

Strategy Research Project

A Military Theory for Destroying Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Organizations

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Abstract

In 1961, French counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner Roger Trinquier wrote that the “master concept” of “modern war”—wars between nation states and insurgents and terrorists—is the destruction of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations. The theory presented in this work, the Simultaneous Attack/Persistent Pursuit (SAPP) theory, achieves Trinquier’s master concept. It is a theory of war following the historical pattern of military theories aimed at the destruction of the enemy forces through maneuver and annihilation, but does so using an element of complexity theory called “emergence.” The theory achieves decisive success by denying two key aspects of insurgent and terrorist warfare—ambiguity and protractedness. It denies ambiguity by applying overwhelming force simultaneously against all known or suspected elements of the clandestine organization to shock the system and force the emergence or exposure of formerly hidden elements. Persistent pursuit is then used to rapidly force the continued emergence of the remaining elements until decisively destroyed to deny protractedness.

A Military Theory for Destroying Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Organizations

Western nation states have historically struggled to counter insurgent and terrorist movements whose strategies rely on two key characteristics to achieve their political goals— *ambiguity* and *protractedness*.¹ *Ambiguity* is the intentional effort by the insurgent and terrorist movements to deny the nation states the ability to decisively detect, engage, and destroy the critical element of the movement—the clandestine organization.² *Protractedness* is the intentional extension of the conflict in time and space by the insurgent and terrorist movements through *ambiguity* to asymmetrically defeat the nation states through political, military, economic, and/or moral exhaustion.³ Insurgent and terrorist movements use these two characteristics to “postpone decisive action, avoid defeat, sustain themselves, expand their support, and alter the power balance in their favor.”⁴ Together, *ambiguity* and *protractedness* allow insurgent and terrorist organizations to achieve their desired political outcomes or end states based on their strategic logic of “winning by not losing.”⁵ Historically, nation states have accepted, rather than challenged *ambiguity* and *protractedness* as natural elements of insurgent and terrorist strategies.⁶

This paper posits that the clandestine organization within the insurgent and terrorist movement is the critical component for long-term survival or *protractedness*, and thus the greatest practitioner and benefactor of ambiguity. If all else fails, and the overt forces are destroyed, the clandestine organization achieves the strategic logic of *winning by not losing*.

In his 1961 book, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, French counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner Roger Trinquier wrote that the “master

concept” of “modern war”—wars between nation states and insurgents and terrorists—is the destruction of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations.⁷ Based on Trinquier’s master concept, this study looks at the feasibility of the destruction of clandestine insurgent and terrorist organization as the way for the nation states to deny *ambiguity to the clandestine organization*, which inherently denies *protractedness* at the same time. The goal of denying ambiguity to the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organization is to expose the clandestine members to greater targetability and ultimately destruction per Trinquier.⁸

This construct provides the opportunity for a decisive military theory applied by the nation states against clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations to overcome *ambiguity* and *protractedness* in the shortest amount of time to achieve the desired military end state or political objective of destruction.⁹ There are currently no counterinsurgency or counterterrorism theories or strategies that attempt to specifically deny the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations’ *ambiguity* and *protractedness* as an overarching goal or objective.¹⁰

Based on the above, the theory presented in this work, the *Simultaneous Attack/Persistent Pursuit* (SAPP) theory, achieves Trinquier’s master concept of destruction of the clandestine organization through the denial of ambiguity, and protractedness. SAPP is a theory of war following the historical patterns of military theories aimed at the destruction of the enemy forces through maneuver and annihilation, but does so using an element of complexity theory called “emergence.”¹¹ The theory achieves decisive success by denying *ambiguity* and *protractedness*. It denies *ambiguity* by applying overwhelming force simultaneously against all known or

suspected elements of the clandestine organization to shock the system and force the emergence or exposure of formerly hidden elements.¹² *Persistent pursuit* is then used to rapidly force the continued emergence of the remaining elements until decisively destroyed to deny *protractedness*.

The SAPP theory is a universal theory for destroying clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations at the national, transnational, and/or global levels.¹³ This theory is posited as a theory of war or a military theory because it centers on the use of “force to compel our enemy to do our will.”¹⁴ For this theory, force is used to kill or capture all members of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations resulting in the organizations’ decisive destruction.

The frame of reference for this theory is from the nation state or nation states’ perspective, facing national, transnational, and/or global clandestine insurgent or terrorist organizations which threaten their national interests, either directly or indirectly. For nation states confronting domestic clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations, the theory can be applied predominately as a law enforcement theory with considerations for the nation states’ legal limitations.¹⁵

The theory can also be applied to clandestine insurgent and terrorist networks regionally and globally in partnership with other nation states, with some nations leveraging their domestic law enforcement and military capabilities internally, while being supported by other nations through military support. The nation state's ability to impart force at each level depends on its national will, capabilities, command and control, sustainment, and strategic and operational mobility and maneuver. While most nations states can operate at the national and transnational levels, very few have the

ability operate globally. The United States is one of the few nation states this theory envisions capable of not only executing global operations, but synchronizing them as well. The United States can also execute unilateral operations transnationally, but preferably the United States supports and enables partner nations conducting transnational and national efforts. Recently published U.S. joint force and military service future concepts align well with SAPP theory at all levels.¹⁶

The SAPP theory fits the description of military theory as described by two strategic theorists Colin Gray and Milan Vego. Both Gray and Vego agree that sound military theory explains how to conduct and win a war against a specific enemy—in the case of the SAPP theory—clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations.¹⁷ Vego further delineates general and specific theories of war, where general theories apply to “war as a whole,” while specific theories focus on a specified threat, military action, domain of war, or art of war.¹⁸ Based on this description, the SAPP theory is a specific theory, but also universal in that it applies to the full spectrum of clandestine insurgent and terrorist networks at the national, transnational, and global levels.

Additionally, this theory strives to achieve Vego’s concept that, “Military theory should develop a way of thinking rather than prescribe rules of war.”¹⁹ This theory challenges conventional thinking, not only about the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations, but their strategies, and long-held beliefs about the efficacy of population and enemy-centric counterinsurgency and counterterrorism theories of the nation states favored today. Finally, as noted above, this theory incorporates the other elements of national power to achieve Vego’s concept that “sound military theory should encompass

not only military but also nonmilitary aspects that affect preparations for and conduct of war.”²⁰

The SAPP theory as explained below takes into account Gray and Vego’s points, and frames the theory using a narrative form of a theory development model which frames the problem and provides the theoretical solution consisting of a hypothesis, theory description, assumptions and premises, hypothesis testing, and a transition from theory to practice. Key terms are defined throughout the narrative or in the end notes for ease of reference, and the end notes also encompass expanded commentary on the theory presented below.

Framing the Problem

The problem frame will explore the nuances of clandestine organizations, their relations with the other organizational elements of an insurgent and terrorist organization, and describe the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the organizational form and function. Secondly, the problem frame discusses the nation state’s efforts to counter insurgent and terrorist organizations from the perspective of the population and enemy-centric theories.

Clandestine Organizations

Generally, insurgent and terrorist organizations have both overt and clandestine elements. Clandestine elements, consisting of underground and auxiliary support networks, are cloaked in *ambiguity* for survival through the application of clandestine form via compartmentalization, and clandestine function through clandestine tradecraft.²¹ The clandestine members operate *ambiguously* under constant pressure and fear of death or capture in a cat and mouse game with the nation state’s military forces and law enforcement.²² The overt elements consist of guerrilla units and/or

insurgent or terrorist armies. Paramilitary guerrilla units of varying sizes use hit-and-run tactics but do not seek or want decisive engagements with the nation state's military forces. Insurgent and terrorist armies are large, conventionally organized and equipped. They are capable of seizing and holding terrain and challenging with the nation states' conventional forces directly. The clandestine and overt elements develop over time depending on the human terrain—urban or rural, the security environment, and the size and composition of the clandestine and overt elements required to achieve the political goals of the movement.

The growth of the clandestine and overt forces follow Mao Tse-Tung's three phase construct for protracted war: *strategic defensive*, *strategic stalemate*, and *strategic counteroffensive*.²³ *The strategic defensive* includes organizing clandestinely, growing both clandestine networks and overt units with purpose based on the threat of detection and goals, conducting subversion and sabotage against the nation states, and ultimately protecting the clandestine organization until the political goal is achieved. In most cases, the clandestine organization remains on the strategic defensive as a protective measure as the overt elements advance to other phases. Some movements, especially clandestine terrorist organizations, may never transition out of this phase and still achieve their objectives.

The strategic stalemate includes the growth and employment of guerrilla units, who conduct guerrilla warfare to wear down the nation states. Finally, *the strategic counteroffensive* consists of mobile warfare by insurgent and terrorist armies directly challenging the nation state's conventional military forces. Based on successes and failures, the insurgent and terrorist organizations can transition between these phases.²⁴

What does not change is that the clandestine organization is always present and prepared to start over in *the strategic defensive* phase should the overt element be defeated or destroyed. If the insurgency is pushed back or is limited to *the strategic defensive*, the nation states could potentially deny *ambiguity* to and destroy the remaining clandestine organization ending the movement.

Consequently, the insurgent and terrorist movements' long-term survival and political success are dependent on the clandestine organizations.²⁵ Despite their obvious importance, the clandestine organizations are largely misunderstood and overlooked by the nation states.²⁶ Instead the nation states orient on the overt forces of the insurgent and terrorist organizations which are the most visible to threat nation states' populations, military, and government. Despite the visible and direct threat of the overt forces, the members of the clandestine organization are the actual "puppet masters" of the overall insurgent and terrorist organizations—the overt forces are simply their "puppets." Furthermore, the overt forces are not cloaked in *ambiguity* because they are much easier to replace than the members of clandestine organizations. In the same way, puppets are much easier to replace than the puppet masters.

Despite the clandestine organizations' critical "puppet master" role in the overall movement, the clandestine organization is the least understood component by the nation states as noted above. The clandestine organizations are historically four or more times the size of the overt elements—a scale that is critical to understand.²⁷ Developing estimates of the size of insurgent and terrorist organizations are difficult and tend to default to the size of the overt elements.²⁸ The clandestine organizations are generally organized as human networks with command, control, operations, information

operations, logistics and finance, intelligence, counterintelligence, shadow government, evasion, recruiting, and training networks.²⁹ The human networks leverage clandestine physical infrastructure to support their specific network efforts, such as secure clandestine safe houses, meeting sites, bed-down locations, headquarters, logistic hubs, caches, cover businesses, hospitals, etc. Due to the criticality of the infrastructure, numerous locations of each type are established. Each additional location increases the options and flexibility for the clandestine members if a site is interdicted by the nation states. In many cases, the additional options allow the clandestine members to make survivability moves every few hours to a few days to deny the nation states the ability to pinpoint their location.³⁰ The clandestine organizations protect both the human networks and physical infrastructure using clandestine form and function.

Clandestine organizations use specialized organizational forms and functions to conceal their human networks and physical infrastructure among the populations of their operational environments.³¹ The clandestine organizational form is based on compartmentalization of people and information to minimize damage due to interdiction.³² Compartmentalization works like circuit breakers in electronic circuits. When a network member or members are killed or captured, the breakers “close,” cutting off all links from the interdicted individual to other members of the organization.³³ This leaves the nation states with no trails to follow and no leads to pursue.³⁴ While the nation states reorient on the next individual, the members of the clandestine networks use established procedures to reorganize around the loss, and reset the breakers. This type of compartmentalization is very effective in protecting the organization from individual strikes.³⁵ However, if too many individuals are removed simultaneously the

organization is unable to effectively reorganize without violating the general rules of clandestine function or tradecraft.³⁶

The clandestine functions enhance the form by focusing exclusively on minimizing signatures, referred to as clandestine tradecraft.³⁷ The art of minimizing signatures of the members of the clandestine organization as they interact with others in the organization, with the population, and when conducting operations against the nation states is critical not only to the individual practitioners, but the clandestine organization as a whole. *Ambiguity* is critical where exposure has life or death consequences. Minimizing signatures is the key to clandestine organizations maintaining *ambiguity*.³⁸ The clandestine tradecraft practices of different members of the organization are based largely on experience, training, and lessons learned from the mistakes of others.³⁹

At the lowest levels within the clandestine organizations, little to no training in clandestine function or tradecraft is provided. This is due to the fact that at the edges of the organization members fall into a gray area between overt and clandestine. At the edge, clandestine members are conducting subversion, sabotage, or terrorist attacks themselves, either singularly or as members of compartmented cells or groups of individuals, directly against the nation states' forces. These individuals are viewed more as overt elements and easier to replace by the more senior leaders in the clandestine organization, and thus receive minimal training. This benefits the clandestine organization as a whole because due to their limited training, the members operating on the edge of the organization are easily detectable by the nation states. Therefore, they become "bright shiny objects" upon which the nation states' forces focus their efforts on

as force protection measures leaving the difficult-to-replace members of the clandestine organization safe in their own *ambiguity*.⁴⁰

However, there are inherent weaknesses in the clandestine form and function. With regard to clandestine form, the compartmented structure provides protection from interdiction, but it can only overcome a certain amount of interdiction operations simultaneously or over a short period of time and maintain its structural integrity. This is dependent on the size of the organization and how much redundancy or resilience is built into the overall organization. The larger the organization, the more stress the networks can accept. This type of loss is exactly why clandestine networks are effective.⁴¹

This is especially true if the nation states are unable to impact the replacement or recruitment process, in which case losses can be quickly replaced, denying the nation states' attrition strategies.⁴² It should be noted that some practitioners and theorists believe decapitation strikes to kill or capture key leaders or facilitators provides sufficient system shock.⁴³ However, a large body of research shows this to be a false assumption, and in reality, results in short-term disruption at the most, but has little impact on the form.⁴⁴ Therefore, to stress the clandestine form, a significant number of simultaneous interdictions are required, with the number depending on the size of the organization.

