


## Logistics Smart Power: A Bridge Between Hard and Soft Power

by

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### Abstract

After sixteen years of war and a decline in US tools of soft power, the US has to think more creatively about how it uses its resources. Department of Defense leadership has challenged military planners to be proactive in countering competition short of armed conflict. This includes actions to attract allies and partners through soft power, in order to effectively counter America's threats. One way for the DoD to support soft power is through logistics. This is an opportunity that has been largely missed. By developing military logisticians to consider strategic effects through professional military education, improved talent management, Training with Interagency opportunities, allowing for logistics experimentation funding at the Combatant Commands and the development of a Logistics Strategic Appraisal Tool, logisticians should be able to better develop logistics operations with strategic effects. These steps offer a way to develop and apply logistics as an aspect of American soft power. This effort, when combined with hard power, will lead toward more comprehensive and effective approaches or the use of smart power.

## **Logistics Smart Power: A Bridge Between Hard and Soft Power**

Hard power is necessary at times, but the long game is on the soft power side – diplomacy, development...education...Taken together, hard and soft power complement each other to create smart power.

—Admiral James Stravridis<sup>1</sup>

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States found itself as the only superpower in the world and at a point in history where it had an opportunity to expand its global influence. In the decades that followed, the world accelerated its move towards globalization. The period was also a moment that allowed the United States an unprecedented opportunity to build relationships with many new countries in the world. However, polling in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, revealed that global sentiment towards the United States was that of a love-hate relationship – the world believed in what America stood for, yet disagreed with many of its policies.<sup>2</sup> In the wake of terrorism at home, America made moves that further detracted from the climate of global support. The National Security Strategy published in 2002 reoriented US foreign policy to include unilateral United States action and preventative war, hallmarks of what would become known as the Bush Doctrine.<sup>3</sup> International law has long held that preemptive war was a just cause for conflict, acceptable if there was an immediate threat to a country's sovereignty. However, preventative war, actions to prevent a nation from acquiring the ability to attack, was a departure from these accepted norms.<sup>4</sup> The US entered Iraq in 2003 largely alone due to this difference of interpretation.<sup>5</sup>

What has followed is more than a decade of war that has eroded American influence. As Robert Kagan noted, "The detainment facilities at Guantanamo, the use of torture against suspected terrorists, and the widely condemned invasion of Iraq in 2003

have all tarnished the American “brand” and put a dent in America’s “soft power” – its ability to attract others to its point of view.”<sup>6</sup> America’s recent foreign policy efforts and wars detracted from its ability to maintain relationships with traditional allies and partners and the ability to attract new partners. After sixteen years of war and the rise of great power competition, the US has to think more creatively about how it uses its resources.

One way for the United States to correct this trend is to increase its investment in diplomatic efforts, but recent policy decisions have actually exacerbated the challenge. Over the past several years we have heard both diplomats and military leaders alike lament funding shortfalls for the Foreign Service. It is these Ambassadors and Foreign Service Officers that are charged with wielding the diplomatic instrument of national power. Many see the State Department as a key ingredient in US foreign policy, such as building relationships or sustaining alliances. Senior leaders recognize that a successful national strategy includes fostering unity of effort across the government and the synchronization of all instruments of national power. In 2013 congressional testimony, General James Mattis noted, “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.”<sup>7</sup> These comments emphasize the critical link between military and diplomatic actions, as well as their connection to a successful strategy. Mattis continued this line of thinking as Secretary of Defense. In his November 2017 Planning Expectations, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) provided direction to the Secretaries of the Military Departments that emphasized the need for a whole of government approach:

Our discussions must also focus on what we can do today to proactively achieve our objectives, not just on what we do if we fail. The Department

must be able to provide recommendations on the use of the military both within and outside the construct of contingency plans and combat operations in order to protect our national interests and achieve our strategic objectives as an element of national power, alongside diplomatic, economic, and information actions.<sup>8</sup>

This statement reveals clear direction from the current DoD leadership that we must think differently to affect the strategic environment.

