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Deception as a Supplement to the Instruments of National Security

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Abstract

The shift from a relatively stable bi-polar world has increased the need for supplements to the existing instruments of national power. To supplement national power without increasing costs, the U.S. should study and apply strategic deception. Deception is an effort to take active steps to manipulate and distract an opponent in order to shift the strategic picture, creating operating space for political as well as military actors. The returns for a modest investment in deception greatly exceed the initial costs. Examined here are Iraqi strategic deception efforts against Iran and against the Gulf War coalition, and the 1973 Egyptian deception campaign against the Israelis. Deception operations should be codified into policy at the national level, where they can then be mirrored down the chain of command into the agencies and the military. The Defense Intelligence Agency would coordinate, train, and monitor the effectiveness of Deception Planning Cells which are staffed by field grade officers with the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) of Deception Planner. The military could lead a cultural shift to use deception by incorporating it into its planning and operational cycle. This could in turn pave the way to incorporate it in conjunction with other national instruments of power.

Deception as a Supplement to the Instruments of National Security

We are never deceived; we deceive ourselves.

—Goethe¹

The modern world radically shifted in only one generation after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and the end of a unipolar world. Competing regional powers and non-state actors have changed the strategic environment. Within this time frame, globalization and technology have blurred the lines between tactical and strategic. Even the traditional Westphalian system of state actors is challenged by the rise of transnational groups and the number of states in crisis or failure. Added challenges include the effects of climate change and the spread of nuclear weapons and material. In this highly complex environment, American and Western nations still define rules based global security and prosperity as vital national interests. With these growing threats, the U.S., along with its allies, will have to spend more to maintain their world view. Resources are not infinite, and the American electorate is becoming reluctant to shoulder the costs associated with maintaining *Pax Americana*. Simply, the way to maintain international security in a more complex world, without increasing the associated costs, is to get greater effect from the existing instruments of national power.

One solution to achieve this is the judicious use and application of strategic deception. A low cost, but highly effective mechanism, deception generates strategic breathing space by creating imbalances in opponents. Deception is a highly complex effort, requiring knowledge of the opponent, and relying on the close coordination of multiple stakeholders. While inexpensive relative to its effects, those effects can be devastating. Deception is an art that must be designed and practiced by professionals within a coordinated framework. This requires the creation of a professionalized cadre

within the military which will coordinate its operations as a part of a whole-of-government strategic plan. Demonstrated success in the military and intelligence services will create models to apply this tool in conjunction with other instruments of national security policy.

The U.S. should look internally to find ways to supplement its instruments of national power without significant increases in costs. The study and application of deception into a whole of government approach is a viable solution. Strategic deception is an effort by a government or non-state actor to take active steps to manipulate and distract an opponent to create an opportunity to take unanticipated decisive action. To be effective, strategic deception needs to push the opponent's decision makers towards a plausible but incorrect conclusion, with efforts carefully tailored to support that opponent's cultural and historical biases. Deception plays on many levels to create a background which supports the proffered conclusion. When successful, it creates a strategic space for the deceiver, and puts the deceived at a disadvantage. If successful, the deceiver's psychological efforts create physical disadvantages of time, space, or resources.

Deception is inexpensive relative to its outcome. For a comparatively small investment of money and personnel, armies have achieved surprise at the strategic and tactical levels. An opponent surprised is an opponent initially unable to offer calculated effective resistance. In Operation FORTITUDE, using only a few thousand troops, and careful message coordination at the senior level, the World War II Allies deceived the Germans as to the D-Day landings.² Even tactical deceptions can have strategic effects. In the 1990 Gulf War, U.S. forces used a scratch unit of 460 men to tactically deceive

the Iraqis, while the Iraqis diverted U.S. airstrikes towards SCUD missile mock-ups in the Western Desert.³ Both were effective small scale operations that had strategic consequences. Each of these three deceptions were responsible for the opponent's strategic misapplication of massive amounts of resources.

Deception's Purpose, Targets, and Requirements

Deception is manipulating an adversary's perception to create an advantage, while disguising true objectives or capabilities. It targets decision makers and their roles within their organizations. It requires solid understanding of the opponent and creates narratives at multiple levels within multiple facets of power. The deception narratives are closely coordinated to be mutually supporting. These narratives closely mirror objective truth, and can be considered realistic possibilities. Deception is facilitated by innate human psychological biases. Because of the complexity of deception operations, they engender their own specific requirements. Joint Publication 3-13.4 has provided a basic list of six principle requirements they believe are needed to conduct military deception operations: focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and integration.⁴ These principles define the information needed to design a deception stratagem.

