Facing Up the Bear: Romania and a Reemergent Russia

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Russia's destabilizing actions and policies noticeably transformed the geopolitical environment in the region, bringing a threatening uncertainty about regional security arrangements. The purpose of this paper is to present Romania's options in a strategic environment where Russia act more assertive and aggressive. It focuses on three areas. First, it explains what the historical roots of the perception that Russia is a threat for Romanians are. Second, the paper will explore the current European regional strategic environment and possible future evolutions in Southeastern Europe. Finally, it will present some options to enhance Romanian Armed Forces capabilities and increase their interoperability. These options allow the consolidation of national defense capacity and strengthen Romania's profile within NATO and the EU.
Abstract

Russia’s destabilizing actions and policies noticeably transformed the geopolitical environment in the region, bringing a threatening uncertainty about regional security arrangements. The purpose of this paper is to present Romania’s options in a strategic environment where Russia act more assertive and aggressive. It focuses on three areas. First, it explains what the historical roots of the perception that Russia is a threat for Romanians are. Second, the paper will explore the current European regional strategic environment and possible future evolutions in Southeastern Europe. Finally, it will present some options to enhance Romanian Armed Forces capabilities and increase their interoperability. These options allow the consolidation of national defense capacity and strengthen Romania’s profile within NATO and the EU.
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New things are old things happening to new people.

—Dr. John Lennox

The world faces a wide range of threats and security challenges that originate from state and non-state actors interacting in complex and unpredictable ways. These destabilizing factors include; conventional military forces, terrorist groups, violent extremist organizations, cyber and hybrid forms of war. These all pose a threat to the security and stability of nations and the world.

For centuries Romanians fought to defend their country from mostly external forces. The idea that “Romania is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State,” is embedded in peoples’ hearts and minds and is stated in the Constitution. Romania shares the western democratic values such as human dignity, civil rights and liberties, free development of the human personality, justice, and pluralism, and equality under the law. After more than 25 years of stability and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia’s destabilizing actions have created uncertainty about regional security. This includes Moscow’s bombastic nuclear rhetoric, the annexation of Crimea, the violation of Ukraine’s sovereign borders and other provocative military activities are concerns and present significant risks. Its military presence in the Black Sea is higher than ever.

There are concerns that the national sovereignty is threatened by Moscow’s belligerent actions. Because of this, the Romanian Armed Forces must be enhanced in the medium to long term to be able to withstand an initial attack and, in the framework of collective defense, to defend its national territory. A key part of this is the requirement to increase the interoperability with other NATO forces. These two facets will allow the
consolidation of national defense capacity, strengthen Romania’s profile within NATO and the EU.\textsuperscript{5}

This paper presents Romania’s options in a strategic environment where Russia is acting more assertive and aggressive. It focuses on three areas. First, it explains the historical roots of the perception that Russia is a threat for Romania. Second, the paper explores the current European regional security environment. Finally, it presents options to enhance Romanian Armed Forces capabilities to match the regional security environment.

According to a poll conducted in 2015,\textsuperscript{6} Russia is the country Romanians (61.7\%) dislike the most. Similar, when asked to name the one country that poses the biggest threat to them, 57\% of Romanians pointed to Russia.\textsuperscript{7} The reason for this is rooted in 300 years of mixed relations between Romanian state entities and Russia (to include the Soviet Union.) Ranging from excellent to worst, these relations changed whenever Russian interests changed, often working at odds against Romania.\textsuperscript{8} In advancing its ends to dominate Europe, Russia and then the Soviet Union repeatedly occupied, subjugated, split, oppressed and ethnically cleansed Wallachia and Moldavia or Romania. Romanian history is connected and influenced by the country’s geographical position. Settled between the Carpathian Mountains, the Danube River, and the Black Sea, it is at the crossroads of great empires. Throughout history, the territories inhabited by Romanians were subject to economic political and military interests for regional powers like Poland and Hungary Kingdoms, the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Russian Empires.
In the Middle Ages, Romanian Principalities (Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania) faced long and repeated confrontation against the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. In alliance with the neighboring Christian countries, and, at times, alone, they fought countless battles against the Ottoman Turks, preventing their expansion and protecting Christian Europe. For a time, the Ottoman wave seemed unstoppable. Constantinople was captured by the Ottomans in 1453, Belgrade fell in 1521, and Hungary disappeared after the battle of Mohacs in 1526. The Balkan Peninsula became a Turkish-ruled territory. Surrounded, Wallachia, Transylvania, and Moldavia recognized the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire after Hungary had become a pashalik, in 1541.

Unlike the other peoples of Southeast Europe, the Romanians maintained their state entities, political, military and administrative structures in a tribute-paying system. The Principalities continued to have native princes, had never been administrated from Istanbul and were out of the Ottoman way of land tenure. More significantly they kept their religion and cultural traditions and offered protection for Christians fleeing from the intolerant Islam.

The beginning of the 18th century changed the balance of powers in Central and Eastern Europe. The Ottoman Empire attempt to capture Vienna in 1683 failed, and the Hapsburgs extended their claims to Southeastern Europe. The peace treaty of Karlowitz (1699) between the Sultan and Austria, Poland, and Venice resulted in the annexation of Transylvania, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia by the Habsburg Empire. Venice acquired the Peloponnese and most of Dalmatia. Poland gave back its conquests in Moldavia but reclaimed part of Ukraine west of the Dnieper River. The Turks and the
Russians concluded a two-year armistice. However, the Russian Czar proclaimed himself as the protector of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Romanian princes in Walachia and Moldavia began to identify Russia as a solution to breaking the Turkish oppression. The ambitious dreams of the Czars to become the successors of the Byzantine Emperors and to control the Bosporus and Constantinople placed the Romanian Principalities in the way of Russian expansionism.

