Promoting Success: Observations on the Army's Approach to Human Capital

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Promoting Success: Observations on the Army’s Approach to Human Capital

Assessment and development of leaders can be greatly improved by considering the interaction of knowledge, skill, and aptitudes; formal structure and processes; and strategy. The Army’s human capital is inherently sub-optimized because strategies adapt faster than the formal structure which results in selection of officers who are not a strong fit for the new strategies while inadvertently selecting against those who would be a good fit. Developing leaders means updating systems and leveraging a strategy to ensure a strategic fit for those officers with the KSAs most important to the Army. The Army can preserve the potential of its human capital by expanding promotion pathways, increasing the diversity of its force, and improving senior leader engagement with subordinates.
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Abstract

Today’s officers will address tomorrow’s emerging threats and challenges, but the Army is using yesterday’s structure, processes, and strategies to assess and develop them. Assessment and development of leaders can be greatly improved by considering the interaction of knowledge, skill, and aptitudes; formal structure and processes; and strategy. The Army’s human capital is inherently sub-optimized because strategies adapt faster than the formal structure which results in selection of officers who are not a strong fit for the new strategies while inadvertently selecting against those who would be a good fit. Developing leaders means updating systems and leveraging a strategy to ensure a strategic fit for those officers with the KSAs most important to the Army. The Army can preserve the potential of its human capital by expanding promotion pathways, increasing the diversity of its force, and improving senior leader engagement with subordinates.
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Most companies today espouse “people are our most important asset” and invest considerable sums in workforce development, largely through training programs. But truly committing to helping people grow requires more than this.

—Peter M. Senge

Officers serving today will lead the nation through tomorrow’s emerging threats and challenges. Yet the Army is using yesterday’s structure, processes and strategies to assess and develop them. Is this a problem? Perhaps some of the Army’s institutional activities have stood the test of time and proven themselves to be highly effective, while others have become antiquated and introduce vulnerabilities that have not yet been realized. Given rapid advances in technology and globalization, the increased complexity of threats and challenges, and the changing nature of the workforce, we have a stake in minimizing the vulnerabilities of the latter. As Peter Senge reminds us, any approach to this question should extend beyond a mere consideration of the Army’s training programs. A broader systematic approach that examines the Army’s assessment and development processes is advisable.

As a people-centric organization, the notion of human capital offers a helpful construct. Human capital looks beyond the individual and takes into account the broader construct within which the individual works to determine the overall productivity of the workforce. As described by Dr. Andrew Hill, “The value of human capital is rooted in a system of firm-worker linkages: 1) knowledge, [skills, and attributes]; 2) formal structure, processes and support; 3) informal structure (networks, etc.); 4) strategy; and 5) culture.” Using Hill’s construct as a general framework, this paper will focus on
diagnosing several challenges that impact the Army’s ability to optimize its human capital to meet its requirements.

Of particular concern is the long-term risk to human capital introduced by the misalignment of the Army’s formal structure with its strategies. Current laws and policies governing the Army’s formal structure have accumulated over time and may not facilitate the Army’s current strategies. Because the strategies adapt faster than the formal structure, the system is inherently sub-optimized. This could result in selection of officers who are not a strong fit for the new strategies while inadvertently selecting against those who would be a good fit. Furthermore, the closed, up-or-out nature of the Army’s officer corps means any shortfalls created by this system are potentially long-lasting. The junior officers of today are the limited pool from which the Army will draw the senior officers of tomorrow, so mistakes in selection, training, and assignment have long-term consequences.

Firm-Worker Linkage Overview

The Army’s assessment and development of leaders can be greatly improved by considering the interaction of three “firm-worker linkages:” 1) knowledge, skill, and aptitudes (KSAs); 2) formal structure and processes; and 3) strategy or strategic-fit. This paper will explore these aspects by providing an initial discussion of the individual firm-worker linkages and then exploring four key observations derived from their interaction. Finally, the paper will consider three broad implications and opportunities which may prove useful to those considering how to take action now to preserve the Army’s potential for success into the future.
Knowledge, Skills, and Aptitudes (KSAs)

The fundamental building block of human capital consists of KSAs which are largely held by the individuals within workforce.\textsuperscript{6} KSAs that produce the most productivity for the Army’s human capital include four specific fields of knowledge including military-technical, moral-ethical, political-cultural, and leader development.\textsuperscript{7}

The Army invests in the KSAs of its workforce by providing some of the knowledge and skills through training and education, while other KSAs come from an officer’s personal life and experience.

All officers enter the Army with a college degree, which serves as a proxy for a basic level of KSAs such as communication, critical thinking skills, understanding of history, and exposure to foreign language training (to name a few). To optimize the KSAs of its workforce, the Army then provides training opportunities throughout the officer’s career including specialty skills, training related to the officer’s specific field, and general training on leadership and management. The Army places a heavy emphasis on its Officer Education System that has the stated intent to:

produce a corps of leaders who are fully competent in technical, tactical, and leadership skills, knowledge, and experience; understand how the Army runs; are prepared to operate in a unified action environment; can demonstrate confidence, integrity, critical judgment, and responsibility; operate in an environment of complexity, ambiguity, and rapid change; build effective teams amid organizational and technological change; and adapt to and solve problems creatively.\textsuperscript{8}