The designed stratagem is a psychological tool used to make an opponent undertake a physical action. An effectively designed stratagem, therefore, must be crafted to manipulate a specific target audience. Deception is not not providing the truth; it is setting up an alternative truth as more attractive. Opponents are rational actors who will examine any situation and make predictions of potential outcomes. So too must the deceiver examine and predict those objectively viable outcomes before beginning to craft a deception plan. The crafted plan uses multiple means to make one of the existing options look more attractive than the others. Deception is based on what is possible, so

the deceiver's presented option must look eminently reasonable, logical, and fit within the opponent's frame of expectations.⁵ The deceiver wants his victim to make a specific choice, and tips the scales towards the selected option. The specifics of how will greatly depend on the situation or the opponent. Academia can provide deep bench expertise and knowledge, while Signals intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) provide more relative information. All combine to form the holistic background needed to design attractive but false options. The more understanding one has of an opponent, the better the chances of the success.

Carefully constructed deception operations target the facets of an opponent's decision making apparatus by focusing on three core elements: leadership, the military, and the state (or population). Within the structure of those targets, deception operations provide information to the different vertical levels which range from strategic down to tactical. This deception information is also coordinated to be mutually supporting across the facets of leadership, military and state. This requires an understanding of the target, and highly coordinated messaging at all levels of the deception. The efforts of other instruments of strategic national power are also ongoing, and deception can tie into these. Deception may individually target the leadership, the military, and the state, but a concerted, culturally accurate, mutually supporting effort is more effective. In a successful deception campaign, an opponent looks to obtain confirmation of a hypothesis, and finds that it is supported by every input from tactical up to grand strategy, and across to the other elements of leadership, military, and state.

The opponent's leadership is the most important actor in any deception plan. Leadership makes and implements the decisions that are the physical manifestations of

the deceiver's planned psychological approach. The deceiver's goal is to produce an action or an inaction in support of the deceiver's intentions. Since leaders differ in making and implementing decisions, any deception plan requires a solid understanding of the leadership's role and how it operates within its own system. A deception plan may use multiple avenues to communicate its particular message, but all parts of the message are tailored to appeal to the target. By understanding how the leadership makes decisions, the deceivers create the conditions to guide the deceived.

The importance of the deceiver's approach aimed at the military is second only to the tailored approach to the leadership. It is usually military planners who focus on the physical elements of their opponents' forces. The deception effort guides the opponents' military leadership into making the wrong choice. It is a unique creation to appeal to a defined audience. As with the leadership and the state level deceptions, military deception too is only part of a strategic whole. It will be mirrored at all levels down from the strategic military leadership, and all efforts will be coordinated and mutually reinforcing of the overall narrative.

Since there are fewer decision makers in the leadership and the military than in the state, deception efforts aimed at the state are lower in priority, and more broad in scope. In this case state can refer to the population, the organs of the state governing apparatus, or the followers within a non-state actor. This deception plan does not have to be as detailed as the tailored approach to the leadership. However, it requires a deep cultural understanding of existing norms, and it must fit within the overall strategic plan. With the state or the population as the target audience, other instruments of national power have more opportunities to support the stratagem. Here, propaganda and other

information operations create an atmosphere which can help a deception plan become more believable. As deception's goal is to have an opponent to undertake an action, and as it is difficult to motivate an entire population, deception against a state is more effective when it is used to create an atmosphere that supports other ongoing deception operations.

Fundamentally there are two types of deception operations: reinforcing an existing perception or changing a held perception. Deception's target is a human being's concept of reality, and humans are filled with psychological biases. Two of the most important for deception are cognitive biases, where people attempt to fit evidence into a predetermined conclusion, and anchoring biases, where the first received information sets the tone for all further information received. Psychology demonstrates that humans are more likely to cling to perceptions, rather than to accept change.⁶ "With respect to deception, one overwhelming conclusion stands out: It is far easier to lead a target astray by reinforcing the target's existing beliefs, thus causing the target to ignore the contrary evidence of one's true intent, than to persuade a target to change his or her mind."⁷ Since it is more difficult to change perceptions, the deceiver should concentrate on the existing perceptions and work to reinforce them. This is the cognitive bias, providing what the opponent wants to see.

The second, anchoring bias, helps the deception by ensuring that future inputs are defined and limited to fit the initial narrative. All organizations, whether modern stratified armies or small terror cells, conduct a basic analysis of any situation: perceived inputs, calculation, and response. In government organs, analysts work to create clarity from the inputs they receive. Operating under pressure to divine their

opponent's intentions, analysts will often make early judgements based on less than clear inputs.⁸ A deception plan needs to allow enough time for the targeted analysts to perceive and examine the false option. "Perceptions are quick to form but then resist change. Once we have formed an impression about an object, event, or situation, we are biased toward continuing to perceive it in the same way."⁹ As analysts make judgements early in the assessment cycle, it makes sense to begin deception operations as early as possible. This allows time for an opponent to accept and hopefully defend the false narrative, even in the light of true evidence.