One way to achieve the nation's strategic objectives and to better align with Secretary Mattis' guidance is to rethink how the DoD uses military logistics. Logistics efforts are often at the forefront of government actions and they can play a key role in promoting American influence. Several of the military's missions center on the coordination of people, facilities and supplies. For example, Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts are primarily logistics operations with soft power implications. There are also several historical and recent examples of military logistics influencing soft power. The Berlin Airlift was a logistics operation of over 200,000 flights between 1948 and 1949 that broke the Soviet blockade and conveyed the strategic message of US support of West Berlin. In 2004, the US Navy and US Marines were among the first responders to the earthquake and resulting tsunami in Indonesia, these efforts greatly changed the world's largest Muslim nation's view of the US and increased military to military interaction.<sup>9</sup> US Navy hospital ships have been providing humanitarian assistance and logistics support to South America and in response to disasters for many years, bolstering the reputation of the US to affected populations. Despite the potential advantages that logistics operations offer, these types of efforts are often reactive.

The SECDEF also tasked the Department of Defense to provide strategic options to proactively achieve objectives.<sup>10</sup> Military logistics are uniquely positioned to provide

alternative ways to meet this objective. In this era of dispersed, global operations, the military logistician routinely interacts face-to-face with non-military organizations and with officials of foreign governments in the conduct of global logistics. Some of these interactions, such as reducing customs timelines, building regional distribution networks, enabling development and disaster relief or negotiating international contracts, can have strategic implications for the United States. A shift in approach in how the government conceives of and synchronizes these efforts is needed. A reimagining of the uses of military logistics offers ways to support whole of government or international efforts to achieve the nation's strategic outcomes.

#### Military Diplomacy

The military has long understood its role as a diplomatic tool of the state. Carl von Clausewitz noted, "...that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political discourse, carried on with other means."<sup>11</sup> Recognizing this, each Service has developed its own specialized branch of Foreign Area Officers: those men and women that conduct the business of strengthening ties with foreign militaries. Likewise, Geographic Combatant Commanders conduct military-to-military engagements with foreign militaries as a part of a Combatant Command Campaign Plan or Country Security Cooperation Plan. The US Navy routinely conducts port visits in the vein of exporting American values and showing the flag across the globe, efforts designed for familiarization, promotion of goodwill and friendly relations with foreign populations. All of these diplomatic engagements are the result of either extensive and specialized individual training or high-level, negotiated events. Military logistics efforts also engage routinely with partners but tends to be used as a diplomatic tool only in the wake of crisis and the ensuing HADR efforts. The Department of

Defense is missing an opportunity to use its logistics efforts in a more proactive way that focuses on achieving strategic effects. Logistics efforts offer senior leaders another strategic tool that can be used as a bridge between hard and soft power.

To create a soft power role for military logisticians requires a shift in the mindset of strategic leaders, military planners, interagency partners and military logisticians themselves. The Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (JSJ4) mission statement reads, “Lead the logistics enterprise, drive joint force readiness and provide the best logistics advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to maximize the joint force commander’s freedom of action.”<sup>12</sup> This statement seems to limit the logistician’s role to that of an enabler, it does not challenge the logistician to generate logistics options with strategic outcomes for senior leaders. Thus, most logisticians espouse that their job is to extend the operational reach of the commander and support lines of communication. In joint planning, the logistician is thought of as a part of the supporting cast and their contribution is limited to a logistics estimate or logistics annex to a plan. In this way, supportability of the base plan becomes the defining outcome of logistics efforts. While this will remain the main focus of military logistics, there are opportunities to utilize logistics effects as standalone efforts to shape strategic outcomes.

