STABILIZATION: A NEW APPROACH TO WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION

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PREFACE

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) conducted an Integrated Research Project (IRP) with 10 resident and 1 distance education student from the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). The IRP was part of the students’ degree requirements for graduation. Each student selected a research topic under the theme of “Improving Whole of Government approaches to operational planning and execution for stabilization.” The students attended three separate lectures to gain background knowledge and interact with experts in the field of the Defense, Diplomacy and Development (3D) planning process, specifically focusing on the challenges for the Department of Defense in developing integrated implementation strategies, which link near-term projects to long-term strategies. Each student was assigned one to two mentors from PKSOI, and when interests aligned, a second mentor from academic and interagency partners. Several students worked in collaborative thematic groups, and every student had multiple venues to present their theories and assertions to groups of subject matter experts to determine the feasibility of their proposals.

PKSOI would like to thank the USAWC students for their diligent research and writing efforts, as well as sharing their experiences and insights with the group to enhance the depth and breadth of the overall compilation. The following individuals were contributing authors to this effort: CAPT Daniel Shultz (USN), COL Daniel Grassetti, COL Rwakabi Kakira (Rwanda Fellow), COL Kevin Nash, LTC Kristine Cambre, LTC John Dethlefs, LTC Jeffrey Farris, LTC Joel M. Greer, LTC Anne Hessinger, LTC Brian Horton and LTC Robert Perrymen.
The following experts provided tremendous guidance and a wealth of experience to the USAWC students acting as mentors and readers throughout the compilation of the students research papers:

- Dr. Volker Franke from Kennesaw State University,
- Drs. Michael Fratantuono and Joseph Sherwood McGinnis from Dickinson College,
- Dr. William Olson, former Deputy Assistant Secretary (acting) for Low Intensity Conflict, Department of Defense, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Department of State,
- Dr. Christopher J. Lamb from the Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University (NDU),
- Dr. Thomas Matyok from Air University,
- James Ruf from the United States Institute for Peace (USIP),
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- Travis Farrell from the USAWC War College library,
- and the PKSOI staff of Drs. Richard Love, Professors William Flavin and Richard Coplen, Senior State Department Advisor Tamara Fitzgerald, Senior USAID Advisor Ryan McCannell, and John Winegardner.

PKSOI would also like to extend our gratitude to the USIP for graciously hosting a panel discussion of experts for the IRP students to gain a better understanding of the complex relationship of interagency and international interactions and collaboration on stability activities. We would also like to thank the panels members, whose insight greatly influenced the policy recommendations of the IRP authors:
• Dr. Schear, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations

• Beth Cole, Special Advisor, Violent Extremism, Conflict and Fragility, USIP

• Arthur Collins, Deputy Director, Office of Plans and Initiatives, Bureau of Political Military Affairs/Department of State

• John Agoglia, National Security Policy Analysis Forum, Center for Applied Strategic Learning/NDU

• Dr. David Alpher, Washington Head of Office and Advocacy Manage, Inclusive Security

• COL Shon McCormick, Army Fellow at Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University; former director on the National Security Council Staff

• Marcia Wong, Policy Advisor, International Committee of the Red Cross

• John Power, Business Development Director, New Century US
The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states. Such an operational environment is complex and requires a whole-of-U.S. Government response, coupled with non-governmental and international partners and supported by the affected nation to achieve their own national goals. Since 1947, the national security system has struggled to handle effectively the range and complexity of the existing global threats and opportunities.

As the operating environment has changed rapidly since 1947, the response to that environment has also evolved, but not sufficiently fast to achieve successful campaigns in a more efficient and shorter duration engagements. Over the past thirty plus years, numerous academic institutions, think tanks and governmental agencies have identified and catalogued these problems and challenges. From the Eberstadt report to Congress in October 1945 through the Defense Science Board Summer study of 2016, stacks of studies and reports have called for improvements in the national security system, as well as a Whole-of-Government (WoG) approach to national security concerns. These studies call for improvement of the U.S. Government (USG) ability to assess, decide, plan, deliver, and adjust operation and implementation plans, employing a whole of government strategy. However, as the Congressional Research Service in 2012 concluded, there is no consensus among agencies on how to fix the perceived problems. Numerous reforms have occurred, and the need for a holistic approach has been understood, but the basic system remains of stove-piped, non-integrated, horizontal, systemic approaches.
Since the 1990s, the USG has striven to absorb the strategic lessons from Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, and Syria. These experiences underscored the benefits of applying all of the instruments of national power to complex problems. Still, as numerous reports reveal, gaps persist in several critical areas: civilian capacity; interagency education, training and exercises; effective planning, coordination, and collaboration; cross-organizational understanding of capabilities; an interagency framework that establishes proper roles and responsibilities; unified assessments leading to a shared understanding of the operational environment; adequate statutory authorities and funding mechanisms; and sufficient information sharing. A paper for the incoming Administration’s transition team prepared in November 2016 by the Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DoD) summarized the issues as follows:

The US Government is lacking a number of critical mechanisms to formulate and execute stabilization efforts and does not systemically empower and integrate important capabilities into existing processes. Stabilization has not been treated as a priority. The Fragility Study Group of the National Security Council (NSC) attributes these performance shortfalls to “…bureaucratic politics; the pursuit of maximalist objectives on unrealistic timelines; the failure to balance short-term imperatives with long-term goals; the habit of lurching from one crisis to the next; and missed opportunities to act preventively.” While intellectually sound, the earlier, more ambitious initiatives often fell short for these reasons. The smaller projects demonstrate that executive branch and legislative-executive branch cooperation
is possible, but these projects are often cumbersome or address only a niche. We believe it is possible to do better without infringing on the prerogatives of individual agencies.³

Throughout 2017, the DoS, USAID and DoD reviewed the significant lessons learned from past stabilization efforts and produced the Stabilization Assistance Review. “The review revealed that the performance of U.S. stabilization efforts has consistently been limited due to the lack of strategic clarity, organizational discipline, and unity of effort in how the USG approaches these missions.”

The report recommended establishing a framework for Stabilization that included:

- establishing strategic engagement criteria and priorities to guide stabilization
- pursuing a more purposeful division of labor with multilateral bodies, while mobilizing other bilateral donors on stabilization
- defining agency roles and responsibilities for stabilization to improve performance
- building the capacity of a U.S. Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to meet stabilization needs
- leveraging flexible funding to enable sequenced, targeted approaches to assistance
- promoting conflict-sensitive approaches to Justice and Security Sector Assistance
- institutionalizing learning, evaluation and accountability in USG approaches⁴
KEY FINDINGS

- A WoG approach is necessary to achieve US national security goals. The USG has institutional challenges at all levels in achieving the required level of collaboration. There are many facets to consider to overcome these collaboration challenges, such as, processes, organizational structures, culture, human capital, resources, authorities, education and training.

- Some of the inherent frictions to interagency collaboration include the essential nature of the U.S. governing process, which is often hindered by authorities and funding challenges; the nature of various agencies cultures; the lack of information sharing among the interagency players; the varied processes, tool and timelines of each agency; the lack of overarching interagency “doctrine”, education and training; and the mismatch between resources and capabilities among various stakeholders.

- Research has uncovered best practices that, under key circumstance, have provided an acceptable level of collaboration to translate policy into execution.
  - The operation requires a clear, achievable purpose and vision shared by all stakeholders.
  - The operational scope was small, focused, discreet, and empowered by appropriate resources and authorities.
  - Mission support emanated from the highest levels and was reflected throughout the USG. The relevant Embassy was instrumental in bringing the plan to frui-
tion with the essential support of the host nation and multi-national partners.

- Structure followed function, to include appropriate human capital; the right people from the appropriate agencies were on the team with clear lines of authority.

- Education, training, and experiential learning in a collaborative environment is essential prior to deployment, ad hoc teams in country are doomed to failure.

- All key players agreed on processes and tools and rules of the road, while ensuring information sharing agreements were in place.

- Learning and adaptation was embraced; these were learning teams.

- Agencies and individuals were rewarded for their participation.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**General/Overarching**

The interagency task force on fragile states, which is currently focusing on early warning mechanisms and conflict assessment tools, should expand its scope to prioritize stabilization within the NSC process, while providing necessary guidance and end-to-end management. Use the Mission Manager concept espoused as a tool to organize a whole of government response for end-to-end management. The Administration should clarify roles and responsibilities of agencies designating the Department of State as the lead federal agency for stabilization with USAID as
lead implementing agency and DOD in support. The Administration should accept the recommendations of the 2017 Stabilization Assessment Review (SAR).

Process, Structure and Culture

With State as the lead federal agency, all agencies should accept State’s deliberate and crisis planning processes, which can be used as a central core for the development of a WoG steady-state planning process. The Administration (NSC) should adapt a standard approach for a WoG assessment process. Assessment/situational analysis underpins policy development, planning and implementation. The Administration needs to identify a new organization to collect and compile lessons learned and best practices in the area of complex operations, which was a Congressional mandate for the now dissolved Center for Complex Operations. The lesson learned process must consider appropriate resourcing as a major component of all compiled best practices. Designate, within resources, a standing cadre of personnel who are certified to participate in WoG teams. Certificates are explained in the Preparation section below.

Resources and Authorities

Interagency partners should work with Congress to establish flexible funding and authorities to transfer money to other agencies to meet immediate demands in adaptable and emerging crises. Combatant Commands need flexible authorities to allocate funding to stabilization activities in the face of these dynamic situations. Gain and maintain total visibility over where and how the USG spends its money using existing tools such as contract spend dashboards
to synchronize interagency spending with theater campaign plans.

• Preparation
  o Designate USIP, a non-partisan organization, as the governmental lead for educating WoG personnel.
  o USIP should provide a curriculum to credential graduates in WoG assessment, planning and execution.
  o USIP should establish a community of practice for the interagency similar to INPROL. PKSOI’s community of practice network on Blackboard can be used in the interim.
  o USIP should expand its support of Interagency Table Top Exercises. DOD should ensure that it’s strategic war gaming meets the requirements to support other agencies of the USG.
  o The U.S. Army, as the Joint Proponent for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, must lead the Joint Force in supporting State as the lead federal agency and USIP as the lead for preparation by
    ▪ Supporting continued education and training with military and civilian governmental and non-governmental partners and look for ways to make this easy. This should include, but not be limited to, providing an IT platform for supporting an education and training community of practice, facilitating tabletop exercises, seminars, and conferences, training programs, service and joint exercises.
    ▪ Develop a plan to provide a “bench” of subject matter experts to support whole of government planning and execution task forces.
Identify and, as needed, preserve critical capability categories that can be called upon to support planning and execution processes, like advisory skills, civil affairs, transitional public security, expeditionary civilian expertise; and cultural experts.
INTRODUCTION
By William Flavin

A hundred thousand men, coming one after another, cannot move a Ton weight; but the united strength of 50 would transport it with ease.

GEORGE WASHINGTON,
letter to Dr. William Gordon,
Jul. 8, 1783

Despite thirteen years of experience—and innumerable opportunities to learn lessons from both successes and mistakes—there have been few significant changes in our cumbersome, inefficient and ineffective approach to interagency operations in the field.

Admiral Dennis Blair, USN (ret.), Ambassador Ronald E. Neuman, and Admiral Eric Olson, USN (ret.), 2014

The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states. The operating environment is complex and requires a whole-of-U.S. Government response, coupled with non-governmental and international partners supported by the affected nation to achieve national and international security goals. Since the National Security Act of 1947, the United States’ national security system has struggled to handle effectively the range and complexity of the global threats and opportunities.

As the operating environment has changed rapidly since 1947, the response to that environment also
has evolved, but not fast enough, using a piecemeal approach. Over the past thirty-plus years, numerous academic institutions, think tanks and governmental agencies identified and catalogued these challenges. From the Eberstadt report to Congress in October 1945 through the Defense Science Board Summer study of 2016, there have been stacks of studies and reports calling for a whole-of-government (WoG) approach to national security and improvements in the national security system. RAND, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the American Academy of Diplomats, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board, the Congressional Research Service, the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspectors General for Afghanistan and Iraq, the Senior Military Service Colleges, the Project on National Security Reform and numerous others call for improving the United States Government’s (USG) ability to assess, decide, plan, deliver, and adjust to emergent and persistent national security threats. However, as the Congressional Research Service in 2012 concluded, there is no consensus among all agencies on how to fix the perceived problems. Reforms have occurred with an eye toward a holistic approach, but the basic system remains one of stovepipes and personalities, not of integrated, horizontal, systemic approaches.8

Since the 1990s, the USG strove to absorb the strategic lessons from Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, and Syria. These experiences underscored the benefits of applying all instruments of national power to complex problems. Still, as numerous reports reveal, gaps persist in several critical areas: civilian capacity; interagency education, training and exercises; effective planning, coordination, and
collaboration; cross-organizational understanding; an interagency framework that establishes proper roles and responsibilities; a unified assessment process leading to a shared understanding; adequate statutory authorities and funding mechanisms; and sufficient information sharing. A transition paper for the incoming administration prepared in November 2016 by the Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DoD) summarized the issues as follows:

The US Government is lacking a number of critical mechanisms to formulate and execute stabilization efforts and does not systemically empower and integrate important capability into existing processes. Stabilization has not been treated as a priority. The Fragility Study Group (of the NSC) attributes these performance shortfalls to “… bureaucratic politics; the pursuit of maximalist objectives on unrealistic timelines; the failure to balance short-term imperatives with long-term goals; the habit of lurching from one crisis to the next; and missed opportunities to act preventively.” While intellectually sound, the earlier, more ambitious initiatives often fell short for these reasons. The smaller projects demonstrate that executive branch and legislative-executive branch cooperation is possible, but these projects are often cumbersome or address only a niche. We believe it is possible to do better without infringing on the prerogatives of individual agencies.\(^9\)

Throughout 2017, DoS, USAID and DoD reviewed the significant lessons learned from past stabilization efforts and produced the Stabilization Assistance Review. “The review has shown that the performance of U.S. stabilization efforts has consistently been limited due
to the lack of strategic clarity, organizational discipline, and unity of effort in how we approach these missions.”

The report recommended establishing a framework for Stabilization that included:

- Establishing strategic engagement criteria and priorities to guide stabilization
- Pursuing a more purposeful division of labor with multilateral bodies, while mobilizing other bilateral donors on stabilization
- Defining agency roles and responsibilities for stabilization to improve performance
- Building the capacity of a U.S. Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to meet stabilization needs
- Leveraging flexible funding to enable sequenced and targeted approaches to assistance
- Promoting conflict-sensitive approaches to justice and Security Sector Assistance
- Institutionalizing learning, evaluation, and accountability in our approach.10

A successful WoG approach is critical for DoD. Research and experience agree that the military approach alone cannot address complex global challenges, which are often chiefly political in nature. DoD’s actions must be nested inside of a WoG approach. Sometimes military force is necessary to address these complex problems. DoD possesses a range of capabilities, in conjunction with the other instruments of national power, to assist host nation security forces establish a safe and secure environment while countering violent extremism, addressing organized crime, dealing with humanitarian emergencies and mass atrocities, and building enduring institutions. Stabilization is not an activity the U.S. military may do, rather it is an activity they are doing and will continue to do.
The military has demonstrated that it is good at conducting offensive and defensive tasks, but it often fails to pay sufficient attention to stabilization. Stabilization consolidates the gains achieved through offense and defense in order to achieve sustainable outcomes that align with U.S. national interests and strategic goals. In other words, successful post-conflict stabilization assures that the U.S. wins the war, rather than a series of battles. Alternatively, successful pre-conflict stabilization of fragile states prevents protracted bloodshed and further divisions in troubled societies. These outcomes depend on multi-agency, multi-nation, and whole-of-society approaches. The lack of appropriate USG authorities, agreed upon division’s of responsibilities, limited capacity, communications challenges, and an agreed upon framework for a WoG/whole-of-society effort impedes adequate planning and execution for consolidation of gains.

On the surface the issue is straight forward. The USG needs the ability to jointly assess, decide, plan, implement and adjust strategy and plans. However, the problem is multidimensional and includes the integration of processes, structures, organizational cultures, training and education, resourcing, and human capital, as emphasized through multiple studies.

NATURE OF THE US GOVERNING PROCESS

The USG process is characterized by weak integrating structures dominated by strong functional organizations such as DoD, DoS and the Central Intelligence Agency. The roles and responsibilities, as well as the resources of the functional organizations, are codified in law. However, there is no defined set of roles and responsibilities to guide these
organizations when they come together for collective action during stabilization activities. In this situation, these organizations demonstrated a propensity to strive to protect core organizational values at the expense of a collective USG WoG response. The Strategic Assessment of Stabilization studies survey of experts concluded that no one is clear which of the USG agencies has the lead responsibly for the different elements of stabilization, which leads to the problem of who is in charge.  

Legal statutes, executive orders and presidential directives are often unclear or contradictory, and overlap or promote confusion. This occurs naturally through the shared responsibility between Congress and the Executive Branch to design strategies, and is compounded by the transitory nature of the Executive Branch. Keeping up with the changes to the U.S. Code, which outlines appropriate authorities as well as the dearth of Executive Branch documents adds to the complexity of determining which is the most current authoritative document. Given that there is no WoG professional development program, it is difficult to have a body of professionals capable of applying and evaluating all authorities and resources.

NATURE OF VARIOUS AGENCIES CULTURES

Because the nature of the process defaults to functional organizations, those organizations have developed distinctive cultures that maximize their own organization at the expense of the collective. These organizations developed their own human resource approaches, processes, funding mechanisms, planning timelines and feedback loops that are targeted to best deliver the capabilities that the organization was
designed to carry out its mission. These processes maximize these capabilities but they provide challenges in integrating the requisite capabilities toward a collective goal that needs the combination and synchronization of these capabilities. A system or an organization’s structure should serve its strategy, which in turn should aim to achieve an organization’s objectives in the most efficient manner possible given the organization’s environment.

Thus each organization will approach a problem through its own cultural lens rather than from a WoG perspective. The military will look through a security and adversary lens, while USAID will look through a resilience and development lens. The military will take a top-down, end-state-driven vision, while USAID’s will be bottom-up, continuous engagement. These approaches will affect the planning, execution and measures of effectiveness.

DIFFERING PROCESSES

There are hundreds of processes and procedures embedded in the various departments. These processes include assessment, policy development, planning, implementation and evaluation. There have been several attempts over the last thirty years to reach an USG agency-wide agreed upon assessment, planning, and evaluation process. Currently, the USG agencies possess a 3D (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense) planning guide, a draft document describing the different planning regimes of Defense, State, and USAID, while considering ways to make those processes mutually supportive.
Understanding the different tools, authorities and time horizons for the various agencies is useful, but without senior leadership support, these processes do not lead naturally to a holistic WoG approach. The Project on National Security Reform concludes:

Thus, national security planning is not driven by a consistent planning methodology from the top. Instead, departments and agencies develop a diverse set of bottom-up processes. On the positive side, this has created a vibrant and rich discussion of effective departmental planning procedures. This potential advantage is outweighed, however, by the significant incoherence a bottom-up-only approach has produced across the diverse planning efforts, including the failure to identify gaps between them and overlaps among them.