The weaknesses of the clandestine form largely center around emergency contact procedures. Emergency contact procedures are used when communications are down or when individuals have been removed from the network and the organization attempts to reorganize.⁴⁵ When this happens, it is likely two individuals that do not know each other may have to execute emergency communication plans.⁴⁶ Anytime the

clandestine members have to use emergency contact procedures, there is an increased likelihood of detection. Also, given that clandestine organizations are complex human systems, any individuals that fail to use tradecraft correctly, increase the risk of detection for themselves, as well as anyone they are associated with based on those mistakes.

Countering Insurgent and Terrorist Organizations

The nation states generally practice, one of two schools of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism theories— population centric and enemy centric. For this theory, the use of population and enemy-centric will be applied to both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism for simplicity.

First, population-centric theories place a premium on isolating and protecting the population from insurgent and terrorist organizations. Destruction of the enemy is the secondary objective. Due to the protracted nature of population-centric theories, and the lack of focus on enemy formations, this theory type does not address *ambiguity* or *protractedness*.⁴⁷ Population-centric theories and theorists are best described by General David Petraeus' famous line, "You [can't] kill or capture your way out of an industrial-strength insurgency."⁴⁸ Despite the popularity of population-centric theories since the events of September 11, 2001, there are few historical examples of population-centric theories resulting in lasting success.⁴⁹

Those that did succeed, such as the often used example of the British efforts in Malaya, were successful because the efforts isolated not only the insurgents and terrorist organizations from the population, but also from external support, as isolating internal to the organizations—isolating the core irreconcilable from the reconcilables willing to put down arms and/or work with the government.⁵⁰ This study refers to this

successful isolation model as the “three isolations,” which effectively reduced the insurgent and terrorist organization to a manageable size. Then the nation states can pursue and destroyed through death or capture of the remaining irreconcilables. Thus, the truly successful population-centric theories that understand the importance of establishing the three isolations, are ultimately focused on the destruction of the enemy as the end state.

Enemy-centric theories on the other hand expend little to no effort protecting or isolating the population, and instead focus on targeting the armed elements, leaders, facilitators, or other key members of the insurgent or terrorist organizations in an attempt to achieve a disruption, disaggregation, minimalization, or attrition.⁵¹ For the West, enemy-centric theories have focused on precision strikes using either manned or unmanned aerial platforms, or special operations forces to conduct strikes against individual insurgent and terrorist organizational leaders and facilitators. The focus on individual targeting individuals, known as either high-value individuals (HVI) or high-value target (HVT), is time and resource intensive based on legal requirements to increase confidence in target identification and minimize collateral damage and civilian deaths. What has emerged is less theory, than a targeting methodology, known as the “find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) process.”⁵² F3EAD is individual centric—focused on the HVIs or HVTs in series—and result in tactical actions, that do not effectively add up to a larger theory or strategy.⁵³

As a result of the individual-focused interdiction efforts, the clandestine organizational form is not challenged; the removal of individuals is disruptive, not decisive.⁵⁴ This is especially problematic with stand-off precision strikes, where

individual interdictions occur over extended periods of time, with no isolation, allowing the clandestine organization to easily replace losses over time, resulting in no long-term impacts on the clandestine organization.⁵⁵ In other cases, such as special operations efforts that apply the F3EAD process rapidly to increase the tempo of strikes against individuals, in an effort to overcome the strengths of the clandestine form, more disruptive effects were achieved, but were also not decisive. In addition, *ambiguity* is challenged only individually, but ultimately is not on a great enough scale to deny *protractedness*. While the special operations forces at times have successfully increased the rate of interdiction, they lacked the correct scale or correlation of forces due to their limited numbers to gain a decisive advantage against an organization consisting of tens of thousands of clandestine members.⁵⁶

Based on the above, overcoming the form and function of clandestine organizations provides an opportunity to deny *ambiguity* and *protractedness*. For the nation states, neither the population-centric or enemy-centric methods deny *ambiguity* and *protractedness* to any large extent, and neither has achieved consistent lasting and decisive outcomes.⁵⁷ Additionally, both schools of thought assume the enemy will remain *ambiguous* and the conflict will be *protracted*, and thus play to the strengths of the insurgent and terrorist organizations by never seeking to deny either. Instead, the nation states cede the initiative to the insurgent and terrorist organizations and allow them to thrive in *ambiguity* and *protractedness*.⁵⁸ Based on the above problem frame, any decisive military theory applied by the nation state against clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations has to overcome both of these characteristics.⁵⁹

Hypothesis

Based on the problem frame, insurgent and terrorist organizations effectively use *ambiguity* and *protractedness* to their advantage, but there are inherent organizational form and function weaknesses that can be leveraged by the nation states to achieve exposure and rapid defeat. For the nation states, population and enemy-centric counterinsurgency and counterterrorism theories fail because they do not overcome *ambiguity* and *protractedness*.⁶⁰ Any decisive military theory has to overcome both of these characteristics.⁶¹

Theory

Based on the above problem framing, the *Simultaneous Attack/Persistent Pursuit* (SAPP) theory posits a nation state, or nation states in partnership, can rapidly and decisively expose and destroy national, transnational, and/or global clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations by denying *ambiguity* and *protractedness*.⁶² This is achieved through the *strategic maneuver* of large-scale military and law enforcement forces at the tactical, operational, and/or strategic levels to *simultaneously attack* all known or suspected elements across the breadth and depth of the clandestine organizations.⁶³ The simultaneous attack causes immediate and substantial *dislocation, resulting in emergence* or exposure of the clandestine members of the organization as they react to this initial shock to the system.⁶⁴ The effort shifts immediately to *persistent pursuit* to destroy the initial and subsequent emerging elements, as more members of the clandestine organization react and *emerge* due to detectable mistakes or signatures leading to their interdiction. *Persistent pursuit* continues to maintain pressure on the organization until it disintegrates, exposing the remaining clandestine members, and allowing for the entire organization to be destroyed.

Assumptions and Premises

The SAPP theory is based on a series of assumptions and premises in order to deny *ambiguity* and *protractedness*. Five primary areas are addressed: nuances of destruction, emergence and complexity theory, shared understanding, legitimacy and legality, and scale of effort.

Nuances of Destruction

For this theory, destroying is equivalent to killing or capturing all members of the clandestine insurgent or terrorist organization. Clearly killing or capturing all members of the organization sets the bar very high. The scale of the kill and capture efforts over a short period of time for the SAPP theory, may be misconstrued as wonton killing, excessive collateral damage, and mass arrests. However, to achieve destruction while simultaneously minimizing legal, moral, and ethical issues related to theories of just war or the just conduct of warfare, and other domestic and international laws, this theory places a premium on the military and police forces' legitimate use of power to capture and detain as the primary goal.⁶⁵ In this theory, military and police forces use force only when required, and they do so through the disciplined, legal, and legitimate use of force based on rules of engagement or escalation of force. In some cases, specifically in denied areas where ground force options may not be feasible, stand-off precision strikes are used, but are also bound by the same ethical use of force standards.⁶⁶ Thus, capture vice killing is the desired goal, and when killing is required, it is done in a disciplined, legal, and legitimate way. Capture vice killing is the desired outcome not only to minimize legal gray areas, but because capture provides an opportunity to gain additional information from the detainee to fuel the *persistent pursuit* operations.

At the lower end of the application of force scale, for example, police-like tactics can be used such as soft-knocks, call-outs, cordon and knocks, or cordon and searches.⁶⁷ The next level of escalation is the use of direct action raids by special operations to provide the opportunity for an outcome other than killing. Special operations forces are capable of gaining tactical surprise and control, and the precision use of force to minimize collateral damage.⁶⁸ If the risks of on-ground interaction are too high to be acceptable for the decision makers, then precision stand-off strikes are used, with the clear understanding that collateral damage is much tougher to control and the ability to develop the situation from a distance is significantly diminished.

In hostile areas where military forces are used in lieu of police forces, the disciplined escalation of force is used to minimize negative perceptions. Force escalation is based largely on the risk associated with the targeted location and/or individual members of the clandestine organization, such as likelihood they will fight or attempt escape, or detonate a suicide vest to avoid capture. The higher the risk, the more likely the direct application of force is used to protect the nation states' forces and ensure tactical success.

Destruction is the only way for a nation state to win decisively against these clandestinely-organized, violent groups seeking political change.⁶⁹ The goal is to destroy the violent elements, and force other non-violent supporters who share similar ideologies and/or grievances to seek non-violent political means for change. Many current theories to counter insurgent and terrorist organizations are hampered by their inability to overcome the ideology or grievances surrounding the conflict. This military theory overcomes the power of motivating factors like ideology and grievances through

the application of overwhelming effort and military power against the threats' *means*, nullifying *will*. This is based on Carl von Clausewitz's idea that, "[T]o overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors... *the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will* [emphasis in original]."⁷⁰

Killing and capturing every member of the organization makes their *will* or ideology irrelevant to the military problem.⁷¹ However, this military theory acknowledges that while ideology and grievances are not military problems, the theory sets conditions for the other elements of national power, of all the nation states involved, to find long-term, non-violent political solutions to these issues.⁷² If, at some point, other violent groups emerge based on a similar ideology or grievances, the nation states simply apply the theory to the new group—the earlier, the better—to once again force a non-violent political solution.⁷³

The idea of total destruction has largely been given up in both population and enemy-centric camps in favor of what some theorists and practitioners view as more “realistic” outcomes, such as disruption, disaggregation, isolation, minimization, and even deterrence. Sir Robert Thompson, a British counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner, focused on the population as well, but also recognized that destroying the insurgent organization was a worthwhile goal, with a caveat—if it could be achieved.⁷⁴ David Galula, a contemporary of Trinquier, also highlighted that the ultimate goal for the nation states' military and police forces is the destruction of insurgent forces.⁷⁵ Galula even went so far as to highlight the importance of simultaneous destruction stating, “like the heads of the legendary hydra (sic), [the insurgent organizations] have the special

ability to grow again if not all destroyed at the same time.”⁷⁶ Yet his writing makes it clear he was focused on the isolation of the population from the insurgents—what he viewed as an achievable goal. In the end, regardless if the desired outcome is isolation or destruction, success has never been assured and the Clausewitzian fog, friction, and chance are always in play.⁷⁷

Emergence and Complexity Theory

The concept of *emergence* is derived from complexity theory and describes “*the process whereby the assembly, breakdown, or restructuring of a system results in one or more novel emergent properties* [emphasis in the original].”⁷⁸ For this theory, the “novel emergent properties” are the signatures that are produced by the members of the clandestine organization, an inherently complex adaptive system, as an attempt to reorganize under pressure. Unlike other complex adaptive systems, reorganization for clandestine organizations are bound by the desire to remain *ambiguous* to protract the conflict—in other words, win by not losing.

Therefore, in this theory *emergence* favors the nation states, since members of the clandestine organization are forced to decide whether or not to violate the clandestine tradecraft rules to regain contact and reorganize, which is likely to result in a detectable signature. Ideally, the SAPP theory forces the clandestine members to use emergency communications procedures which significantly increases the individual signature, as well as those they are contacting. Additionally, due to the SAPP theory, the member attempting to reorganize via contact cannot be sure which members have been killed, captured, or are on the run, thus increasing the potential for emergence of one or both parties. These are the types of discernable mistakes or *emergence* that the nation states’ intelligence apparatus is looking for to focus the *persistent pursuit* efforts.

Persistent pursuit continues to pressure the clandestine members into making additional mistakes in rapid succession.⁷⁹

While the theory development model describes how *emergence* is used as the conceptual underpinning of the SAPP theory, a second element of complexity must be clearly explained because of the inherent assumptions and premises that it uses. Critical to the theory is the idea that nation states can force beneficial adaptations of the clandestine organizations, in other words *emergence*, through action. Combining complexity theory and the Clausewitzian concept of “using force to compel the enemy to do your will.”⁸⁰ While this theory acknowledges that complex adaptive systems cannot be controlled per se, in this theory the nation states’ actions are intentionally designed for force adaptations in order to cause detectable mistakes and miscalculations based on two independent variables that serve as controls.⁸¹

The first independent variable is the rules of clandestine form and function for the clandestine organization. They are common rules that all clandestine organizations follow. When violated, the result includes increased structural fragility (violation of form) and increased signature (violation of function), putting the organization at risk if detected and interdicted.⁸² The second independent variable is the physical infrastructure used by the clandestine organization since the known and suspected physical infrastructure is generally static.⁸³ As the nation state learns, it begins to identify known and suspected physical infrastructure tied to known or suspected clandestine organizational members. This catalog of locations becomes critical during the strategic maneuver, since they offer a potential static location to check.

Based on the clandestine tradecraft rules, generally an individual within the clandestine organization should not return to a location that was interdicted by the nation state for fear they may come back or have compromised the location in some other way. Thus, as the nation state conducts actions, it denies physical options to the members of the clandestine organization, which as the operations continue, should force mistakes, especially when options run out.⁸⁴ The clandestine member has two options. First, they can develop new physical infrastructure options without the time or space to use clandestine tradecraft fully to do so, increasing the risk of detection. Second, they can violate the clandestine rules and return to formerly compromised locations. Both are bad options.

Impacting the efficacy of the effort is the scale of the operations envisioned in this theory to force the systems' wide shock based on the nation states overmatching the insurgent and terrorist organizations.⁸⁵ Since this is a new theory, there are no historical correlations of forces to draw from other than using baselines ratios, such as 10:1 security forces to clandestine members, from historical counterinsurgencies, which are highly debatable.⁸⁶ However, large scale operations have a quality of their own with regards to perceptions and miscalculations of the clandestine members, which benefits this theory's overall effect. For example, during the maneuvers in support of the simultaneous attack and the persistent pursuit, the members of the clandestine organizations will have difficulty discerning the actual targets of the large-scale movements at all levels—national, transnational, and global. Therefore, forces moving within the vicinity of an unknown clandestine member who is not the actual target of the operation, may force a detectable reaction. There is a high probability that early warning

mechanisms will attempt to alert the clandestine members in the area of movement, which are also detectable. All of these reactions are inadvertent, but beneficial to the nation state resulting in a detectable signature, emergence, and the facilitation of persistent pursuit.

