DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: PRIMER FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

1st Edition

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Foreword

Robert O. Work

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest business enterprise on the planet.

There are many ways to state its mission. I prefer the following: to recruit, organize, equip, train, educate, exercise, retain and maintain a Total Joint Force that is ready and prepared for war and operated forward to preserve, enforce, or compel the peace.

This mission statement well captures the dual nature of the DOD business enterprise. There is an administrative practice focused on building, running and maintaining the Total Joint Force, and an operational practice focused on deploying and employing it in both peace and war. The combination of the two defines the art of defense management, which “translates national security policy and strategy into capability and capacity—a coevolution of ends, ways, and means.”

As is proper for a force that guards our Nation’s interests and protects our citizenry and allies, we often place heightened attention on DOD’s operational practice. Only the absolutely best—those who have mastered the art and science of war and proven themselves in the crucible of command—rise to the highest levels of operational command.

The same is not always true for those who rise and lead the administrative practice. This is due to the misleading association of leadership solely to the operational practice and management solely to the administrative practice. In truth, one must be a highly effective leader to master the intricacies of the administrative practice.

This shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone who has operated at the senior levels of defense management. This is where the executive-level decisions that guide the Department are made. It is where civilian control of the military is exercised; where best military advice is formulated and given; where Congressional oversight occurs; where national defense and national military strategies are created; where the program—the sum of all Joint Force capabilities and capacities—is forged; where a supporting budget is built; where defense policies are developed and overseen; and where Department activities are explained to the American people.

Operating in this environment is not for the timid. A central task involves the allocation of resources among the four services, and among the various operational portfolios such as strategic deterrence; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; tactical air forces; space and cyberspace, etc. It involves designating winners and losers. It involves intense bureaucratic infighting. The faint hearted need not apply.

It is also the level that oversees the day-to-day activities of the Department, which are more diverse than any other business in the world.
They include, among other things, a standalone recruiting force and processes; four different training and academic institutions; a uniquely complicated payroll system; a giant real estate operation; an enormous health care system; a global grocery and retail chain; the largest email system in the world; an information technology portfolio that exceeds $45 billion; a global distribution system that rivals FedEx; and a vast research and development and acquisition enterprise. The range of activities is both breathtaking and daunting.

All these important tasks endure regardless of who occupies the White House or which party controls Congress. Being able to understand them—much less master them—requires the very highest measure of skill. And being able to do so while accounting for and adjusting to the vagaries of DOD’s arcane planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) process and a Congress incapable of passing annual budgets on time requires an extraordinary amount of knowledge and patience.

And leadership. Executive-level decisions in the defense enterprise require the forging of coalitions of mutual interests, among civilian political leaders, long-serving government civil servants, and military leaders and their staffs. The old saying that there are those who watch things happen, those who make things happen, and those who ask, “what the heck just happened?” applies in spades at the senior levels of the defense enterprise. Simple orders and directives seldom accomplish their intended purpose, even if given by the most senior leaders (including the Deputy Secretary of Defense!). Success rides on those who make things happen—who can convince a naturally conservative and sometimes reluctant bureaucracy that something should and can be done.

In sum, then, only those leaders comfortable operating at the swirling nexus of strategy, policy, operations, programs and budgets, willing to offer best military advice under conditions of uncertainty and sometimes great disagreement, who understand the demands of both DOD’s operational and administrative practices, and have mastered the ins and outs of the PPBE and Congressional budgeting, and who can make things happen can succeed at the senior levels of defense management.

Success starts with knowledge. This Defense Management Primer provides the first step along the long road to achieve it. Please take it seriously, and to heart. Best of luck! You are going to need it!

Robert O. Work
Deputy Secretary of Defense
May 2014 – July 2017
Preface – What is “Defense Management”?

Defense management resides at the nexus of national security policy, strategy, campaigning, and strategic leadership. It is how our government translates national security policies and strategies into trained and ready forces for combatant commanders—units of personnel and equipment that mobilize, deploy, conduct and sustain operations, redeploy, and de-mobilize.

However, it is far more complicated than managing forces on hand. It involves the development of new ones to address emerging threats, posturing the forces around the globe for ease of employment, and ensuring adequate command, control, and support in garrison and during operations. Thus, defense management is less about the details of personnel, equipment, and facilities and more about what the overall force can do now (capabilities), how much it can do (capacity), and what it needs to do that it cannot (requirements). Moreover, the forces that services provide for operations must be interoperable for unity of effort and versatile so to adapt and respond to changes in the environment. Defense management is also not a linear process that moves from strategies to forces on hand. Rather, the ends, ways, and means co-evolve because the environment changes faster than the military can develop new capabilities and available resources are never sufficient to satisfy the national strategies. Therefore, defense management is also an exercise in managing risk. Ensure the vital interests are covered, and address the rest when one can.

The work of defense management is difficult and data-intensive. Somehow the intangible, abstract, and sometimes ambiguous goals expressed in strategies must be translated into assets—dollars, personnel, materiel, facilities, infrastructure, real estate, contracts, agreements, and so on. It involves many strategic decisions on what to prioritize, what to stop doing, where to shift resources and energy, or what to defer for later. Defense managers therefore rely on numerous decision support systems (e.g., automated data processing tools) and processes (e.g., boards, centers, working groups, teams) to provide the necessary analysis to make the best decisions for the military. However, these systems and processes also require continuous critical evaluation and modification to ensure the completeness of analysis and acceptability of any strategic decision among internal and external stakeholders.

In military culture, the enterprise side of running the military is not nearly as glamorous or exciting as command. It is not uncommon for students in the U.S. Army War College to prefer their next assignment be in a command or similar billet far away from the Pentagon. However, defense management involves all senior military and civilian leaders. The old adage colonels run the Army is absolutely true, and it applies to all O-6s and GS-13s through 15s. They devote much of their time and energy to developing requirements, participating in councils of colonels or other boards,
providing data and information to decision makers, rendering advice to
their commanders on upcoming strategic decisions, and spending a lot
time in conferences and meetings with counterparts in Washington. War
College graduates will spend much of the remainder of their careers (and
many beyond as civilians or defense contractors) involved in matters of
defense management.

The purpose behind this Primer is to provide senior leaders with
an understanding and appreciation of the defense management environ-
ment—the context, information gathering, decision making, and culture—
that describes the co-evolution of national security strategies with the gen-
eration and sustainment of combat power. The Primer is aimed at senior
professional military education students and senior military and civilian
officers entering their initial enterprise-level assignments, be they within
the Pentagon or among the many commands and agencies involved in de-
veloping and providing trained and ready forces for combatant command-
ers. We also believe this Primer is a valuable resource for junior officers in
their first assignments to Washington, DC.

The Primer covers two major themes. The first two chapters discuss
the individual defense manager and the enterprise to which they serve:

• **Chapter 1. Senior Leaders = Defense Managers.** Our view is that
  leadership and management at the enterprise level are one and the
  same. Effective senior leaders, military and civilian, lead and man-
ge both people and things. Tom Galvin situates the individual
reader in the position of a senior leader and discusses their roles
and expectations as change agents, communicators, and advisors.
How do defense managers make sense of the complex environment
and sustain the long view? What are the enduring tensions that
make enterprise decisions complex and difficult? What separates
successful defense managers from the rest?

• **Chapter 2. What is the Defense Enterprise?** Tom Galvin presents
  a definition of the *defense enterprise* as a “very large public sector
  professional organization.” Each word in the definition has partic-
ular meaning in how the military behaves as an organization, and
shows what the military shares with or is distinct from private sec-
tor firms or other government agencies.

The remaining four chapters cover the enterprise’s external envi-
ronment and its three main echelons – defense, joint, and service.

• **Chapter 3. National-Level Challenges Affecting Defense.** Doug
  Waters explores the national perspective, such as how national
security policy and strategic interests inform the defense manage-
ment process. It includes the articulation of strategic interests, fiscal
policies, and decision making at the political level. It also describes
stakeholder and media challenges the environment prevails upon
defense managers, and what they should do about them.

- **Chapter 4. Defense Organizational Processes.** Lou Yuengert and Tom Galvin explore how the national perspective is internalized at the Department of Defense level. The chapter presents the Department’s organization and relationships among the services, agencies, and field activities it oversees. It then discusses two major systems run at the Department level—one for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution and the other for acquisition of materiel and services.

- **Chapter 5. Joint Systems and Processes.** Rich Meinhart presents an overview of the ways and means employed to operationalize strategic direction across the joint community. In particular, it addresses the important responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and how the Chairman meets those responsibilities through the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

- **Chapter 6. Service Systems and Processes.** In this chapter, Fred Gellert takes the Service perspective and presents how the Services operationalize strategic direction congruently or differently from the joint perspective to develop programs and systems to build and sustain combat power. He also addresses the “Title 10” functions whereby the Services translate means (budgets and people) into capability, and common tensions between a Service’s active and reserve components.

This Primer is not intended to stand alone, rather it provides a lens through which to understand and appreciate other texts and references containing details on the processes and systems currently in place. An example of this is *How the Army Runs,* which is a reference handbook for U.S. Army officers. Combined together, this Primer and associated reference works help illuminate the complexity and dynamics that exist, causing the system to co-evolve with the security environment and needs of external stakeholders. The Primer is also a companion for the U.S. Army War College’s *Strategic Leadership Primer* (SLP) that addresses the nature and character of the competitive global environment, the roles that senior leaders play in organizations at the strategic level, the competencies they must enact, the character and values they must exhibit, and the ways and means of developing themselves to assume positions of strategic leadership. This Primer applies concepts from the SLP specifically to leadership and management of the defense enterprise.

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Chapter 1. Senior Leaders = Defense Managers

Tom Galvin

As learning institutions, it is imperative that we reflect on our experiences during the past 10 years to assess the impact and understand both our strengths and weaknesses. This is necessary to see ourselves so we can determine how we should adapt and institutionalize the lessons of the last decade. This will enable us to promote the knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors that define us as a profession, and develop our future leaders.

We undertake this as we remain both a force in contact and a force that must begin to reshape. We do so from a position of strength anchored in our shared values and joint effectiveness born from years of fighting together, and the strength of our Service competencies and cultures. As we go forward, we must continue to uphold the values that underpin our profession to maintain and enhance the trust of those we serve, our civilian leaders in government, and the American people.

-- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin E. Dempsey


Most day-to-day running of the defense enterprise falls upon its newest senior leaders, officers of pay grade O-6 and civilians of the rank of GS-14 and GS-15. Every day, they keep the U.S. military bureaucracy functioning as efficiently and effectively as possible. Upon graduation from the U.S. Army War College, count yourselves among them, regardless of whether or not you are actually assigned to the Pentagon. Just as much as you are the next generation of senior leaders, you also comprise the next generation of defense managers. You are both leader and manager, and will be henceforth.

Unfortunately, military culture celebrates leadership but dismisses management. It describes leaders as men and women of exceptional quality who inspire followers to do great things. Managers, on the other hand, are often described as bureaucrats who get in the way of leaders for self-serving reasons. This is a misperception damaging to the profession of arms. Effective senior leaders, military and civilian, lead and manage both people and things, and concern themselves with matters of both efficiency and effectiveness. After all, winning the next war is about training and motivating people and ensuring it is equipped and sustained for the fight. Combatant commanders depend on the defense enterprise to provide

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trained and ready forces where and when needed. Running the enterprise is tough, but vital, work.

Some common duty assignments for new senior leaders include the following:

- As division chief in a service component command staff, combatant or sub-unified command staff, service staff or secretariat, or joint staff responsible for translating policy into strategy, strategy into programs, or programs into budgets
- As a subject matter expert or military advisor rendering best military advice to a senior leader in an executive branch department (including Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)) or as a fellow to a national security-oriented civilian body
- As a senior planner translating strategies into requirements
- As a program executive officer or other official within a major acquisition program responsible for developing and fielding new capabilities to the force within the boundaries of cost and schedule, or
- As a division chief or senior team member preparing future doctrine, training, or education, or conducting high-level research into matters of policy and strategy

Despite the size and depth of the defense bureaucracy, many successful defense managers sustain focus on the long-term, think creatively and innovatively, and persist through needed improvements that help the institution perform its ultimate purpose: to be prepared to fight and win the next war.

**Defense Management: A Study of Tensions**

Why is it so tough? Because virtually every strategic idea, decision, and action inflames an inherent tension in the environment. Six such tensions are shown in Figure 1. Tensions in the Defense Enterprise. National level strategy formulation invokes a tension between “rhetoric” (i.e., the messages that national leaders wish to send to allies, adversaries, and the U.S. public) and “reality” (i.e., what capabilities DOD actually has to match the rhetoric). The tension would be lessened if real-time objective measures were possible, but they are not. Rather, defense managers must rely on their judgment of how well aligned DOD’s capabilities are with national strategies. And judgment can always be questioned by those with differing viewpoints.

Funding and resources is another source of tension, as the demands by the military will almost always exceed the budget available. More capability may be preferred but a balance of capabilities may be the only feasible option. So who compromises and how? When is it proper to share the wealth (or lack of it), and when must leaders stand their ground and demand changes to the budget?
Requirements and capabilities are two tensions that go hand-in-hand, because together they influence the distribution of resources. Given finite resources, which should the enterprise emphasize more? Current readiness or modernization? And who should own those capabilities, keep at service level or centralize across the joint community? The services view autonomy as precious, while the Department of Defense is under real pressure to reduce redundancies.

Finally, there is tension over control of the defense enterprise. By law and tradition, the U.S. exercises civil control over the military. Strategic decisions demand more than just the military’s position—they need input from all elements of national power. However, military leaders will naturally resist decisions they view as detrimental to the force.

Navigating these tensions is an art. To do so, defense managers exercise strong strategic thinking skills, communication and negotiation, empathy, self-awareness, and perseverance. They are proactive, recognizing when important issues can become embroiled in conflict, and work tirelessly to mitigate it. Competencies of good defense managers relevant to the enterprise environment include the following:

**Fostering Change**

Defense managers exercise vision and provide strategic direction to the force. However, they rarely have the opportunity to devote the neces-
sary energy to converting that vision into a strategic plan to be implemented. That translation process often falls to O-6s and GS-14s/15s, who must operationalize the vision and direction in the form of strategic plans, programs, and adjusted budgets with long- and short-term goals, objectives, targets, and measures of success.

**Initiating Planned Change (“Transformation”)**

Planned change efforts—in the forms of new programs and associated changes in doctrine, training, manning, etc.—are often referred as “transformations” and come in three forms: internally-focused, externally-focused, and realignment. Internally-focused transformations are ones that target the organization’s “internally focused goals, philosophy, or culture.” While clearly these changes may be in response to adjustments in the overall environment, the effort is initiated and managed from within the defense establishment. General (GEN) Shinseki’s Army Transformation of the late 1990s was an example of this type, as among the desired capabilities were a reduced tooth-to-tail ratio and greater interoperability through the employment of common chassis among a range of future vehicles. The inspiration for the transformation came externally, including the uncertainty wrought by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more diffuse set of threats to stability and U.S. interests. Goal-setting, concept development, programming and budgeting, and most other aspects of operationalizing this change were internally generated.

Externally-focused transformations are described as changes in the “externally-focused strategy” or “important ways it interacts with customers, clients, or parent organizations,” such as other U.S. government agencies, Congress, and the Nation. The purpose and goals of the change were established by an external entity. Operationalizing those goals could be a combination of external and internal actions, but assessment and acceptance of the change is ultimately external. One example of an externally-focused change is the transition to the All-Volunteer Force in the 1970s that significantly altered the relationship between the U.S. military and the American people. Another example was the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 that, among other things, forced the Services to institute “jointness” in career management and professional education.

Realignment transformations reflect “important changes in the responsibilities or resources” of organizational elements or their “additions or eliminations.” This form of change is common at both the strategic

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
(top-down) and unit (bottom-up) levels. They take existing capabilities and structures and re-position them for employment in different ways. The mid-2000s overseas force posture efforts are examples of this. As a combination of desires to reduce the costly presence of large forces posted overseas and address the lessons learned of late-1990s operations in the Balkans, the Defense Department re-stationed force structure in the continental United States while ensuring the remaining overseas forces were more globally employable. Transformations of this type can be expansionist to grow capacity in response to increased demands, such as raising the Army’s end strength which involves both recruiting more personnel and establishing new or expanded units for them to join. Some transformations are explicitly reductionist, with emphasis on cutting structure, eliminating redundancies, or reducing the end strength of the force. Such transformations are very sensitive because of concerns about releasing quality personnel (military and civilian) from service and introducing vulnerabilities or capability gaps. As an example, Secretary Rumsfeld’s mid-2000s pursuit of the elimination of service component commands and 15% cut from headquarters strength across the joint force faced both concerns. It was pursued on a reasonable belief that the defense hierarchy was too top heavy with too many vertical layers. However, it proved very difficult to do, particularly with the high OPTEMPO (operating tempo) in the Pentagon, a growing insurgency in Iraq, and lack of clarity in the associated elimination of functions.8

Each type of effort invokes different responses (from embracing to ambivalent to hostile) from stakeholders, both inside and outside the military. Defense managers serve on the front lines of the controversy, both in trying to make sense of the Transformation effort and in communicating with stakeholders to get the effort embraced and moving.

