Strategy Research Project

Transforming U.S. Army Talent Management

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As the global strategic environment evolves in complexity, volatility, uncertainty and ambiguity, it is critically important to analyze how the U.S. Army's talent management strategy prepares officers for service in the future strategic environment.   Although the Department of Defense (DoD) emphasizes the strategic importance of talent management, transformational reform has met significant resistance by stakeholders, both internal and external to the organization. To better prepare future strategic leaders who are capable of thriving in a complex, multi-domain environment, the U.S. Army must fundamentally change its talent management culture by implementing additional, new embedding and reinforcing change mechanisms. These mechanisms include the dedication of resources, deliberate role modeling, the implementation of an officer broadening strategy, and the refinement of company grade officer evaluation reports and centralized selection board processes.

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Transforming U.S. Army Talent Management

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Abstract

As the global strategic environment evolves in complexity, volatility, uncertainty and ambiguity, it is critically important to analyze how the U.S. Army's talent management strategy prepares officers for service in the future strategic environment. Although the Department of Defense (DoD) emphasizes the strategic importance of talent management, transformational reform has met significant resistance by stakeholders, both internal and external to the organization. To better prepare future strategic leaders who are capable of thriving in a complex, multi-domain environment, the U.S. Army must fundamentally change its talent management culture by implementing additional, new embedding and reinforcing change mechanisms. These mechanisms include the dedication of resources, deliberate role modeling, the implementation of an officer broadening strategy, and the refinement of company grade officer evaluation reports and centralized selection board processes.

Transforming U.S. Army Talent Management

> Developing a lethal, professional and technically competent force requires an openness to new ideas and new ways of doing things in an increasingly complex world. We will change and adapt.
>
> —GEN Mark A. Milley[1]

The U.S. Army's senior leaders of 2040 are serving in its ranks today.[2]   As the global strategic environment evolves in complexity, volatility, uncertainty and ambiguity, it is critically important to analyze how the U.S. Army's talent management strategy prepares officers for service in the future strategic environment.   Although the Department of Defense (DoD) emphasizes the strategic importance of talent management, transformational reform has met significant resistance by stakeholders, both internal and external to the organization. To better prepare future strategic leaders who are capable of thriving in a complex, multi-domain environment, the U.S. Army must fundamentally change its talent management culture by implementing additional embedding and reinforcing change mechanisms.[3]

Understanding the need for future reform requires an evaluation of talent management's strategic importance. First, an analysis of current DoD and U.S. Army efforts to match future technological advancements with comparable improvements in leader development is essential. Second, a study of internal and external opposition to recent reform efforts is critical, focused on organizational biases that generated resistance as well as ineffective strategic communication that compromised stakeholder support. Third, the recommendation of new embedding and reinforcing mechanisms is necessary to influence future organizational culture change regarding talent management. Implementing these mechanisms will allow current U.S. Army and DoD leaders to achieve small wins in strategic leader development, consolidate gains, and

enable current DoD strategic leaders to recommend subsequent, foundational adjustments to officer management statutes found within the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).[4] Understanding the U.S. Army talent management strategy, the Army's resistance to reform, and potential future transformation initiatives allows U.S. Army leaders to better prepare today's tactical-level officers to be tomorrow's strategic-level leaders.

<center>The Strategic Importance of Talent Management</center>

Talent management in the U.S. Army should establish the developmental foundation for every officer that serves within the organization, from the tactical to strategic level. As the U.S. Army continues to invest significant capital in modern technological advancements such as precision weapon systems and remotely piloted aircraft, its officer development system must also adapt to ensure future leaders are prepared to integrate these technologies effectively in the strategic environment. The Army's Human Dimension White Paper acknowledges this fact: "to dominate on the battlefield of the future, the Army must not only invest in long-term technological and equipment solutions, but must also invest in its people as the most agile and adaptive Army resource".[5] Historically, the Army used its assignment and leader development processes to enable the growth of adaptive officers, capable of accomplishing complicated, multi-faceted tasks.[6] However, the mastery of vast tactical and operational tasks does not sufficiently prepare an officer to tackle the unique skill sets needed of strategic leaders. Future strategic leaders must be able to understand the strategic environment and the context of complex problems, be able to articulate strategic vision, and be able to develop comprehensive strategies to lead change within multi-cultural organizations.[7]