Absent agreed-upon processes for interagency planning, the strong tendency of departments and agencies is to go their own way on planning: The implementation of policy, strategy, and plans is overseen at the department or agency level because authorities and appropriations flow through those organizations. Integrated interagency implementation is rare because such organizations do not exist for the most part. The longest standing mechanism for interagency implementation is the country team. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy clearly designated the ambassador as the chief of mission, with responsibility and authority over all nonoperational USG personnel in a given country. However, as noted in the structure section of this part of the report, the chief of mission does not have de facto ability to integrate policy implementation.12
NO OVERARCHING “DOCTRINE”

The system tends to be driven from the bottom with each agency providing its own guidance. Attempts have been made to provide overarching guidance for the conduct of interagency operations. The most notable was the Interagency Management System (IMS) developed by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Office of the Secretary of State (S/CRS) in 2005 as a result of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44. The IMS was developed by an interagency team and supported by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) which issued a handbook for all of the DOD on how to implement the system. It was exercised and taught as part of an interagency education project. However it did not survive the transition of S/CRS to CSO (State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations) and has become a memory.

The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), in support of S/CRS, developed the “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction” in 2009, which has become the equivalent of a joint doctrine publication for the interagency. However, the Guiding Principles was never officially recognized as such and, although it still exists, it does not carry the weight of doctrine. So, the interagency is left without a concise expression of how USG agencies contribute to achieving national goals. There is no common frame of reference across all agencies to assist in establishing common ways of approaching problems. There is no overarching concept that links theory, history, experimentation, and practice to foster initiative and creative thinking. What we are left with is an informal consensual approach based on each agency’s concept of dealing with stabilization.
NO OVERARCHING EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Congress to the President has made several attempts to improve education and training curriculum for education and training professionals on national security, but none have been institutionalized. After the 1994 Haitian Operation, the President issued Presidential Directives (PDD) 56 that mandated an exercise program for USG preparedness. A program was run for a few years, but ended with the change of administrations. In 2005, the Bush administration issued NSDP 44 that established S/CRS with an inherent interagency training and education program that again functioned for several years, but ceased in 2011 with the transition of S/CRS to CSO. Currently each agency conducts separate educational and training events, but there is no centrally developed, presented and monitored program. The USG does not advocate for the professionalization, or even offer any rewards for interagency assignments.

RESOURCES AND AUTHORITIES MISMATCH

The USG system is designed to budget for national-level functions, such as defense, diplomacy, foreign assistance, intelligence, and other statutory core mandates of individual departments and agencies, but not for integrated national-level missions. This balkanization of resources is a challenge for allocating appropriate means to support cross-departmental missions required to address stabilization. Resourcing among departments varies, with DOD receiving a significant budget to deal with national security issues, while other departments are not sufficiently resourced to support national security issues. According to
Gordon Adams, American University professor, “There is no coherent planning or budgeting mechanism in the federal government to bring these activities together and examine their synergies.” The USG as a whole has not come to consensus on those activities that even constitute National Security requirements from a budgetary sense.

The asymmetry in agencies’ resources can be an impediment to collaboration fostering a dependence on the agency with the most resources, inclusive of personnel and equipment. Limited personnel resources in agencies other than DOD, affect their ability to exchanging personnel for planning and operations, let alone administrate an integrated education and training strategy. The USG needs a comprehensive review of capacity and capabilities to determine what resources should be developed in which agencies to support national security requirements. DOS and USAID personnel are fully employed overseas and in Washington, leaving only tiny “training bench” for interagency education or a trained cadre for deployments with the military. The shortfall in qualified personnel to train policing function to maintain public order in support of international requirements and the Rule of Law is also indicative of this lack of capacity. Several attempts have been made to address this issue with a Global Contingency Fund shared by Defense and State and the use of 1207 and 385 authorities to transfer monies between departments, but still no comprehensive approach exists.

The 2017 SAR identified flexible funding as a goal for the USG. The review concluded that effective stabilization does not require extremely high funding levels; rather, stabilization depends on consistent, flexible funding accounts that are unencumbered
by earmarks and can enable agile, targeted, and sequenced approaches to stabilization programming. The SAR calls upon State, USAID, and DoD to put in place appropriate structures and mechanisms to better use our existing flexibilities and resources.¹⁴

**LACK OF LESSONS LEARNED OR BEST PRACTICES**

How can an organization improve without examining the successes and failures? Yet the USG does not have an effective process to capture such lessons, or develop best practices from a WoG perspective. There are very few established interagency processes for monitoring the collective progress of stability actions. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has written extensively on the need for monitoring, assessing and adjusting activities and programs to achieve an “end-to-end” process. The Project on National Security Reform concluded that, “The national security process currently includes only a weak capacity for self-reflection, self-renewal, or self-reform.”¹⁵ Most of the metrics for evaluation are department-centric with the DOD having the most robust lessons learned and assessment process that feeds back into doctrine development and education. So, each USG department or agency is left to determine success based on its own internal implementation and review. Additionally, there are bureaucratic blockages to information flow with classification, compartmentalization and contractors adding to the challenge. The national security system as a whole has little infrastructure for investigating, capturing, retrieving, and disseminating valuable knowledge
throughout the system. In 2005, NSPD 44 directed the DoS to collect and incorporate lessons learned into strategic planning processes, but with the transition of S/CRS to CSO that task went unfulfilled.

The SAR identified the critical need to institutionalize learning and accountability. Policy and strategy can only be adjusted through a system that uses evidence and analytics to assess the conflict environment and provide a feedback loop to discover the program’s effectiveness and shortfalls, and the best method to change those existing processes.

The United States Congress authorized the creation of the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) in the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). CCO was established at the National Defense University (NDU) to serve as an information clearinghouse and knowledge manager for complex operations training and education, as well as acting as a central repository for information to support lessons learned processes and best practices compilation in the area of complex operations. It served as a feedback and information conduit to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and broader USG policy leadership to support guidance and problem-solving across the community of practice. CCO produced several studies and a quarterly publication, but budget cuts and resource constraints prevented it from realizing its potential, and has since been dissolved.

**INTEGRATED RESEARCH PROJECT STUDY**

The Project for National Security Reform worked for years, supported by a number of experts, and it identified all of these issues and proposed solutions, although few were implemented. Chris Lamb, a
Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, identified many other attempts to address institutionalizing interagency planning and execution that have fallen short. No systemic approach has been able to endure. The USG mustered neither the will, nor the capability, even in the face of the Iraq and Afghanistan crises, to develop the capacity and capability for a sustained institutional solution. Several other studies identified discrete examples of interagency success, but the approach has been ad hoc, and characterized by work-around solutions dependent upon key personalities. The goal of this study was to examine the national security system’s approaches to stabilization at the strategic and operational levels, and determine how to improve that approach. It considers both aspirational and inspirational ideas: what could be proposed that is feasible and achievable, and what existing resources could be applied or re-purposed to improve a WoG approach.

This study, conducted by students and faculty of the U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC) Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), considered various aspects of the problem to determine what might be possible and what might increase the likelihood of success. It considered the processes, structures, organizational cultures, training and education, resourcing, and human capital in light of historical and current practices. It looked at what worked and what was not sustainable. It considered current and past examples, existing research, and the experience of the student from their previous assignments. The study examined the following examples: COORDS in Viet Nam, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South Counter Drug Taskforce, the
Trans Sahel Counter Terrorist Program (TSCTP), the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria) Taskforce, the role of the U.S. Country Team, the Iraq/Afghanistan funding and resourcing programs, and the 3D Joint Staff’s Unity of Effort Framework.

Chapter one, entitled “Processes, Structures and Cultures” by William Flavin, discusses previous research and attempts to institutionalize a collective approach toward planning for complex problems. It looks at processes, structures, and culture. It summarizes the recommendations of various researchers, academic institutions, think tanks, and commissions. It incorporates the works and insights of the following USAWC students, who researched this issue during academic year 2017.

LTC Daniel J. Grassetti identified the USG gap in institutionalized stability planning. He understood that the current structures in DoS, USAID, and DoD do not include authorized and assigned standing stability planning capacities. He examined the feasibility of establishing permanent, joint, cross-functional, interagency teams dedicated to planning for and managing stability operations. U.S. responses toward addressing stabilization challenges have been ad hoc, such as PRTs deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, or task forces created to counter ISIS or Boko Haram or other crisis issues, or specially-focused organization, such as the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) to deal with drugs. Based on the lack of enduring capacity in the USG, can enduring Cross Functional Stability Planning Teams be created and sustained? If they cannot, then what is feasible?

LTC Brian R. Horton considered the same problem, but from an operational perspective. While LTC Grassetti looked inside the “beltway,” LTC
Horton looked at the embassies and the Geographic Combatant Commands. He questioned the ability of the Embassy Country Teams to possess sufficient capability and capacity for long-term planning, while also marshalling additional key resources to address a major crisis. LTC Horton was also concerned about the Country Team’s ability to operate in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment beyond the walls of their Embassies and Consulates in order to interface with disenfranchised populations. Based on a review of previous models, he looked at what might be possible to embrace and support the concept of a Forward Deployed Interagency Assistance Teams (FDIAT) at the operational level.

COL Joel Greer agreed that FDIATs at the operational level are needed that can leverage existing DOD and Army capabilities to facilitate WoG and multi-national approaches. He further proposed leveraging Civil Affairs expertise as a better use of existing Army assets to facilitate such a WoG approach. He also considered the Army’s emerging Security Force Assistance Brigades as another tool.

Both the interagency teams in Washington DC and at the operational level need the appropriate planning and assessment tools. LTC Kristine Cambre looked at the assessment process. She believed that, while there are numerous tools available, there is a lack of a WoG agreed-to assessment model and set of metrics capable of dealing with disaster response, as well as other stabilization crises.

COL John Dethlefs understood that wargaming for the U.S. military is a key tool in developing a better plan. So how do we improve the ability of the WoG to participate in wargaming? He proposed a methodology to improve wargaming and turn it into
a truly WoG tool that considers national interests and risk, while combining the instruments of national power to achieve desired political outcomes.

This chapter examines two recent initiative in Jordan and the Lake Chad Basin. Beth Cole’s USIP case studies was used as a point of comparison in Col Jeff Farris’ research. These initiatives were chosen as an example of a WoG approach that crosses several agencies, countries, and includes multiple international partners. Both used flexible funding mechanisms, as well as a combination of planning and execution, not only at the strategic level in the “beltway,” but also at the operational level. These initiatives could be an example of what can be expected for future stabilization efforts. We need to consider how we can best prepare and support such efforts.

COL Jeff Farris addressed the issue of countering Boko Haram. The United States needs to ensure its policies include all instruments of national power - Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic means -- to address the true grievances in the Lake Chad Basin area. He examined these means in his research from an AFRICOM and Special Operations perspective, including Civil Affairs.

Taking this research into consideration, the chapter concludes with a proposed way ahead that embraces the most likely way that the USG responds to stabilization and how to routinize and improve upon that response so that we can better assess, decide, plan, implement and adjust.

In chapter two, Rick Coplen addresses resources and authorities. No WoG approach is possible without having adequate means applied appropriately. It looks at what has worked and what tools are available to obtain necessary resources and authorities to use those resources.
LTC Rob Perryman assessed the challenges and lessons learned, both positive and negative, in achieving global collaboration and recommended solution strategies, especially in the realm of funding generation and allocation. He considered changes in funding processes, organizational structures, and political/economic approaches. He used CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM as case studies to understand financial resource relationships and impediments related to supplemental funding, allocation and disbursement. He considered expanding authorization and appropriation for the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), revising the authorities of parallel programs of DOD, DOS and USAID, and delegation of authority to transfer funds from agency to agency. He also considered training and education for military and civilian personnel, as that will be key to understanding how to marshal and use resources wisely.

COL Kevin Nash addressed the challenge to properly leverage the economic instrument by understanding how the money is being spent. He considered the multiple stove-piped contract organizations, and the constraints imposed by the lack of qualified personnel, as well as the limited understanding by staffs at the GCCs of tools and authorities. These shortfalls leads to wasteful spending and negative operational effects. He then looked at recent PACOM tools used to visualize and understand what is, and has been spent by federal agencies in a country over time, and considered whether these new tools can provide better outcomes. Understanding the current authorities and resources and being able to obtain them through re-programing, re-allocation, or appropriation is critical.

In Chapter three, Richard Love addresses training and education. All studies agree that having the
appropriate individual with the knowledge and skills to bring together a WoG effort is essential. This chapter considers the myriad of recommendations on educational reform aimed at properly educating stability professionals at the employment of a WOG approach.

CAPT Dan Shultz considered the underlying barriers to enduring, systemic interagency integration are cultural differences, beliefs, underlying assumptions, values, and cultural artifacts. The lack of an effective interagency approach negates significant potential opportunities to employ strategic programming, operational design, and community end-to-end management. The continued development of professionals through non-integrated education and training is functionally incoherent with respect to generating legitimate and enduring systemic interagency integration, and is inconsistent with everything known about strategic leadership development and organizational design principles. CAPT Schultz examined the requirements to develop accreditation for national security professionals with the intent of creating a common culture, loyalty, and belonging to the Interagency Community. The chapter concludes with a proposed way ahead to achieve the institutionalization of interagency education and training.

Chapter four summarizes the findings and proposes a way ahead. It looks at what the most likely response of the USG would be toward stabilization, and therefore what the interagency community, especially the DOD, can do to be better prepared.
CHAPTER ONE: PROCESS, STRUCTURE AND CULTURE

By William Flavin

Processes, structures, and a supportive culture are required to assess, decide, plan, execute and monitor stabilization from an end-to-end management perspective. Many individuals, think tanks, academic centers, government agencies have identified these challenge and attempted various solutions, however none have been institutionalized.

Recently, the Defense Science Board, NDU, USAWC, Joint Staff, DOD Combatant Commands, several governmental and non-governmental organizations, interagency stabilization table top exercises, and the 3D’s transition paper for the new administration recommended an end to the ad hoc approach. These organizations advocate for enhanced structures and processes that would include interagency stabilization teams, an inclusive WOG planning process, cross-agency assessment of the operational environment, mechanisms to integrate agency capabilities, and integrated feedback loops for the institutionalization of lessons learned. Such proposals have been made many times before, so will this time be any different? 17

PDD56

One of the first attempts at codifying an interagency process was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)56 entitled “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,’ issued by the Clinton administration in 1997. Operations in Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans in the mid 1990’s highlighted the need for an interagency process.
PDD56 directed that a political-military (POLMIL) implementation plan be written to coordinate a USG response. The Administration realized each agency approached planning in a different way, and rather than dictate a process, they used the POLMIL plan as the framing document. The method for input into the plan was left to each agency, and they were permitted to their own internal processes as long as they supported the overall plan.

Bernard Carreau, former deputy director of CCO, described the plan:

The plan would include a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, and desired end state; identify preparatory tasks for conducting an operation, such as congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, and media coordination; and identify major functional area tasks, such as political mediation, military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, and social reconciliation. Executive Committee officials would be required to develop their respective part of the plan in full coordination with relevant agencies. PDD 56 also called for a rehearsal of the political-military plan, an after-action review, and the development of an interagency training program.  

The directive called for an exercise program and a lessons learned component, which was intended to form a culture of planning and execution. Several exercises were conducted mostly sponsored by the NDU, and assessed by the United States Marine Corps
(USMC) and PKSOI. Other agencies participated in the exercises, but not on a consistent basis, and not with senior players. PDD56 did inform the planning process for Kosovo in 1999, and by all accounts proved useful.\textsuperscript{19}

However, with the change of administrations, PDD56 was not embraced by the Bush administration, which did not see a need for a formalized interagency planning process. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 abolished PDD56, and established NSC Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) as the main vehicle for interagency coordination of national security policy. Therefore, there was no framework to guide the planning and execution for the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan. Many committees and working groups operated concurrently, but without a PDD56 envisioned POLMIL plan, there was little coordination, direction, or sharing of information.

An interagency plan was finally released in April 2002, five months after the inception of the operation. The plan did not meet the minimum requirements outlined in PDD56. The plan’s end states, interim objectives and measures of effectiveness were neither disseminated nor used, and did not describe an interagency division of labor, nor specify lines of authority among USG agencies. The plan did not fully develop the international context for U.S. engagement, and did not establish a balance between short term needs in coordination with long-term objectives.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{NSPD 44}

The difficulties of the post-war planning and execution in Iraq and Afghanistan, prompted Congress to introduce several bills calling for a

Similar to PDD56, S/CRS, as directed by NSPD 44, established processes and procedures for interagency collaboration, but unlike PDD56, it also established structures, but did not mandate a POLMIL plan. Non-DOD agencies of government felt the PDD56 mandated POLMIL plan was too “military” in nature, and constrained flexible responses. S/CRS developed the Interagency Management System (IMS), which was an interagency planning process, complete with educational and exercise components, as well as a structure to execute the planning. The IMS established an approach to gain unity of effort across all USG civilian and military components. Application of a WoG approach was to ensure that:

- Planners consider all possible USG and partner capabilities to achieve identified objectives;
- Planning groups include necessary personnel from all relevant sectors and agencies;
- Planners approach problems in a multi-sectoral way and avoid stove-piped responses;
- On-going or existing policies and programs are reassessed and integrated into new objectives and desired outcomes;
- and Planners consider and incorporate the capabilities and comparative advantages of national, international, and non-governmental actors for achieving national objectives.

WoG planning for stabilization maximizes results across all sectors, ensures effective allocation of USG resources, and sets the tone for a unified effort in both planning and implementation throughout the duration of an intervention. DOD supported both S/CRS and the IMS. In 2008, Joint Forces Command published an IMS guide, and in 2010, a handbook to guide military participation in the IMS.21

However, the IMS proved unable to overcome resistance among DOS bureaus and skepticism from Congress and U.S. Ambassadors, who saw few problems with the existing system in which they played leading roles. So, despite many IMS educational and exercise events from 2006 to 2010, when the Haiti Earthquake crisis of 2010 occurred, the administration fell back on the time honored tradition of working around the system and not using the IMS, which resulted in a series of problems the IMS was designed to address. This resistance to use the IMS, coupled with the draw down in Iraq, led to the transformation of S/CRS into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), which had no interagency mandate, thus the IMS withered away. CSO personnel still retain their planning experience and education gained from their time in S/CRS. 22

The IMS was just not a planning framework, but also a series of interagency teams, termed the Civilian
Response Corps (CRC), with dedicated personnel at various level, trained to employ the framework. The IMS was to function at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels with the intent of integrating planning functions across the government to achieve end-to-end crisis management. The CRC consisted of:

(1) a Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group (CRSG) at the strategic/ policy level with a dedicated support staff or Secretariat located principally in Washington D.C.,

(2) an Integration Planning Cell (IPC) that supported the GCC, and

(3) an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) which supported WoG structures and processes at the Embassy, which could be augmented by Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs) at the tactical field level.

These structures were flexible in size and composition to meet the particular requirements of the situation, and integrated personnel from all participating agencies. Each team was designed to support and augment, not replace, existing structures in Washington, at the GCC, and in the field. International or coalition partners might also be represented in the team structures.23

By 2010, the entire IMS and the supporting CRC was dismantled. Ryan McCannell, in his Monograph, *The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment*, outlines the reasons:

*Yet this new policy arrangement (NSPD 44) faced entrenched opposition within the foreign policy bureaucracy, which in turn complicated its endorsement on Capitol Hill. Congressional researcher Nina Serafino cites the dismay within the DOS at the creation of S/CRS,*
particularly among existing DOS bureaus that claimed responsibility for elements of R&S, including PolMil and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL).14 In addition, American University professor Gordon Adams notes that the powerful DOS regional bureaus, which manage and coordinate U.S. embassies overseas, resisted the creation of a new office with direct access to the secretary because it threatened their own power within the bureaucracy.15 Finally, embassies in conflict-affected countries lacked confidence that S/CRS teams would add value. In fact, the office’s slow start-up and weak initial capacity exacerbated these doubts.16

Most notably, policy makers at the DOS and the NSC decided against involving the fledgling office in Iraq, to prevent it from becoming overwhelmed by the massive R&S efforts already underway in that country. This arguably sound bureaucratic management decision nevertheless undercut the office’s political standing within the DOS17 – since the Iraq R&S challenge was ostensibly the impetus for NSPD-44 in the first place.24

So where does that leave us today? Some processes, structures and cultures that value a WOG approach are still around, and in the past few years, there is a growing movement toward addressing interagency planning and execution.

