Special Commentary: Limits of Negative Peace
Patricia M. Shields

A Wake for Counterinsurgency?
Steven Metz
Jacqueline L. Hazelton

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Sten Rynning
Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen

War and Social Perception
Paolo G. Tripodi and David M. Todd
John Chapin, Marissa Mendoza-Burcham, and Mari Pierce

Army Expansibility
Esli T. Pitts
Robb C. Mitchell
From the Editor

**Features**

*Special Commentary*

5  **Limits of Negative Peace, Faces of Positive Peace**  
Patricia M. Shields

**A Wake for Counterinsurgency?**

13  **Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy**  
Steven Metz

25  **Insurgent Defectors in Counterinsurgencies**  
Jacqueline L. Hazelton

**War among (& for) the People**

39  **Rethinking NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians**  
Sten Rynning

51  **Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe**  
Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen

**War and Social Perception**

65  **Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan**  
Paolo G. Tripodi and David M. Todd

79  **Third-Force Influences: Hollywood’s War Films**  
John Chapin, Marissa Mendoza-Burcham, and Mari Pierce

**Army Expansibility**

89  **Expanding Brigade Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?**  
Esli T. Pitts

101  **Rapid Expansion and the Army’s Matériel: Is There Enough?**  
Robb C. Mitchell

**Book Reviews**

*Irregular Warfare*

111  **Tough Sell: Fighting the Media War in Iraq**  
By Tom Basile  
Reviewed by James P. Farwell

112  **Counter Jihad: America’s Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria**  
By Brian Glyn Williams  
Reviewed by Robert L. Bateman
114 Los Zetas Inc.
By Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker

116 Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings
By Fernando Reinares
Reviewed by Audrey Kurth Cronin

Political History

118 Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow: Confidential Diplomacy and Détente
By Richard A. Moss
Reviewed by William Thomas Allison

119 The Lincoln Assassination Riddle: Revisiting the Crime of the Nineteenth Century
Edited by Frank J. Williams and Michael Burkhimer
Reviewed by Matthew Pinsker

121 The Netanyahu Years
By Ben Caspit
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill

Military History

123 War in the Shallows
By John Carrell Sherwood
Reviewed by Martin N. Murphy

125 Doing What You Know: The United States and 250 Years of Irregular War
By David E. Johnson
Reviewed by J.P. Clark

127 War Neurology
Edited by Laurent Tatu and Julien Bogousslavsky
Reviewed by Andreas Kuersten

128 How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950
By Seth Johnston
Reviewed by Joel R. Hillison

Regional Studies

131 Security Forces in African States: Cases and Assessment
By Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb
Reviewed by Diane E. Chido

133 Thabo Mbeki and Julius Nyerere
By Adekeye Adebajo and by Paul Bjerk
Reviewed by Diane E. Chido

Strategic Leadership

136 Negative Leadership: International Perspectives
Edited by Daniel Watola and Dave Woycheshin
Reviewed by Charles D. Allen
From the Editor

Our Autumn issue opens with a special commentary by Patricia Shields, whose “Limits of Negative Peace, Faces of Positive Peace” questions whether we have thought through the ramifications of the quality of the peace we seem to have, when indeed we have peace at all.

In our first forum, *A Wake for Counterinsurgency?* Steven Metz’s “Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy” asks whether we ought to admit that strategies based on the principles of counterinsurgency have proven too costly for the United States, and whether we might be better served to approach such problems from a more counterterroristic perspective. Jacqueline L. Hazelton’s “Insurgent Defectors in Counterinsurgencies” underscores the value of using defectors to offset weaknesses in a counterinsurgency effort, which in turn reinforces the conventional wisdom that such efforts are in fact more political than military in nature.

Our second forum, *War among (& for) the People*, takes up the argument of Rupert Smith who claimed modern wars are now invariably waged among civilian noncombatants. Along those lines, Sten Rynning’s “Rethinking NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians” discusses the strengths and weaknesses of international efforts to safeguard people unwillingly affected by conflict. In “Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe,” Matthew Metzel and John Lorenzen argue policymakers would do well to look to prior American interventions for insights into handling the complex issue of mass migration.

The third forum, *War and Social Perception*, concerns the public’s perceptions of warriors and war. In “Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan,” Paolo Tripodi and David Todd examine the ethical context in which US Marine snipers urinated on Taliban corpses. The authors conclude a strong command climate is the most important influence behind ethical behavior. In “Third-Force Influences: Hollywood’s War Films,” John Chapin, Marissa Mendoza-Burcham, and Mari Pierce discuss the role of movie images in influencing the public’s perceptions of US service members.

Our second installment on *Army Expansibility* features two contributions on the the US Army’s ability to expand in the event of a great power war. Esli Pitts offers a model for transitioning the current Army into a force approximately twice as large in “Expanding Brigade Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?” Robb Mitchell’s “Rapid Expansion and the Army’s Matériel: Is There Enough?” examines the matériel challenges the US Army might encounter if it were required to double in size on short notice. ~AJE
ABSTRACT: This commentary reminds policymakers of the opposing forces of positive and negative peace within the sphere of national defense. Lest leaders balance the dominate strategy of active defense with the state of positive peace, the world is destined to repeat such a negative peace as the Pax Romana.

Clearly some notion of peace is implicit in national security and peace. The absence of war is the predominant conceptualization of peace within the security community. This designation, also known as negative peace, has many pitfalls; its dominance is being questioned by leaders in international security.1 This commentary examines the limitations of negative peace and explores the contested and complicated notion of positive peace. In a world where militaries are called upon to intervene directly and indirectly in contentious and violent civil wars, such as those in Syria and Libya, or to engage in lengthy, volatile postwar stabilization, such as that occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan, both negative and positive peace can, and should, be useful conceptual tools. Army leaders can use them to craft short-term and long-term strategy as well as to advise civilian leaders.

An Army rightly focuses on preparing for war; at the same time, its leaders have a vested interest in peace and are often cautious about moving toward the use of force. General Colin Powell illustrated this in his memoir My American Journey. Here he recounts a conversation with Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the United Nations, during a briefing on the crisis in Bosnia. She was incredulous about the options he laid forth asking, “What is the use of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”2 This prompted a “near aneurysm.” His soldiers were not toys to be brought out to solve the latest international crisis, they were human beings to be deployed only when absolutely necessary. General Powell clearly revealed a strong and visceral vested interest in peace!

The roots of negative peace’s dominance are easy to trace. Historically, war was about conquest or defending one’s boarders. Peace such as, Pax Romana, was a military peace, one with the goal of growing an empire, reaping its bounty, and maintaining order. This was, of course, a brutal negative peace where threats, like the Jewish rebellion at Masada, were violently suppressed. In a world where slaves


were commonplace, militaries had free reign to use any means necessary to ensure order—the absence of war. Concerns and constraints about human rights and social justice were millennia away. Peace, in Western society, was experienced as the order that accompanied the end of a war. Negative peace also aligns well with the Hobbesian notion that men are, by their nature, warlike. Peace is the anomaly. Realism, the underlying theoretical framework used to draft our security policy, traces its roots to Thomas Hobbes.

The young fields of peace studies and peace research have come to be dominated by negative peace. Scholars, well-schooled in statistical methods, develop and use sophisticated data bases where war and peace are a single variable with the values of zero and one. Over time, the study of peace and war often became conflated as if mirror images of each other. The *Journal of Peace Research* noted this irony through a meta study with the remarkable title, “Peace Research: Just the Study of War?”

Although it certainly may not feel like it, interstate war has been on the decline since the end of World War II. Nevertheless, it certainly does not appear we are in a comfortable state of peace. There is a growing recognition that the singular dominance of negative peace limits how national security is conceptualized and has perverse outcomes for policymaking.

This is not to say negative peace should be discarded. Rather, the limits of negative peace should be understood, and more comprehensive notions of peace should be acknowledged and used in national security discourse.

**Limitations of Negative Peace**

“Peace is not merely the inverse of war” and therefore requires a different theoretical orientation and place in military strategy. Negative peace uses a short-term time horizon, which reinforces a tendency to see the job as complete once the fighting stops. It undermines efforts for a broader peace by freezing the status quo, and it potentially leaves the door open for human rights abuses to continue unabated.

Militaries are often intimately associated with decisions made at that nexus of conflict and its cessation. These decisions should take into account the longer-term horizon of a sustained peace. By signaling an end, negative peace shifts focus away from the hard work of putting mechanisms in place that can repair fractured relationships as well as nurture resilient and just institutions. These efforts are not about explicit nation-building but rather a recognition that choices about institutional structures and personnel can have long-term consequences. Choices informed by an implicit short-term horizon can undermine a healthy sustained peace, which is a long-term goal. President George W. Bush proudly claimed “mission accomplished” at the end of the hot war with

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5 Goertz, Diehl, and Balas, *Puzzle of Peace*, 1.
Iraq. This moment of victory quickly lost its luster as the situation on the ground deteriorated. Clearer acknowledgement that the complicated road to sustained peace was yet ahead would have been helpful.

The negative definition of peace is less compatible with the post-Cold War, post-September 11, 2011, postmodern security environment. Here “the very tools of war are slipping out of [the] control of nation states as the employment of organized violence becomes more and more characteristic of terrorists, armed bands, and gangsters.” At the same time, national hostilities, and even the tools of aggression, such as Facebook and Twitter, have changed. The Clausewitzian assumptions about war are replaced by a world with blurred distinctions. The one-size-fits-all nature of negative peace is ill-suited for the fractured postmodern security environment.