Additionally, interdiction operations do not have to result in the direct interaction between the military or police forces and members of the clandestine organization to be successful. In fact, it is more likely that a majority of the known or suspected locations will not be occupied by a member of the clandestine organization at the time of the strike. Counterintuitively, this is fine. If the military or police force search suspected physical infrastructure of the clandestine organization, such as a search of a suspected safe house for example, then the location is compromised and the desired outcome is achieved. The key is that the military and police forces may not know they picked a portion of the infrastructure correctly, but the member of the clandestine organization will not know that the site was picked on a guess or hunch. Regardless, the compromise removes this location as a future option for the clandestine members who are following the basic rules of clandestine tradecraft.

The nations states' actions against known or suspected locations also place doubts in the minds of the clandestine members as they try to determine how the security forces detected the location in the first place. These doubts will lead the clandestine member to ask uncomfortable questions, such as: Was the location compromised because the member violated clandestine rules and was detected? Have they been compromised due to interaction with other members of the clandestine organization who themselves violated rules? Are there spies in the network or within the

local population who provided the information to the government? What other evidence do the security forces have or what did they find at the location or from questioning people? Could the information garnered by the security forces help them find the clandestine member? All of these questions will increase the doubts and cognitive pressure on the individual member and lead to mistakes and miscalculations.⁸⁷

Although this theory does not attempt to achieve the three isolations or physical isolations mentioned in the population-centric theory discussion, the simultaneity and *persistent pursuit* will likely lead to inadvertent cognitive as well as physical isolation. As the security forces continue to search locations, the clandestine members will begin to run out of physical infrastructure options, and will be physically and cognitively isolated, and ideally exposed.⁸⁸ This will increase if the population realizes the decisiveness of the overall effort and supports the nation states by providing information. External support could also be isolated if the external support networks are interdicted as well. The clandestine members will also be more isolated and fearful of interaction within the organization. This will make them more prone to making detectable mistakes as they attempt to regain situational awareness or reorganize.⁸⁹

Legitimacy and Legality

Additionally, the nation states must ensure the legitimacy and legality of their actions to minimize the inadvertent actions that may inspire others to join the insurgent and terrorist movements. Gaining and maintaining legitimacy is key to the theory's success and is based on the theories of just war—reasons for war and just conduct of war—as well as international and domestic laws.⁹⁰ The goal is to use the least amount of force to interact with the clandestine organization, yet force a reaction to drive emergence, while protecting the population from collateral damage. The SAPP theory

uses massed efforts, primarily acting among the population, but does so through disciplined, legal, and legitimate application of force in order to gain and maintain the initiative.

By using disciplined, legal, and legitimate force collateral damage is minimized and legitimacy is retained by the nation states in the eyes of the population. If the nation states execute the large-scale operations associated with the SAPP theory correctly, the insurgent and terrorist organizations recruiting numbers will not increase. Thus, a non-violent, non-escalatory interaction at the tactical level between security forces, the population, and the members of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations is preferred. The optimum result for the nation states is the capture of known or suspected members of the clandestine organization for further intelligence exploitation.

Nations states must consider three major legal issues in applying this theory. The first relates to the conduct of operations within their own borders against members of the clandestine organization via military and police forces. Due to the method of operation, the nation states may not have the appropriate domestic legal grounds to execute this theory against the clandestine organization because evidence of their activities may reside only in intelligence reporting vice normal law enforcement reporting. Additionally, use of military forces internally may be an issue for some countries. The countries involved may need to develop legislative rules to execute this theory, or use pre-existing special domestic laws such as court-issued warrants, as the legal bounds for action.

The second consideration is the use of force outside the nation states' borders in support of another nation state or within the borders of hostile nations. The easier case

is supporting another partner nation through diplomatic agreements. If a portion of an insurgent or terrorist organization that is a threat to other nations resides within the sovereign borders of a non-supportive or hostile nation state, then the nations states involved in the theory execution may rely on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which covers nation states' rights to self-defense.⁹¹ In some cases, states may execute covert operations in lieu of using international laws, but these may impact the overall legitimacy of the effort.⁹²

The final legal issue is with regard to detainees since this theory could involve the detention of an entire clandestine insurgent or terrorist organization of many thousands. Legal and legitimate detainee policies and detention facilities for long-term detention are critical since the biggest risk to long-term success are a loss of legitimacy due to poor or no detainee policies, and sub-standard detention facilities which violate legal, ethical, and morale norms. Poor policies and mistreatment of detainees can lead to a catastrophic loss of legitimacy which may result in the release of former insurgents and terrorists who could carry on their armed struggle once released, upending the entire effort. Nation states must have a viable detention policy, plan, and large-centers in place prior to the conflict to ensure timely processing, humane treatment, and rapid intelligence collection and fusion. Botching this effort could lead to strategic defeat as nearly happened with Abu Ghraib scandal.⁹³ Thus, indefinite detention or evidence-based sentencing guidelines will be required.⁹⁴ Other programs such as de-radicalization may also be required.

Shared Understanding

Nation state and partners are assumed to have the analytical capacity to process “big data” related to this type of intense intelligence collection operation.⁹⁵ This includes

the ability to sense or detect anomalies or indicators including physical, cognitive, and digital which are likely to be indicators of mistakes or emergence.⁹⁶ As one analyst notes, “The ability to scrutinize vast sums of data in search of specific attributes poses a grave problem for those who would attempt to operate clandestinely, while blending into the population.”⁹⁷ Given the need to gather and analyze large amounts of information, the organizations involved also must share the information in an agile enough way to ensure a shared understanding of the entire force.⁹⁸ This shared understanding empowers leaders and subordinates to take disciplined initiative at all levels to gain and maintain pressure.⁹⁹ It also allows leaders to shift priorities and resources, deploy reserves, and request additional support from higher as required, in a much more dynamic and fluid way as their organizations continue to prosecute the pursuit.

Scale of Effort

This theory envisions the mobilization, movement, and *strategic maneuver* of military and law enforcement forces on a scale that significantly overmatches the insurgent and terrorist organizations at the level required by the nation states involved. This theory masses the entire military and law enforcement capabilities against the breadth and depth of the insurgent and terrorist organizations at the national, transnational, and global levels. This effort requires significant effort by the nation states, their elements of national power, but the operations change the dynamics of time, from previous and current decades-long effort, to an effort measured in days and weeks. The elements of national power support the effort by gaining critical basing, overflight, sustainment, and partnership agreements to facilitate the entire multi-national effort. Based on the theory and assumptions and presumptions, the theory’s hypothesis can be tested.

Hypothesis Testing

A process tracing methodology is used to test the SAPP theory based on the Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann's "*conflict-theory model*," and Gary Klein's "*recognition-primed decision making*" model.¹⁰⁰ The *conflict-theory model* describes decision making under pressure when confronted with impending danger which matches well with the pressures the SAPP theory applies to members of clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations.¹⁰¹ Former spy, Alexander Foote, who operated under similar pressures that the members of the clandestine organization will feel under the execution of the SAPP theory, validates the model, explaining,

The only excitement a spy is likely to have is his last, when he is finally run to [ground]. An emotion similar to that experienced by the fox. We are assured that the fox really likes to be hunted. I have been hunted; and though the sensation is certainly acute; I can hardly describe it as pleasant and as a fellow sufferer my sympathies are entirely with the fox.¹⁰²

Although the model describes individual decision making, the repercussion for the entire organization is clear when extrapolated hundreds or thousands of times. Therefore, the desired forced emergence described by the SAPP theory development is clearly achievable as the SAPP theory applies massive and continued shock to the clandestine organization as a complex system.

The *conflict-theory model* also applies before, during, and after the initial shock. From the time the members of the clandestine organization sense the deployment and build-up of forces to execute the SAPP theory, the model can be applied. It is likely that some emergence or exposure of clandestine members will happen as the early warning networks begin to forewarn the members of the clandestine organization of the impending operations. Instead of working against the nation states, these early warning efforts, and potential efforts of clandestine members to prepare for a fight, flight, freeze,

or communicate response, may lead to detectable signatures, and thus emergence, which in turn helps the nation states orient.¹⁰³ Based on the increased signature detection prior to execution of the SAPP theory, the nation states gain an increased understanding of the known and suspected elements of the clandestine organization, increasing the potential targets for the initial simultaneous attack or to the pursuit phases.

To begin the process trace, Janis and Mann explain the cognitive-theory model, which matches up well with stress on individuals in a clandestine organization:

Over and above the direct effects of information overload, harassed decision makers, realizing they are confronted with tasks too complicated to manage, suffer a further decline in cognitive functioning as a result of the anxiety generated by their awareness of the stressful situation.¹⁰⁴

Janis and Mann further explain that there are two ways that emergency decisions differ from daily decisions. First, there is a lot at stake, including “personal survival of the decision maker and the people [they] value most.”¹⁰⁵ Second, there is very little time to make this life and death decision. These two combine to force cognitive stress on the decision maker.¹⁰⁶

Janis and Mann’s analysis “indicate[s] that when people receive warnings [or sense impending threats], they ask themselves a number of vital questions, the answers which determine their choice of action.”¹⁰⁷ The questions are:

1. “Are the risks serious if I don’t take protective actions?”
2. “Are the risks serious if I do take the most available protective action?”
3. “Is it realistic to hope to find a better means of escape?”
4. “Is there sufficient time to search and debate [other options]?”¹⁰⁸

Based on the four questions, “five coping patterns” of the individual emerge.¹⁰⁹

First, “vigilance” is shown when the individual is aware of the danger, but not overwhelmed by the danger, characteristic of a well-trained or experienced clandestine practitioner.¹¹⁰ They carefully weigh options or is executing a plan to overcome the difficulty. It is the vigilant individual that the SAPP theory overwhelms due to the collapsing nature of the organization and inability to overcome the massive shock to the system.¹¹¹

The second is the “unconflicted inertia,” which is characteristic of clandestine members who lack experience or are over-confident. When they judge risk due to impending threats they see the risk as minimal or ignore the warning all together.¹¹² This type of response indicates little or no training expected along the edge of the organization where individual losses are easily replaced.

The third coping pattern is the “unconflicted change,” in which the individual changes their actions based on a predetermined course of action with little thought to making necessary adjustments.¹¹³ This individual will likely emerge due to poorly thought out courses of action, and may attempt fight or flight, thus increasing the chance of detection exponentially.

Fourth is “defensive avoidance” in which the individual shows a lack of sensing of the environment and impending doom, failing at the “vigilant search” for new courses of action, selectively missing indicators of increasing risk, and/or “distortion of the meaning of the warning.”¹¹⁴ Thus, they avoid decisions of any kind disregarding the warning. This response characteristic helps the SAPP execution, since these individuals are likely to get caught in the initial and follow up searches of known or suspected locations and can potentially provide keen insights and intelligence to drive future operations.

The final response characteristic is “hypervigilance,” described by Janus and Mann as “panic. . . A person in this state experiences so much cognitive constriction and preservation that [their] thought processes are disrupted.”¹¹⁵ These individuals have an inherent flight response and see impending danger as so great that “the only available escape routes will soon be closed.”¹¹⁶

The process trace of Janis and Mann’s model and characteristics of individuals demonstrates that in all cases, the reactions to the SAPP theory execution will benefit the nation states’ efforts. Even the vigilant individuals will at some point be stressed when the SAPP theory begins to fracture the clandestine form and function protections.

Lastly, the SAPP theory was further scrutinized using Gary Klien’s “recognition-primed decision (RPD) making” model in order to account for those that are not only vigilant, but also extremely competent in their clandestine tradecraft and experienced operating under the pressure of impending nation states’ operations.¹¹⁷ The SAPP theory is fundamentally aimed at rooting out individuals that operate using the recognition-primed decision making based on applying pressure on a scale that overcomes previous experiences. There is potential that if an individual that has observed or been detained in a SAPP theory execution he could have enough experience to overcome fear, remain calm, and attempt to outwit the nation states, but SAPP theory is such a shock that an individual may not be able to remain hidden for very long given the interconnectedness of individuals.

Based on the process trace of both models, the hypothesis of the SAPP theory is theoretically sound, and can deny ambiguity, and thus *protractedness*, by using the system shock to force the emergence of members of the clandestine organization.

While initially those individuals who are vigilant and experienced may not feel the pressure as others, the compounding effects of continued pressure on a large scale will erode both of these characteristics in a short period of time allowing for the destruction of the clandestine organization.

From Theory to Practice

Translating theory to practice is difficult at best. Because this is a theory and not a strategy, it is written in a unconstrained manner, which runs into reality during the transition to strategy. The following is an effort to set conditions for the transition of theory to strategy by applying strategic and operational art to frame the practical application of the theory.

Because this theory is based heavily on seizing and retaining the initiative at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—John Boyd's *Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act* (OODA) theory or loop will be used as the structure for the theory presentation.¹¹⁸ However, to bring Boyds' OODA loop to the strategic level, military design methodology is applied. The current four elements of Boyd's OODA loop are instead characterized as system frames, defined as a "perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon."¹¹⁹ The process of developing each frame is referred to as framing, and is defined as "a way of selecting, organising (sic), interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing (sic), persuading, and acting."¹²⁰ The use of *frames* to describe each OODA element finds its roots in military complex problem and solution framing methods, known as military design methodology.¹²¹ Each frame is explained below in broad terms with important points highlighted in more detail as required for clarity. The use of frames also allows military strategic, operational, and tactical artists,

theorists, and practitioners to readily adapt and transition the theory to reality. They can use the design frames below as a starting point to apply military design methodology and develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to destroy real-world insurgent and terrorist organizations.