Russia's influence grew in Walachia and Moldavia especially when Ottoman power declined. Each time Russia seized the opportunity to conquer neighboring countries. After his success against Sweden in the battle of Poltava (1709), Czar Peter the Great turned to the Dniester river and started a diplomatic offensive in Romanian Principalities. Winning the support of the Prince Dimitrie Cantemir, in 1711, the Russian Army entered Moldavia but was defeated by Ottomans and forced to withdraw. In response, the Ottoman Empire, introduced in Moldavia and Wallachia the ‘Phanariot regime.’ The native princes were replaced with appointed Greeks voivodes recruited from Istanbul's Phanar district. The Phanariot princes purchased their positions, and their goal was to drain as much wealth as possible from the territories. For one hundred years, corruption, exploitation and rapid replacement of rulers caused devastation on the principalities' social and economic conditions. Foreigners monopolized trade, and the peasantry was on the brink of starvation due to severe contributions and heavy labor obligations.

Many of the wars between Austria, Russia and the Ottoman Empire took place on Romanian soil. Each was accompanied by military transit or occupation of foreign troops. The military presence, mainly the Russian one, continued even after the wars
ended. As a consequence, Romanian Principalities suffered not only devastation and irreparable damages, but also population displacements and territorial losses. Peasants were subjected to heavy labor obligations, forced requisitions, and even exile to Siberia.\textsuperscript{14}

The 1812 Peace of Bucharest was signed by Russia and the Porte to secure Russia's southern flank during Napoleon's invasion.\textsuperscript{15} Romanian Principalities returned to the Ottomans, but Russia annexed Bessarabia, the land between the Prut and Dniester Rivers. Bessarabia, under Russian occupation, banned the Romanian language imposing Russian in government, schools, media, books, and churches. An ethnic cleansing began when protesters were deported to Siberia. From that moment, the Czar was not perceived by Romanians as a guarantor of freedom, but instead, they developed "an abiding mistrust of the Russians that would deepen in the next century."\textsuperscript{16}

The Turks, with Russia's approval, crushed the 1821 Wallachian national uprising directed against the Phanariot regime. The rebellion ended the appointment of Phanariot princes to the Walachian and Moldavian Thrones. Instead, native princes could rule but with seven-year terms and only with Russian consent. The terms changed after Treaty of Adrianople (1829), which granted Russian Protectorate over the Principalities. It installed Romanian Princes for life which the sultan could neither reject nor remove without Russian consent. Countries would have independent national administration, freedom of worship and commerce.\textsuperscript{17} The Porte exacted a fixed tribute and remained the principalities' suzerain\textsuperscript{18}, but they also had to sustain the Russian occupation of 90,000 soldiers. Russia could direct aspects of foreign policy, and the principalities' first fundamental laws the Règlement Organique were ratified.\textsuperscript{19} As a
consequence, following the Protector’s model, an oligarchic control of government was legalized. The Boyars were Russian supported rulers, with powers just below the rule of a prince. They protected their privileges, including their tax-exempt status. They reduced the peasants’ freedom of mobility and stiffened peasant obligations. However, the charters established public education and reformed the principalities’ judicial system.  

Russia left the Principalities in 1851 and reoccupied them in 1853 precipitating the Crimean war. The Treaty of Paris that followed Russia’s defeat reaffirmed Ottoman suzerainty over Romanian Principalities but this time under a European guarantee. It abolished the Russian protectorate and returned a part of southern Bessarabia to Moldavia. Between 1856 to 1859, the union of Walachia and Moldavia was supported by Russia to undermine Ottoman rule. These “United Principalities” became Romania in 1859 under Alexander I. Cuza, the Prince elected in both entities.

The European powers and the Ottoman Empire faced a fait accompli and finally consented in 1861, in Paris, the Union. Cuza’s government started reform programs in the military, transportation, law, education and agriculture. Under his rule, the establishment of a strong army began, and working military relations with France started. Cuza organized the Ministry of War and the General Staff and three divisions leading an active permanent army of 20,000 soldiers and 25,000 reserves. Also, he formed the first Romanian Officer’s Training College. A French training mission to the United Principalities and the acceptance of Romanian officers into military academies at Saumur, St. Cyr and Brest would constitute the basis for the future of the modern Romanian Army. He supervised the construction of factories for weapons, ordnance,
and war materiel. In the doctrinal field, the Prince relied on observations and lessons learned by military attaches sent in combat zones around the world, including in the United States of America during the Civil War.\textsuperscript{22} However, its agrarian law and the elimination of serfdom alienated the wealthy classes, and under their pressure, in 1866 army officers loyal to the country's leading boyars, with support from Russia and Germany, forced Cuza to abdicate.\textsuperscript{23}

Carol, a member of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a German family, was selected to replace Cuza. His rule would last until 1881 as a Prince and until 1914 as a King. As a former career officer in the Prussian Army, he experienced combat in Denmark in 1864. Carol continued the military development initiated by Cuza and played a decisive role in securing the independence and sovereignty of Romania.

In April 1877, another Ottoman-Russian war started, and Czar Alexander proclaimed himself again protector of Orthodox Christians. The Russian Empire and Romania signed the Bucharest Treaty under which provisions Russian troops were allowed free passage through Romania. To prevent any surprise, after the experience of 1831 and 1853, a full mobilization was declared, and the Romanian Army secured the passing corridor for Russian forces and concentrated in the south of the country to prevent any attack.

The Declaration presented to the Parliament on May 9, 1877, expressed the will of the people and declared full independence. As a consequence, Romania stopped paying the tribute and redirected the funds to the Romanian War Ministry. After a surprising Ottoman success at Pleven (in Bulgaria), Czar Alexander requested Romania to enter the war. Prince Carol, leading 40,000 soldiers crossed the Danube, assumed
the command of the combined Russian – Romanian forces and defeated the Turks at Rahova, Vidin and finally at Pleven. However, Russia signed the San Stefano Treaty, without recognizing the belligerent quality of Romania and breaking its obligation to respect the integrity of the country. Instead, it forced the Ottoman Empire to cede Dobrugea, Danube Delta, and the Serpent Island keeping the right to exchange them with the South of Bessarabia. Moreover, the treaty stated the right of the free access of Russian troops for two years. Facing Romania’s protests, Russia threatened with occupation and disarmament of Romanian Army. Prince Carol's determination to defend the country will lead to the intervention of European Powers irritated by Russian demands and the danger of its expansion toward Bosphorus Strait and the Mediterranean Sea.