New assignments and additional operational experience provide officers with an opportunity to gain new KSAs or further develop those previously held. However, with such an extensive workforce the Army has long struggled to gain and maintain visibility of the KSAs for its personnel.\textsuperscript{9}
When discussing its workforce KSAs, the Army often uses the term “talent.” The Army’s Talent Management Task Force defines talent as, the unique intersection of skills, knowledge and behaviors in every person. Talent represents far more than the training, education and experiences provided by the Army. The fullness of each person’s life experience, to include investments they’ve made in themselves, personal and familial relationships (networks), ethnographic and demographic background, preferences, hobbies, travel, personality, learning style, education, and a myriad number of other factors better suit them to some development or employment opportunities than others. At the end of 2017, the Army had 76,474 commissioned, active duty officers serving. Each of them holds a wide range of KSAs. To track its diverse talent pool, the Army is adopting the Integrated Personnel and Pay System - Army (IPPS-A), a digital solution providing a modern, integrated human resources (HR) capability to all Army Components. As the system matures, the Army intends to use the newly available information and insight to improve management of its workforce and to facilitate assignments. By bridging numerous and currently incompatible systems, IPPS-A will allow the Army to catalogue the various KSAs of all individuals assigned across the Army – a huge feat for a total of over 1 million personnel in the Active and Reserve Components. Given the expanse of the force, it is also worth considering how all of those personnel fit into the Army and its manpower strategy.

Strategies and Strategic Fit

Strategic fit is perhaps most easily thought of as having the right person in the right job. But to consider the positive or negative impact on the efficacy of human capital, the concept must look beyond any one particular job and look at those aspects of the Army’s strategy to achieve a “competitive advantage.” When considering the strategic fit between the Army and its officers, there are three areas of particular
emphasis. First, the Army has been an all-volunteer force since 1973. Members of society are not compelled to join, but are provided an opportunity and recruited to serve the Nation. Although this paper will not explore this aspect in depth, it is noteworthy as it requires the Army to remain an employer of choice with a positive reputation so as to facilitate recruiting.\textsuperscript{15}

Second, the Army frames itself as a Profession of Arms.\textsuperscript{16} In describing the Joint Force, the 2015 National Military Strategy highlights:

\begin{quote}
In developing the Joint leaders of tomorrow, we emphasize six attributes. Our leaders will: strive to understand the environment in which they operate and the effect of applying all instruments of national power; anticipate and adapt to surprise, uncertainty, and chaos; work to recognize change and lead transitions; operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding; make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms; and think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to joint operations.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

As a profession with standards, performance expectations, and quality control, members may value the sense of pride and opportunities for advancement such a construct provides. Another important aspect of being a profession is the emphasis on officer development, which includes formal development programs such as professional military education (PME) and other more informal development activities conducted by supervisors and through self-study.\textsuperscript{18} The 2015 National Military Strategy further emphasizes the importance of professionals to the military’s overall strategy:

\begin{quote}
Our military and civilian professionals are our decisive advantage. They are the foundation of our operational excellence and our ability to successfully innovate. Therefore, we are dedicated to building creative, adaptive professionals skilled at leading organizational change while operating in complexity.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Finally, the role of the Army itself creates opportunity for its officers to find alignment with its strategy and a place for them to support that strategy. The wide scope
of opportunity presented by the range of missions taken on by the Army is summarized by then Chief of Staff of the Army General Odierno in the forward to Army Doctrinal Publication 1-0:

Over the past 237 years, the United States Army has proudly served the Nation by winning its wars and securing the peace. Our history is marked by decisive action in a wide range of missions—including regular and irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance operations, engagement with allies, and support to civil authorities. Each of these varied missions will require adaptive, high-quality leadership. The Army continuously pursues technological, material, and training advancements to improve its lethality and efficacy. Dramatic advances in fields such as artificial intelligence and automation are shaping the character of warfare in ways not currently fully understood or realized by the Army. Yet the Army will always need skilled leaders. Advanced technology and high-end capabilities will only serve to increase the diverse challenges and opportunities available. Moreover, major combat operations can be enabled through such technological leaps, but the remaining missions such as irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance, and support to civil authorities are inherently people-centric activities. Therefore, the Army needs personnel who can successfully execute varying missions, including those across the spectrum of warfare. Processes to select, assign, and manage such a diverse force is the third, and final aspect of human capital this paper will explore.

Formal Structures and Processes

The Army has significant and highly developed formal structures and processes to manage its human capital. Three aspects are particularly impactful: 1) the Army is a closed system that does not allow lateral entry into the officer ranks; 2) it operates on an
up-or-out system; and 3) it centrally manages the promotion, assignment, and retention of its officer population.\textsuperscript{22}

The Army’s personnel system requires matriculation of highly qualified personnel through the ranks so those who are most qualified can be selected for the most critical senior leadership positions. The Army’s officer system does not allow for an experienced civilian to enter its senior ranks. For example, the Chief Operating Officer for UPS or FedEx could not laterally enter the Army as a senior officer to run its logistics operations. As noted by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, “In the military’s closed personnel system, tomorrow’s leaders are developed and selected from today’s recruits.”\textsuperscript{23} To put this somewhat in context, the Army will eventually select the battalion commanders of 2035 from today’s Lieutenants. Today’s Captains and Majors may be serving as Colonels and General Officers in 2035. Finally, the future Army Chief of Staff and Combatant Commanders may have just completed their battalion commands.