<center>2</center>

Within the first few weeks of assuming office, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter invested his personal time and the time of his Department of Defense staff to create a culture for innovation. Secretary Carter set the conditions for innovative thought, defined the DoD's strategic talent management challenge, and inspired the generation of new ideas to potentially affect a solution.[8] Secretary Carter introduced this effort, titled The Force of the Future, stating, "…as we innovate to stay ahead of threats, we also have to make sure we keep bringing the best people to use that technology into the military and [The Department of Defense], because they're our most enduring advantage – our people."[9] In addition to recruitment challenges, the loss of talented officers within the first ten years of their careers exacerbated the talent management problem, removing any potential for those talented junior officers to develop into future strategic leaders.[10] The Force of the Future challenged existing talent management practices perceived to constrain strategic leader development and recommended several bold, transforming initiatives. These initiatives included granting individual military services the authority to adjust an officer's promotion timeline as well as allowing officers to opt-out of promotion board consideration temporarily in order to pursue non-traditional career opportunities.[11] Secretary Carter stated that these types of initiatives allow officers to, "get off the escalator for a time, and get back on—without hurting their career, but instead helping it, which after all makes sense."[12]

Earlier, in August 2012, the U.S. Army had already addressed leader development challenges in an increasingly complex strategic environment. Through the Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) No. 6-22, Army leaders articulated a leadership requirement model that balanced leader attributes and competencies expected from

Army leaders at every level (Figure 1).[13] The prescribed attributes of character, presence, and intellect are what the Army wants each leader to be and know.[14] The prescribed competencies of leads, develops, and achieves define a set of actions that the Army wants its leaders to do.[15] Demonstrated performance and potential in these competencies and attributes early in an officer's career develops trust throughout the Army organization and allows leaders to exercise the Army's mission command philosophy, whether leading unified land operations or generating the Army force.[16]

Figure 1. Army Leadership Requirements Model[17]

To translate this updated leadership doctrine into tangible action, the U.S. Army also updated various systems and processes to reflect its leader development focus. These updates included changes to the U.S. Army officer evaluation system and Army Human Resources officer assignment process. In 2015, the Army published an updated Officer Evaluation Report format that incorporated a mandatory evaluation of company grade officers' attributes and competencies during each rating period. Additionally, in late 2014, the Army published DA Pam 600-3, updating Army guidance

on Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, incorporating a deliberate effort for, "purposeful expansion of a leader's capabilities and understanding through opportunities internal and external to the Army," defined as the broadening concept.[18]

Each of these nested steps, from the Secretary of Defense to U.S. Army senior leadership, underscore the importance of developing the attributes and competencies early in an officer's career in order to develop the tactical leaders of today into the strategic leaders of tomorrow. However, despite senior leader engagements, updated doctrine, and an adjusted administrative process, Army talent management reform met with internal and external resistance.

<u>Resistance to Talent Management Reform</u>

Although Secretary Carter and his staff articulated the Force of the Future initiative in numerous forums and U.S. Army doctrine echoed the importance of leader development, the Force of the Future encountered internal and external challenges. These challenges appear largely due to the existing biases and the application of general rules of thumb, or heuristics, of the U.S. Army, coupled with an ineffective strategic communication plan that failed to build consensus amongst critical stakeholders.

The current U.S. Army talent management strategy originated from the draft and industrial eras.[19] Over the past four decades, this strategy implemented tens of thousands of modifications to manage the career of every Army officer who entered the all-volunteer force, including the past 15 years of simultaneous wars.[20] Current Army senior leaders, who are stewards of their profession, are the same officers who thrived under the current system. Success in this system and the bureaucratic inertia of the

Army's talent management process likely resulted in a cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias among many of today's successful Army leaders.[21]

Over time, senior leader confirmation bias resulted in a standard Army officer career timeline reflected in the current Army Leader Development Strategy (see figure 2). This timeline allowed decision makers to rely on a simplified strategy to guide an officer's career, developing a standard model (a form of heuristic) to ensure the right skills sets were present in senior leaders, regardless of future, volatile environments.[22] Adherence to this standard model, coupled with confirmation bias, likely prevented senior leaders from embedding and reinforcing transformational talent management reform within their formations.