**Current Planning Guides**

In July 2012, DoS, DoD and USAID published the 3D Planning Guide that described each organizations’ planning perspectives frameworks, processes, terminology and planning cultures as derived from their distinct missions, roles, legal authorities, and congressional interests and earmarks with their
attendant responsibilities. The guide recommends ways and opportunities to improving collaboration between the three pillars, but does not provide a template for developing an integrated plan derived from national guidance. Additionally, it covers deliberate planning, but does not crisis planning.

The guide describes the DOD planning process that develops campaign plans, war plans and theater cooperation plans. For State and USAID, it describes the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) mandated by the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The aim of the ICS was to ensure budgets support strategic priorities; improve monitoring and evaluation systems; and streamline and rationalize planning, budgeting, and performance management processes.

The Country Team develops the ICS for that particular country. The ICS develops Mission Goals and Objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort between DoS, USAID, and any other USG agencies under Chief of Mission (COM) authority. The COM leads the ICS process and has final approving authority.

The guide has remained as a draft, and has not been updated since 2012, but remains a useful reference, however not a driver of planning efforts.

In August 2013, at the request of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), J7 produced the Unity of Effort Framework Solution Guide in collaboration with Department of Homeland Defense, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Department of Justice, and DoS’ Political/Military Bureau and the Western Hemisphere Bureau. The guide is a proposed framework to improve unity of effort for planning
and synchronization of interagency resources. It does not ‘require’ unity, but provides a framework to harmonize short and long term goals to develop common understanding and vision and tools for coordination of efforts. The framework is designed to complement official processes. It consists of a ‘solution guide, a quick reference guide, and a Joint Knowledge on Line course (J3OP-US1214).  

This voluntary framework leveraged some of the experience and insights from the IMS, but has not been used to any great extent. CSO uses their own integrated planners’ handbook and practitioner’s guides (Analysis, Planning, Programs), when they support interagency task forces or country teams. The framework is not used at the annual interagency Table Top exercises sponsored by the J7 and USIP.  

In an effort to rationalize security cooperation across the 3Ds Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23) on Security Sector Assistance was signed in April 2013. It reaffirmed the State Department’s lead in policy, supervision, and general management of Security Sector Assistance. It is supported by a Security Sector Assistance (SSA) Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), which leads USG efforts to synchronize interagency regional plans for SSA under the PPD-23-directed Unified Approach. PPD-23 supports DoS efforts to jointly assess, plan for, manage, and monitor SSA. SSA planning at the country level is conducted by the Country Team with the participation of relevant agencies, including headquarters-based subject matter experts. The SSA plan is approved by the Chief of Mission following a formal interagency review in Washington. Such planning serves as the core organizing document for USG SSA activities, promoting unity of effort with DoS’s ICSs, USAID’s
Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS), and DoD’s Combatant Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs).\textsuperscript{27}

Additionally some structural changes have taken place to bring an interagency perspective to theater operations. One example is USAID’s Office of Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC), formerly the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), established in 2005 to support the goals of NSPD-44. Even though the NSPD-44 is no longer in effect, this office and its related advisors in each of the Combatant Commands continues to provide advice to military decision makers.

Another example is the June 2015 “USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense.” The policy specifically directs USAID missions abroad to share CDCS plans with their military counterparts, and to participate, where possible, in developing DOD country plans and theater campaign plans.\textsuperscript{28}

The NSC has formed the Policy Committee on Global Development, the Atrocity Prevention Board, and the Fragile States Task Force over the last several years to provide a platform to attempt to address issues that cross agencies. These fora are still functioning and seem to provide a venue for further exploitation.

However, Ben Kauffeld, a Foreign Affairs Specialist, interviewed several key USAID practitioners, and concluded that although progress has been made over the past 13 years, success has been limited. Institutionalization has been slow because of “limitations caused by organizational and interpersonal cultural differences, misalignments of planning cycles and geographic coverage, and resource and personnel imbalances.”\textsuperscript{29} With all of the calls for a more institutionalized system, let us analyze some of the attempted models.
WoG Models

Over the years, the USG established interagency teams in a myriad of forms in order to tackle complex, WoG problems. These teams have provided a legacy of both successes and failures in organizational structure, authorities, integration, and unity of effort. Valuable lessons have been captured from these teams that can aid in shaping an institutional model for future deployment in pre-conflict environments.

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

The Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was established under the direction of the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV), General William C. Westmoreland, in Saigon on May 28, 1967. Its twofold mission was to influence the decline of popular support for the Viet Cong insurgency by pacifying the civilian population in the rural provinces of South Vietnam and to strengthen the South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces. At the outset of the Vietnam War, all U.S. agencies working in the country followed strict USG bureaucratic business methods, with each agency receiving guidance and reporting back through stove-piped channels to their agency headquarters in Washington. The WoG response to the Vietnam crisis was “characterized by decentralized decision-making and delegation of authority to each individual agency with little accountability for results.” CORDS
program changed the paradigm by placing a military commander at the head of an interagency team in order to promulgate unity of effort under a unity of command.

The CORDS headquarters was co-located with the MACV headquarters and consisted of a Management and Support Division to run the daily operations and individual directorates for managing the organization's separate programs. Regional offices were located in each of the U.S. military's four geographic regions and mirrored the basic structure of the CORDS headquarters. Subordinate field offices could be found in each of the 250 districts across 44 provinces located in South Vietnam. While the organization included members of the DoS, USAID, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United States Information Agency (USIA), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), it was predominately staffed and operated by U.S. military personnel.” At peak strength, military personnel comprised nearly 85 percent of personnel assigned to the CORDS program (6,500 military to 1,100 civilian).”

Figure 1. CORDS Organizational Structure.
Organizationally, CORDS did two things well. First, it established an interagency team framework under a single commander who effectively directed the unity of effort among all USG agencies. Secondly, it established civilian deputies at each level throughout the chain of command to ensure that it represented a true civil-military effort. This construct reassured civilian agency personnel with initial fears that the military was hijacking their operations. To further coordination efforts, CORDS also established unified civilian-military advisory teams from the national to the district levels. “Each U.S. corps senior adviser had a civilian deputy for CORDS and the province senior advisers were roughly half-and-half civilian and military.”35 True integration happened when staff personnel (civilian and military) were removed from their home agency structures and placed under the direction of senior CORDS advisors. 36 This allowed the staff to focus their loyalties on what really mattered - the end goals of the program.

However CORDS was only a subordinate element of MACV and dependent on the Vietnamese Government’s buy-in to make it successful and that buy-in never happened. At the macro level the US response to Vietnam did not encompass a comprehensive approach countrywide so although at the micro level the civil-military teaming effort of CORDS was laudable it had no strategic effect.

Instead, all of the separate agencies of the USG continued to protect their own institutions, fearful of each other and especially concerned of being overcome by the much larger DoD. CORDS, operating in its own “lane,” was the exception. It focused on the population, built legitimacy and local capacity to provide the
population good governance, security, and economic opportunity. The CORDS program succeeded in its own lane because it developed a workable plan and a bureaucratic structure that was able to execute that plan, it had a leader with the appropriate understanding and personality, it had resources, and it had a President in Washington that provided the requisite authorities but did not directly interfere once the program was launched. However, in 1968 when Komer left, the Military Assistance Command used that opportunity to ensure that Ambassador William Colby, his replacement, stuck closely within the boundaries of the programs and reduced CORDS former independence. British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery was correct in that you have to have the “man” to succeed at civil military teaming.37

The CORDS program is considered by most historians and interagency practitioners as a success in terms of interagency cooperation. However, CORDS represents an entirely different entity for a different time than what is needed today by way of an agile and responsive WoG team for a small footprint. In today’s stability operations, the USG requires a modular team that can deploy quickly. While CORDS provides a foundational way forward in terms of its organization and command structures, it is not a viable model to support current USG requirements worldwide.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan and Iraq were established in 2002 and
2005, respectively, after major combat operations concluded and multiple insurgent groups challenged the two democratic governments in their infancy. The PRTs’ primary goals were to bolster Afghan and Iraqi government institutions in key locations utilizing the expertise of several USG agencies. Unlike the CORDS program, which nested teams from the district field offices, through the provincial and regional offices, to the CORDS headquarters in Saigon as part of the MACV chain of command, PRTs were independent entities linked to local military commanders by way of unofficial coordinating relationships. In some instances, embedded PRTs (ePRTs), were tied directly to specific U.S. Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and focused primarily on supporting counterinsurgency operations (COIN).

PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq bore several similarities to each other, but they differed in some significant ways. In Afghanistan, PRTs were generally led by senior field grade officers with USG civilians holding other key leadership roles on the team. Civilian personnel representing the DoS, USAID, USDA and the military commander formed an Integrated Command Group. However, unlike CORDS, USG civilian personnel did not fall under the command and control of the military, but reported back to their respective agencies in Washington. PRTs in Afghanistan were staffed primarily by the U.S. military. The average PRT in Afghanistan comprised of 60-100 military personnel with only three to four interagency civilians. In Iraq, PRTs were led by Senior Foreign Service Officers from DoS with field grade military officers serving as Deputy Team Leaders. PRTs in Iraq were also much more balanced between military and civilian staff members. The average PRT maintained a small
military support element (10-20 soldiers) to run daily operations and to liaise with the local BCT commander, but the preponderance of the PRT work was executed by civilian employees. Where the PRTs lacked USG expertise, that expertise was provided through the hiring of U.S. civilian contractors with backgrounds in government, economics, public affairs, etc. Though working independently (but in concert with the local BCT), PRTs in Iraq were monitored by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, which provided additional guidance and oversight of PRT activities. With that said, the PRTs in Iraq should be considered better models of interagency cooperation than their sister organizations in Afghanistan.

While PRTs were primarily focused on provincial level issues, several PRTs established satellite offices in key cities in order to provide additional support to city and local reconstruction efforts. These satellite PRTs extended the reach of the main office and consisted of a civil-military staff ranging anywhere from one to four personnel. Satellite PRTs were co-located with U.S. military units which provided them support in the forms of housing, food, office space, and security. While these satellite teams worked extensively with the local commander, they reported directly to the PRT Team Leader. Out of necessity, members of the satellite PRTs were required to be jacks of all trade in order to support a broad spectrum of issues that might include municipal governance, infrastructure projects, rule of law, or local economic development programs. However, as extended staff of the main office, these individuals had substantial reach back capability and could pull additional support from the PRT when they needed technical or subject matter expertise. As an example, in 2008 the PRT in Salah ad Din province, Iraq, managed most of its programs through its headquarters
in Tikrit, but it also maintained six satellite PRTs in order to promulgate program objectives throughout the province down to the local community level.

Figure 2. Sample PRT Organizational Structure.

The Iraqi PRT model was an example of modularity. The size and function of each PRT staff was representative of the provincial issues that each organization faced. While organizational structures were similar, the PRTs could increase or decrease program staff sections based on the priority requirements in the province. Modularity was also displayed through the incorporation of satellite PRTs.

There was an attempt to bring countrywide continuity in 2007 by establishing the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG) staffed by S/CRS to facilitate agreement on goals and strategy. However laudable this effort was, many of the plans were not fully implemented. 40

Although many of the PRTs did a good job and attempted to achieve their goals, the PRTs generally
did not succeed as civil-military teams to achieve whole of government approach. First there must be a comprehensive vision that can translate into operational objectives with a structure informed by doctrine and personnel trained and prepared to achieve those objectives. This was not the case. All of the analysis points to a lack of overall strategic clarity, no agreed doctrine, no comprehensive approach that even came close to CORDS and a lack of training and preparation for those who would join the PRTs.

There was no agreed management and control of the PRTs. Unlike CORDS, where the command and control was clear and efficiency reports of the other agency members were written by CORDS leadership, each agency retained its own control inside the PRTs. Civilian members sometimes had dual or triple loyalties. Neither the Department of State nor the DOD commander was given authority over the members of the PRT so progress was made by consensus, if possible. Because there was no official doctrine or tactics, techniques, or procedures for PRTs, each PRT rotation had to work out its own approaches based on previous handbooks, lessons learned, and desk-side guides.

The funding did not support a whole of government approach. There was neither the structure nor the management procedures in theater to achieve the comprehensive approach. Each country and the separate national and international funds, agencies, and or organizations continued their own programs in parallel with the PRTs. Unlike CORDS, there were multiple sources of funding for the PRT, each with its own constraints and restraints, reflecting the agendas of the parent agencies. The situation has been termed by the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) report,
“convoluted.” Ultimately, PRTs often choose projects based on the convenience of funds and the vision of providing agencies rather than addressing either the drivers of conflict or the structural grievances.41

Lack of civilian capacity even with the civilian surge ensured that PRTs tended to become militarized. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the primary PRT lines of effort focused on governance, political development, political reconciliation, economic development, and the rule of law. However, by placing Department of State as the lead agency in Iraq, the direction of the PRTs and associated priorities of effort were placed in the hands of career diplomats who were more experienced with these priorities than their military counterparts in Afghanistan. Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs echoed this sentiment in its 2008 report, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations.

Giving civilians control would help ensure that PRT operations balance the priorities of long-term development with near-term military imperatives. Some have advocated a ‘triumvirate’ approach to PRT leadership in which military, diplomatic, and reconstruction officials share command responsibility over PRT operations... However, this leadership structure risks exacerbating the already personality driven nature of PRT operations, and could create problems stemming from a lack of clear command and control authority.42

However this lack civilian capacity translated into military filling many of the positions that should have been civilian. The civilians who were contracted often times did not understand the agency they were
representing. In the interviews done by CCO the presence of a long standing USAID or State person in the PRT significantly increased the effectiveness of the effort.

The host nation was not fully engaged. As in CORDS, the involvement of the host nation is critical, as such, the PRTs had a spotty record. Often the local nation was not involved in PRT planning, because of the transitory nature of the personnel in the PRTs and its lack of a coherent approach among all of the ISAF PRTs, establishing the close working network with the host nation that is critical in these situations was extremely difficult.

Lack of support from the highest level affected results. There was no single leader at either the operational or strategic level, with the appropriate access to higher authority and resources that was able to pull all of the various separate agencies together in a holistic manner. Again, Robert Komer had access to the President that allowed him to provide a coherent command and control for CORDS and from cross functional teams. 43

Joint Interagency Task Force

A Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) is a unique organizational structure that focuses on one specific task, mission, or purpose.44 “JIATFs are formal organizations usually chartered by the DOD and one or more USG civilian department or agency, and guided by a [Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)] or other founding legal documents that define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the JIATF’s members.”45 The JIATF concept was developed in
1994 after several years of marginal interagency cooperation in U.S. counterdrug operations. Five years earlier, Congress designated the DoD as lead agency for nondomestic detection and monitoring of suspected narco-trafficking.\textsuperscript{46} In response, DOD established Joint Task Forces (JTF) in several GCC areas of responsibility (AOR). While the JTFs centralized detection and monitoring efforts, there was no established mechanism to enforce interagency cooperation. JTF commanders only had authority over assigned DOD personnel, which led to confusion over interagency plans and operations and duplication of effort among departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{47} In 1991, the Rand Corporation published a report stating that the JTFs had been established where military and civilian security and intelligence organizations were already conducting counterdrug operations. The report concluded that it was “extremely difficult to determine or establish at any one time who is in charge, which organization is supporting and which is supported, and, correspondingly, who reports to whom on what aspect.”\textsuperscript{48} As a result, on April 7, 1994, The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) released the first National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) which outlined a new model for drug interdiction... and thus the JIATF was born.\textsuperscript{49}

While the NICCP established three JIATFs (East, West, and South), JIATF-South, or JIATF-S, became and remains one of the finest examples of interagency cooperation. It is often described as the “gold standard” and the “crown jewel” of interagency coordination and intelligence fusion.\textsuperscript{50} The organization’s integrated team includes all five service components of the U.S. military, three U.S. law enforcement agencies, five intelligence agencies, as well as elements from other
USG departments.\textsuperscript{51} It also includes assets from eleven partner nations. The JIATF’s success can be evaluated using quantifiable measures of success. In 1994, when JIATF-S was established, the organization disrupted or seized 50 metric tons of cocaine bound for the U.S. drug market.\textsuperscript{52} By 2004, that number had skyrocketed to over 210 tons of cocaine.\textsuperscript{53} In 2009, cocaine seizures and disruptions was well over 220 tons - with all other U.S. entities accounting for 40 tons combined.\textsuperscript{54} However, it can be argued that the inherent metric for JIATF–S’s success—metric tons seized or disrupted—is inferior to other measures of effectiveness such as profits seized or the damage inflicted on narco-trafficking organizations. For example, in fiscal year 2014, JIATF-South’s seizures and disruptions dropped to 158 metric tons of cocaine, but this number represented nearly 76\% of cocaine destined for U.S. illicit drug markets in that year.\textsuperscript{55}

Figure 3. JIATF-South Organizational Structure.
There are number of reasons why JIATF-S has experienced such high levels of interagency cooperation. First of all, each of the departments, agencies, and coalition partners within the organization have a strong sense of unified purpose. Specifically within the associated USG departments and agencies, each believes that combating narcotrafficking is essential to national security, and it is something that Congress has expressly funded them to do.56 “A strong shared purpose motivates team members to transcend the competing cultures of their home agencies and helps unify the efforts of people with very different backgrounds and experiences.”57 In 2016, the Air University’s Air Force Research Institute released a 630 page volume entitled Unity of Mission: Civilian Military Teams in War and Peace. In it, the authors explain that since its inception, JIATF-S has been able to focus strategic consensus on its purpose, and has over time been able to “translate that narrow purpose into a well-shared operational concept for team performance of how things are done” within the organization.58 The fact that JIATF-S is focused on one task (to eliminate illicit trafficking) allows the organization to focus on a specific endgame. Its mission statement, vision statement, and published organizational goals all reinforce this purpose and are nested together to provide a clear direction for all members of the organization.59 This unity of purpose has become a powerful top-to-bottom driver for interagency cooperation within JITAF-S.

In addition to unified purpose, another key reason for the organization’s success is its unified command structure. The task force Director is a United States Coast Guard (USCG) rear admiral, with the Vice Director coming from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).60 The Director possesses command
authority and can hire or fire personnel, task organize to meet mission requirements, and direct the actions of subordinate interagency departments. Integration is built into all levels of the command to make certain that internal stakeholders have a voice in developing plans and operations, and to ensure that information is disseminated widely throughout the organization.

While the Directors for Intelligence and Operations are military officers, their Deputies are from the DEA and DHS. Intelligence analysts from CBP, DEA, FBI, and Office of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) are located in the Joint Interagency Intelligence Operations Center to ensure LEAs [law enforcement agencies] are involved in daily operations and that information is not stovepiped.