#### The Importance of Smart Power and Enduring Partnerships

Underpinning the uses of the nation’s instruments of national power is the concept of power itself. National power is the ability to influence another nation to generate outcomes that are beneficial for itself. The tools of influence are often defined as being either hard or soft. Joseph Nye notes, “Hard power is the capacity to coerce them to do so. Hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interests.”<sup>13</sup> Soft power on the other hand,

is "...defined...as the ability to get what one wants through persuasion or attraction...It builds attraction and encompasses nearly everything that other than economic and military power."<sup>14</sup> It is the strategic combination of hard and soft power, "in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently," that creates smart power.<sup>15</sup>

Unfortunately, the United States tends to focus on the use of hard power to solve international disagreements. Some of the decline in the United States desire to utilize soft power can be traced back to the 2002 National Security Strategy that emphasized unilateralism and preventative war. The Center for Strategic and International Studies noted, "Many of the traditional instruments of soft power, such as public engagement and diplomacy, have been neglected and fallen into disrepair."<sup>16</sup> This implies that the United States has become too focused on its military instrument and has allowed our soft power skills to atrophy.

The platform of the current administration continues this trend. It is seen by many as being more isolationist, more pro-military and marginalizes the Department of State.<sup>17</sup> Additionally, the international community has witnessed the United States challenging the global status quo by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate Accords, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital, social media rhetoric and immigration policy changes. The President's budget for 2017 proposed an increase of \$54 billion for the Department of Defense and an almost equal decrease for the Department of State and other entities that offer soft power solutions.<sup>18</sup> While the effects of the recent administration have yet to be determined, there is nothing that shows a reversal of the primacy of the military as the means of choice of our civilian leadership

when confronted with international problems. Focusing on one instrument of national power at the expense of others may lead to a myopic approach to wielding national power. Psychologist Abraham Maslow noted, “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.”<sup>19</sup> Yet most of the international security challenges the United States faces today cannot be solved by the military alone.

Several strategic studies echo this conclusion and point to the need for a broader approach. For example, the *Joint Operating Environment 2035* highlights the trend of shifting strategic relationships in global affairs. It explains that:

A combination of more capable competitors, more dangerous threats, and greater fiscal uncertainty is likely to make unilateral action by the United States more difficult and potentially less effective in 2035. Therefore, the United States will continue to pursue collective security arrangements with a large set of capable and often ideologically or culturally compatible actors...diverse changes will make them more difficult to manage and operate.<sup>20</sup>

The hard power focus of the U.S. has weakened our ability to effectively wield our soft power efforts to enhance collective security arrangements. A better balance of hard and soft power is required.

The predisposition to use military power also detracts from America’s enduring interests. Admiral James Stavridis and General Anthony Zinni state, “To combat the global challenges America faces in the world today, we know that we cannot deliver security solely from the barrel of a gun.” They go on to argue, “America’s future depends on projecting the United States to the rest of the world as compassionate, confident, and, above all, engaged globally.”<sup>21</sup> Smart power is the ability to attract partners of choice while maintaining powerful coercive options. For example, in the Far East, many countries look to the US as their security partner of choice and to China as

their economic partner of choice. To be that strategic partner of choice, the United States needs to attract compatible allies and partners to further our mutual national interests. To accomplish this goal, military hard power solutions should often be the last tool of choice when dealing with international dilemmas. Instead, diplomatic, development, informational and educational efforts are better tools to influence global actors.

Although the Department of State has the responsibility for conducting the diplomacy of the United States, the DoD does and should play a role. There are two distinct ways the military supports diplomatic efforts: to be the coercive hammer to back up public diplomacy and through engagement and security cooperation to enhance Department of State efforts. This last aspect has enormous room for growth. The draft Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2030 (CCJO 2030) highlights several areas for DoD support to Whole of Government integrated security cooperation efforts. CCJO 2030 discusses partner integration "...to augment combat power and for unique capabilities and additional capacity to address *diplomatic, information, economic, and social challenges that exceed purely U.S. military capabilities.*"<sup>22</sup> The DoD's concepts are deliberately dependent on all instruments of national power to achieve desired strategic end states. CCJO 2030 also stresses the need for improving partnerships with the international and interagency partners, better integration of Security Cooperation Activities, the ability to blend physical and informational power and to leader development programs that augment globally integrated operations. Within the military, in proactive peacetime operations short of armed conflict, military logistics is

poised to effectively influence strategic outcomes through partnering activities in support of stability, development and security cooperation.

