperor and the Patriarch worked in concert to expand the influence of both the empire and the church. To be sure, there existed disagreements on spiritual matters such as iconoclasm that threatened the very existence of the Byzantine state. However, the
unifying power of the faith yielded benefits for both parties. As God’s representative on earth, the emperor derived his legitimacy in part from his relationship to the church. Majestic structures such as Justinian’s Hagia Sophia and Basil I’s Nea Ekklesia served as both awe inspiring houses of worship as well as testimony to the inextricable link between state power and religion.

Noted strategist Edward N. Luttwak expounded extensively on the link between statecraft and religion commenting “[t]hat almost all the Byzantines we know of were intensely devout Christians is beyond question, but so is the empire’s persistent use of religion as a source of influence over foreign rulers and their nations.” When Orthodox priests endeavored to convert the populations of neighboring populations such as the Bulgars, Balkan Slavs, and the leadership of the Kievan Rus they set conditions for not only salvation but symbiosis. Lines of communication originally established to promote religion evolved into similar conduits for commerce, cultural exchange, and international relations. The successful conversions of Rus leadership by both Constantine VII and Basil II not only strengthened the dynasty, it also “plant[ed] the seeds of Orthodoxy in the land that would one day call itself the third Rome.” Unfortunately for its enemies, Macedonian messaging was not always divinely inspired.

In a display of savagery born from an instinct for imperial self-preservation, Basil II’s actions following his victory over Tsar Samuel at Kleidion Pass (1014 C.E.) exemplify how one instrument of national power can be successfully integrated with another. Estimates vary concerning the number of prisoners taken by the Byzantine army at the conclusion of this engagement. However, regardless of the amount, contemporary sources relate a ghastly fate. Basil II ordered hundreds of Bulgar
prisoners blinded and returned to their capital in the care of several of their number who lost only one eye at the hands of their Byzantine captors. When this shambling mass of crippled Bulgarian soldiers entered the capital, Tsar Samuel broke mentally and physically. His death, two days after the return of this horrid host, hastened the dissipation of any national will to resist. Some historians question the validity of contemporary accounts. In doing so, they miss altogether the brutal logic and willfully ignore the impact of the strategic message conveyed by this fearsome act.

Bulgaria presented an entirely different problem than the Fatimids in Cairo or the Abbasids in Baghad. Its proximity to Constantinople, its military strength, and its own regional aims had frustrated imperial ambitions for over 400 years. Edward N. Luttwak observed emphatically that the “very existence of a Bulgarian state south of the Danube River was necessarily a threat to the survival of the empire, regardless of its strength or weakness, even regardless of its intentions.” In this campaign bent on state destruction and the subsequent treatment of the Bulgar prisoners, Basil II sent an unequivocal message that any further resistance to his authority would be violently suppressed. Bulgarian acquiescence would soon manifest itself in the ready acceptance of Byzantine titles by Bulgar nobility, the rapid incorporation of Bulgars into the Byzantine army, and nearly 160 years of uninterrupted peace, where after the loss of much of Anatolia in 1071, the region provided the majority of the empire’s tax revenues and agricultural capacity.

Lesson Learned

The Macedonian Dynasty’s employment of the informational instrument simply outclassed its competitors in two ways. First, the leadership synchronized the actions of church and state. This synergy effectively combined imperial power and religion in a
manner that directly and indirectly influenced all manner of actors within the Byzantine sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{53} Moreover, the relationship between the emperor and the Patriarch and their recognition of juridical and ecclesiastical law imbued decision-making with a sense of constancy rarely demonstrated by other polities of the time.\textsuperscript{54} Second, this same notion applied to the use of the military in conveying imperial resolve. While Basil II’s treatment of the Bulgars after his victory at Kleidion Pass represents a particularly brutal message, the Macedonian emperors routinely used the military to conduct show of force operations in contested border regions to dissuade enemy action. Of course, these displays of military might proved effective because they were preceded by the dynasty’s demonstrated willingness to engage and defeat its foes in battle.