Negative peace fits neatly into our natural tendency to frame security threats in absolute terms. Winning is the goal, the enemy is wrong and evil. During World War I, the Sedition Act reinforced this impulse. This frame of reference may be effective at generating support for the war effort, but it can also undermine the peace. Dichotomies like friend/enemy, victory/defeat, and war/peace oversimplify the postmodern security environment. Defining peace as the inverse of war enshrines absolute thinking, making it difficult to form or to change damaged relationships undermining the cooperative potential of human nature.

Militaries and soldiers prepare for war knowing armed combat requires strength, courage, valor, and self-sacrifice. If peace is viewed as the inverse of war, it becomes associated with weakness, cowardice, spinelessness, and self-serving behavior. Why would a soldier seriously identify with this concept? This tension can create an unnecessary us-versus-them mindset, and negative stereotyping, on both sides. The likely possibility that the military and peace advocates share long-term goals is lost in their inflexible belief systems.

American Nobel Peace Prize winner, Jane Addams recognized this problem in *Newer Ideals of Peace*. She argues dedication to peace can also involve self-sacrifice, tenacity, and courage without diminishing the valor of the soldier. Addams emphasized that promoting peace often took courage. Particularly during war, peace advocates can be viewed as traitors or as warped and twisted sentimentalists. Israel’s honored soldier, statesman, prime minister and Nobel Prize winner, Yitzhak Rabin, embraced the Israeli-Palestine peace process, including the Oslo
Accords, and paid dearly for his decision. His death is a tragic reminder of the cost of courage in promoting peace.

A single nation cannot be an island at peace. Peace is about the quality of relationships, which are ideally friendly, between nations or groups. By not taking into account the relational nature of peace, negative peace can lead to absurdities. Although none are at war, can one really say the United States and North Korea or Israel and Iran are at peace? In addition, peace as the absence of war provides little guidance about approaches for identifying or for building support structures that strengthen and solidify shaky relationships that might be headed toward conflict.15

Complications with Positive Peace

The straightforward concept of negative peace has many limitations. A more organic, diverse, and dynamic sense of positive peace exists alongside the dominant negative version. These positive visions of peace incorporate a host of concepts and values such as justice, democracy, sympathy, cooperation, effectiveness, freedom, engagement, order, harmony, and collaboration. Positive peace can also have religious origins and overtones, such as “blessed are the peacemakers.”16 Unlike negative peace, which has a simple definition, there are many inconsistent voices examining the nature of positive peace. While these disparities make it more difficult to make sense quickly of positive peace, it also provides the postmodern security environment with useful tools.17

Most cultures have a concept of peace that goes well beyond the absence of war. These conceptualizations vary widely. Santi (Indian—to maintain a tranquil mindset even in suffering or conflict), ahimsa (Indian—to kill no living creature), heiwa (Japanese—aligning oneself to the common good and social order), eirene (Greek—prosperity and order), and al-Islam (Arabic—to be at peace in alignment with the will of Allah) illustrate the variety of meanings across cultures.18

Shalom, the Hebrew word for peace, is translated as prosperity and as a sense of wholeness. A society is whole when it is rich in righteousness and justice. Or as Enns writes, “Shalom is the integrity, wholeness and well-being that arise from justice. . . . In short, shalom means a full life, in life-enhancing relationships.”19 The intimate relationship between justice and peace found in Shalom is demonstrated in Psalm 85:10 of the Living Bible, “Justice and peace have kissed.” One needs only look at the words of Martin Luther King Jr. to see the profound influence of the Hebrew bible on our understanding of positive peace: “Without justice there can be no peace.”20

15 Diehl, “Thinking about Peace.”
16 Mathew 5:9 (King James Version).
Twenty-five years after World War II, Japanese scholar Takeshi Ishida considers the paradoxes of positive peace. As noted above, the Hebrew notion of Shalom connects peace and justice. Paradoxically, this very connection justifies violence when encountering injustice. The Japanese and other Eastern concepts of peace emphasize harmony in community or “peace in the village,” which have a puzzling implications. In this case, the overriding goal of harmony can be so strong that injustice is tolerated as a way to secure peace in the village. Ishida notes the creativity that both King and Gandhi brought to these challenging paradoxes. King incorporated the Eastern tradition of nonviolence as he used direct action to counter the injustice of racism. Gandhi, used traditional nonviolent sensibilities and direct action to challenge the injustice of colonialism. These cases show the importance of creativity in the application of peace concepts and that cultural norms shape the ideas of positive peace.21

Although notions of positive peace have been around for millennia, Johan Galtung, a noted peace scholar, is credited with bringing the distinction between positive and negative peace to prominence in the first issue of the Journal of Peace Research. He defined positive peace as “the integration of human society.” He also emphasized that positive and negative peace “should be conceived as separate dimensions. One can have one without the other.”22

Most contemporary definitions of positive peace echo these ancient themes. All of the definitions, however, include a long-term perspective. Anderson Royce sees positive peace as an ongoing and challenging process. It is also a “condition in which individuals, families, groups, communities, and/or nations experience low levels of violence and engage in mutually harmonious relationships.”23 The Institute for Economics and Peace defines positive peace as “the attitudes, institutions and structures which create and sustain peaceful societies.”24 Fischer defines positive peace as “an unfolding worldwide process, which nurtures human life and promotes social justice.”25 Galtung expands on his definition noting structural positive peace substitutes “freedom for repression and equity for exploitation,” and then reinforces them with dialogue.26 These long-term perspectives can be in tension with an immediate goal of ending conflict.

Jane Addams includes perplexity and sympathetic understanding in her conceptualization of peace. Sympathetic understanding, or the willingness to put oneself in another person’s shoes, is a way to overcome the rigid moralisms that facilitate conflict. These rigid moralisms are undermined by perplexity. Perplexity allows the questioning of personal belief systems without abandoning them, which cultivates sympathetic

21 Ishida, “Beyond Traditional Concepts.”
understanding. Perplexity and sympathetic understanding do not mean adopting the position of an adversary; rather, they open space for productive dialogue, relationship building, and creative problem-solving.

To distinguish positive peace as unique, some practitioners include “just” as a modifier of the word peace, parallel to the “just war” concept. Just peace recognizes the degree to which a deeper understanding of peace requires justice in order to be sustainable. It also focuses attention on the welfare of the most vulnerable. This metric, also called lateral progress, has the potential to get at the root of many causes of conflict.

Another cultural source for conceptions of positive peace is the African concept of ubuntu, or humanity toward others. South African apartheid (1948–91) was a brutal system of institutional racial segregation and discrimination condemned the world over. Yet, South Africa was able to end apartheid without descending into a violent, endless, civil war. Leaders such as P. W. Botha, F.W. de Klerk, Nelsen Mandela, and Desmond Tutu helped shepherd a transformation in institutions and attitudes. Nelson Mandela’s message of peace can be summarized as, if you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa (TRC), a place where enemies could become partners, relied on the concept of Ubuntu, according to its chairperson and Nobel Peace laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu.

“Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language . . . you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. “A person is a person through other persons. . . . A person with ubuntu is affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed.” Ubuntu has a radically relational basis, asserting not just that individuals should be aware of the interests of others but that an individual’s existence or humanity is dependent on how they relate to others.

Like the peace research community, the conflict resolution field was also largely characterized by the general dominance of a negative peace framing. This focus began to change in the late 1980s and 1990s, when the field oriented toward a positive peace. This reconceptualization led to a shift in focus from conflict resolution to conflict transformation and eventually to peacebuilding. The United Nations picked up these ideas and responded in 2005 by institutionalizing a peacebuilding

30 Shields and Soeters, “Peaceweaving.”
structure alongside its more traditional peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{34} This reframing is also evident in the Institute of Economics and Peace’s new index of positive peace measured by elements such as a well-functioning government, equitable distribution of resources, and acceptance of the rights of others.\textsuperscript{35}

Conflict resolution was criticized because it was biased toward ending a given crisis without sufficient focus on deeper long-term structural, cultural, and relational aspects of conflict.\textsuperscript{36} Conflict transformation emerged as an alternative term through a need to identify and mitigate root causes and to engage multiple levels of society beyond elites. Strategic models help build a just peace—one where people within a society are able to participate in shaping systems that meet their needs. These efforts require a core of cultivated skill sets, including problem-solving, active listening, dialogue, mediation and negotiation skills, as well as trauma awareness, appreciative inquiry skills, self-reflection, and cultural competency skills that allow practitioners to understand and account for their own biases and cultural frames, especially as they work with others.\textsuperscript{37}

Goertz, Diehl, and Balas have developed a continuum of peace categorization scheme that focuses on the relationships at the heart of peace, which includes a continuum of peace states.\textsuperscript{38} These categories provide a way to distinguish between different types of peace or different levels of nonviolent conflict that could lead to war. The state-to-state relationship is the unit of measure. Their framework eliminates absurdities of the simple definition where similar levels of peace are credited to the US-Canada relationship and the North Korea-US relationships. When relationships are terribly deteriorated and on the brink of a prolonged outbreak of hostilities, the new framework attributes states of severe and lesser rivalry. Examples might include the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War or Bulgaria and Greece from 1908–13.

The term negative peace is used to describe conditions where the underlying conflict between the pair of states is somewhat resolved but tensions still can run high. The current rapport between Israel and Egypt is illustrative. A warm peace occurs when diplomatic relationships are well established with highly developed intergovernmental and transnational ties. Romania and France or Germany since 1995 also fit here. Finally, strong allies form the security community and include joint war-planning, diplomatic coordination, and extensive institutionalized functional agreements. Current relationships between the United States and Canada and between Denmark and Sweden are examples.