### Logistics as a Bridge

Logistics is uniquely positioned to provide a critical linkage between hard and soft power to generate smart power. It operates in support of interagency efforts and in conjunction with other humanitarian efforts. Military forces are deployed globally, and logistics has the capability, and likely the capacity, to sustain both soft and hard power operations simultaneously.

Military logistics already intersects with diplomacy and soft power efforts. The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) plan and conduct soft power activities in many of the same physical locations that the military operates. Additionally, these efforts take place in spaces where Non-Governmental Organizations, International Government Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations and commercial organizations are working. For example, military logisticians may be supporting operations or exercises in the same locations that USAID is providing food security assistance, Doctors Without Borders is providing medical care and the World Food Programme and UN Logistics Cluster provides logistics support for the overall humanitarian effort. Logistics is the common element between all of these activities. Every prolonged action, be it military, governmental or civilian, requires logistics. Finally, military logistics activities intersect with the military, economic, commercial and diplomatic activities of the supported nation. Each country, area of responsibility or region has a set of ongoing, yet disparate logistics support operations occurring simultaneously. Harmonizing the role of military logistics with these efforts offers a way to improve America's strategic approach

The Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt) Concept points the way forward for a more robust logistics role, but it can be improved upon. It emphasizes the soft power organizational capabilities of logistics efforts and provides a framework in which military logisticians can operate to synchronize these disparate logistics activities. The JLEnt is the logistics model that dovetails into joint, interagency, international and multinational cooperation to apply logistics support. Christopher Papparone, and George Topic explain, “The JLEnt may be described as the relationships among thousands of logistics providers across the globe, including military organizations that interact in a milieu with other entities, processes, and places. While it is impossible to physically see the entire JLEnt in action, there are multiple ways to visualize how it works.”<sup>23</sup> The authors describe the JLEnt as a complex, adaptive system that, “...is like an organism responding to an ever changing ecosystem (the strategic environment).”<sup>24</sup> This organism (organization) is comprised of multiple logistics partners from the military, civilian, international and private organizations that envisions complementary methods of support.

The 2015 Joint Concept for Logistics proposes a way for the JLEnt to support these global operations through Globally Integrated Logistics.<sup>25</sup> The JLEnt prescribes a Joint, Interagency, International and Multinational global logistics organization that supports Combatant Commanders. This organization, seen below in Figure 1, provides a way of organizing military logistics within a global construct of providers that supports developing logistics as a bridge between hard and soft power.



Figure 1. The Joint Logistics Enterprise<sup>26</sup>

While conceptualization and organization steps add value, they do not maximize the strategic effects that logisticians can achieve through logistics operations. With the understanding that there are multiple logistics actors in each region and that the framework for coordination and cooperation exists, each Geographic Combatant Commander has opportunities to shape better outcomes.

The Combatant Commander (CCDR) holds Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) that can be leveraged to produce strategic outcomes. As outlined in Joint Publication 4-0, “CCDRs exercise authoritative direction over logistics, in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 164. DAFL cannot be delegated or transferred.”<sup>27</sup> The CCDR, through this authority, can direct planning efforts to support logistics operations. Additionally, the Unified Command Plan and National Military Strategy direct globally integrated operations, CCDRs should collaborate on global logistics support with other

CCDRs, Defense Agencies and the Interagency. With these authorities and through a Global Campaign Plan or a CCDR Campaign Plan, an effort should be made to integrate soft power logistics outcomes.<sup>28</sup> Change will occur when leaders, planners and logisticians start to think differently about how to achieve the desired effects through logistics smart power solutions.

### Developing Logisticians to Achieve Strategic Effects

Developing logistics solutions that bridge hard and soft power requires the logistics community to think differently about how we develop logisticians. Several senior logistics leaders were interviewed on this topic and offered suggestions on how this could be done.

First, there are shortfalls in DoD's professional military education that prepares future leaders. Major General James Johnson, a former US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Director of Logistics noted, that professional military education (PME) could be more beneficial if more officers were afforded the opportunity to attend in residence and was less episodic in nature.<sup>29</sup> The 2018 National Defense Strategy comments that even if officers are afforded the opportunity to attend PME, it has "stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity."<sup>30</sup> General Johnson adds that even with PME reimaged, there are shortfalls in talent management, to place the right officers in the right jobs at the right time.