The Army has a congressionally mandated up-or-out promotion system based upon several key pieces of legislation regarding officer management. Specifically, Congress passed the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which form the basis for many of the Army’s personnel policies and processes.\textsuperscript{24} These laws impose timing, tenure, and joint requirements on the services to ensure sufficient, highly-qualified personnel are available within the services. These Cold War-era laws continue to provide the legal requirements underlying today’s DoD HR policies, particularly promotion timelines and gateways for the uniformed services.\textsuperscript{25}
The Army also centrally manages the assignments and promotion of its officer population. The personnel assignment process is primarily based on filling the Army’s requirements with qualified personnel. For officers, the most significant requirements are key and developmental billets, which are also essential to an officer’s career timeline. The Army’s Human Resources Command assigns officers to the organizations to meet the Army’s structural requirement and branch-specific key and developmental positions required for promotion. Jobs are not typically determined by an individual’s specific KSAs, but rather the structural positions and the basic qualifications required – typically to include only rank and branch. For promotions and selections, the Secretary of the Army provides guidance to centralized boards which consider the entirety of an officer’s file with select areas for emphasis and favorable consideration. Of the information contained in the officer’s file, the Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs) and the associated senior rater comments play an essential factor.26

There are three key aspects of OERs that relate to the Army’s formal structure and processes. First, OERs are generated in a decentralized manner by which two superiors, known as the rater and senior rater, evaluate officers on their performance and potential, respectively.27 Second, the pool comprising a rated population is local and specific to the particular officers making up the rating chain (i.e., the rater and senior rater.) As a result, the populations vary in size, rating chains may be specialized or skewed in their composition, and comparisons of performance and potential are relative to the local population – not the officer’s entire competitive category. Third, the senior rater comments are restricted and typically include no more than four sentences to capture up to a year of service by the officer. In practice, senior rater comments focus
on potential in terms of 1) quantification relative to the officer’s peers, 2) advanced schooling, 3) promotion, and 4) command. For more senior officers, the officer’s potential to serve as a general officer is also a point of particular interest.\textsuperscript{28} Performance is also evaluated and the aspects of performance related to a set of standard, Army-specified aspects of knowledge, skills, and attributes.\textsuperscript{29} The decentralized generation of reports requires clear, consistent, and concise writing to accurately convey the officer’s potential to the centralized board which has to compare officers with diverse rating chains from an entire Army-wide competitive category.

Observations from the Firm-Worker Intersections

While each of these three aspects may be interesting in its own right, the intersection of them provides several key observations and potential areas of concern or opportunity. Looking at the three firm-worker linkages and how they intersect leads to four key observations, as noted in Figure 1.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Firm-Worker Linkage Intersections}
\end{figure}
Observation Area 1 is the ideal situation where the three linkages all intersect favorably and Army’s human capital is highly productive. In Observation Area 2, the Army’s formal structure and processes are not aligned with the other two factors. In this area, the Army selects against the personnel with the very KSAs most likely to improve the efficacy of its human capital. Observation Area 3 reflects a situation where the strategies and strategic-fit are not enabled by officer KSAs and formal structure and processes. In this area, the Army counterproductively selects officers with KSAs that undermine the productivity of its human capital. Finally, in Observation Area 4, officer KSAs are not adequate to enable a strategic-fit within the existing formal structure and processes. The Army lacks necessary and sufficient KSAs for its human capital to effectively meet requirements. Each of these observation areas will be explored below.

**Observation Area 1**

When the three firm-work linkages are aligned, the Army is able to optimize its human capital. In such a case, the synergistic relationship between strategy, formal structures, and the KSAs of the workforce enable a high degree of productivity. This may well describe how the Army’s systems were intended to operate, particularly during the Cold War when new congressional legislation on manning came into being. The legislation sought to create a diverse experience profile to ensure the military had the right officer corps to succeed against a known opponent.30 This reflects a desire to achieve “perfectly separable human capital” which, as Hill explains, means that “a firm may replace an employee and suffer little change in productivity. All investments in the employee accrue to the structural position in the organization.”31

During the latter part of the Cold War and following the adoption of DOPMA, professional military education, centralized promotions and assignments, and a
dominant threat seemed to focus development and assessment of human capital.\textsuperscript{32} As the 1990-91 Gulf War demonstrated, the combined impact of Goldwater-Nichols and DOPMA created a more integrated force where the unexpected loss of officers due to combat, dismissal, or promotion did not impact mission accomplishment.\textsuperscript{33} Although all officers were important, none were indispensable. Subordinates were prepared to advance and the centralized officer management system provided replacements. The Army’s deliberate investment in a structure that ensured its personnel had the necessary support and training to achieve a strategic fit created “separable human capital” that increased the potential for optimum productivity.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Observation Area 2}

In this area, formal structure and processes are not aligned with the strategies and officer KSAs. This results in lower overall productivity of the Army’s human capital due to poor strategic-fit of its workforce. As an example, a new officer may enter the Army with an advanced degree in organizational management and an aptitude for identifying new opportunities for employment of technology. Such an officer may be very well suited for operational-level staff positions. However, the officer must start at the most basic level. If, for instance, the officer is assigned as an Infantry lieutenant and does not exude great physical fitness and strong direct leadership skills, the officer’s senior rater may not provide a favorable evaluation. Although the officer may have the KSAs essential for success in future positions, the officer is bypassed for promotion or elects to leave the Army based on the perceived lack of future. Ultimately, the requirement for all officers to begin as a lieutenant and work at the tactical level can lead to early losses of key KSAs that would be of value to the Army in more senior positions.\textsuperscript{35}
Another example stems from changes to the operational environment which leads to new requirements for the Army’s human capital. In this case, the misalignment of formal structure and processes could result from inflexibility and inability to quickly adapt. With no formal structure to reflect the new requirements, the Army relies on leaders or human resource professionals to identify officers with the necessary KSAs from existing organizational structure. These specially selected personnel are not as easily replaced and unexpected losses could dramatically degrade the performance of the organization as the Army’s human capital is not optimized to address these new requirements.36