Key to the command structure are the foundational legal documents upon which the organization is built. As a national level counterdrug task force, it is designed to meet the requirements of its mandate, established by Congress, rather than just the missions of those individual agencies that compose its body. While it is officially a subordinate command to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), it reports directly to ONDCP, “which works to protect the integrity of JIATF-South’s mission and ensures continued interagency support.” National level authorities provided to the organization are unambiguous and interagency agreements of understanding are designed to provide clearly defined roles for participating agencies. The authorities provided to the command underpin the collective need for an interagency framework.
[T]he National Interdiction Command and Control Plan makes JIATF–South the sole agent that can perform detection and monitoring within its 42-million-square-mile operating area. This singular responsibility makes the task force the natural focal point for intelligence fusion and reduces the problem of multiple agencies with competing jurisdictions.65

In many ways, however, JIATF-South’s role as a national level task force makes it difficult to replicate as a model for smaller interagency teams supporting specific pre-conflict stability operations. Part of its continuing success is its unique relationship with ONDCP, which provides JIATF-South with a separate line-item funding stream through USSOUTHCOM with which to conduct counterdrug operations.66 This frees participating USG agencies from digging into their individual departmental budgets to support task force efforts. This is an unlikely scenario for smaller interagency teams supporting US embassies abroad. Additionally, JIATF-South is an enduring task force that has developed its interagency processes and its unique culture over the course of two decades. Its standard operating procedures are detailed in a 600 page compendium and are updated daily and translated into several languages.67 JIATF-S is built to conduct steady state operations, not to manage crises. While JIATF-S provides solid examples of unity of purpose and a unified command structure, its singular mission, enduring nature, and executive level benefactor makes it an imperfect model for what is needed to support U.S. country teams during stability operations. The following cases look at most recent whole of government responses to stabilization.
Jordan 2011 to 2016

Jordan has been a key partner of the U.S. providing stability to the Mideast for many years. Before 2011 and the Syrian conflict it was maintaining steady state police with Jordan and with the American Embassy in Jordan. In fact the US was cutting back on its support for Jordan in the areas of development assistance and health and water programs prior to 2011. But that all changed with Syria and ISIS. In 2012 over 236,487 refugees enter the country followed by 300,000 the next year. The American Embassy and the USG were faced with a crisis that called for innovated approaches.68

Jordan was faced with a refugee flow crossing their boarders that threatened the internal stability of their country. There was the potential in Syria of even larger exodus moving toward their country and their internal security was being challenged by the growth of violent extremists in their midst, fighters who had returned from ISIS, and sympathizes to the cause. The following issues had to be address by the U.S.: the internal refugee camps inside of Jordan, support for the communities who were hosting refugees outside of the camps, assisting Syrian Refugees in Syria to prevent them from entering Jordan, dealing with the internal security and legitimacy challenges posed by dissident groups and violent extremists.

As USAID and DOD support began to grow in support of Jordan, the US Ambassador and the USAID director recognized that a WoG approach was needed from Washington DC to the Field to combine efforts among silos that traditionally worked separately. A WoG response was developed over time driven by operational requirements exemplified by the escalating
Syrian Conflict, the closing of Embassy Damascus, the entry of Russia on behalf of Syria, ISIS capture of Mosul, the declaration of a Caliphate, and the multinational response to all of this.

Under the leadership of the Ambassador who acted as an honest broker for all US agencies and the USAID mission director with the DoD created a series of innovative approaches to civil military approaches that were refined over time and brought USAID, DOD and State as well as the Government of Jordan into closer strategic and programmatic alignment.69

This innovation was based on WoG assessments that were conducted on a continuous basis including Table Top Exercises with CENTCOM and SOCOM, facilitate at times by Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of the US Army War College, which provided the understanding needed to proceed. These assessment included the Government of Jordan. Based on these assessment it was quickly realized that the magnitude of the situation demanded a collaborative response and flexibility authorities and funding. The assessments allow for the development of compelling narratives to influence the Administration and Congress to generate the needed support.70

The civil military teaming grew from a Civil Military Support Element Civil Affairs deployed to the Embassy from CENTCOM Forward Jordan (CF-J) to a Senior USAID Civil Military Coordinator and eventually to the Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP). The SSAP functions mirrored the Syria Transition and Assistance Response Team (START) that coordinated assistance to Syria from Turkey. The two platforms communicated and coordinated with each another. They also coordinated with USAID’s Syria Task Force in Washington DC, which was established in 2012
to coordinate cross-border assistance to Syria from multiple surrounding countries.

A USAID senior Foreign Service officer directed a 3D team of fifteen and reported to the deputy chief of mission. The USAID mission gave administrative support, so the SSAP could be easily ramped up or down. It had a clearly defined vision and purpose, provided needed support that was beyond the capacity and capability of the Country Team and a limited scope which did not threaten the long term mission of the Country Team.

The SSAP team was composed of fifteen personnel from USAID, State, and DOD. The director was a USAID senior Foreign Service officer. Personnel from the component US government organizations did not ultimately take direction from the SSAP director; they all technically reported directly to their own organizations but were mandated to work with one another. For example, the SSAP’s civil affairs officer—a six-month rotational position staffed by OIR’s Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force in Kuwait—reported to the OIR Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force headquarters in Kuwait. This officer helped ensure that DOD and US civilian assistance organizations developed a common understanding of the operational environment and stayed out of one another’s way. The ambassador formally delegated authority to the SSAP director via a classified memo; USAID set forth how members of the team would be organized and work with each other on a daily basis. The SSAP also received administrative support from USAID/Jordan. SSAP was designed to remain lean so that it could serve its purpose without becoming an entrenched part of the US government’s long-term embassy apparatus in Jordan.
and it could be dismantled at the appropriate time, when the crisis permits.

The SSAP shared information on events in Syria through a regular interagency meeting on assistance chaired by the deputy chief of mission. All elements at the embassy were invited to listen while SSAP members drilled down on what they were doing and how their activities intersected with the GOJ and other partners. Embassy staff always accompanied SSAP staff to meetings with Jordanian government counterparts and they often pulled SSAP personnel into meetings to ensure coordination. In 2016, the SSAP participated in about half-a-dozen scenario exercises with DOD that required 3D organizations to plan for and practice “responding” to hypothetical events that could affect the operating environment, US priorities, and a host of other factors.71

In Washington DC the USAID Syrian Task Force was established by the USAID administrator and co-run by USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and its Bureau for the Middle East to deal with the complexities from the field. It developed into a WoG coordinating element through knowledge sharing and taping into Washington DC processes to support field initiatives.

In September 2011, the State Department in Washington, D.C., initiated the Office of the Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions. The office was established in recognition of the increased burdens of the Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia desks in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) in the wake of the Arab Spring. The Office of the Special Coordinator was supplanted in 2014 by the Office of Assistance Coordination (NEA/AC), led by a deputy assistant
secretary of state. This new office was responsible for developing and implementing the US government’s assistance policy throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The officer facilitated the support for the Embassy Jordan with coordination, managing foreign assistance funding, budget preparation and keeping the Washington agencies informed and on board.

The SSAP, START and NEA/AC use existing authorities and funding creatively and sought exceptions, new authorities, or new funding to enable leaders to confront crises in the face of evolving circumstances. The worsening situation became a catalyst that assisted collaboration with law makers to come up with flexible approaches. To adapt to this reality, the 3Ds layered humanitarian assistance and longer-term development assistance to support resilience in refugee-affected communities, providing refugees with the temporary help they needed while assisting host communities to expand, for example, public health and education services to meet needs of both Jordanians and long-term refugees. The coordination challenge in Jordan was too technical and too specific for the Embassy Jordan to handle within its normal functions and therefore the new whole of government structures both in Jordan and in Washington were essential to collectively brainstorm approaches and lay the ground for a near and long term approaches.72

What made this possible was having the right people in the right place at the right time. The military, State and USAID senior leaders had both theoretical and practical experience in Stability Operations. Some like the USAID Director in Jordan had serve as the Senior USAID Advisor to PKSOI and senior educator at the Army War College. The working members
of these teams likewise were education in whole of government. Members from CSO in State augmented the teams bringing with them from their time with S/CRS, education, their Planning Practitioners Guide, exercises and practical work in Washington and in other Embassies. The cultural spirit of working toward a common goal even though stovepipes still existed helped to find ways to collaborate.73

The Lake Chad Basin 2013-2016

Fragility in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous state and one of its two largest economies, has been a long-standing concern of the United States. This fragility coupled with the fear of the regional consequences of the convergence of violent extremism from the Central Sahel, with Mali’s Tuareg’s rebellion and the potential for AQIM to gain a foothold in several states compelled the U.S. toward a WoG/regional approach.

The key catalysts that focused the whole of US government was the abduction of the Schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria in April 2014 by Boko Haram and the subsequent focus of the White House and Congress on this issue. This was followed by Boko Haram’s attached of Baga, Nigeria January 2015 that mobilized the African Union, and the Nigerian Election of President Muhammadu Buhari that enabled closer cooperation.

Toward the end of 2014, State’s assistant secretary for African affairs, USAID’s assistant administrator for the Africa Bureau, the commander of AFRICOM, and U.S. embassy officials in the affected countries together made overtures to civilian and military leadership in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to push the notion of improved cooperation. The United Kingdom, France,
and others made the case in parallel. In early 2015, the African Union acted with the nations of the Lake Chad region to revive the Multi-National joint Task Force under the authority of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. Its role would shift from boarder control toward a more robust military posture. So a regional platform was revived with support from US, United Kingdom, and French military elements.

In the wake of the abduction of the School Girls, the State Department’s (State’s) undersecretary for civilian security, democracy, and human rights, and State’s Bureau for African Affairs formed the Nigeria Planning and Operations Group (NPOG). It is a team of State’s technical and regional experts, plus a military liaison who had worked for US Africa Command (AFRICOM) and with USAID’s Office of Civil Military Cooperation. Its job was to define objectives, priorities, and processes for quickly arbitrating disagreements in interagency fora. USIP assessed the NPOG as follows:

The NPOG was created to assemble objective-specific strategies quickly and to make recommendations for action in response to evolving crises. Although it made strides toward crafting strategy and planning for crisis, the NPOG sometimes struggled to negotiate disagreements internally. As a result, when decisions were passed up to the secretary of state or to the White House, the regional bureau’s perspective was typically privileged, rather than a balanced regional and functional view.

Interagency coordination was run out of US Embassy Nigeria overseen by the U.S. Ambassador. USAID brought together all elements of the US government that worked on northeastern Nigeria and this included a countering violent extremism working
The use of field-based interagency structures enabled adaptive crisis response coordination. USIP’s case study summarizes the US response.

*Much of the US government’s 3D work to mitigate the LCR (Lake Chad Region) crisis was organized and implemented bilaterally to target the unique needs and challenges of individual LCR countries. To meaningfully address the regional BH crisis, the 3Ds have had to carefully calibrate many of their bilateral activities to reflect changing regional dynamics. As the crisis has evolved, the 3Ds have adapted by creating new structures and processes that knit together bilateral initiatives with individual LCR countries so they are mutually reinforcing, creating an effort that has been greater than the sum of its parts. This section includes a few examples of how the 3Ds began and continue to coordinate across borders to mitigate the regional crisis.*

That included leveraging existing platforms and resources and establishing an interagency task force in Washington. USAID West Africa Regional CVE Unit as part of USAID’s West Africa Regional Mission, based in Accra, Ghana, brought together a team of democracy and governance, USAID/OTI, and AFRICOM personnel to work in a CVE unit that coordinated activities and shared information among U.S. 3D partners in the region. This coordination with this element better aligned U.S. bilateral engagements as well as developing a regional CVE framework with AFRICOM.

In February 2015, State formed a regionally focused Interagency coordination structure headed by a retired U.S. ambassador, the Senior Coordinator on Boko Haram that worked to ensure clarity of objectives and
strategy in the fight against Boko Haram. The senior coordinator on Boko Haram coordinated development of a strategy to defeat Boko Haram, bring relief to affected populations, and address conditions that gave rise to Boko Haram. The coordinator also harmonized U.S., UK, and French actions. The coordinator established the DDR and Defection Action Group time invested to ensure a regional and whole of government approach takes hold.

WoG approach was facilitate by working with Congress to get the resources needed. As a result of the abduction of the school girls, Congressional interest was engaged. Resolutions were passed condemning the act and bills introduced that requested State and DOD develop a comprehensive strategy. Use this interest Defense, State and USAID used funding authorities in creative ways to help address the crisis. For example, USAID consulted Congress for authorization to take the unprecedented step of assisting a country’s military—Nigeria’s—to develop a framework for DDR of former BH members. The implementation of this activity required consultation with State colleagues, who vet the involved individuals and units to ensure that they are not guilty of human rights violations. It set the stage for other donors and U.S. organizations to assist with implementation of a DDR plan—which, if successful, will help prevent former BH members from easily reigniting conflict in the future.

Other funding mechanisms were used such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund and the Global Security Cooperation Fund. In May 2014 President Obama announce a $5 Billion fund the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) to support the efforts of both DOD and State to build a network of local security partners against terrorism in the Middle East and Africa.
The Global Security Cooperation Fund (GSCF) authorized under the FY 2012 NDAA, section 1207, to “improve the planning and execution of shared State and DOD security assistance challenges in partner countries” by requiring that DoD and State jointly plan and fund security sector reform.

Consultation with Congress on funding required a concerted effort from the Ambassadors in all four of the Lake Chad Region countries and key leaders from Defense, State and USAID. But the investment of time and energy worked to develop flexible funding mechanisms. The use of existing authorities creatively and seeking exceptions was based on a collaborative plan and strategy successfully communicate to Congress with measures of effectiveness.

What made this possible was again having the right people engaged with education and experience supported by CSO and other elements who had worked other interagency problems in the past. USIP summary case study summarizes:

The US government recognized by late 2013 that stemming the BH crisis would require the cooperation of Nigeria’s neighbors. In 2014, the senior leadership of US 3D institutions began finding ways to knit together counterterrorism, CVE, development, and humanitarian assistance approaches across LCR countries. In such a situation, it would not have been unusual for the embassy-based teams to be out of touch; the State Department’s standard operating procedures prioritize embassy engagement with Washington, D.C., not between embassies.

DOD’s combatant commands and forward structures are somewhat better at enabling communication and
collaboration among forward operating units, but even SOF elements working in different parts of a region sometimes develop only ad hoc habits of coordination.

However, adaptive structures and processes helped the 3Ds achieve more together than they could have alone. The creation of the CVE unit in Accra and the senior coordinator on BH position in Washington, D.C., and the use of CTPF planning processes to engage the 3Ds and Congress in discussions about how funds should be used all helped. The 3Ds’ complementary activities in LCR countries have sought to ensure that BH members pushed out of communities in one country don’t simply move on to roost in neighboring countries and that the hard work of addressing the root causes of the emergence of VEOs such as BH can be the focus of longer term strategic efforts.76

Assessment

Looking at the cases above and considering the analysis done by RAND, Johns Hopkins University, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, and Chris Lamb and Jim Orton at NDU the following criteria has been used to identify insights. As Lamb and Orton caution, that these criteria have some traction in the vast literature on the subject but still lack a cohesive body of empirical research focus at the Civil-Military team level.77
Criteria

**Purpose and Vision:** Is there a mandate and how is that mandate translated into agreement among stakeholders to align short term objectives with strategic vision in a coherence and common approach?

**Scope:** What is the scope of the mandate in terms of time and deliverables?

**Empowerment, Authorities/Resources:** Are adequate resources provided and the authority to spend and move resources to accomplish the purpose sufficient?

**Support:** Is the mandate supported by the US Governmental decision makers, other levels of organization, multi-national stakeholders, and the host nation?

**Structure and composition:** How are the teams designed and how are individuals chosen?

**Preparation:** How are the individuals or groups prepared for operating in a whole of government environment?

**Decision Making/Management:** What is the command and control arrangement and are their agreed tools for planning, execution, and monitoring?

**Culture:** Does the team adopt a whole of government culture as to norms, values, and beliefs?

**Information sharing:** Is key information shared among stakeholders to create a common understanding that would lead to a common approach?

**Learning and Feedback:** Is there an ongoing process of assessment, reflection, and applying knowledge?

**Rewards:** Does the system reward performance in the whole of government context?
General

All of the cases above were purpose built for the problem and were not a standing interagency formation. Most grew and developed as the situation demanded and as more knowledge and understanding emerged.

Vision

Missions succeeded when they have developed clear strategic and operational goals and measures of performance. These goals are then shared by all of the participants and understood by all of the parent agencies. All of the stakeholders therefor have agreed on the assessment and vision.

CORDS purpose was clear and was translated into operational deliverables unlike the PRTs. CORDS was able to unify the pacification effort as PRTs were never able to do. JIATF mission clarified as it matured and was shared by all components and included an end-to-end approach toward the drug problem that included measures of performance. For Jordan and Lake Chad Region both developed mission clarity that could be operationalized and the deliverables identified.

Scope

The scope of the successful cases was limited with defined deliverables either in time, space or both. The objective of CORDS, to gain support for the government of South Vietnam from its rural population which was under the influence or controlled by the insurgent communist forces, provided clarity and was operationalized throughout the program. It provided
clarity and purpose but as it had to be nested in a holistic approach within MACV and supported by the South Vietnamese government it fell short. Internally the CORDS program functioned efficiently and score some local success. The PRTs struggled with a mission that in breath and time was a challenge. There was neither unity among nor within the PRTs and again they were depended on the host nation for success which varied over time and never completely worked. JIATF had a narrow mission, interdict drugs, that was not bound by time. Within that narrow mission set it developed an operational concept shared by all that contributed to its efficient operation. The scope for Jordan task force was to provide support to Jordan to effectively manage potentially destabilizing internal stressors and to address the humanitarian and security needs in Syria in ways that helped prevent and mitigate Syria’s violent conflict and VEO activity from threatening Jordan. This was clear and able to be operationalized from top to bottom. Additionally it was bounded by time. When Jordanian situation stabilized the external support would no longer be needed. The limitation on time made this acceptable to the U.S. Embassy in Jordan. The mission for Nigeria and Lake Chad region was focused on defeat Boko Haram, mitigate Boko Haram’s impact on the people of the Lack Chad Region and undermine the conditions that gave rise to Boko Haram. With the abduction of the Chibok Girls, the attack on Braga, Nigeria and fragile situations in neighboring countries a multi-national approach developed supported by the new President of Nigeria and the other countries of the region. As the geographic area expanded, the approach continued the same focus on Boko Haram which provided a platform for harmonizing the various programs such as supporting
the African Multi-National Joint Task Force, provided a platform to harmonize humanitarian access to Northern Nigeria, and building community cohesion and resilience.  

Empowerment, Authorities and Resources

The cases that succeeded were provided adequate resources and authorities to move monies where they were needed. A key component was agreeing to devolving authority to lower operational levels where the understanding of the local situation was better and resources could be better applied. Members of the interagency team should be educated and understand authorities and resourcing especially of their own agencies. The ad hoc nature of many interagency teams means that untrained individuals may be pressed into service with little understanding of the authorities required or how to leverage and manage resources.

Having the skills to do these things right not only can avoid legal problems, bad publicity, and wasted time and money but also will achieve mission accomplishment.

CORDS had a separate funding stream of money from the various agencies and the authority to use that money. This was empowering and allowed for linking resources to objectives. The PRTs on the other hand depended on separate funding from agencies and often had to contend with separately funded program over which they had no control. They were not empowered. JIATF-South was able to apply resources to support their programs even though they did not have explicit formal authorities. JIATF-South using the declaration of countering drugs as a key national interest has been able through negotiations,
periodic planning conferences, and flexibility has been able to obtain pledges of support from the interagency and international partners. DOD is legislated to provide the operational money for the operation of the Headquarters but all of the rest of the operational authorities and monies are pledges. This prevents any long range planning and places the operation in jeopardy when emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina occur that will divert assets. As the case study of JIATF states” it is a mix of top-down congressional and executive branch mandates and negotiated outcomes.”