...our assignment system does not always match individuals to the best assignment to continue development of specific competencies or maximize the most recent education experience, because the needs of the institution may not support that match. Institutionally, we need to re-evaluate our PME and assignments systems to ensure we are developing our personnel as early as possible to meet future competency requirements. That means we need to transform how we deliver who gets

what and when (in PME and assignments). In general, we have to develop individuals sooner with their Service function, understanding their Service's overall capabilities/competencies, Joint and Interagency, and Industry capabilities/competencies.<sup>31</sup>

Producing logistics leaders with a deeper understanding of national strategy will allow for these officers to see the strategic opportunities in planning efforts. Logisticians tend to see each mission as a discrete effort focused on temporal accomplishments.

Mr. Mark Bennington, Assistant Commander for Contracting, Naval Supply Systems Command notes,

as a consumer of requirements packages from Logisticians, I am not seeing creative thinking and forward looking packages. I tend to see a reliance on the past to build requirements for the future. The US Navy has a tremendous opportunity to enhance the United States "brand" every time a ship pulls into a foreign port. However, well before this happens sailors (and the "stay behind" logisticians) need to access whatever tools are available to understand the US national strategy and how they fit into that strategy.<sup>32</sup>

The exposure to creative thinking and systems models at Senior Service Colleges provides a starting point for logisticians to begin their planning efforts. Without understanding the bigger picture and continuing to plan only for the support of an individual unit, ship or operation, logisticians are missing an opportunity to impact national strategic goals.

Another opportunity to develop military logisticians would be to expand the Training with Industry (TWI) initiative. The current model places logisticians with civilian corporations such as Starbucks, Exxon-Mobile, Home Depot and FedEx. These officers then return to the military with best practices from industry. Creation of a Training with Interagency program could be a way to build understanding of their government logistics partners and gain strategic empathy of the interests of these agencies.

Potential candidates include Department of State Regional Bureaus, USAID, USAID

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the UN World Food Programme and even with Private Volunteer Organizations.

Enhancing the strategic profile of logisticians should also include deliberate actions to improve collaboration and innovation. Mr. Dennis D'Angelo, a member of the Senior Executive Service and a former Deputy Director of Logistics at both USAFRICOM and US Central Command, believes that there should be experimentation funds provided for Combatant Command J4s.<sup>33</sup> These experimentation funds should not only look at ideas and concepts to drive logistics engagements and strategy, but at how logistics operations could provide soft power effects. Mr. D'Angelo points to US Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) relationship with SOFWERX as a model for logisticians to follow. SOFWERX is a partnership between USSOCOM and the Doolittle Institute that, "through the use of our growing ecosystem, promotion of divergent thought, and neutral facilitation, our goal is to bring the right minds together to solve challenging problems."<sup>34</sup> Engagement with academia and industry through experimentation could provide concepts that support logistics smart power.

#### Logistics Strategic Appraisal Tool (LOGSAT)

With sufficient professional military education, experience from the right assignments, creative thinking and futures tools, logisticians will be better poised to be use logistics to advance strategic goals. One way to assist logisticians in the design and development of strategic options for senior leaders is through the use of a Logistics Strategic Appraisal Tool or LOGSAT (Figure 2 below). This tool is adapted from the U.S. Army War College's *Strategic Appraisal Tool*.<sup>35</sup> Colonel Ian Lyles and Colonel Dan Cormier note, "...the failure to comprehend the factors that influence international issues often stymies U.S. global efforts."<sup>36</sup> A similar case can be made about the

development of logisticians and the ability of logisticians to see the strategic environment in which they operate. As mentioned, logistics officers are often performing their duties without an understanding of how their efforts contribute to strategic goals. The Army War College faculty developed a thinking aid that, through a series of questions, is designed to assist in generating a comprehensive appreciation of the environment and, in turn, better strategies.