Assessing On-Going Change

Although they sound the same, initiating a transformation effort and keeping it moving forward are two very different challenges. Many defense managers find themselves inserted into the middle of the story, undertaking responsibilities for moving along transformation efforts they did not initiate and that they will not see completed during their tour at the Pentagon. More often than not, defense managers taking over in the middle of an effort do not have adequate time to fully understand and appreciate its purpose and history. Stories abound of them having to spend the first day in the office on the Hill defending their program or fighting off forces wielding budget axes (sometimes the wielders were merely waiting for the manager’s predecessor to leave).

8 Burwell B. Bell and Thomas P. Galvin, “In Defense of Service Component Commands,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 2005): 96-104. This is an example of veiled concerns about the impacts of eliminating such headquarters from the force structure.
Which efforts to keep or cancel? This is often a harder decision than it sounds. Military scholar Zhivan J. Alach notes three factors that defense managers might consider. One is the threat or the condition under which the change effort was initiated. Accelerants for change include suddenly emergent threats and what other leaders perceive to be vital needs based on their prior experiences. A challenge for change efforts is that the threat or condition dissipates or changes before the responding capability (in the form of program or change in force structure) is available. The second factor is the organizational culture of the entities within the Pentagon, which is notably risk intolerant and desiring of clear cost-effective solutions, all the while having to grow to meet the increasing demands of accountability from external stakeholders. It is also generally not amenable to outright cancellation of flagging change efforts. The third is technology which, while rapidly changing, may not be advancing commensurate with the military’s desires.9

Defense managers need to assess the objective state of the change efforts they are chartered to manage. What was the condition or threat that the project seeks to address and is it still valid? What are the cultural barriers within or external to the change effort? Is the effort reaching too far, expecting developments or capabilities that simply do not exist? Questions such as these need to be asked continuously, as the change effort and the environment will evolve.

Working in Teams

Most defense management activities are done collaboratively through teams. Teams at these levels are often global, involving subject matter experts sharing functional or geographic responsibilities. Teams come in many forms and exist for many reasons, but tend to fall along a continuum from enduring communities of practice to project teams assembled for specific purposes.10

Example of communities of practice include the communications community under the Defense Information System Agency and Joint Staff J-6 that manages the Global Information Grid or the array of Asia-Pacific experts from OSD-Policy, Joint Staff J5, U.S. Pacific Command and its service component commands, and the service staffs. These share information, plan, coordinate, and respond to crises rapidly, and with today’s global technologies can bring in specialized talent from across the government to handle novel issues. The energy generated by these communities of practice fuel the engines of defense management—articulating the requirements of the field that are translated into needed capabilities, plans, programs, and ultimately platforms and systems placed in the hands of

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Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. However, this same energy can produce a lot of tension within the team due to the different priorities, goals, and perspectives of the communities represented. The challenge for defense managers is mitigating such tensions and preventing conflict that may arise so teams can develop solutions.

Project or cross-functional teams may form out of a community of practice for a specific functional project, or may be built entirely *ad hoc* based on an emergent issue that requires immediate Departmental response. Such teams need not be exclusively military personnel, nor need their workspace be confined to the Pentagon. An example of this was the establishment of the Army IED (Improvised Explosive Device) Task Force that formed in response to the growing IED threat in Iraq in 2003. Commissioned by the Army G3 at the time, the Task Force included special operations personnel, contractors, and a “small, hand-picked cadre of officers” who headed to Iraq to “make creative recommendations on adjustments to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by operating forces.”¹¹ Unlike many project teams that disband upon completion of their original tasks, the Army IED Task Force of 2003 would eventually grow into its own separate joint organization in 2006 called the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which helped shape viable responses to IEDs.¹²

**Cutting Through Complexity**

Standing at the crossroads between the vertical hierarchy with its formal business practices and the horizontal networks with their high-energy information sharing and innovation can be delicate work. Sometimes the dynamic and complex nature of the modern security environment is overwhelming, inhibiting a defense manager’s ability to foster change and lead teams toward a better future. In “The Complexity Trap,” Gallagher, Geltzer, and v. Gorka showed that complexity has always been present even in the supposed bipolar world of the Cold War.¹³ They warned that “succumbing to complexity does not tell us how to react; indeed, if anything, it dissuades us from reacting at all, out of fear that we cannot possibly know what to do.”¹⁴

Stakeholders often lack the patience or desire to deal with the complexity of many modern military issues, and look to senior leaders

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¹⁴ Ibid.
to reduce them to simple, digestible sound bites. An example of this can be found in Congressional testimony, where leaders serving as witnesses must answer very complex questions within a prescribed five-minute timeframe for each Member in the committee. While the protocols of such hearings are out of the ordinary and very strict, military and civilian officers apply the same principle of simplicity when engaging with Members in any setting. The same also applies for any stakeholder from within the U.S. or state government, partner nation, or international body.

**Corollary: Differentiating Levels of Analysis**

Cutting through the complexity to deal with tough issues in apples-to-apples terms with stakeholders makes understanding of the level of analysis critical. Complex, ill-structured problems (such as sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)) operate across three levels of analysis—the macro-level of the military institution and its interface with society, the meso-level of units from small-unit to service component command, and the micro-level of the individual.\(^{15}\) Even though an issue is being discussed among senior military leaders, for example, does not necessarily mean that they are taking a macro-perspective. For example, an Army decision to introduce a new bonus program as a means of recruiting certain skill sets into the AVF might be a response geared at the individual level of analysis. If too many volunteers suddenly pursue the new program (including those who would otherwise have volunteered anyhow), effects will be felt across the Army budget (macro). Another example is a debate over cutting quantities of a weapons system being purchased from X-thousand to Y-hundred (macro) which may impact the force modernization plan with its long lists of units needing those systems (meso).

Successful senior leaders understand how changes at one level of analysis will bring about second-order effects across the other levels. They also understand that providing simple answers at one level requires assumptions and controls being placed on the other levels, lest the answers be unreliable. By seeking to bring any discussion to a common perspective, the same level of analysis, the defense manager increases the chances of clear and effective communication, negotiation, or problem resolution.

**Communicating with Courage and Being a “Player,” Not a “Spectator”\(^{16}\)**

Probably the most important and sometimes most difficult role that senior leaders play is in helping sustain an open communications en-

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\(^{16}\) This phrase – being a “player” and not a “spectator” -- has been used for many years in the context of the U.S. Army War College’s Defense Management course and its predecessors. For example, it is used in Michael V. McCrea, *Defense Management and Business Transformation*, Faculty Paper (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 2013), 10.
In his book Assignment: Pentagon, MG Smith told a vignette about speaking truth to power and being a player. An excerpt follows:

I was sitting in the briefing room of the three-star operations deputy of the U.S. Air Force Dutch Huyser [who] was debriefing [his staff on a meeting]. General Huyser had just articulated his view on how the military ought to be restructured throughout the world. He wanted, for instance, a Northeast Asia Unified Command … a Southwest Pacific Unified Command …, and a Specified Naval Command in Hawaii. After his monologue on this subject, he asked if anyone in the room had any objection to his grand design.

There were a number of people in the room who were clearly not comfortable with some of his ideas, but since he was expressing them with such conviction, none of my colleagues spoke up. … I felt somebody ought to speak up. So I held up my hand and said that I thought that some changes were needed but that some of his ideas would be bad for the Air Force and for the nation. …

The next day, I was assigned as team chief for an ad hoc group that was to put together an Air Force position on a revised Uni-

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19 Ibid., 90.
Smith spoke truth to power and exercised initiative in an environment that encouraged it. In doing so, he was rewarded with an opportunity to shape a Service’s position that would guide how that Service would support our national security interests in the coming years and gain important insights and experience that he would parlay into future responsibilities.

However, sometimes the “power” referred to is one’s own. The problem might not be outright ethical breaches, where rules were broken or lies exposed. It is in the gray areas where senior leaders must navigate the complexity and intensity of bureaucratic battles, the high stakes involved with defense programs, the politicized nature of many national security matters, and the occasional ruthlessness of the budget axe. These can present senior leaders with difficult ethical dilemmas when, as Smith said, “If the goals you and your service are pursuing are good and honest ones, you may feel the pressure to lie as a means to carry out those goals.”21 The lies may not be outright untruths, but of omission or “spin” where rationally articulating a position gives way to unwarranted advocacy.

These challenges do not deter senior leaders from exercising initiative. Through self-awareness and continuous critical and reflective thinking, senior leaders learn to recognize the ethical boundaries on such issues. They are both adept at avoiding crossing them and at coaching, teaching, and mentoring others on recognizing them.

Conclusion

Serving as defense manager is both challenging and rewarding. Good senior leaders rise above the formal duty description and seek out the informal roles and opportunities to make a difference in the defense, joint, or service environments. They carve out a niche that leverages their experience and expertise in ways that benefit the overall institution and, most importantly, help it accomplish its ultimate purpose—to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders.

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20 Ibid., 91-92.
21 Ibid., 198.
Chapter 2. What is the “Defense Enterprise”?

Tom Galvin

A common thread encountered with military students at the U.S. Army War College is the view that militaries are not like corporations, often citing as justification that the military lack a profit motive. While there is truth in this view, the logical follow-on questions go unanswered: (1) what kind of organizations are militaries, and (2) what does that suggest about a military’s structure, processes, and related behavior? This chapter will help answer these questions, and therefore provide a better understanding of how militaries behave compared with a wide range of large public- and private-sector organizations. It also helps explain the unique qualities of militaries as they compete for resources to develop the necessary capabilities to meet national security requirements.

However, the term military can be misleading. It means “of or relating to armed forces,” which introduces a bias toward the operational context and the uniformed service members working within it. For that reason, this primer will prefer a larger, more inclusive term that encompasses the whole institution and its political role in mobilizing the nation’s resources to develop capabilities and thereby provide trained and ready forces. The term used here will be the defense enterprise.

The defense enterprise combines three distinct behaviors — those of a: (1) very large, (2) public-sector, and (3) professional organization. These behaviors are often complementary but they also produce natural tensions (e.g., public-sector bureaucracy versus profession). The purpose of this chapter is to define and explain these behaviors, drawing from the fields of microeconomics and management.

Defining the Defense Enterprise

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines an enterprise as both “a unit of economic organization or activity” and “a systematically purposeful activity.” This is a good fit to describe DOD’s purpose and activities without connoting commercial activity (i.e., like the similar terms “business,” “industry,” or “firm”). Moreover, the term enterprise is already used to describe large-scale or strategic level activities in support of a federal mission. For example, the DOD Information Enterprise includes the capability and capacity to provide information technology ser-

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vices to all of DOD. Applying the term DOD-wide, the defense enterprise provides defense for the nation by generating and sustaining the capabilities and capacities needed for its mission.

Therefore, the defense enterprise is defined as a political-military activity whose purpose is to generate and sustain capability to meet national security requirements under authorities established by politically appointed civilian leaders. The defense enterprise is essentially a civil-military partnership, whereby national leaders and defense managers work together on behalf of the nation, with the latter fully accountable to the former. Also, generating and sustaining capability is done in systematic fashion. The tools of the enterprise are its processes and systems, many of which will be briefly introduced in subsequent chapters. These tools help execute authorities and ensure auditability.

The defense enterprise is not a single organization but a collection of organizations with the potential to be mobilized in times of war. As Figure 2. The Defense Enterprise shows, the enterprise’s permanent organization is DOD that includes subordinate organizations at the defense, joint, and service levels (these are further detailed in Chapters 4 through 6).

The dotted box at bottom of the Figure shows other federal and non-federal entities which enable DOD in times of peace and war. Pragmatically, the “defense enterprise” only includes those with the potential to directly augment or enhance DOD’s mission and capacity to fight and win wars. The defense industrial base, for example, includes those private sector firms that contribute to current readiness, modernization, mobilization, the conduct of military operations, and other DOD activities. Research organizations such as private laboratories and academia conduct government-sponsored research to support development and enhancement of military capabilities, review strategies and policies, and other functions. Federal departments and agencies provide the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of power to complement the military. The Department of Homeland Security includes the Coast Guard, which is realigned under the Department of the Navy in times of war. National Response Framework Support Agencies include federal, state, local, territorial, private sector, and non-governmental/private volunteer organizations that provide capacity to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from national disasters and crises. Their abilities to mitigate domestic security concerns is vital for DOD to maintain its critical roles in defending the nation.

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28 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 19.
State and local agencies are also part of the enterprise. In addition to the National Guards, state departments of transportation contribute to or directly manage and maintain much of the physical infrastructure the military uses for mobilizing or responding to crises. These include seaports, airports, railyards, roadways, and other facilities or real estate to support accession and movement of forces.

Finally, there are a range of organizations identified in the U.S. Code, some of whom have capabilities they can or do provide to DOD. Volunteer organizations include service-level auxiliaries such as the Civil Air Patrol (Title 36) and Merchant Marine (Title 49). The Civil Air Patrol is a non-profit corporation that augments the Air Force and provide aviation for search-and-rescue, disaster relief, and other missions. The Merchant Marine is a private volunteer fleet of ships available to transport cargo and personnel. There are also a number of Patriotic Organizations listed in Title 36, Subtitle II. These are not agencies of the U.S. Government but are organizations “with a patriotic, charitable, historical, [or] educational” purpose who are federally chartered.31

The relationships with DOD are established in various ways: memoranda of understanding, Congressional charter, interagency agreements, and contracts (such as acquisition of goods or services from the private sector).32

The defense enterprise is a very large, public-sector, professional, preparedness organization. Each component of this description is significant, and is elaborated in the following sections.

A “Very Large” Organization

The scope and size of the enterprise warrants special attention. Service end strengths easily exceeding one million men and women, combining active duty and reserve components; including civilians, contractors, family members, defense industrial partners, etc., makes it readily apparent how large and complex the defense enterprise is. Turcotte describes very large organizations as follows:

[A] multifunctional organization with at least five hierarchical levels and a very complex external environment from which resources and directions flow. In such an organization, the range of

32 For example, Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of Defense and the American Red Cross, March 10, 2009, that allows the Red Cross to operate on DOD installations to support the military’s blood supply; These include Patriotic Organizations, 36 U.S.C., Subtitle II. This includes: Civil Air Patrol, 36 U.S.C., Chapter 403 and American Battlefield Monuments Commission, 36 U.S.C., Chapter 21; For example, see Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, October 2017) that includes DOD requirements to support national emergencies.
top management responsibilities allows only infrequent, though often intense, interactions with most subordinates. Opportunities for personal direction and role-centered leadership patterns are limited. Range and complexity of organizational issues make it difficult for executives to master the details involved. They must instead develop skill in abstracting the essence, implication, and key ideas from complex issues.33

The real meaning of “large” or “very large,” whether in terms of on-hand assets or numbers of personnel, depends greatly on the industry.35 On both counts the U.S. defense enterprise is massive and is considered the largest and most powerful of any nation.36 The DOD employs over two million personnel and holds trillions of dollars in assets.37

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34 Figure developed by author.


37 Department of Defense, “About the Department of Defense,” Department of Defense
But becoming and staying very large comes with a price. Larry Pleshko and Inge Nickerson show that as an organization grows, so too does its formalization, integration, centralization, and complexity.\textsuperscript{38} They further observe that even if an organization does not change in size, its natural tendency is to grow more formal, centralized, and complex; that is, to become naturally more bureaucratic.\textsuperscript{39} Turcotte summarizes the challenges for leaders at the top levels of very large organizations as follows: (1) being unable to rely on past experience, (2) agenda being “dominated by external events,” (3) an inability to “get their arms around the organization,” and (4) extremely limited time available to deal with internal matters which risks leading to conflicted policies and priorities.\textsuperscript{40} He also notes change strategies that work well for smaller organizations may not necessarily work in very large ones, a finding supported by various studies in change.\textsuperscript{41}

Very large organizations are dynamic and complex, but they tend to adapt naturally toward a more stable, structured form that risks becoming hardened, bureaucratic, and unable to innovate or adapt. In his book \textit{Accelerate}, Kotter described this as a natural part of the life-cycle of an organization as it slowly adopts successful habits and practices into its culture. This moves the organization from a more dynamic network-based culture to one of managed hierarchy. Although Kotter notes that managed hierarchies are necessary in very large organizations to allow routine necessary actions to remain routine in implementation, the strategic agility inherent in the networked approach is vitally important.\textsuperscript{42} The U.S. Army’s recent adoption of the Mission Command philosophy is a step in that direction, emphasizing how subunits should be trusted to make proper, autonomous decisions to achieve the commander’s intent.\textsuperscript{43} From an organizational change standpoint, Mission Command encourages localized, independent pursuit of innovative solutions to complement the pursuit of the higher headquarters commander’s vision.

\textbf{A “Public-Sector Professional” Organization}

The defense enterprise’s public-sector and professional attributes will be discussed together as they represent two sometimes-clashing perspectives. The conflict stems from the ordinary conditions that: (1) resources granted to public-sector organizations are never sufficient to generate all the capability that the enterprise views as necessary to meet all require-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Larry P. Pleshko and Inge Nickerson, “Strategic Comparisons of Very Large Firms to Smaller Firms in a Financial Service Industry,” \textit{Academy of Strategic Management Journal} 6 (2007): 105.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Pleshko and Nickerson, “Strategic Comparisons of Very Large Firms to Smaller Firms….”
\item \textsuperscript{40} Turcotte, 159.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Beaver and Pleshko & Nickerson, for example.
\item \textsuperscript{42} John P. Kotter, \textit{XLR8 (Accelerate)} (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 20-22.
\end{itemize}
ments at minimal risk, and (2) the uncertainty in aligning requirements with capabilities creates the need for continuous government oversight, ostensibly to ensure the efficient use of resources, whereas professional organizations consider effectiveness as paramount.44

As a *professional* organization, the defense enterprise stewards the expert knowledge required to effectively employ the capabilities during operations. Qualities of professions include self-governance, custodianship of a domain of professional knowledge, and the granting of autonomy by society which implies a trusting relationship.45 The military collectively endeavors to maximize these qualities, which is fundamentally the purpose for forming as a professional organization vice exercising individual practice (i.e., such as medicine and law) whereby the organization significantly scales down in times of peace.