Jordan and Lake Chad Region were both able to leverage authorities and funding based on the limited scope of their mission. Both missions used existing authorities and funding in creative ways and sought exceptions form Congress to meet unforeseen situations. In Jordan humanitarian assistance was integrated with long-term development to address refugee affected communities. This was coordinated with DOD monies for security force assistance programs in the US Embassy and overseen by State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Office of Assistance Coordination (NEA/AC) and the Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP).

For Lake Chad Region several existing funds were leveraged and Congress was engaged by Defense, State and USAID to provide flexible authorities with assurances. The funds that were use were Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF), the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, the Economic Support Fund, and the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Defense,
State and USAID have used funding authorities in creative ways to help address the crisis in the Lake Chad Region.

Support

All successful cases had continuous support from senior levels in the US Government. Often this has come as a result of a key events such as 9/11, drug trafficking, the earthquake in Haiti, the refugee flow into Jordan, or the kidnaping of the school girls by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The catalyzing event has focused leadership and provided support toward gathering resources and providing policy to support a WoG approach. Support by other stakeholders such as multination partners, NGO, International Organizations, and the host nation are essential as well. The bottom line is that all successful cases enjoyed top level leadership.

Robert Komer, the lead for CORDS, had the ear of the President of the U.S. and with that the continuous support from the White House. When he left the post, Ambassador William Colby, his replacement did not have the same level of access and MACV reduced the effectiveness of the operation. Support for the PRTs never had a Komer. This can be seen in the various changes in the PRTs approaches over the years and the varying levels of support. Gaining and maintain support especially sustained at the top level was key. But even with such leadership there are some issues that could not be solved. Even with the support of the President and Cabinet especially SECDEF Gates, adequate civilian capacity could not be obtained or sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan because of various systemic bureaucratic issues. The PRTs did not always benefit from what did show up from the civilian surge.
Without advocacy throughout the system the results are not optimal. 80

JIATF-South maintained high level support for the mission through the Office of National Drug Control Policy as expressed in the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan and the DOD who was mandated under the National Defense Authorization Act to support the effort.

Jordan and Lake Chad Region were able to gain senior level leadership focus. The immediate crisis of potential collapse of Jordan and the push to “bring back our girls” helped. The senior military, diplomats and USAID leaders worked continuously to maintain the momentum not only with the White House but also with the Congress and this lead to support in the way of funds and authorities.

Structure and Composition of the Team

The team needs to be fit for purpose with the right people with the appropriate skills. The members need to understand all stakeholders and be able to leverage partner capabilities and expertise. Successful teams have employed a vetting process to try to ensure the right people who can communicate and have the appropriate decision authority from their parent agency can be brought on board. Members of the team understand how their own agency works and how to obtain resources from their agency. Also they have a knowledge of the other capabilities of the other members of the team and how their expertise can be integrated into the whole. Understanding each other agencies was a plus.

CORDS consisted of key individuals who had extensive South East Asia experience selected for their
regional understand and their link into their parent agencies. The support by the President of the US enabled Komer to design and organize as he needed to fit for the purpose.

PRTs were a mix over time. When a team happened to have the right mix of experts then it worked well. The operative term is “happened” as there was no coherent staffing and vetting over time.

JIATF-South put together a cross functional team based on an assessment of its mission. The concept is networking to link many functions in a collaborative manor. As the mission altered based on the operational environment the organizational structure adjusted. However rapid turnover is built into the structure with agencies unwilling to commit individuals away from parent agencies for over a year. This limits what can be achieved.

Both Jordan and Lake Chad Region took the lead from the Embassy and worked with the Embassy to ensure the people were value added. This was gamed as part of series of Table Top exercises and adjusted over time. Flexibility again was the watchword.

The embassy in Jordan established an interagency working group that met weekly under the deputy chief of mission’s leadership. In 2014, the Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP) was formed; its functionally mirrored the Syria Transition and Assistance Response Team (START) that coordinated assistance to Syria from Turkey. The two platforms communicated and coordinated with each another. They also coordinated with USAID’s Syria Task Force, which was established in 2012 to coordinate cross-border assistance to Syria from multiple surrounding countries. This approach used the existing expertise and repurposed them with augmentation from the US.
State developed the Nigeria Planning and Operations Group NPOG in DC which was replaced with the Senior Coordinator on Boko Haram to respond to the changing environment. Roughly concurrent to this, USAID/WA started up its CVE unit, which included an on-site AFRICOM liaison. The CVE unit occasionally consulted with State’s Sahel regional counterterrorism officer in Algiers to develop a common picture of VEO threats in West Africa and to support complementarity among USAID, AFRICOM, and State counterterrorism and CVE activities. The CVE unit today participates in a broad weekly discussion hosted by the senior coordinator on BH at State’s Bureau for African Affairs in Washington, D.C. Again using existing expertise in new ways to respond to needs.

**Preparation**

Having individuals that understand their own organizations, the mission, the operating environment, the doctrinal concepts, and the authorities and resources as well as how to plan and execute is necessary for success. This requires some commitment on each agency to prepare their folks for service in an interagency team. However, except for the educational initiative of S/CRS under NSPD 44 there has been no coherence whole of government educational approach. The lack of understanding has been demonstrated time and again. Success in the cases above has been cause a great deal by individuals who have combined experience with education and brought that to the game.

CORDS did conduct a preparation program for its members that consisted of language, culture and military training. Most of the CORDS participants who
were interviewed after stated that they thought the training program as appropriate and needed.81

There was no coherent preparation for the PRTs.

Civilian agency personnel fared less well in their appreciation of the security-related elements of the mission, the interrelationship between kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of the mission, and the interplay among their own initiatives and counterterrorism and COIN requirements.

This is understandable given that most civilian agency personnel had little to no background in security issues and no military training. With a few exceptions, most civilian agency personnel did not even have the opportunity to train with their military counterparts before deployment.82

In Jordan success can be attributed to the key individuals who had both education and experience. The Ambassador had served in complex environments in key positions and on the NSC as the director on Iraq. The USAID mission director not only served in complex environment be also served as the USAID senior advisor to the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at the US Army War College. The SSAP director had been mission director in combat zone and student at the Army War College. CF-J commander had served in Afghanistan and on the Joint Staff and was a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies as well as the Army War College. Augustation from CSO had previous education and experience working in S/CRS.

The Lake Chad region approach again benefited from leaders who were educated and experienced. The Special Operations Commander and the USAID
Assistant Administrator for Africa both had worked in Afghanistan as well as other hot spots. The USAID Nigerian Mission Director had experience in West Bank and Gaza as well as Serbia.

**Decision Making/ Management**

Successful cases had clear lines of authority that delineated who is supporting and supporting. Parent agencies must be fully on board and respect this arrangement. Leaders of multi-agency teams must adapt leadership styles are conducive toward network teaming. Ideally, team members will have decision-making authority and can speak authoritatively for their respective organizations. For those decisions or actions that go beyond what they are empowered to do, interagency team members must be able to reach back to key decision-makers to facilitate flat communications and timely decisions. The value of a team member is based on his or hers ability to deliver. Relationships among the various participants and their agencies were codify by agreement such as Intergovernmental or Interagency Agreements (IGA) agreements, Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), Mutual Aid Agreement (MAA), Cooperative Assistance Agreement, Standby Contract, or Contingency Contracts. These are agreements that involve a commitment for a response when certain agreed-upon conditions exist.

All key players must agree on processes and tools to deal with wicked problems. Common ground must be found to build consensus among stakeholders, and take collective action that fulfills mutual interests. The problem must be viewed from the start as a WoG not an individual agency problem. Effective planning is
not imposed from above but originates in the field. Interagency teams are most effective when they speak to policymakers with one voice. The following key issues must be agreed upon: goals and metrics, operational approach, roles and responsibilities, assessing progress and adjusting.

CORDS certainly fit this model with clear lines and procedures run by DOD with other agency representative under the control of the military lead.

PRTs had problems clarifying processes and procedures. Team that took the time to establish a process and achieved by in function better than those who did not.

JIATF-South agreed to processes and procedures and produced a manual printed in several language that lays out how business was to be conducted.

Because the portfolio for Jordan was complicated, continuous coordination was needed to keep everything in focus. The US Embassy through its working groups and table top exercises controlled and focused the effort. USAID senior Civil-Military advisor developed a “rules of the road” that provided a guide for roles, responsibility and procedures that would be used to coordinate the civil and military efforts and this proved essential toward success.

In Lake Chad Region, NPOG in 2014 hosted a planning effort to anticipate problems and look for solutions. The CVE unit brought together the regional players to assess various approaches and provide a conduit to share information. The Senior Coordinator on Boko Haram assisted in providing another conduit for sharing information and bringing together agencies.
Culture

Successful cross-functional teams require a supportive culture that fosters cohesion and trust. The Army Research Institute research on civil military teams concluded that successful teams adapt and build bridges across separate organizational cultures to form partnering relationships that collaborate to solve problems. The key is how to do this given institutional resistance, short deployment times of individuals and other stakeholder imperatives. Some of the organizations under consideration did better than others.

CORDS according to the interviews of participants after the conflict viewed themselves as developing a culture and approach and believing that they had unity of effort and an understanding and respect for the other agencies culture and had built the appropriate bridges.

The PRTs lacked a common team identity. Although this varied from team to team and over time, the Center for Complex Operations conducted research into the PRTs and concluded that:

*Members either did not feel they were part of the same team, or more likely, home agency; prerogatives and missions prevented them from being part of the team. This does not mean that there was no sense of camaraderie. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of interviewees reported a sense of kinship with fellow team members, and intra-team friction and interpersonal conflicts were the exception, not the rule. Yet there are institutional and structural factors, including separate agency core missions, cultures, authorities, funding streams, and reporting and evaluation requirements, that prevented members from being a true team working toward the*
same mission goals. Barriers to team identity arose not only between civilians and the military, but also among civilian agencies, such as between the DOS and USAID, between USAID and USDA, and even among different groups within individual agencies—especially between career and temporary employees.83

JIATF-South long running mission tenure is an issue were agencies shuffle staff through for 9 to 24 month rotations that mitigates against establishing a team culture. JIATF-South uses a core of long-term civilian to imbue the cohesion and trust needed.

For both Jordan and the Lake Chad Region the top level focus on the mission, the clear mission and limited scope and the leadership both from Washington and at the Embassies, in CENTCOM and AFRICOM assisted in formed a can do attitude allowing those bridges to be built toward a unified approach.

Information sharing

Information channels were open and key cross-cultural communications was happening. The barriers to information sharing were breached and information sharing agreements were in place. External communications worked as well. A collaborative communications network that safeguards classified and other operational information while permitting collaboration and information sharing among the team was essential. Some characteristics of this environment include a common operational picture that can be shared among all members of the team, simple templates for the collection of information, and a maximum dissemination of information in an unclassified, open-source environment.
For example in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals. The operational environment encompasses not only the threat but also the physical, informational, social, cultural, religious, and economic elements of the environment. Each of these elements was important to understanding the root causes of conflicts, developing an appropriate approach, and anticipating second-order effects. Despite the importance of the operational environment, the US government (USG) approach often did not reflect the actual operational environment. Different components of the USG had differing approaches, based, in part, on different understandings of the environment. A nuanced understanding the environment was often hindered by a focus on traditional adversaries and a neglect of information concerning the host-nation population. Over time, forces and leaders adapted tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), organizations, and materiel solutions in order to better understand the environment but a whole of government shared understanding remained difficult.

CORDS participants believed that information flowed well inside of CORDS and that this assisted in all members of the effort understanding what they were doing and translating overall guidance into operational outcomes. Information sharing with PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq did not work well. All of the PRT commanders and participants interviewed by USIP and CCO complained about the lack of adequate information flow.

JIATF-South established mechanisms under the lead of DoD/ SOUTHCOM to rationalize information
flow and worked hard through various meetings and working groups to tackle the other agency problems. Jordan and Lake Chad Region both put mechanisms in place to handle information flow and both believe that what they did served them well.

Learning and Feedback

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has consistently emphasized the need to keep records and monitor whether programs are delivering on what they were intended to deliver. Knowledge-management practices can maintain continuity and help to train new team members. This is the start toward providing the feedback needed to adjust programs and approaches.

A RAND Corporation study of best practices found that: “Conservation of experience, especially at the theater level and below, is also indispensable to success. In addition to assuring that relevant personnel remain engaged for a situationally significant period of time, this includes an effective capacity within ongoing operations for lessons learned, sharing of experience, and adaptation, especially regarding best practices.”

JIATF-F history is one of learning and adapting from a military focused operation to one that looks at the problem from end to end incorporating the goals of all stakeholders. This was drive in part by reduction in funding and the need to do more with less always a motivator. So that task force became a learning institution.

PRTs never became a learning institution possible because of their composition and continuing rotation of peoples. There were high points of individual PRTs that took lessons and
Rewards

Agencies and individual must remain motivate to support whole of government approaches. If there are no rewards for institutionalized agencies and individual careers within those agencies it is difficult to remain committed to whole of government approaches. Gold Water Nichols act included incentives in its legislation that rewarded service members for joint service. Current there are no institutional rewards for interagency service. So those rewards must be created for whole of government approaches to be successful.

When the team performs well and accomplishes the vision it can provide a psychological reward that is powerful. The NDU Institute for National Security Studies research points to this type of reward powerful for those on PRTs, CORDS and JIATF-SOUTH.

JIATF-South ensured that the various agency stakeholders got credit for drug seizures and prosecution and not the JIATF. Thus agencies and careers were supported and budgets justified. This was a win-win situation for the JIATF.

CORDS by having agency buy-in to all working under DOD and accepting DOD civilian management ensured that the members were rewarded and not punished by their parent agencies. Such a system never was in place for the PRTs.

Summary

While an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to consider some of the factors that have led to interagency success and failures in the past. The standard operation of the U.S. federal
government does not facilitate whole of governmental approaches. As Dr Bill Olson suggests, the framers of the U.S. constitution purposefully designed the government this way.

They thus deliberately and with intent set about to create a divided government, one in which power was both separate and shared in order to inhibit coordination. Thus, at the beginning and at the very core of the U.S. concept of government are deeply embedded obstacles to coordination that can only be overcome at a significant constitutional and therefore political price.85

This bureaucratic system creates two significant roadblocks to interagency cooperation: funding and legal authorities. Congress establishes the federal budget, and there are very few funding streams in which money is shared between USG agencies and departments. This problem can be somewhat alleviated through the lead-agency concept, but that triggers the concerns addressed earlier with regards to the fact that the department with the money generally gets to make all of the rules. Authorities are mandated by U.S. code and establishes what agencies can perform what, and where, and how. Interagency cooperation inherently requires giving up a certain amount of autonomy to others, which often limits an agency to what it can do unilaterally. In effect, “coordination can reduce the efficiency of an individual agency to carry out task specific, agency-specific objectives.”86

Beyond funding and authorities issues, there simply may not be a demand for additional USG capacity from country teams working in pre-conflict environments. A recent discussion between Senior Foreign Services
Officers from Department of State and USAID surmised that the introduction of an additional interagency team might be perceived as a challenge to the team already working in the country.\textsuperscript{87} When there is a crisis as in Jordan and Nigeria that stresses Embassy functioning, demand was there for external whole of government approach. Esoteric “turf” issues may preclude the smooth alignment of purpose required between the country team and the deployed team there to support it. One argument is that additional funding resources attached to the deployed team may help to ease some of those concerns and pave the way towards meaningful collaboration between the embassy and the team newly arrived to support it.\textsuperscript{88}

Another potential roadblock is the capacity for USG civilian agencies to fill the manning requirements of the future interagency team. The military is built to respond to crises and contingencies. In effect, military personnel spend their days training until they are called upon to deploy in support any number of missions spanning the range of military operations. Civilian agencies, on the other hand, are built to conduct continuous, steady state operations using the full employment of their resources at all times. They do not have the depth of resources which can quickly assemble and deploy in support of global requirements.\textsuperscript{89} As mentioned earlier, in 2008 Congress attempted to address this interagency capabilities gap by funding the establishment of a new Civilian Response Corps (CRC), to be managed by S/CRS within the DoS.\textsuperscript{90} The CRC was designed to provide both an “active” and a “stand by” civilian interagency surge force capable of responding to global crises and conflict-affected countries.\textsuperscript{91} Unfortunately, a number of interagency turf wars immediately erupted after the creation of S/CRS. For example,
many within the DoS believed that S/CRS created redundancy of effort, “particularly among existing DOS bureaus that claimed responsibility for elements of R&S [Reconstruction and Stabilization], including PolMil affairs and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL).” In 2012, CRC was disbanded for a number of reasons, to include the fact that its primary client, U.S. embassies in conflict-affected countries, did not express an interest in the additional support capability that CRC provided.

While these potential roadblocks must be addressed, this chapter focuses on what we can learn from historical interagency models. Between the CORDs program in Vietnam, PRTs in Iraq, JIATF-South, and the models of Jordan and Lake Chad Region, there are several valuable concepts that should be embedded into a deployable, WoG team. While no model possesses all of the right ingredients, they collectively provide examples of interagency successes that can be applied to a new model.

Figure 4, below, summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of each model based on the deployable interagency team requirement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Variables</th>
<th>CORDS</th>
<th>PRTs</th>
<th>JIATF</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lake Chad Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose and Vision</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Yes inside CORDS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes/ Long Time Frame</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment Authorities/Resources</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support USG and Host Nation/Multi-National</td>
<td>Yes but no Host Nation buy in</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes with 14 participating countries</td>
<td>Yes concurrent planning with Gov’t of Jordan</td>
<td>Yes coordination with all countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure/Composition</td>
<td>Yes NO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Yes not planned</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes not planned</td>
<td>Yes not planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making/Management</td>
<td>Yes DOD lead by Directive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes MOUs and SOPs</td>
<td>Yes by “Rules of the Road” agreement</td>
<td>Yes through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Yes framed by DOD</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes through Long Service Civilians</td>
<td>Yes limited mission scope</td>
<td>Yes limited mission scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes part of JTF</td>
<td>Yes key mechanisms established</td>
<td>Yes key mechanisms established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning and feedback</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes and organization adapted</td>
<td>Yes approach adapted</td>
<td>Yes approach adapted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes — stakeholder credit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Historical Interagency Models
CHAPTER 2: NEW FUNDING APPROACHES TO STABILIZATION

By Richard Coplen

“Unbalanced resourcing and manpower between the DOD and DOS create significant roadblocks to enhancing interagency presence in a region; a more balanced approach would strengthen US engagement more broadly.”

Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security

How can we best provide the statutory authorities and funding processes that are timely, targeted, and flexible enough to effectively promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states? As Bill Flavin appropriately asserts in the introduction to this book, proposed solution strategies should enable a systemic WoG/society response that effectively leverages all the instruments of national power, while facilitatign sustained cross-departmental collaboration, experimentation, and creating thinking.

The context of this discussion is complicated by the ongoing debate amongst civil-military actors regarding the utility of international stability efforts and which USGal agencies should receive the resources to lead key aspects of those efforts. This debate includes consideration of appropriate roles and missions for the DoD and DoS in the evolving definitions and scope of ‘security assistance’ and ‘security cooperation.’ Additionally, the complexity of this problem is exacerbated by an incoherent, cumbersome, and ad hoc national approach and the existence of a multitude of funding authorities---some which extend beyond
the scope of ‘security cooperation’ and most which are neither timely, targeted, flexible, nor designed to promote cross-sector collaboration.