The \textit{United States 2017 National Security Strategy} advocates the same constancy when it articulates a goal of shaping and directing communications campaigns to advance U.S. influence while adhering to “American” values.\textsuperscript{55} The weakness in this current approach stems from a widespread perception that U.S. actions are not aligned in word, deed, or investments. For example, charges of hypocrisy on issues such as human rights and issuing “red lines” in response to the actions of other sovereign states undermine U.S. legitimacy in a variety of international fora.\textsuperscript{56} In order to overcome this perception and combat these charges, decisive action in combination with disciplined messaging across the information domain needs to underscore a pattern of consistent state behavior.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{The Military Instrument of National Power}

The Byzantine exercise of the military instrument of national power during the Macedonian Dynasty represents the ideal confluence of strategy, doctrine, and capability.\textsuperscript{58} An imperial mindset profoundly influenced by its forbears as far back as the
Roman Republic provided Byzantine leadership with a sense of confidence when it came to confronting the latest crisis. After all, it was their predecessors who defeated Hannibal, conquered Gaul, and turned back Attila, the Scourge of God. The intellectual pursuits of their emperors and generals included the study and writing of military history and theory. This passion for military education “served to broaden the repertoire of Byzantine armies and navies, endowing them with a greater variety of tactics, operational schemes, and practiced stratagems than any of their opponents could command.” Most importantly, these same leaders understood their battlefield success rested on their ability to integrate these concepts with the best resources and training into the men who defended the empire.

The Emperor Maurice’s Strategikon proves invaluable as a foundational document of Byzantine strategic and military thinking. Written during the costly Sassanid Wars between 575-628 C.E., this military manual offered practical insights to the commanding officer while underscoring the need to preserve limited combat power. Just as the Emperor Augustus clamored for Publius Quinctilius Varus to return his lost legions, Byzantine generals understood their field armies needed to be employed with the greatest care. In the simplest terms, defeat or even defeats could be overcome but the destruction of armies so typical of the ancient battlefields could not. In a particularly relevant use of metaphor, the author in “Book VII: Strategy: The Points Which the General Must Consider” captures the concepts of maneuver, risk and cost:

Warfare is like hunting. Wild animals are taken by scouting, by nets, by lying in wait, by stalking, by circling around, and by other such stratagems rather than by sheer force. In waging war, we should proceed in the same way, whether the enemy be many or few. To try and simply overpower the enemy in the open, hand to hand, and face to face, even though you might appear to win, is an enterprise which is very risky and can result in serious
harm. Apart from extreme emergency, it is ridiculous to try to gain a victory which is so costly and brings only empty glory.\textsuperscript{65}

In this paragraph, the reader sees Byzantine strategy operationalized in a manner readily understood at all levels of command. The Macedonian Dynasty’s leaders not only embraced these ideas, they would improve upon it in their own words and in their own deeds.

An unbroken string martial successes by Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969 C.E.) as both a general and a regent emperor against the Arabs best illustrate this evolution of the Byzantine military specific to its organization, technology, and logistics. Appointed to successive commands by the emperors Constantine VII and Romanus II, Nicephorus II Phocas continued to build upon the triumphs of Romanus I Lecapenus and John Curcuas.\textsuperscript{66} While serving under these two emperors, Nicephorus II Phocas stymied Abbasid aggression by conducting offensive operations in Syria (957 C.E.) and Mesopotamia (958 C.E.).\textsuperscript{67} His subsequent retaking of Fatimid controlled Crete (961 C.E.) and his defeat of the renowned Hamdanid Emir Ali ibn Hamdan, Sayf-Al Dwalah, not only set conditions for his ascension to the throne but it also presented him with the opportunity to implement his vision across the entire Byzantine military.