Figure 2. U.S. Army Officer Career Timeline (Illustrative for Active Component)[23]

To overcome confirmation bias and the application of heuristic processes such as the Army Officer Career Timeline, strategic communication at the Army and DoD level was paramount. This communication was critical both within the internal Defense organization as well as to external stakeholders, such as Congress. Although service regulations prescribe adherence within the Defense Department, a significant challenge existed when assessing external stakeholders and their influence on implementing change. For the Defense Department, the Senate Armed Services Committee was a relevant stakeholder, assessed as both high interest and high power, requiring close

management and inclusion in any communication plan.[24] However, the Defense

Department managed its relationship with Congress ineffectively, as demonstrated

during Brad Carson's (Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness)

confirmation hearing in February 2016. Senators accused Mr. Carson of failing to keep

Congress informed of proposed historic personnel changes, many that would require

legislative action.[25] Senator McCain further stated that Mr. Carson's efforts were, "an

outrageous waste of official time and resources during a period of severe fiscal

constraints."[26] These comments demonstrate that the Defense Department failed to

assess critical stakeholders and failed to communicate the strategic importance of the

Force of the Future effectively, resulting in the potential for fractured trust during future

engagements. The DoD's effort to institute transformational talent management reform

may have also met significant resistance because it was too aggressive, failing to first

adjust the cultural foundation within the DoD and subordinate services, and failing to

gather the necessary data needed to garner appropriate stakeholder support outside

the organization. These challenges may not prevent future success, but highlight the

need to readjust the Army's talent management reform strategy in an effort to

implement future, effective change.

Implementing Future, Transformational Talent Management Reform

DoD and U.S. Army strategic leaders should not abandon the effort for

transformational talent management reform. Instead, these leaders should strive to

evolve the U.S. Army's talent management culture with additional, new embedding and

reinforcing change mechanisms. Adjusting the culture of a mature organization, such

as the U.S. Army, is not an easy task. The Army's success during the Cold War and

post-Cold War periods makes cultural change even more difficult as senior leaders

likely want to maintain current processes because they justify past successes that are a source of pride for the organization.[27] Although bold, rapid changes, such as those recommended in the Force of the Future, highlight critical elements of success in a dynamic environment, aggressive change in a mature organization may generate greater resistance than with a more gradual approach. Organizational culture expert W. Warner Burke stated, "Culture is 'the way we do things around here' and concerns deeply held beliefs, attitudes and values. Taking a direct, frontal approach to changing values is fraught with difficulty, resistance, and strong human emotion."[28]

Despite recent setbacks, strategic leaders can influence substantive change to the U.S. Army's talent management strategy in an incremental, but meaningful method. Current senior leaders must look to embed a critical assumption within the U.S. Army--today's talent management strategy may not fully prepare tomorrow's strategic leaders to succeed in the anticipated, complex environment.[29] Strategic leaders can embed this assumption, particularly through the allocation of resources and the use of deliberate role modeling when developing subordinate leaders.[30] These leaders can also reinforce this cultural change by synthesizing an Army officer broadening strategy and streamlining the Army's administrative systems and processes to enable the selection of the right officers at the right time for broadening opportunities. Over time, Army and DoD leaders can leverage cultural change to attain small wins, to consolidate gains, and to collect non-anecdotal data to aid in the strategic messaging for substantive DOPMA reform. Implementing these changes can fundamentally transform talent management within the U.S. Army and set the conditions for the effective development of tomorrow's strategic leaders.