This commentary is not about providing answers but perhaps about bringing new and more nuanced questions to the table. For positive peace or a long-term view, leaders should bring vision and wisdom to the task. To date, the security sector has focused on the shorter decision

\textsuperscript{34} Rob Jenkins, \textit{Peacebuilding: From Concept to Commission} (New York: Routledge, 2013).
\textsuperscript{35} IEP, \textit{Positive Peace Report}.
\textsuperscript{38} Goertz, Diehl, and Balas, \textit{Puzzle of Peace}. 
calculus. Surely there is room for wisdom. Positive peace, such as that between the United States and Canada, may be impossible to achieve globally, but is still worth considering.

Lastly, Abraham Lincoln, in his second inaugural address called for a positive peace as the Civil War drew to a close. How would our lives be different today if he had had a chance to implement his vision?

“With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.”

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ABSTRACT: This article introduces the value of efficiency in counterterrorism, such as that applied in Israel’s effective national defense strategy, to resolve the conundrum of eliminating global terrorism.

Over the past fifty years the US military’s interest in counterinsurgency has ebbed and flowed, reflecting broader shifts in American grand strategy and the global security environment. The first US “counterinsurgency era” began in the early 1960s when policymakers recognized the Soviet Union and China were inspiring or directly supporting left-leaning insurgencies to weaken the West, and to do so with less risk than direct military confrontation.

Southeast Asia soon became the primary laboratory. After the United States withdrew from Vietnam, the military purged its counterinsurgency knowledge and capability only to rebuild it partly in the 1980s when Soviet backed insurgent movements were rising again, most importantly in El Salvador. By the 1990s, the United States again abandoned counterinsurgency, assuming it was a legacy of the Cold War that would fade to irrelevance with the demise of the Soviet Union. Insurgencies lingered in the Americas, Africa, and Asia; but without sponsors, most seemed irrelevant to Washington. When the United States military was deployed to the Balkans, peacekeeping rather than counterinsurgency became the central component of what was then known as “low intensity conflict” and later “military operations other than war.”

When the September 11 attacks on the United States and President George W. Bush’s subsequent Global War on Terrorism led to US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency came roaring
back, beginning what David Ucko called a “new counterinsurgency era.”

But this iteration was different. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were initially intended to be short stabilization operations following the removal of hostile regimes. They only evolved into counterinsurgency when opponents of the new, American-backed governments adopted the techniques of Cold War insurgents.

From 2003 onward, the US military rediscovered, updated, and applied Cold War-era counterinsurgency concepts, turned them into updated Service and Joint doctrine, and developed organizations and capabilities to implement the new doctrine. This approach took extensive effort since the Army’s inclination after Vietnam was to resist involvement in counterinsurgency. Partly because of this resistance, the revival of counterinsurgency took several years. Even so, it was the fastest such adaptation of a conventional force in history.

During this process, though, the United States never seriously debated whether Cold War-style counterinsurgency made strategic sense in Iraq and Afghanistan—whether it was a universal approach or a time- and situation-specific one. Because extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan were doing things that looked like twentieth-century insurgency, American strategists simply dusted off Cold War counterinsurgency and revised it. This worked in Iraq to an extent. After several years of bloody and expensive fighting, the insurgency was battered to the point the Iraqi government could have finished it off by institutionalizing political and economic reform and continuing to professionalize its security forces.

The US campaign in Afghanistan was less successful. The conflict there was a lower priority than that in Iraq, so stabilization and

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8 Unlike the period between Vietnam and the 1980s, or from the early 1990s to 2005, Joint and service counterinsurgency doctrine continues to be updated on a regular schedule. While new revisions will be published soon, the current versions are US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013); and Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014).


reconstruction programs were underresourced. Afghanistan had a much weaker national identity and professional class than Iraq, making the job of supporting counterinsurgency more difficult. And the Afghan insurgents had two of the things a successful insurgency needs: a lucrative funding source (opium) and an external sanctuary the United States has been unable to shut down (Pakistan).\(^\text{13}\)

Today, US involvement in Afghanistan is at a much lower level than a few years ago. But, there is no sign Kabul will be able to contain, much less defeat, the insurgents any time soon. Even so, American political leaders continue to bet on counterinsurgency, apparently believing if the precise US troop levels and missions are found, it eventually will work. In reality it will not, mostly because there is a much bigger issue at play: Afghanistan demonstrates the American conceptualization of counterinsurgency, born in the Cold War and resuscitated without a fundamental revision after the September 11 attacks, has reached the end of its lifespan.\(^\text{14}\) The Army, the Joint Force, and the rest of the US government now must do what it failed to do after September 11 and seriously examine the assumptions, conceptual foundations, and strategic effectiveness of counterinsurgency. This analysis will demonstrate counterinsurgency is unacceptably inefficient and should be abandoned in favor of a new method of antiterrorism that better reflects the domestic political situation and the dynamics of the twenty-first-century global security environment.

**How We Got Here**

While the United States has a long tradition of small wars against irregular opponents and implemented a form of counterinsurgency in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902, counterinsurgency did not become central to American grand strategy until the 1960s.\(^\text{15}\) Worried by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s January 1961 speech endorsing “wars of national liberation,” the eroding security situation in Laos and South Vietnam, the consolidation of Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba, the French defeat in Algeria, and the outbreak of communist insurgencies in Colombia and Venezuela, President John Kennedy concluded the Soviets were undertaking indirect aggression against the West using leftist insurgencies. This decision made counterinsurgency strategically significant.

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14 For an elaboration of this argument, see Gian P. Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York: New Press, 2013), 113–35

The rationale for US involvement in counterinsurgency grew from the “domino theory” and the “death by a thousand small cuts” notion popular among French strategic theorists.\textsuperscript{16} Revolutionary war, this group believed, had become the dominant form of conflict in the late twentieth-century. Defeats for pro-Western nations, even in places appearing unimportant, could aggregate into global Soviet victory. With a military stalemate in Europe and communist expansion checked in Korea, the Cold War had devolved to a series of Third World skirmishes. The strategic significance of insurgency was symbolic and perceptual as an indicator of historic trends.

To respond, Kennedy ordered a wide-ranging expansion of US counterinsurgency capabilities. He first formed a cabinet level Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas Internal Defense Policy to develop a unified counterinsurgency strategy and coordinate efforts across the government.\textsuperscript{17} The Pentagon created an Office on Counterinsurgency and Special Activities headed by Major General Victor H. Krulak (US Marine Corps), giving him direct access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{18} The military services integrated counterinsurgency into their professional educational systems and established training centers for it. Army Special Forces were expanded and reoriented toward counterinsurgency assistance.\textsuperscript{19} Even the State Department and the Agency for International Development began to take counterinsurgency seriously, albeit with less enthusiasm than the military.\textsuperscript{20}

From its inception, though, US thinking about counterinsurgency had a heterogeneous intellectual foundation. One important element was the French notion of \textit{guerre révolutionnaire}, which viewed insurgency as East-West proxy conflict. A second element was the belief that counterinsurgency required holistic stabilization and political reform rather than simply battlefield victory and thus needed a tightly integrated military, political, informational, economic, intelligence, and law enforcement effort. This idea came from British pacification campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, and elsewhere, as well as from French officers who fought insurgents in Indochina and Algeria.\textsuperscript{21}

The third component of American counterinsurgency was the theory of modernization borrowed from academia.\textsuperscript{22} Derived in part from the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}


\bibitem{Asp} Robert B. Asprey, \textit{War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History} (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 736

\bibitem{SOF} Army Special Forces were created to undertake unconventional warfare behind Soviet lines during a major conflict in Europe.


\end{thebibliography}
writings of German sociologist Max Weber, modernization theory was based on the idea that the natural path for developing societies was from traditional economic, political, and social organizations to “modern” ones relying on bureaucratic administration with professional credentials and expertise rather than familial or traditional authorities.

As Americans grappled with insurgency, modernization theory provided an overarching intellectual framework. Policymakers and strategists concluded the difficult and complex transition from traditional to “modern” societies and political systems created tensions and conflicts. Modernization saw the political awakening of previously passive segments of society, such as the rural peasantry and marginalized ethnic, sectarian, or racial groups. Often traditional structures of order decayed more rapidly than modern ones developed. All these factors provided opportunities for revolutionary movements. If revolutionaries could not seize power through a Bolshevik-style putsch, one alternative was a protracted, rural insurgency based on an extensive political underground, information warfare and propaganda, terrorism, and guerrilla operations.

Modernization theory told American counterinsurgents that success was not simply defeating insurgent units but expanding the state’s capacity to govern and secure its territory—in other words to do the things modernization theory says “modern” states should do. Until a nation became modern, it could not use political institutions to reconcile divergences among its population or have its security forces prevent or defeat organized insurgency. Thus, counterinsurgency required nation-building.

From the beginning, this kludge of very different ideas had internal tensions. Conceptualizing insurgency as a form of war suggested it should be military-centric, but if battlefield victory did not equate to strategic success, the military could only do half the job—and, it was the easier half. Of course in conventional war, the peace settlement determines whether battlefield success led to strategic victory, but in counterinsurgency, what came after battlefield success was even more difficult to determine.

That conclusion was not the only fissure in the concept. When the British and French undertook counterinsurgency while decolonizing, they assumed the authority of the nation where the conflict occurred. They could impose deep political and economic reforms even if traditional elites opposed it. Yet things were different for the United States: it did not undertake counterinsurgency but counterinsurgency support working through a local partner government. That divergence means the British and French models, which were part of the intellectual foundation of American counterinsurgency, were not fully applicable. Neither those models nor academic modernization theory explains how to compel a resistant local ally to undertake deep reform. In fact, as the United States helped a partner nation expand its political, military, law enforcement, and intelligence capability, Washington’s ability to compel change declined. The United States never surmounted this leverage dilemma.
in Vietnam or later in Iraq or Afghanistan. Current counterinsurgency doctrine recognizes this problem but offers no solution.\textsuperscript{24}

Combining academic modernization theory with British and French notions of counterinsurgency also created organizational problems. The military dominated America’s counterinsurgency organization even though the ultimate solution to insurgency was nonmilitary. Despite creating large embassies in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, either the US military remained the most important player (Vietnam, Afghanistan) or the embassy found when most of the US military left and the insurgency was under control, it could not convince the partner government to finalize success by continuing deep reform (Iraq).