An example of an effective multi-layer stratagem targeting leadership and the state occurred in the years prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. Britain was battling the Nazis alone, while the U.S. remained neutral. The British stratagem forsook the military and instead targeted American legislators' support for isolationism, and the American population. This was a direct effort to influence U.S. lawmakers, and in turn shift U.S. policy towards support for Britain. The U.S. national strategy of isolationism was attacked, and public opinion was swayed by manipulated media. Senior U.S. political and cultural figures who supported isolationism were besmirched. By the war's end, the term 'isolationist' had almost become an insult. British success came from knowing the target, coordinating the messages they introduced at the lowest to the highest levels, and eventually influencing the U.S. leadership.¹⁰

Studies of Practical Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Deceptions

History provides some excellent examples of deception operations, both successful and unsuccessful. Examined here are Iraqi strategic deception efforts against Iran and against the Gulf War coalition, and the 1973 Egyptian deception campaign against the Israelis. The examples of successful deceptions confirm the

tenets that deception is to manipulate an opponent into undertaking an action, it requires an understanding of the target, and it requires coordinated messaging across the scope of the campaign. A final point is that these deception efforts were inexpensive relative to their successful outcomes.

Iraqi Deception Efforts in 2003 and 1991

With his strategic messaging about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in 1999-2003, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi high command present an interesting twist on Hitler's or Churchill's public pronouncements during World War II.¹¹ Saddam had two separate and nearly contradictory messages to send, one to the international community and one to his enemy Iran about his WMD programs. Saddam was in a bind, "... simultaneously attempting to deceive one audience that they were gone, and another that Iraq still had them."¹² Iraq had used chemical and biological weapons to halt Iranian human wave attacks in the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam had also used them against his rebellious Kurdish subjects. Post-Gulf War documents led to the discovery of a secret Iraqi quest to build nuclear weapons. By 1998, Iraq was under a UN mandate to destroy all its WMD stockpiles, and had demonstrated its willingness to appear to mislead UN weapons inspectors operating under the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).¹³ Examples included when weapons inspectors were denied entry to military facilities at the same time as the Iraqi military was seen to be moving equipment out of the facilities. Iraqi military units discussed removing the terms "nerve gas" from their radio traffic.¹⁴ Despite this apparent evidence, the UN weapon inspectors never found proof of Iraqi WMD. The entire effort seemed to show that Iraq was hiding WMD from inspectors.¹⁵ Saddam made the calculation that it was better to have the UN i suspect he was cheating by keeping WMD, than to make himself vulnerable to the

Iranians or his own restive population by admitting he had come clean on his weapons program. Even as U.S. military forces were gathering in Kuwait, Saddam still did not believe the U.S. would drive to unseat him, while he knew very well that an internal coup or a successful Iranian invasion would end with his death.¹⁶ His deception plan against the UN targeted the weapons inspectors themselves, with the idea they would report his crafted narrative to the UN main body. His deception plan against Iran included strategic messaging of his military capabilities through the expectation that the UN would publically accuse him of having chemical weapons. His pronouncements, and not so hidden subterfuge, were a clever use of strategic messaging to upset Iran's military calculus, and bolster Iraq's internal and external defense.

Following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Iraqis ran a media campaign broadly aimed at their Arab military opponents. It was designed to show the American forces as weak, cowardly, and unwilling to fight the Iraqis. Ironically it claimed that the U.S. forces were shifting from the fortified coastal area of Kuwait further to the west, leaving the Arab armies to fight Iraq alone. The Iraqi military based this deception effort on their belief that the U.S. forces would attack straight north from the Saudi-Kuwait border. This deception may have reinforced Iraqi analysis of coalition movements, as U.S. forces were moving to the west, and any inputs received by the Iraqis could be assumed to have come from their own propaganda.¹⁷ In this case, internal secrecy and compartmentalization, important features of any deception plan, might have only added to the confusion. For the Iraqis, the campaign had no positive effect. While it properly targeted their Arab opponents, it violated the aforementioned concepts of using deception to force an opponent to undertake an action. This Iraqi effort was not part of a

greater strategic plan; it did not serve to mask Iraqi actions, or get coalition forces to move anywhere. The poorly conceived plan backfired as it only served to potentially blind their own analysis.

Egyptian Deception in the 1973 Yom Kippur War

Egyptian efforts in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 demonstrate successful strategic, operational, and tactical deceptions, against targets within Israeli leadership, military and the state. In late spring 1972, a state of 'no peace, no war' defined the Arab-Israeli status quo.¹⁸ The stinging Arab defeat in 1967 and loss of territory did not sit well with the Arab leadership or the Arab street, and to compound matters, Egypt's economic situation was worsening. By late 1972, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat decided that only war would break the stalemate, and with his Syrian allies began planning to launch what became the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War.