Moreover, this situation is exacerbated by the up-or-out process that forces officers to take on key and developmental requirements for promotion. In one case, the specialists and experts with the necessary KSAs to meet the Army’s new requirements do not meet the key and developmental requirement and are passed over for promotion. Alternatively, those officers may fill the key and developmental billet but not demonstrate exceptional performance and are therefore less competitive for selective assignments. In the worst-case scenario, senior raters view the officer’s potential as marginal or sub-standard and provides the officer with a poor evaluation that leads to subsequent dismissal or pass-over for promotion. In any case, the requirement to fill that important billet is driven by the up-or-out system and the billets assessed as key and developmental stem from the existing organizational structure. The organization undermines the potential of its human capital by effectively selecting against the very individuals it needs to execute its own strategy in the long-term.
Unfortunately, laws and policies governing the Army’s formal structure and processes have accumulated over time and do not allow sufficient flexibility to adapt requirements quickly to optimize its human capital by ensuring strategic-fit for its manpower with increasingly important KSAs. This is significant because early losses of personnel with important KSAs are generally irreversible. The Army seeks a high-quality force but cannot assess leaders into the force laterally. It must select individuals from within the current structure or bring in a junior-level officer who will need to advance through the regimented up-or-out process.

**Observation Area 3**

In this area of Figure 1, the Army’s formal structure and processes endorse and empower officers who are not a strategic-fit for the organization. As a result, the organization develops wasted capabilities and does not have the optimal human capital to meet its own strategy and emerging operational requirements. In worst-case scenarios, the Army actually selects officers with KSAs that undermine the productivity of its human capital.

A particularly concerning problem introduced by this misalignment is the retention and promotion of toxic leaders. Toxic leaders are an anathema to the Army’s emphasis on its status as a profession. Such leaders’ impact on the volunteer force structure is concerning. In “Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the US Military,” Dr. George Reed focuses on the scope and nature of toxic leadership in the military and notes that, “Unfortunately, the promotion and command selection processes that exclusively rely on top-down assessments are as likely to promote a toxic leader as one who is not toxic.” He continues by noting that, “Inflated evaluation and fitness reports do a poor job of identifying those with destructive leadership styles.”
Beyond the particularly concerning issue of allowing toxic leaders to be promoted, a centralized promotion system may also constrain diversity and inadvertently generate a cohort of nearly identical officers through a virtually one-size-fits-all approach to evaluations and promotion boards. As an example, promotion to Colonel within Special Forces requires an officer to have served as a Battalion Commander. Command is the single key and developmental position for promotion. There is currently no other pathway designated in DA PAM 600-3. Battalion Command is essentially seen a proxy to determine if a Special Forces officer has the potential to succeed in more senior positions. Yet most of the positions filled by Special Forces Colonels are not command positions and instead require extensive expertise in areas such as operations, planning, and force development. A Special Forces officer who received an advanced degree in planning or foreign relations may be an ideal officer to serve at higher levels; however, the system is not structured to facilitate this type of diversity.

Although the promotion system may strive to be unbiased, the inputs to the system are not equal. The decentralized evaluation process, consisting of different rater/senior rater writing styles, population sizes, and perceptions of what’s important to be considered “high potential” introduce a potential for evaluation biases or inconsistencies. Evaluations are based on relative populations, not the overall group of officers – in selective groups such as Special Forces, this places them in competition with one another for evaluations and relative ratings. However, the centralized promotion process will compete the officers in broader categories with others, using evaluations likely rendered under different standards.
Observation Area 4

In this final, particularly problematic area from Figure 1, KSAs of available individuals do not align with the organization’s strategy or the formal structure and processes. For instance, rapid changes in the operational environment lead to new requirements for which the Army’s formal systems have not developed, assessed, or promoted well-suited or prepared officers. The remaining officers in the closed, up-or-out system are essentially the wrong people for the new requirements. The problem is compounded as the officer accession and up-or-out structure precludes bringing in those with the necessary KSAs to meet the requirements, so the institution must attempt to either adapt the current workforce to meet the challenge or seek a technological or material solution.

This creates missed opportunities for the organization – and potentially a shortfall into the future – as individuals (i.e., senior leaders) must matriculate up through the organization. Additionally, the impacts noted in Observations 2 and 3 can accumulate over time and inadvertently leave the organization with significant capability gaps or oversights in KSAs. Richard Hooker describes such a situation where he notes that leaders did not have the necessary KSAs to accomplish the mission and notes, “…gaps in these skill sets contributed to poor outcomes that might have been prevented either by having different professional development and military and civilian education opportunities or by applying more refined selection criteria for specific, very high-level positions.”