The *observe frame* is similar to the *environmental frame* in military design.¹²² This frame develops a system of deep and shared understanding of the entire environment surrounding a problem, as it pertains to the desired end state, which could be a political-military end state. In this case, the destruction of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organization is a desired military end state and a political objective. The end state helps to guide the development of the *observe frame*. This frame includes all of the relevant actors—friends, adversaries, and neutrals—and their relationships and propensities from the perspective of the nation states involved. Additionally, it includes elements of culture, history, geography, political systems, and laws, and how they impact the framework in its current state. Within the *observe frame*, the goal is to gain a deep and shared understanding of the entire environment. This allows a nuanced understanding of the entire environment in which the targeted insurgent and terrorist organization operates to identify potential relationships, propensities, opportunities, or risks, that would not be seen otherwise if it was not for the wide research and learning aperture.¹²³

The friendly nation state or states incorporate themselves, their national power, capabilities, authorities, and policies, power, and knowledge of themselves into the frame to increase the overall shared knowledge of the *observe frame*. This allows the other elements of national power to understand information that is vague or missing and

ensure there are linkages to national policies and laws and the interagency and intergovernmental limitations which in total paints a much grander picture for all involved. Furthermore, they can use the *observe frame* to understand potential shaping efforts each element of nation power needs to accomplish to set conditions or increase options for future operations. For example, these include access, overflight, basing, and partnerships. The information and learning aperture is opened wide to see the entire environmental in total.

The *observe frame* is developed based on the emergence of a new insurgent or terrorist organization or a known insurgent or terrorist organization now presenting a national security threat to the nation state where it may not have before. This frame is also used to scan a wide range of insurgent and terrorist organizations, setting conditions for the rapid transition to an *orient frame* based on specific threat indicators or desire for action by the nation state's leaders. The key to observing is strategic patience in order to learn and orient on the actual problem better.

The *orient frame* is analogous to the military design *problem frame*.¹²⁴ In this case, the *orient frame* extracts the key elements related to the problem and potential solutions from the *observation frame*. For this theory, the *orient frame* is focused on the problem of an insurgent and terrorist organization as a refinement of the larger lens of the *observe frame*. This refinement then allows a detailed study of the key elements related to the specific problem. For this theory, the *orient frame* is largely focused on three elements for simplicity: detailed understanding of the insurgent and terrorist organizations of interest; detailed understanding of other friendly, neutral, or hostile actors that may impact the efforts to destroy the insurgent and terrorist organizations;

and a detailed understanding of the friendly nation state or states participating in the effort.

The *orient frame* first develops the detailed systems diagram of all elements of the insurgent and terrorist organization, known and suspected, to visualize the problem as it relates to the desired end state. This frame visualizes the known and suspected human networks and physical infrastructure as a structural framework for systems analysis. The human networks are visualized using social network systems diagram showing the relationship between individuals in the clandestine organization. The focus in this frame is to determine the known and suspected members of the organization, their relationships, and tangible items that might lead to their detection and identification, like their appearance, movement patterns, addresses, phone numbers, and vehicle descriptions.¹²⁵ Physical infrastructure is also templated and aligned to the human networks to build patterns of life and associations.¹²⁶ The human and physical infrastructure together make up the organization upon which the nation states' intelligence apparatus will focus on throughout the execution of this theory. The reason they both matter is because people move, infrastructure does not. Individuals of interest use infrastructure to facilitate their clandestine activities, and regardless of how good their clandestine tradecraft, they will set patterns that are likely discernable to some degree.¹²⁷ The two together help to paint a picture of the breadth and depth of the organization, and will guide the *decide frame*.

The second part of the *orient frame* is the detailed understanding of the relationships, opportunities, and risk related to friendly, neutral, and hostile actors. Friendly elements include nations, non-state actors, or proxies *not* currently partners for

the theory execution, but potentially critical to enabling or executing portions of the theory. For example, a nation could provide basing, overflight, and deny entry into their country by members of the insurgent or terrorist organizations that attempt to escape during theory execution. Friendly non-state actors and proxies could play roles in denied areas of hostile or neutral countries, to include intelligence collection, paramilitary, and/or covert operations against the insurgent and terrorist organization, where direct nation-state military action cannot be used.¹²⁸ Hostile nation states are identified which may take advantage of vulnerabilities of nation states involved in the theory execution and thus, need to be deterred and dissuaded. Oppositely, this frame might identify common purpose with hostile and neutral states who face related threats, and are willing to participate overtly or covertly in the execution of the theory to increase the scale of the correlation of forces.

Lastly, the *orient frame* aims to fully understand capabilities, limitations, and risk associated with all of the elements of national power fully committed to participating in the theory execution. The *orient frame* is the combination of a deep understanding of the known and suspected human and physical infrastructure of the insurgent and terrorist organizations, the total capabilities available to the nation states, and any risk associated with other hostile actors that could impact the execution of the theory. Throughout this frame, the information and learning apertures are narrower, concentrated on the refined portions of the *orient frame*. Together, this provides a menu of options for the leaders to choose from to achieve the goal of the destruction of the threat organization, which translate into solutions for theory execution in the *decide frame*.

The *decide frame* is analogous to the military design *solution or approach frame*.¹²⁹ In this case, the *decide frame* extracts options to achieve the desired end state from the *orient frame*. Strategic and operational art is then used to pick and choose among the options to solve the problem. For example, the *decide frame* determines options for the breadth and depth of operations. Large-scale options include a global non-state actors' organization, plus regional affiliates, plus national level insurgencies and terrorist groups. Small-scale options may be confined to a geographic space—transnational or even national, or potentially confined to a single group, even though other groups are operating in the same areas concurrently. The options are organized as an approach or a series of approaches to achieve the desired end in various ways, based on the means available, all bounded by the risks associated with each approach.

In the *decide frame*, if an overarching strategy is being developed to synchronize global, transnational, and national efforts, then the solution or approach is articulated as “ways” of a strategy formulation normally as the combination of ends, ways, and means.¹³⁰ For strategy, the elements of national power as the means, are pulled from the *orient frame*, linking operational level actions to policy objectives. For operational level campaigns or tactical level operations, the “ways” are organized as lines of effort or lines of operations.

The “means” consist of combined joint and partner military forces, law enforcement forces, and potentially irregular capabilities such as proxies and surrogates in denied areas. The “means” are organized in time and space, along the lines of effort or operations, linking tactical actions to strategic ends. The strategic and operational approaches are fully war gamed and analyzed to ensure they are feasible, suitable, and

acceptable, and risks associated with each are clearly articulated. The nation states' political and military decision makers then choose one of the approaches for execution. Through diplomatic negotiations the nation states involved agree on roles and responsibilities of each nation to include command structure, geographic responsibilities, leads for diplomatic and military efforts in the specific regions, intelligence sharing agreements, and sustainment structures.

With the decision, the *decide frame* transitions from planning to preparation or shaping actions to set conditions for execution of the theory per the *act frame*. Preparatory actions are taken to set conditions for the *act frame*. Throughout the preparations, the nation states continue to observe and refine the *orient frame* specifically to gain a greater understanding the threat organization, identify emerging opportunities and risks associated with other actors in the frame, and to understand how the shaping efforts are impacting the environment and the threat. The other elements of national power are used to set conditions for rapid transition to the execution of the theory.

Diplomatic efforts focus on solidifying partnerships, basing, overflight, and political support for the action, potentially to include United Nations resolutions to ensure the execution is bound by legitimate legal, moral, and international norms. Additionally, diplomatic efforts, supported by the military, work with all of the other nation states to develop search and arrest warrants for the legitimacy of the operations.

Domestically, the nation states involved ensure they have the appropriate domestic and legislative support to execute the theory. Information efforts focus on legitimizing future action, and preparing the impacted populations for the execution of

this theory, which will shock not only the threat organizations, but likely the international and domestic communities in its large scale and high tempo. Information efforts also set conditions to disrupt the threat information capabilities upon execution of the theory. Economic elements of national power are used to support the overall operation, such as funding efforts to gain basing and overflight agreements, gaining and maintaining support of key partners and allies through burden sharing. Lastly, elements of national power are also used to deter and dissuade any hostile nations that may seek to exploit opportunities while the nation state is executing the theory. Once all of the pre-execution conditions are met, the effort transitions to execution or *act frame*.

Military efforts will focus on movements of capabilities to staging areas, deception efforts to mask the movements and build up, rehearsals, and linking up advisors and liaison officers with partners and allies to ensure unity of effort. Linkages between law enforcement elements and the military are established to ensure seamless integration. Covert paramilitary operations and other special operations commence in denied areas to ensure the irregular capabilities are prepared and set for execution. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are focused on ensuring shared understanding of the threat by all forces by geographic region, especially across artificial seams and boundaries between major commands and partners. Interoperability issues, especially related to intelligence sharing and fusion, are addressed prior to execution. Global, operational, and tactical responsibilities are assigned by geographic area.

The *act frame* is the execution of the design or plan, thus there is no equivalent frame in military design methodology. However, leading up to and throughout execution,

the *observe*, *orient*, and *decide frames* are continually updated, specifically as new known or suspected individuals or locations are identified for both the initial simultaneous attack and throughout the *persistent pursuit* phases. As this happens the updates to the enemy picture impact the *decide frame* driving further decisions on the application of military power and law enforcement against emerging elements of the insurgent and terrorist organizations. It also informs the decision of strategic and operational-level leaders as they decide when and where to use strategic and operational reserve or pursuit forces, or to use other elements of national power to continue to shape the environment.

The *act frame* begins once the final strategic movements to position key capabilities are complete. The strategic capabilities include all intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to observe for emergence, as well as strategic strike platforms, national mission forces, global response forces, and covert paramilitary forces to support the execution. Strategic, operational, and tactical level pursuit and quick reaction forces or reserves are established with critical enablers.

Based on the decision of the overall forces commander, the force will execute the *strategic maneuver to simultaneously attack* all known and suspected members of the organization and locations globally, transnationally, and/or nationally. The forces at each level action their assigned targets per any cultural constraints, such as the requirement for some targets to be serviced by local law enforcement officers, and develop the situations to include interdiction of local follow on targets as they are identified. All intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are focused on detecting *emergence*, not supporting operational or tactical-level actions. Operational

and tactical level elements use surprise and agility to seize and maintain the initiative and gain local superiority over the intended target.

In some cases, where the insurgent or terrorist organization is overtly organized and in a war of movement phase, holding or threatening terrain, appropriately scaled punitive or spoiling attacks are executed using larger conventional forces to disrupt, defeat, or destroy these elements during the execution of the simultaneous attack to further unbalance the insurgent and terrorist organizations. Additionally, these attacks destroy as much of the overt force as possible, and forces the remaining members back into earlier protracted war phasing. This sets conditions for emergence and destruction of the remaining members. The punitive or spoiling forces need agile mobility, and likely include airborne, air mobile, or even heavier forces, depending on the conventional capabilities of the insurgent and terrorist armies. Due to the limited nature of these operations, there would be no heavy force build-up unless required to secure lodgments and protect lines of communications in support of the short-duration strikes in hostile countries. It is conceivable that punitive or spoiling operations executed simultaneously with this theory will cause further dislocation and disintegration across both the overt and clandestine elements. It is unlikely the overt elements can survive long without the clandestine elements providing key provisions, intelligence, and leadership.¹³¹

The *simultaneous attack* across the breadth and depth of the insurgent and terrorist organizations against the known and suspected members and locations will cause an immediate and massive system shock, resulting in *dislocation* or *emergence* of hidden members. Immediately following the *SAPP execution*, the force begins gaining and maintaining the initiative and pressure to force the continued *emergence* of

the insurgent and terrorist organizations' members. As momentum increases, the clandestine organization is unable to adapt and reorganize fast enough while remaining hidden effectively. Members of the clandestine organization try to regain situational awareness and reestablish connections, but are unable due to the massed interdiction of members throughout the organization.

Due to the pressure on each of them, minor mistakes in their clandestine tradecraft compound and begin to expose individuals and their links to others allowing further interdiction. As this continues, the organization begins to *disintegrate*, exposing the remaining members, which are killed or captured through persistent pursuit.

Throughout this effort, intelligence and experience gained through action are shared rapidly and broadly to ensure shared understanding, and to allow rapid exploitation of events through continued execution of disciplined initiative. As strategic and operational targets emerge, or if an operational force is culminating, the commander decides when and where to employ strategic and operational pursuit forces and reserve forces. Audacious action driven by disciplined initiative and agility of the force allow *persistent pursuit* to force the emergence of all members of the organization ultimately. The added benefit of this large-scale pressure is the likely negative impact on the insurgent and terrorist organizations' information operations, which benefits the nation states.

Once the destruction is complete, the force will consolidate gains and work with host nations to set conditions for redeployment. The force may be redeployed piecemeal depending on local and regional successes, or if the pursuit phase transitioned into a discrete operation. In this case, the theory has been successful, but

the pursuit is only after a few individuals, who are literally on the run. A more discrete force, such as special operations and national-level law enforcement now lead efforts to track down and kill or capture these fleeing individuals. It is critical that sufficient forces are applied to the remaining insurgent and terrorist elements to maintain constant pressure until they make fatal mistakes and are destroyed.

Lastly, during this process, there may be times when a threat to the nation or deployed forces may require minor actions prior to the simultaneous attack to disrupt or defeat a threat as a preemptive measure. Additionally, some actions may be taken against portions of the insurgent and terrorist organizations as part of the deception plan. Care must be taken that these actions do not negatively impact the *orient frame*, such as loss of fidelity on the known or suspected locations due to adaptations by the insurgent or terrorist organizations. These are called *distractions* and *distensions*, and will be described in more detail in the definitions section.

The OODA frameworks is not an orderly process in the sense that frames are non-sequential at times. Throughout the application of OODA, changes to the environment, threat, and friendly efforts may cause a refinement of the frames to occur with any one or more of the frames. Additionally, because each frame is representative of a complex adaptive system, the system is always adapting and changing, thus the frames must adapt and be refined based on learning through action in the system. What may have started as social network analysis in the *observe frame* is now is dynamic network analysis due to the rapidity of the operations driving constant change and adaptation within the insurgent and terrorist organization as members are removed and the remaining members decide how to respond.¹³²

Once the act frame is in motion, the *observe*, *orient*, and *decide* frames are simultaneously used to assess progress and identify new risks and opportunities. The *observing*, *orienting*, *deciding*, and *acting* becomes so intertwined that the nation states can rapidly understand, adapt, and execute efforts as emergence takes place until all of the members of the insurgent and terrorist organization are killed or captured.

The above can be described as the global application of the theory, but the same concept can be applied regionally or nationally, all dependent on the insurgent and terrorist organization's breadth and depth, and the capabilities of the countries involved.