However, it is important to distinguish the defense enterprise as a professional organization from the military as a profession. While the civilian leaders of the defense enterprise certainly conduct themselves professionally, they are not necessarily professionals. As political appointees, the top civilian leaders may not be granted the same autonomy from society or sustain the domain of expert knowledge in the conduct of duties. This can raise tensions when military officers and their civilian leaders disagree, and is the reason why certain top military officials serve in direct advisory roles to the President and Congress, potentially making public dissenting views from those of civilian authorities.

As a *public-sector* organization, the defense enterprise operates as a bureaucracy, responsible for efficiently generating capabilities using the nation’s resources entrusted to it. The defense enterprise’s fundamental unit of analysis is the *program*, “activities and spending in terms of their contributions to organizational goals” that combines funding with the authorities (often referred to as the “color” of money) and timelines to spend it.46 While the authorities may represent constraints on the enterprise’s ability to operate efficiently, they serve as effective and efficient means of oversight. Programs can be evaluated based on their ability to deliver the specified capabilities according to the schedule, and unsuccessful programs should in theory be reduced or cancelled. However, the slate of programs in the budget are political decisions as much as they are professional ones, and the cancellation of a program can carry ramifications that may offset any savings generated.

While there may be tension between the professional and public sector characteristics of the defense enterprise, it can result in complementary outcomes. Lacking the profit motive, the enterprise will prefer activ-

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44 Snider, 14.
45 Ibid.
ilities that increase effectiveness at the risk (to a point) of inefficiency. The creation of the Overseas Contingency Operations funding stream in the 2000s is an example. When the client (represented by Congress) deemed the service of defense to be inadequate, the client provides more money for the purposes of securing higher levels of that service. Of course, the inverse can be a source of conflict if the client does not grant sufficient resources to the enterprise, which means the latter cannot effectively provide the expected levels of desired service. Because effectiveness and efficiency of providing such services are hard to measure quantitatively, even in wartime, it is difficult to determine how many resources are precisely enough to protect the nation.

This leads to another vitally important defense enterprise activity: stewarding public resources. The military prudently leveraging the assets its clients have entrusted to it by eliminating (or at least minimizing) fraud, waste, and abuse. Congress and the executive branch demand full accountability and transparency from the enterprise’s top leaders. Demonstrating such accountability requires senior leaders to satisfy legal requirements, such as producing mandated reports, making routine formal statements, and testifying before Congress. In practice, it also includes leadership actions to improve efficiency. Redundancy, for example, is normally discouraged, and many stakeholders regard reducing redundancy as a minimum requirement to exercising good stewardship. Yet, this presents to the joint force and the services with a significant challenge – posturing a U.S. military with right balance of capacities and capabilities across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains to provide defense of the nation without any exploitable gaps. At some level, redundancies protect against the creation of such gaps.

A “Preparedness” Organization

The final attribute regards the fact that the defense enterprise does not perform its core function—fighting and winning the nation’s wars—on a day-to-day basis. Commercial firms and many public sector organizations perform their core functions daily and measure actual performance on a routine basis. In contrast, militaries are like police, firefighters, emergency medical personnel, and other first-responders in that they measure their potential to provide their prescribed services to the nation or society when called upon.

47 Ibid.

48 Harry Mayer, First Responder Readiness: A Systems Approach to Readiness Assessment Using Model-Based Vulnerability Analysis Techniques, Masters’ Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005) describes first response organizations as those who maintain resources for both conduct and enabling of response operations. Response operations are activities in which an organization mobilizes and employs resources based on an emerging condition, such that the activities aim to negate or mitigate said condition and restore some form of status quo ante. Emergency medical personnel, police, firefighting, and militaries fall into this category. This text prefers the term preparedness organization as it reflects the ordinary state of the organization between response operations, a state of preparedness to respond to the next contingency.
Thus, militaries speak in terms of preparedness, which ostensibly measures their potential for success in combat when the nation calls. Preparedness is about answering what the military can do where and when from a defense enterprise standpoint, but this is more than just a military responsibility. Nationally, being prepared for war requires the whole of the defense enterprise—including the national infrastructure, the defense industrial base, the homeland, relationships with allies and partners, and anything else that the military requires to fight and win. Thus, preparedness provides a benchmark of confidence in the defense enterprise’s ability to address threats to national security interests.

The direct role for senior military leaders is ensuring the ability to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders, now and in the future. Thus, leaders use measures of readiness to analyze both the quality and quantity of forces available for operations. Readiness management systems provide the means for reliable and consistent analysis of personnel, equipment, and training statuses as both current snapshots and projected forward in time.49 Such measures are probabilistic, in that a unit at highest readiness is expected to perform in combat better than a unit at lowest readiness.50 This is an expectation based both on statistical analysis and combat experiences, and the enterprise designs the ratings to aid decision making. However, the ratings are still a best guess! It is not possible to know until a combat situation whether the higher readiness unit would actually perform better. Therefore, preparedness organizations contend with a significant amount of uncertainty and strive to reduce uncertainty and risk when possible.

Implications

The structure of the enterprise has implications for how DOD relates to external actors and conducts routine business. Two particularly important implications are provided below.

The Nation and Its Defense Enterprise are a ‘Two-Way Monopoly’

The defense enterprise and the nation operate in a relationship with only one provider, the enterprise as a monopoly, and only one client or buyer, the nation51 as a monopsony. The monopoly/monopsony relationship is also called a bilateral (or “two-way”) monopoly.52 Such relationships involve

50 Using the U.S. military’s C-ratings as an example, units at “C-1” would ordinarily outperform units at “C-4” on the battlefield, although this assumes that the rating assessment accurately reflects the anticipated performance. See Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995).
51 The “client” is represented by Congress in this case as Congress has sole authority to purchase defense capabilities and fund operations. It is true that the military takes strategic direction from the President, but Congress’ authority to control resources is more important from a defense management standpoint.
continuous bargaining, as both sides negotiate over the resources to be allocated for the defense function. Senior leaders in the defense enterprise will present unmet requirements to barter for more funding, while Congress must address constituent concerns across all government functions.

The need for continuous bargaining drives an almost insatiable need for more information and analysis to support one’s position. The professional military expertise and judgment of senior leaders are rarely enough on their own merits to influence stakeholder decisions, it requires support of a growing array of increasingly complex decision support processes and systems. Users of these systems are pressed for more comprehensive and real-time analysis, requiring greater quantities and reliability of data to justify a stance. The challenges posed to senior leaders is ensuring the validity and trustworthiness of such processes and systems, whereby the analysis and recommendations they give actually answers the questions posed to them. Hence, these processes and systems are constantly evolving to keep up with the demands of senior leaders fighting for its share of the federal budget.

An important implication is the difficulty defense managers’ face in exercising transformational change at the enterprise level. Transformational change often calls into question existing processes, systems, and information flow, leading to further bargaining with stakeholders. Even when the change is externally directed, as described in Chapter 1, stakeholders may constrain the defense managers’ abilities to transform enterprise processes and systems in kind.

**Dominance of Decision Support Systems**

Decisions at the enterprise level are more than just the output of a decision-making process. There are many decisions that precede it. For example, acquisition of a new capability involved decisions concerning the acceptance of a requirement; investment of resources to develop the technologies; judgments regarding the readiness of those technologies; authorities to test, evaluate, and field the capability; and all the budgetary moves along the way. Similarly, restructuring a service involves a string of decisions, including how to study the need to restructure, the assumptions to be used in modeling and simulations, interpreting the results, translating those results into options for re-organization and re-stationing, and then communicating the preferred choices to stakeholders. Each individual decision is likely to be controversial and face opposition, regardless of the rationality of the senior leaders’ choices.

Pursuing all these decisions is beyond human capacity alone. Thus, the enterprise makes systematic use of human and automated activities.

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91, no. 5 (October 1983): 765-800. They defined “bureau” as all executive branch Cabinet Departments in the U.S. Government and established that each has a bilateral monopoly with Congress although regulatory policymaking involves competition among the Departments.
to collect and analyze vast amounts of information, then collaborate with and build consensus on the outcomes among many internal and external stakeholders. Defense managers thus both automated systems and human-borne processes, to aid in decision making.

To foster consistency and efficiency in deriving decisions on complex matters, the enterprise employs numerous decision support activities. Decision support helps decisions get made while ensuring leaders have the information and analysis readily available so they can exercise their professional judgment. At the strategic level, the decision is more than the output of the process. There are many strategic decisions leading to that output, and because of the complexity of the decisions, leaders employ decision support activities throughout. To illustrate, decision scholars John King and Susan Star, provide five areas where senior leaders benefit from some form of decision support activity:

- **Recognition** of need for a decision. Some DOD decision support activities persistently monitor the environment and alert leaders when indicators of a problem appear. Leaders then decide whether to ignore the indicator or act. These can be automated systems (e.g., cyber) or routine collection of information from the field (e.g., readiness reporting).

- **Acquisition** of relevant information. This includes processes and systems to collect information and use modeling and simulation to test possible outcomes. The design of the simulation, including specifying assumptions, are all important decisions that influence the data sought and results generated. The Total Army Analysis process is an example, using modeling and simulation to analyze a programmed force structure against defense planning guidance.53

- **Sorting** (or labeling) of information as “important” and “unimportant.” A common example in DOD is the process of prioritizing requirements. Whether automated or done by human hands, this involves a lot of decision making that can anchor subsequent decisions.

- **Concluding deliberation** over the degree of import of pertinent information. For example in DOD, boards and working groups that review and validate analyses and options to be presented to the decision maker.

- **Establishment or ratification** of the “decision”; or the product of the process.54

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The usage of automation versus “human-in-the-loop” for decision-making is a decision unto itself. Military culture accepts technological solutions for accessing and organizing raw data in a routinized fashion to produce objective results or providing statistical analysis that interprets the data usefully. But the professional character of military organizations places great value in the exercise of human professional judgment to validate and certify such analyses. Properly designed simulation engines are capable of infusing national and senior leader guidance and feasibility criteria into the simulation, which theoretically would reduce or eliminate subsequent reviews leading to senior leader approval. Consequently, many enterprise decisions involve a series of reviews—often starting at the O-6/GS-15 level and progressing to steering committees at the general officer level before reaching final decision.

Although one would ordinarily desire a decision support process or system to be comprehensive, consistent, and efficient, they often are not. Most were designed to address a specific need at a particular time, and the need may have evolved since then. Many decision support activities were developed partly independently from one another and may overlap. Overlaps among defense, joint, and service processes are particularly challenging because the contexts often differ and each community can claim that its perspective is unique and requires protection and autonomy. Stakeholders, however, may challenge the efficiency of redundant levels of decision-making and press for centralization at the defense or joint levels.

Conclusion

For senior leaders whose prior experience is at the unit level of leadership, the tensions that arise out of the behaviors discussed in this chapter may appear foreign. Unit level leaders are more accustomed to making decisions based on their professional judgment and ability to draw from expert knowledge. At the enterprise level, this manner of decision making competes against the ‘business model’ of a public sector organization, and the continuous bargaining with external stakeholders that comes as a result. Moreover, the senior leader will become exposed to an ever expanding array of processes and systems to help justify new or changing requirements for military capabilities. Indeed, this is not corporate behavior, but it is also far different from unit behavior. The good news is that the behaviors of the defense enterprise and its interaction with the environment, while complex and quite challenging, can be explained and understood.

Defense managers, however, should not fall into the trap of muddling along with the process and lose sight of the big picture. Famed sociologist Max Weber wrote, “It is certain that there can be no work in political economy on any other than an altruistic basis... If our work is to retain any meaning it can only be informed by this: concern for the future, for those
who will come after us."\textsuperscript{55} The defense enterprise exists to help provide for the national defense. Bureaucracy helps this very large, complex organization do precisely that. It only succeeds when the corps of defense managers apply vision and longer time horizons and avoid being shackled under the constant churn of the moment.

Chapter 3. National-Level Challenges Affecting Defense

Douglas E. Waters

Officers and civilians moving into positions as strategic advisors at the enterprise level of the DOD face many challenges, even more so if they have had limited exposure to defense management issues, systems and processes in the past. It is challenge enough to master the internal tasks associated with the new position, including interactions with complex decision-support systems described in a unique acronym-centric vernacular seemingly designed to confuse the uninitiated. However, new strategic leaders within DOD also must increasingly focus on the external environment, where powerful interests, issues and stakeholders interact within a new and complex milieu. To succeed, senior leaders must be aware of the challenges and opportunities inherent to actors, systems and processes that overlay DOD, influence and guide internal personnel and systems, and shape the defense and military environment.

However, simple awareness of external issues is not sufficient. To fully appreciate the challenges associated with defense management at the strategic level, it is important to understand the overarching context in which DOD operates, and the tensions that are inherent within this complex environment, as a nuanced understanding of these entities can help provide insight into the how and why of external stakeholder behavior.

Some external stakeholders, systems and processes affect DOD more directly than others, and it is the challenges within these areas that are the focus of this chapter. First, the contextual challenge that shapes most governmental enterprise level decisions and actions is discussed—as understanding the political dimension that permeates Washington, DC is a prerequisite to effectively operating at senior levels within this environment. The congressional challenge is discussed next, as Congress, especially in its role in the Federal Budget process, has profound influence over DOD activities. Finally, challenges associated with two important stakeholders are discussed: the interagency challenge in its nexus with defense policy and strategy development; and implications, opportunities (and threats) associated with the media challenge—built on an uneasy and sometimes contentious relationship between the military and the media.

Contextual Challenge

Before exploring other external challenges, recognition of the environment that DOD and the Military Services operate in at the enterprise level is critical. Political considerations permeate the day-to-day thinking at senior levels within the U.S. Government to a degree not normally seen in subordinate DOD organizations, and this “political” aspect to decision-making may be somewhat disconcerting to career military officers. Merriam Webster defines politics as “activities that relate to influencing the actions and policies of a government or getting and keeping power in
Is it therefore unreasonable that presidents, their closest advisors, cabinet secretaries, heads of agencies and members of Congress think and act in a political way? Adding in the budgetary stakes (and organizational influence that goes with it), which are an order of magnitude higher in Washington, DC, only adds to this political dynamic. When one juxtaposes close to four trillion dollars in annual U.S. Government spending against a leading political scientist’s definition of Washington politics as “who gets what, when, how,” it is quite easy to understand the intense political focus.

While the professional military ethic stresses that service members should not be overtly political or participate in partisan political activities while serving in uniform, the reality is that all influential external systems that interface with the Defense Enterprise are inherently political in nature. Senior military officers must recognize this tension, become savvy of the political issues and nature of the decision-making processes, but do not presume to actively engage in political decision-making themselves. This is easier said than done. Samuel Huntington observed in The Soldier and the State that our very system of government draws military professionals into the political arena. However, as General George Marshall so eloquently stated, “Political factors may exercise a determining influence on military operations, therefore they must be given careful consideration. Yet soldiers must not assume to lead or to dictate in such matters.” Success in this arena mandates a sophisticated understanding of the political-military dimensions surrounding decision-making, but officers must ensure they do not cross the political Rubicon.

Congressional Challenge

The actions of Congress affect the defense manager’s day-to-day existence in significant ways. First, Congress has oversight authority over the Department of Defense, and this policy-making role has substantial influence over DOD’s structure and regulation. Even more significantly, Congress has the power of the purse. Congress exercises these authorities

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60 In 49 B.C., Julius Caesar violated long-standing Roman law and led his army across the Rubicon river into Rome, leading to civil war with Pompey and the Roman Senate; For a more detailed discussion of how to approach civil-military relations and providing best military advice within this political context, see William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making,” Parameters 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 13-26.
61 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8 and Section 9, Clause 7.
each year in the Federal Budget Process through development and passage of the *Defense Authorization and Defense Appropriation Acts*. Second, as with all its activities, Congress’s role in the budget process is intrinsically linked to the contextual challenge outlined above, and the ramifications from this are significant. In fact, the current and projected fiscal environment, its impact on the Federal Budget Process, and the seeming inability of national leadership to address it are arguably the biggest issues that DOD and the military face today.

While most of the focus is on the Congress when it comes to budgetary matters, the Federal Budget Process is conducted by both the Executive and Legislative branches of government using parallel and sequential sub-processes.62 This process is logical, but there are significant challenges associated with it for defense managers. For the process to work well, three things must occur: 1) spending and revenue amounts must be somewhat in balance to maintain fiscal sustainability in the years ahead; 2) the President and the Congress should adhere to statutory timelines so that appropriations acts are signed into law prior to the start of a new fiscal year; and 3) the President and both Houses of Congress must be able to achieve consensus or compromise. Unfortunately all three of these preconditions to a well-functioning and sustainable budgetary process have failed to hold in recent years.