A student of war, Nicephorus II Phocas’ writing in his \textit{Praecepta militaria} provides numerous examples of advances in Byzantine organization, technology, and logistics. In terms of force structure and management, Nicephorus II Phocas placed a long overdue emphasis on the development of an infantry force to work in concert with the already capable cavalry arm.\textsuperscript{68} Composed largely of Armenians serving in a variety of infantry roles, these soldiers were equipped and trained to serve in square formations designed to accomplish two principal goals: serving as mobile base from which the cavalry could
operate either in the offense or defense; and defeating the attacks of mounted enemy when acting independently or deprived of the protection afforded by their own cavalry.\textsuperscript{69}

The heavy cavalry known as the \textit{kataphraktoi} also benefited from both technological and tactical advances in their own revival under Nicephorus II Phocas. The best equipped and most heavily armored soldiers (and horses) in the Byzantine army, these main battle tanks of antiquity wore composite armor whose various sections hung from a corselet.\textsuperscript{70} This enabled the soldier to adjust the weight and protection of his armor in direct relation to both the enemy threat and the often oppressive heat while on campaign.\textsuperscript{71} When employed in battle, the \textit{kataphraktoi}, armed with lance and mace, deployed with mounted archers in an integrated wedge formation designed to “win the battle outright with one carefully timed and executed charge.”\textsuperscript{72}

Logistics also enabled this improved force to excel while conducting both defensive and offensive operations. In response to an external threat, the organization of the empire into independent provincial constructs called \textit{themes} enabled the military leadership to call up local reserves to augment the regular \textit{tagmata}.\textsuperscript{73} The mobilization and movements of the combined reserve and regular forces were facilitated by a uniquely Byzantine system described as a “complex, expensive but efficient system of marching camps, supply dumps and provincial collection and redistribution of material resources….”\textsuperscript{74} From an operational perspective, this disposition of personnel and materiel enabled the rapid convergence of Byzantine forces in a time and place of greatest advantage. Because of the long and permeable border with the various caliphates, the vast of majority of these engagements occurred when the enemy forces attempted to egress from Byzantine territory burdened with their ill-gotten gains.\textsuperscript{75} For
example, while Nicephorus II Phocas conducted operations on Crete, his brother Leo Phocas exercised this system with particular skill in his response to a large Hamdanid raid in 960 C.E.\textsuperscript{76}

Less original but equal in importance, the logistics employed by the Byzantine expeditionary army in the east demonstrate the importance of systems and discipline while on campaign. The relevant texts describe the rates and order of march, the types of camps, and the manner of supply in exhaustive detail.\textsuperscript{77} Derived largely from the practice of their Roman forebears, Byzantine fortified encampments required the following: a defensible position with trench and palisade; space to accommodate all personnel; availability of water; and access to forage.\textsuperscript{78} Not surprisingly, the instructions given to advance quartering parties address all of these concerns to ensure the most efficient and secure movement through hostile territory.\textsuperscript{79} Contemporary writers go to great lengths to discuss the success or failure of these expeditions as it related to leadership’s ability to adhere to these seminal practices in the crucible of campaign.\textsuperscript{80} Nicephoras II Phocas’ use of fortified encampments to protect extended supply lines in support of his operations against Tarsus in Cilicia and Antioch in Syria served as a model for his successors to follow.\textsuperscript{81}

Lesson Learned

Scholarship and reflection moored the Macedonian Dynasty’s exercise of the military instrument in strategy, operations, and innovation. As part of a larger Byzantine tradition, Nicephorus II Phocas’ \textit{Praecepta militaria} demonstrates an unmatched commitment by Macedonian leadership to record those observations relevant to the art and science of warfare.\textsuperscript{82} It was these same observations and their application that produced victory at Melitene, Dorostolon, Aleppo, Tarsus and the Kleidion Pass.
Perhaps best described by Eric McGeer, the Macedonian Dynasty distinguished itself in the advance of professional military education (PME):