The preceding observations highlight a key risk of the Army’s current process for assessing and developing productive human capital: if formal structures and processes are not aligned with, or responsive to, the Army’s efforts to ensure the strategic fit of its
officers and their KSAs, those systems will thoughtlessly act to sub-optimize the productivity of its human capital. Some actions may not be particularly concerning. For instance, officers will be assigned based on branch and grade, not their KSAs. Promotion timelines will be based on time in grade, not how officers might be a better strategic-fit at their current levels. Evaluations will be influenced by top-down perspectives of performance, not the value of an officer’s KSAs or their toxic impact on personnel. Selections will be based on performance in KD positions, not upon the KSAs necessary to succeed as senior leaders. But at its extreme, such a misaligned system pushes out those personnel with KSAs the Army needs while keeping those it does not actually want. None of these conditions are ideal, all are sub-optimal, and any one of them introduces a degree of long-term risk to human capital due to the Army’s closed, up-or-out system. At best, problems are identified and addressed quickly and only have a limited, but lingering impact on human capital productivity. At worst, the problems are latent and not recognized until years later when productivity collapses. Depending on the nature of the issue, the system could take years to recover. Therefore, it is important to further consider the implications of such a challenge and begin to consider opportunities to address it now.

Implications and Opportunities

As noted above, the officers who will be leading the Army as field grade and senior officers in 2035 are currently serving. Looking ahead to that time horizon, the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035 predicts six contexts of future conflict:

Violent Ideological Competition focused on the subversion or overthrow of established governments.

Threatened U.S. Territory and Sovereignty will become increasingly prevalent as enemies attempt to coerce the United States and its citizens.
Antagonistic Geopolitical Balancing by capable adversaries will challenge the United States over the long term and place difficult demands on the Joint Force over wide areas of the globe.

Intimidation, destabilization, and the use of force by state and non-state actors alike will result in Disrupted Global Commons and A Contest for Cyberspace.

Internal political fractures, environmental stressors, or deliberate external interference will lead to Shattered and Reordered Regions. These contexts suggest that the Army’s human capital will need to be prepared to address a wide-range of operational requirements. The Army cannot go back in time and re-assess new officers and would be hard-pressed to pull those who have separated back into the service. If the strategy depends on a professional, volunteer force and the structure does not allow for lateral entry, the Army should have a good estimate of the necessary KSAs, ensure it draws those individuals in, and then continues to promulgate them through the system. Or it needs to hedge its bets.

The observation areas above bring to the forefront three particularly important insights to ensure the Army’s human capital in prepared for the challenges of 2035. First, the military as whole can seek to expand its promotion pathways to facilitate new and varied opportunities to its officers. Second, the Army can modify any number of its current processes to improve the functional diversity of its force. And perhaps most importantly, change can start now at the individual level with today’s leaders working to improve their engagement with subordinates, look beyond assessments influenced primarily by unit performance, and identify the KSAs, both good and bad, which impact an officer’s potential to meet the Army’s requirements going forward.
Expand Promotion Pathways and Opportunities

The dynamic operational environment and increasing complexity of requirements necessitate an evolution of the federal laws governing officer personnel management. One possible approach would be to amend DOPMA and Goldwater-Nichols to return key officer management decisions, such as promotion timelines and quotas, to the service secretaries without the requirement to pursue Congressional waivers or exceptions. Previous studies by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) and the Hoover Institution have identified potential options and associated benefits for amending DOPMA. Such Department of Defense-level changes would allow the Army to capitalize upon its ongoing efforts to improve Talent Management and adapt its warfighting capability to rapidly changing contexts. The Army is implementing key changes in its personnel policies which will likely impact the experience profile and retention of officers. The Army’s introduction of a modern HR tool will provide greater insight to the workforce and facilitate more precise talent management of officers. Such visibility was not available or envisioned during the establishment of DOPMA or Goldwater-Nichols. To realize the potential of this technological advancement, flexible policies and procedures are needed to optimize DoD’s ability to manage personnel.

Because the Army’s promotion timelines are derivative of federal laws, amending those laws would enable reassessment and potential adjustment to current gateways. Such changes could motivate the most talented officers to remain in service while granting flexibility for managing specialized capabilities. For instance, given the specialization required in some technologically-advanced disciplines such as Cyber warfare, the ability to extend promotion timelines in conjunction with the Blended Retirement System may facilitate the retention of these critical personnel.
More importantly, removing or relaxing the time constraints of the current up-or-out system would ease the pressure for officers to aggressively pursue KD positions. This would allow more officers to take on broadening assignments to expand their knowledge and build additional skills. As noted by Richard Hooker, such experiences are important for senior leaders but are not readily available:

Four-star generals and admirals are practically by definition masters of Service and joint warfighting, but at the most senior levels, other attributes are necessary. These include interagency acumen, media savvy, a detailed understanding of congressional relations, a strong grasp of the defense planning, programming, and budgeting system, and skill in multinational environments. Normal career development patterns do not always provide opportunities to build these competencies.47

The wide variety of requirements in ADP 1-0, as previously noted, highlight that the required KSAs for future leaders should include irregular warfare and engagement with allies. Likewise, the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the importance of working with allies and partners.48 Such sentiments are further expanded upon by Hew Strachan and provide a good example of what proper strategic-fit looks like:

Political effects are therefore part of the immediate framework of military action in counter-insurgency warfare. … As a result, ‘political’ generals … do better in counter-insurgency than ‘gung-ho’ warriors. ‘Political’ is used here in a non-partisan and entirely unpejorative sense: it just means that officers have to be able to negotiate as well as to fight, to be sensitive to others’ culture as well as to the morale of their own units.49

As noted by the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Milley, “Professional military education combined with practical experience in leadership positions is the principal way the Army builds leaders.”50 To prepare its workforce for the unknowable future requirements, the Army should also provide its officers with civilian educational opportunities and encourage a wide variety of broadening opportunities within the Department of Defense and beyond. Having gained this broader experience profile, the military’s up-or-out
systems must retain sufficient flexibility to advance those with such a diversity of skills. The current one-size-fits-all approach does not allow for effective talent management.