**Increasing U.S. Debt**

Current and future projections of U.S. publicly-held debt indicate that spending and revenue amounts are not in balance. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) have used a 60 percent debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio as an international benchmark for fiscal sustainability, and the U.S. crossed that ratio for the first time since World War II in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 Great Recession and has remained there since.63 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) annually releases a long-term budgetary outlook that, barring any significant debt-reduction legislation, continues to project alarming debt to GDP ratios far in excess of U.S. historical highs.64 Simply put, the U.S. Government does not collect enough revenues to offset increasing outlays at a sustainable rate of deficit financing.65

62 For details concerning the federal budget process, see Harold W. Lord, *Authorization or Appropriation*, Faculty Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, April 16, 2012).


65 To stabilize debt, the U.S. Government cannot deficit spend at a level that exceeds nominal economic growth. See Donald B. Marron, “America in the Red,” *National Affairs*, no. 3
The growth in deficits and debt arises from increases in mandatory spending that are primarily due to an aging demographic, increasing health care costs, and rising interest payments on the debt.\textsuperscript{66} Indeed, accounts that resource all of the federal government except for Social Security, Health Care programs and interest on the debt are forecast to continue to decline well below historical norms if there is no change in mandatory programs and policies.\textsuperscript{67} This tension is significant, and while historically, DOD has seen its inflation-adjusted budget affected by recurring boom and bust cycles centered on wars or the perceived level of national security threat, senior defense leaders must recognize that the increasing debt is a new and potentially superseding variable that they will contend with well into the future.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{Timeliness}

The \textit{Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act} of 1974 (as amended by subsequent legislation) established the current Federal Budget Process including statutory timelines for both the President and Congress to meet.\textsuperscript{69} Meeting these timelines is critical to ensuring the passage of authorization and appropriations acts before the start of the fiscal year. Unfortunately, the President and especially Congress do not have a very good track record, with a trend towards increasing delays of late.\textsuperscript{70} Late appropriations acts resulting in Continuing Resolutions and the use of one-year Overseas Contingency Operations funding on an annual basis do not provide DOD with sufficiently stable funding to sustain and modernize capabilities and is an increasing challenge for defense planners. Continuing Resolutions in particular are an inefficient means to fund the DOD, as they result in prohibitions on funding for “new start” programs (and the inability to terminate activities); deferred training, travel and maintenance; contracting delays and short duration contracts that can drive up costs; hiring freezes and other personnel management inefficiencies; among others.\textsuperscript{71} This subject has been repeatedly raised with Congress during annual posture and budget hearings.\textsuperscript{72} This, coupled with the continuing specter

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\textsuperscript{66} Congressional Budget Office, \textit{The 2017 Long-Term Budget Outlook}, 1-3.  \\
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 16.  \\
\textsuperscript{68} Todd Harrison, \textit{Analysis of the FY 2015 Defense Budget} (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, September 4, 2014), 15.  \\
\textsuperscript{70} Todd Harrison, \textit{Looking Beyond the Fog Bank: Fiscal Challenges Facing Defense} (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Backgrounder, April 2013), 1. The article has data through FY13. Number of days late in enacting defense appropriations FY14 to FY 17 (Congress.gov data): 109, 75, 77 and 186 days, respectively. Average number of days late since FY10: 123 days.  \\
\end{flushright}
of sequestration cuts per the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA), all degrade multi-year stability in plans and budgets and thwart effective and efficient strategic planning.

**Increasing Polarization**

The atmosphere surrounding the White House and Congress has always involved spirited political debate; however, in recent years the amount of partisan activity seems to have increased. Indeed, the Pew Research Center has documented an increasing level of polarization within the Congress, accompanied by a collapse of the middle, more moderate, membership within both parties. Some have attributed this to the gerrymandering of Congressional districts, however, not all agree, and while gerrymandering may have some impact within the House of Representatives, the Senate has managed to become sharply divided without it. This polarization seems to be more aligned with the diverging political views and vision of the electorate, especially those who are more politically engaged, which the Congressional membership merely reflects.

This division clearly has negative implications for the proper functioning of the budget process, and therefore has direct impact on the ability of the military to plan for the future. As Representative Jeb Hensarling, co-chair of the 2011 Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (known as the “Super Committee”) assessed, “Ultimately, the committee did not succeed because we could not bridge the gap between two dramatically competing visions of the role government should play in a free society, the proper purpose and design of the social safety net, and the fundamentals of job creation and economic growth.” Failure to find common ground and meet deficit reduction targets was the trigger that ultimately resulted in the 2013 sequestration cuts (per the 2011 BCA), which had a significant negative effect on DOD accounts (operational readiness in particular).

**Congressional Challenge Implications**

What does this increasing debt, lack of a stable budgetary process, and political polarization mean for DOD? It further complicates an already

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75 The Pew research indicates that the majority of U.S. citizens have not become dramatically more polarized (i.e., are still centrist in outlook), but politically engaged citizens, and thus the parties, have indeed done so. Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” June 12, 2014, http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ (accessed January 26, 2016).

daunting task: aligning the ends of defense strategy with ways and means within an environment comprised of powerful stakeholders with differing goals and incentives. The unstable and uncertain annual budget cycle, coupled with a divided political class, forces senior leader focus primarily toward securing sustainable resource levels, and exacerbates an unbalanced strategy development process within DOD that is already criticized as too means-driven or overtaken by means decisions. While senior leaders within DOD cannot directly control this dynamic, they can (and have tried) to explain to Congress and the President the impact that it has on DOD’s ability to plan. Smart, focused engagement of key Congressional leaders and their staff, with the intent of establishing solid working relationships and trust between DOD leadership and Congress, can potentially help to shape congressional decisions in a more positive direction. However, the current political divide between the parties makes this much more difficult than it would have been in the past.

Defense managers must also appreciate the perspective of members of Congress, who are in Washington to represent their constituents (and won’t be after the next election cycle if they fail to do so). Many service members regard this as a purely parochial dynamic that is somewhat distasteful and ultimately harmful to the national security of the country. However, Congress is doing the job demanded of it by voters, and in many instances what some might view as parochial activity has legitimate strategic considerations (such as preservation of the industrial base, troop morale, innovative technology development) above and beyond the local impact. While DOD leaders and staff will never eliminate the need for Congressional members to directly serve their constituents’ interests (even when they are counter to DOD priorities), establishing good working relationships with Congress and providing solid advice and information on military needs and capabilities is the best means to influence Congressional actions in a positive direction.

**Interagency Challenge**

The political context associated with strategic level decision-making influences high-level interactions between Department of Defense leadership and other key stakeholders, and interagency cooperation (or lack thereof) is clearly shaped by this dynamic. This can be problematic, as

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78 The history of political polarization in the U.S. shows that more often than not, it has been the norm. The post WWII/Cold War period of significant numbers of moderates in both parties may well have been an anomaly due to the geo-strategic and domestic issues of the time. However, a return to partisanship at this time is problematic, as the debt issue requires action – action that can only come through compromise or, alas, forced by a crisis. See David W. Brady and Hahrie Han, “Our Politics May be Polarized. But That’s Nothing New,” _The Washington Post_, January 16, 2014, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/16/our-politics-may-be-polarized-but-thats-nothing-new/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/16/our-politics-may-be-polarized-but-thats-nothing-new/) (accessed January 12, 2016).
senior leaders within the interagency generally depend on gaining consensus with other involved Departments and Agencies, and frequently cannot attain their organizational objectives or generate a whole-of-government solution without the cooperation of other external stakeholders. Those involved in interagency deliberations by necessity need to be subject matter experts within their own fields to be credible, but to be truly effective, they also must possess knowledge and ability to deal with bureaucratic politics and strong idiosyncratic personalities. Other tensions are also in play, as differing organizational cultures, agency approaches, resourcing levels and battles over turf and “who is in charge” complicate interagency coordination and cooperation.

Each Department and Agency has unique mission areas, and unsurprisingly, distinct organizational cultures. Differing assumptions about how problems should be approached can be a recipe for misunderstandings and conflict if these significant cultural differences are not accounted for. For example, the Departments of State and Defense dominate the national security realm, and “the former uses words to solve problems while the latter uses force packages.” Additionally, other agencies lack a robust planning function, and also have far less discretion over their budgets and programs than does the military. This can foster suspicion of DOD involvement in their traditional areas of expertise, as interagency partners may fear being overwhelmed by the quick pace of operational planning and the significant resource delta that exists between DOD and other agencies. On the other hand, other agencies frequently look to military budgets for resources when they lack the capacity to act by themselves.

Relationships and personalities matter, and within the interagency reliance on key associations forged over time are frequently the only means to gain organizational objectives when decisions and outcomes are in the hands of stakeholders outside the normal chain of command. Subject matter expertise, a full understanding of the relevant issues, awareness of other organizational positions and priorities, and the ability to foster consensus are essential in interagency deliberations.

Media Challenge

The media presents a separate challenge for defense managers and the military. The military and the media are both powerful institutions, whose natures and goals are fundamentally in tension with each other, resulting in an uneasy relationship that is frequently characterized by mistrust. This mistrust results in a military culture that, especially since the Vietnam War, tends to view the media negatively and promotes avoidance

80 Ibid., 36.
behavior between members of the military and the press. While this tendency is understandable, it is also counter-productive. The media and the military need each other, and the establishment of good relations with prominent members of the press is critically important for defense managers and their senior leaders. The military wants to get its message out, and the media represents the primary means to transmit organizational messages to the public at large. Also, the media is going to report on military and national security matters, as it views public awareness of governmental operations and decision-making as a central tenet of its purpose within a democratic republic. Avoiding reporters (or worse alienating them) will only result in inaccurate (and potentially negative) press coverage that can shape public and Congressional opinion to the detriment of U.S. government policy objectives. As military historian Douglas Porch stated:

*The tendency of unprepared reporters, charging from crisis to crisis, unaware of the issues at stake or of how the military functions, is to frame complex matters in simplistic ways – or even to indulge in “gotcha” journalism (focusing on errors and mis-statements). For its part, the military owes access to information both to Congress and the American people. Furthermore, it needs to get its story out – for the military will be competing with other groups, and enemies, eager to put their “spin” on events. To do this, it needs the media.*

Establishing good media relationships is hard work, but it is imperative for senior leaders and their staffs to make the effort. Whether it is getting the message out to the public and Congress about the latest DOD initiative or providing human interest memes to help foster positive impressions of life in the military, the media is a critical conduit. When a crisis unfolds, leaders and spokespersons who have established solid relationships and trust with journalists may see stories and newscasts that are framed in a more positive light (or at least containing the organization’s side of the story). While certainly not a panacea that automatically results in good press coverage, failure to establish relationships that engender trust with the media is likely to come back and haunt an organization and its leadership.

**Implications for Defense Managers**

The political context and challenges associated with defense management at the DOD enterprise level do not exist in separate silos; in fact, as components of complex systems, they interact and influence, sometimes in unpredictable ways. However, a nuanced understanding of the actors,

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82 A good example of this was the Navy’s handling of the USS Greeneville collision with the Japanese Trawler *Ehime Maru*. See John Byron, “Commentary: A Public Relations Disaster,” *Proceedings* 127 (April 2001): 2.

83 Porch, “No Bad Stories,” 104.

processes and dynamics of the external environment can help in prediction, and this is why it is important that new defense managers work to gain this strategic perspective.

Strategic leaders spend much more time looking outside their organizations than do lower-level leaders, scanning for trends, anticipating problems and opportunities, and shaping the environment in order to better posture their organizations for success.\(^\text{85}\) Strategic advisors and defense managers need to do the same. The political context influences most major decisions in Washington, DC—be aware of this and use that knowledge to anticipate key stakeholder actions and reactions. Understand that interagency partners come from different organizations with distinct cultures, approaches to problems and concerns about protecting turf, and make concrete efforts to establish relationships and trust to facilitate consensus-building and effective policy development.

The media, like the political context, influences all the actors and systems at this level, and the strategic importance of incorporating solid media relations and strategy into decision-making goes well beyond the implications for crisis response or routine public affairs information transfer. Public opinion within the U.S. is greatly influenced by the media, as are the opinions of DOD’s most important stakeholders. This has significant ramifications across the DOD Enterprise, including sustaining the AVF, increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes during Congressional engagement and minimizing misunderstandings over intent by other interagency stakeholders. Members of Congress will respond to engaged constituents far quicker than they will the latest senior leader strategic narrative delivered during a routine office call. Understand this dynamic, and factor it into your thinking. The media should not be an afterthought, and reporters should not be avoided; the media should be viewed as a strategic opportunity.\(^\text{86}\)

An appreciation of political context and the challenges associated with the Congress, the interagency and the media should be important to those moving into positions as strategic advisors for very practical reasons as well. Simply put, failure to appreciate the strategic environment, key actors and issues that enterprise level leaders must grapple with can quickly get a senior staff officer or civilian sidelined as someone who “doesn’t get it.” In order to be effective within the Pentagon or other strategic-level billets, advisors must be able to see and anticipate issues that are relevant and compelling for their strategic-level leaders. A failure to understand the political dimensions of a decision, the probable negative reaction of a key


\(^\text{86}\) The author is not suggesting Information Operations directed at the American public and Congress! However, an ethical and honest engagement with the media over time can be viewed as a strategic opportunity. See William B. Caldwell, Shawn Stroud, and Anton Menning, “Fostering a Culture of Engagement,” Military Review 89, no. 5 (September-October 2009): 10.
stakeholder, or the necessity to anticipate and shape the media’s coverage of a controversial proposal can result in recommendations and actions that would be counterproductive to the organization’s interests. This will not go unnoticed by leadership.\textsuperscript{87}

**Conclusion**

Working at the strategic level, either as principals or as a member of their staffs, requires an appreciation of the importance and influence of external stakeholders, systems and processes. These entities offer challenges, but knowledge of national security processes, key stakeholders to engage, and the ability to generate consensus is critical to success at senior levels. Being comfortable with the political context and how it shapes decisions at the National level, coupled with an appreciation of the need to understand and develop relationships with members and professional staff in Congress, interagency partners and the media will facilitate successful navigation of the external challenges at DOD’s enterprise level.

\textsuperscript{87} This section is derived from the author’s experiences working in the Pentagon in strategic-level staff positions. For another similar perspective, see Smith, *Assignment – Pentagon*, 36.
According to Title 10, U.S. Code, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) is the “principal assistant to the President” and has authority over the DOD.\textsuperscript{88} The SecDef’s responsibilities include providing guidance to the military departments on priorities, programs, budgets, contingency planning, national security objectives and policies, and projected resource levels. Additionally, the SecDef is given direction from Congress and is required to submit periodic reports (usually annual) on a wide range of subjects including: assessment of threats; U.S., Allied and adversary military capabilities; the cost of stationing U.S. forces in foreign countries. The DOD is generally organized to assist the secretary in the execution of these responsibilities.

This chapter discusses the organization of the DOD and two major processes unique to it that garner and allocate resources and manage the acquisition of major equipment systems. The first is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) which exercises \textit{program budgeting} to allocate resources over time against multi-year programs, ostensibly to deliver capabilities to the joint force on schedule and within the budget.\textsuperscript{89} The chapter discusses both PPBES and the challenges of effective program budgeting. The second is the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) that governs acquisition of weapons systems and other goods and services at DOD level. The military’s preferences for cutting-edge capabilities to stay ahead of adversaries makes weapon systems acquisition very complex and often subject to the pace of technological progress. Therefore, acquisition at DOD level is subject to different pressures than unit-level contracting, where the requirements are easier to define and the capacity of the private sector is more measurable. This chapter will address some of those challenges.

\textbf{The Department of Defense}

\textit{Organization of the DOD}

The DOD is an evolving organization. Figure 3. Department of Defense Organizational Structure (November 2017) provides a macro level view as of November 2017.

\textsuperscript{88} Title 10 – Armed Forces, Sec 113. Secretary of Defense, \url{http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/113}.

\textsuperscript{89} For more information on the origins and meaning of \textit{program budgeting} (often used synonymously with programming), see David Novick, \textit{Origin and History of Program Budgeting} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1966). This is a transcript of a talk given to the U.S. Bureau of the Budget and U.S. Civil Service Commission for training on the then-Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
The Office of the SecDef is a large, complex organization unto itself. Its primary roles include policy development, planning, programming, budgeting and fiscal policy, and program execution and evaluation. These responsibilities are divided functionally among five Under Secretaries and a number of Assistant Secretaries. Subordinate to OSD are 19 defense agencies and 8 DOD field activities, most of which are under direct supervision of an Under Secretary. For example, the Defense Health Agency falls under the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, while the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency answers to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Of note, eight defense agencies are designated as combat support agencies (CSAs) and come under joint oversight by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Staff is depicted at the right of the figure, showing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the Joint Staff. Meanwhile, ten

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90 Figure adapted by authors from U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Organizational Structure,” PowerPoint Presentation, October 4, 2017.

91 Under Secretaries are directly subordinate to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and identified as Level III rank according to Title 5 of the U.S. Code, Section 5314, while Assistant Secretaries are Level IV per Section 5315. In 2017, there were five Under Secretaries – Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO), Intelligence (USD(I)), Personnel & Readiness (USD(P&R)), and Policy (USD(P)).