The contribution of Romanian Army to Russian victory underpinned Romania's entitlement to national independence and sovereignty but with painful sacrifices. It would be officially acknowledged by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Following a compromise, Romania lost the South of Bessarabia and a third of Dobrugea but kept the Danube Delta and the Serpent Island. While in 1812 mistrust of Russia was the public feeling, now in people’s perception, Russia was the enemy. Constantin Bacalbasa, a respected journalist of that time wrote:

> From this moment, Romanians’ friendship for Russia was over. Russians are looked now coldly and with enmity. Daily conflicts occur in all the country with Russian soldiers. Russian ingratitude and the violation without shame of the formal engagements assumed on April 4, 1877, in the Convention revolt all Romanian souls. Russian cause in Romania is lost forever.²⁴

> Accordingly, historian Alex Mihai Stoenescu considers 1878 “the threshold from which in the Romanian common perception inculcates a Russophobia phenomenon.”²⁵
He asserts that not only the dishonest political behavior but mostly the destructions, arsons, robberies, rapes and humiliations suffered by Romanians from the Czarist Armies conducted to a complete destruction of Russia’ image.26

The implication of Russia in Romania’s internal affairs did not stop after the 1878 conflict as demonstrated by the peasant’s revolt of 1888 and 1907, which were instigated by Russia.27 First World War events fed the tensions and increased the animosity. During the war, the Russian Army withdrew without notice and left Romania with no option but to capitulate. It followed a prolonged conflict with the Bolsheviks for Bessarabia. The Treasury was seized and never returned. Bessarabia and Bukovina were again annexed in 1940 after the Nonaggression Treaty between Stalin and Hitler (known as Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact). The Second World War brought Russian occupation again between 1944 and 1958. As usual, it was accompanied by plundering, rape, and violence. As other countries conquered by Soviets, Romania faced the imposition of communism, ideological purges, mass imprisonment, and the forced displacement of entire populations.28

After the 1989 Revolution, Russian involvement in Moldavia, its support for the separatist movement in Transdiester only increased the animosity and further accentuated the negative feelings related to Russia. The frictions continue today. Russia aggressively reacted to Romania’s accession into NATO and UE, and for the moment the relations between the two countries can be viewed as “cold.”

This historical overview explains why Romanians maintain a distaste for Russian and Soviet values. These feelings drove Romanian Army over the Dnieper River during WW II. They were present for 50 years of Communism determining a different behavior
and a different approach in relation with the Soviet Union. In a way, this justifies ‘maverick actions’ expressed in the incredible exclusion of Soviet troops in 1958, the refusal to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the opening to the west in the years that followed. Russia is perceived now in Romania, as it was in the 19th century, the most critical threat to independence and sovereignty.

Although unique, the global strategic environment is dynamic. NATO distinguishes several key strategic drivers of change: globalization of society, political geometry, demographic and environmental change and the impact of technology.\textsuperscript{29} Although the Romanian National Defense Strategy 2015-2019 does not expressly define the strategic environment, it has the same approach to strategic drivers. Its focus is on a strategic partnership with the United States of America, NATO, and the EU which are fundamental pillars.\textsuperscript{30} Without mentioning political geometry, the United States considers demographic and environmental change and the impact of technology as drivers. This makes the strategic environment “fluid.”\textsuperscript{31} Russia instead, views global development driven by competition, interregional rivalry, economic instability, complex political evolutions, and tensions. It wants to assume an increasing role on the international stage.\textsuperscript{32}

Some other drivers of change came into action in the last years. For example, there is increased interdependence between international, states and non-state actors. They interact having common collaborative goals in some domains, but different views or even conflictual relations in others. This interaction brings a blurring distinction between domestic, regional and global, military and non-military dimensions and divergence in the comprehensive use of instruments of power. The interdependence
brought by globalization on one side and rules imposed by integration on the other are in constant friction. This trend is expressly manifest in the EU member countries, EU as an organization, the US, and Russia relations. Regional geopolitical transformations, shifts or even reorientation in foreign policy with increased democratic reforms or dramatic involutions of societies is also a new strategic driver. Such transformations can have malign effects.

Social, politic, judicial and economic improvements in Eastern Europe are positive expressions of this driver and impact on stability, cooperation and increased living standards for people. Contrary to this, the Arab Spring and Daesh actions in Syria and Iraq followed by migration, Turkey drift and the rise of nationalism and euro-scepticism in some European countries are constant challenges and sources of risks and threats to regional security and the international order.

During its history, Russia has had an atypical geopolitical situation. Diverse ethnic groups, languages, and religions, are melted on a vast territory full of resources. Only strong authoritarian rulers and regimes, imposing conformity from above, have successfully preserved state’s survivability, prevented economic collapse and resisted attacks from outside and from insight. Whenever the Russian state has collapsed, Russians connected the events with weak leadership. In the early 17th-century ‘time of troubles’, internal turmoil and Vasily Shuysky are accounted responsible.33 For the March Revolution of 1917 and the Bolshevik regime that followed, Nicholas II weakness is embedded in Russian perception as the main cause. Simplistic and blunt, Mikhail Gorbachev was too weak and unable to understand that Western ideas of democracy do not suit Russia and consequently unable to prevent the collapse of the USSR.34
The view is that when ruled by strong leaders, Russia was powerful and ultimately imposed its will in Europe and the world. Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Lenin and Stalin used brutal methods to strengthen their rule but completed grand plans for Mother Russia. Cultural pattern through values and traditions support Russian people’s need to be led by someone who 'did' things, even ruthless against them, but beneficial for the country.