The first steps in Egypt's deception plan targeted the Israeli leadership and state, through Egyptian strategic messaging. The Egyptians and Syrians used state controlled media to broadcast an appearance of passivity. The Egyptian leadership fed the state press with reports of planned trips by President Sadat during October, the regime's attempts to rekindle diplomatic efforts at the UN, and public complaints about the low state of Egyptian Army readiness.¹⁹ Sadat's government inquired of U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger about the potential to further discuss the UN Resolution 242. This successful Egyptian disinformation campaign can be referred to as the sounds of silence, where a quiet international environment acts as background noise which, by conditioning observers to a peaceful routine, actually covers preparations for war.²⁰ Unlike the Iraqi media announcements, Egyptian media efforts masked their own

military preparations, and reassured the Israeli leadership and population that Egypt was not going to war.

At the operational level, which targeted the Israeli military leadership, the Egyptian deception had three main goals: inhibit consolidation of military installations on occupied land, keep Israel off balance by forcing military call ups, and lull the Israelis into a false sense of security.²¹ In addition to random cross-Suez Canal shelling, the Egyptians maintained a constant state of military readiness that ensured the Israelis would have to undergo repeated call ups and mobilizations for little reason but to inure the Israelis to the multiple false alarms. Due to Israel's small population, reserve mobilizations were expensive. Prior to initiating the October attack, the Egyptians had mobilized in May, August, and September, 1973.²² The Israelis matched the first two mobilizations with their own, but decided not to mobilize a third time. The Egyptians added to this deception by publically demobilizing troops in early October, lulling the Israelis into a false sense of calm.²³ In addition to the mobilizations and stand downs, the Egyptians conducted slipshod tactical level defensive military exercises within view of the Israeli positions while conducting offensive operational exercises deep in the desert.²⁴ The near comical exercises in view of the Israelis reinforced previously held Israeli perceptions of the poor readiness of the Egyptian military. The Israeli military was carefully shown what they already believed: mobilizations that had no purpose, public demobilizations, and poorly disciplined troops manning the Suez Canal.

There is potentially another dimension to the Egyptian strategic deception efforts; the use of a double agent. A Mossad-recruited Egyptian, Marwan Ashraf, who was Sadat's chief of staff, might have been a plant feeding false information to the Israelis.²⁵

This agent could, like the British Double Cross system of WWII, have rounded out Israel's assessment by providing an ostensibly third party source.²⁶ The asset added to his legitimacy by reporting the possibility of an invasion only a few hours before the invasion took place. The asset also revealed Sadat's war aims, which were to achieve limited territorial gains, and be in a better position to restart negotiations with Israel. The last piece might have been Sadat's messaging to his opponent that he would not be driving to Jerusalem, and thereby trigger an Israeli nuclear defense. If true, the use of a double agent demonstrates the high level of skill which Egypt used in its broad-spectrum deception planning.

The Egyptian deceptions for the October War were successful from the strategic down to the tactical, and accurately targeted Israeli leadership, military and population. Each aspect of the deception supported the other and fit into a simple grand stratagem: lull the Israelis. The Egyptians created a mood of bellicose rhetoric, but which was not matched by any major military efforts. The plan did not try to change Israeli perceptions, but instead encouraged the misperception that the Egyptian military was unprepared, and incompetent. Israeli leadership and the state received Egyptian strategic messaging via the media, while the Israeli military was duped by staged military exercises. The successful deceptions at all levels allowed Egyptian units to cross the Suez Canal, penetrate the Bar Lev Line, and drive deep into the Sinai, successes that would not have been possible without its deception plan.

Challenges and Opportunities of Deception in 2020-2025

Given that strategic deception is effective, and relatively inexpensive, it has particular relevance for the U.S. in today's resource constrained and uncertain world. Future national security operations will require more attention to deception than is

currently being applied. To reach a point where the broad application of strategic deception becomes normal requires the tools and a supporting philosophy which encourages deception. Introduction of a major philosophical shift to consider and use strategic deception across the instruments of national security would be unrealistic, and the effort would probably have little chance of success. A smaller application using a proof of concept would have a better chance of succeeding, and then becoming a model upon which the concept could be expanded. The military has the most experience with deception operations, and given its structure, budget, and manpower capabilities, it would be a logical branch upon which to build a proof of concept.

The last 15 years have witnessed a tectonic shift in the availability, dissemination and control of information, all of which affect deception operations. The ubiquity of smart phones, combined with the near universal access to the internet, have changed the whole dynamic of how people and organizations receive and process information. The time surrounding sending and receiving messages has collapsed, as strategic messages can now be instantaneous. Even strategic leaders send out government policy positions and intentions via Tweet messages. Massive popular uprisings were organized near instantaneously while repressive governments attempted to control these populations by restricting internet access. This upsurge in the amount of available information has affected intelligence collection and deception operations differently. Some particular changes are how information is collected, analyzed, processed and interpreted, and the time which each of these actions require. The newer speeds in receiving and dissembling information have changed some aspects of how deception is conducted.