92 Exceptions include the Defense Information Systems Agency who answers to the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the Defense Legal Services Agency who answers to the General Counsel (GC). Both the CIO and GC are Level IV positions.

combatant commands answer directly to the Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman having a coordinating responsibility. The combatant commands include six geographic combatant commands with responsibilities for coordinating, planning, and oversight of U.S. military activities (land, sea, and airspace) in a geographic region designated by the Unified Command Plan and four functional combatant commands with global responsibilities in a particular functional area. Joint systems and processes will be further described in Chapter 5.

The three military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) oversee four services, with the Marine Corps under the Department of the Navy. Service-level systems and processes are described in Chapter 6.

**Defense Processes**

*Defense processes* are defined as those conducted under the control of OSD as opposed to those where the primary responsibility lies with the Joint Staff (i.e., *joint processes*). The military departments, services and combatant commands generally participate in both defense and joint processes.

Figure 4. Three Major DOD Decision Support Systems shows three vital decision support systems that contribute to the development of military capability—OSD owns the PPBES and the DAS while the Joint community owns the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS). The two OSD systems are presented in this chapter, focusing on the purposes and outputs, and the senior officials managing the processes rather than the details of the processes themselves.

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**Figure 4. Three Major DOD Decision Support Systems**

*Resources*
- Planning, Programming, Budget & Execution System (PPBES)
  - “calendar driven”
  - Oversight by Deputy Secretary of Defense

*Requirements*
- Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS)
  - “needs driven”
  - Oversight by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    (see Chapter 5)

*Materiel Development*
- Defense Acquisition System (DAS)
  - “event driven”
  - Oversight by the Milestone Decision Authority

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94 U.S. Cyber Command became the tenth combatant command, achieving Initial Operating Capability as of November 2017.

95 Chart drawn by authors based on instructional material used in the U.S. Army War
Programming Within DOD and the PPBES

What is Programming?

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara introduced DOD programming in the early 1960s - to link strategic plans to budgets.\(^96\) Programming (also known as program budgeting) is deeply ingrained in defense culture, governing DOD allocation of resources across all defense functions.

According to William F. West in his book on program budgeting, programs encapsulate “activities and spending in terms of their contributions to organizational goals,” and are structured to allow “decision makers to compare different activities and units that serve common goals.”\(^97\) Charles Hitch, one of the architects of PPBES, declared that programs served two purposes: (1) to constrain plans within fiscal constraints, and (2) to force annual budgets to follow plans, not drive them.\(^98\) Since McNamara’s time, the ‘program’ has become the primary unit of analysis for military financial activities and it is the method DOD uses to present its request for appropriations to Congress.

A 2007 review on utilization of program budgeting in government offered four different uses of a program:\(^99\)

(1) “As a tool of policy analysis, program budgeting facilitates comparison and evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of alternative spending options that have the same objectives.

(2) As a means of improving government performance by giving managers operating discretion.

(3) It facilitates accounting for the full cost of government activities.

(4) It enables the government to plan ahead and set spending priorities.”

In the early days of programming, usage (1) was dominant, particularly as it pertained to evaluating both the purposes of programs themselves and clarifying which programs fit within the roles and missions of

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98 Hitch. 258.
the services. In fact, one of the architects of PPBS said that establishing programs are ways of making policy because the objectives of the program are variable. Usage (2) is very relevant for defense managers. Rather than Congress dictating precisely where each dollar goes, they provide broad authorities in the form of Major Force Programs that encapsulate activities involving a particular DOD force or support mission. Thus, program budgeting allows flexibility as planning changes or execution runs into difficulties. Uses (3) and (4) have become prevalent in more modern times as the U.S. balances increasing fiscal pressures on the federal budget (see Chapter 3) with the growing diversity of national security threats.

**Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES)**

The PPBES is the current system used in OSD to align defense strategy with resources. The DOD executes this process in the context of the annual federal budgeting process. Its outputs, the DOD input to the annual President’s Budget and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), are the basis for the annual Defense Authorizations and Appropriations Acts passed by Congress. In the late winter of each year, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides each Executive Branch Department guidance and a fiscal budget allocation (referred to as the top line) based on economic and political analysis and the President’s priorities for the coming year’s budget to be submitted in early February of the next year. From this guidance and top line, the DOD begins its PPBES process.

Table 1. Key Documents and Products of PPBES (October 2017) lists the documents and products associated with the four phases.

**Planning Phase.** The Planning phase is done in the context of several strategic guidance documents that are published periodically (not annually) that may be in effect when OMB issues its budget guidance. These documents include the National Security Strategy published by the National Security Council, the Defense Strategy Review published by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) required by statute to be published every four years, and the National Military Strategy (NMS) published by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). There may be other formal and informal guidance given to DOD by the President or SecDef that may affect this planning effort. The CJCS provides advice to the SecDef in the form of the Chairman’s Program Recommendation. This advice is based on input

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1. West, **Program Budgeting**, 12.
4. PPBES has gone through several name changes since its inception as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in the 1960s. Lord, “**Defense Resource Management: PPBE**,” 01:45-02:45.
5. This was formerly called the **Quadrennial Defense Review**.
from Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs through several periodic assessments which are explained in Chapter 5. The outputs of the planning phase include the SecDef issuing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and Fiscal Guidance (FG) to the Military Departments and defense agencies. The DPG is normally published by April of each year and initiates planning and programming by the subordinate departments and agencies.

### Table 1. Key Documents and Products of PPBES (October 2017)

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<th>Phase</th>
<th>DOD Lead</th>
<th>Key Documents</th>
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| Planning    | USD(P)   | **Inputs**: strategy documents (e.g., National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy Review, National Military Strategy); Chairman’s advice; formal or informal guidance from the President.  
**Products**: Defense Planning Guidance (OSD) & Fiscal Guidance to military departments and agencies (OMB)  
**Next Steps**: Departments and agencies develop and provide service Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) |
| Programming | CAPE     | **Inputs**: POMs; Chairman’s Program Assessment  
**Products**: SecDef Resource Management Decisions directed to the services; adjudication of all programming decisions; POMs adjusted |
| Budgeting   | USD(C)   | **Inputs**: Final adjusted POMs  
**Products**: Defense budget – input to the Presidential Budget |
| Execution   | USD(C)   | **Inputs**: Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts  
**Products**: Obligations; re-programming requests |

**Programming Phase.** The Programming Phase follows the development of the Program Objective Memoranda (POM) by the departments and agencies, the review of those programs by OSD and the Chairman, and the Program Review process where issues are raised and resolved. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) oversees this phase of the PPBE. The CAPE monitors development of the departments and agencies’ POMs, reviews them when submitted to OSD in September, and leads the program review for OSD. Additionally, the Chairman, through the Joint Staff, provides the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) to the SecDef where he advises the Secretary on component adherence to the DPG and FG. Another consideration concerns changes in the environ-

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106 Table prepared by authors.
ment (political, threat, etc.) that have occurred since the DPG and FG were issued in April and the POMs were submitted in September. OSD has the ability during the Program Review to enact changes to the programs based on these contingencies.

Along with the their POMs, all participants can submit issues for OSD consideration—changes in the environment, appeals for changes in priorities, fiscal or other concerns affecting program execution in current or upcoming fiscal years. CAPE evaluates and sorts these issues into functional groups and manages issue teams from the military departments, agencies, OSD, and the Joint Staff that discuss and make recommendations on the issues for ultimate consideration by the SecDef.

**Budgeting Phase.** The Budgeting Phase begins when the Service POMs are submitted to OSD. The POMs are translated from programming language and formatted into the Congressional budget format required for submission of the President’s Budget in February of each year. USD (Comptroller) has the lead in OSD for the Budgeting Phase. Once the Service POMs are finalized based on SecDef decisions, the budget is completed and submitted to OMB for inclusion in the PB.

**Execution Phase.** The Execution Phase begins when Congress appropriates money to DOD and the Services and technically ends when appropriated dollars are obligated, spent, and tracked by the Service and OSD comptrollers and reports are submitted to Congressional committees. During this phase, most appropriations are spent according to Congressional authorizations and for the appropriated purpose. DOD senior leaders can re-purpose appropriated money below certain modest thresholds or with Congressional approval (called re-programming). This occurs when appropriated money can no longer be spent for its intended purpose or because of changes in the circumstances or in priorities. DOD generally submits all re-programming requests for a given fiscal year to the Congress at the same time in an omnibus request.\(^{107}\)

**Concurrent Nature of PPBE Phases.** At any given time of the fiscal year, multiple phases of the PPBE are occurring simultaneously. The Execution Phase is on-going every day of the fiscal year. The Planning Phase usually begins before the PB is submitted for the previous year and likely before the Service Programs have been completed. In any case, while the SecDef, Chairman, JCS, Service Secretaries and Chiefs are defending the current Presidential Budget and Service POMs before Congress, the Services are preparing the next POM for submission. This can be confusing for senior leaders and staff officers especially if there are major changes from one program to the next.

**Implications**

As the above suggests, PPBES is exhaustive and constant, consum-

\(^{107}\) There is no specified timeline, but generally these occur later in the fiscal year.
ing considerable organizational energy at all levels of DOD. It is easy for participants to be captured by the process and lose sight of the purpose they are trying to achieve. The challenge for senior leaders is to transcend the short-term demands of the system and maintain a strategic long-term view. In a RAND report, David Chu and Nurith Berstein offered some questions that the defense enterprise must be designed to confront.  

![Calendar Date](image)

**Figure 5. Concurrent Nature of PPBE Phases**

- What set of forces should the country maintain? How should forces be organized? Under what command structure?
- What training should forces receive? How ready should they be, and for what?
- With what equipment should forces be armed? In what condition should equipment be maintained?
- What tempo of operation should forces be prepared to maintain?

Another possible set of questions is posed by defense budget analysts L. R. Jones and Jeffrey McCaffrey in a critique of attempted PPBES reforms in the 2000s. The wording of the questions clearly cue defense man-

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109 Figure prepared by authors.
agers to critically examine the information that flows through PPBES.\footnote{L. R. Jones and Jerry L. McCaffery, “Reform of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems and Management Control in the U.S. Department of Defense: Insights from Budget Theory,” \textit{Public Budgeting and Finance} 25, no. 3 (2005): 1-19.}

- How does the military know that a particular strategic plan is suitable toward meeting stated national security requirements?
- How does it know that a given program is satisfying the plan?
- How do we know that a given budget is providing the necessary means at the right time?

Congressional stakeholders ask similar questions of PPBES’ outputs at each phase. In addition to the information and advice provided by defense managers, Members can tap two non-partisan agencies to conduct research—the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).\footnote{CRS reports are on request by Members and are not ordinarily released to the public. However, many non-confidential reports are available through the Internet. All unclassified GAO reports are released to the public and available at \url{http://www.gao.gov} (accessed 19 December 2017).} The former focuses on policy and legal analyses while the latter focuses on federal spending and program performance. Their reports are useful resources for defense managers exercising stewardship of the profession, providing insights into the efficacy of military plans and programs and their alignment with policy.

\textbf{Acquisition and the Defense Acquisition System}

Very little of what DOD consumes in goods and services is produced internally. Instead, it spends billions of dollars annually to acquire the materiel required to provide the capabilities needed by the military services to execute the NMS. This level of spending elicits high levels of scrutiny from Congress and the public (through the national press) resulting in a complex system of oversight, accountability and risk reduction measures.

\textit{What is Acquisition?}

\textit{Acquisition} is the process by which DOD procures goods and services, primarily from the private sector through contracting or purchase agreements. But while the Federal Acquisition Regulation and hosts of laws, policies, and regulations govern defense contracts, they do not always suggest whether or not contracting is the best answer, nor do they help assess the quality of a contract. Metaphorically speaking, they build the contract vehicles, but do not teach leaders how to drive them.

How acquisition is supposed to work is simple. \textit{When DOD desires goods and services in support of requirements, it exercises a fair and equitable competitive bidding process to select a vendor, leading to the negotiation of a contractual agreement at reasonable cost to the taxpayer while meeting specifications and timelines acceptable to DOD.} In practice, however, each phrase belies
challenges and tensions that should raise questions in the minds senior leaders during an acquisition.

The phrases “desired goods and services,” “fair and equitable competitive bidding process,” “reasonable cost,” and “meeting specifications and timelines” are what make government acquisition problematic. The nature of the U.S. defense industry includes a small number of viable companies able to produce the materiel, equipment, and services that meet DOD requirements. These companies are essentially partners with DOD and are involved in the requirements process (identifying what is feasible) and in the cost estimations provided in government contracts. Defense companies are very active in lobbying members of Congress trying to influence (legally) what capabilities are contracted for and under what conditions. Therefore, they are involved in determining what the DOD “requires,” how “fair and equitable” the competition is, and what is a “reasonable cost.”

The Defense Acquisition System (DAS)

In the context of Federal Acquisition Regulations that pertain to all federal government entities, the DAS is governed by DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System and DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. The objectives of the DAS are to procure the most effective capabilities for the lowest cost in a timely manner. This is complicated by an environment of constantly changing threats, rapidly evolving science and technology innovations, Congressional interest in where the money is invested and spent, an unstable and uncertain budget, and consideration of the viability of the domestic industrial base. Additionally, DOD or its departments and agencies may change requirements for internal reasons. These factors cause compromises within and between programs that result in less capable systems that take longer to develop and that are more costly. All of this is contrary to the goals of the system.

The DAS establishes the prerequisites for an acquisition program to exist: (a) valid military requirement (need), (b) money budgeted, and (c) reasonable expectation that the procured item(s) can be manufactured and fielded. In general, decisions regarding the need for capability development are made by uniformed military leaders, specifically the Chairman, JCS and the Service Chiefs.112 The PPBES governs the programming and expenditure of money for programs. The DAS, therefore, governs the development, testing, manufacture and fielding of materiel systems. Decisions in the PPBE and DAS are the purview of civilian political appointees with the advice of uniformed military leaders.

A full explanation of the DAS is beyond the scope of this Primer, however Figure 6. Key Phases and Milestone Decisions in the DAS summarizes key phases and milestone decisions along with representative activities.

112 Military requirements are governed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS), discussed in Chapter 5.
The DAS is a deliberate system designed to identify and minimize risk at each step with a goal of procuring the best available capability at the lowest cost while adhering to a reasonable schedule. With “best available capability” as the default priority, many programs spend more money than anticipated over a longer period of time in order to maximize the performance of procured weapons systems. When budgets are tight, program timelines may be relaxed or procured amounts reduced to push current costs into the future. When the capability need is more urgent, programs may accept less capability, spend more money or both to meet tighter timelines. Acquisition executives (politically appointed civilians for major or costly programs) make a series of Milestone Decisions, described in Figure 3, to move a program from one phase to another. Passing the Milestone A decision requires rigorous analysis of alternative solutions and needed technologies to show they are ready for development. Milestone B decisions include thorough analyses of technological readiness, cost, and defense industry capacity (in the form of prototypes). At Milestone C, the decision is made that the desired capability can be effectively manufactured, tested against detailed performance standards, and prepared for fielding to the force. These decisions are often delayed because of slower than expected technology development or integration, failure to meet performance standards under operational conditions, manufacturing problems or erosion of financial commitment to the program. These delays result in a perception that the DAS is slow or unresponsive, and why there have been regular delays.

113 Chart developed by authors based on Defense Acquisition University, “Defense Acquisition Life Cycle Compliance Baseline (Pre-Tailoring),” April 18, 2017, linked from the DAU Home Page, DAU.mil (accessed January 19, 2018).
calls for its reform.\textsuperscript{114} Operational needs requiring expedited development or purchase of goods that cannot wait for DAS, lead to the development of complementary processes for rapid fielding.\textsuperscript{115} This leads to further questions about reform of this process.

One question regards the conditions under which leaders continue or cancel programs that have progressed through DAS, such as being a program of record (i.e., passed Milestone B)? By the time a program of record is established, DOD has invested considerable resources to analyze it and manage risk. Congress has probably shown interest. The rapid emergence of better solutions may challenge the validity of the program on the surface, but may induce hidden costs or risks that have yet to be analyzed. Moreover, the need to replace or cancel a program may be politically or emotionally charged, complicating the leaders’ decisions. Unfortunately, these can only be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

Another question regards whether or not rapid fielding should be the normal process. DAS was formed when the military clearly had the technological lead and did not face direct competition for scientific and industrial superiority. The advent of modern smartphone technologies, sophisticated drones, and other capabilities being developed in the private sector have been game changers, causing the military to rely more on off-the-shelf solutions. Rapid fielding capitalizes on such existing and emerging technologies. Traditional weapon systems programs taking decades to develop and field do not seem attractive by comparison. However, rapid fielding incurs greater risk in sustainment, interoperability, and unforeseen vulnerabilities—e.g., cyberattack. Does rapid fielding signal the decline of proprietary development in DOD, or do the risks suggest the opposite?

Finally, there is consideration of the defense industrial base. National Security professionals argue that a strong industrial base is vital to national security. After decades of consolidation, the options available for developing new militarily-unique systems is limited, and budgetary constraints makes such development potentially less profitable. Consequently, preserving such a base is critical, but must be done properly. Senior leaders should not confine this perspective to a per-program basis and maintain the strategic view of overall health and sustainment of the industrial base so it has the capability and capacity to mobilize to address large-scale war.