For sure Vladimir Putin is a strong leader. How will Russia evolve under him? Is Putin a new Augustus moving the Russian people to the West through conquests like Peter the Great did? Does he follow Ivan the Great’s policy to open up relations with countries to his west and south? Is Putin the patron of arts, promoter of reforms and defender of the Orthodoxy like Catherine the Great? Will he try like Khrushchev to make reforms to raise up the standard of living for his people? Alternatively, will be what Alexander I became to Russian people, the hero that prevailed in the Napoleonic Wars? Probably none of the above but a complex mix of all and this is why today, Russia faces a “one-man decision-making system” in which President Putin’s unpredictability and the quest for international recognition seize every opportunity. His goal is to regain and enhance the sphere of influence and “consolidate the Russian Federation’s status as a leading world power.”

From the Russian perspective, the role of the military as a factor in international relations is not declining. Russia already had proven in Georgia and recently in Syria that can achieve political objectives using the military instrument of power. However, Putin’s regime successfully experienced the use of non-military means to obtain overwhelming successes. Cyber-attacks, information campaigns and economic
sanctions (in fact countersanctions) aggregated with diplomatic and political actions and, in a lesser extent, military deployments, posture, and operations were more than effective. A combination of these used in Crimea and Ukraine undermined NATO and the United States ability to respond promptly and exploited opportunities to diminish any military advantages.

The internal situation in Russian is subject to economic instability mainly determined by a low price of oil and the economic sanctions imposed by EU and the United States. However, taking advantage of NATO and the United States focus on Iraq and Afghanistan, and a high price of oil, Russia has boosted its defense spendings and has now a better trained, equipped and capable armed forces.

The increased support for separatists in Ukraine and the heavy militarization of Crimea pose a severe threat not only to the Republic of Moldova and Romania but also to stability and integrity of Europe. In August 2016, an S-400 Ballistic Missile Regiment reinforced Crimean Air Defences. Russian Airborne Forces Chief of Staff said in an interview that this year, an Airborne Battalion would be deploying in the northern Crimean city of Dzhankoi, followed by a regiment in 2018.36

The Black Sea Fleet is a high priority of the State Armament Program, and by 2020 new units should be commissioned and additional mobile missile coastal forces deployed.37 New platforms (six multipurpose frigates armed with anti-ship – P-800 Onyx missile, anti-surface cruise missile Klub and anti-air capabilities Shtil and six submarines -Kilo class) will critically enhance Russian anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and contribute to locking Russia's southern flank.38
Russia’s military build-up includes the deployment of 20 additional Su-27 Flanker fighters on the Crimean airbase of Belbek (in November 2015), as well as long-range supersonic bombers Tu-22M3 capable of carrying nuclear weapons on Gvardeyskoye airbase. Together with Tu-142 and Il-38N, and Ka-27 and Ka-30 helicopters, they are meant for anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrols as far as the Eastern Mediterranean. By 2020, existent non-modernized air platform will be replaced with multipurpose Su-30SM, Su-34 as well as Su-35 fighters. Reports about deployments of short-range nuclear-capable Iskander missile systems to Crimea would make insecure all Eastern European countries. The Iskander-M range can extend into Moldova as well as littoral areas of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

Crimea is a military power projection platform where Russia deployed long and medium range missiles, advanced air and missiles defense systems, combat aviation, Special Forces, strategic airlift assets, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, surface ships, and diesel submarines. It became “a Black Sea fortress and a base for westward expansion of the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions, for militarily threatening the European Union countries ensuring Russian presence in the Mediterranean.” Despite Moscow having signed the Istanbul Accord that stipulates their withdrawal by 2002, the presence of Russian soldiers in the self-proclaimed Republic of Trans-Dniester, can offer Russia an opportunity to openly or covertly deploy A2/AD systems in the separatist republic with significant impact on Romania’s security.

The current status quo is to Russia’s advantage. Putin’s regime went out from a strained political isolation leveraging financial and economic means. The future actions of pro-Russian regimes or leaders in Europe and proximity (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, and Turkey) are concerns over the EU and NATO political cohesion. Some of these leaders have regularly criticized EU sanctions against Russia without worrying about consensus in Brussels and "have left themselves the option of closer ties with Moscow."44

The European countries dependence on Russian energy, untouched by the economic sanctions, gives Kremlin an advantage. Europe imports over half of its energy and is "dependent on Russia as its leading supplier of fossil fuels – 31% of gas, 26% of coal and 32% of crude oil imports"45 but the relation is a symbiotic one. Fossil fuels sold mainly to EU countries account for around 70% of Russia's exports, and half of its budget.46 The prices are more and more subject to Russian abuse because only countries with diversified supplies can negotiate (for example, Germany pays €24/MWh, Lithuania €38, and Bulgaria €43).47 These differences are subject to European Commission investigations into alleged manipulation by Gazprom of its position as the EU's main gas supplier.48 Russia supplies 18% of the EU's mined uranium being a major nuclear energy player.49 Some of the European countries operate Russian-built nuclear power stations (Finland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria) and from these, some are entirely dependent on Russian fuel supplies. European Parliament expressed constant concerns over energy security. Resolutions stressed "the EU's need to diversify transportation channels and energy providers" while criticizing Russia for "using energy supplies 'as a political tool.'"50

Putin understood how to turn energy dependency into political capital and use it to weaken the European Union. A good example is the last visit he paid in Hungary. Prime Minister Orban stated in a press conference that "the world is in the process of a
substantial realignment," and the visit “will create favorable conditions for stronger Russian-Hungarian relations.” Contrary, Andras Racz, a Russia expert, and associate professor at Pazmany Peter Catholic University in Budapest, asserts that “there is no trust on the Russian side towards Orban but Hungarian leader is a tool for weakening European Union unity.” He also suspects that the warm relations of recent years had more to do with Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy.

Russia had stopped the accession of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO by creating “frozen conflicts” in these countries. Finally, Moscow succeeded to simultaneously build or reinforce Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) “bubbles” in Kaliningrad, Crimea, and Syria with strategic effects. These make NATO and the United States power projection increasingly risky and enable Russia to exert its influence. Forces deployment, integration, and build-up are significantly challenged by a combination of lethal and cyber, electronic and space capabilities. Use of jammers, disruptive and destructive malware and anti-satellite weapons will impede communications, positioning, and navigation finally restraining the freedom of maneuver.