The ease by which individuals can enter into the domain of what was previously only available to intelligence services or the publishing industry has created a vast repository of information. It would seem that this expansion of access to information would make deception more difficult. However, the information flow can be used to both perceive and deceive. Information collection is always ongoing via multiple collection methods; however, it creates a paradox of more information but potentially less understanding. An intelligence analyst receives collected information, studies it, draws conclusions, and publishes intelligence reports. As the analyst receives information, he requires more confirmation of the information collected. More collected information results in more confirmation requirements, which are satisfied through more collection—a vicious circle. At times, the information reaching analysts can become so great as to overwhelm the recipients.²⁷ This affects integration of a deception plan, as the deceiver wants the deceived to be able to receive the false signals from across the collection spectrum.

Modern technology has greatly increased some intelligence collection capabilities; three of the main areas are SIGINT, IMINT/GEOINT or satellite Imagery Intelligence, and the extensive growth of media platforms called Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). As each collection capability advanced, defensive measures likewise increased. Modern military radios use encoded frequency hopping communications across a wide signal spectrum, thereby practically eliminating the ability to decode the communications, or often to identify it by type. This obfuscation has the perverse effect of making it easier to replicate for deception purposes. Clusters of overlapping cell phone signals can indicate large numbers of people in one place, and

just as easily signals can be made to look like large numbers of people in one place. Satellite or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) collected imagery has increased, but it still cannot reveal the intention behind the images. Camouflage and obscurity have mirrored observational advances. The older mass media of cable news TV, radio, or newsprint are still manipulated the traditional way: through the provision of false or carefully selected information. And finally, while there is an abundance of social media reporting, valuable information becomes lost in the electronic flood.

Multi-spectrum information collection can make it more difficult to deceive as there are many different ways to compare the validity of the incoming information, but the advantage still lies with the deceiver for two reasons. The first is that information flow is vastly greater, but not necessarily clearer. There are now larger repositories of information to review, which slows down analysis. Once reliable sources of intelligence confirmation, such as SIGINT, can now be more easily and cheaply manipulated. The second point returns to the inherent human tendency to maintain previous biases, and to invent excuses to ignore contrary evidence, locking decision makers into a perception. As Joel Brenner, former counsel at NSA, noted in 2015, "Very few things will be secret anymore, and those things which are kept secret won't stay secret very long...The real goal in security now is to retard the degradation of the half-lives of secrets. Secrets are like isotopes."²⁸ However, if properly designed at the outset, and in line with other viable alternatives, the deception plan might be able to weather inadvertent discovery, or partial exposure. Barring a shift in intelligence collection and analysis philosophy, the deceiver will still have the initial upper hand.

American society places great value in the openness of its representative government, and in its free press, with which it holds government leaders accountable. There are obstacles to incorporating the use of deception within the government, particularly the deep seated American belief that deception is not fair, or that it confounds those U.S. values of openness and honesty. Despite living in a society that bombards people with the crafted deceptions of Madison Avenue and Hollywood, Americans view deception as sneaky, or underhanded.²⁹ While deception has its place in the arsenal of government tools, it must be carefully employed so that it does not violate the public's trust in a free media or in the authenticity of the government itself. It cannot confound U.S. values. This delicate balance was on display after the 1990-1991 Gulf War when the media complained that it had been used as part of the coalition's deception campaign.³⁰ It is important to reinforce the American values of an honest government and a free media that is not a government propaganda arm.

It is for these reasons that many do not support the use of deception. Since incorporating deception as a supplement to the instruments of national power might be difficult for some Americans to accept, it would be more practical to apply it initially within a military context. A redefinition of terms might also help overcome some preconceived biases against 'deception', such as using the term 'managing perceptions'. Regardless of the terms used, if the U.S. is going to commit to an action, it should commit to using all available tools. Considering deception as just another tool, will facilitate its application. It is hard to argue with deception's value in its effect on the opponent: a misapplication of resources, surprise, and the creation of strategic operating space. The returns on investment of people, resources, and risk to achieve

strategic aims of misleading an opponent are high. Without having to commit all available resources, the deceiver can unbalance or even manipulate an opponent into a beneficial strategic position. Deception operations constrain an opponent and reduce his strategic options, which in a zero-sum game, create a benefit for the practitioner. Since deception creates hard-to-shake biases and assumptions, it is beneficial to introduce these designed biases early. The incorporation of deception planning and operations into national strategic decision making should begin with defense policy.