Following Congressional and organizational resistance, the Secretary of the

Army invested additional time and personnel to talent management reform, establishing

the Army Talent Management Task Force (TMTF) on June 17, 2016.[31] The Army

established the TMTF to, among other tasks, review current talent management

policies, develop an executable talent management strategy, ensure that ongoing talent

management efforts receive senior leader visibility, and provide recommendations

regarding optimization of human capital.[32] The TMTF coordinates with various agencies

within the Army, including the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC),

subordinate Army level Commands, the Army Staff, and the Army National Guard.[33]

The establishment of the TMTF is an aggressive step in the right direction,

mandated to produce tangible products within three years of its founding. However,

there is a missed opportunity to embed significant change in the talent management

culture by only incorporating the subordinate Army-level commands of U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), U.S. Army Forces Command

(FORCSCOM), and U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC). First, although TRADOC,

FORSCOM, and AMC represent a significant percentage of the Army's force structure,

the TMTF will miss valuable feedback from other senior commands that do not

participate in these formal discussions such as service component commands,

operational force headquarters, and direct reporting units who may view talent

management differently based on their operational requirements.[34] Second, and more

importantly, the Army is missing an opportunity to amplify its strategic message

regarding the importance of talent management reform. As the TMTF conducts

numerous coordination meetings, at a minimum of monthly for the duration of the

project, the subsequent preparation by subordinate headquarters to provide meaningful input will require tactical unit interaction.[35] This preparation and successive understanding that talent management reform is a priority at the Department of the Army level, will further embed the importance of seeking new and innovative ideas to develop our tactical leaders of today for the strategic challenges of tomorrow. The Army should seek the widest audience for this forum to both embed the message and enrich the substance of talent management discussions.

Expanded participation in the Talent Management Task Force, coupled with continued strategic leader messaging, also allows leaders to embed a changing Army culture through deliberate role modeling. As current U.S. Army leadership continues to develop and retain high quality officers by affording opportunities to attend fellowships, graduate school programs, and unique assignments such as with the Office of the Congressional Legislative Liaison (OCLL), there still exists varying levels of resistance at the tactical level to allow, or even recommend, participation in these programs by some commanders. LTG(R) David Barno described this tendency as anti-intellectualism, stating that some senior officers view opportunities such as earning an advanced academic degree, teaching at academic institutions, or taking advantage of unique broadening opportunities as "taking a knee", a view that will have harmful, long term impacts on the development of future strategic leaders.[36]

Routine, personal engagement by current strategic Army leaders will increase the visibility of strategic leader development efforts to the lowest tactical level and will likely result in tactical battalion, brigade, and division commanders understanding the rising expectation to identify and groom those officers who demonstrate the best

potential for strategic leadership. As commanders identify these young officers with demonstrated outstanding potential, they can seek opportunities to retain and develop talented officers by carefully managing subordinates' professional timelines to take advantage of unique, broadening assignment opportunities. Personal engagement regarding talent management by tactical level commanders will further resonate at the junior officer level, deeply embedding the changing culture of leader development for those officers who strive to be future strategic leaders.

As the Army lays the foundation for culture change through multiple embedding mechanisms, it must also apply tangible reinforcing mechanisms to standardize reform efforts throughout the Army. Specifically, the Army can provide subordinate commanders with the means to develop high potential junior officers through a synthesized broadening strategy and a refined company grade officer evaluation tool that better enables the selection of the right officer at the right time for broadening opportunities. Coupled with revised promotion and selection board guidance that emphasizes the importance of participation in broadening programs, these reinforcing efforts will continue to advance fundamental change in organizational culture that can set the conditions for future legislative revision of DOPMA law.

In the U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy for Force 2025 and Beyond, the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 articulated clearly that effective talent management requires a systems approach to ensure the right person is selected for the right job at the right time.[37] The G-1 articulates this guidance further through a series of goals, objectives, and critical enablers that establish an ends, ways, and means based strategy for holistic Army talent management (see figure 3).