> But what truly sets Byzantium apart as a medieval state with a sophisticated and coherent art of war are the tactical treatises studied here, which combine to present a remarkably detailed exposition of contemporary warfare in its various aspects—battles, raids, sieges, and campaigning—drawn from the experience and expertise of the commanders who wrote them which have no parallel in western Europe until the time of the Hundred Years War.83

This laudatory observation stands in stark contrast to the Secretary of Defense’s comments on professional military education in 2018 National Defense Strategy where he writes: “PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.”84 The content of these military manuals and the resulting success on the battlefield demonstrate the Macedonian leadership’s own focus on lethality and ingenuity in, for example, their focus on the integration of infantry and cavalry in direct response to the mobile character of warfare on the empire’s eastern frontier.85 It is no accident by the end of the tenth century that the Hamdanids, Fatimids, and Abbasids found themselves cowed by a highly organized, superbly equipped, and well supplied Byzantine military trained to execute combined arms maneuver.86

**The Economic Instrument of National Power**

The economic instrument of national power played a critical role in the formulation and execution of Byzantine policy.87 Widely considered one of the strongest economies in the Mediterranean between the seventh and twelfth centuries, trade, industry, and agriculture all flourished during this period.88 A rapidly growing population unchecked by disaster also contributed to this period of growth. The regulation of commerce by powerful guilds and the oversight of state officials reduced market
volatility while ensuring the satisfaction of supply and demand in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{89} This combination of favorable socioeconomic and demographic factors generated unprecedented wealth resulting in a treasury surplus despite the conduct of frequent military campaigns during the Macedonian Dynasty.

This surplus stemmed from yet another Roman legacy institution: the tax system. Assessed as one of the three most powerful state institutions, in addition to the military and the Orthodox Church, the tax system buttressed imperial authority through the predictable generation of revenue.\textsuperscript{90} This complex system of taxes derived largely from land holding interests in the outlying provinces created yet another tangible link between Constantinople and its subjects.\textsuperscript{91} As a result, the Byzantine Empire possessed the monetary muscle to exercise the other instruments of national power.

The military instrument of national power benefited from this economic largesse in four ways. First, the military’s indispensable role in preserving the security of the state ensured its receipt of the largest part of the budget.\textsuperscript{92} Second, the military budget enabled the development and acquisition of the best technologies and equipment.\textsuperscript{93} Third, the salaries from regular taxation supported full time military service.\textsuperscript{94} Fourth, full time military service allowed individuals and units to train on a consistent basis.\textsuperscript{95} Consequently, the professional Byzantine soldier or sailor often found himself matched against an inferior opponent. Undisciplined tribesmen, poorly trained conscripts, and seasonal warriors typically fared poorly when pitted against the Byzantine military.\textsuperscript{96} In describing the Byzantine military, the venerable British military historian Sir Charles Oman stated “[i]n courage they were equal to their enemies; in discipline, organization, and armament, far superior.”\textsuperscript{97}
This economic boon produced an advantage in both the diplomatic and informational spheres as well. Typically considered prior to the use of force, bribery frequently subverted enemy goals and/or frustrated their ambitions.\textsuperscript{98} Paying a “tribute” to a lesser polity, financing a proxy force, or presenting a “spontaneous gift motivated by imperial benevolence” invariably spared the Byzantine Empire those costs associated with armed conflict.\textsuperscript{99} As to information, the concentrated wealth in Constantinople and its purposeful display throughout the city and in the Great Palace inspired amazement in all.\textsuperscript{100} The opulence found in the Hall of Nineteen Couches impressed allies, enemies, and neutrals alike.\textsuperscript{101} Humbling and entralling in equal measure, the majesty of the court and its environs regularly altered perceptions, softened positions, and dissipated resolve in the empire’s favor.