Russia uses information operations as “a key enabler for its aggressive hybrid tactics executed in Eastern Europe,” and dedicates enormous resources and intelligence efforts to prevail in the information domain. The intensity, sophistication, and complexity of Kremlin’s information warfare are without precedence. State-sponsored propaganda disseminated directly and covertly “exploits ethnic, linguistic, regional, social and historical tensions, and promotes anti-systemic causes, extending their reach and giving them a spurious appearance of legitimacy.” President Putin directly threatened Romanian citizens in connection with the Deveselu facility that became
operational in May 2016. “If yesterday people simply did not know what it means to be in the crosshairs in those areas of Romania, then today we will be forced to carry out certain measures to ensure our security,” he said in a press conference in Greece. This coordinated information campaign poses a critical threat to all European countries and North America.

For Putin, the next step will be a demonstration of NATO’s inability to assist or defend one or more of its members. As a NATO official stated in a conference, actions will not be isolated. Moscow will act simultaneously along its entire border with NATO and in its periphery to put pressure on NATO decision-making system and to stretch its forces. Such actions will lead to a break in the European and transatlantic relation with effects on the international order. The Baltics and The Black Sea regions are perfect to exploit such an opportunity.

For Romania, the danger can come from the instability in Transdniestra and the manipulation of the problems experienced by Romanian minority in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Hungarian minority continues their claims for autonomy in the so-called Szecklerland. Russian propaganda and disinformation can trigger uncontrollable ethnic or other problems. More important, the Baltic states, Poland and Romania do not have the defense capability to withstand a Russian military aggression and for the moment are dependent on NATO’s response.

Over the medium to long term perspective, Russian objectives to destabilize Romania’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity will serve the higher interest of transforming the Black Sea into a “Mare Nostrum,” and rebuilding a buffer zone under its influence. It will also demonstrate that Russia divides Europe and promote its
dominance. These can lead to a new international order and the defeat of EU and the US policy regarding European allies.

There are two possible approaches for Putin to test NATO unity using the Black Sea region. First, to create a land bridge from Russia to Crimea and Odessa, to expand Russian military presence and influence towards Trans-Dniester and Moldavia, directly threatening Romania. Claiming the protection of minorities, human rights, and national identity Russia will invade the southern Ukraine down to Odessa or will deploy forces in Transdniester entering in Moldavia. This option is improbable due to Russia’s preference to avoid direct implication and the high risk of a confrontation with the military power of NATO. However, it can be feasible to create and maintain frozen conflicts in the area and to test the determination of NATO to intervene outside its Area of Responsibility (AOR).

In the second option, using the strategy of ambiguity\textsuperscript{59}, Russia can create a “gray zone” at Romania’s northern border concealing its direct involvement by using hybrid warfare. An ethnic problem, artificially created in Ukraine using Romanian minority rejection on mobilization and deployments in the combat zones\textsuperscript{60} and late evolutions in the educational system that banned the Romanian language from some schools\textsuperscript{61} will inevitably provoke Romania. The scenario is a combination of that exercised in Eastern Ukraine with a new approach in which Romanian minority in Ukraine is used to involve Romania, a NATO member, in a “gray zone.” Putin can stop and maintain a frozen conflict on NATO’s border, or continue with the annexation of new territories. Success, in any of the alternatives, will profoundly shake the credibility of NATO and especially the trust in the transatlantic link.
After the 1989 Revolution, Romania began a transition process from a communist totalitarian state to a real democracy. Although a painful process, Romania is now a democracy with stronger institutions, a better health care system, a professional army, a free judiciary, and media. It is a reliable economic, political and diplomatic partner and a trusted military ally.

The Romanian domestic environment presents a continuous economic growth that is not reflected yet in the population’s well-being. Although the World Bank forecasted an economic growth for Romania of 3.7 percent in 2017, 3.4 percent in 2018 and 3.2 percent in 2019, the same institution draws attention that the country has the highest poverty rates in the EU. The unequal distribution of prosperity creates animosities between the population and politicians, mainly the parliamentarians. Although the achievements of Romania in fighting corruption “have rightly attracted widespread recognition and substantial progress has been made,” this phenomenon remains one of the vulnerabilities to national security. According to the Transparency International, Romania has to take some accelerated steps to efficient prevent both petty as well as grand corruption. It must correct the main dysfunctionalities affecting the public administration and increase transparency of administrative procedures. Moreover, standardizing the criteria for civil service administration, it must ensure predictability of public policy decisions.

Different from its neighbors, Romania is less dependent on Russian natural gas and oil. All of the imported gas comes from Russia, but it represents only less than 25% of the domestic demand in peak season. Romania produces 400 billion cubic feet and has the fifth largest reserves of natural gas in Europe and much potential for shale gas.
production. The prospects of substantial gas reserves in The Black Sea make credible the desire for complete energy independence by 2020. However, is expected, after the annexation of Crimea, for Russia to claim Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), “which may seriously complicate the division of the Black Sea continental shelf and EEZs with Romania and Turkey.”

The Romanian military capabilities and capacities are not able, alone, to prevent Russian aggressive actions. The reason for this is the under-financing that followed the economic crisis in 2009. For the moment, the Romanian Armed Forces operate a mix of Soviet and Western equipment. Although in the two last two decades, the acquisition process was Western-oriented, part of this equipment is old. It has to be upgraded or replaced. Its maintenance requires enormous efforts and consumes a significant amount of resources. Military facilities, barracks, warehouses, training facilities and firing ranges need urgent repairs and modernization. Meantime, Romania consumes resources to maintain a substantial number of installations that are out of military use. Despite these shortfalls, soldiers are the most valuable resource of Romanian Armed Forces. Due to culture and soldiering traditions, Romanian soldier poses courage, resilience, discipline and motivation. They are adaptable and skillful. Moreover, the participation in multiple international military operations, coalition, allied or UN-led made them resilient and able to confront the hardship of enduring military operations.