\textsuperscript{115} For example, JEON/JUON and COTS purchases.
Military leaders at many levels have used systems and processes in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation while simultaneously preparing to meet future challenges. This chapter will first examine the statutory responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (abbreviated CJCS, also referred as “Chairman”) along with an overview of the joint systems and process that help execute these responsibilities and address future challenges in concert with other leaders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Defense Department organizations. The Chairman’s Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is used to develop the Chairman’s formal strategic guidance and advice documents, while providing insights to shape his informal advice to the Secretary of Defense (Sec Def) and President. It then examines the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (VCJCS or “Vice Chairman”) key responsibilities and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s (JROC) key processes. This council provides resource and acquisition advice to the Chairman and Defense leaders on key issues and makes decisions on lower level acquisition programs. Both the Chairman’s planning system and JROC’s processes take guidance from civilian leaders and provide direction to operationalize this guidance across the joint force. The chapter will conclude by providing three key leadership insights on the use of strategic planning systems and processes.

**Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Responsibilities**

Congress specified the Chairman’s formal responsibilities in Title 10 US Code, Section 153, under the following descriptive subheadings: (1) Strategic Direction; (2) Strategic and Contingency Planning; (3) Global Military Integration; (4) Comprehensive Joint Readiness; (5) Joint Capability Development; (6) Joint Force Development Activities and (7) Other Matters. These responsibilities were a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), which many consider the most significant defense legislation since the War II. The GNA served to:

- Strengthen civilian authority
- Improve military advice to civilian leaders
- Place more responsibility and authority on combatant commanders to accomplish their missions

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(accessed March 20, 2018). While the Chairman’s key responsibilities are outlined in § 153, there are other responsibilities in § 117, 118, 153, 163, 165, 166 and 181, plus 22 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C.

• Increase attention on strategy formulation and contingency planning
• Provide for more efficient resource use; improve joint officer policies, and
• Enhance the effectiveness of military operations.118

The 2018 Chairman’s Instruction describes JSPS as, “the method by which the CJCS fulfills his statutory responsibilities, maintains a global perspective, and develops military advice.”119 Briefly, it integrates the processes and guidance from people and organizations above the Chairman (President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council), and people and organizations he coordinates with (Services, Combatant Commanders and Agency Directors). The Chairman has neither control over any significant defense resources (the Secretary of Defense, Services, and Agencies control resources) nor direct control of operational military forces (Combatant Commanders control operational forces). However, orders to those forces are processed through the Chairman.120 The Chairman formally influences civilian leaders and those he coordinates with through the JSPS. In addition to influencing leaders, this system provides specific direction for the many staffs that support them. As such, the JSPS formally integrates the Nation’s strategy, plans, and resources from a joint, integrated, and global military perspective.

A way to envision the JSPS is how it operationalizes the Chairman’s six responsibilities identified in Title 10 US Code, Section 153.121 Each of the Title 10 responsibilities and key documents related to these areas are summarized in Table 2. Responsibilities, Components, and Purposes of the Joint Strategic Planning System was developed from an enclosure in the 2018 CJCSI.122


119 U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Strategic Planning System, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), Draft - 3100.01D (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2018); Figure 1; A-2. Hereafter CJCSI 3100.01D. Information in this chapter is taken from this draft CJCSI forwarded to the author by the Joint Staff in March 2018 to update an earlier version of this chapter that used the 2015 JSPS Instruction.

120 Richard M Meinhart, Joint Strategic Planning System Insights: Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990 to 2012 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2013), 5 and 29.

121 Structurally, the JSPS underwent a major change in 2018, but the new Chairman’s Instruction was not yet published at press time. For almost a decade prior to 2018, the Chairman’s JSPS was organized under an assess, advise, direct and execute framework with associated responsibilities, processes, and products identified under each area. The forthcoming Instruction directly links the joint strategic planning system’s components to these Title 10 responsibilities. This chapter is based on the draft 2018 revision. See CJCSI 3100.01D, 2.

122 Ibid., I-1. Table developed from Enclosure 1, Summary Table of JSPS Products, from the draft CJCSI 3100.01D x May 2018. Please note that joint responsibilities and components are
Joint Strategic Planning System’s Key Components

When examining these key responsibilities, components, and purpose identified in Table 2 it is important to appreciate the linkages and interdependencies of those six areas. Further, the Chairman’s key responsibilities identified by Congress in Title 10 US Code have grown in specificity over the past two decades, particularly when considering the advice associated with the National Military Strategy, Risk Assessment, and Comprehensive Joint Readiness. All of these key responsibilities and components associated with the Title 10 responsibilities of Strategic Direction, Strategic and Contingency Planning, Comprehensive Joint Readiness, Joint Capability Development, Joint Force Development, and Global Military Integration Advice are now examined.

Strategic Direction

One of the most important changes to the Chairman’s Joint Strategic Planning System is the importance of National Military Strategy (NMS), described in the Chairman’s Instruction as “the central strategic guidance document for the Joint Force.” Title 10 now provides specific guidance as to what must be addressed in this document, when it should be submitted to Congress in a classified manner with an unclassified summary, and when a risk assessment of this strategy needs to be conducted. Guidance in Title 10 further identifies five broad ways the NMS must be linked to Presidential and Secretary of Defense guidance documents, six different areas the NMS must address, six areas the risk assessment must address, and when the NMS and risk assessment must be sent to Congress through the Secretary of Defense.

Three key Presidential strategic documents that inform the NMS are the National Security Strategy, the Unified Command Plan and Contingency Planning Guidance. Three key Secretary of Defense strategic documents that shape the NMS are the National Defense Strategy, Guidance for the Employment of the Force and Defense Planning Guidance. Generally while national and defense guidance documents provide strategic advice on the what and the ways to address many strategic challenges, the NMS is more focused on the how in aligning the ends, ways, means, and risk to achieve U.S. national interests and objectives in the President’s and Defense Secretary’s strategic documents.

subject to change – this summary table is provided for illustrative purposes only.

123 CJCSI 3100.01D, 2.
124 U.S. Code- Title 10, Chairman: Functions § 153 (b).
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., B-1.
127 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibilities and Component(s)</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Direction:</td>
<td>• Directs Joint Force on planning, employing forces, establishing force posture, and guiding future force development; key document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National Military Strategy (NMS)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic &amp; Contingency Planning:</td>
<td>• Operationalizes the NMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)</td>
<td>• Guides and directs preparation and integration of campaigns and other plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Joint Readiness:</td>
<td>• JMNA provides integrated assessment of comprehensive joint readiness and synthesis of the other products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA)</td>
<td>• Assessments and estimates capture readiness from the combatant command, service, and key functional perspectives with different time horizons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Annual Joint Assessment (AJA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>• Joint Personnel Estimate (JPE)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>• Joint Strategic Intelligence Estimate (JSIE)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Joint Logistics Estimate (JLE)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Force Development:</td>
<td>• JOE describes the future operational environment and associated challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Operating Environment (JOE)</td>
<td>• FoJCs and CJTG direct activities to ensure the Joint Force meets current and future requirements through concepts and training</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Family of Joint Concepts (FoJC)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance (CJTG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Capability Development:</td>
<td>• Identifies and assesses joint military requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Capability Gap Assessment (CGA)</td>
<td>• Recommends and prioritizes resources to address risk and gaps</td>
</tr>
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128 Table developed by author based on CJCSI 3100.01D, I-1.
### Global Military Integration Advice:

- Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA)
- Global Campaign Plan (GCP)
- Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR)
- Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)
- Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP)
- Unified Command Plan (UCP)

- Assesses risk and key challenges in executing the NMS
- Addresses most pressing transregional and strategic challenges across multiple domains
- Offers advice to national leaders on investments, global force alignment, employment and deployment of forces
- Offers advice to President on guidance to combatant commanders in multiple areas

### Strategic and Contingency Planning

The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) is the key planning product.\(^\text{129}\) It provides detailed planning direction to prepare and integrate Joint Force campaign and contingency plans to address threats and challenges from multiple perspectives across geographic regions and warfighting domains. The JSCP directs development of four types of campaign plans: (1) Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), (2) Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs), (3) Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs), and (4) Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs).\(^\text{130}\) As the names suggest, these types of plans focus on different areas and functions.

The GCPs are the most integrated and sophisticated of the four types of campaign plans.\(^\text{131}\) The Secretary of Defense designated the Chairman as the global integrator who determines the most pressing strategic challenges across all domains, and designates responsibilities to the geographical and functional combatant commands to develop and publish these plans. The Chairman designates one combatant commander as a coordinating authority for a specific GCP. Once the plan is developed, it undergoes a formal review process using cross-functional teams involving other combatant commanders, multiple Joint Staff directorates, and other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies as needed. The Chairman then reviews the final plan before it to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The Chairman also provides the Secretary with best military advice on “resourcing, prioritization, posture, capabilities and risk mitigation measures.”\(^\text{132}\) This advice stems from results of multiple JSPS processes and products.

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129 U.S. Code-Title 10, Chairman: Functions § 153 (a) (2).
130 CJCSI 3100.01D, C-1.
131 Ibid., Information in this paragraph is summarized from Enclosure C.
132 Ibid., C-3.
The three other plans are not formally part of JSPS, and as their titles indicated are more focused in specific areas. As expected, RCPs are assigned to geographic combatant commanders and FCPs are assigned to functional combatant commanders for their development. In both cases regional and functional threats often require coordination across multiple combatant commands. The CCPs replaced the Theater Campaign Plans and are focused on the combatant commands’ daily activities as well as objectives from the other three types of plans.

**Comprehensive Joint Readiness**

There are five different comprehensive joint readiness responsibilities in Title 10 US Code that are associated with: overall preparedness of the joint force to execute responsibilities in defense strategies and contingencies; assessing risks from readiness shortfalls and developing risk mitigation options; advising and assessing critical deficiencies and strengths in joint force capabilities; advising on mission and functions contractors can perform and associated risks; and evaluating preparedness of combatant commanders to carry out their missions. Comprehensive Joint Readiness also informs the other five JSPS areas listed in Table 2. Responsibilities, Components, and Purposes of the Joint Strategic Planning System. As the Chairman’s Instruction identifies, “Comprehensive Joint Readiness is the ability of the Joint Force to meet immediate contingency and warfighting challenges while preparing for future challenges.”

Six JSPS elements enable the Chairman to fully execute these responsibilities: (1) the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA), (2) the Annual Joint Assessment (AJA), (3) the Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS), (4) the Joint Personnel Estimate (JPE), (5) the Joint Strategic Intelligence Estimate (JSIE), and (6) the Joint Logistics Estimate (JLE). The JMNA is an annual comprehensive readiness assessment of the ability of the Joint Force to execute the NMS; hence, it is considered a capstone readiness assessment. The AJA is a comprehensive survey that gathers data and analytical readiness insights from Services, combatant commands, the National Guard, and the Coast Guard that informs other processes and products. The CRS provides a framework for policy and procedures to assess both unit readiness to accomplish core tasks and strategic readiness associated with combatant commanders’ ability to execute specific campaign plans. To accomplish this within the CRS, there is Joint Combat Capability Assessment that includes a Joint Force Readiness Review and Integrated Contingency Plan assessments. The JPE is an annual assessment by the Joint Staff J-1 of the Joint Force’s ability to support the NMS from a joint

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133 Ibid. Information on these three other plans is summarized from C-1 to C-2.
134 U.S. Code-Title 10, Chairman: Functions § 153 (a) (4).
135 CJCSI3100.01D, D-1.
136 Ibid., D-1 to D-4. Information in this paragraph is summarized from Enclosure D.
137 Ibid., D-1 to D-2.
personnel readiness perspective. The JSIE is an annual assessment by the Joint Staff J-2 of global threat environment from two to ten years to better inform the combatant commands and Services. The JLE is an annual assessment by the Joint Staff J-4 of the ability to project, support and sustain the Joint Force to enable it to execute its missions and identifies logistics and cross-cutting risks in Joint Capability areas with a Future Years Defense Program focus.

**Joint Force Development Activities**

There are six different Joint Force development responsibilities in Title 10 US Code: (1) developing joint doctrine; (2) providing guidance for joint training; (3) formulating policies for military education; (4) formulating policies for joint concept development and experimentation; (5) formulating policies associated with armed forces joint lessons learned; and (6) advising the Secretary of Defense on joint command, control, communications and cyber capability.138 The Chairman executes these responsibilities by producing a Joint Operating Environment (JOE) assessment, developing a Family of Joint Concepts (FoJC), and providing annual Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance (CJTG).

The JOE assessment, which is produced for a new Chairman, is a comprehensive assessment of the future operating environment and associated military implications to better prepare the Joint Force for future challenges.139 The FoJC identifies how the Joint Force needs to operate within the future operating environment, influences the development of new capabilities, and informs Service concepts. Important products of the FoJC are the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and the many different Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs). The CCJO, which is produced about every four years, “describes the Chairman’s vision for how the Joint Force will operating in the future operating Environment and guide Joint Force Development.”140 This influences the many different JOCs that describe needed joint capabilities to execute across the range of military operations that are further analyzed across many Joint Staff processes. The annual CJTG provides “guidance to the Joint Force for the planning, execution, and assessment of individual and collective joint training for a four-year period”141

**Joint Capability Development**

There are seven different Joint Capability Force responsibilities in Title 10 US Code associated with: (1) identifying new joint military capabilities to maintain armed forces superiority and recommend investments; (2) performing military net assessments of U.S. and allies capabilities versus potential adversaries; (3) advising on priorities of combatant commanders;

138 U.S. Code-Title 10, Chairman: Functions § 153 (a) (6).
139 CJCSI 3100.01D, Information in this paragraph is summarized from Enclosure E.
140 Ibid., E-2.
141 Ibid., E-3.
(4) advising on Services program recommendations and budget proposals related to defense strategy and combat commanders’ requirements; (5) advising on new and alternative joint capabilities and alternative program and budget proposals; (6) assessing joint military capabilities and identifying capability gaps; and (7) recommending tradeoffs in acquiring materiel and equipment to support strategic and contingency plans.\textsuperscript{142} The Chairman accomplishes these responsibilities through advice from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on a wide variety of capability assessments discussed later in this chapter, decisions associated with the Joint Capabilities and Integration and Development System (JCIDS), and the way the Chairman interfaces with the Secretary of Defense’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system.

The annual Capability Gap Assessment (CGA) is the primary product under Joint Capability Development.\textsuperscript{143} This annual assessment includes a capability gap analysis, an internal portfolio review of joint and service capabilities under development plus the combatant commanders’ Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) submitted in the AJA under Comprehensive Joint Readiness. The capability gap analysis is a JROC-led review and uses inputs from the Services and combatant commanders to determine how the IPLs and other capability gaps are being addressed to close or mitigate the gap while considering the associated risk.\textsuperscript{144} This influences the JMNA discussed earlier in the Comprehensive Joint Readiness section and the Chairman’s Program Recommendation discussed in the Global Military Integration Advice section. IPLs provide combat commanders a voice in both the capability development and resource processes, while influencing the Chairman’s resource advice document to the Secretary of Defense.

**Global Military Integration Advice**

There are two succinct global military integration responsibilities identified in Title 10: “(A) providing advice to the President and Secretary on ongoing military operations; and (B) advising the Secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces among geographic and functional combatant commands as necessary to address transregional, multi-domain and multifunctional threats.”\textsuperscript{145} In addition to the NMS and GCPs, other documents that enable him to execute these responsibilities are the Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA), Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), and the Unified Campaign Plan (UCP).

The annual classified CRA, forwarded through the Secretary of Defense to Congress, is “an assessment of strategic risk to national interests

\textsuperscript{142} U.S. Code-Title 10, Chairman: Functions § 153 (a) (5).

\textsuperscript{143} CJCSI 3100.01D, Information in this paragraph is summarized from Enclosure F.

\textsuperscript{144} Note that while an Integrated Priority List is indeed a list, the term “IPL” is often colloquially used to represent a single item on the list representing a single capability gap.

\textsuperscript{145} U.S. Code-Title 10, Chairman: Functions § 153 (a) (3).
and military risk to execution of the NMS.” 146 In developing this assessment, there are inputs from the Services, combatant commanders and an independent Joint Staff Risk Assessment, and the CRA informs the future NMS and the JMNA discussed earlier. The annual CPR is the key resource document that provides the Chairman’s military advice to the Secretary of Defense on a wide range of capability and comprehensive joint readiness investments, as well as identifying approaches in employing and sustaining the Joint Force to meet future challenges. There is no specific CPR format or required contents, but it is focused on influencing Defense Planning Guidance and resource processes associated with the PPBE system. The GFMIG is “the Chairman’s advice on the global assignment, allocation, and apportionment of the Joint Force to meet transregional, multi-functional Challenges across all domains.” 147 Finally, the UCP provides guidance “to the combatant commanders; establishes broad missions and responsibilities; delineates geographic boundaries; and, specifies functional combatant commander responsibilities.” 148 The Chairman prepares the UCP every two years for Secretary of Defense review and approved by the President.