Figure 2. Logistics Strategic Appraisal Tool<sup>37</sup>

The LOGSAT is a framework that logisticians can use at the Combatant Command or Joint Task Force level to assist in the development of strategic logistics options. It is a method to help logisticians understand the theater in a comprehensive and holistic way and to navigate through what is most likely a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous logistics space.

The first two Quadrants focus on understanding the perspectives of the US Government. Quadrant 1 helps the logistician understand strategic guidance. Logistics

planners gain an appreciation of all higher-level guidance beginning with the President's National Security Strategy (NSS), logistics planners must understand US purpose, values, interests and national strategy for achieving them. Diving deeper into guidance, the Unified Campaign Plan (UCP), the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) all provide guidance on how the US will employ its military and what ways and means are available to achieve ends with acceptable risk. Further guidance can be found in the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan and the Global Employment of the Force end-states.

Quadrant 2 assists the military logistician in understanding interagency guidance and plans in the region. Military logistics planners must understand what interagency partners are trying to accomplish in the region. Familiarization with Department of State and USAID Joint Strategic Plans, Department of State and USAID Joint Regional Plans plans, USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategies and each Ambassador's Integrated Country Strategy must be understood to ascertain where these agencies' and DoD's interests intersect. Logistics planners should determine how Ambassadors think about issues in the region through the Defense Attaché. Finally, planners should determine what liaison officers exist on their staffs and cultivate relationships before crisis, as this will be critical to unity of effort during crisis and facilitate whole of government solutions.

The last two Quadrants help planners orient on external actors in the strategic environment. Quadrant 3 examines the other actors operating in the logistics space. These include International Government Organizations (such as the UN), Private Volunteer Organizations (such as the Red Cross or Doctors without Borders) and

commercial activities (UPS and FedEx). In addition to appreciating their interests, understanding their access, location and desire to work with military must be determined.

Quadrant 4 assesses individual countries that the US is trying to persuade or attract. What are their needs, what current Foreign Military Sales or Foreign Military Financing cases are open and what have they specifically asked for? Does an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement exist or can one be negotiated? What have they asked the Ambassador for? Does a gap exist between what interagency or international partners can provide and what the country has asked for?

Each situation will be different, but the LOGSAT can be used as a tool to determine if there are logistics operations that can produce the smart power effects. As a framework for understanding the environment that logisticians are operating in, the LOGSAT provides a method to for military logisticians think about utilizing the JLent to determine synergies to achieve logistics smart power effects.

#### A Practical Application

A practical example of how the United States can reorient its logistics focus may serve to clarify the points in this paper. Through the LOGSAT, a potential area of synchronization between DoD and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and food security is examined. In this example, both USAID, OFDA, international partners and DoD have equities in East Africa.

In any situation where DoD anticipates or plans activities in the humanitarian space, a baseline description of agency interests must be discussed. Understanding tensions between missions and core competencies is required as a first step as it

relates to DoD support of humanitarian efforts. The DoD does not want to get into the business of replacing commercially available logistics capability as it would detract from the core mission of defense of the nation. The DoD does get involved in these efforts only when officially requested through a lead Federal agency (Usually USAID-OFDA) in specific circumstances. However, Commanders on the ground are authorized to take limited additional action in the first 72 hours of a crisis in order to save lives and mitigate suffering. This has been specifically limited so the DOD focuses on its core competency and the relief community focuses on its core competency. DOD usually gets called upon when it has a capability and/or capacity that doesn't exist in the civilian community.

A review of these general rules of engagement should be made to determine if there are greater opportunities for cooperation. At the very least, joint DoD and USAID/OFDA planning efforts in steady state could find gaps and seams in capability, capacity and funding. There is the potential that they could be filled with military logistics with little additional cost (military airlift whitespace, excess capacity in the military logistics system or combining logistics military to military engagements with actual food security supply chain efforts). Although DoD may be the more expensive partner for logistics, further study should be conducted on inter-department funding mechanisms through congressional action or departmental transfer authority to facilitate whole of government solutions.