NATO membership and the strategic partnership with the U.S. are the two pillars of country’s security. Romania hosts operational elements of the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, now part of NATO’s ballistic missile defense. It provides the Host Nation Support (HNS) for the NATO Force Integration Unit
designed to facilitate the deployment of NATO troops and for the Alliance’s Multinational Division-Southeast headquarters, NATO’s higher command and control structure in the region. Moreover, at the Warsaw Summit, Romania assumed the framework for a NATO multinational brigade (MNBDE), which is under development. Part of the Tailored Forward Presence (tFP), MNBDE will have contributions at the battalion level from Bulgaria, Poland, and Turkey. The United States, Canada, and Germany have also announced significant contributions. Within the context of Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), an Air Defence Battery will join the US-led Battle Group based to Orzysz, Poland. Recently, the Mihai Kogalniceanu Air Base (MKAB) became an important hub for the US to deploy troops and equipment in and from Afghanistan. It is also used as an airport of disembarkation/embarkation in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve and European Reassurance Initiative.

Understanding both advantages and obligations resulting from its member status, Romania deployed troops in support of NATO, EU and coalition missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. It also contributed to maritime security operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Unified Protector during the Libya crisis and Anti-ISIL coalition in Syria. All these engagements prove Romanian commitment and Armed Forces capability to satisfy its responsibilities as a NATO member country besides significant resources required. The commitments, constant improvements of defense capacity and significant contribution with troops established Romania as a “steadfast ally of both the United States and NATO.” It has the strongest security guarantees ever offered. NATO and the EU membership,
strategic partnerships and good relations with neighboring countries offer the opportunity to increase its geostrategic profile.

During the Wales Summit, NATO agreed to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets. They also decided that Allies “need to display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed.” 70 NATO states a minimum of 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense from which more than 20% is dedicated to major equipment, including related Research & Development. 71 A ten years period was established to move towards percentage guidelines to meet NATO Capability Targets and fill NATO’s capability shortfalls. 72 Through this, countries ensure that their forces meet NATO guidelines for deployability and sustainability and can operate together effectively.

On January 2015 the President of Romania and representatives of Parliamentary Parties and Minority Group signed the National Political Agreement on Increased Defense Resources. The cosigners agreed that four objectives are going to guide all future actions related to defense. First, the budget for defense will increase to reach 2% of GDP by 2017. Secondly, it establishes the continuation of this level of funding for the following ten years with the mention that if financial situation allows the percentage will increase. The allocations will be related to the security needs and the obligations Romania will assume. Third, the Agreement forms the basis of a national political consensus between parties (in power or opposition) to respect a strong commitment to supporting the level of military budgetary allocations and duration agreed. Finally, it states the support for the multiannual planning process to ensure predictability in the
acquisition policy and the development of cooperation programs between the national defense industry and foreign specialized companies.

After voted, on February 17, 2017, the budget of the Ministry of Defence has indeed reached 2% of GDP from which approximately 48% allocated for acquisition. Ministry of Defense Gabriel Les stated that these means allows commitment “to reconfiguring and modernizing the military system, which is a must in the volatile situation in the vicinity of the country.” The same day, NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg congratulated Romania for the major efforts of raising the defense budget adding that it is an example to be followed by the state members of NATO. The policy expressed by the Ministry of Defense must be applied using a cost consciousness approach. This will bring a greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending.

To ensure the appropriate security and defense profile for Romania Ministry of Defense Gabriel Les presented military strategic objectives:

- Consolidating the national defense capacity;
- Continuing Romania’s Armed Forces transformation and modernization;
- Developing capabilities able to respond to the asymmetric and hybrid threats;
- Deepening the security dimension of the Strategic Partnership with the U.S;
- Participating in missions and operations in areas of strategic interest for Romania.

For Romania, a military aggression is unlikely. However, the capacity to trigger such aggression is higher due to the presence of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Black Sea. According to Romanian Military Strategy, this is the main threat to the security of Romania and other states in the region. Strategists suggest
different approaches to the A2/AD problem. Wermeling proposes three options: “destroying adversary’s A2/AD capabilities, creating a counter A2/AD zone, and enacting a distant blockade.”\textsuperscript{78} Aaron L. Friedberg also supports three alternative counter-strategies: Air–Sea Battle, a distant blockade, and a maritime denial strategy.\textsuperscript{79} Addressing the European theater of operations, Simon sees only two: “defeating the A2/AD challenge and hedging against it.”\textsuperscript{80} While each option is distinctive in term of ends, they are interconnected and complementary from the means and ways.

Defeating strategy assumes a synchronized campaign to disable communications and sensors and destroy the missiles, ships, submarines, and aircraft in the A2/AD zone. Concurrently, the concept requires increased survivability of platforms operating within the A2/AD zone as well as viable sensors and communications systems supporting the complex operations.\textsuperscript{81} This option is feasible and directly eliminates the threat and offers access and freedom of maneuver. It is technologically intensive and requires capabilities such as stealth, long-range strike, cyber and electronic warfare, and advanced missile defense systems that Romania does not possess.

The ‘Hedging’ operational approach “seeks to turn the anti-access tables on the enemy or competitor to raise the costs of potential aggression.”\textsuperscript{82} The option is less technologically intensive and more asymmetric in nature. Romanian geography is suited for such an option. Littoral configuration, Danube Delta, and the Carpathian Mountains offer major advantages for defense. To apply this option Romanian Armed Forces need to acquire or modernize its air, sea, and land capabilities to negate and reduce the risks posed by the Russian conventional forces. Moreover, forces need to be organized and
trained for “protracted warfare” through small and highly distributed units, prepositioned and concealed weapons and ammunitions and special operations. They will focus on delay operations, lethal maneuvers in depth, ambushes, and sabotage which will raise the costs of a potential Russian aggression, and contribute to deterrence by denial. Nevertheless, only a balance between the two options is feasible, acceptable and from Romania’s perspective sustainable. The burden of the ‘defeating’ part of the strategy can be addressed only by the deployment of NATO or US capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems and offensive capabilities that can target launchers (land based, surface or undersurface), command and control infrastructure and sensors, restoring deterrence.