**Vice Chairman and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council**

The Vice Chairman’s leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and its subordinate JROC boards and working groups help enable the Chairman to meet his Title 10 US Code responsibilities and fully execute the JSPS. The JROC also has specific responsibilities, now specified in Title 10 U.S. Code, which are focused on assisting the Chairman in the following seven areas: (1) assessing joint military capabilities and prioritizing gaps to meet National Defense Strategy requirements; (2) reviewing and validating whether a proposed capability fills a joint military capabilities gap; (3) developing recommendations on program costs and fielding targets consistent with priority and its urgency of capability gap; (4) establishing and approving joint performance requirements to ensure interoperability and fulfill capability gaps; (5) reviewing performance requirements for a capability identified by the Chairman; and (6) identifying new capabilities based on technology advances or operational concepts; (7) identifying alternatives to certain acquisition programs.149

The Vice Chairman chairs the JROC, an organization comprised of officers in the grade of General or Admiral from the Services.150 The JROC’s organization and processes are considered the most integrating and influencing councils within the Defense Department on complex joint military issues. Combatant commanders, Undersecretaries of Defense and directors of DoD-level organizations identified in Title 10 are advisors to the JROC.

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146 CJCSI3100.01D, G-2. Information in this paragraph is summarized from Enclosures G and I.
147 Ibid., G-3.
148 Ibid.
149 U.S. Code – Title 10 Joint Requirements Oversight Council § 181 (b).
150 Combatant commanders changed from being members of the JROC to advisors, which was reflected in changes to 10 U.S.C. in 2017.
within their authority and expertise to insure issues are fully vetted before a decision is made on major joint military requirements and programs.\textsuperscript{151} The Chairman’s JROC Instruction also identifies other senior defense civilian officials that are advisors to the JROC, as well as the defense agencies and field organizations and interagency organizations that participate in Joint Capability Board (JCB), Functional Capability Boards (FCBs) and lower boards depending on issues being considered.\textsuperscript{152}

To execute those responsibilities, the JROC and its three lower level boards use an overall capabilities approach and expanded gap analysis associated with JCIDS, which are aligned with Joint Capability Areas (JCAs). The JCIDS is an integrated process that provides a baseline to identify, review and validate capability requirements in capability portfolios to facilitate doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPFP) changes across the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{153}

The first organizational level below the JROC is the JCB, chaired by Director of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment under the Joint Staff J-8.\textsuperscript{154} Other members are general, flag, or government civilians from the services and combatant commands. They advise the JROC on a wide variety of issues across the capability portfolios to insure that issues coming before the JROC are ready for robust discussions and decision making. The JCB also has a wide range of civilian and military advisors from DOD and interagency organizations depending on the issues being discussed.

Below the JCB are six FCBs, each chaired by a Joint Staff flag officer or civilian equivalent from a designated Joint Staff directorate (e.g., J-2, J-4, J-6 and J-8).\textsuperscript{155} FCB members are O-6 or civilian equivalents from the Joint Staff, services, combatant commands and other DOD components with equity in the issues being discussed. An FCB General Officer/Flag Officer Integration Group, composed of the FCB chairs and select advisors from within or outside DOD, meets on a biweekly schedule to ensure cross integration of capabilities and core functions. They provide specific recommendations to the JCB and JROC.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.; (c) There are four Under Secretaries of Defense, two Department of Defense Directors and Combatant Commanders identified as advisors on matters within their authority and expertise. Title 10 also states that the JROC should seek the advice of Services Chiefs, Defense Agencies or other DOD entities as needed.

\textsuperscript{152} U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council}, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123 (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 12, 2015), A-14 to A-16.

\textsuperscript{153} U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System}, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01I (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 23, 2015), 1-2. Hereafter \textit{CJCSI 3170.01I}. The nine current JCAs are Force Support, Battlespace Awareness, Force Application, Logistics, Command and Control, Net Centric, Protection, Building Partnerships and Corporate Management.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., A-4 to A-5.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., A-5 to A-7.
Below these FCBs is the lowest JROC organizational level, Functional Capability Board Working Groups (FCB WGs).\textsuperscript{156} They are chaired by an O-6 or civilian equivalent from a Joint Staff Directorate with the number of working groups and topics being considered determined by the FCB Chair. There is also an FCB O-6 Integration Group composed of Working Group Chairs, division chiefs from the J-8 and J-7 as well as representatives from the other organizations that advise the JROC depending on the issue being considered. This group also generally meets biweekly to shape advice provided to their higher level working Integration Group.\textsuperscript{157}

To make this overall structure even more complex, there are other Joint Staff organizations that shape which issues go to various boards and contribute to assessments made by these lower JROC organization levels. First and perhaps most important, there is the Joint Staff Gatekeeper from the J-8 Directorate that serves as the single point of entry for all capability requirement decisions and related issues.\textsuperscript{158} The Gatekeeper can identify what board level can make the final decision, as all issues do not have to go to the JCB or JROC. There are also three divisions within the J-8 that can contribute to assessments across all FCBs with the expertise associated with their division titles: (1) Joint Requirements Assessment, (2) Capabilities and Acquisition, and (3) Program and Budget Analysis.\textsuperscript{159}

The JROC and its lower level boards have gained inputs from Combatant Commanders and other Defense and Interagency organizations, along with Integration Working Groups. The decisions from these deliberations in various ways directly shape the Chairman’s strategic planning annual resource advice to the Secretary of Defense. This resource advice document, called the Chairman Program Recommendation, is designed to influence the Secretary of Defense Planning Guidance. Furthermore, this Council’s inclusive, collaborative, and analytical nature influences other Service and Defense leaders that provide input; hence, there is agreement well beyond the Council’s formal members and decisions.

**Conclusion: Leadership Insights**

From this examination of the Chairman’s JSPS and Vice Chairmen’s JROC, there are broad insights for senior leaders who use or are considering using a planning system, processes, or councils to shape strategic decisions. These insights center on strategic environment changes, process characteristics, and organizational culture.\textsuperscript{160}

First senior leaders must have a robust strategic planning system and processes to address the strategic environment challenges from both

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., A-8 to A-9.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., A-11 to A-12.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., A-9 to A-10.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., A-10 to A-11.
\textsuperscript{160} Meinhart, *Joint Strategic Planning System Insights*, 26-28. Strategic planning insights summarized from these pages.
an external global perspective as well as internal organizational perspective and meet the requirements from Congress. Assessing the strategic environment is a key responsibility of strategic leaders to assist them in executing their overall responsibilities.\(^{161}\) Many of the components of the JSPS in its six key Chairman functional areas assessed the environment in many different ways. Also, leaders need to modify the systems and processes as strategic challenges, requirements, and their focus changes.

Second, senior leaders need to ensure processes are integrated, inclusive, and flexible to enhance effectiveness. The integrated nature is illustrated in how joint requirements and capabilities are examined by the lower-level boards from multiple perspectives before reaching the JROC when decisions are needed at this level. The integrated nature is also evident as many of these JSPS products in one area influence others with a systems thinking perspective. The inclusiveness is demonstrated by the much greater representation beyond just the military to include civilians from many different organizations as input to the analytical assessments and their contributions to JROC-related decisions have increased overtime.

Finally, a formal strategic planning system that has well-defined and inclusive processes and products can be a powerful mechanism to create a climate and help embed a culture within a complex organization. This last insight comes from seeing how the U.S. military is more jointly focused as the Armed Forces have evolved from Service de-confliction in warfare and weapons capabilities in the early 1990s to a greater joint interoperability in the late 1990s to early 2000s and now to a growing joint interdependence focus.\(^ {162}\)


\(^{162}\) Author assertions as the way the words deconfliction, interoperability and interdependence were used over the past two decades. For more information, see how interoperability was explained in 2000 in *Joint Vision 2020* and interdependence in 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*.  

Chapter 6. Service Systems and Processes

Fred Gellert

As part of the DOD, the military departments and their services are the creators and providers of military capability. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the military departments are composed of one or more uniformed services led and managed by a service chief under a civilian secretariat and staff. The divisions of authorities and responsibilities between secretariats and the respective uniformed services are largely codified in law, and can be confusing for new defense managers. This chapter explains how the departments are chartered and organized to meet their missions of providing trained and ready forces to joint commanders.

 Authorities from Titles 10 and 32

The U.S. Constitution provides the overall authority and structure for the armed forces. Congress raises and supports the military while the President serves as the Commander in Chief. Congress has established numerous laws that specify all aspects of provisioning, leading, and utilizing the armed forces. The set of laws for the active and reserve components of the military services are codified in Title 10 U.S. Code while those for the two services under the National Guard (Army National Guard and Air National Guard) are in Title 32. These are then conducted under the overall supervision of the DOD and supported by the joint staff and organizational command structure. Of note, the services do not conduct warfighting missions, which are reserved for the Combatant Commanders.

Under the direction and leadership of the OSD, the DOD executes the direction of the President while providing the civilian oversight of the military required by Congress. On behalf of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff (JS) provides military advice to DOD organizations and military direction/coordination to the services and the Combatant Commands who are the end-users of military capability. However, it is solely the charge of the military departments and services to develop, build, generate, and sustain service unique military capabilities in support of national security requirements. The requirements can be based on single-service capability needs, such as at-sea refueling or long range aerial bombing, or based on multi-service requirements from the joint force, such as medical services and communications. Given this responsibility at the service level, the boundary between OSD/JS and the services is military operations and funding. Military operations are conducted by the joint commands, under the direction of the SecDef, while approximately 70% of Congressional funding is appropriated for the individual military services rather than being provided to the DOD or Joint Staff. The OSD provides oversight, especially in Congressional interest areas like materiel procurement and facilities construction, but it is largely the services who spend the money.
The authoritative functions mandated by Congress are the same for each of the three military departments as listed in law and codified in Title 10 U.S. Code. The Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and their respective military services, perform these functions, referred to as Title 10 functions:163

1. Recruiting.
2. Organizing.
3. Supplying.
4. Equipping (incl. research and development).
5. Training.
7. Mobilizing.
8. Demobilizing.
9. Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
10. Maintaining.
12. Construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.164

Everything the military services do or spend is legally based in Title 10 and ultimately supports one of the above twelve functions. In practice, these Title 10 functions are not necessarily mutually exclusive as this list delineates. The military function of personnel and the executive management area of Human Resource Management are the combination of recruiting and administering, but also include aspects of organizing, training, mobilizing, and demobilizing. The Defense Industrial Base arose from the need for additional capacity for construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment (the 11th function on the above list), but also assists in carrying out the functions of suppling, equipping, mobilizing, and demobilizing.165

Title 10 also details specific responsibilities between the secretariats and their service staffs, and some missions are reserved exclusively at the secretariat level. For example, Title 10 specifies that the secretary shall have sole responsibility for the functions of: Acquisition, Auditing, Comptroller (including financial management), Information management, Inspector

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163 Which includes two services—The Navy and The Marine Corps. See Chapter 4.
164 10 U.S. Code-Title 10, Secretary of the Army, § 3013; U.S. Code-Title 10, Secretary of the Air Force, § 5013; U.S. Code Title-10, Secretary of the Navy § 8013. The Marine Corps is covered under the Department of the Navy: see U.S. Code-Title 10, Commandant of the Marine Corps, § 5043. Secretaries of each department are charged with the same list of responsibilities.
165 Interestingly, the function of Servicing is nowhere defined separately and should be considered as being performed in the execution of other functions (e.g., suppling, equipping, maintaining, and repair of military equipment).
General, Legislative affairs, and Public affairs. The military service staff is precluded from performing any of these functions. As an example, though the Public Affairs Officer for each of the departments is a military officer, that officer does not directly report to the service chief of staff as they are a part of the secretariat staff.

Military Department and Service Organizations

Authorities and responsibilities for these functions rests with the secretaries of the military departments, overseen through assistant secretaries, and supported by the chiefs of the four military services and their military staffs. The secretary is appointed from civilian life and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for: (a) the functioning of their department, (b) formulation of policies and programs consistent with national security objectives, (c) carrying out functions to fulfill current and future operational requirements, (d) coordinating with the other departments to avoid duplication, (e) implementing implementation budget decisions in an effective and timely manner, (f) presenting department positions, and (g) supervising departmental intelligence activities. The Under Secretary of each department serves as both the deputy secretary and as the Chief Management Officer. Besides the assistant secretaries who carry out broad functional responsibilities, each secretary has several special assistants conducting specialized functions such as Judge Advocate, Inspector General, Legislative Affairs, and a Reserve Forces Policy Committee.

Each military department is organized in two complementary but separate structures: (1) the secretariat, generally composed of professional and politically-appointed civilians, and (2) the service staff, generally composed of uniformed members augmented with professional civilians. The difference is most clear in the Department of the Navy in which there exists two separate military services in the Navy and the Marine Corps who both fall under the same military department, The Department of the Navy. The purpose of the secretariat is to exercise civilian control of the military through issuance of policy directives and through oversight of budget development and execution. All Title 10 responsibilities originate in the authority of the department secretary. The military service staff, under the direction of a chief of staff, provides military advice to the secretariat, oversees development of military doctrine, approves military requirements, and issues orders and directives to service-specific units not under joint command. The other organizations with different chains of authority are the Army and Air National Guard services as they report to their par-

166 As stated in, U.S. Code-Title 10, Office of the Secretary of the Army § 3014; U.S. Code-Title 10, Office of the Secretary of the Navy § 5014 for the Navy; and U.S. Code-Title 10, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force § 8014.

167 As stated in U.S. Code Title-10, Secretary of the Army § 3013; U.S. Code Title-10, Secretary of the Navy § 5013; and U.S. Code Title-10, Secretary of the Air Force § 8013.

168 The term “chief of staff” is used to denote the senior officer of each military service. In the Army, that officer is titled Chief of Staff, Army (CSA). For the other services: the Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF), the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).
ent services and departments for some Title 10 functions but report to the National Guard Bureau for others.\footnote{169}

Each division within the Office of the Secretary has assigned functional areas of responsibility and assigned levels of policy and budget authority. While mostly filled by civilian personnel, the secretariats have military personnel assigned who are not part of their respective uniformed military service staff. In meetings, they represent organizations that are senior to any military staff organization.

While each military department is organized slightly differently, they are largely organized along the same Title 10 functional responsibility areas. See Table 3. Title 10 Functions by Assistant Secretaries.

\textit{Table 3. Title 10 Functions by Assistant Secretaries}\footnote{170}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title 10 Function</th>
<th>Army\textsuperscript{1}</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Recruiting</td>
<td>ASA Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASN Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASAP Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Organizing</td>
<td>ASA Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASN Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASAP Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Supplying</td>
<td>ASA Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT)</td>
<td>ASN Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA)</td>
<td>ASAP Acquisition &amp; Logistics (SAF/AQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Maintaining</td>
<td>ASA Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT)</td>
<td>ASN Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA)</td>
<td>ASAP Acquisition &amp; Logistics (SAF/AQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) (11) Equipping (R&amp;D, Acq, repair)</td>
<td>ASA Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ALT)</td>
<td>ASN Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA)</td>
<td>ASAP Acquisition &amp; Logistics (SAF/AQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Training</td>
<td>ASA Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASN Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASAP Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Mobilizing.</td>
<td>ASA Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASN Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASAP Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Demobilizing.</td>
<td>ASA Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASN Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASAP Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Administering (Pers, MWR)</td>
<td>ASA Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASN Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&amp;RA)</td>
<td>ASAP Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Buildings</td>
<td>ASA Installations, Environment, and Energy (IEE)</td>
<td>ASN Energy, Installations and Environment (I&amp;E)</td>
<td>ASAP Installations, Environment, and Energy (SAF/IE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{169} Specifics for the service reserve and the National Guard are found in U.S. Code Title-10, Reserve Components Subtitle E.

\footnote{170} Table prepared by author.
The Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs oversees all personnel programs and the use of the reserve forces. The Assistant Secretary for Acquisition is the senior executive for all decisions regarding materiel acquisition processes—e.g., research, development and testing, procurement, contract management, and logistics. The Assistant Secretary for Installations oversees a large portfolio of bases, facilities infrastructure, management of energy costs, and compliance with environmental regulations. The Assistant Secretary for Financial Management develops all budget requests to Congress and oversees the financial and legal obligations of appropriations to that service. The Army has an additional assistant secretary, the Assistant Secretary of Civil Works, to oversee the federal civil works program executed by the Army Corps of Engineers.

Table 4. Supporting Military Staff by Title 10 function shows the service’s support staffs divided by Title 10 function. Each military service staff uses a structure of deputy chiefs of staff, also designated as numbered general staff organizations, and special staffs such as surgeon general or installation management. The purpose of support staffs is to assist the secretary and chief of staff in carrying out their Title 10 responsibilities, specifically: (a) prepare forces for employment, (b) investigate and report on military preparation to support combatant commands, (c) prepare detailed instructions for the execution of prepared plans, and (d) coordinate the actions of the organizations of the service. The deputy chiefs of staff perform their functions under the supervision of the service chief of staff, but are also aligned functionally to the appropriate assistant secretary. Specific military functions on the service staff that are not also in the secretary staff include: general counsel, surgeon general, chaplain, and chief of the reserve. The chief of staff of each service has the responsibility to supervise these staff responsibilities and serve as the principle military advisor to the secretary. This role for the service chief is separate and distinct from their role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as specified in section 151 of Title 10.

Primary Tasks of the Military Services

As part of the defense enterprise, the three broad tasks for the military services are to develop their unique military capabilities, integrate those into the force, and to generate those capabilities for use by joint commanders. Figure 7 depicts the simplified overview of these tasks, designated broadly as force development, force integration, and force generation.