Lesson Learned

The economic instrument provided a foundation for the Macedonian Dynasty’s expression of DIME.\textsuperscript{102} In essence, the Byzantine economy enabled the other instruments depending on the circumstances. A strong industrial base, a location conducive to trade throughout the Mediterranean, and, most importantly, the consistent generation of tax revenue gave Constantinople a quantifiable advantage over her competitors. As a general rule, the Macedonian Dynasty operated with a budget surplus.\textsuperscript{103} This surplus enabled the construction of public works, the payment of professional administrators, and the offer of financial inducements to potential allies or enemies. In relation to security, this wealth fostered the growth and maintenance of highly trained and well equipped military.\textsuperscript{104} In simple terms, the military consistently won the annual budget fight until 1025 C.E. because those Macedonian emperors and their administrators understood “military strength was always the indispensable
instrument of Byzantine statecraft, without which nothing else could be of much use—
certainly not bribes to avert attacks, which would merely whet appetites if proffered in
weakness." In stark contrast, the United States rapidly increasing debt arguably
complicates its future use of DIME.

A combination of rising debt and a pattern of persistent uncertainty in the annual
budget cycle undermines the U.S. ability to effectively employ the economic instrument.
The most recent posture statements by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff included frank comments on the negative impacts
of sequestration, the use of continuing resolutions, and the impacts of the Budget
Control Act. Even the SECDEF’s recent success in securing a defense budget over
the legislative caps represents a mixed blessing. In the near term, the proposed budget
deal provides the Secretary with the resources he needs to implement his National
Defense Strategy. In the long term, when considered in conjunction with the recently
passed tax bill, the proposed budget deal represents another instance where the U.S.
government appears committed to spending beyond its means. This lack of fiscal
responsibility represents a threat unlike any the U.S. military might face on the
battlefields of the future. With the most recent projections indicating a national debt
approaching 30 trillion in the next ten years, the discretionary spending vital to the
defense budget becomes imperiled. The goal of a Byzantine-like surplus resourcing
the implementation of the U.S. strategy seems unrealistic, but practical measures to
reduce the national debt appear prudent in mitigating future risk.

Conclusion

In addressing the U.S. Army’s operating concept, Lieutenant General H.R.
McMaster passionately advocates for the study of history because it “can help leaders
ask the right questions.” In an era where many analysts confidently predict the end of U.S. hegemony, it behooves U.S. strategic leaders to examine how and why other empires ascended and declined, expanded and contracted, prospered and withered. Over 1100 years, the Byzantine Empire did all of these things. However, for most of its 189 years, the Macedonian Dynasty displayed the very best this great empire had to offer. What was the Macedonian Dynasty’s secret? In short, the leadership generally understood the contextual nature of national power. Consideration of all instruments in relation to other actors and the relevant circumstances enabled the Macedonian leadership to consistently ask the right questions: “power over whom, and with respect to what?”

A consistent reliance on the military instrument of power to exclusion of others demonstrates U.S. unwillingness to ask these same questions despite the presence of this concept in its own national strategies and doctrine. Statements addressing the fundamental nature of “routine interaction” among the instruments of national power appear to fall on deaf ears when one observes the knee jerk response to deploy military in response to both global and domestic contingencies. The Macedonian Dynasty did not eschew the use of the military instrument of national power. In fact, the regent emperors and Basil II employed the Byzantine military with regularity. However, the use of the military rarely served as the first course of action and the Macedonian leadership understood the need to balance its use with the other instruments. Like the Macedonian leadership, the United States must develop better context in its own exercise of national power. Continued imbalance among the instruments exacerbated by a lack of integration will only hasten its decline and fulfill the speculative musings of academics.
Endnotes


3 In using the term “Byzantine Empire,” the author adopts, in large part, John Haldon’s description in his work *Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204*. The Byzantine Empire refers to the eastern Roman Empire from the “end of the ‘late Roman’ period in the eastern and central Mediterranean/Balkan region (from the sixth century therefore) to the fifteenth century, that is to say from the time when a distinctively East Roman political formation began to evolve with the recognition of the cultural divisions between ‘Greek East’ and ‘Latin West’ in the empire’s political structure, to the fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1453….”? John Haldon, *Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204* (London: T.J. International, 1999), 1.