Policy is the authorization and codification of philosophy, and demonstrates the institution's support and commitment. Deception operations should be codified into policy at the national level, where they can then be mirrored down the chain of command into the agencies and the military. Executive and agency level policies provide guidance, and direct the conduct of deception operations. Specific military guidance would be under Department of Defense (DOD) policy which would identify the organization, structure, authorities and resources required. The DOD policy would articulate deception's mission and scope within the strategic and theater operational environments, specifically the size and role of deception cells within the combatant commands. DOD policy would also direct the coordination of deception operations across the DOD, and with other agencies as applicable.

At the national level the President, through the National Security Council (NSC), would direct the examination of the potential to use strategic deception in the decision-making process. This would be articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSC would determine if strategic deception would facilitate achieving the national strategic goals. If deception were to be included in the NSS as a requirement, it would

create the bureaucratic impetus needed by the Secretary of Defense to institute the program across the DOD.

Via the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Secretary of Defense would direct the use of deception operations within the DOD to support national security policies and objectives. The Secretary of Defense, and his subordinates, would approve the deception programs submitted under the Combatant Commanders' Operational Plans (OPLAN). The various offices would ensure the proposed deception effort is synchronized with national strategic goals or end states.

Of the multiple federal agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would be well suited to develop and coordinate deception operations. DIA collects and analyzes military intelligence from multiple collection sources. The Central Intelligence Agency also has a long history of direct intelligence support to the military. The close cooperation between the CIA and the military facilitates deception operations. The FBI runs counter-intelligence operations, and their assistance could provide invaluable in a large-scale deception operation. Additionally, the DHS manages multiple organizations that have a history of counter-intelligence or law enforcement operations. All of these agencies have liaison officers among themselves, allowing for close coordination and a division of responsibilities. The synchronization across agencies allows for a leveraging of strengths and will result in a better deception operation.

Since it is a both a separate DOD Agency and commanded by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)'s J2, DIA would be uniquely positioned to provide direct

support to the Geographic Combatant Commander's (GCC) deception operations. As part of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), the J2 is tasked with understanding the adversary's beliefs, perceptions, and likely reactions.³¹ This would make it a logical focal point from which to coordinate strategic military deception operations as planning starts. Deception requires intelligence and counter-intelligence, both of which reside within DIA. DIA would be able to facilitate and coordinate some aspects of the six principles of military deception planning noted in JP 3-13.4. This includes both providing information about the target, centralized control, integration, and in designing and implementing deception operations. Although not as accurate as Britain's monitoring of decrypted German Enigma signals, DIA would be able to provide feedback on the deception plan. Through a targeted intelligence collection mission in coordination with the rest of the intelligence community, DIA could use both collection and analysis to gauge the effectiveness of ongoing deception operations.

At the Geographic Combatant Command level, deception would be incorporated into a classified annex to the OPLAN and run from a Deception Planning Cell. Officers staffing the Deception Planning Cells would have access to and be included in joint planning groups, and would have oversight of the associated deception plans. This oversight would be backed by the GCC commander, and within the GCC it would be mirrored down to the service component level.

The basic requirement is a professionalized work force, and institutionalized apparatus to support them. The designated deception planners will be integrated and will operate within the J3/5 and at the G3/5. The deception plans would be created in

the J5 and the G5, and then passed along with the operational plans to the J3 and G3 for operations. Each operational plan would have an accompanying deception plan incorporated into it. Deception Planning Cell liaisons in each major supported command would coordinate with their respective operational planners to ensure a unity of the deception effort. If properly compartmented at the theater and joint GCC level, sub units would be unaware their movements or actions might be in support of a deception campaign.

As deception is a deliberate manipulation of the human opponent's choices, the most important element of deception is its human practitioner. To create this pool of deception planners, the military would identify appropriate field grade officers and provide the opportunity to obtain an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) as a Deception Planner. This additional skill set engenders minimal administrative or personnel requirements. The selected officers would serve in the GCC or at the service level in alternating rotations as either an actual planner or a deception planner. It allows officers to move into and out of the deception planning field as they move through their career, and it would not hinder their career advancement. By directing that an officer with the ASI does not serve back to back positions within this ASI, it ensures the officers remain proficient in their primary skill set.

This practitioner must have a complete understanding of the operational art to create viable false choices. The best source for these officers would be those with operational maneuver experience. The concepts involved in deception already exist in operational planners as they consider courses of action and red-team their ideas. Viewing a problem from the opposing side is key to creating a successful deception. It

requires understanding both the operational art and how an opponent will think and react. While it might be easy to select officers from the intelligence field, as they come from a culture that prizes secrecy, the officers selected to work in deception need an operational maneuver background. Future deception planners must be selected from the officers that already have a deep understanding of their operational art.