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171 As stated in U.S. Code Title-10, Assistant Secretaries of the Army § 3016; U.S. Code Title-10, Assistant Secretaries of the Navy § 5016; and U.S. Code Title-10, Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force § 8016.
172 U.S. Code Title-10 § 3016 (b) (3).
173 As stated in U.S. Code Title-10, Deputy Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Chiefs of Staff (Army) § 3035; U.S. Code Title-10, Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations § 5036; U.S. Code Title-10, Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations § 5037; and U.S. Code Title-10, Deputy Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Chiefs of Staff (Air Force) § 8035.
174 As stated in U.S. Code Title-10, Chief of Staff § 3033 for the Army, U.S. Code Title-10, Chief of Naval Operations § 5033 for the Navy; U.S. Code Title-10, Chief of Staff § 8033 for the Air Force.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title 10 Function</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Recruiting</td>
<td>DCS Personnel (G1)</td>
<td>DCNO Mnpwr, Pers, Ed, &amp; Tng (N1)</td>
<td>DCS Manpower, Personnel, and Services (AF/A1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Organizing</td>
<td>DCS Operations (G3)</td>
<td>DCNO Integ Cap &amp; Resources (N8)</td>
<td>DCS Strategic Plans and Programs (AF A5/8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Supplying</td>
<td>DCS Logistics (G4)</td>
<td>DCNO Fleet Read &amp; Log (N4)</td>
<td>DCS Log, Eng, Force Pro (AF/A4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Maintaining</td>
<td>DCS Operations (G3)</td>
<td>DCNO Mnpwr, Pers, Ed, &amp; Tng (N1)</td>
<td>DCS Operations (AF/A3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) (11) Equipping (R&amp;D, Acq, repair)</td>
<td>DCS Programs (G8) &amp; DCS Logistics (G4)</td>
<td>DCNO Integ Cap &amp; Resources (N8)</td>
<td>DCS Strategic Plans and Programs (AF A5/8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Training</td>
<td>DCS Operations (G3)</td>
<td>DCNO Mnpwr, Pers, Ed, &amp; Tng (N1)</td>
<td>DCS Operations (AF/A3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Mobilizing</td>
<td>DCS Operations (G3) &amp; Chief Army Reserve (CAR)</td>
<td>Chief Navy Reserve (CNR)</td>
<td>Chief Air Force Reserve (AF/RE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Demobilizing</td>
<td>DCS Programs (G8)</td>
<td>DCNO Integ Cap &amp; Resources (N8)</td>
<td>DCS Strategic Plans and Requirements (AF A5/8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Administering (Pers, MWR)</td>
<td>DCS Personnel (G1)</td>
<td>DCNO Mnpwr, Pers, Ed, &amp; Tng (N1)</td>
<td>DCS Manpower, Personnel, and Services (AF/A1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Administering (Budget)</td>
<td>DCS Programs (G8)</td>
<td>DCNO Integ Cap &amp; Resources (N8)</td>
<td>DCS Strategic Plans and Requirements (AF A5/8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Buildings</td>
<td>Asst Chief of Staff Installation Mngt (ACSIM), and Corps of Engineers²</td>
<td>DCNO Fleet Read &amp; Log (N4)</td>
<td>AF Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Force Development**

Depicted as the “left half” of Figure 7. Creating Military Capability for the Combatant Commander, force development is the service-specific systems and processes to envision, develop, build, acquire, and prepare military capabilities nested under the JCIDS, a specified responsibility of the CJCS. While details differ in each service in names and specific procedures, increasingly the services similarly determine capability gaps, establish requirements, and approve recommended solutions using the JCIDS. Specific processes for each service are listed in their governing policies and directives. Each service writes concepts and doctrines of employment,

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175 Table prepared by author.
176 CJCSI 3170.01.
determines capability requirements, assesses capability gaps, develops solutions to capability gaps, prioritizes the solutions against available resources, and then implements the approved solutions.

**Concept and Doctrine Development.**

Each service begins its development of military requirements by envisioning its ideas and methods to conduct its unique types of military operations. Called operating concepts, each service has its own organization and process to develop concepts. Concepts are then turned into details of service doctrine that provide the description of military operations necessary to develop training, equipment, and tactics. Unlike the joint implementation of JCIDS, which begins the process by identifying capability requirements, the services must first determine how they intend to operate their forces to provide service-specific capabilities before they determine what capabilities are required and if any capability gaps exist.

The Army begins the JCIDS process by developing operating and functional concepts as organized under the *Army Concept Framework*.\(^{178}\) These then inform the detailed development of doctrinal publications such as infantry operations, logistics frameworks, and leader development. The other services have their own process to develop their operating concepts, all of which must be nested inside the *Joint Operating Concept*. Concepts are the foundation for military capabilities development and are intentionally broad to allow the widest consideration of needs and capabilities across the force over an extended period. Senior leaders and their staff should periodically reconsider their concepts and doctrine to ensure they are appropriate to the changing environment. This requires time and energy in an already busy senior leader environment, but is a task only able to be accomplished by senior leaders and their advisors.

**Capability Gap Assessment**

Once the service determines its operations doctrine, it then assesses the required capabilities it needs to conduct missions according to that doctrine. These assessments can be near or long term, small or large in scope, and internal or external to the service. Assessments can include methods such as formal analysis of alternatives, functional experiments, operational tests, war games, staff studies, and concept experiments. Invariably there will be gaps in what the service can perform today and what it considers its needs in the future. Those gaps are then analyzed in the Capabilities-Based Assessment process to determine the recommended solutions to satisfy the gap. As required in CJCSI 3170.01I, the governing instruction for JCIDS, all capability requirements must be traced to service or joint roles, missions, and concepts and must be assessed against the entire Joint Force, not just the specific organization.\(^{179}\)


\(^{179}\) *CJCSI 3170.01I, A-3.*
Senior leaders must ensure military requirements are written so as to be clearly defined, specific, and detailed enough to inform solution developers without being so specific as to constrain innovative solutions. Capability gap solutions can be in a single functional area, or most typically encompass changes in multiple areas. In developing solutions, the acronym DOTMLPF-P denotes the solution domains to consider: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy. The DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation (DCR) is the formal document to state the required needs by area and is used for all non-materiel solutions. Material solutions are developed in the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). For senior leaders, the key to success in this process is to be clear in the requirement, open to innovative solutions, assign a clear priority to the requirement/solution, and then champion the effort to get it through the bureaucracy. Given the myriad military requirements in a dynamic strategic environment, senior leaders must be persistent as it will be easy for their actions to stall or become lost.

Materiel Solutions. Typically the most costly type of solution for military capability gaps are those requiring development and procurement of materiel solutions. All materiel based military capability solutions are processed using the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), discussed in Chapter 4. Other than some small differences in assignment of responsibilities inside the process, each military department follows the Department of Defense Instruction 5000 series. The Initial Capabilities Document, the Capability Development Document, and the Capability Production Document provide the formal communication of material solutions between the user and the acquisition, test and evaluation, and resource management.

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180 Figure prepared by author based on course materials used in the Defense Management course.
communities. The development of materiel capabilities is typically long and costly and therefore senior leaders should exhaust all other possible solutions before deciding a materiel solution is required.

**Requirements oversight.** Most military requirements are generated and prioritized by the military services. As with the JROC of the JCIDS system (Chapter 5), the services utilize similar structures led by the service Vice Chief to approve detailed statements of military requirements, approve specific solution methods, and prioritize them for resourcing.\(^{181}\) In the Air Force, for example, Policy Directive 10-6 directs the Air Force to: “Establish and use the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council as the single, corporate body to validate and prioritize all Air Force capability requirements,” while in the Navy, Navy Instruction 5000.2E specifies a Resources and Requirements Review Board as the focal point for decision making.\(^{182}\)

**Force Integration**

Depicted by the boxes in the middle segment of Figure 7. Creating Military Capability for the Combatant Commander, force integration is the service-specific process to implement capability solutions into the existing military force. As defined in Army Regulation 71-32, “Force integration is a multidisciplinary, capstone process that examines, validates, modifies, and monitors all aspects of change. It results from activities within functions or functional groupings designed to increase operational capability at the organization level.”\(^{183}\) Force integration includes the areas of Structuring, Manning, Training, Equipping, Sustaining, Stationing, Deploying, Funding, and maintaining Readiness.\(^{184}\) Whenever providing capability solutions, senior leaders must consider each of these areas to ensure full implementation in the most timely and efficient manner.

The key task for strategic leaders and their advisors in force integration is to implement the required changes in the most efficient manner in the short term while ensuring those changes maintain the long-term effectiveness of the force. This is no small task given the enormous near-term consumption of readiness from CCDR operational requirements and service-specific training requirements. This challenge is multiplied further during times of constrained resources.

Force integration is akin to change management in the commercial sector. Senior leaders can gain new knowledge and understanding in

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\(^{181}\) Ibid.


\(^{184}\) Ibid., paragraph 1-13.
managing change by reading business-related publications. Besides the mechanics of implementing the change, large organizations undergoing change are beset by myriad factors of organizational psychology, culture, and bureaucratic inertia. Tasks such as scanning the environment, establishing vision, managing stakeholders, and changing organizational culture are all part of force integration at the senior level.

**Force Generation**¹⁸⁵

Depicted on the right side of Figure 7. Creating Military Capability for the Combatant Commander, force generation is the process of providing employable military capabilities for combatant commanders.¹⁸⁶ It identifies available forces for use by a combatant commander to achieve a mission assigned by the national command authorities. It may also define the relationships of those forces with the combatant command—from standing or permanent allocations such as forward stationed forces during the Cold War, to general pooling of forces available to all combatant commands until ordered otherwise.

Available resources include those inside military units, such as personnel and equipment, and also those resources on bases and installations, such as training land, airspace, transportation assets, and buildings. At its heart, military readiness measures the capacity services have to generate forces at any given time. Each service measures readiness differently, based on their own concepts and methods. But fundamentally, military readiness involves the balance of three primary resources: manpower, equipment and supplies, and training. U.S. law, DOD polices, and service secretary directives provide governing rules and guidance as to “limits” of readiness and thus limits to the generation of forces, in particular personnel policies such as limitation of time deployed versus time at home station. As requirements for military forces increase, each service must adjust its readiness methods, in coordination with DOD, to meet demand. When demand becomes too large, the services must articulate the risk to the most senior military and civilian leaders, who may opt to increase the size of the force structure or restrict the demand. Force structure increases are possible, as was the case for the Army and Marine Corps during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Because of resource limitations, it is not possible for services to maintain all units at peak readiness. Training and repair parts are example resources that are naturally constrained, and units lacking access to them will naturally fall to lower readiness levels. The services must manage risk and ensure priority units (e.g., those first to deploy in times of crisis) are able to sustain higher readiness. Therefore, the services implement force generation strategies to manage the relative priorities of units at any given

¹⁸⁵ This section summarizes the more thorough description of service force generation concepts and processes by Edward J. Filiberti, *Generating Military Capabilities*, Faculty Paper (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2016).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.
time and align those priorities with access to critical readiness resources. Planning factors such as timing of need, transportation requirements, cost, and quantity on hand determine the placement of specific units and personnel at different levels of readiness according to the strategy. The reserve components of each service have additional constraints on their readiness that must be considered as well, but generally are an active participant in the force generation process. Particularly in the Army, there are critical military capabilities that only exist in the reserve forces or are in such small numbers in the active force as to be unusable without the reserves. Thus, force generation is a total force process.

**Resource Management**

The key role of the military department and service staff is to manage resources. Developing, integrating, and generating military capabilities requires a range of resources beginning most significantly with money, but also including time, personnel, and facilities. Requesting, scheduling, integrating, and executing the expenditure of those resources to provide military capabilities is the purpose of the Department of Defense’s PPBE system, discussed in Chapter 4. Led and supervised by the civilian secretariat staff, each service completes the tasks in each of the four PPBE phases using similar processes to meet the congressionally mandated and DOD-directed procedures to annually plan and utilize funds. The PPBE system is calendar-driven and therefore activities in force management to create capabilities must be completed along a timeline that allows timely insertion into the PPBE process. Often, a well-designed solution idea offered in December will not even be considered until after the following March, would not be funded until the next fiscal year, and would not enter the force for months after funding is provided. This is sobering, but is the reality when working at the level of the military service and department.

Each year, the services develop their fiscal year budget request, called the Budget Estimate Submission (BES), as well as their program plan for the next four years, called the FYDP, which details money, manpower, and force structure quantities. DOD and the services have a top-line budget amount called the Total Obligation Authority (TOA) which funds all service operations, personnel, and capability development activities. To determine the specific TOA needed, the services conduct detailed analysis in planning anticipated military requirements for the next 15 years and beyond, programming the elements required to meet those requirements over the coming 5 years, and budgeting for monetary expenditures in the following year. This annual, cyclic, process is occurring each day of the year throughout DOD and the services with different parts of the process taking on greater or lesser effort depending on the specific time of the year. Each service divides the details of their PPBE process differently, but all achieve the same level of detailed submission at the same time as part of DOD’s inclusion in the annual Federal Budget process.
Implications for Defense Managers

The military services wield most of the detailed authority and responsibility for providing joint military capabilities as provisioned by Congress and directed by the President in fulfilling their constitutional responsibilities. As such, defense managers and advisors working at the levels of the military departments and services bear special responsibility to get those capabilities as right as possible for the long term. Some final thoughts on meeting these responsibilities follow.

Use realistic scenarios and planning assumptions. The tendency is to accept those that are favorable to your service and reject those that are not. Resist that temptation. Specific service requirements today may not be so important in the future - think long term. Ships, planes, and tanks tend to be around for 30 years.

Consider integration across services, even if that means your service gives up something. It may just end up being better all-around for the joint force and thus your service in the long run. True military capability comes from the application of combined capabilities under a joint force.

Make military requirements clear, precise, reasonable, relevant, and resource informed while still creating the necessary capability. Those leaders and team members that will build, integrate, and employ those capabilities, typically long after you have left your current job, need the best chance of getting it right. It is OK to push the envelope, but that has its own challenges. Sometimes “good enough” is best.

Be honest, clear, and complete on trade-off considerations. No change is cost-neutral and every change has unintended consequences. Advocate for your program, but know that your program comes at the cost of other capabilities that are likely just as important. The best solution is not your program, rather the best solution is the optimal mix of the most critical capabilities.
Conclusion

The Primer presents the defense enterprise as it is designed and intended to function. It broke down four layers of the enterprise—national, defense, joint, and service—to show the different roles, missions, resources, and processes at each layer. It presented the laws, regulations, and doctrine that established these divisions of responsibilities and associated checks and balances.

Of course, this is not necessarily how the enterprise always functions in practice. The wars in the 21st century significantly changed the way the enterprise operated, and often the formal rules followed what became operational norms. For example, the Joint Urgent Operational Needs process formed out of recognition that the standing acquisition system was not sufficiently responsive to new requirements from theater. It began as the result of urgent unresolved issues, developed as the enterprise learned how to respond effectively and efficiently, and became systematized as the organization learned and adapted.

Such churn is ever present. The enterprise is constantly changing in response to the dynamics of the both the global and national political environments. When new senior leaders take on assignments at the enterprise level, they may encounter such changes in the formative stages—looking like half-baked ideas or poorly-formed processes in conflict with how the organization is set up to do business. It may therefore be tempting to apply the brakes, when in reality the better approach is to press the accelerator instead. Senior leaders should ask the hard questions about whether the phenomenon indicates problems with the process as designed, with differences in perspective between entities in the enterprise, or with changing or unmet needs of stakeholders.

So how does one prepare to be a defense manager? As one may infer from Chapter 1, the competencies needed of senior leaders also apply to defense managers. Defense managers require strong strategic thinking skills, manage strategic problems, envision the future, understand complexity, lead change, build consensus, negotiate, render best military advice, and perform effectively in joint, interagency, and multinational environments. This reinforces the idea that defense management is essentially one form of applied strategic leadership. The main difference between defense managers and principles on flag-officer staffs is largely context, not function.

However, performing the duties of defense manager is difficult because of the pace, which can be overwhelming. Defense managers must avoid devolving into high-ranking crank-turners of the machine. They instead should be its engineers, architects, or artists. As engineers, senior leaders should ensure alignment between the processes and systems and

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187 For more detail, see Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, Strategic Leadership Primer, 4th ed. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, in press), Chapter 5.
the purpose they serve. If the purpose or situation has changed, senior leaders must lead commensurate change in the processes. As architects, senior leaders must also keep watch over the functioning of the enterprise as a whole. Process-by-process change allows for incremental adjustments, but sometimes the entire system must be transformed. Such has been the call for weapons systems acquisition over the course of decades, for example. And, there is an art to management, particularly over an all-volunteer organization that puts significant stock in the development and welfare of its people, and over a military force with global responsibilities. The need to maintain qualitative and quantitative superiority over a wide range of conventional and unconventional adversaries require both resources and creativity, not complacency.

The pressures on senior leaders to subsume themselves to the whims of the enterprise are, and will always be, great. Given the opportunity, the short-term demands of running the military will consume all available time. The challenge is to transcend the churn and fight to sustain the long-term big-picture view. *Is the enterprise doing everything in its power to ensure the provision of trained and ready forces now and in the future? If not, what is preventing the enterprise from doing so?* And then for the individual senior leader and the processes and systems they are responsible for, are they helping or hindering the enterprise’s cause?

There is always room for improvement. The enterprise can always be more effective, more efficient, better postured to address unforeseen issues, or better aligned with the needs of the environment. Improving the enterprise takes players, and not spectators.
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- Sec. 5043. Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Sec. 8013 and 8033. Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, respectively.
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