The Decay of Old Concepts

As American counterinsurgency was revived in Iraq and Afghanistan, the problematic assumptions and internal tensions inherent to the concept festered and worsened, becoming less tolerable as the strategic significance of insurgency declined. For instance, the architects of post-September 11 counterinsurgency accepted the idea that it is a type of war; the phrase “counterinsurgency warfare” was common. While insurgents do use armed action, war is not entirely military but rather military-centric.\textsuperscript{25} Insurgency, by contrast, is designed to diminish the importance of the military realm, primarily because the state—especially a state that has external counterinsurgency support—is normally militarily dominant, at least at the very end.

In some ways, insurgency is more akin to premodern fighting where the primary objective was to demonstrate the bravery of individual warriors or capture prisoners for ritual sacrifice or slavery than to impose the political will of one group on another. This means calling counterinsurgency “war” is using the word euphemistically like the “war on poverty” or “war on drugs.” This allegory makes sustaining public support difficult since Americans expect their nation eventually to “win” in some demonstrable way. Approaching counterinsurgency as war skews both its organization and its expectations.

The traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency assumed partner governments supported the Western-Weberian notion of modernization and were willing to undertake deep reforms to become “modern.” All they needed was a boost. Counterinsurgency had “an ideological dimension imbued with a distinctively American liberal philosophical and political self-understanding.”\textsuperscript{26} From this perspective, all the United States needed to do was provide partner governments the means to modernize.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{24} See, for instance, JCS, \textit{Counterinsurgency}, VIII-8.
\item\textsuperscript{26} Smith and Jones, \textit{Political Impossibility}, 57.
\end{itemize}
This assumption proved accurate in some places like El Salvador, Colombia, and the Philippines. To the architects of American counterinsurgency, that success validated the principle, leading them to draw universal conclusions from culture- and situation-specific circumstances. Yet in many parts of the world—including those most prone to insurgency—the state is not a detached reconciler using a rule set that does not favor any one segment of the society. The body politic is not designed to balance diverse interests but to formalize and to sustain the group holding power. Because this motive produces resistance, Americans encouraged the local elite to transform the political, legal, and economic systems into something reflecting the Western notion of fairness or, as it is often phrased, good governance. But, such entreaties ask elites to alter a system that benefits them, their families, and their peers.

In other words, the American approach to counterinsurgency is contingent on partner elites acting irrationally—doing things against the interests of themselves, their families, and their affiliates. As Joint counterinsurgency doctrine notes, “US counterinsurgents will often have to cajole or coerce [host nation] governments and entrenched elites to recognize the legitimacy of those grievances and address them. This is especially true where reforms would involve compromising the political and financial interests of those elites.”27 While accurate, these elites generally undertake just enough reform to satisfy Washington, which keeps assistance flowing without fundamentally altering the beneficial system.

Thus another flaw with the traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency appears: the United States seeks the complete defeat of the insurgents while its local partners often benefit from the persistence of an insurgency large enough to sustain American interest and assistance but not powerful enough to overthrow them. Insurgency keeps aid flowing and gives the political elite an excuse for repression, exclusion, and holding onto power.28 Imagine, for instance, Afghanistan with the Taliban defeated: with little interest from the world, the country would sink back into even more crushing poverty. Without a stream of external assistance, Afghanistan’s professional class and political elite would have far fewer economic opportunities. In long running conflicts, a “war economy” usually emerges, which benefits both the elites that the United States supports and the insurgent leaders.29 Ultimately, this rapport means those with the power to end an insurgency—whether local elites or counterinsurgent leaders—often have little incentive to do so; while those who suffer the most from the conflict—the local population—do not have the power to end it.

While US doctrine recognizes the problem, the United States has never found a way to resolve it.30 To gain the support of the American public, US political leaders must portray a conflict as one where supporting the local elite is an important, even vital American interest.

27 JCS, Counterinsurgency, II-19.
30 JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-3.
This commitment, combined with the fact that many insurgency movements are, in fact, worse than America’s partners, diminishes US leverage over its partner elite. Thus, the United States is unable to compel its partners to undertake the degree of system change that might prevent future armed resistance but which erodes their own power and wealth.

The United States also is hindered by the idea that the “normal” state of affairs is for a state to exercise control over all of its national territory. In many parts of the world—including those prone to insurgency—this is not the norm. While governments would be happy to do so, they draw the very rational conclusion that the benefits of exercising full control over their national territory is not worth the costs. Thus, they focus on the areas where the elite and its affiliates live, whether regions or parts of cities, and on the wealth-producing parts of the nation such as economically robust urban areas, regions with important natural resources, and transportation corridors. They write off rural hinterlands dominated by nonelite groups, regions that do not generate wealth, and increasingly, poorer urban areas. Elites accept these areas are informally governed, often with little or no presence by the formal state. The potential for armed conflict emanating from informally governed regions always exists, but local elites make the rational decision that tolerating that risk—and living with persistent terrorism—makes more sense than attempting to exercise full control everywhere.

The traditional notion of counterinsurgency called on the state to undertake economic development to undercut resentment and opposition. In other words, the state would provide a better deal to the population than the insurgents. This idea made sense within the context of modernization theory as American’s first grappled with counterinsurgency. It was no coincidence Walt Rostow—the deputy national security adviser for John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, as well as an architect of US involvement in Vietnam—had written a book linking the “stages” of economic growth with political stability.31

Positing a causal relationship between economic growth and preventing or quelling insurgency has many problems though. One is the tendency of populations to grow faster than the creation of jobs. Many analysts have found a correlation between youth bulges and youth un- (or under-) employment as well as internal political violence.32 Even states that recognize this interdependence often can do little about it, particularly in an era of globalization, when the economic health of a nation is often determined by external factors beyond its control.33 And, the causal linkage between economic growth and insurgency oversimplifies the causes for someone creating or joining an insurgency. Often psychological factors such as personal grievances or the desire for personal empowerment, heroic status, or simple

boredom are as, or more, important than political factors or the absence of economic opportunity. Simply creating low status jobs does not address these psychological factors.

Today changes in the global security environment exacerbate the flawed assumptions and the internal tensions of the traditional conceptualization of counterinsurgency and undercut much of its remaining validity. Take the notion that counterinsurgency requires the state to create a counternarrative to the one propagated by insurgents. The counterinsurgency narrative, according to Joint doctrine,

should contextualize what the population experiences, legitimizing counterinsurgent actions and delegitimizing the insurgency. It is an interpretive lens designed to help individuals and groups make decisions in the face of uncertainty where the stakes are perceived as life and death. The [counterinsurgency] narrative should explain the current situation and describe how the [host nation] government will defeat the insurgency. It should invoke relevant cultural and historical references to both justify the actions of counterinsurgents and make the case that the government will win.35

Creating a coherent narrative was feasible in the twentieth-century when the primary means of information propagation other than interpersonal communication—authoritative written material or broadcasts—could be controlled, or at least largely controlled, by the state. In today’s information saturated environment where narratives can form, grow, go dormant, and be reborn outside the control of the state, the idea of counterinsurgents agreeing to and implementing a narrative to influence perceptions of a conflict, as US counterinsurgency doctrine calls for, is nostalgic at best. With radical transparency and instant connectivity, there is more of a theme and meme swarm than the development and promulgation of an agreed-upon, coherent narrative.

State sponsorship of insurgency or provision of sanctuary to insurgents still happens as it did during the Cold War. Think Russia and Ukraine, Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Iran and Yemen. For the United States, though, there is no risk of the “death of a thousand small cuts” as during the Cold War. Insurgency is still using proxy aggression but is no longer a form of superpower proxy conflict. In general terms, this application means insurgency is less strategically significant than it once was.

Where Do We Go Now?

Today insurgency is most common precisely where the flawed assumptions, conundrums, and internal tensions of the traditional notion of counterinsurgency are the most pervasive. And, the United States security policy has entered a time of frugality. America can no longer lavish security resources with little regard for efficiency. This need for frugality means counterinsurgency has run its course. With the strategic

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35 JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-9.
36 For an exploration of this concept, see Steven Metz, “The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency,” Parameters 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 80–90. For a more expansive treatment of the broader phenomenon, see James Jay Carafano, Wiki at War: Conflict in a Socially Networked World (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2012).
stakes lower, it no longer makes sense for the United States to accept the gross inefficiency and adverse benefit-cost ratio of counterinsurgency. America must still counter irregular threats but improve efficiency and better balance costs and benefits.

The first step is remembering the United States reengaged in counterinsurgency after the September 11 attacks because policymakers saw it as part of antiterrorism. Such actions were a way to eliminate sanctuaries for extremist movements and shrink the pool of terrorist recruits. But in reality, counterinsurgency support almost never reaches that end state. Partner governments take American support and implement enough reforms that the insurgency cannot overthrow them; then, the partners stop. They tolerate simmering extremism in the hinterlands or urban slums so long as it does not pose an existential threat to the regime.

This practice means counterinsurgency may be an effective method of antiterrorism; however, it is not an efficient one. Today the United States needs antiterrorism strategies that are acceptably effective but also affordable and sustainable. To find them, policymakers must remember the threat of nations ruled by extremists providing bases for terrorists to attack the United States or its allies. Thus, helping create friendly governments that rule the way the United States would prefer might be nice. But, the only necessity is preventing terrorist power projection.