Conclusion

The above theory development model provided the framework upon which this theory of war could be presented. As described and analyzed, the theory provides the nation states a way of overcoming *ambiguity and protractedness*, the two key elements of insurgent and terrorists' strategies, and decisively achieves the destruction of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations.¹³³ As Steven Metz notes, "there are two broad approaches to war. The 'scalpel' uses armed force in conjunction with other elements of national power to convince an opponent to accept an outcome which it does not want. The [other is the] 'cudgel' [and uses armed force to] simply impose ...one's will on an enemy."¹³⁴ This theory is the "cudgel;" as a counterpoise to the "scalpel" theories of precision strikes. It imparts the nation states' will through military power *en masse* onto the insurgent and terrorist organizations simultaneously in a single *strategic maneuver*.

Based on complexity theory, this simultaneous massed attack by the nation states, across the breadth and depth of the known and suspected members of the clandestine organization, results the emergence of the once hidden members to

detection and further interdiction. With the initiative seized by the nation states through the initial attack and dislocation, the nation states continue to impose its will through *persistent pursuit*, further exposing the clandestine organization through emergence, until the remainder of the clandestine organization disintegrates and is ultimately destroyed. The focus on the destruction of the enemy organization, a purely military problem and solution, then allows the other elements of national power to address the non-military root causes and issues, such as grievances and ideology.

This theory allows the nation states to finally adapt to the wars which have long favored the asymmetry of the insurgents and terrorists. This adaptation allows nation states to now win decisively by denying the insurgent and terrorist organizations' use of *ambiguity and protractedness*. This in turn denies the insurgent and terrorist movement's ultimate logic of "winning by not losing." The theory capitalizes on the inherent weaknesses of clandestine organization form and function to achieve the decisive outcome.¹³⁵ This is the only theory that counters both *ambiguity and protractedness*, and overcomes the dangers of these long-term efforts, and instead wins decisively by denying *ambiguity and protractedness*. This theory realizes Roger Trinquier's master concept for *modern war* as he advocated in 1961. What was described above is a theory of war for a nation state, or nation states in partnership, to rapidly and decisively destroy national, transnational, and global insurgent and terrorist organizations.

The ultimate question remains—will the theory work? The answer is entirely dependent on the nation states involved and the scale, breadth, and depth of the threat insurgent and terrorist organizations. The theory is viable if the nation state or states: 1)

can gain a sufficient intelligence picture of the clandestine network of known or suspected locations to cause emergence if attacked; 2) have the capabilities and capacities to conduct *strategic maneuvers* to execute SAPP either nationally, transnationally, and/or globally; 3) are able to organize the appropriately sized force—military and law enforcement—at such a scale to achieve overmatch against the insurgent and terrorist organizations at all levels; 4) ensure a shared understanding of the threat’s organization and reaction throughout the forces involved; 5) can organize in a way to ensure unity of command through large-scale command, control, and synchronization; 6) are supported by the other elements of national power to set conditions; and 7) will ultimately have the political will and international and domestic support to execute SAPP.¹³⁶ The reality is that the transition from theory to practice depends on the strategy or campaigns developed to execute the theory.

Thus, the theory translated into strategy for execution is the ultimate test of viability in execution. A theory is unconstrained, but a strategy is likely constrained in either means or ways, which result in risk. The closer this theory can be applied to its unconstrained nature through the application of strategic, operational, and tactical art, the more likely it is to succeed as theorized. Given the military end state of destruction of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations, the ways and means of the nation states are the ultimate arbiter of successful transition of theory to practice and ultimately, to the viability of SAPP.

This theory is an audacious and innovative departure from current and past theories for countering insurgent and terrorist organizations. It is a military theory but will require the art of war to be applied by the “great captains” of the future. As Napoleon

Bonaparte noted centuries ago, “In the art of war, lesser men are schemers who avoid risk with mediocre results. The great captains of history see many ways of waging war; they seek the path of genius and change the face of the world.”¹³⁷

Endnotes

¹ Note the theory in this paper uses Metz and Millen’s concept of “protractedness and ambiguity,” as an organizing principle, from Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004), 15, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB586.pdf> (accessed January 26, 2017).

For simplicity, this theory refers to “insurgent and terrorist” together cover the broadest range of national, transnational, and global groups using one or both of these types of strategies. For this theory, an insurgent organization is defined as an organized movement by elements of the population that use subversion and armed conflict against a nation state or occupying power to achieve political goals or political control. Terrorist organization is defined as an organized movement that uses violence to achieve political goals. Both definitions are the author’s definitions based on a review of multiple insurgency and terrorist definitions. For examples, see John Mackinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago: from Mao to bin Laden* (London: Hurst and Company, 2009), 4-5, 9-10, 223 (for insurgency), and 4-5 (for terrorism); Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 1-41 (both insurgency and terrorism); Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 1 (for insurgency), 19-20 (for guerrillas); David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” *Small Wars Journal*, November 30, 2004, 15, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2016).

² Authors definition based on Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 15; Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to the Basics* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011), x; Demarest uses “anonymity” instead of *ambiguity*, but highlights the same idea—the control of one’s identity or whereabouts is a key element of insurgent and terrorist warfare and survival. Also, see Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 12.

³ Authors definition based on J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., “The Issues of Attrition,” *Parameters*, Spring 2010, 9-14, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010_bartholomees.pdf (accessed January 27, 2017); Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 15; Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War*, 37; Demarest highlights that “[For the members of the clandestine organization], prolonging the conflict means staying alive and at large. Insurgents [and terrorists] protract violent contest because [their] personal demise or incarceration...often means the end of the insurgency [or terrorist group]. Internal wars are never just protracted. [The members of the insurgent and terrorist organizations] protract them as a matter of life or death—theirs.” Mao Tse-Tung’s protracted people’s war theory provides the fundamental theory for this type of protracted war strategy; see Mao Tse-Tung, “On

Protracted War,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Volume II (Peking, China: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 113-189; Mackinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago*, 15-29, 225-229.

⁴ Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007), 2, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB790.pdf> (accessed on January 26, 2017).

⁵ See Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 15; Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 13; Derek Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations*, JSOU Report 12-3 (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2012), https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/Documents/12-3_Jones_041112_FINAL.pdf (accessed September 22, 2016), 61-67; Abdulkader H. Sinno, *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 13; interestingly Sinno notes, “The [operation] that decisively influences how structure affects performance is the organization’s control of a territorial safe haven—a portion of the contested territory where an organization’s rivals cannot intervene with enough force to disturb operations.” For this theory, the insurgent and terrorist use and control of the human terrain is a “sanctuary for *ambiguity*.” The above work provides a theory for the rivals to challenge to the insurgent and terrorists’ sanctuary.

⁶ See Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War*, 37; Demarest explains, “If the counterinsurgent builds his designs and plans upon the assumption that insurgent war is a naturally protracted affair, he is likely to suffer two negative consequences. One is a failure to recognize the precarious position of the insurgent, born of tactical and operational disadvantages as to culminating points, potential correlation of force, and anonymity. . . . Therefore, all else being equal, the counterinsurgent should want to accelerate the war by applying as many resources as possible.” Demarest’s second negative is “the consequence of the natural-protraction fallacy relates to the counterinsurgent’s own morale base. There are few examples of a democratic country not having their electorates grow weary of war.” Also, see Stanley McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir* (New York: Penguin Publishing, 2013), 116; McChrystal demonstrates this idea of falling prey to protractedness, “While we had some tactical advantages, we were, in some way, years behind the enemy. Defeating [al] Qaeda would be a protracted campaign.”

⁷ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, 1985), 8-9, 67, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/ModernWarfare.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2016); McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 123; Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” *Parameters*, Spring 2004, 19-20, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/04spring/tomes.htm> (accessed February 12, 2017). Other counterinsurgency theorist noted the goal of destruction of the clandestine organization, see for example, Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London, UK: Chatto and Windus, 1974), 56; Thompson noted, “In the process of eliminating the [underground] organization, the attention of the intelligence organization should also be directed to identifying, and eliminating if possible, *all members of the insurgent organization* [emphasis added].”

⁸ Center of gravity is not used in this theory. Due to the focus on denying *protractedness* and *ambiguity*, and the use of complexity theory, as well as large-scale forces against the insurgent and terrorist organization en masse, center of gravity is unnecessary to the theory or

its application. For differing points of view on center of gravity, see Peter Neumann, Ryan Evans, and Raffaello Pantucci, "Locating Al Qaeda's Center of Gravity: The Role of Middle Managers," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 34, no. 11 (October 25, 2011): 825-842, <http://www-tandfonline-com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2011.611936> (accessed January 22, 2017); Joseph L. Strange and Richard Iron, "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 35, 20-27, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-35.pdf> (accessed November 28, 2016); Daniel Steed, "Strategy: Renewing the Center of Gravity," *War on the Rocks*, July 17, 2014, <https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/strategy-renewing-the-center-of-gravity/> (accessed November 28, 2016); Lawrence Freedman, "Stop Looking for the Center of Gravity," *War on the Rocks*, June 24, 2014, <https://warontherocks.com/2014/06/stop-looking-for-the-center-of-gravity/> (accessed November 28, 2016).

⁹ See Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War*, 37-38; Demarest notes, "[T]he counterinsurgent should want to accelerate the war by applying as many resources as possible, especially early-on, ...to force the insurgent...into more and more encounters, in which the probable correlations of force favor the [state]....If the objective is, however, to win a war, the counterinsurgent should do everything to accelerate the insurgent's demise."

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ This work uses complexity theorist Alex Ryan's definition of *emergence* throughout the study, defined as "*the process whereby the assembly, breakdown or restructuring of a system results in one or more novel emergent properties.* [italics in original]." Also see his concepts on scope, resolution, and state in Alex J. Ryan, "Emergency is Coupled to Scope, Not Level," *Complexity, Special Issue: Complex Systems Engineering* 13, no. 2 (November/December 2007): 69-70, 73; See Yaneer Bar-Yam's description of scope, resolution, scale, weak and strong emergence in Yaneer Bar-Yam, "A Mathematical Theory of Strong Emergence Using Multiscale Variety," *Complexity* 9, no. 6 (March 26, 2004): <http://www.necsi.edu/research/multiscale/MultiscaleEmergence.pdf> (accessed October 5, 2016); Serena Chan, *Complex Adaptive Systems*, Research Seminar in Engineering Systems Theory Paper (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 31, 2001), 1-6, <http://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/Complex%20Adaptive%20Systems.pdf> (accessed February 2, 2017). For background on complexity theory as it applies to military strategic theory, to include the interplay of emergence, see Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2006), 20-25, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=641> (accessed September 23, 2016); Tom Czerwinski, *Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs* (Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program, 2008), 10-50, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Czerwinski_Coping.pdf (accessed September 29, 2016); Andrew Hill, *The Devil You Know: An Introduction to Complex Adaptive Systems*, Working Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 30-32.

¹² See Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 30-31; Kilcullen describes "operational shock," to cause "dislocation," but decides against this options due to the inherent ambiguity and resilience of the insurgent networks.

¹³ The author defines insurgents and terrorist organization's spatial and geographic boundaries as global, transnational and national. Global is used to describe the combined reach of an organization, or group of organizations, across the globe; transnational is equivalent to region, and includes two or more countries; and national is all actions within a nation state.

Thus, the levels and depths can be combined to portray state and insurgent and terrorist organization actions, organizations, or efforts. For the nation state, the levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—are used. Compared to the spatial boundaries of an insurgent and terrorist organization, strategic is equivalent to global; operational is equivalent to transnational; and tactical is equivalent to national level.

¹⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc; 1993), 83.

¹⁵ This study primarily uses the seven element model of national power, military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic (MIDLIFE); since it separates law enforcement specifically as an element of national power; see D. Robert Worley, "Instruments of Power," in *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System* (Raleigh, NC: Lulu Press, 2012), 275-291.

¹⁶ Although this theory is a universal theory for nation states, the United States is likely the only power capable of executing this theory as described across all levels of war and global geographies. This theory not only fits the "American Way of War," but emerging joint and service operating concepts describe U.S. joint capabilities which would allow the execution of this theory, and could be readily adapted to the theory as described. Finally, only the U.S. military has the forces, logistics, and mission command capabilities and structures to manage a global campaign that integrated the national powers across the entire joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment, to include coordination and supporting law enforcement actions as described in the theory. See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Posture Statement*, Presented to the Senate Armed Service Committee, 114th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, March 17, 2016), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_03-17-16%20.pdf (accessed February 13, 2017); U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2012), 4, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/ccjo_jointforce2020.pdf (accessed on October 16, 2016); U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 31, 2014), 14-17, <http://tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/TP525-3-1.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2017); Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, September 2016), 5-9, <http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/MCCDC/MOC/Marine%20Corps%20Operating%20Concept%20Sept%202016.pdf?ver=2016-09-28-084156-190> (accessed January 5, 2017); Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, *Air Force Future Operating Concept: A View of the Air Force in 2035* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force, September 2015), 8, <http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/AFFOC.pdf> (accessed January 8, 2017).

¹⁷ Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 41; Milan Vego, *Joint Force Quarterly* 62 (3rd Quarter 2011): 60, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-62.pdf> (accessed August 22, 2016).

¹⁸ Vego, "On Military Theory," 60.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 64.

²¹ The author uses clandestine as an adjective to describe types of objects—organizations or people—as well as to describe methods, techniques, acts, activities, or operations conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. Clandestine arts or tradecraft describes the artful employment of the above. Some may question why covert is not used instead of clandestine. The author did this on purpose to minimize confusion between clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations and potential for the nation states to conduct “covert operations” as part of the theory.

²² Some may argue that given a radical ideology the clandestine members are not afraid of death or capture. While this is partially true, they also have a fundamental logic of winning by not losing—they inherently want to stay in the proverbial “game” to continue their armed political struggle. They have likely identified their successors, but their fear is a fear of failure vice fear of death. If this was not the case, then why would leaders like Usama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi operate clandestinely vice intentionally seeking death?