10 The enumeration of four principles is the author’s own conception based on his research and its relationship to his own thesis’ focus on DIME. However, Edward N. Luttwak’s “operational code” and John Haldon’s “Strategy and Diplomacy: Theories and Practice” are seminal works in any such endeavor. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, 415-18; John Haldon, *Warfare, State, and Society*, 34-46.


17 Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 13


19 Ibid., 258-59.

20 Antonucci, “War by Other Means,” 2.


22 Brownworth, *Lost to the West*, 182.


24 Carey, *Road to Manzikert*, 81.


29 Brownworth, *Lost to the West*, 184.


34 In joint doctrine the informational instrument of power is defined as: “Information remains an important instrument of national power and a strategic resource critical to national security. Previously considered in the context of traditional nation-states, the concept of information as an instrument of national power extends to non-state actors—such as terrorists and transnational criminal groups—that are using information to further their causes and undermine those of the USG and its allies. DoD operates in a dynamic age of interconnected global networks and evolving social media platforms. Every DoD action that is planned or executed, word that is written or spoken, and image that is displayed or relayed, communicates the intent of DoD, and by extension the USG, with the resulting potential for strategic effects.” See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, I-12.


37 Brownworth, Lost to the West, 137-144; Harl, World of Byzantium, 74-78.

38 Ibid.

39 Brownworth, Lost to the West, 25-36; Chirila, “10 Reasons,” 7.


42 Ibid., 114; Kurbalija, “What Can We Learn,” 3.


44 Brownworth, *Lost to the West*, 188.


48 Ibid.


51 Ibid.


57 See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, I-12.

58 In joint doctrine the military instrument of power is defined as: “The US employs the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals. The ultimate purpose of the US Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Fundamentally, the military instrument is coercive in nature, to include the integral aspect of
military capability that opposes external coercion. Coercion generates effects through the application of force (to include the threat of force) to compel an adversary or prevent our being compelled. The military has various capabilities that are useful in non-conflict situations (such as in foreign relief). Regardless of when or where employed, the Armed Forces of the United States abide by US values, constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of arms.”

Ibid., I-13.


62 McGeer, _Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth_, 359-60.


65 Dennis, _Maurice’s Strategikon_, 65.

66 Brownworth, _Lost to the West_, 182; Ostrogorsky, 187.

67 Ostrogorsky, _History of the Byzantine State_, 282.

68 Carey, _Road to Manzikert_, 84; McGeer, _Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth_, 202-06.

69 Carey, _Road to Manzikert_, 82-84; McGeer, _Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth_, 257-66.

70 McGeer, _Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth_, 214-16.

71 Ibid., 216.

72 Ibid., 289.

73 Heath, _Byzantine Armies 886-1118_, 11-14, 17-22.

74 Haldon, _Warfare, State, and Society_, 174-76.

75 Luttwak, _The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire_, 343-45.

76 Romane, _Byzantium Triumphant_, 7-9.


78 Haldon, _Warfare, State, and Society_, 152.


83 Ibid., 363.


86 Ibid., 145.

87 Laiou, *The Economic History of Byzantium*, 3-4; In joint doctrine the economic instrument of power is defined as “A strong US economy with free access to global markets and resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the enabler of a strong national defense. In the international arena, the Department of the Treasury works with other USG agencies, the governments of other nations, and the international financial institutions to encourage economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crises. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, I-13.


91 Ibid.


93 Carey, *Road to Manzikert*, 82.


95 Ibid., 9-10.

96 Ibid.

97 Dennis, *Maurice’s Strategikon*, xiii-xiv.


100 Kurbalija, “What Can We Learn,” 2; Brownworth, Lost to the West, 188.

101 Kurbalija, “What Can We Learn,” 2-3; Brownworth, Lost to the West, 188.

102 Laiou, The Economic History of Byzantium, 401.

103 Ibid., 19; Kaldellis, Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood, 6; Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, 56.


109 Ibid.


111 Ibid.