The U.S. Army's Broadening Opportunity Program clearly complements the major objective of "develops" through the identification of employment, education, and training opportunities that will extend a Soldier's talents and optimize his or her performance.[38] However, unlike the Army Talent Management Strategic Framework, U.S. Army's Human Resources Command's Broadening Opportunity Program (BOP) does not yet have an associated strategy that is nested with the overarching development operation. The Army's current broadening concept does not yet follow a synthesized ends, ways, and means approach, but rather describes broadening as a "way" for officer development in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management.[39] This Pamphlet does not address the subsequent means to apply to these broadening efforts at the Army level, but only addresses particular programs for certain Army specialty branches (such as Infantry and Logistics), detailing specific development goals within those branches.[40] Although the HRC-established BOP section allows for a single point

## Appendix A: Army Talent Management Strategy Map

Figure 3. Army Talent Management Strategy Map.[41]

of contact to process all broadening related actions, it does not execute an overarching broadening strategy for the Army. Rather, the BOP section implements the Army's governing documents including AR 621-17, Army Fellowships and Scholarships and AR 621-1, Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions.[42] However, the BOP section does produce a holistic BOP catalog that details the numerous broadening programs available along with the associated deadlines and descriptions of various selection processes. This catalog enables individual officers to understand various broadening opportunities and details how these officers can compete for participation if he or she meets the published requirements.[43] These programs and organizations demonstrate that the Army is willing to dedicate time and resources to developing junior officers for potential strategic leadership, but also demonstrate the lack of a cohesive strategy that prevents these programs from serving as an effective reinforcing mechanism of culture change.

To reinforce its development objective, the Army should develop a specific officer broadening strategy, resourced appropriately, to manage its effort across the entire force. HRC or the Army's Senior Leader Development (SLD) office could lead this development effort. Within current DOPMA constraints, Army senior leaders could establish a competitive, centralized selection board (in the same manner as current promotion or command selection boards) to identify those officers who demonstrate exceptional performance and potential, based on the Army's desired leader attributes and competencies.[44] Through participation in a specified broadening program, these officers would further develop those skills that the Army identifies as critical for future service at the strategic level. As depicted earlier in Figure 1, three broadening periods

exist for a U.S. Army officer – one for senior Captains prior to Intermediate Level Education, one for junior Colonels following Senior Service College, and one for senior Colonels following O-6 level command.[45] Centralizing the competitive, broadening process would allow the Army to assess a broad range of officers, regardless of their designated year group. Selection board processes are a familiar system within the Army, do not require Congressional approval, and create some flexibility to groom and manage officers' careers.[46] Furthermore, the dedication of U.S. Army personnel and time to this board process reinforces senior leader strategic messaging about the value of broadening programs. These steps would also allow the continued application of the innovation model through piloting and prototyping of broadening programs to test incremental change and affect long term, transformational reform.[47]

As the Army refines and synthesizes its officer broadening programs, it can also simultaneously reinforce cultural change by making substantive adjustments to the company grade officer evaluation report format, allowing leaders to identify high potential officers earlier in their careers.[48] In light of prescribed attributes and competencies, the Army revamped its officer evaluation system in November 2015, publishing an updated OER format requiring leaders to, "assess subordinates professionalism, performance, and adherence to the attributes and core leader competencies of the Army Leadership Requirements Model."[49] Specifically, for company grade commissioned officers (Second Lieutenant through Captain), rating officers must include a narrative assessment of the rated officers performance in each attribute and competency. Furthermore, Army regulation mandates that rating officers conduct counseling with those they rate at the beginning of the rating period, quarterly

throughout the period, and at the conclusion of the rating period to determine responsibilities, prioritize objectives, assess progress and, ultimately, potential for future service, thus reinforcing the Army Leadership Model.[50] When implemented, these adjustments are an effective tool for commanders at various levels to incorporate desired attributes and competencies into counseling and individual leader development. However, this update fails to provide an effective, quantifiable method to differentiate between multiple officers when assessing a leader's individual attributes and competencies.

To quantify an officer's comprehensive performance and potential, the current company grade officer evaluation report requires rating officers and senior rating officers to assess overall performance or potential in comparison to a rated officer's peers. The rater or senior rater can only give the top 49% of his or her rated population the highest assessment ("excels" for the rater and "most qualified" for the senior rater).[51] Subsequently, this methodology allows assignment officers, promotion board members, and senior leaders to assess a particular officer's performance rapidly, in relation to his or her peers. However, there is not a similar methodology for the assessment of specific attributes or competencies, which in turn, places less significance in this area of the evaluation when viewed by the same assignment officers, board members or senior leaders. Quantifying only overall performance and potential may not enable assignment officers and selection boards to identify the right officer for a certain broadening assignment that requires a desired combination of attributes and competencies. Furthermore, this lack of quantification may not enable these same assignment officers

to seek specific broadening opportunities for other officers that may need to strengthen particular attributes and competencies in preparation for future, strategic assignments.