²³ The three-phase construct per Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War,” 136-141. For this study, both insurgents and terrorists’ organizational growth will use Mao’s three phase model. However, it is unlikely, except in rare cases like the Islamic State, where a terrorist group would operate in the strategic offensive phase. This is due to the high-threat environment terrorist groups face, and the fact that they largely hide among urbanized populations, which are not conducive to larger scale guerrilla warfare or transition to larger and more formal military-like units. Additionally, for transnational and global terrorist networks, they may not enjoy the physical terrain to transition beyond Mao’s first phase. However, global terrorist organizations can support one of their franchises to gain and control terrain, and then use it as sanctuary by the global group from which to conduct terror attacks, such as al Qaeda’s uses of the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan leading up to 9/11. The Islamic State provides an example, where the organization transitioned from a largely clandestine organization to a terrorist army, but did so largely by importing foreign fighters to fill its conventional ranks. Current counterterrorism strategies do not account for terrorist organization transitioning out of Mao’s phase one. Counterinsurgency strategies however could be applied to this larger threat. Also, see Samuel B. Griffith, *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961), 21-22.

²⁴ Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 43; as Thompson notes, “When facing defeat both militarily or politically, there is only one gambit for [insurgency] to play, and that is to take the famous ‘one step backward’.”

²⁵ As British counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner Robert Thompson notes, “The lesson to be learnt [from successful counterinsurgencies] is that even if an armed [overt] insurgency is defeated, the [clandestine] political and subversive struggle will go on and can still win.” From Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 45.

²⁶ Andrew R. Molnar et al., *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, November 1963), v. Current U.S. military doctrine does not address the clandestine organizations directly, instead referring to them as networks or clandestine networks; see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Countering Threat Networks*, Joint Publication 3-25 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 21, 2017), vii-xiv; Appendix F is specific to clandestine networks and is based largely on the author’s previous work. See Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*.

²⁷ Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 5-6.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5-6, 30-31.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-10.

³⁰ See McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 202.

³¹ Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 20, 25-27, 39-41.

³² Networks cut-outs include use of lower-level individuals as couriers or locations such as drops which allow the indirect communication between key players of the organization but minimize their direct contact. Networks may also use compartmentalization of information to a needs-to-know basis to minimize potential exposure of critical information if a member is captured.

³³ Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 25-30.

³⁴ For an example of this see McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 202.

³⁵ Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 25-30.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 78-79.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3, 8-9.

³⁸ Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concept*, 6. "Tomorrow's fights will involve conditions in which 'to be detected is to be targeted is to be killed.'...No matter what the means of detection, unmanaged signatures will increasingly become a critical vulnerability."

³⁹ Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 70-71.

⁴⁰ This is especially true for highly-connected individuals, who seem to be leaders due to the large number of personal interactions with other members. For the nation states, highly-connected individuals are intuitively perfect targets whose removal are envisioned to disaggregate the organization and do significant damage. In reality, individuals whose connections are easily discernable are poor clandestine tradecraft practitioners since being both highly connected and having those connections detected violate all clandestine form and function rules. They are instead the dummies in the system. Interdicting these individuals actually increases the security of the clandestine organization by removing those that are most likely to expose it. Interdiction disaggregates poor practitioners which makes the clandestine organization more resilient, not less. See Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 2-3.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 32-33.

⁴² See McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 116; McChrystal demonstrates this idea of falling prey to protractedness, "While we had some tactical advantages, we were, in some way, years behind the enemy. Defeating [a] Qaeda would be a protracted campaign."

⁴³ See George A. Crawford, *Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare*, JSOU Report 09-7 (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, September 2009), 1-3, https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOU_Publications/JSOU09-7crawfordManhunting_final.pdf (accessed February 3, 2017). Second, for decapitation strikes, see Max Fisher, “Does Killing Terrorist Leaders Make Any Difference? Scholars are Doubtful,” *The New York Times Online*, August 30, 2016, <http://nyti.ms/2bYT0RZ> (accessed November 15, 2016); Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” *International Security* 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 47-49, <http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/decapitation.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2016); Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” *Security Studies* 18 (2009): 721, <http://informationcollective.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Jordan.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2016); Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” *Security Studies* 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 8-11, http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3804_pp007-038_rev.pdf (accessed November 15, 2016); Joshua Foust, *Understanding the Strategic and Tactical Considerations of Drone Strikes* (Washington, DC: American Security Project, January 2013), 16-17, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200110%20-%20Understanding%20the%20Strategic%20and%20Tactical%20Considerations%20of%20Drone%20Strikes.pdf> (accessed December 16, 2016).

⁴⁴ This is a prominent belief in western militaries, but reality proves differently. For example, the death of Usama bin Laden had no lasting shock effect. It might have been good for the psyche of the U.S. and international audiences, but al Qaeda continues to pose a threat. See Fisher, “Does Killing Terrorist Leaders Make Any Difference? Scholars are Doubtful”; Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?” 47-49; Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” 721; Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” 8-11.

⁴⁵ See Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 47-50; Chad C. Serena, *It Takes More than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 24; Serena explains, “In networked organizations, information flows both shape and are shaped by transactions among organizational members. If information flows decrease for any reason, uncertainty—about the environment and the organization—will increase, organizational structures will likely break down, and the capacity for self-synchronization, the sine qua non of complex networked organizations, will diminish.”

⁴⁶ Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 47-50.

⁴⁷ See Elliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review*, March-April 2006, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/cohen.pdf> (accessed December 14, 2016); The principles outlined in this article were later incorporated into U.S. Counterinsurgency doctrine; also see Thomas X. Hammes, “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks,” *Military Review*, July-August 2006, 25-26, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/Military_Review_20060831_art006.pdf (accessed December 14, 2006); Hammes highlights the idea of population security over attacking the enemy formations explaining, “Once we understand the insurgent network or major segments of it, we can attack, however, if our attacks support our efforts to provide security for the people. If there is a strong likelihood of collateral damage, we should not attack because collateral damage, by definition, lessens the people’s security.”

⁴⁸ Sam Bailey, "Interview: General David Petraeus," *Frontline*, June 14, 2011, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/interview-general-david-petraeu/> (accessed December 19, 2016).

⁴⁹ See Audrey Kurth Cronin, "U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism," *Orbis*, Spring 2012, 19-20; Dan G. Cox and Thomas Bruscino, eds., *Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol?* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, AY 10-01), 1-5; Gian P. Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army," *Parameters*, Autumn 2009, 6-8, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09autumn/gentile.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2016); Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, ed., *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 1, 2015), 412.

⁵⁰ See Joes, *Resisting Rebellion*, 9, 236-237; Mackinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago*, 48-50; Record, *Beating Goliath*, 107; John A. Nagle, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 95-107; Cohen et al., "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency." Based on the author's analysis, the British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya achieved all three isolations and then defeated the remaining members of Malayan insurgent organization. Despite Western doctrines adoption of many of the key elements of the British Malayan experience, the military focus on destroying the enemy once fully isolated has been largely misunderstood. This has led to poor application of theory and few lasting, and decisive counterinsurgency victories.

⁵¹ For an example of a disaggregation theory and other nodal attack theories, see Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 30-35.

⁵² See McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 50, 153-154, 161; as McChrystal notes on page 161, "I had already concluded that a strict decapitation strategy was unlikely to work. Top [al] Qaeda leaders were well hidden, and their capture or death was rarely decisive;" Charles Faint and Michael Harris, "F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion 'Feeds' The SOF Targeting Process," *Small Wars Journal*, January 31, 2012, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/12209> (accessed January 6, 2017).

⁵³ See Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2013, 44-47; McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 50, 153-154, 161; Faint and Harris, "F3EAD: Ops/Intel Fusion."

⁵⁴ Without a quick and decisive victory, nation states likely find themselves in one of two situations. First, a quagmire of never ending internal conflict that wears out the states involved, which may lead to the overthrow of the government. Second, they may succeed in achieving their goals, and defeat but not destroy, the insurgent or terrorist group. This then leads to a future, but related conflict, as their national interests are threatened once again by the formerly defeated, but not destroyed group. This group can reemerge organizationally smarter and stronger having learned a lesson from the first effort. A good example of this is the al Qaeda in Iraq's transformation into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. See Ministry of Defense, *Joint Doctrine Publication 01: UK Joint Operations Doctrine* (Wiltshire: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2014), 2; The UK doctrine makes a keen observation, "However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results." Also see, U.S. Air Force Academy Public Affairs, "Rice Speaks at Academy, Outlines US Strategy against ISIL," April 15, 2016, <http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/722671/rice-speaks-at-academy-outlines-us-strategy-against-isil.aspx> (accessed September 14, 2016); for example, in this speech, President Obama's National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, highlights the false

sense of future success in a protracted conflict against al Qaeda, stating, “It is a complex effort. It will not be accomplished fully in just a few weeks or months, or even a few years. But day by day, mile by mile, strike by strike, we are making substantial progress...we’re going to keep up the momentum.” Also see Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory*, 173-174; Joby Warrick and Peter Finn, “CIA Director Says Secret Attacks in Pakistan have Hobbled al-Qaeda,” *Washington Post Online*, March 18, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031702558.html?hpid=topnews> (accessed December 15, 2016); in this article from 2010, even before the death of Usama bin Laden, former U.S. Secretary of Defense and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta, hailed the success of drone strikes specifically in Pakistan, saying al Qaeda was on the run. Seven years later, the group is still a global threat with dangerous regional affiliates.

⁵⁵ This issue of not being able to stop replacements of key leaders has led to a long running joke that the worst job in an insurgent or terrorist organization is to be the “number three man,” because the news reports regularly about the “number 3” of a targeted organization being killed, again. While funny, it captures the reality of using precision strikes but not being able to isolate the event to keep the “number three” from being quickly replaced. While being “number three” in an organization like this probably has a short life-cycle, the organizations made up of hundreds or thousands of individuals, and likely still growing, can replace the “number three” indefinitely. For examples, see Robert Mackey, “Eliminating Al Qaeda’s No. 3, again,” *New Times The Lede Blog*, June 1, 2010, https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/eliminating-al-qaedas-no-3-again/?_r=0 (accessed January 12, 2017).

⁵⁶ McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 161-162; McChrystal was very close to discovering the concept underpinning of the theory presented in this study, noting, “I believed...if we controlled the tempo, rather than merely eliminated personalities, we could halt [AQI’s] momentum....Then partnering with a more robust Coalition and Iraqi effort, we could ensure [AQI’s] defeat...Our campaign would...seek to deny the insurgents [their] inherent advantage: if we could apply relentless body blows against AQI—a network that preferred spasms of violence followed by periods of calm in which it could marshal resources—then we could stunt its growth and maturation. Under enough pressure, AQI’s members would be consumed with staying alive and thus have no ability to recruit, raise, funds, or strategize.” Although he adapted his force to achieve this vision, his force was not large enough to achieve his desired effects and his ultimate desired outcome, the destruction of AQI.

⁵⁷ For examples of the problems with measuring success against organizations cloaked in “ambiguity,” see “Time to Declare Victory over Qaeda,” *CNAS Blog*, December 9, 2011, <https://www.cnas.org/press/in-the-news/time-to-declare-victory-over-qaeda> (accessed February 22, 2017); “When to Declare Victory?” *CNAS Blog*, 10, 2012, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/blog/when-to-declare-victory> (accessed February 22, 2017).

⁵⁸ See Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War*, 37; Demarest explains, “If the counterinsurgent builds his designs and plans upon the assumption that insurgent war is a naturally protracted affair, he is likely to suffer two negative consequences. One is a failure to recognize the precarious position of the insurgent, born of tactical and operational disadvantages as to culminating points, potential correlation of force, and anonymity. . . . Therefore, all else being equal, the counterinsurgent should want to accelerate the war by applying as many resources as possible.” Demarest’s second negative is “the consequence of the natural-protraction fallacy relates to the counterinsurgent’s own morale base. There are few examples of a democratic country not having their electorates grow weary of war.”

⁵⁹ Ibid., 37-38; Demarest notes, “[T]he counterinsurgent should want to accelerate the war by applying as many resources as possible, especially early-on, . . . to force the insurgent...into more and more encounters, in which the probable correlations of force favor the [state]. . . . If the objective is, however, to win a war, the counterinsurgent should do everything to accelerate the insurgent’s demise.”

⁶⁰ Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 15.

⁶¹ See Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War*, 37-38; Demarest notes, “[T]he counterinsurgent should want to accelerate the war by applying as many resources as possible, especially early-on,...to force the insurgent...into more and more encounters, in which the probable correlations of force favor the [state]...If the objective is, however, to win a war, the counterinsurgent should do everything to accelerate the insurgent’s demise.”

⁶² As noted earlier, although this theory is a universal theory for nation states to execute SAPP at nationally, transnationally, and globally, the United States is likely the only power capable of executing this theory as described across all levels of war and global geographies. This theory not only fits the “American Way of War,” but emerging joint and service operating concepts describe U.S. joint capabilities which would allow the execution of this theory, and could be readily adapted to the theory as described. Finally, only the U.S. military has the forces, logistics, and mission command capabilities and structures to manage a global campaign that integrated the national powers across the entire joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment, to include coordination and supporting law enforcement actions as described in the theory. See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Posture Statement*; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: 2020*, 4; Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*, 14-17; Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concept*, 5-9; Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, *Air Force Future Operating Concept*, 8.

⁶³ In reference to *strategic maneuver*, see B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), 17-18, 337-338; The term *strategic maneuver*—borrowed from theorist B. H. Liddell Hart—indicates first, the importance of this initial effort, and second, the sheer magnitude of the force applied regardless if it is executed against a national, transnational, and/or global insurgent or terrorist organizations. Although B. H. Liddell Hart’s envisioned of *strategic maneuver* as an indirect method against the rear areas of a conventional force, vice a direct attack on the front lines. The purpose of the indirect method of the strategic maneuver was to cause dislocation of the main force as it attempts to react to the maneuver. IN a similar light, the SAPP theory uses the same principle for the *simultaneous attack*. In this case, the *simultaneous attack* is against an enemy that has no main force on a front line. Instead the main force are the hidden members of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations, and the *simultaneous attack* and persistent pursuit are against known or suspected elements of the clandestine organization. Unlike a maneuver into the weaker rear areas for force dislocation of a conventional force, this theory is attacking the weak links in the clandestine organization—those that have been detected—to forces dislocation of the still hidden members as they are forced to react, thus increasing their signature and detection as emergence in the system, allowing for their destruction.