Given that, the United States should shift to something such as the Israeli approach to extremism and terrorism. After finding out how difficult and costly traditional pacification and counterinsurgency is and recognizing it could never “win the hearts and minds” of the Arab populations in places like southern Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, Israel concluded it could tolerate extremism but not terrorism, settling for a realistic, affordable, and sustainable approach that is not contingent on how neighboring states are ruled. If enemies mobilize enough strength to threaten Israel directly, it strikes at them with the most effective combination of air and land based military power. After weakening the extremists, Israel withdraws, knowing it may have to repeat offensive operations again if the threat reaches intolerable levels.

This approach, which relies on the time-tested techniques of spoiling raids and large-scale but limited duration punitive expeditions, might provide an acceptably effective and sustainable post-counterinsurgency strategy for the United States.37 Such an avenue clearly would require some sort of small persistent presence using some combination of the intelligence community, military special operations forces, overhead assets (most unmanned), and increasingly, ground-based autonomous systems. But if al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, or another terrorism-based extremist movement develops bases and a power projection capability in a place like Afghanistan, Libya, or Yemen, the United States should launch a powerful military and interagency strike force. But America should abandon the idea that the Afghanistsans, Yemens, and Libyas of the world want to, or can become, stable, pro-American nations, or that trying to transform them is a good use of increasingly scarce security

resources. So long as transnational terrorists do not plot, train for, and launch attacks from such nation’s soil, that is enough.

To make this approach work, the US military needs to redesign its forces and develop strategic concepts and doctrine for limited duration, large-scale expeditions. The key would be the ability to project Joint and interagency forces—increasingly ones bolstered by autonomous systems—over long distances, and repeat as necessary. The mantra for counterinsurgency has always been “clear, hold, build.” An expeditionary antiterrorism strategy would accept clearing is necessary, but holding and building are not worth the costs. Adversaries would no longer believe they could draw the US military in and wear down American will over time. Hopefully, opposing forces would be deterred by knowing the United States could at least “clear” through large-scale expeditions as many times as necessary, particularly as expeditionary forces increasingly integrate autonomous systems. Deterrence always requires capability, credibility, and communications. An antiterrorism strategy based on limited duration expeditions would be credible in a way traditional counterinsurgency is not.

Conclusion

Traditional counterinsurgency was seen as a form of war without all the definitional attributes of war but with a dose of an old-fashioned theory of modernization, which has been superseded in the academic world. If the concept ever made sense, it no longer does. Counterinsurgency must be refocused on the core security problem: transnational terrorism. Counterinsurgency might be a way to address that problem, but it is immensely inefficient and difficult to sustain politically. When the United States had a surplus of defense resources and could garner public support for anything that struck back at extremism in the emotional years immediately after the September 11 attacks, inefficiency was tolerable. Now, it no longer is.

This turn of events suggests the United States must abandon counterinsurgency as a tool of antiterrorism. Shifting to a strategy that contains, weakens, and deters transnational terrorism by strategic expeditions—large scale punitive raids, repeated if necessary—is a viable way of meeting the criteria of minimal effectiveness, maximum efficiency, and political sustainability.
ABSTRACT: This article identifies the value of insurgent defectors fighting within counterinsurgencies to offset weaknesses within the effort and to act as a force multiplier, as long as the counterinsurgent meets defectors’ shared interests with the government.

With internal conflict comes the question of what to do with insurgent defectors. In Afghanistan, international actors and the Afghan government have been intermittently attempting to reconcile with, or rehabilitate, members of the insurgency. These efforts have included incorporating defectors into the security forces. In Iraq, the government faces major questions about how to handle Sunnis who fought for the Islamic State and then changed sides. In Syria, the alignments and realignments of state and nonstate actors have been dizzying.

As the United States continues supporting other weak, failed, and unstable states, the question of how to use defectors to achieve operational goals remains prominent. Furthermore, as the international community continues efforts to end internal conflicts and integrate insurgent fighters into national armies, larger questions about assuring peace after conflict also arise.

This article analyzes the conditions in which counterinsurgencies have most effectively used guerrilla defectors in their fighting forces. Systematic analysis of the Algerian War (1954–62), the insurgency in Oman (1965–76), the Rhodesian Bush War (1964–79), the civil war in El Salvador (1979–92), and US operations in Iraq (2003–present) provide variations in operational and strategic outcomes, types of counterinsurgencies and insurgencies, and historical contexts to identify lessons applicable to other campaigns. The lessons learned emphasize the importance of using defectors for their unique skills and for assuring a long-term, post-conflict alignment of political interests between defectors and counterinsurgents.

The exploitation of defectors lends support to the argument that counterinsurgency is essentially a political struggle, rather than strictly a military one, and thus political measures taken by counterinsurgents...
strongly influence who wins and who loses.\textsuperscript{3} A counterinsurgent’s ability to attract elements of the insurgency suggests a broader ability to make choices that will weaken the political and military challenges posed by insurgents. Conversely, a counterinsurgency unable, or unwilling, to provide political accommodations to gain the cooperation of those it has fought against is unlikely to have the political capabilities necessary to defeat the insurgency.

Attempts to draw insurgents away from their causes are common in counterinsurgency campaigns. Discussions of the use of defectors, such as in pseudo gangs that infiltrate an insurgency, do appear in existing work on counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{4} Using them as fighters is apparently less common, but there is little research available on this aspect of counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{5} The use of defectors as fighters does not necessarily win wars, but under certain conditions it can advance political and military counterinsurgency goals because defectors can act as force multipliers. Many other questions about defectors are not addressed here, but are worthy of investigation.

**Advancing Counterinsurgent Goals**

Counterinsurgencies can reap substantial benefits by using defectors as fighters to overcome innate areas of weakness such as local knowledge and irregular fighting ability.\textsuperscript{6} Defectors can provide operational and strategic information on the insurgency’s leadership, members, operations, communications, caches, and support systems; the civilian population, leaders, and groups including their languages, cultures, interests, demands, and frustrations; as well as other conditions such as terrain and weather. Defectors can provide irregular warfare skills to conventionally trained armies and to armies whose primary role has been regime protection rather than fighting ability.\textsuperscript{7} Additionally, defectors can, on behalf of counterinsurgents, exchange information with other actors in the conflict, the insurgency, and the populace. Troops from other areas of the country or foreign forces may not have this ability. Many, if not all, insurgencies conduct a degree of irregular warfare, which equips insurgents with greater irregular warfighting skills than the average soldier in a conventional army.


\textsuperscript{5} Valuable literature on militias as state proxies is developing, but it does not focus on defectors.

\textsuperscript{6} For more on the degree to which states can understand communities within their borders, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). The Department of Defense (DoD) defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” DoD, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0* (Washington: DoD, 2007).

Counterinsurgencies that take advantage of an insurgent’s unique skill set are likely to benefit more than those that merge insurgents into regular forces. Effective use of defectors’ knowledge and irregular fighting abilities requires matching their unit assignments with their unique skills and giving them a voice in designing operations they will participate in, which also takes advantage of their high levels of self-confidence. This factor ties into the need to work according to the interests of the defectors and the counterinsurgency. Research finds an increased sense of agency plays a role in individual decisions to become an insurgent. Logically, ex-insurgents would want to retain that sense of controlling their own destiny in their new roles. Their local knowledge probably means they have greater insight into the likely political effects of counterinsurgent choices than government or intervening forces.

Acceptance and cooperation from regular forces is another factor that contributes to the successful use of defectors. If conventional forces refuse to cooperate with defectors’ efforts, the defectors’ presence and actions are not force multipliers but sources of division and resentment within the counterinsurgent force. Defector units must also be consistently trained and supported to do what they do best, which is typically small-unit operations such as ambushing, tracking, and intelligence collection.

For defectors to remain on the counterinsurgency’s side, they must identify their own interests with the counterinsurgency’s success and believe their benefits will continue beyond the conflict’s end. Such interests may range from revenge or personal gain to a desire to be on the winning side. Any individual defector’s interests are likely to include a variety of short- and long-term motivations comprised under the rubric of identifying with the goal of counterinsurgent success. Defectors are more likely to remain with the counterinsurgency if they left the insurgency because their interests began to align more closely to those of the counterinsurgency than defectors motivated by weariness, fear, or financial gain. This tendency occurs because insurgents, in taking up arms, reveal their focus on the future and their belief in their ability to shape it.

Research Design

The cases examined here were drawn from counterinsurgency campaigns in which a great power backed a client threatened by an insurgency. Also for policy relevance, these cases include various degrees of great power intervention, from occupation by tens of thousands of combat troops to a small footprint of military advisors. All cases involve an insurgency fueled at least in part by nationalism.

Some may argue wars for national liberation are an artifact of the post-World War II breakdown of the colonial order, and thus have limited relevance in the postcolonial world. However, contemporary cases of resistance to occupation are similar to anticolonial wars in the desire of the insurgents, and their civilian supporters, to reduce...
the influence of the great power backing their government. Finally, cases of counterinsurgency success and failure assist in determining whether the variables important for the effective use of defectors differ according to campaign outcomes. These variables are, first, how the counterinsurgency uses defectors as fighters, and second, to what degree the counterinsurgency assures defectors’ interests. Defectors who use their unique skills and who expect postwar benefits from counterinsurgent success are likely to be more effective in advancing the counterinsurgency’s effort.

Algerian War: Counterinsurgency failure. During the revolutionary war for national liberation, Algerian insurgents drove the French from power in what France considered its territory. The insurgents sought equal rights with and eventually gained independence from the French.

Insurgency in Oman: Counterinsurgency success. The Sultan of Oman and his British backers countered a broad-based nationalist and Marxist insurgency in Dhofar, Oman’s southernmost region. Insurgents seeking greater independence from Britain, and a social and political revolution, were decisively defeated in the military campaign.