**Seek and Encourage Diversity**

Another key aspect of improving the Army’s human capital is to ensure the Army’s formal structure is not actively working against its own strategy by eliminating the very officers it needs to succeed. While it is impossible for the Army to know precisely what officers and associated capabilities it will need in the future, it is possible to mitigate the risks of that uncertainty. Colin Gray provides a well-informed perspective on the challenges presented by the unknowable future and preparing to address its requirements:

> You cannot know today what choices in defense planning you should make that will be judged correct in ten or 20 years’ time. Why? Because one cannot know what is unknowable. Rather than accept a challenge that is impossible to meet, however, pick one that can be met well enough. Specifically, develop policy makers, defense planners, and military executives so that they are intellectually equipped to find good enough solutions to the problems that emerge or even erupt unpredictably years from now. And, one has to emphasize, develop, and maintain capabilities sufficiently adaptable to cope with a range of security challenges, since particularly threats and opportunities cannot be anticipated with high confidence.”

To develop a workforce with the wide range of capabilities as discussed by Gray, the Army should seek to encourage and retain broad diversity within the force. The importance of diversity was reinforced by Elizabeth Mannix and Margaret Neale who noted that diverse individuals and teams are more effective at conducting what they termed “exploration activities,” which include “experimenting, innovating, divergent thinking, and problem solving.” These are valuable attributes for an Army that must address an uncertain and unknowable future.
Although the Army has policies and processes in place to facilitate demographic diversity, the Army’s formal structure needs to foster diversity in a broader sense. As noted by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission in their final report, “diversity encompasses more than demographics, and [the Armed Forces] must take action to harness the range of knowledge, skills, and backgrounds needed to prevail in the rapidly changing operational environment.”\(^{53}\) The Commission also noted that, “Today’s military operations are executed in complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing environments. Men and women representative of the U.S. population and with different skills, experiences, and backgrounds are needed to respond to new and emerging threats.”\(^{54}\) The report highlights that these differences are “operationally relevant. … diversity can increase military agility and responsiveness.”\(^{55}\)

As an example of diversity beyond demographic aspects, consider the extreme leadership challenges presented during World War II and the important roles Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, and Patton each played. Each of these famous wartime leaders had diverse education and experiences including extended overseas assignments, positions as aides to senior leaders, duties outside of the Army, and time instructing at various professional military education (PME) institutions. Without a mandated up-or-out system, these leaders were able to develop a broad base of experience and take on assignments beyond a narrow, command-focused track of assignments necessary for advancement to the next grade. The diversity they brought to the Army ensured the United States had highly qualified personnel to serve in distinct roles such as an advisor to U.S. senior political leadership, leader of all Allied forces in Europe, and commander.
of armored forces that defeated a near-peer competitor in the drive from France into Germany.

Unfortunately, many of those same experiences shared by Marshall, Eisenhower, and Patton might preclude their advancement in today’s Army. For instance, it’s inconceivable today that anyone assigned as an instructor at the US Army War College or the Command and General Staff College would ever advance to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied Commander, or a Corps Commander. Compressed timelines and the lack of sufficient key and developmental evaluations, would preclude selection for the necessary command and preferred developmental positions. But it would not be a reflection of their KSAs. The importance of functional diversity is particularly important in positions for which there are no effective technological or material alternatives. Such positions include, but are not limited to, command billets, leadership of multifunctional teams, and engagement with allies and partners for training, advising, and providing assistance. Officers in these positions require high-level social skills which would be nearly impossible for the Army’s technological advances to supplant. These skills, such as “empathy, leadership, teamwork, and coaching … could become even more valuable than advanced quantitative ones. And the ability to combine social with quantitative skills will often have the highest payoff of all.”

Adjusting the policies and structure to support different career pathways would allow for diverse expertise within the Army. Over time, such opportunities would lead to a truly broad experience profile within the Army’s workforce that would increase the potential for its human capital to successfully address the unforeseen challenges.
through new and innovative solutions. As noted by Hill, “The strategic environment is full of complex, adaptive systems that are large and diverse, dynamic in their boundaries and composition, and – most importantly of all – populated by humans who remember, learn, and change in response to actual or expected changes in the environment. People make already hard problems much harder.”\(^5\) A diverse array of tools and heuristics allow officers to more effectively address these difficult problems in an increasingly complicated environment.

**Improve Senior Rater Engagement**

While addressing promotion pathways, opportunities, and diversity are largely tied to the Army’s formal processes and structure, the decentralized nature of the evaluation system provides another opportunity to improve the Army’s overall human capital. Senior raters provide the critical interface between the individuals of the workforce and the formal structure and processes. Senior leaders play the essential role of engaging with their subordinates, identifying those with potential to address the Army’s key challenges, and providing accurate evaluations that reflect their potential. However, the 2015 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) indicates there is a concerning number of leaders who are not engaged and developing their subordinates.\(^5\) As a result, these leaders may also be providing evaluations that are not reflective of workforce talent and undermining the objective of promoting those with the greatest potential.