Large-scale decisive action describes the overmatch of the correlation of forces between the nation state, or states, and the insurgent and terrorist organizations. It requires the employment of enough military force to not only engage every known or suspected portion of the clandestine organization, but has enough built in flexibility, with pursuit forces and/or

reserves at each level of war, to rapidly exploit opportunities. This force is large enough to rapidly destroy the entire insurgent and terrorist organizations at all levels. A similar concept, “go ugly early,” was described in Anna Simmons et al., “The Sovereignty Solution,” *The American Interest* 2, no. 4 (March 1, 2007): 4-7, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2007/03/01/the-sovereignty-solution/> (accessed January 7, 2017); also see Hooker and Collins, *Lessons Encountered*, 413; Hooker and Collins note, “[T]he normal military preference for overmatching force in armed conflict is often right, even if it commonly invokes opposition from civilian decision makers.”

For the discussions on the state, the standard three-levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—are used to describe the nation states’ efforts. For this theory, a nations states combined national power can be used at each level, and would normally be described as an interagency effort or unified action. Since this is a military theory, it assumes the other elements of national power and their respective agencies are in support. All three levels of war normally have significant overlap, but for this work, strategic is any effort above a theater; operational links the strategic to the tactical, and denotes the space above a single nation, thus multiple nation states, as part of a region; and tactical is all efforts within the nation state’s borders.

⁶⁴ *Dislocation* is the forced exposure or *emergence* of the enemy force, or for this theory, the members of the clandestine organization, through the maneuver. The concept of dislocation is found in Army doctrine, but originally B. H. Liddell Hart’s theory of strategic maneuver was an indirect method—not attacking the main force, but attacking weaker rear areas—to cause dislocation. The theory presented here uses Hart’s idea to describe the large-scale maneuver required to strike known and unknown elements simultaneously, with the goal of dislocating the hidden elements. See U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Design Methodology*, Army Technical Publication 5-0.1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, July 1, 2015), 5-4, https://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp5_0x1.pdf (accessed September 24, 2016); Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *The Liddell Hart Memoirs* (New York: Putnam, 1965), 162-165; Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1977), 55.

⁶⁵ See Bill Calcutt, “Just War Theory and the War on Terror,” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 6, no. 2 (September 7, 2011): 111-112, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18335330.2011.605125> (accessed February 15, 2011).

⁶⁶ Due to the nature of these types of lethal and non-lethal operations, land forces, both military and law enforcement are the primary mechanism for defeat, supported by precision strikes from air, land, and naval platforms. The nation states’ armies are primarily focused on defeating the enemy’s organization in a conventional conflict. For irregular warfare, the same holds true, but additionally leverages law enforcement components for legitimacy, which together target the members of the organization. See Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*, 17; as the operating concept notes, “Army forces adapt continuously to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. *Army forces defeat enemy organizations* [emphasis added].”

⁶⁷ Paul Pillar, “Strategic, Analytical, and Technological Developments in Disrupting Networks,” *Unrestricted Warfare Symposium*, Ronald R. Luman, ed. (Laurel, MD: John Hopkins University, 2008), 116; As Paul Pillar explains, “Even a knock on a door can have a very disruptive effect if it sows concern, fear, and distrust inside the terrorist organization. We have seen on many occasions where just the knock on the door and perhaps some questions by local

police or security services were sufficient to cause a major disruption planning and operations of a terrorist cell.” For more information, see the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center, *Cordon and Search: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations*, Army Training Publication 3-06.20, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Combined Arms Center, August 2016), 2-3 and 27; and Elliot D. Woods, “The Soft Knock,” *Assignment Afghanistan*, blog entry posted October 2009, <http://assignmentafghanistan.org/story/soft-knock/article> (accessed December 17, 2016); As Woods points out, “The soft knock approach grew out of the failures of the cordon and search tactics implemented by U.S. forces in Iraq. These so-called hard knocks alienated the population while providing negligible intelligence. With the soft knock approach—always conducted alongside [local indigenous law enforcement] officers—the owner of a property must give his permission to the troops at his door before they can come in and search the premises. If he says no, the police secure a warrant.”

⁶⁸ See James D. Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to The War on Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 8-1; It should not be misconstrued that Clausewitzian fog, friction and chance are not in play when special operations are used. Instead it should be acknowledged that this is a form of warfare, thus even the best risk mitigation and reduction does not mean that fog, friction, and chance are not at play.

⁶⁹ See William T. Johnsen, *Re-examining the Roles of Landpower (sic) in the 21st Century and Their Implications* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, November 2014), 24; Johnsen makes an important point, “Defeat of an opponent’s forces seems a relatively straightforward proposition. . . . however, defeating an enemy’s military is a necessary, but insufficient first step. In some cases, defeat of a country’s military forces may be sufficient to control the will of an opponent’s leadership. In other cases, defeating an adversary’s military forces may not translate into political victory.” As it relates to this thesis, the elements of the clandestine organization, are both military and the political leaders. Thus, destruction of the organization, through death or detention of the individual members, is the mechanism for defeat, and is different than defeating a nation state in this regard. Also, see Griffith, *Mao Tse-Tung*, 34.

⁷⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 86; Hart, *Strategy*, 337; J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., “A Theory of Victory,” *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume 1: Theory of War and Strategy*, 5th Edition, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2012), 107, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1109> (accessed October 15, 2016).

⁷¹ McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 247; McChrystal makes a statement is important to consider, as he notes that despite confidence the Coalition would win against, AQI, he expresses a common frustration, “*How many of these guys [AQI] do we have to kill before they break?*” The answer as it relates to this theory is all of them. If not, some will still have the will to continue to resist.

⁷² See Worley, “Instruments of Power,” 275-291; James Mattis, “A New American Grand Strategy,” *Defining Ideas Journal*, February 26, 2015, 4, <http://www.hoover.org/research/new-american-grand-strategy> (accessed September 22, 2016); Mattis notes, “Are America’s diplomatic, economic, and other assets aligned to the war aims, with the intent on ending the conflict as rapidly as possible? We have experienced the military alone trying to achieve tasks outside its expertise. When we take the serious decision to fight, we must bring to bear all our national resources.”

⁷³ Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 48.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁷⁵ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 107.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 101.

⁷⁸ See Ryan, "Emergency is Coupled," 69-70, 73; See Bar-Yam, "A Mathematical Theory"; Chan, *Complex Adaptive Systems*, 1-6; Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 20-25; Czerwinski, *Coping with the Bounds*, 10-50; Hill, *The Devil You Know*, 30-32.

⁷⁹ See Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War*, 38; Per Demarest, "If the objective is...to win a war, the counterinsurgent should do everything to accelerate the insurgent's demise." With respect to maneuver and annihilation, see the following: Hart, *Strategy*, 17-18, 337-338, 341-342; B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Revolutions in Warfare* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 14, 22-23; James J. Schneider, *Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundation of Operational Art*, Theoretical Paper No. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, June 16, 1992), 35; Michael R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Art," 2, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/modern_operations.pdf (accessed November 28, 2016); Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory*, 276; .J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., "A Survey of the Theory of Strategy," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume 1: Theory of War and Strategy*, 17-18; Bartholomees explains, "[A]n annihilation [is a] standard strategic [category]....Annihilation seeks political victory through the complete destruction (often in a single battle or short campaign) of the enemy armed forces."

⁸⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 83.

⁸¹ B. H. Liddell Hart's captures the essence of forcing adaptation through the pressure of persistent pursuit, for the state's advantage, noting, "[E]ven if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionally, will be the fighting;" from Hart, *Strategy*, 338. Also, note, The human infrastructure of the clandestine organization—all the hidden members—are the dependent variables—dependent in the sense that of the human infrastructures use of the physical infrastructure and clandestine form and function rules.

⁸² Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic*, 69-72; Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operating Concept*, 6.

⁸³ This idea is similar to David Galula's thoughts that, "if the insurgent is fluid, the population is not. By concentrating his efforts on the population, the counterinsurgent minimizes his rigidity." This same idea is applied here, but instead of the broader idea of population, this theory concentrates on the rigidity of physical infrastructure. See Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 83.

⁸⁴ An implication for the nation states is the potential to set up intelligence capabilities, human or technical, to monitor the locations already targeted to catch those members of the

clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations that fail to follow the rules or take calculated risks to return to locations cleared by the nation states' security forces.

⁸⁵ Using a national level scenario based on the situation in Iraq prior to the surge in 2007. There were over 440,000 available combined security forces. While definitive insurgency number do not exist, this scenario assumes the following: 30,000 suspected members, with a total of 100,000 known or suspected physical infrastructure locations. A time is designated for the *simultaneous attack*, preferably at night when there are few civilians moving around. The entire force would conduct the strategic maneuver, timing their departures from operating and staging bases to arrive at the same time on target. The movement and maneuver of forces alone would likely result in emergence and drive the initial efforts by the tactical units to seize the initiative and being the persistent pursuit phase. The members of the clandestine organization would be unable to cope with the scale of operations, or the interdiction of 100,000 locations, thus denying them options, and forcing a reaction. This same idea can be war gamed for all external networks, including foreign fighter networks extending globally, and those elements working recruiting or radicalizations efforts domestically in Western nations. Any external support mechanisms linking the national level to a global level non-state group could also be interdicted. See Amy Belasco, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009), Table 1, 9, <https://fas.org/sqp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2017); Joseph A. Christoff, et al., *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2008), 1, 23-29, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08837.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2017). There are no agreed upon or similar Iraqi insurgency numbers prior to the surge. There is a wide range of potential number from the low 10,000s to over 100,000. This study averages the differing reports and uses 30,000 for illustrative purposes only. Any actual application of the theory would have to adjust security force numbers according to the estimated insurgent and terrorist organization numbers to ensure overmatch.

⁸⁶ The counterinsurgency correlation of forces of 10:1 ratio or greater for success is a strongly debated topic by counterinsurgency experts. This study only highlights the importance of correlation of forces to ensure the strategic and operational artist who apply this theory achieve overmatch in scale for success. There are no studies specific to how much force is needed to ensure success of the theory presented here, but the overall correlation of forces compared to the total estimated size of the insurgent and terrorist group should be considered carefully in all planning efforts. See Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 127-128, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html> (accessed on January 27, 2017).

⁸⁷ See Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 55.

⁸⁸ For the security forces conducting a search of a suspected location, they may not get confirmation that the location is an actual part of the physical infrastructure of the clandestine organization. This does not matter. The clandestine member will know this and will have to assume the location is compromised. This also highlights the fact that suspected locations should be intermittently rechecked to keep the clandestine members guessing.

⁸⁹ See Janus and Mann, *Decision Making*, 17.

⁹⁰ See Calcutt, "Just War Theory," 111-112.

⁹¹ See Joshua Foust and Ashley S. Boyle, *The Strategic Context of Lethal Drones: A Framework for Discussion* (Washington, DC: American Security Project, August 16, 2012), 2-3, <https://www.scribd.com/document/102744195/The-Strategic-Context-of-Lethal-Drones#> (accessed on December 16, 2017).

⁹² See Cronin, "Why Drones Fail," 44-47; Danial Byman, "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2013, 35-39.

⁹³ See McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 199.

⁹⁴ Mattis, "A New American Grand Strategy," 3; Mattis explains, "Is the authority for detaining prisoners of war appropriate for the enemy and the type [of] war that we are fighting? We have observed the perplexing lack of detainee policy that has resulted in the return of released prisoners to the battlefield. We should not engage in another fight without resolving this issue up front, treating hostile forces, in fact, as hostile."

⁹⁵ See Jonathan Lord, "Undercover Under Threat: Cover Identity, Clandestine Activity, and Covert Action in the Digital Age," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 28, no. 4 (2015): 666-669, 684-687; Errol van Engelen, "Blacklisted: Big Data Will Effectively Fight Terrorism In The Free World," *linkedin.com*, January 19, 2015, <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/smart-data-effectively-fight-terrorism-free-world-van-engelen>, (accessed February 12, 2017); Engelen highlights, "People (terrorists too) are generating more and more data – From their smartphones, appliances, satellites, terminals, cameras and a range of other sensors on vehicles and machinery. Anything people do online can be traced, stored and analyzed." Mattathias Schwartz, "The Whole Haystack," *The New Yorker Online*, July 26, 2015, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/whole-haystack> (accessed February 12, 2017); "Why Big Data Analytics Holds the Key to Tackling the Changing Terror Threat," *SAS Insights*, https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/articles/risk-fraud/big-data-analytics-tackles-terrorist-threat.html (accessed February 22, 2017); Patrick Tucker, "The Secret Weapons in the War on Poaching...and Terrorism," *Defense One*, April 28, 2014, <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/04/secret-weapon-war-poachingand-terrorism/83311> (accessed February 22, 2017); Chris Strohm, "Predicting Terrorism From Big Data Challenges U.S. Intelligence," *Bloomberg Technology*, October 13, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-13/predicting-terrorism-from-big-data-challenges-u-s-intelligence> (accessed February 12, 2017); D. M. "John" Mitra, "The Relevance of Technology in the Fight Against India's Maoist Insurgency," *CTX* 4, no. 1 (February 2014): <https://globalecco.org/277#> (accessed February 22, 2017); John Hollywood et al., *Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), xv-xxii, 3-8, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG126.html> (accessed September 24, 2016).

⁹⁶ See the discussion of "digital exhaust" in Lord, "Undercover Under Threat," 667, 684-687; Hollywood et al., *Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior*, xv-xxii, 3-6, 8. As Hollywood et al., note, "The key is to watch, to have expectations about what is being watched, to identify out-of-the-ordinary happenings, and to be able to correlate them with other interesting observations."

⁹⁷ Lord, "Undercover Under Threat: Cover Identity, Clandestine Activity, and Covert Action in the Digital Age," 669.

⁹⁸ See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2017), II-1 - II-4, III-14 - III-17, Figure III-2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf (accessed February 13, 2017).

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, II-2, II-7.