In August 2016, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a comprehensive report entitled, DOD ‘Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues’ which provides summary overviews of more than 80 separate authorities for security cooperation activities. The number of authorities identified by CRS is derived from the DOD security cooperation programs catalogued in the current Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) Security Cooperation Programs handbook; using different counting methodologies, a RAND study listed 184 separate authorities.

This CRS report asserts that since 9/11, Congress has given DoD increasing authority to conduct a wide array of ‘security cooperation’ programs under Title 10 of the U.S. Code as well as through the annual National Defense Authorization Acts. The authorities summarized in the CRS report include the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF), Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), Section “1233” Coalition Support Funds (CSF) in Iraq and Afghanistan, Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF), Building Capacity of Foreign Security Forces (formerly known as “Section 1206 Train and Equip”), Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), and many others. The report concludes with the clear implication that, despite recent useful Congressional reforms, much remains to be done to strike an “appropriate balance of civilian and military resources to meet national security and foreign policy goals.”
Further complicating the picture, in addition to the multitude of authorities described above, USGal agencies have used other sources to fund stability-related efforts. For example, funding for the six major Title 10 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief authorities is appropriated annually under the DOD appropriations Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civil Action account (OHDACA). Funding for some security cooperation authorities may also be subsumed under a larger budget category or simply drawn from the defense-wide operations and maintenance budget, making identification of funding sources and levels more difficult.

Given the complex challenges described above, this chapter first assesses existing authorities, funding processes, and spending practices—including disparities and overlap across USG agencies. Then it considers how they can and should be altered to fund stabilization efforts, while maximizing effectiveness and prompting sustained collaboration amongst the disparate stakeholders. This analysis also considers lessons learned from previous engagements, as well as potential changes in funding processes, organizational structures, political/economic approaches, the skillsets of the planners and operators, and tools designed to better monitor and assess relevant contract spending. Thankfully, the U.S. Congress is already starting to take actions that align with some of the recommendations offered here; however, more can and should be done.

Many of the core principles and supporting research of this chapter are provided by Strategic Research Project papers written by U.S. Army War College Class of 2017 resident students LTC Robert Perryman and COL Kevin Nash. Additionally, since the publication of those papers, the USGal Accountability Office
(GAO) issued a relevant analysis and inventory of funding authorities supporting Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance efforts. This GAO analysis also references the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, which included significant reforms proposed by DoD in the realm of ‘Security Cooperation.’

Robert Perryman’s paper, entitled “Global Collaboration through International Funding Generation and Allocation Solution Strategies,” assesses the challenges and lessons learned of attempts to achieve global collaboration—and then recommends solution strategies, especially in the realm of funding generation and allocation. He considers changes in funding processes, organizational structures, and political/economic approaches. Perryman uses CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM as case studies to understand financial resource relationships and impediments related to supplemental funding, allocation and disbursement. He also highlights the disparities between the major U.S. government actors regarding funding for stabilization and reconstruction (DOD, DOS, and USAID) and the mismatch between funding and core capabilities. He reinforces this analysis with the research of a group of Princeton University graduate students who produced a report entitled, “Lessons for US Doctrine: Challenges in Stabilization Operations” in 2015. Perryman also recommends expanding authorization and appropriation for the GCC, revising the authorities of parallel programs of DoD and DoS/USAID, and delegating the authority to transfer funds from agency to agency. Finally, Perryman suggests broadening and deepening training and education for military and civilian personnel, as that will be key to understanding how to marshal and use resources wisely.
Kevin Nash’s paper, entitled “Optimizing Contract Spend in Support of Combatant Commander Objectives,” addresses the challenge of how to properly leverage the economic instrument of power by better understanding how the money is spent. He explains how new Contract Spend Dashboards (CSDs) provide that visibility, enabling the U.S government to better see itself and ask the right questions. He considers the multiple stove-piped contract organizations and the constraints imposed by the lack of qualified personnel and the limited understanding by staffs at the GCCs of tools and authorities. This leads to wasteful spending and negative operational effects. He then looks at recent tools, such as CSDs, used by PACOM to visualize and understand spending by federal agencies in a country over time and considers whether these new tools can provide better outcomes.

Major Recommendations

Perryman and Nash offer the following major recommendations:

1. Work with Congress to establish flexible funding and authorities to be adaptable to emerging crises.
2. Enable Combatant Command funding in the area of stabilization to be more flexible in the face of dynamic situations.
3. Expand the transferability of funding authorities to allow agencies to meet immediate demands.
4. Gain and maintain total visibility over where and how the USG spends its money using existing tools such as contract spend dashboards, thus synchronizing interagency spending with theater campaign plans.
5. Enhance the relevant training and education for military and civilian personnel, enabling them to
more effectively use the available authorities, funds, and tools.

These recommendations flow from Perryman and Nash’s evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of existing authorities, funding processes, and spending practices. Notably, Congress has already started taking actions that align with some of these recommendations. For example, Section 384 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2017, created and codified a program to be known as ‘Department of Defense Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program’ to oversee the development and management of a professional workforce supporting security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense....”

Although more narrowly defined than Perryman’s suggestion for increased education amongst a broad range of military and civilian officials, this appears to be a useful first step.

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included other significant reforms, including Section 1281, which provides a potentially useful mechanism for enhancing interagency collaboration in the area of security cooperation. In the spirit of the recommendations shown above, it grants the authority to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to enter into an agreement under which each Secretary may provide covered support, supplies, and services on a reimbursement basis, or by exchange of covered support, supplies, and services, to the other Secretary during a contingency operation and related transition period for up to 2 years following the end of such contingency operation. The term “covered support, supplies, and services” is defined as food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, communications services, medical services,
ammunition, base operations support, use of facilities, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, and calibration services. Although this new authority does not “expand the transferability of funding authorities” as fully as Perryman suggests, it can potentially prove to be a useful tool for expanding USG capability and interagency collaboration. Nevertheless, some observers suggest that this new authority may actually increase DoD’s relative influence vis-à-vis the DoS, given the significantly higher funding levels normally provided DoD.

Notably, in the context of the NDAA for FY 2017, Congress decided not to approve a proposal for a separate “Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund.” This fund would have authorized $2.14 billion for the Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund, $1.47 billion of which to be funded through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds in order to broadly execute the Defense Department’s security cooperation programs. This fund would have been a consolidation of several different counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and military training authorities and represented a significant overhaul of how DoD security cooperation is funded. Although the Senate passed this language, the House did not. The Conference Committee rejected the Senate proposal.

**Disparities between DOD, DOS, and USAID Funding for Stabilization**

Robert Perryman asserts that despite some improvements in interagency coordination, there remains a significant disparity between funding and personnel staffing provided to DOD, DOS, and USAID. Data from Emergency and Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO)/Global War on Terror (GWOT) funding for War-Related Activities (FY2001-FY2016) shows DOD funding during this period at $1.6 Trillion and DOS at $123 Billion.\textsuperscript{110} Although somewhat dated, figure 5 below reflects the extreme contrast in budget apportionment and personnel data in FY 2010.\textsuperscript{111} That year, the DoD staff of 3 million

```
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\caption{DOD, DOS, and USAID Personnel/Budget Comparison\textsuperscript{112}}
\end{figure}
```

“The Department of State (DoS), together with USAID, had a $52B budget and 57,000 employees in FY2010, of which half were foreign nationals.”\textsuperscript{113} Not only does the civilian agency lack of capacity and funding reduce the potential for establishing unified action across government agencies, but it also forces the military to engage in activities/missions that they are not accustomed to supporting. For example, “The military-civilian teams which make up the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in both Iraq and Afghanistan are an example of the military support
to a traditionally civilian task of reconstruction and development.” In the past ten years the US military has outmanned and outspent their counterparts, giving DoD the defacto lead in areas traditionally controlled by the Department of State or USAID.

The following chart demonstrates how DoD programs increasingly parallel traditional DoS and USAID programs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DoD Program</th>
<th>Parallel Traditional DoS and USAID Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Train and Equip Funds for Afghan and Iraqi Forces</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing (FMM), International Military Education and Training (IMET)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Train and Equip: Section 1206 Authority</td>
<td>FMF, IMET, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Support Funds (reimbursements to coalition partners)</td>
<td>FMF, IMET, PKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)</td>
<td>USAID- Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)/ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOS Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)</td>
<td>IMET</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. DOD and DOS/USAID Parallel Programs

“To a large extent, these new programs parallel and complicate existing authorities, muddling the roles and responsibilities of DOD, State, and USAID in stabilization operations without regard to the core competencies of each. For instance, Section 1206 gives DOD authority over money for train and equip programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is
traditionally the State Department’s role, while the CERP gives DOD authorities that traditionally fall under USAID’s purview.”

Additionally, the Princeton graduate student report asserts that, “Because the military has acquired large funding authorities that parallel those under the State Department, the military has less incentive to coordinate with civilians in stabilization operations. This reduces unity of effort at both the planning and operational levels.” They offered the following chart in 2015 to compare the strengths, weaknesses, and resource timelines for DOD, DOS, and USAID in the pursuit of stabilization efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Funding &amp; Staffing Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Rapid staff turnover</td>
<td>Annual appropriations under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short-term time horizon</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited development</td>
<td>Quick spending from commander’s Operations and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and local expertise</td>
<td>Maintenance (O&amp;M) budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authorities often limited to</td>
<td>Quick, flexible spending from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>security reform, but are changing</td>
<td>Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Typically prohibited from</td>
<td>Section 1206 and (GSCF), among other special</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>providing assistance to</td>
<td>annually renewable authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>internal security forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Works regionally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Small staff in country team, policy</td>
<td>Annual appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>planning, and specialized bureaus</td>
<td>May receive DoD transfers under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security concerns—especially post-</td>
<td>Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benghazi—limits access to insecure areas</td>
<td>Transfers to DoD under a number of FAA and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annual appropriations cycle limits</td>
<td>AECA programs may be too slow to respond to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ability to respond to rapidly changing</td>
<td>immediate security concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>situations</td>
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Figure 7. Comparative Strengths, Weaknesses, and Resource Timelines for Stabilization Actors
Perryman’s Recommendations

Given the challenges described above, LTC Robert Perryman offers several recommendations. The first is to expand the appropriations and authorities of the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF). According to Title 10 United States Code, paragraph 166a, the fund has several uses, including, “contingencies, selected operations, humanitarian and civic assistance, bilateral or regional cooperation and force protection.” However, these do not explicitly include peacekeeping and stability operations. Therefore, Perryman recommends that Congress pass legislation that changes United States Code 166a to specifically encompass peacekeeping and stability operations as a function of the CCIF when there is an urgent and anticipated need for Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Stabilization and Reconstruction.

Second, Perryman recommends that Congress reverse the trend in the funding authorities of the Department of Defense that increasingly parallel those of the State Department and USAID. For example, in Figure 7 above, “Section 1206 gives DoD authority over money for train and equip programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is traditionally the role of DoS, while CERP gives the DoD authorities that traditionally fall under USAID’s purview.” This clarification of roles and authorities can help reduce redundancy and increase unity of effort at the planning and operational levels. Since the U.S. military has taken the lead on missions traditionally executed by the DoS and USAID, Congress should also significantly upgrade the capability and capacity of these two agencies. “Unbalanced resourcing and manpower between the DoD and DoS create significant roadblocks to enhancing interagency presence in a region; a more
balanced approach would strengthen US engagement more broadly.”

Perryman’s third recommendation is for the creation of a Board within the GCC area of responsibility to whom Congress can delegate the power to transfer or reprogram funds between US government agencies when there is an emerging requirement and the executing agency lacks the necessary funding. He suggests that the transfer or reprogram action would take place immediately following approval by this Board comprised of personnel from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Government Accounting Office (GAO), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Treasury Department.

Perryman also highlights the need for improved understanding, supported by more education and training, amongst planners and operators when he states, “However, careful review of Joint Publication 3-07 (Stability) and Joint Publication 3-08 (Interorganizational Cooperation) indicates each of the joint publications explicitly defines financial resource relationships between various United States Government (USG) Departments, NGOs, IGOs, and Private Sector Corporations. It appears that the information within these documents is not entirely understood or translated between the military and civilian personnel who are operating at the theater strategic, operational and tactical level.”

Speaking at the initial rollout event for the preliminary draft of this publication at the US Institute of Peace in May 2017, Perryman reinforced the need for more education amongst military and civilian officials and suggested inclusion of the following specific courses: Fiscal Law; Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution; Budget Management, Resource Management, and Deployed Operations Resource Management.
Optimizing Contract Spend in Support of Combatant Commander Objectives

COL Kevin Nash, focusing on ways to enhance the visibility and optimization of contract spend to support the Combatant Commander’s objectives and promote interagency collaboration, asserts in his Strategic Research Project paper that:

“The Army and the joint force rely increasingly on operational contract support (OCS) in expeditionary environments, however, the contracting efforts in support of combatant commander (CCDR) objectives lack optimization. Our military and civilian leaders across the WoG (WoG) struggle with collaboration on contracting efforts. One element of effective collaboration requires visibility of contracts within each service, within DoD, and across the WoG to achieve designated objectives. A contributing factor to this problem is a lack of understanding of available OCS tools that could effectively facilitate cross-sector collaboration. The impact of poor collaboration is wasteful spending and negative OCS effects. This paper explains how combatant commands (CCMDs) can use recently introduced contract spend dashboards (CSDs) as an OCS tool, within existing processes, to significantly improve awareness, cooperation, coordination, and synchronization across the WoG to meet CCDR objectives. CSDs are an important tool to help CCMDs see themselves and help our senior leaders and planners ask the right questions.”

Nash also asserts that it is important to understand the difference between Operational Contract Support (OCS) and contracting. OCS is defined as the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of
joint operations. A contract is a component of the OCS process and defined as a legally binding agreement for supplies, services, and/or construction awarded by government contracting officers. Contract Spend Dashboards (CSDs) allow the joint force and the WoG to leverage the economic instrument of national power via contract data in all phases of an operation from shaping (Phase 0) to enabling civil authorities (Phase 5).

The Contract Spend Dashboard (CSD) is a visualization and graphing tool that pulls data from the common federal contracts database and employs filters that distinguish between contracts by the DoD Services, DoS, USAID, CCMD, Country, Fiscal year, FMS versus non-FMS, Contract Category (supply, service, construction). The CSD, which includes raw data and trend lines, is tailorable, sortable, and exportable to all interagency partners. In effect, CSDs operationalize the contracting data, providing quantifiable information in an understandable format to facilitate cooperation, coordination, and synchronization. An example of a CSD used by PACOM is shown in Annex A.

Nash posits that Contract Spend Dashboards can provide effective tools to facilitate WoG collaboration across contracts by enabling answers to key questions. For example: Are the contracts operating at common or cross purposes? Are there contracts that seem duplicative? If so, are there opportunities for consolidation? What CCDR objectives are these contracts supporting? Is there situational awareness of contracting organizations operating closely in time and space? Are the contracting organizations sharing vendor performance data? Are lessons learned shared between the components and the WoG on other contracting experiences in the country? The answers
to such questions can inform a Joint Contract Support Board (JCSB) as it reviews contract activities in a particular country and seeks to generate collaboration between all members.

Nash characterizes the US federal contracting process as a complex adaptive system (CAS) which is defined by being large and dense, causally complex, and constantly changing its structure and behavior. The depiction of the contracting process as a CAS is important because it demands that users focus on the areas in the process that can facilitate required change to attain desired results. The problem of poor cross-sector collaboration identified the need to change aspects of the post-award contracting process to alter the conditions to achieve a new, more favorable condition. Figure 8 below shows the Army contracting process as it relates to the varied external data interfaces.

Figure 8. Army Contracting Command Contracting System and Interfaces
The post-award portion of the contracting process is circled in Figure 8 above and identifies the key area that can be leveraged to provide the informational tools that can help improve collaboration. The targeted users for the CSDs at this portion of the contracting process are not just contracting professionals but are also CCMD planners that may have little to no contracting experience. Frequently, their level of contracting experience necessitates solutions that are readily accessible, intuitive, and not unnecessarily complicated with contracting jargon. Accordingly, Nash recommends that exposure to and training on the CSD tool should focus primarily on these OCS practitioners and CCMD planners that do not have a contracting background.

The Contract Spend Dashboards are relatively new Operational Contract Support tools developed by Army and DoD organizations to show contract-specific data in each CCMD occurring each fiscal year. This data includes all categories of contracts including theater support, systems support, and external support contracts. Theater support contracts are those written by a contracting organization with authority from within the theater itself. Each service component has theater contracting capability in the CCMD. The Army, for example, has Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC), U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with their own contracting authorities in each CCMD. System support contracts are those “awarded by a Military Departments and USSOCOM contracting offices’ supporting systems program executive offices (PEOs) and PM offices for the provision of technical support, maintenance, and, in some cases, repair parts for selected military weapon and support systems.”

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External support contracts, awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority is external to the theater, provide a wide variety of logistics and support services. The most common external support contracts are the Services’ civil augmentation programs (CAPs) and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) prime vendor contracts. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts are a blend of external support and system support contracts that also have significant OCS effects in each CCMD. In short, the contracting data in each of these areas is filtered by the CSD to show who is contracting in a given country/region, what type of item or service is being procured, where the contract occurs, and when the contract award was made. Before the advent of CSDs, a CCMD had to rely on their components to provide visibility of contracting activities. A CCMD has no contracting authority of its own, forcing reliance on the services for their contracting support. The introduction of Contract Spend Dashboards in 2015 allows key CCMD leaders, staff, and OCS professionals to have detailed visibility of contracting activities in their area of responsibility.

Nash suggests that during a time of declining resources and continued high operational tempo on CCMD and component staffs, problematic tendencies arise when executing theater security cooperation (TSC) operations without assessing effects on the CCDR’s objectives for each country. Failure to coordinate contracts and contract effects can manifest itself in various ways during all phases of the operation. For example, host nation prices increase when entities unknowingly compete with one another for the same items. Additionally, shortages can occur in one agency of the WoG if another contracting entity purchases the bulk of the available resources in an area. Finally, without a coordinated approach, the U.S. can
inadvertently draw employment to an industry from another area of the local economy, ultimately harming the local population over time. These are just a few examples of the many potential unintended effects that arise from a lack of coordination of OCS efforts. To address such issues, CCMDs establish boards, bureaus, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs) in the OCS arena like a joint contract support board (JCSB) to de-conflict OCS efforts in the AOR. JCSBs can be powerful groups to exchange OCS information, however, they do not have ready access to tools and data describing the current contracts in theater that can help de-conflict operations, set priorities, and drive dialog to a WoG approach in an AOR. Nevertheless, the tools now exist via CSDs to facilitate examination of contract data as part of the campaign planning process, thus enabling a robust dialog on contract spend across the WoG to ensure synchronized efforts rather than efforts at cross-purposes.

Nash recommends that to address the challenges described above, there is an overarching need for OCS integration within the CCDR’s overall command theater strategy (CTS) and theater security cooperation plan (TSCP) via the joint operational planning process. It is critical that the policies, processes, and procedures for OCS integration occur in Phase 0 to operate effectively in later phases. The systems and processes to analyze and assess contract spend during Phase 0 are disciplines that can also be modified and adjusted in later phases of the operation as necessary. Waiting to conduct such analysis and coordination during later phases, like stability operations in Phase 4 or transition to civil authorities in Phase 5, puts any CCMD behind in de-conflicting the WoG contracting approach. OCS analysis and integration occurs within all types of joint
operational planning to include campaign planning, deliberate planning, and crisis action planning (CAP).