Rhodesian Bush War: Counterinsurgency failure. Black nationalist insurgents defeated the minority white government in the former British colony now known as Zimbabwe.

El Salvador’s civil war: Counterinsurgency success. A broad-based revolutionary insurgency fought to end US domination of the state and the region and to end military rule. The US-backed incumbent government remained in power after the peace agreement, but the military was no longer in control.

US operations in Iraq: Continuing counterinsurgency. After the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, it toppled the government. Broad-based insurgencies have fought the US occupation, Sunnis and Shiites waged civil war, and terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, battled for power.

Analysis

Special Skills

Evidence from the civil war in El Salvador and US operations in Iraq shows the most value is gained when defectors’ strengths offset a counterinsurgency’s weakness. The evidence from Rhodesia indicates a lack of attention to defector units’ strengths and weaknesses can have political costs for the counterinsurgency. To take advantage of unique skills—such as intelligence and irregular fighting ability as well as knowledge of the terrain, languages, cultures, population, and insurgency—counterinsurgents conduct a full assessment of the situation to take advantage of unique skills, such as intelligence, irregular fighting

ability. If the conflict involves ethnicity, for example, coethnic defectors are more likely to be effective than cross-ethnic ones.12

In Dhofar, the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) exploited the fighting ability of the firqats, or militias, formed around defectors with tribal connections and local knowledge. The firqats knew the ground and guerrilla tactics; they were good at what the British officers and the other troops, from such locations as Northern Oman and Pakistan, were bad at—including reconnaissance, speed of maneuver, and recognizing trails and individuals in the mountains, where the insurgency was strongest. The firqats were also better at intelligence collection and, unsurprisingly, at communicating with other Dhofaris.13 Lacking military discipline, the firqats patrolled and ambushed in small groups, and held tribal territory that had been taken in conventional joint operations with the Sultan’s Armed Forces.14 The firqats were reliable skirmishers against small numbers of insurgents. But their lack of discipline and refusal to conduct operations were not of direct benefit to their exasperated regular SAF officers.15

The firqats were a force multiplier by virtue of the ethnicity they shared with much of the mountain population: the counterinsurgency’s use of the coethnic force in these regions was less likely to spark resistance than punitive operations conducted by non-Dhofari troops. Brigadier John Graham ordered the Dhofar Brigade to continue punishing Dhofaris who helped the enemy, using the firqats whenever possible.16 The firqats also made the Sultan’s counterinsurgent force look less like an army of occupation. The insurgents reportedly considered one firqat a greater danger than 10 of the Sultan’s regular troops.17

The firqats were a rich source of information.18 During Operation Husn, the Omani force used firqats to identify individuals trying to leave the area.19 The defectors were also able to identify insurgent leaders and supporters, round them up, and encourage them to repudiate the insurgency publicly.20 The firqats made it possible for the counterinsurgency to clear insurgents out of the valleys of eastern and central Dhofar at relatively low cost. Searching the deep, jungled, cave-riddled depths required examining every square yard for insurgent arms


14 Jeapes, SAS, 123.


16 Directive for Commander Dhofar for 1972 Update, March 3, 1972, John Graham Collection, Oman Archive (OA), GB165-0327, Box 2, Folder 3, Middle East Center (MEC), St. Antony’s College (SAC), Oxford University, UK.


18 Interview recording, Brigadier John Bryan Akehurst (commander, Dhofar Brigade, 1974–1976), October 14, 1992, catalog number 11156, reel 2, Imperial War Museum (IWM); and Jeapes, interview.

19 Ops/2 Confirmatory Notes: Operation Husn, April 7, 1975, Edward Ashley Collection, OA, GB165-0399, Box 2, Folder 2/3, MEC, SAC, Oxford.

20 Jeapes, SAS, 64–65.
and supply caches. The Sultan’s troops stayed in the heights while the firqats and their Special Air Service (SAS) advisors cleared the valleys. The firqats’ demeanor indicated how dangerous each area was. The firqats also talked with the populace and returned with the location of caches. Blind searching in the valleys was a wasted effort.21

In El Salvador, US advisors experimented with the use of defectors’ skills in the field. Some of the success of defector units in El Salvador was due to support by experienced, individual US Special Forces advisors who had worked with other non-US troops and in other conflicts involving irregular warfare.22 In one area, defectors were used in a role similar to that of a pseudo gang, but they did not masquerade. The defectors, led by a former insurgent platoon leader, made up the most successful unit in the 5th Brigade Zone in 1985–86, which once accounted for the majority of kills in the entire brigade. The unit walked into insurgent bases and killed or captured everyone present, with Salvadoran special forces support.23

US advisors in El Salvador also used defectors to identify other insurgents. In the 4th Brigade Zone in 1989–90, US advisors made a practice of hiding a defector inside a truck with a hole cut in the canvas so he could see the villagers who lined up to accept rice, oil, beans, and other foodstuffs delivered in civic action projects. Anyone the defector identified could either be quietly picked up outside town or followed in hopes of finding an insurgent camp.24 Defectors also provided the insurgency’s communications codes, a great prize given the insurgency’s highly effective operational security.25

During US operations in Iraq, tribal forces in Anbar turned against al-Qaeda to side with the US military and joined the Iraqi army and police while conducting their own operations to raid insurgent caches and safe houses.26 These independent operations benefited the counterinsurgency at relatively little cost.

In contrast, the Rhodesian counterinsurgents learned the costs of using defector units, such as the Selous Scouts, for operations that played only to their tactical strengths. The Scouts served not only as pseudo gangs but also as trackers, guides, and hunter-killer teams.27 These defectors significantly increased the intelligence the counterinsurgency received through their long-range reconnaissance and surveillance

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21 Jeapes, interview.
22 MG Mark Hamilton (USA Retired) (US military group leader in San Salvador during peace talks), interview with author, April 13, 2010.
24 MG Simeon Trombitas (USA Retired) (senior advisor/chief of operations, planning and training with the 4th Infantry Brigade in Chalatenango, El Salvador, 1989–90), email message to author, April 4, 2010.
27 Beckett, “Rhodesian Army.”
missions. One study credits the Scouts with 68 percent of all insurgent kills inside Rhodesia.28

However, these defectors also pushed operations into neighboring states, including mounting assassination attempts and large operations that hurt the Rhodesian government politically. One egregious case involved a raid in which unarmed guerrillas were shot as they stood in a parade formation and all the patients in the camp hospital were burned alive when Scout fire set the structure alight. The attack drew international condemnation, which was intensified by the fact that the camp was a registered UN refugee center.29

The Scouts had the material capability to launch these external operations but lacked the strategic understanding to recognize the political implications of their warfighting choices. In addition, their background and training meant they were not particularly concerned with the state-to-state relations important to Rhodesia. The Scouts focused on destroying the insurgency militarily.

**Enfranchised Roles, Targeting, and Operations**

Evidence from Algeria and Dhofar supports the finding that defectors are more likely to serve counterinsurgent purposes when they provide input into their roles, targeting, and operational planning. In Algeria, the French formed a force of Harkis, who were Arab, Berber, or Muslim Algerian soldiers rather than French or French Algerian soldiers, made up of about 1,000 insurgent defectors, keeping each unit near its home community. The Harkis, reluctant to fight elsewhere due to fear for their families’ safety, were more effective at hunting insurgents because they knew the operational areas well.30 Similarly, in al-Anbar province, the US Army found former insurgents were more likely to join the Iraqi army if they were assigned to their home area.31 In Dhofar, the firqats’ insistence on seemingly endless talking over operational plans maddened the British regular officers, but commanders considered it was worth the cost because of the military and political gains enabled by the defectors.32

**Organize, Train, and Support**

In Dhofar, El Salvador, and Iraq, the counterinsurgencies benefited by organizing, training, and fully supporting defectors’ operations. The French failure to do so in Algeria had high costs.

In Dhofar, the SAS began with a determination that units of defectors would not be used simply as guides; they would be fighters, properly armed, trained, and supported.33 The SAS trained the firqats in fire discipline, patrol formations, tactics, and maneuver, as well as operating as units with machine gun, mortar, artillery, and air support.34 Extending the SAS role from training to accompanying the firqats in

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30 Cassidy, “Long Small War.”
31 Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
33 Jeapes, S-A3, 48.
34 Jeapes, email message to author, September 11, 2009.
the field made backing them with direct and indirect fires and air power possible. This presence also reduced high-level concerns about the possibility of the firqats returning to the other side, though at a cost.35 The SAS men working with the firqats suffered a casualty rate as high as 30 percent.36

Local forces in Dhofar who were untrained, poorly armed, and unsupported were less reliable. Most could stand guard and little more. Some passed information to the insurgents.37 The Oman Gendarmerie, who were guarding the fort at Mirbat when insurgents mounted an attack in July 1972, declined to assist the small number of SAS troops and other defenders repelling the onslaught.38 In Algeria, the Harkis grew from 18 to 385 village forces, totaling about 60,000 fighters. Their effectiveness, however, varied significantly with the abilities of the French officers assigned as area administrators and responsible for training.39

Individual advisors in El Salvador created effective units in their area of operations even with limited institutional support. One highly effective unit of defectors was set up quietly, outside US Embassy oversight, and the troops were paid with Central Intelligence Agency money.40 This unit was supported by the best troops the US advisors could find and train, Salvadoran special forces noncommissioned officers, who also ran the operations. The men got special uniforms and pay and were exempt from routine duties. The CIA provided a bounty for captured weapons that could be traced to the insurgency.41