¹⁰⁰ For simplicity, the author used individual decision making models to show the efficacy of the theory, See Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*; Karol G. Ross et al., "The Recognition-Primed Decision Model," *Military Review*, July-August 2004, 6, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA521492> (accessed on February 16, 2017). Below the author provides additional hypothesis testing and results not included in the body of the research paper:

An additional process trace hypothesis test was completed using a non-operational case study. Here the theory is compared against Sinno's eight vital processes of clandestine organizations per Sinno, *Organizations at War*, 12; These processes consist of: "formulation and implementation of strategy, coordination of activities, mobilizing resources, maintaining control and discipline, resilience in a hostile environment, attracting foreign aid, balancing interorganizational cohesion and competition, and generation and preservation of knowledge." Based on a generalized application of the theory against these eight, the SAPP theory would either overcome or overwhelm these processes, or they would become irrelevant due to emergence and destruction of the organization.

Hypothesis testing using short case studies of operations against clandestine organizations were reviewed and tested against two aspects of the theory—the ability to deny ambiguity and protractedness. The three case studies are: 1) U.S. military Special Operations Task Force (referred to as the Task Force) commanded by General Stanley McChrystal in Iraq from 2004-2008 against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); 2) The U.S. interagency Phoenix Program in Vietnam from 1967-1972 against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI); and 3) the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) against organized crime syndicates.

The first case study found that Task Force efforts against AQI were ground breaking in their tempo, intelligence and interagency fusion, reorganization within the context of "network versus network" concepts, and capabilities, and led to over 11,000 AQI killed or captured. However, they did not lead to decisive denial of ambiguity or protractedness for two primary reason. First, the effort was focused on individual targeting in series, vice simultaneous attack, requiring heavy investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to develop patterns of life and pinpoint locations of individuals for raids or strikes. Second, the scale of the TF effort was too small to match the scale of AQI. The TF had less than 300 personnel, and despite increasing tempo to conduct 300 or more raids a month, there was little sustained offensive efforts by the coalition to support TF efforts. Had the entire coalition executed SAPP, then the TF could have been postured as a strategic or operational pursuit force to strike key targets during emergence. Additionally, it is questionable if network versus network theories are viable for large-scale operations. Hierarchies using centralized control and decentralized execution may be a better option. For detailed understanding and insights of this case study, see Stanley McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir* (New York: Penguin Publishing, 2013), 92-93, 96-158, 161-166, 168-194, 198-212, 220-224, 247-248; Stanley McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World* (New York: Portfolio/Penguin 2015), 2-4, 6-8, 17-28, 32, 49-50, 75-76, 81-84, 128-131, 180-182, 184-188; 235-244.

The second case study on the Phoenix Program showed success in denying ambiguity in part, but not protractedness. The Phoenix program did use a combination of U.S. and South

Vietnamese intelligence and paramilitary efforts against the VCI. The Phoenix Program was responsible for approximately 5,000 VCI eliminated, and was effective enough to inadvertently force the VCI clandestine networks farther underground vice exposing them. Interestingly, over 26,000 VCI were eliminated based on a combination of Phoenix Program and conventional force interdiction, although the two efforts were not directly linked. Based on this, there is potential that if the entire military and paramilitary efforts were combined and focused over a shorter period of time, then potentially ambiguity and protractedness would have been denied. For greater understanding of the Phoenix Program, see Andrew R. Finlayson, "The Tay Ninh Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and Its Role in the Phoenix Program, 1969-1970," *A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations*, June 26, 2008, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/a-retrospective-on-counterinsurgency-operations.html> (accessed February 15, 2017); Ken Tovo, *From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005), 4-6, <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix= &identifier=ADA434885> (accessed December 5, 2016); Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century*, 10; Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review*, March-April 2006, 85-89, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art008.pdf (accessed February 15, 2017).

The final case study on the FBI showed the execution of arrest patterns similar to SAPP. The FBI builds cases against entire crime syndicates instead of just one person, and take the syndicate down in a series of simultaneous arrests, pursuing individuals that are not arrested immediately. These arrests included international and domestic coordination with numerous entities and resulted in successful operations that denied ambiguity. The only issue is the long-lead time to the execution of the actual arrests, which does not deny protractedness. However, once executed all individuals were arrested within hours, showing the potential of a SAPP like effects on the crime syndicate. For more case study information see, Kristin M. Finklea, *Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 22, 2010), 9, 13, <https://fas.org/sqp/crs/misc/R40525.pdf> (accessed January 26, 2017); U.S. Attorney's Office, "Twenty-Four Defendants with Ties to Powerful Italian Organized Crime Syndicate Known as the 'Ndrangheta Arrested in Coordinated U.S.-Italian Takedown," *New York Field Office Press Release*, February 11, 2014, <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2014/twenty-four-defendants-with-ties-to-powerful-italian-organized-crime-syndicate-known-as-the-ndrangheta-arrested-in-coordinated-u.s.-italian-takedown> (accessed January 27, 2017); Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Mafia Takedown: Largest Coordinated Arrest in FBI History," *FBI NEWS*, January 20, 2011, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/mafia_012011/mafia-takedown (accessed January 27, 2017); See Department of Justice, "Seventy-Three Members and Associates of Organized Crime Enterprise, Others Indicted for Health Care Fraud Crimes Involving More than \$163 Million" *Federal Bureau of Investigations National Press Release*, October 13, 2010, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/organized-crime_101310 (accessed January 26, 2017); Kevin Horridge, "FBI Busts Major Mafia Crime Syndicate, Including Illegal Gambling ops," *Casino.org*, August 16, 2016, <https://www.casino.org/news/fbi-busts-major-mafia-crime-syndicate-included-illegal-gambling-ops> (accessed January 26, 2017); Richard Esposito, Mark Crudele, and Aaron Katersky, "Feds Arrest More Than 30 Alleged Mobsters in New York Area," *ABC News*, January 16, 2013, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/feds-arrest-30-alleged-mobsters-york-area/story?id=18228516> (accessed January 26, 2017).

Hypothesis testing using computer simulations should be done to further refine this concept. The author tested a similar hypothesis in 2008 as an unsanctioned, non-scientific, tertiary effort. The format was a larger simulation to test technology-focused future capabilities in a scenario using a partner nation facing an increasingly difficult insurgency. The author served as a special operations task force commander over all special operations conducting advise and assist to all partner nation military forces throughout the country. The author's three-man simulations team executed over 600 targets in the initial *simultaneous attack* throughout the country based on the patterns observed. The the team executed over 400 persistence pursuit operations based on what the theory presented here would call "emergence." After two iterations of this theory, our team was asked by the computer programmers to stop conducting large-scale operations because the tempo of operations was projected to destroy the "insurgency" within two more days, but the technology simulation was scheduled for another week and a half.

Hypothesis testing could also be done on a reduced scale via real world operational testing against a known threat organization to validate the theory. The author's unit tested this theory in 2007 during a combined operation with special forces in the lead with their Iraqi partnered force, supported by elements of a conventional U.S. brigade against a tribal target set, consisting of twenty-one known or suspected target locations. All 21 targets were interdicted simultaneously, followed by pursuit. One high value individual escaped the operation, but was detained the following day after making a grave mistake along the border of his tribal region. He attempted to hijack a vehicle of Iraqi soldiers who had participated in the previous night's operation as he attempted to escape the area of operation. Once he was taken into custody, the entire tribe joined the anti-al Qaeda in Iraq efforts and were enrolled in the future Sons of Iraq program.

¹⁰¹ See Janis and Mann, *Decision Making*, 55; Author's note The Janis and Mann theory was chosen by the author based on the author's real-world experiences observing members of the clandestine insurgency. The model matches very well to this problem set.

¹⁰² Alexander Foote, *Handbook for Spies* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949), 3.

¹⁰³ See Chad C. Serena, *It Takes More than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 24.

¹⁰⁴ Janus and Mann, *Decision Making*, 17.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁰⁸ The endnote is for all four questions from Janus and Mann, *Decision Making*, 55.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹¹¹ In this case the vigilant individual in a clandestine organization are confident they or their leaders have established the network correctly, and is reasonably sure that the elements of the

clandestine form, compartmentalization or the “circuit breakers” will protect the individual and/or the network in total if a member of the organization is killed or captured, allow for reorganization around the loss.

¹¹² Ibid., 56.

¹¹³ Ibid., 57.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 54.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 51.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ross et. al., “The Recognition-Primed Decision Model,” 6.

¹¹⁸ See Bartholomees, “A Survey of the Theory,” 30.

¹¹⁹ Martin Rein and Donald A. Schön, “Frame-reflective policy discourse,” in *Social Sciences and Modern States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads*, ed. Peter Wagner, Bjorn Wittrock, and Hellmut Wollmon (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 263; quoted in Alex Ryan et al., *Art of Design*, Student Text, (Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Version 2.0), 322; Alex Ryan, “A Theory of Systemic Design,” *Relating Systems Thinking and Design*, Working Paper, 2013, 3, <http://systemic-design.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Ryan.pdf> (accessed on November 18, 2016).

¹²⁰ Schön, “Frame-reflective Policy Discourse,” 263; quoted in Alex Ryan, “A Theory of Systemic Design,” 3.

¹²¹ Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2016), 23-31, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/PDFfiles/PCorner/CampaignPlanningHandbook.pdf> (accessed March 18, 2017); U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1 - III-18, http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/ip5_0.pdf (accessed October 10, 2016); U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Design Methodology*, 1-1 - 1-5, 3-1 - 5-8.

¹²² Environment frame is defined as “a graphic and narrative description that captures the history, current state, and future goals of relevant actors in the operational environment;” from Ryan et al., *Art of Design*, 323.

¹²³ See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, II-1 - II-4, III-14 - III-17, Figure III-2; McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World*, 226.

¹²⁴ Problem frame is defined as “refinement of the environment frame that defines, in text and graphics, the areas for action that will move existing conditions toward the desired end state;” from Ibid.

¹²⁵ See Errol van Engelen, “Blacklisted: Big Data Will Effectively Fight Terrorism In The Free World,” January 19, 2015, <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/smart-data-effectively-fight-terrorism-free-world-van-engelen> (accessed February 12, 2017); Engelen highlights, “People

(terrorists too) are generating more and more data – From their smartphones, appliances, satellites, terminals, cameras and a range of other sensors on vehicles and machinery. Anything people do online can be traced, stored and analyzed.” Mattathias Schwartz, “The Whole Haystack”; “Why Big Data Analytics”; Patrick Tucker, “The Secret Weapons in the War on Poaching...and Terrorism,” *Defense One*, April 28, 2014, <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/04/secret-weapon-war-poachingand-terrorism/83311> (accessed February 22, 2017); Chris Strohm, “Predicting Terrorism from Big Data Challenges U.S. Intelligence,” *Bloomberg Technology*, October 13, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-13/predicting-terrorism-from-big-data-challenges-u-s-intelligence> (accessed February 12, 2017); Mitra, “The Relevance of Technology in the Fight Against India’s Maoist Insurgency”; Hollywood et al., *Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior*, xv-xxii, 3-6, 8. As Hollywood, et al., note, “The key is to watch, to have expectations about what is being watched, to identify out-of-the-ordinary happenings, and to be able to correlate them with other interesting observations.”

¹²⁶ For countries where the nation state or a partner state have operated in the past, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, historical data bases may already provide significant insights into locations used by insurgent and terrorist organizations in previous conflicts if similar demographics still exist. This historic data provides a starting point for deeper analysis of potential physical infrastructure for the *orient frame*. Observation based on author’s experiences.

¹²⁷ See Engelen, “Blacklisted”; Schwartz, “The Whole Haystack;” “Why big data analytics holds the key,” *SAS Insights*; Tucker, “The Secret Weapons,” *Defense One*; Strohm, “Predicting Terrorism,” *Bloomberg Technology*; Mitra, “The Relevance of Technology”; Snyder, McKay, and Boon, *Out of the Ordinary*, xv-xxii, 3-6, 8.

¹²⁸ For considerations working with surrogates, see Daniel L. Byman, “Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terror,” *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 82-83, 90-99.

¹²⁹ Solution frame is defined as, “Ideas or actions intended to deal with a problem or problem situation;” and an approach frame is defined as a “visualization of the broad general actions that will produce the conditions that define the desired end state;” both from Ryan et al., *Art of Design*, 320, 324, respectfully; note, author adapted solution frame from Ryan’s definition of approach.

¹³⁰ Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century*, 69-71.

¹³¹ See Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 56.

¹³² See Chan, *Complex Adaptive Systems*, 2.

¹³³ Metz and Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 15.

¹³⁴ Steven Metz, *Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2007), 86, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=752> (accessed January 26, 2017).

¹³⁵ Per Donald Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 423; this idea is adapted from Kagan’s analysis of the adaptations required by

Sparta and Athens noting “To win, each had to acquire the capacity to fight and succeed on the other’s favorite domain.” In this case, the nation state must adapt its way of war to succeed against the favorite strategy of the insurgent and terrorist organizations.

¹³⁶ For example of concepts that support this theory, specifically global and transregional executions by the United States, see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: 2020*, 4-7; The CCJO 2020 describes “eight key elements to globally integrated operations: First, globally integrated operations requires (sic) a commitment to the use of mission command....Second, globally integrated operations must provide the ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in time and across domains.....Third, globally integrated operations both enable and are premised on global agility....Fourth, globally integrated operations place a premium on partnering....Fifth, globally integrated operations provide for more flexibility in how Joint Forces are established and employed....Sixth, future Joint Forces will leverage better integration to improve cross-domain synergy—the complementary vice merely additive employment to capabilities across domains in time and space....Seventh, flexible, low-signature or small-footprint capabilities such as cyberspace, space, special operations, global strike, and intelligence, surveillance (sic) and reconnaissance (ISR) will play more pronounced roles in future joint operations....[and] Finally, future joint operations will be increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended consequences [emphasis in original].”

¹³⁷ As quoted in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, *Campaign Planning Handbook*, Final Working Draft (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States War College, AY 08), vii, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/campaign_planning_primer.pdf (accessed November 21, 2016). The author was unable to locate an original source for the quote to verify, but it is a fitting quote for this theory.

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