DoD, the U.S. Institute for Peace and the American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction) have developed agreed upon guidelines for the relations between U.S. Armed Forces and non-governmental humanitarian organizations in hostile or potentially hostile environments.<sup>38</sup> These guidelines focus on

the tactical cooperation in humanitarian operations in hostile environment but lacks direction on how to plan and enable these types of operations in a steady state environment.

A potential application for military logistics to support other objectives is in the area of food security and international development, both steady state activities. In a recent roundtable discussion, a group of over 50 experts from the Department of State, USAID, the DoD, the Department of Commerce, and other governmental and academic practitioners met to discuss the confluence of food security and national security.<sup>39</sup> With the understanding that there are authority, funding and mission/interest obstacles at the very least, logisticians ought to consider other non-military efforts in their region that they can shape or enable to create soft power effects. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and food security seem like an intersection of interests worth considering. If the military logistician considers FHA or food security through the LOGSAT, there may be opportunities to affect strategic outcomes by enabling those agencies in the lead for the U.S.

Starting in quadrant 1 of the LOGSAT for this example of providing food security in East Africa, the logistics planner would strive to understand higher level guidance pertaining to the region. The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that we will promote American values and that one NSS priority action is to reduce suffering through support for food security.<sup>40</sup> A military planner would realize that although these are the types of efforts that are under the purview of the Department of State, they could be supported by military logistics. This is a potential intersection of missions where logistics smart power could be generated. Understanding that food security is directly

proportional to overall security makes it a concern for military planners. The International Food Policy Research Institute has conducted research that shows food insecurity can be both a cause and a result of conflict.<sup>41</sup> Further, guidance from the NSS, the NDS and NMS discuss the importance of going forward with allies and partners. Soft power is the tool of a nation that attracts allies and partner, in this case military logistics is in a position to enable a soft power effort that has been shown to prevent conflict.

After understanding the higher-level guidance for potential military support to food security, the planner moves to quadrant 2 to understand what other actors' strategies are in the region. A detailed review of the Department of State Bureau of African Affairs' strategy documents shows efforts for food security in Africa and how they relate to national policy. A planner may then review the Department of State Office of Food Security and Feed the Future strategies, planning documents and budget requests to understand planned activities in the affected area. USAID and OFDA country plans must also be understood to ensure that DoD and USAID efforts would be complementary. The logistics planner would cultivate existing relationships to inform planning efforts and generate new relationships where gaps exist. The Joint Staff J5, Combatant Command staffs and other Joint Task Forces are structures where interagency personnel can be found for collaboration. Before moving to quadrants 3 and 4, a logistics planner would determine if policy, authorities and funding support moving forward with more detailed analysis on specific actions without additional requests.

Shifting to quadrants 3 and 4, the logistics planner would engage with the Defense Attaché to obtain the Ambassador's understanding of the situations and to

ascertain what other actors are operating in country. Although each situation will be different, understanding the goals of all actors (to include the affected country), the geopolitics of the region, relationships, the sum of the logistics activities and methods that the U.S. has at its disposal will inform logistic planner's development of strategic logistics options for senior leaders.

### Conclusion

After sixteen years of war and the rise of great power competition, the US has to think more creatively about how it uses its resources. Russia and China are engaged in a strategic competition with the US. Their manipulation of social media, predatory economics and gray-zone conflict require a proactive US response. Defense Department leadership has challenged military planners to develop proactive ways to counter competition short of armed conflict. This includes actions to attract allies and partners through soft power, in order to effectively counter the coercive practices of these two powers. One way for the DoD to support soft power is through logistics. This is an opportunity that has been largely missed. By developing military logisticians to consider strategic effects through professional military education, improved talent management, Training with Interagency opportunities, allowing for logistics experimentation funding at the Combatant Commands and development of a Logistics Strategic Appraisal Tool logisticians should be able to better develop logistics operations with strategic effects. These steps offer a way to develop and apply logistics as an aspect of American soft power. This effort, when combined with hard power, will lead toward more comprehensive and effective approaches or the use of smart power.

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