Romania must build credible capabilities, highly interoperable, able to hedge Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial Systems during the initial attack, and in the framework of collective defense, to defend the national territory. Meantime, Romanian Armed Forces will continue to fulfill the obligations assumed in the Allied context within and beyond NATO Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Armed Forces have to improve Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Cyber Defense capabilities, in cooperation with Romanian Intelligence Community, and the Ministry of Interior to assure early detection / countering of any form of hybrid warfare. Romania must reorganize its ISR units, increase their level of readiness, establish and render operational ISR capabilities at the brigade and regiment levels. Romania financed two of NATO ‘Smart Defense’ initiatives related to ISR area. This includes the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that gives commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. AGS consists of air, ground and
support elements, performing all-weather, persistent wide-area terrestrial and maritime surveillance in near real-time. Acquired by a group of 13 countries, five Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft and the associated ground command and control stations will be NATO operated and maintained covering its entire AOR. The second program is NATO Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) which is meant to provide the Alliance an immediately available airborne command and control (C2), air and maritime surveillance and battlespace management capability.\(^8\) The fleet of 16 Boeing E-3A 'Sentry' aircraft is an essential part of air battle management. Combining the national efforts within the Alliance framework, Romanian ISR capabilities must identify factors of military risk, achieve information superiority and timely disseminate intelligence products to political-military decision makers. They must use high fidelity and redundant sensors and interconnect on Allied or partner networked joint ISR systems to produce, process, exploit, and disseminate intelligence products.

Cyber threats constitute direct challenges to national critical infrastructures with impact on national or Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Romania needs to address these threats within an interagency and allied framework. First, Romanian Armed Forces have to add in the doctrine cyberspace as a new “domain of operations.”\(^8\) In this new domain, specialized units have to plan, conduct and evaluate defensive and offensive cyberspace operations to protect data, networks, and other systems or to target and neutralize threats. These units must be able to prevent, detect, and defend against cyber threats. They also need to recover from cyber attacks and enhance and coordinate national cyber defense capabilities. These Cyber units must be
responsive, mobile and resilient and apt to maintain freedom of action through cyberspace and the information environment.

For the Romanian Naval Forces, a balance between current programs, new ones and readiness will strengthen deterrent posture and ability to fight against the air, underwater and surface threats and protect exclusive economic zone especially now when neighbors directly with the Russian one. By 2020, in a first phase, the modernization of T22R frigates and two missile carriers together with re-motorization of river military vessels must continue according to existent plans. Rear Admiral Alexandru Mirsu, Chief of the Navy Staff, announced the purchase of the first new multifunctional Corvette in the upcoming period. He also presented the reestablishment of a coastal missiles unit equipped with mobile launching installations and platforms for command and control. On the long term, by 2026, the Navy will purchase another three multifunctional Corvettes and modernize the third missile carrier. Moreover, depending on the budget Chief of the Navy Staff assumes to initiate a multiannual procurement program for new submarines. Naval forces have to maintain the current trend of training activities at sea and on land, in the country and abroad in the joint and multinational context. In 2016, Romanian ships spent 159 training days at sea, in 170 international activities, double over the previous year.

Romanian Air Forces received their first multirole fighter aircraft, a major investment in the country’s defense capacity. The program, contested and delayed several times, finally came true. The first nine F-16 fighter jets arrived 2016 at the 86th Air Base as first part of a group of 12 multirole planes. The last three will come during the spring of 2017. Romania must continue this program, and with at least one more
squadron of 12 aircraft to ensure the subsequent release from service of the outdated MIG 21 Lancer fighters. This capability will greatly enhance Romanian Air Forces’ interoperability with NATO nations and the US, making them a more appreciated ally. It will also support Romania’s legitimate need for self-defense, for the defense of allied airspace and set the conditions for a long-term development of the Air Forces.

Addressing the threat posed by a proximal A2/AD zone, Romania must integrate its national capabilities to create a multilayered air defense system connected to NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). A large-scale joint, force on force, field training exercise can be the solution to develop and assess the ability of Air Forces to execute Suppress Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions. Ground Based Air Defenses can be used as opposing forces or secondary target audience. Nevertheless, there is a substantial risk in this option. Romania does not have ballistic missile defense capabilities. A solution to fill the gap can be the rotational presence of NATO Patriot batteries to provide point defense for critical objectives such as MKAB or EPAA. These systems are defensive and not a violation of NATO-Russia Foundation Act and will certainly offer assurance and have a deterrent component.

Land Forces face the most difficult problem in balancing readiness with modernization and acquisition. Land Forces must provide the maneuvering, strike, and protection capabilities to achieve the deployment, presence, expansion, and continuity of land-centric military operations. They are also responsible for the immediate response capabilities destined for international missions, the enhanced NATO Response Force, and the EU Battle Groups on a rotational base.
The threat posed by A2/AD systems and the perspective of proactive warfare, demand Land Forces a reprioritization of objectives in correlation with more substantial budget allocations. They have the opportunity to finally launch the acquisition of long-desired new 8×8 amphibious armored vehicle (AAV). In November 2016, Uzina Automecanica Moreni and Rheinmetall Landsysteme signed Shareholders’ Agreement establishing a Romanian-German joint-venture company for manufacturing AAVs within the national defense industry. The traditional Romanian producer of armored vehicles will cooperate with the foreign partner and manufacture the vehicles in Romania.