Similarly, efforts to use the local militias, known as Awakening Councils, against al-Qaeda in Baghdad, Iraq, were more effective when US troops not only worked closely with militia commanders but also when operations included militias, Iraqi army troops, and US soldiers together. Complaints about Iraqi and militia intimidation of civilians and criminal behavior dropped significantly under these conditions, a positive indicator as the United States sought popular support for the counterinsurgency.42

Military support for the Iraqi militias was also important in increasing their effectiveness. When residents of the Baghdad neighborhood of Amiriyah decided to challenge al-Qaeda, they faced a hard fight. The Americans held their fire against the militia when it initiated action and later sent in two Stryker platoons to stop the insurgents’ advance against the militia members hard-pressed in their strongholds.43 On an earlier occasion, US forces quickly blocked an al-Qaeda attack on a tribe in Anbar that had begun challenging its control the area.44 These US choices

35  Jeapes, S-Afs, 48.
36  Jeapes, interview. For context, the casualty rate for British Commonwealth troops in World War II was nearly 11 percent. Thomas Harding and Graeme Wilson, “Afghan Casualty Rate ‘at Level of Last War,’” Telegraph, July 16, 2007.
38  Interview recording, anonymous, October 23, 1992, catalog number 11161, reel 1, IMW.
39  Cassidy, “Long Small War.”
40  Pedrozo, emails.
41  Ibid.
43  Kuehl, “Testing Galula.”
44  Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
prevented the slaughter of new allies and demonstrated commitment and a willingness to bear the costs of keeping the partnership. US forces in Iraq also found that paying, equipping, and training tribal forces was worth the cost. Recruits accepted for training in the Iraqi police received a payment, and officers who stayed with the police force for more than three months received a bonus. Training included urban combat to build the coalition’s small-unit effectiveness. Violence dropped significantly in Anbar once US forces reached a modus vivendi with the tribes.46

Cooperation within Conventional Forces

In Dhofar and Iraq, defectors were better able to support insurgent goals when main force troops and officers recognized the value of their efforts and demonstrated a willingness to cooperate operationally. Evidence from Algeria, Rhodesia, and El Salvador is insufficient for affirming a lack of coordination and distrust between irregular and regular units can lead to bad outcomes such as friendly fire episodes.47

The campaign in Dhofar was based on more extensive use of the fiqrats. The strategy was to fight for and hold territory in the eastern sector of Dhofar and then the central area. The counterinsurgency targeted areas of weaker support for the insurgency, held the territory, and eventually pushed insurgents into the more thinly populated west to destroy them adjacent to their safe haven in Yemen. The fiqrats were integral to the plan. They scouted and skirmished, gained targeting information from friends and family in their home areas, helped the Sultan’s army take new territory, and then held it with the SAS.

The fiqrats routinely coordinated with the counterinsurgents in operations from clearing to eliminating insurgent mortar positions and searching for arms caches.48 The regular officers found trusting the fiqrats difficult, and the risk of friendly fire was high because the fiqrats looked and dressed like the insurgents.49 But, when the SAF shunned the defectors, operations were less successful. Near the end of the war, one regimental commander refused to work with fiqrats. Without their intelligence, he could not locate the last remaining insurgents in the cleared eastern area. The SAS was reassigned to the area, reestablished its relationship with the fiqrats, and began getting the information the Sultan’s Armed Forces needed to remove the remaining insurgents.50

The SAF complained that the fiqrats were in touch with the enemy, but that was part of the point: the fiqrats were getting information and trying to win over more defectors.51 The militias were also unpredictable, and thus frustrating, to regular forces accustomed to orderly, hierarchical behavior. The defectors were eager to attack, would jump into a flurry

45 Ibid.
47 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
48 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 140–41; “Notes on Visit to Oman,” COL W. J. Reed, Ministry of Defence DEFE 25/312, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Kew, UK; Akehurst, We Won a War, 77; and Jeapes, SAS 190–91.
49 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
50 Jeapes, interview.
51 Jeapes, SAS, 76.
of activity to arrange an operation, then change their minds. But, the SAS, with a background in working with non-European troops and in irregular warfare could recognize the fiqbats’ strengths and be patient, as well as interface with the SAF to facilitate cooperation.

In Iraq, the United States was also apprehensive about cooperating with militias and about letting former insurgents into the security forces. These concerns were allayed in part by educational efforts pressed by a few US officers. US troops supporting the Awakening educated coalition forces on the intelligence and local knowledge defectors could offer. American soldiers also emphasized the increasing alignment of interests between Sunni fighters and the United States.

Aligning Interests

Effectively using defectors as fighting forces requires the counterinsurgency to recognize, and strengthen, aligned interests, which need not be identical. Recognizing intersecting or overlapping interests requires the counterinsurgency to prioritize its own goals. The campaign in Dhofar and the early efforts in Iraq support this element, while evidence from Algeria and a later period in Iraq show the costs of not seeking or cementing aligned interests.

In Dhofar, the SAS leaders who formed the fiqbats around defectors were bitterly disappointed that the units had to be structured around tribal relationships when they had hoped for a pantribal force based on their own liberal values. But the first-formed fiqbat had to be broken up because of intertribal squabbling.

Conversely, the effectiveness of the tribally based fiqbats was exceptional precisely because of their tribal affiliations. Each unit operated with their SAS handlers in their own tribal area, refused to participate in any operation that did not directly benefit them, and refused to cross tribal boundaries in the mountains, where the insurgency was strongest. Their stubbornness infuriated the British officers leading the Sultan’s campaign, but it paid off. The fiqbats influenced cousins and brothers with the insurgency, when they considered it in their interest to do so, and collected information from them. The fiqbats warned

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52 Jeapes, J., 88.
54 Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens.”
56 Jeapes, interview; and Perkins, interview.
57 Gardiner, Service of the Sultan, 157; and Perkins, interview.
58 Perkins, interview; Jeapes, J., 78; Akehurst catalog number 11156, reel 2, IWM; Jeapes, interview; R. A. Loyd Jones to A. A. Acland, July 1, 1971, DEFE 24/1835, TNA; D. F. Hawley, October 16, 1972, DEFE 25/294, TNA; Sitrep, December 19, 1972, DEFE 25/368, TNA; Review of the Military Situation Since the 10th December 1973 to the 23rd January 1974, Commander Sultan’s Armed Forces MG Timothy Creasey, DEFE 25/312, TNA; The Principles Governing Military Assistance to Oman, DEFE 25/315, TNA; Civil Administration in Dhofar, Oman, November 4, 1974, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) 8/2216, TNA; and Report Commander Sultan’s Armed Forces to Chiefs of Staff 28 December 1975, DEFE 11/899, TNA.
their families that enemy activity near the outposts would mean no more water in the harsh terrain. These outposts also made patrolling deep into insurgent territory and expanding the network of tracks in the mountains possible, which also increased military access to the region.

The fiqrats safeguarded the interests of their friends and family as well as their own. One day, mountain herders brought 1,400 goats to an outpost. The fiqrats told their SAS handlers that they would not go on any more operations if the military did not buy the goats. Dhofar’s governor recognized a test when he heard one. He had the goats flown down to the plain and purchased.

In Dhofar, the fiqrats made sure their interests were known and met in other ways as well. The fiqrats were paid regular wages, plus bonuses for captured enemy weapons. Providing employment for and feeding the families of fighting-age men made the fiqrats an expensive insurance policy for the sultan that continued after the conflict in the form of bounties for insurgents’ weapons and ammunition. Between August 1974 and August 1976 alone, Sultan Qaboos bin Said paid out nearly a million pounds. When the conflict was winding down, the fiqrats feared for their livelihood. Their SAS handlers noticed that once the fiqrats’ future was assured, the insurgents lurking in the valleys faded away. The fiqrats were becoming warlords, but the government remained stable. By conflict’s end, the fiqrat leaders controlled all activity in their areas, including the grazing and watering of livestock and the sale of state food, while staying busy conducting political affairs in Dhofar’s capital city, Salalah, without challenging the sultan.

In Anbar, when powerful Sunni tribes stopped fighting the United States and allied with it against the new dominant local power, al-Qaeda, then-Colonel Sean B. MacFarland put aside concerns about criminal activity and potential fickleness on the part of the provinces’ political leaders. He focused instead on getting what he needed from them as intelligence sources and fighters. “You don’t get to be a sheik by being a nice guy. These guys are ruthless characters,” MacFarland said. “That doesn’t mean they can’t be reliable partners.”

In Algeria, the French often used force and the threat of force, including torture and threats against their families, to gain the cooperation of defectors. The French suffered a major setback with Force K, a Muslim Algerian guerrilla force. Force K turned out to consist largely of insurgents and men who became insurgents after joining. Once the deception was discovered, some 600 members of the 1,000-man force escaped to the insurgency with their weapons and equipment.
In El Salvador, the counterinsurgency had success with its few attempts to use defectors as fighters. This application may have been limited because there was little alignment of interests between members of the insurgency and the government. Many of the insurgents who defected, including those who surrendered after increased combat operations dislocated large numbers of civilians, did so out of war weariness.\textsuperscript{70} In addition, many defectors were from areas with relatively weak devotion to the insurgency.\textsuperscript{71}

In Iraq, a key shared interest between the United States and the sheiks of the Anbar Awakening, which had mixed success, was keeping the tribal leaders alive. US forces supported and backed tribal operations against al-Qaeda, and provided security for the sheiks and their families. Further, the Americans acknowledged the status of the sheiks by incorporating them into governance structures. When Sheikh Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi of the Abu Risha tribe led a campaign against al-Qaeda, the United States provided security for him, made him the counterinsurgency coordinator for Anbar, deputized his militias, and accepted his tribesmen into the Iraqi Police. Similarly, the tribesmen of the Abu Mahal tribe came to dominate the Iraqi Army brigade in their area.\textsuperscript{72}

The costs to the counterinsurgency of not seeking to align some interests with defectors and potential defectors can be high. In Iraq, the danger of not finding a way to keep defectors’ interests aligned with those of the government quickly became evident. The United States initially paid salaries to Awakening members with the expectation that the Iraqi government would take over in the longer term, providing jobs that would keep the former insurgents aligned with the government.