Evaluation reports serve as the foundation of the Army’s centralized selection and promotion processes. Therefore, raters and senior raters are particularly important in developing and assessing human capital. Reed highlights the critical importance of senior raters as such:
The only opinions that count on fitness and evaluation reports are the perceptions of supervisors who rate their subordinates. Supervisors can be fooled, especially if they have broad span of control. We should not expect senior raters who comment on over fifty personnel evaluations to know their subordinates well.\(^5^9\)

As noted earlier, a senior rater's comments are limited in length and detail, but are incredibly impactful within the Army’s selection and promotion system. As senior raters make their assessments, they focus on the rated individual’s potential to succeed in positions of increased responsibility and in higher levels of service.\(^6^0\) But this is an inherently difficult task, particularly given the potential for biases to distort their perception.

The Army’s reliance on individual potential as a basis for promotion becomes a problem if comments regarding potential are actually a function of current unit performance. In “The Halo Effect,” Phil Rosenzweig discusses a person’s “tendency to make inferences about specific traits on the basis of a general impression.”\(^6^1\) Such tendencies and biases stem from a leader’s innate and unconscious desire to “create and maintain a coherent and consistent picture, to reduce cognitive dissonance.”\(^6^2\) Rosenzweig notes that “perhaps nothing lends itself to the Halo Effect more than leadership,” particularly because assessments of leadership are affected by the associated assessment of company performance.\(^6^3\) Given the difficulty of assessing something that cannot be seen or measured, this is not surprising as “most people don’t recognize good leadership when they see it unless they also have clues about company performance from other things that can be assessed more clearly…”\(^6^4\) Reed provides further insight into this challenge and notes that senior raters can also suffer from:

…leadership attribution bias, a variant of the fundamental attribution error whereby observers tend to place unwarranted emphasis on individual characteristics to explain behavior rather than considering external factors.
In other words, leaders are afforded more credit or blame than actually warranted for organizational success or failure.\textsuperscript{65}

Senior raters clearly have a challenging role to determine an individual’s potential outside of their performance or that of their unit. Looking beyond the easily measured variables and past performance, the senior leader’s job becomes part art and part science. Senior leaders must study their subordinates to determine their character, competence, and commitment. But, as with so many of the social sciences, “Many things behavioral scientists study cannot be observed directly. In fact, most of what is important and human about us is unobservable.”\textsuperscript{66} As cited in Rosenzweig’s book, Robert Rubin provides a somewhat indirect insight about how leaders may approach this challenge:

\begin{quote}
Once you’ve internalized the concept that you can't prove anything in absolute terms, life becomes all the more about odds, chances, and trade-offs. In a world without provable truths, the only way to refine the probabilities that remain is through greater knowledge and understanding.\textsuperscript{67}
\end{quote}

Unfortunately, gaining that knowledge and understanding is difficult. As noted by Reed, “Those responsible for evaluating a large number of subordinates tend to get spread thin and are frequently challenged to devote sufficient time to properly observing, coaching, and mentoring subordinates.”\textsuperscript{68} Also, some of the best indicators of leadership potential such as interaction with peers and subordinates are intangible and often go unobserved by superiors. This is exacerbated by the fact that often the best leaders are the humblest, and will not make their best moments obvious, whereas the worst will exaggerate and misrepresent their abilities.

This final point, therefore, is perhaps the most important: senior raters need to engage and develop their subordinates. The findings from the CASAL indicate that
“Develops Others” is the lowest ranked area with less than two-thirds of indicating their superiors were effective and over 20% saying they never or almost never even receive counseling. The various indicators associated with this competency are even worse and show the Army faces a fundamental problem in the development and assessment of leaders that undoubtedly affects the overall potential for optimizing human capital. The lack of individual development is not just an Army issue, it reflects a broader trend among the workforce. As a Deloitte survey highlighted, so-called “Millennials” expect continuous coaching, leader development, and communication as part of an ongoing feedback process to address ambiguity.

Aside from workforce dissatisfaction, the lack of engagement and development also indicates that senior raters may not fully understand the leader attributes of character, presence, and intellect of their subordinates. Or they may have a distorted view. This creates an environment for poor leaders, such as those who create toxic leadership environments to achieve and exploit good unit results. As noted earlier, Reed highlighted the potential dangers associated with top-down assessments used by the Army for selection and promotion. Without engaged leaders, these toxic leaders can rely on the halo effect that stems from their unit’s strong performance to gain favorable ratings despite the deleterious effects their leadership has on their Soldiers. Leaders should engage and understand their people to accurately reflect their capabilities – such engagement must include a more holistic perspective of the rated officer to include their impacts and effects on the unit and its Soldiers. Such improved knowledge and understanding would lead to better evaluations and improved human capital.
Conclusion

Leader development and assessment ought to extend beyond efforts focused on the individual officer. To adequately develop leaders, the formal systems and strategies and their impact on the workforce should be considered. Leader assessment should take into account the potential consequences of centralized systems that could inadvertently undermine the organization’s strategy. While both development and assessment are impacted by centralized, organizational-level efforts, the information that drives those systems is generated in a decentralized manner. This underscores the role of leaders to engage their personnel, understand the subordinates’ KSAs and how they can best support the Army’s strategy, and provide thoughtful assessments. The need for capable uniformed officers to address the increasingly complex environment, new technology, and changing character of war will certainly remain critical to the success of the Army and its activities.