Land Forces should start a new program for the acquisition of the Antitank Guided Missiles Systems (portable). These capabilities in high number have a significant deterrent role and in time can completely replace the old Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers and existent obsolete ATGM. There is also a need for modernization or replacement of air defense systems. Although most are of Soviet production, the modernization solution was successfully applied by several NATO countries. A decision for the replacement needs a common Air, Naval, and Land Forces approach to ensure a joint capability integrated into the National Air Defense System. For field artillery, the acquisition of long-range Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems, for the MLRS Brigade, will offer a capability able to engage in ‘defeating.’ A2/AD systems. The LAROM systems, still in the middle of their life cycle, can be transferred to MLRS units in the Artillery Regiments increasing their firepower.

Armed Forces training should address the challenges of hybrid warfare. Russian actions in Crimea and East Ukraine demonstrate that hybrid war is not only a military effort but a combination of military and nonmilitary means. The last were predominant in
achieving political and strategic objectives. There is a stringent need for a new training environment and exercise scenarios which specifically undertake the real threat and include A2/AD zones and systems. Consequently, exercises designed to respond to such threats have to have an interagency representation not only at strategic but down to the tactical level.

Being a border state Romania, in the framework of collective defense, will host NATO forces making interoperability a force requirement. Defined by NATO as “the ability for allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives,” interoperability enables forces, units, and systems to function effectively. Interoperability has three dimensions interrelated and mutually dependent. A technical one, related to systems, weapons, and equipment, a procedural dimension addressing doctrines, procedures, and tactics, and a human dimension considering the training, terminology, language and culture.

An inexpensive way to increase interoperability is the successful implementation of mission command. The concept encompasses three ideas: the philosophy – related to the human domain, the exercise of mission command that transcends from technical to the procedural domain, and the warfighting function that belongs to the doctrinal field. The Romanian Armed Forces express now mission command only as a way to exercise command when addressing unstructured and complex problems.

Inculcating mission command as a philosophy and warfighting function will necessitate significant actions from strategic down to the operational and tactical levels. Although these measures require time, Romanian Armed Forces must develop a specific doctrine for mission command. They must also adapt or change doctrines.
following the normal cycle introducing mission command as a philosophy and demanding its application in all operational and administrative activities. For the operational component of training, besides the exercises, commanders can use any administrative activity to train and evaluate leaders in exercising mission command. Mission command as philosophy, warfighting function and system is the best solution to overcome rapid changes in the situation, inherent in facing hybrid threats. Institutionalized, it is a driver for interoperability in NATO and across Partnership for Peace (PfP) participant nations. Mission command exercised during peace time improves units’ climate and as a consequence will induce changes in the organizational culture of Romanian Armed Forces with results in increased interoperability.

During the last 15 years, Romanian troops trained to understand cultures where they conducted stability operations. The process involved the use of information operations with their psychological, public affairs, civil-military components as enablers to ‘win hearts and minds.’ Currently and in the future, the interaction between allied soldiers generated by the later evolutions in NATO and the US strategy demand a new perspective to the second domain of interoperability, the human one. Now Romanian leaders and soldiers have to become accustomed to the cultures of allied countries where they will be deployed or from where troops will come into their country.

From multiple definitions of culture; the most appropriate to this context is articulated by Goodenough who sees culture as “a set of standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating and acting.”98 Differences between cultures are visible practices (symbols, heroes, and rituals) which evolve rapidly and represent the
“fluid representation of culture” and values that are dualistic in nature and slow to change.99

Leaders and soldiers can understand differences in culture through cultural awareness and cross-cultural competence. The last is a “set of culture-general knowledge, skills, abilities, and attributes that provide the ability to operate effectively within any culturally complex environment.”100 Cross-cultural competence can be improved through education, training, and experience and can reduce “the increased cognitive strain that accompanies working in an intercultural environment.”101

Romania’s security and further progress is linked to its geographic position, history, and the region. In the Black Sea area and the Balkans, the balance between geopolitical powers was always fragile. The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union repeatedly occupied, devastated and annexed parts of Romanian territory. Russian political dishonesty and the burden of 50 years of communism built in Romanians conscience a deep feeling of mistrust and rejection. Romanians see now Russia as the primary threat to their security.

Russia’s aggressive actions and destructive influence combined with its hybrid warfare and anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are causes of great concern for Romania and neighboring countries. Moscow’s intent is orientated toward weakening the European cohesion and NATO alliance.

To address this threat, Romania must act comprehensively, integrating the instruments of power, to maintain its independence and territorial integrity. Enhancing Romanian Armed Forces will allow Romania to show that is determined to defend itself against Russian aggression and preserve the existential national security interests of
the country. Credible deterrence capabilities and increased interoperability advance the consolidation of the national defense capacity, strengthen Romania’s profile within NATO and the EU and make it an active, predictable and reliable ally and a security provider in the area.

Endnotes


5 Ibid., 8.


9 The Ottomans recognized four kinds of real property:
- state land consisted of all arable farm land and pastures, forest, mountains, roadways and market places – it belonged to the sultan unless granted to someone’s use.
- land under usufruct grant by the sultan to civil or military officials (semi-public land).
- land devoted to pious purposes or the support of hospitals or fire companies (was tax-exempt property).
- land under private property - occupied by people’s houses, or gardens, vineyards and orchards.


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26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 31.


38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


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Schwartz, “Opinion: No antidote to Putin's influence in Eastern Europe.”

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Examples are foreign-language televisions such as Russia Today and news agency *Sputnik International*.

Independent journalists, experts, commentators as well as paid propagandists - Internet blogs / trolls (example: http://alternativaest.ro/).

Edward Lucas and Peter Pomeranzev, *Winning the Information War Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC:

59 Mastriano and Setser, “Blunting Moscow’s Sword of Damocles Policy in the Baltic Region.”


65 Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Simon, “A European Perspective on Anti-Access/Area Denial and the Third Offset Strategy.”
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
95 The LAROM is a Romanian native-made, highly mobile, multiple rocket launcher, attached to a DAC-25.360 6x6 truck, in service with the Romanian Land Forces. It can operate with the standard 122 mm rockets, as well as with the more advanced 160 mm rocket, with a strike range between 20 and 45 km.
97 Ibid.
99 Ibid.