To reinforce the importance of strategic leadership potential and development as related to the Army's published attributes and competencies, the Army should institute a quantifiable assessment tool on the company grade officer evaluation report. This tool does not have to follow the same, percentage-limiting methodology as the overall performance or potential evaluations. However, it should allow rating officers to assess an officer's performance and potential, in comparison to his or her peers, on a quantifiable scale for each attribute and competency. Subsequently, promotion boards, assignment selection boards, and other human resources entities can apply broadening assignment guidance to demonstrated attributes and competencies to enable the selection of the right officer, for the right assignment, at the right time. Furthermore, this adjustment can allow the collection of quantifiable data over time, enabling further assessment of how junior officer attributes and competencies at the tactical level translate into potential to succeed in broadening assignments, higher-level command, and strategic level assignments.

Upon revision of the Army's broadening strategy and associated company grade officer evaluation report formats, the Army and Defense Department can further reinforce cultural change through the revision of officer promotion and command selection board guidance, favorably recognizing participation in broadening assignments. Strategic leaders may also designate particular broadening assignments to replace tactical level requirements, thus allowing officers to compete for subsequent competitive jobs regardless of their designated cohort year group. Coupled with the

embedding mechanisms of strategic leader engagement and messaging, these incremental assignment and promotion updates will serve as a reinforcing mechanism, stressing the importance of broadening skills to officer advancement. In turn, the competitiveness of broadening programs, as well as potential retention rates, will likely increase as officers seek unique opportunities that will not compromise their ability to remain competitive for promotion.[52]

Over time, strategic leaders can scale these competitive programs, make them part of the norms and culture of the U.S. Army, and allow leaders to attain small victories and consolidate gains as the strategic preparedness of the force increases while the departure of talented junior officers decreases.[53] These small victories and consolidated gains will allow strategic leaders to inform stakeholders about the benefits of a centralized, performance-based process versus a more rigid officer career timeline. It will also allow leaders to involve all stakeholders in the expansion of such programs and ignite stakeholders' imaginations about increased senior leader potential within a new talent management strategy. Finally, strategic leaders can invite these same stakeholders to act as key players in the revision of DOPMA law, reforming the Department of Defense talent management process in alignment with the Force of the Future model.[54] Although this process will take time, achieving short-term wins through internal talent management initiatives will establish the environment for future, transformational talent management reform.

Implementation of future talent management reform will come at a cost. To effectively embed and reinforce change in the U.S. Army, current senior leaders would need to dedicate significant personal time and organizational resources. Implementing

TMTF recommended changes, adjusting organizational structure to implement talent management strategy, updating Army systems and processes, and conducting advanced research will cost both time and money in a continually constrained fiscal environment. Additionally, energizing Congress for substantive DOPMA law adjustment will require investment of DOD time and resources, as well as investment from each subordinate service and defense organization. Although challenging and, at times, costly, these investments can establish the conditions required to match technological advancements with an improved strategic leader capacity.

Critics may argue that the U.S. Army's current talent management strategy created an agile, professional military force that successfully fought multiple, simultaneous wars within an ever-changing strategic environment employing ever-changing tactics. Significant deviations from the current talent management model may run the risk of reducing the warfighting capability of U.S. Army leaders, purposefully removing leaders from Soldiers during the most formative time of their careers. Furthermore, in today's fiscally constrained environment, investing limited monetary resources in broadening opportunities instead of tactical capacity may be an unsound strategic decision.

Current Army leaders may be among the finest produced in a complex combat environment and deliberate investment of precious resources is a paramount concern, however, the Army must not lose sight of the ever-changing character of war. As globalization, cyber-connectivity, and non-state actors continue to redefine the current and future operating environment, the ability to train future strategic leaders to think critically about complex problems is as important as it is to train these leaders to

maneuver forces tactically in combat. Investing organizational resources to change the

Army's culture to prioritize strategic leader development will not only help retain the best

and brightest that serve in the Army's ranks today, but will enable the Army to select the

best among these officers to be the strategic leaders of the future.