A constraint on resources and the lack of familiarity with available tools hinders the development of truly comprehensive CTS and TSCP documents that include the analysis of data like contract spend. The doctrine for campaign planning is thorough in describing broad operational activities, but feedback from the field signals significant gaps that can be addressed by contract spend analysis. A theater strategy is defined as “the bridge between national strategic guidance and the joint operation planning required to achieve national and regional objectives and end states.”¹³¹ Importantly for this paper, “CCMDs employ theater strategy to align and focus efforts and resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies in their AOR and support and advance US interests.”¹³² To support this goal, theater strategies normally focus on increasing security cooperation activities, building partner capacity, improving force posture, and preparing for contingencies. Theater strategies employ military and regional engagement, close cooperation with the DoS, embassies, and other federal departments and agencies as ways to achieve theater objectives. Doctrine goes on to state that “theater strategy should be informed by the means or resources available to support the accomplishment of designated end states and may include military resources, programs, policies, and available funding.”¹³³

Nash’s personal experience in Pacific Command (PACOM) in 2014-2016 showed problems within the current planning process that prevented OCS inclusion in campaign planning. While there were overarching discussions during CTS and TSCP efforts concerning
the overall objectives associated with activities of each country as they relate to activities, exercises, security assistance, training and education, military contacts and humanitarian assistance, they did not get into the details of OCS. Generally, there were personnel resource challenges on the staff and an unawareness of available OCS tools. The staff lacked exposure to the concept that synchronization of OCS activities in relation to the WoG TSCP activities is the mechanism to optimize contract spend in support of CCDR objectives. As a result, repeated flaws observed included the failure to adjust contract spend to meet the needs in a particular country. Often, staffs based planned TSCP activities on the previous year’s activities without adjusting them based on current priorities. This was often exacerbated as CCMDs delegated TSCP activities to the service components. Another observed flaw was a failure to inform our key leaders conducting military contact activities on the amount, type, and quantity of spend over time in particular countries. This information is helpful for senior leaders in describing the U.S. strategy and type of engagement as it changes over time. In the end, the CSD approach provides near-real time spend information in a rapid manner. The CSDs can be a primary tool for CCMD and component staffs to provide the quantitative contract spend data for input to the campaign plans and the subsequent assessments.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) recently published a bulletin on ‘security cooperation’ that highlighted five recurring issues, with relevance to contract spend analysis, at the CCMD and Army Service Component Command (ASCC) levels that hinder proper analysis and insight of theater activities. One key insight captured the need to focus TSCP planning
on four key areas: identify supporting objectives; identify actual requirements; prioritize countries and resources; and assess the activity and its impact on the theater strategic or supporting objectives. CALL asserts that TSCP planning does not always follow such a disciplined process, thus minimalizing areas like economic analysis. Although strategic planners within a staff may conduct a political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) analysis on each country, the information may never be shared with OCS practitioners. With the CSD tool, OCS practitioners can improve the collaboration with strategic planners on the staff to exchange information and help ensure that contract spend occurs in concert with CCDRs objectives. This type of assessment of the environment, especially the economic environment, becomes even more critical in later phases of an operation. For example, in Afghanistan in 2011, after studying the environment, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) provided “four quantitative measures of economic success: vendor vetting, elimination of barriers to compete for contracts, contractor education, and employment rates.” Vendor vetting screens potential vendors for ties to criminal or insurgent networks. Removal of barriers and contractor education allowed opportunities for the population to enter the workforce. The measurement of employment rates on contracts could be compared with intelligence reporting to ascertain the effectiveness of the employment opportunities in reducing violence. The OCS community is a key stakeholder in campaign planning and can prove to be a value-added participant from the outset.

Nash points out that the CALL bulletin also recommended that, given the inexperience of many
personnel on CCMD and ASCC staffs, local Army Security Cooperation Planners Courses be offered to new staff officers. These courses should cover doctrine and the systems and processes available to facilitate planning efforts. Those responsible for OCS planning on CCMD staffs may not have a contracting background and remain unaware of selected OCS tools like CSDs. This sort of course would be an ideal forum to cover a topic like CSDs and leveraging the economic instrument of national power. Nash recommends that the OCS community proactively engage with staffs at CCMD and ASCC levels to help educate them on OCS capabilities.

A third CALL lesson is the importance of senior leaders in the CCMD participating in engagements, command-sponsored visits, or regional summits. CALL asserts that key leader involvement is crucial to engage with partners to build relationships, gain access, and advance key strategic efforts. The staff needs to better arm the CCDR and other key leaders with current contract spend data to enable them to speak with authority on the WoG approach in each region and country. The CSDs are an uncomplicated tool that can be made readily accessible to staffs as part of travel pre-briefs or read-ahead information packets for senior leaders.

The fourth area of importance is the need to improve CCMD abilities to conduct assessments of the CTS and TSCP. CALL notes that in an era of declining resources, CCMDs need to evaluate their TSC programs to establish priorities, defend funding, and expend resources where they will do the most good. In order to do so there is a need to establish measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for those activities as a basis for evaluating their progress.
toward specified objectives.”\textsuperscript{138} There is a tendency to measure mundane items like the number of exercises, conferences, and people trained in a given year but this approach misses the mark on covering the measures of effectiveness of such engagements against the overall objective. The CSDs provide solid quantifiable data to help make such assessments from an economic viewpoint. As mentioned earlier, these assessments can have greater impact in later phases of an operation. From January to March 2011, the Bagram Contracting Office in Afghanistan awarded over $81 million dollars in contracts and employed over 39 thousand personnel in support of the “Afghan First” program.\textsuperscript{139} This effort to invest in local vendors anchored in the larger economic campaign objectives developed by the International Security Assistance Force in their response to the assessment of the environment.

Nash notes that CALL is also highlighting the need for further integration of the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS) to facilitate planning, execution, and assessment of security cooperation activities. CALL notes that although the use of G-TSCMIS to record joint activities is mandated by the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and DOD directives, its use is not strongly enforced.\textsuperscript{140} They suggest that CCMDs fully incorporate G-TSCMIS as part of the command’s business rules and leverage the system for operational reporting with both internal and external ASCC stakeholders.\textsuperscript{141} Contract financial data, supplemented with CSD information, should be part of G-TSCMIS data entries to provide wide dissemination among planners.

Nash recommends that the path forward for the CSD effort includes updating the graphing capability
within the ACC CSD tool to show trends over time (like the AGCS tool, as mentioned earlier), leveraging ECC and ACC leadership to more fully introduce CSD capability to CCMDs, and sharing the feedback from the development of this capability with Army and Joint lessons learned organizations. The developers of the ACC CSD have already expressed a high degree of interest in feedback to improve the graphs on the dashboards and indicated it would not be difficult to implement changes. The leveraging of the ACC and ECC leadership is important because CSB commanders are in direct support of ASCCs in each CCMD. They have access to key strategic leaders who need introduction to the CSD tools to help optimize the use of their resources. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is another key stakeholder in the OCS process. OCS planners at CCMDs are primarily from DLA’s Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) and they could strongly benefit from introduction and access to CSDs. There is an opportunity to leverage existing databases like G-TSCMIS to capture contract spend information with other TSC information. Organizations like CALL and the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) are good starting points to share the initiatives described in this paper and spread the word beyond the OCS community. In the end, OCS is commander’s business and utilizing tools like CSDs can help bring economic power to bear in order to meet strategic objectives.

There are significant opportunities to leverage the economic instrument of national power at CCMD levels in order to optimize the contract spend of the Joint Force and the WoG in theater. This PKSOI Integrated Research Project challenges senior leaders to develop strategies to facilitate effective WoG collaboration and
operations to stabilize fragile and conflict-affected states. Available tools like the ACC CSD and the AGCS database can assist in the analysis and assessment of contract spend in a theater. Using FPDS-NG, these tools provide insightful, timely, and quantitative data and trends to make decisions about future spending priorities. With such tools, OCS practitioners on CCMD staffs can provide significant input into the Joint Operation Planning process. A second benefit is the situational awareness such tools provide key strategic leaders who are stakeholders in the TCS and TSCP plans to better engage with their regional counterparts on U.S. WoG activities in each country. The current process uses a modicum of economic data in making campaign and country plans, however, there are opportunities to expand this capability to benefit each CCMD. The integration of these CSDs is essential in the earliest phase of an operation (shaping) so the process and discipline are in place to continue the discipline into the later phases of an operation, specifically, stability operations and transition to civil authorities. Contract spend is simply one data point that can be used to assess the success or failure of theater activities to achieve CCDR objectives. As mentioned, the benefit to the data is that it is timely, accurate, and measurable thus simplifying the assessment of the relative “goodness” of the contract spend. The overarching benefit of CSDs is that they facilitate collaboration on contracting efforts by providing visibility of contracts across the WoG. By introducing key stakeholders to this powerful OCS tool and incorporating its use within current B2CSWGs, the CCMDs can increase cross-sector collaboration and reduce negative OCS effects. Focusing on improving collaboration in Phase 0 provides the experience and discipline to include the
same cooperation, coordination, and synchronization in later phases.

The suggestion above offers another useful way to facilitate improved collaboration amongst the relevant stakeholders. In the context of all the recommendations offered in this chapter and the Congressional reform actions to-date, there seems reason for optimism that we can eventually provide statutory authorities and funding processes that are timely, targeted, and flexible enough to effectively promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states.

Interestingly, some analysts predict that the ongoing reform process may take years to unfold fully. They assert that security cooperation reform proposals included in the NDAA of 2017 appear to be part of a much larger debate. Broader, related issues that these analysts urge be considered over time include further institutional changes in DOD and the State Department to improve coordination within and between those two agencies; further evaluation of the appropriate balance for security cooperation among DOD missions and the ways in which the armed forces should be resourced and organized to balance all missions to ensure the national defense; and the appropriate balance of civilian and military resources to meet national security and foreign policy goals.

As this larger debate plays out, the strategies recommended in this chapter remain valid as potential enablers of a systemic WoG/society approach that effectively leverages all the instruments of national power, while facilitating sustained cross-departmental collaboration, experimentation, and creating thinking. More can and should be done---this chapter provides the contours of a useful roadmap.

CHAPTER 3: STRATEGIC EDUCATION:
SOLUTION OR MIRAGE FOR “WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT” COLLABORATION?

By Dr. Richard A. Love

During the academic year 2016-2017, select students of the Army War College conducted an Integrated Research Project (IRP) focused on bridging the joint, interagency and intergovernmental divide to provide more effective “whole of government” capabilities for complex contingencies. The project, which consisted of a collaboration between the Army War College students and faculty from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at the Army War College, recognized early, as so many other projects and reports have in the past, that a whole of government approach is critical to achieving U.S. national security goals. In essence, efficient and effective matching of resources to ends – the ways – is a central requirement for future operations. But what about the people, the decision makers, leaders, implementers? How can they best operate in this complex interagency environment?

The IRP investigated aspects of a whole of government framework through doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P). Highlighted in the study is the central importance of leadership, leader development, understanding of U.S. cross-governmental capabilities, resources and authorities and an appreciation across the many levers of U.S. national power of “who does what”, “who controls what” and “who pays for it.” Understanding the many and varied aspects of these fundamental questions requires knowledge of Executive branch departments,
systems within these departments, the relationships between and among departments and the primacy of Congressional oversight, authorizations and appropriations. The study clearly shows the uneven way leaders are trained across departments. This includes how they are recruited, cultivated, promoted and the degree to which their educational requirements and opportunities promote “whole of government” knowledge and experiences to make them effective within the interagency and intergovernmental fields. Another area explored by the IRP team was the way in which, and the degree to which, education and training are reinforced throughout a career; how interagency and intergovernmental experience is viewed more or less favorably by institutional bureaucracies and how departments, with an emphasis on the Department of Defense, make good on the promise to make soldiers “lifelong learners.”

Significantly, the study made several important findings and recommendations regarding the how government practitioners are educated on the questions above, namely, “who does what”, “who controls what” and “who pays for it.” The study found that there exists no Executive branch system, framework or unifying approach to professional and leader development at the strategic, national level. Today, there is no systematic educational pathway to achieving what would amount to “national security professional” status, accreditation or certification. This is not necessarily bad since at present, each Executive department may craft its own unique education and training requirements specific to it particular needs, priorities and funding levels. Yet, today’s challenges are fast moving, played out on the world stage instantaneously and require rapid decisions. Missteps, miscalculations and decisions which lead to frustrated expectations present high-risk
challenges to today’s leaders. Those leaders and the ones who will inherit an even more fluid, global and multi-actor domain competition space must know, understand and speak authoritatively on all elements of national power and as importantly, know where they “fit” in leading or supporting any national level effort. At present, authorities, responsibility and capabilities are misaligned, misunderstood and cumbersome and these complex relationships are not eased by the current education process. Educating leaders on the nuances of these aspects of national power provides context, reduces risk and expands the reach and effectiveness of national power. Significantly, however, efficiency must be balanced with our foundational principles. The Constitution was not designed for efficiency; it was designed to protect democracy, civil liberties, curtail folly and ensure a robust decision making framework accountable to the Sovereign, the People of the United States. Understanding these cross-governmental principles, how the interagency interrelates to its components and Congressional matters is key to developing effective thinkers, planners, policy makers and leaders in the field of national security.

The IRP made several important recommendations. To address the lack of a unified strategic level educational framework, the study recommended that Congress designate an independent authority with the expertise and autonomy to serve as the focal point for “whole of government” education. One recommendation is to consider the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), a non-partisan organization, as a potential lead for educating whole of government education for federal personnel. The focus would be on Executive branch education but could include offering educational credentialing across the Executive, Legislative and Judicial co-
equal branches of government. To implement this concept, USIP or a similar organization would provide a curriculum to credential graduates in whole of government assessment, planning and execution and establish an easy to access and useful community of practice available for interagency leaders and practitioners interested in expanding knowledge and understand. Ideally, with USIP providing the executive agent function, educational tools and resources would be more widely available and exercises, tabletops and simulations could be offered by or thought USIP or in support of other executive branch agents to reinforce learning and promote “risk-free” decision making. An important component of this learning strategy must include the private sector and from a defense perspective, also account for the civil-military dynamic.

The objective, ultimately, is to develop effective leaders who understand strategy and are able to craft solutions that encompass ends, ways and means to achieve national objectives. Developing the “bench” of leaders and subject matter experts to support whole of government planning and execution task forces is a daunting one, yet a valuable investment for the future. Education and leader development, while merely one aspect to achieving such a goal, is nonetheless critical and with Executive and Congressional leadership, achievable. However, what can reasonably be achieved through a center of gravity focused on strategic level education? What is broken now and how, if at all, has the current educational failed to produce the leaders needed for today’s complex threat environment? Finally, even if the IRP’s recommendations are fully embraced, funded and executed, will they fulfill the ends sought or only marginally improve operational to strategic level education and leader development?
Why the “education solution” so appealing?

Education is an essential component in any leader development strategy. Learning how to think and how to apply knowledge are central to any decision making process and carries beyond “what to do if” training. Yet, education is neither cost free nor a one-and-done proposition. It is time consuming, takes time away from central mission planning and execution in any organization. It is costly since it depends on solid curriculum development and experts in pedagogy, instruction and subject matter expertise to effectively educate students. And education should be geared to match personnel at different points in their careers; education applicable early in a career is not best served as careers progress but should grow, adapt and mature as leaders do. Additionally, as pointed out by Elliot Cohen, the relationship between leadership and education are complex. Consider,

Leadership is a practical, not theoretical, art. There are, therefore, limits to how much of it can be imparted in a classroom. It is more a matter of self-study than of formal instruction; military organizations are probably unique in the opportunities they provide for modest doses of theory reinforced by massive quantities of carefully contrived practice and coaching.144

The U.S. military has been served well by officers who have spent years in academic training throughout their careers. Given the complexities of the battlespace and the ever increasing realms of competition across multifaceted domains from economic to political, U.S. military leadership is seeking to develop, expand or tap
into programs offering educational opportunities at the operational to strategic levels. The U.S. Army, for example, recognizes this need and is doing something about it. The School of Advanced Military Studies Strategic Planning and Policy Program, or ASP3, is one such effort. Graduates of the multi-year ASP3 can expect to serve in key planning positions with the U.S. Army, various Defense Department activities, the White House NSC staff, the intelligence community, State Department, Congress, the combatant commands or civilian think tanks and military schools. The ASP3 is a five- to six-year regimen of graduate education and assignments that is offered by the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and results in a Ph.D. at the end of the program. The purpose of the ASP3 program is to develop a deeper strategic thinking capability by providing the Army with officers who have a deeper knowledge and understanding of the challenges presented by the complex environments of today and tomorrow; to establish a bench of not only “doers” but “thinkers” who can match the urgent needs of tomorrow with the planning required today to meet those challenges.

This need for strategic level thinking and leaders who understand the elements of national power is not unique to the U.S. military. “In a complex security landscape, with multipolar threats and players, the only way to limit mistakes and fight and win wars is to have a higher level of education for our military leaders.” “It’s fundamental to success that the most senior commanders understand the lessons of history and develop the intuition and vision to see complex problems rapidly and clearly, and are able to create and lead innovative, well calibrated and successful solutions. Otherwise armed forces will be confined by
their leaders to preparing by rote for the war they last fought.”

What do we want?

The IRP determined that a gap existed between operational art and strategic education. What is needed is a systematic way to train and educate professionals who understand the interagency and can operate effectively in this environment and clearly think in terms of strategic objectives. Executive departments are expert at conveying the “how to” for their department; how USIAD works, how the State carries out its missions, how the Services support Combatant Commands in the Department of Defense. This is in some degree operational art, how organizations organize, train and equip to meet mission objectives. What is missing are educational tools and professional opportunities to learn how to operate within the interagency realm and how national objectives and policies are made, pursued and implemented and how cross-Department collaboration is needed to achieve whole of government efficiency. At present, there are very few ASP3-like programs that include these national level considerations. As such, interviews with current and former senior leaders reveal how successful leaders adapt to this complex interagency environment, point to important events in a professional’s career that enabled them to succeed and detail attributes – humility, persistence, open-mindedness, for example – that are character traits of good leadership. There is, however, little in national and strategic-level education that prepare future leaders on how to advise leaders at the highest levels of their department or within the interagency.
The Department of Defense’s Professional Military Education and Joint Professional Military Education perhaps come the closest to meeting this objective, but there are few analogous programs within the other Executive departments.

What is needed are professionals who understand the capabilities and cultures of the other departments and how to coordinate an effective whole of government response to meet strategic ends. An appreciation is required that not all will have command authority, most will support and aid in coordinating a whole of government response and others will provide information and facilitate the good execution of an objective. For example, the NSC is first an foremost a coordinating body that advises the National Security Advisor and, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the President’s Military Advisor, provides national level advice for the Cabinet and the National Command Authority. Ultimately, executive-level command and policy is directed by and through the President, with issues resolved and supporting decisions made at the Department level.

Education at the strategic level affords actors to understand not merely roles and responsibilities, but also bureaucratic cultural distinctions and ways of doing business that highlight diversity of method and approach that may have additive value to the success of an objective. So what is education? Consider the definition provided by the Joint Staff in their Officer Professional Military Education policy:

In its broadest conception, education conveys general bodies of knowledge and develops habits of mind applicable to a broad spectrum of endeavors. As viewed through the prism of “Learning Domains,” education
is largely defined through the cognitive domain and fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives, critical and reflective analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, ill-structured or non-linear problems. This contrasts with training that focuses learning largely through the psychomotor domain on the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and tasks. Learning that addresses attitudinal understandings of joint matters is focused through the affective domain...