Since the Defense Intelligence Agency would monitor the effectiveness of the GCC deception operations, and as it maintains the Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS), so too could DIA design and manage a common training regime for an ASI in Deception Planning. This training would begin the professionalization of the practitioners, and DIA's institutionalization of its practices would signal its permanence. Curricula would introduce national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. Training would emphasize creating deception planning that is coordinated with other elements within the command structure, and build upon the officer's current experience in his own individual field. Leveraging their current expertise, these officers will learn to create unique and viable deception plans that fit within the command structure. A select few officers would have to serve on staff at DIA to facilitate the cooperation between the agency and the planners in the GCC Deception Planning Cells, and to monitor the ASI training program. The joint training program run at DIA would introduce the officers to the programs within the agency that will facilitate their future planning efforts. Upon their return to their individual units, these officers would have a common training touchstone, which facilitates future cooperation.

Conclusion

Deception planning and deception operations should be used consistently at the GCC and service component commands during steady-state and normal operations.

Deception operations are often more art than science, and art takes practice. Deception architecture is not built overnight, and successful operations require experienced practitioners. While the U.S. military learned and applied great lessons from WWII, one lesson that was left to atrophy was the use of strategic deception. Unfortunately, the skills learned from this strategic, multi-service, and multi-national effort were not incorporated into post-war doctrine. As the dangers of mistakes in wartime are too high, peacetime provides the opportunity to develop and build future deception operations.

Deception has the ability to help shift the strategic picture, creating operating space for political as well as military actors. Even if only used in coordination with the instrument of national military power, deception is effective in creating a strategic imbalance in opponents. The returns for a modest investment in deception greatly exceed the initial costs. In major military conflicts, Americans have at times used military deception to great effect. However, America has never incorporated its multiple instruments of national power into a grand deception plan. Although there is cultural and political opposition to using deception, the shift of the modern world away from a relatively stable bi-polar world has increased the need for supplements to traditional power. The military could lead a cultural shift to use deception by incorporating it into its planning and operational cycle. This could in turn pave the way to incorporate it in conjunction with other national elements of power. With the changing world, and opponents who look for every advantage, it is an opportune time to use ingenuity and intellectual power to help maintain American hegemony.

Endnotes

¹ Goodreads, "Jonathan Wolfgang von Goethe: Quotes: Quotable Quote," <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/93663-we-are-never-deceived-we-deceive-ourselves> (accessed March 23, 2017).

² Roger Hesketh, *FORTITUDE, The D-Day Deception Campaign* (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2000). Operation FORTITUDE was the cover name given to the massive U.S./UK multi-year effort to convince the German High Command that the Allied invasion would fall at Pas De Calais and not Normandy. It involved the use of false radio signals, dummy equipment, fake armies with real commanders (General George S. Patton, Jr.), and coopted Nazi spies. As the ULTRA Program decoded encrypted German signals, the Allies could monitor the effectiveness of FORTITUDE. The German General Staff and Hitler were persuaded that Calais was the real target of the invasion, and withheld Panzer reinforcements which could have defeated the Normandy landings.

³ U.S. Marine Corps, *Liberators of Kuwait City: 1st Marine Division, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Aug. 8, 1990 – Feb. 28, 1991* (Camp Pendleton, CA: U.S. Marine Corps, 1992), 74-77; Charles J Quilter, *US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1993), 65; Charles W. Kershaw, LtCol, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Task Force Troy, telephone interview by author, November 7, 2016. A 460-man multiservice scratch unit, commanded by U.S. Marine Corps LtCol Kershaw used a combination of mock ups, live fire, and close air support to mimic the presence of the 2nd Marine Division. The division had disengaged and begun its movement to new positions far to the west. Postwar interviews of Iraqi forces confirmed the deception's success as the Iraqis continued to believe they were facing the entire 2nd Marine Division; Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, eds. *The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978–2001* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 187. In 1990, Iraqi SCUD Force Commander LTG Hazam Ayubi used only a few men to build a series of 26 decoy SCUD missiles and launchers that were emplaced among their real launch sites. Throughout the period of hostilities, multiple squadrons of U.S. airpower were expended against the launchers (both real and mock-ups) instead of their primary mission of striking command and control in Baghdad.

⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Military Deception*, Joint Publication 3-13.4 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 26, 2012), I-6.

⁵ Hesketh, *FORTITUDE, The D-Day Deception Campaign*. In 1944, the German General Staff had enough information to know an invasion of Europe was imminent, and understood that the French coast between Cherbourg and the Pas de Calais had several viable invasion locations. Operation FORTITUDE played on both the General Staff and on Adolf Hitler to make Calais appear the more logical. Without the deception plan, the German Army would have considered either beach to be a viable invasion point from England. The deception plan merely tipped the balance towards one of two logical choices.

⁶ Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind, Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion* (New York: Vintage Books, Jan 2013).