Extraordinary technological advancements continue to emerge in a volatile and

complex strategic environment. To maintain its strategic advantage, the Department of

Defense and the U.S. Army must reassess its talent management strategy now and set

the conditions for future transformational change. Historically, organizational biases,

heuristics, and ineffective strategic communication created resistance to such change,

necessitating the need for today's strategic leaders to implement an intentional

innovation model for future efforts. These leaders should now lead an organizational

culture change, implementing both embedding and reinforcing mechanisms that

establish a clear vision, institute incremental and substantive changes, and

communicate an effective strategic message to stakeholders, both internal and external

to the Defense Department. These actions will establish the conditions for future,

transformational talent management reform that will best prepare junior leaders for the

tactical challenges of today as well as the strategic challenges of the coming decades.

Endnotes

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¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy 2013* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2013), 6.

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¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, 5.

¹⁷ Ibid., 5.

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[20] Barno and Bensahel, "U.S. Military Brain Drain?"

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[24] High interest and high power model taken from, Stephen J. Gerras, *Communication with External Audiences – A Stakeholder Management Approach*, Faculty Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2010), 3.

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[28] W. Warner Burke, *Organizational Change Theory and Practice* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), 13.

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[30] Gerras, Wong, and Allen, *Organizational Culture*, 17-19.

[31] Secretary of the Army Eric K. Fanning, "Charter, Army Talent Management Task Force," Washington, DC, June 17, 2016.

[32] Ibid., 1-2.

[33] Ibid., 3-4.

[34] Army Force Structure taken from, *The United States Army Home Page*, www.army.mil/info/organization (accessed December 2, 2016).

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[36] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "Six Ways to Fix the Army's Culture" *War on the Rocks*, September 6, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/six-ways-to-fix-the-armys-culture/ (accessed November 9, 2016).

[37] U.S. Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy: Force 2025 and Beyond* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 20, 2016), 7.

[38] Ibid., 10.

[39] U.S. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development*, 11-12.

[40] Ibid.

[41] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Talent Management Strategy*, 14.

[42] *The U.S. Army Human Resources Command Home Page*, https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Broadening%20Opportunity%20Programs%20Building%20a%20cohort%20of%20leaders%20that%20allow%20the%20Army%20to%20succeed%20at%20all%20levels%20in%20all%20environments (accessed December 15, 2016).

[43] The Broadening Opportunities Program Catalog taken from, *The U.S. Army Human Resources Command Homepage,* https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Broadening%20Opportunies%20Program%20Catalog (accessed December 15, 2016).

[44] For content, Human Resources Command implemented an HRC-internal selection panel for officer broadening opportunities. However, this HRC-internal panel does not follow the same construct as promotion or command selection boards. For further information on the HRC-internal selection panel see, Human Resources Command, "Military Personnel Message 16-232: Broadening Opportunities for U.S. Army Officers," August 16, 2016 https://www.hrc.army.mil/MILPER/16-232 (accessed January 5, 2017).

[45] U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy*, 13.

[46] Barno and Bensahel, "U.S. Military Brain Drain?"

[47] Ibid.

[48] Numerous recommendations exist for substantive adjustment to personnel evaluations, including several options provided by Tim Kane in 2017. To access Mr. Kane's insights see, Tim Kane, *Total Volunteer Force: Lessons from the U.S. Military on Leadership Culture and Talent Management* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2017), 37-41.

[49] U.S. Department of the Army, *Evaluation Reporting* System, Army Regulation 623-3 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 1, 2012), 35.

[50] Ibid., 34.

[51] Ibid., 33.

[52] Numerous examples exist of junior officers departing military service due to lack of unique opportunities, for example CPT Tyler Jost's comments in, Barno and Bensahel, "U.S. Military Brain Drain?"

[53] Concept of scaling programs, attaining small victories, and consolidating gains taken from, John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 117-144.

[54] Inform, involve, ignite, and invite model taken from, John Baldoni, *Great Communication Secrets of Great Leaders* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2003), 32-33.