Training and education are not mutually exclusive. Virtually all military schools and professional development programs include elements of both education and training in their academic programs. Achieving success across the joint learning continuum relies on close coordination of training and education to enhance synergies as personnel develop individually over time, acquiring and performing progressively higher skills and responsibilities as their careers advance.\textsuperscript{149}

This construct is useful in distinguishing the education and training domains while emphasizing that education and training are not mutually exclusive. That said, in many ways a great deal can be learned from JPME education and military training since while not mutually exclusive, they are not mutually reinforcing. For example, many new graduates of JPME I and JPME II follow this with training activities that prepare them for their next assignments. Training “to do the job” is thus not supported by educational opportunities that further the national level perspectives education can provide. Nonetheless while this exists to a degree in military education, the same is true for other Executive departments.
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Skelton Panel\textsuperscript{150} and the 2010 follow-up study demonstrate Congressional intent to develop, foster and sustain intellectual rigor in the military ranks. It is worth remembering a few of Ike Skelton’s themes posed as a series of rhetorical questions that are as applicable today as they were in the 1980’s: “Where are our strategic thinkers of today? Does our military structure no longer nurture such individuals? Is our professional military education system such that it would be impossible for [an Alfred Thayer] Mahan, [George C.] Marshall, or [Maxwell] Taylor to make a contribution? Does our military spend so much time studying weapons systems and tactics that there is no room for strategic thinking?”\textsuperscript{151} Skelton, Representative for Missouri’s 4th congressional district from 1977 to 2011 and former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, argued that lack of education needed to produce agile thinkers and leaders presented a serious weakness to U.S. ability to confront and overcome threats in the future.

In 2012, General Dempsey released a white paper on PME stating the purpose of PME was to “develop leaders by conveying a broad body of professional knowledge and developing the habits of mind essential to our profession,” including intellectual curiosity, coupled with openness to new ideas.\textsuperscript{152} Therefore, Congress and senior leadership in the Pentagon agree with the intended goal of PME, that is broad-based intellectual agility/curiosity. That, however, may not be shared by subordinates operating parochially by Service or support the Combatant Commands as end users.\textsuperscript{153} What most agree on and is represented by the Skelton Panel is that meaningful reform must be based on need. So, “what’s the problem?” Skelton and
others such as former Representative Steve Israel, who served New York’s 3rd congressional district from 2001 to 2017 simply recognized that experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with new threats in the cyber realm and tense competition among, between and with countries such as China and Russia suggests that those at the apex of strategic decision making lack the tools, especially in educational opportunities and intellectual agility to compete effectively. The argument is that the military does not lack strategic talent, rather, it does not reward those who exhibit intellectual creativity, initiative agility through assignments and promotions. The point is that those with intellectual talents become advisors to the military and civilian leadership; they do not become the leaders themselves. While general and flag officers are well versed at operational art, they are lacking at the strategic art necessary to devise and execute national level policy.

Ultimately, with Ike Skelton’s passing and Steve Israel’s retirement, there are few to none voicing the need to promote strategic level education within the Department of Defense specifically, and within the Executive branch more generally. Sadly, with no Congressional voices raising concern and few within the bureaucracies who benefit most from the current process seeing a need for reform or even a “course correction”, it may take a crisis to serve as the forcing function needed to re-evaluate strategic education. Absent a crisis, the answer to “so, what’s the problem” will be “there is no problem.”
Are we asking the wrong question?

Are we overpromising what education can solve? While educational reform is an important tool with promise, it may not be the best tool to get at the root cause of strategic thinking problem. As pointed out by Robert Scales, a retired United States Army major general and former commandant of the U.S. Army War College in his article for War on the Rocks:

The pedagogical system that spawned today’s generation of senior officers is deeply embedded in officer culture. Prior to 9/11, no officer could be promoted to general or admiral without first attending a service specific or joint level war college. The rules have since been relaxed due to the exigencies of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most officers receive their first dipping in higher military operations and strategy at a “staff college,” essentially a mid-level education given to officers at about their eleventh year of service. Both schools are selective. In the Army, the Command and General Staff College takes about half of those eligible and the Army War College takes fewer than a quarter. Every service has its own intermediate and senior school. Ike’s great reform was to transform the curriculum and student body of these schools from single service to “joint” institutions.\(^{154}\)

The real importance of Scales’ insight has less to do with how an institution provides educational touch points over an officer’s career and the selectivity for admission to Service schools, in this case the Army. Rather, Scales points to a problem that education cannot solve, the officer culture, the promotion system and the rewards and benefits unique to the military that selects
its generals and flag officers. What is going on here is the risk to reward calculation for aspiring officers. Tactical lessons and operational art are knowable, understandable and learnable. Textbooks reflect this and focus on operational art and command at the operational level. While the Goldwater-Nichols act promoted officer education and mandated joint duty assignments, one lesser understood consequence was cementing the primacy of the Combatant Commands and its leadership as the apex of warfighting. Thus, operational considerations and politics at the regional and sub-regional levels was paramount, not national or truly strategic level competency. Again, this is not necessarily a negative for strong operational competencies provide a clear path to promotion, are much better understood that strategic level art and competencies are more readily observable by those responsible for promotion. Yet, theater strategy is currently paramount, not national level, strategic grand strategy. Operational considerations drive education, not strategic ones. As Dr. Stephen J. Mariano at the National War College argues, this “lowered the aim point to theater strategy.”

Today’s complex global environment consists of more levels with relationships among more actors, more politics and more jurisdictions. Decisions in these environments are more complex with far reaching consequences, some of them unintended. So how can the U.S. develop leaders to successfully navigate this complex environment? How are Executive departments developing and preparing their future leaders? Who can effect educational change and is the cost of doing so worth the effort? The IRP struggled with these foundational questions and found strategic education lacking for the complexities of today’s
globalized challenges. While specific measures were recommended, including a greater role by USIP to spearhead strategic education across the interagency, it is important also to return to the proposition that training and education are not mutually exclusive and that while virtually all military education and professional development programs include elements of both education and training in their academic programs, as mandated Officer Professional Military Education Policy, “achieving success across the joint learning continuum relies on close coordination of training and education to enhance synergies as personnel develop individually over time, acquiring and performing progressively higher skills and responsibilities as their careers advance.”156
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Successful WoG approaches all have the following characteristics: individuals matter. Educated and experienced individuals are necessary to develop the vision, establish the processes, build the team, get the resources and maintain internal and external support. When coupled with senior-level support from the top and throughout the government, especially including the relevant Embassy’s central role, then progress is possible. For lasting effect, however, the WoG team must include the host nation.

The approach must be purpose-built with form following function to include necessary expertise and scoped so that stakeholders will buy into its purpose and vision in order to enable flexible authorities and resourcing. Additionally, the WoG team must advance, complement or at least not threaten the functional responsibilities and autonomy of parent agencies and institutions or of local host national authorities. This works better if the WoG team is limited in scope with clearly defined authorities. Finally the teams that were successful shared information from all agencies and became learning institutions, adjusting to changes in the operating environment.

The USG, for the most part, has resisted establishing standing WoG institutions except for the interagency policy committees of the NSC. An institutionalized WoG approach to complex problems on a grand scale has been illusory since WWII. The ad hoc approach based on immediate circumstances, usually a crisis, has been used and at times has yielded results and at other times has not been as successful. Let us accept the
fact that the ad hoc approach remains the predominate instrument of choice and see how we can improve our game by making key institutional changes that can have large impacts.

Recommendations

These are divided into four categories: General Overarching; Process, Structure and Culture; Resources and Authorities; and Preparation. Many of the recommendations come from the 3D paper on “Sustainable Stability.” The recommendations hope to improve the ability of the USG to assess, decide, plan, implement and adjust.

General/Overarching:

1. Expand the work of the interagency task force on fragile states – currently focusing on early warning mechanisms and conflict assessment tools – to prioritize stabilization within the NSC process and provided guidance and end-to-end management. This would include using the Mission Manager concept espoused by Chris Lamb as a tool to organize a WoG response for end-to-end management. 157

2. Implement the findings of the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review.

3. The Administration should clarify roles and responsibilities of agencies to establish a working framework by designating the Department of State as the lead federal agency for stabilization with USAID as lead implementing agency with DOD in support and prepared to assume key tasks depending on the security situation.
**Process, Structure and Culture**

1. With State as the lead federal agency, all agencies should accept State’s deliberate and crisis planning processes as the center around which a WoG steady-state planning process can be developed.

2. The Administration (NSC) should adapt a standard approach for a WoG assessment process that takes into consideration the various agencies differing objectives and positions. Assessment/situational analysis is the key that underpins policy development, planning and implementation.

3. The Administration should re-establish the Center for Complex Operations mission given by Congress to support lessons learned processes and best practices compilation in the area of complex operations, to include appropriate resourcing.\(^{158}\)

4. Support, within resources, a standing cadre of personnel who are certified to participate in WoG teams.

**Resources and Authorities**

1. Work with Congress to establish flexible funding and authorities, including between federal agencies, to be adaptable to emerging crises.

2. Expand Combatant Command funding in the area of stabilization to be more flexible in the face of dynamic situations.

3. Expand the transfer of funding authorities to allow agencies to meet immediate demands.

4. Gain and maintain total visibility over where and how the USG spends its money, using existing tools such as contract spend dashboards to synchronize interagency spending with theater campaign plans.
Preparation

1. Congress should continue to advance the efforts started by Ike Skelton and Steve Israel to sever as a forcing function to finally educate and reward a core of National Security Professionals.

2. Designate USIP, a non-partisan organization, as the governmental lead for educating WoG personnel.

3. USIP should provide a curriculum to credential graduates in WoG assessment, planning and execution.

4. USIP should establish a community of practice on stabilization for the interagency, similar to the one it has for rule of law and police (INPROL). PKSOI’s existing community of practice run on Blackboard can be used in the interim.

5. USIP should expand its support of Interagency Table Top Exercises. DOD should ensure that its strategic war gaming meets the requirements to support other agencies of the USG.

6. The U.S. Army, as the Joint Proponent for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, must lead the Joint Force in supporting State as the lead federal agency and USIP as the lead for preparation by
   a. Supporting continued education and training with military and civilian governmental and non-governmental partners and look for ways to make this easy. This should include, but not be limited to, providing an IT platform for supporting an education and training community of practice, facilitating tabletop exercises, seminars, and conferences, training programs, service and joint exercises.
   b. Develop a plan to provide a “bench” of subject matter experts to support WoG planning and execution task forces.
c. Address the supporting structures of rewards, promotion, and benefits that are the backbone of a system that produces and uses a core of national security professionals.

d. The Joint Proponent should identify and, as needed, preserve critical capabilities in categories that can be called upon to support planning and execution processes like advisory skills, civil affairs, transitional public security, expeditionary civilian expertise; and cultural experts.
Annex A: Examples of Contract Spend Dashboards

Figure 9 below displays the trend of the WoG contract spend in terms of dollars and contracting actions from FY14 through FY16. A contracting action is basically any contract award or modification. The timeframe is adjustable to the period of interest, in this case FY14-16 is used for example purposes. This particular graph can reflect the WoG contract spend approach to Mongolia as reflected in the theater strategy and country plan. In this case, Figure 9 depicts a general downward trend in contract dollars over time and a relatively steady number of contract actions.

Figure 9. AGCS Mongolia CSD Spend Trend FY14-16 for WoG by Dollars and Actions

The bar graph portrayed in Figure 10 is a “drill-down” of Figure 9 and shows the trend of the dollars and actions solely from DoD in Mongolia over FY14-16. The spending in dollars is slightly steadier than the
WoG example and the contract actions are also steady. Analysts might review this chart and inquire as to why the spending was so much higher in 2014 than the most recent two years. Although it is not depicted here, the CSD showed some significant USACE construction efforts in support of the Five Hills Training Area in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. As mentioned previously, the questions generated when reviewing such CSD and AGCS data are the first step to optimizing WoG resources in the country and region.

Each service component can utilize the CSD tool to be more efficient in managing their own resources in support of TSCP activities. The graph in Figure 11 relates to the Army specifically and shows the ASCC commander and staff how the Army spends over time in Mongolia. The ASCC staff can study a chart like this
and determine how well it implements the economic instrument of national power with the funding that it controls. While conducting the assessment of the TSCP and related country plans, a component can assess the effectiveness of contract spending in meeting the identified objectives or whether that spending should be adjusted to address other areas.

![Contract Actions by Category: PACOM](image)

The final example of the graphing capability, shown in Figure 12, demonstrates how spend can be broken out by type of item purchased. The general contracting portfolio categories are for supplies, services, and construction. Both the AGCS and ACC CSD tools allow for pie charts to show these categories. This type of pie chart gives leaders a picture of the maturity of our relationship with a particular country. Large amounts of construction may indicate a deeper,
long-term relationship with a country. They may also indicate significant reconstruction efforts after conflict or a natural disaster. Larger numbers of supply and services contracts could be indicators of a more rudimentary relationship. Leaders at all levels would expect to see changes in what is procured based on CCDR objectives for selected countries and regions.

Figure 12. AGCS Mongolia Spend Category FY15-16 for U.S. Army

The CSD contract details by country and corresponding trend analysis allow CCMD staffs the visibility of contract spend to facilitate incorporation into theater campaign plan objectives. For example, in Phase 0, the incorporation of economic data can support “expansion of XX elements of partner capacity” or “improve attitudes and perceptions of cooperation with the United States.” A quantitative measure of support to expansion of partner capacity can be something like “what are the number and type of FMS contracts
per year?” Another measure could be “what are the number and type of contracts supporting XX element of partner capacity expansion per year?” Physical counts of contracts and their value can be compared with communications analysis of television, radio, and social media perceptions of U.S. involvement with the host nation. On their own, these measures would not tell the complete story, but, combined with other
ENDNOTES

1. The following organizations have written key reports on the subject: RAND, Center for Strategic and International Studies, American Academy of Diplomates, Council on Foreign Relations, Defense Science Board, Congressional Research Service, the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan and Iraq, the Senior Military Service Colleges the Project on National Security Reform

2. Christopher J. Lamb and Joseph C. Bond provide an extensive list of all of the organizations and studies

3. “Sustainable Stability”: A Feasible Future for U.S. Stabilization Efforts” (Washington DC: November 2016) p1, The Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict endorse this paper, which calls for pragmatic adjustments to the United States Government’s approach to stabilization.


8. Christopher J. Lamb and Joseph C. Bond provide an extensive list of all of the organizations and studies.

9. “Sustainable Stability”: A Feasible Future for U.S. Stabilization Efforts” (Washington DC: November 2016) p1, The Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the
Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict endorse this paper, which calls for pragmatic adjustments to the United States Government’s approach to stabilization.


11. Ibid., 11.


15. Locher, 287

16. Lamb 6


22. Lamb p 6 in his section on Tale of Two Burning Bushes describes the standard approach of working outside of the system by Presidents.


29. Ibid, 53.


32. Ibid


34. Coffey, 28


39. Ibid, 6


41. Flavin, Civil Military Teaming 329


44. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interorganizational Cooperation Joint Publication 3-8,(Washington DC: October 2016), Appendix E.

45. Ibid


47. Ibid

48. John Ahart and Gerald Stiles, “The Military’s Entry into Air Interdiction of Drug Trafficking from South America” (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), 28

49. Munsing and Lamb, 18

50. Ibid, 3

51. Ibid, 6

52. Ibid, 24

53. Ibid
54. Ibid, 5


56. Ibid, 35

57. Ibid


60. Joint Publication 3-8, Interorganizational Cooperation, E-3


62. Joint Publication 3-8, Interorganizational Cooperation, E-3

63. Munsing and Lamb, 42

64. U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats (The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD, December 2009), 6-8 - 6-9

65. Munsing and Lamb, 39

66. U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 6-9

67. Munsing and Lamb, 46-47

69. Ibid. 632

70. PKSOI conducted a TTX in Jordan in 2014 facilitated by Professor Jim Embrey that laid the ground to bring together all of the players and map a coherent way ahead.

71. Cole, Jordan, 31-32

72. Ibid, 42


75. Ibid. 38

76. Ibid 45


78. Cole, Boko Haram, 20


83. Ibid, 118


85. William Olson, 223.

86. Olson, 225

87. Discussion between Tamara Fitzgerald and Ryan McCannell

88. Ibid

89. Thomas S. Szayna, et al., 
*Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations* (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2009), xviii

90. Ryan S. McCannell, The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment, 4

91. Ibid, 7

92. Ibid, 5
93. Ibid, 13


95. The National Defense Acquisition Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 2017 defined ‘Security Cooperation’ Programs as “any program, activity (including exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the Security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: (A) To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. (B) To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation. (C) To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114–328, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. (Dec. 23, 2016), 130 STAT. 2000, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-114publ328/pdf/PLAW-114publ328.pdf (accessed Jan 13, 2018).


98. Ibid., 1. This report states that under the ‘security cooperation’ definition, “DOD may conduct activities such as training, equipping, and otherwise supporting foreign military forces to fight terrorist groups or to enable them to participate in coalition or other operations. DOD may also conduct humanitarian assistance, military and government educational programs, and other initiatives to assist foreign militaries, as well as their governments and populations. Such activities are intended to encourage better
relations between DOD personnel and representatives from foreign militaries, governments, and populations.”

99. Ibid., 30. The following are authorized under the CCIF, “A few permitted uses are related to foreign assistance. These include humanitarian and civic assistance, urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Permitted activities also include force training, contingencies, selected operations, command and control, joint exercises, military education and training for military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries, including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses.” Notably, ‘stability operations’ are not included.

100. Ibid., 23. Section 1201 authorizes U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan to carry out small-scale projects to address urgent humanitarian relief or urgent reconstruction needs within their areas of responsibility.

101. Ibid., 28. This Building Partner Capacity authority, “Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces to enable such forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or to support or participate in military, stability and peace support operations which benefit U.S. national security interests.”

102. Ibid., 29. This report states that this GCSF, “Authorizes a joint DOD-State Department fund to provide assistance to enhance the capabilities of a country’s military or other national security forces to conduct border and maritime security, internal defense, and counterterrorism operations, or participate in military, stability, or peace support operations.”

103. Ibid., 20.


105. This GAO analysis provides many useful insights, but has one significant limitation---it excludes efforts whose sole purpose was humanitarian, health, disaster, or development assistance.
These types of efforts can and do play a vital role in many stabilization efforts supported by the U.S military. In fact, in many cases, the threats addressed by these types of efforts are the root causes of instability and conflict—the security threats are actually driven by these causal factors. Accordingly, these types of efforts should be included in a comprehensive analysis of stabilization endeavors.


109. Ibid., Section 1281 (a).


112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.


117. Ibid., 29.


119. Ibid., 32.


123. Nash, 3.


125. Ibid.


127. Ibid.

128. Matthew Meinert, Virtual Contracting Enterprise (VCE) Architecture, PowerPoint chart, February 21, 2017. Chart was modi-
fied by the author after receipt via email from Mr. Meinert to include external DoD database interfaces.


130. Ibid.


132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.


137. Ibid., 15.

138. Ibid.


141. Ibid.

143. Ibid., 20.


147. Ibid, quoting Giampaolo Di Paola, former Italian Minister of Defense.

148. Ibid, quoting Sir Richard Barrons, former Commander, Joint Forces Command, UK.


150. Congressman Skelton was the central actor in Congressional efforts to reduce cross Service dysfunction arising from Operation Desert One, the 1980 rescue mission in Iran. This effort culminated in passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.


155. Dr. Stephen J. Mariano, Associate Dean for Research and Outreach, National War College, Washington, DC.


160. Ibid.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0, III-29.