⁷ Richards J. Heuer, "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1981): 298.

⁸ Ephraim Kam, *Surprise Attack, The Victim's Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 91.

⁹ Heuer, "Strategic Deception and Counterdeception," 297.

¹⁰ Thomas E. Mahl, *Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-44* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1998). Mahl details a multi-year effort to use the media to sway the American electorate and in turn their representatives, combined with direct pressure on U.S. legislators. The campaign was supported by wealthy and powerful Americans who had close ties to Britain. The effort worked because the deceivers intimately understood those touchstones which defined American culture. Pro-British propaganda set the stage to shift popular U.S. perceptions. The British used the American media to hector and shame opponents, and laud supporters. They manipulated or created false polls showing broad U.S. popular support for their cause, and made sure legislators were aware of the ostensible shift away from isolationism. With this complete understanding of the target, they manipulated the American population, knowing that the population would in turn influence their leadership.

¹¹ Barton Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War* (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), 161. Churchill's constant and public talk in 1943 about the "soft underbelly of Europe" caused the German high command to believe an Adriatic invasion was possible even with scant evidence. They continued to garrison Wehrmacht formations in Yugoslavia rather than move them to oppose actual Allied landings in northern Europe. Hitler too used a similar tactic in 1941. He publicly and repeatedly said he would not enter in to a two-front war, yet launched Operation Barbarossa while fighting in western Europe. Any discovered evidence of Barbarossa's troop buildup in the East was explained away as preparations to invade England.

¹² Kevin M. Woods et al., *Iraqi Perspectives Project. A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership* (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2006), 91.

¹³ Jeffery Richelson, *Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: National Security Archives, February 20, 2004), <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/#2> (accessed January 7, 2017).

¹⁴ Woods et al., *Iraqi Perspectives Project. A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership*, 93.

¹⁵ *A Decade of Deception and Defiance, Saddam Hussein's Defiance of the United Nations*, Background paper for George W. Bush speech to UN General Assembly (Washington, DC: National Security Archives, September 12, 2002), <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd13.pdf> (accessed January 17, 2017).

¹⁶ Woods et al., *Iraqi Perspectives Project. A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership*, 15, 25, 45.

¹⁷ Kevin M. Woods, *The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War* (Newport, RI: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 200-201.

¹⁸ Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, *Elusive Victory, The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). Egyptian journalist Mohammed Heikal described a state of 'no peace, no war' to define the Arab-Israeli status quo, especially during the time of U.S.-USSR détente.

¹⁹ Ossama El-Sawah, *Deception in the Ramadan War, October 1973*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1999), 18-19.

²⁰ Michael I Handel, *Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, Vol. 19, 1976), 197.

²¹ Frank Aker, *October 1973 The Arab Israeli War* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985), 9.

²² Jon Latimer, *Deception in War* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001), 83.

²³ Ossama El-Sawah, *Deception in the Ramadan War, October 1973*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1999), 17.

²⁴ Aker, *The Arab Israeli War*, 10.

²⁵ Abraham Rabinovich, "Our Mysterious Man on Nile," *The Jerusalem Post*, February 17, 2011, <http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Features/Our-mysterious-man-on-the-Nile> (accessed February 12, 2017).

²⁶ J.C. Masterman, *The Double Cross System in the War from 1939 to 1945* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972). The British had caught and turned or imprisoned all Nazi agents in the U.K., and used these doubled agents to feed misinformation back to the German intelligence. To increase the bona fides of one agent, they had him transmit a warning of the D-Day invasion at Normandy, but only a few hours before the actual invasion. It would be too late stop the invasion, but would bolster the agent's credentials in German eyes.

²⁷ Ephraim Kam, *Surprise Attack, The Victim's Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 54.

²⁸ Daniel C. Dennet and Deb Roy, "Our Transparent Future. No Secret is Safe in the Digital Age. The Implications for our Institutions are downright Darwinian," April 6, 2015, <https://medium.com/@dkroy/our-transparent-future-aa86a7bcfe85#.p449mig37> (accessed February 15, 2017).

²⁹ Walter Jajko, "Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning," *Comparative Strategy* 21, no. 5 (2002): 352. Reflecting a common opinion of the time, FDR's Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, said, "gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

³⁰ Jon Latimer, *Deception in War* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001), 298, Illustration #27. In 1990, the U.S. military allowed the media to report on the large number of U.S. Marines practicing shore landing and beach assaults. As intended, these reports furthered the Iraqi belief in a seaborne assault. After the war, the media accused the government of being manipulated into supporting a deception campaign. Even though the military never lied to the media, some media outlets felt angry enough to publish their displeasure.

³¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Insights and Best Practices, Joint Operations*, 4th ed. (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 2013), 60, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/joint_operations_fp.pdf (accessed January 13, 2017).