Returning to the question posed at the beginning – is the Army’s use of yesterday’s structure, processes, and strategies to assess and develop today’s officers a problem? I submit that it is. But the nature of that system and the time delay in seeing the effects will be years in coming. The Army’s formal structure and processes do not allow for adequate development or assessment of its leadership to achieve a competitive advantage in all aspects of which the Army seeks to compete. The one-size-fits-all construct precludes the Army from selecting, developing, and utilizing its personnel in the most productive manner and does not allow for adequate development of regular and irregular warfare capabilities. The incremental changes to the Army’s formal structures and processes have facilitated modest updates to its HR policies, but
do not provide sufficient flexibility to ensure the Army is able to optimize its human
capital to adapt to the future environment.

But that doesn’t mean the future is pre-determined. There is opportunity to
address this. The military can work with Congress to change the laws that undergird
and constrain the system. The Army can change its processes to encourage more
broadening opportunities. And today’s leaders can support a better Army by developing
tomorrow’s officers and providing unbiased evaluations that look to the Army’s future
needs.

As noted by Secretary of Defense Mattis during testimony in 2017:

I believe providing competitive pay and benefits is a necessity to attract
and retain the highly qualified people needed in today’s military. …
Investment in military compensation, Blended Retirement, the Military
Health System, and family programs are essential to fielding the talent we
need to sustain our competitive advantage on the battlefield."74

Such changes to long-standing institutional functions show that the Department of
Defense is willing to make changes to ensure the readiness of the force. But to ensure
that talent is assessed and developed appropriately for future challenges, further
actions are necessary.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., 13.

5 Of the five firm-worker linkages described by Dr. Hill, the Army can directly impact the
three discussed above. The remaining two are more emergent phenomenon. Informal structure
and culture impact the efficacy of human capital but aren’t directed or controlled by the
individual or the organization. They arise from the collective action of the individuals within the institution. Notably, informal structures may exist outside of the Army, such as community groups, religious organizations, family ties, and so forth. While these areas are worthy of additional exploration and undoubtedly contribute significantly to the risks and opportunities associated with human capital, particularly in regards to the complexity and instability of human capital, it exceeds the scope of this particular paper.


7 ADP 1-0 expands upon these fields as follows, “First, the military-technical field encompasses the doctrine of how the Army applies landpower, including the integration and adaptation of technology, the organization of units, and the planning and execution of military operations. Second, the moral-ethical field describes how the Army applies its combat power according to law and the expectation of our citizens. Third, the political-cultural field prescribes how personnel and units operate effectively across and outside the Army’s institutional boundaries. Land operations require cooperation with other Armed Forces, foreign militaries, other government agencies (our own and those of other countries), and all manner of human societies. Finally, the Army specializes in leader development because good leaders are the qualitative multiplier on any battlefield, the most dynamic element of combat power.” U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Army Doctrinal Publication 1-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 2012), 2-4, [http://data.cape.army.mil/web/repository/doctrine/adp1.pdf](http://data.cape.army.mil/web/repository/doctrine/adp1.pdf) (accessed March 5, 2018).


11 As this paper focuses on active duty commissioned officers, this particular figure excludes warrant officers and all officers of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The complete rollup of personnel data is available at Defense Manpower Data Center, “DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications,” [https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=rg1712.pdf&groupName=milRank Grade](https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/rest/download?fileName=rg1712.pdf&groupName=milRank Grade) (accessed March 5, 2018).


13 Ibid.


32 The efficacy of DOPMA following its introduction remains a question. RAND’s in-depth study of DOPMA’s impacts show mixed results and, in some cases, areas where the law and subsequent policies may have had detrimental impact on officer management. Rostker, *The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act: A Retrospective Assessment*, 17-43.


34 Ibid.

35 The requirement for officers to enter as Lieutenants does not apply to all branches. For instance, select specialties such as nurses, lawyers, chaplains, and dentists operate under different guidelines as provided for by DOPMA. Rostker, *The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act: A Retrospective Assessment*, 10.

36 A specific example of new and evolving requirements includes those associated with security cooperation. The Army does not have sufficient personnel with the necessary KSAs, particularly the ability to effectively operate in cross-cultural environments where an appreciation or understanding of the operational variables (e.g., political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information) impact the efficacy of cross-cultural engagements. Although this introduces risk to the operational requirements, the Army’s formal system has been slow to adapt and account for these requirements. Derek S. Reveron, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 9-10.


39 Ibid., 148.

40 Ibid.


46 Mattis, *Senate Armed Services Committee Written Statement for the Record*, 12.


53 Military Leadership Diversity Commission, *From Representation to Inclusion*, xiii.

54 Ibid., xviii.

55 Ibid., xiv.


59 Reed, Tarnished, 148.

60 U.S. Department of the Army, Officer Professional Development, 10.


62 Ibid., 50-51.

63 Ibid., 57-58.

64 Ibid., 61.

65 Reed, Tarnished, 9.


68 Reed, Tarnished, 148.

69 Riley, 2015 CASAL, x.

70 Ibid.


72 U.S. Department of the Army, Officer Professional Development, 6.

73 Reed, Tarnished, 148.

74 Mattis, Senate Armed Services Committee Written Statement for the Record, 12.