After the US drawdown, this \textit{modus vivendi} fractured. The Iraqi government hired half or fewer of the fighters, and many of those hired received menial work rather than positions in the security forces. A number of defectors returned to fighting the government by aligning with al-Qaeda, for pay, to avoid attack, or both. Nathum al-Jubouri, a former Awakening Council leader in Salahuddin province, explained the group’s uncertainty about “what the government intends for them.”\textsuperscript{73} Ultimately, a number of former insurgents and former defectors joined forces with al-Qaeda’s successor organization, the Islamic State, and have continued fighting the government and allied foreign forces.

\textbf{Conclusions and Recommendations}

This article has shown that counterinsurgencies get the most out of using defectors as fighters when that use supports the fighters’ unique skills and meets their interests.


\textsuperscript{71} Waghelstein, \textit{El Salvador}.

\textsuperscript{72} Long, “The Anbar Awakening.”

In the successful campaigns in Dhofar, El Salvador, and Iraq, counterinsurgents used defectors’ unique skills for operational success. In Dhofar, the counterinsurgency also used the fiq̱āts for strategic success. These warlords remain in power and contribute to Oman’s long-term political stability because the government continues to protect their interests. In Dhofar and Iraq, counterinsurgents also gave defectors a say in planning operations. In all three successes, defector units were properly trained and supported and conventional forces cooperated with them at the tactical and operational levels. In the two cases of failure, there is limited evidence that counterinsurgents used defectors’ unique skills, gave them a say, properly supported and cooperated with them, and met their interests. Further research should determine not only more about use of defectors in these cases but also examine additional cases.

These findings, while constrained by the limits of the information available, suggest a counterinsurgency should prioritize its interests to get the best out of defectors. Its need to defeat the insurgency should be balanced with its desire to limit the creation of alternate power centers within the state as well as any hope to retain the moral high ground by refusing to cooperate with brutal actors. Further, the counterinsurgency should make an effort to identify and to take advantage of strategically overlapping interests, such as material rewards or status, with some of those valued by insurgents.

The counterinsurgency should try to recognize when fissures develop within the insurgency and seize those opportunities to create incentives for partnership, rather than considering the insurgency as a unitary actor with diametrically opposed interests to those of the government. Counterinsurgents should recognize that insurgent leaders who can, and will, bring their followers with them when they defect are more valuable than individual defectors. The counterinsurgency should identify and act upon ways to cement its alignment of interests with defectors in the longer term as well as identify and use defectors’ most important skills for the tasks at hand. This process includes bringing defectors’ knowledge and insights into the planning and targeting process and using them in cooperation and coordination with conventional forces. The counterinsurgency should apply the necessary resources to train, equip, and support defectors properly, which includes assigning task trainers, handlers, and leaders experienced in irregular warfare and with non-Western fighters. Effective use of defectors as fighting forces is not determinative in counterinsurgency, as far as this study can tell, but it does provide governments and foreign forces with support in areas where they are likely to be weakest.
ABSTRACT: This article discusses the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's policy of “Protection of Civilians” in directing international efforts to counter adversaries who blur the boundaries of war during armed conflict.

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commanded the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2014, NATO allies and partners learned that protecting civilians was a key parameter of both operational and strategic success. The allies continuously adapted their campaigns to focus on mitigating and tracking civilian casualties. Later, at the post-ISAF Warsaw summit in mid-2016, the allies agreed to a wider policy on “the protection of civilians” that was explicitly framed as a lesson learned from Afghanistan.1

Afghanistan was not the first time the allies used armed force in an operation that fell somewhere between war and peace. In Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s they discovered, in Commanding General Rupert Smith’s laconic phrase, it was no longer “practical” for politicians and diplomats to expect the military to solve problems by force, just as it was no longer “practical” for the military to plan and execute purely military campaigns.2 Today, security cooperation and stabilization are essential activities for Western armed forces.3 Still, what was so different about the Afghanistan mission was the degree to which stabilization looked and felt like war in terms of its brutality, loss of life, and the level of ammunition expended. Thus, the Afghan lesson was that defense forces and allies need to prepare better to navigate the complex gray zone where war meets crisis management, where humanitarian law (the law of armed conflict) meets human rights law, and where power and principle intertwine. This lesson became NATO policy in mid-2016.

Moreover, no sooner had the allies adopted the “Protection of Civilians” policy than their intent to pursue it appeared questionable. This skepticism was certainly the case among the personnel interviewed for this article where the impression is that NATO allies are losing political interest in their collective policy: they appear content to have pushed an action plan to military authorities, to have decreased the International Staff that can otherwise help drive policy, and to turn...
their gaze toward deterrence in Europe. The root cause of this shift is political: Russian policies in Ukraine and along Europe’s eastern rim have pushed collective defense to NATO’s forefront. Following the straightforward rules of collective defense (i.e., the law of armed conflict or humanitarian law) is also comfortable. Political and military leaders know and understand these laws in detail: military forces can apply lethal force only in cases of military necessity, they must distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and they can only use force proportional to the objective.

Issues related to the protection of civilians are, in contrast, quite complex and politically challenging. If, in war, such protections are about the principle that harm to civilians must not be disproportionate to the military advantage sought, then in crisis management they are about something much broader, namely, upholding human rights law and good government. The protection of civilians, thus, blends naturally into a wide and often normative debate about human security and human development where limiting civilian casualties is just one piece of a bigger puzzle. The rest is about limiting violence against particularly vulnerable groups in society, especially women and children, and then securing access to food, clean water, and public services, and providing opportunities for economic and social development.

More broadly, the policy is about global governance, a framework in which NATO plays second fiddle or harmonizes with the UN Security Council. For armed forces trained for “duels,” Clausewitz’s definition of war, this human rights terrain, where there is no real enemy but a public order to build, is difficult. For the political masters of NATO governments, the policy is fraught with danger. Introducing human rights on the battlefield is to offer opponents—such as the Taliban and Russia—an opportunity to link the use of force to human rights abuse, which however tedious the claim, undermines the legitimacy of the campaign. Moreover, a tight operational partnership with the UN stokes normative debates on how outsiders critical of military action and militarization can best gain control of, or influence over, NATO. These debates are politically uncomfortable for NATO governments and unhelpful from the perspective of getting things done on the ground.

Thus, with a certain degree of relief, NATO allies have reduced their ground engagement in Afghanistan and turned their attention to the more straightforward challenge of deterring Russia. They should, however, be mindful that a wide gap between defense at home and crisis management policy in distant and not-so-important theaters will put at risk their own strategic focus, organizational capability, partnership engagement, and political legitimacy.

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4 Interviews with NATO staff, November–December 2016. With the adoption of the “Protection of Civilians” policy and an ensuing action plan, NATO replaced all International Staff with National Voluntary Contributions that rotate much more frequently and thus offer less continuity and policy-drive.

5 Customary international law and the Geneva Conventions are the sources of the law of armed conflict.

6 NATO is still in Afghanistan, running the Resolute Support Mission in support of Afghan authorities, and also the larger US security assistance mission, but NATO’s force contribution has declined from 40,000 troops (not counting US troops) in 2010 to the current level of 5,000. In 2010, the US force level in ISAF in Afghanistan was 90,000 but in 2017 rose from a low of 8,000 troops to 12,000.
The allies and partners have an opportunity to stay clear of such risks, this article argues, if they pursue a pragmatic policy of bridging military defense and civilian protection where possible. The next section steps back to the Afghan campaign to expose the political issues that caused NATO problems regarding protection of civilians, and to explain, in part, why the Alliance focused on civilian casualties. The second section turns to the policy adopted in 2016 and explains how NATO managed to navigate underlying political tensions. The third and final section considers how the “Protection of Civilians,” in spite of its political baggage, offers NATO strategic, organizational, and diplomatic opportunities.

Force in Afghanistan

By mid-2015, NATO’s lessons-learned unit concluded “ISAF did indeed successfully reduce ISAF-caused [civilian casualties] over the period 2008 to 2014, and that there is evidence that this reduction was a result of measures taken by ISAF to do so.” The reduction, which NATO actively sought on the ground and which UN data confirm, was hard-won, though, and required political engagement with a number of fundamental problems.

The first problem was defining the political purpose of the war and how to achieve it—the political and operational objectives—following Clausewitz. The initial phase of the war had a clear objective of defeating the Afghan Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda terrorist organization it hosted, which amounted to a war of self-defense following the UN Charter’s article 51 and international humanitarian law. The fall of the Taliban regime in November 2001, however, complicated the justification for the continued use of armed force. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the US-led coalition justified its continued war against remnants of al-Qaeda on the grounds of self-defense and the consent of the new Afghan regime.

Still, controversy arose in respect to whether the fairly straightforward laws of war applied to a conflict between states (the coalition) and a nonstate actor (al-Qaeda); as well as to how the parallel stabilization mission (ISAF, of which NATO took command in 2003), which decidedly was not about self-defense, could operate; and the ends the mission was ultimately to achieve. ISAF’s defined objective was to build local security forces, which in principle was simple enough, but the degree to which this gave ISAF ownership of government capacity

7 Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), Protection of Civilians: How ISAF Reduced Civilian Casualties (Lisbon, Portugal: JALLC, 2015), 1.


Building was not clear, as was the case with the operational muscle—military power—ISAF could legitimately apply.

Government capacity building brought tensions with other actors in this domain, notably the Afghan political authorities and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and operational conditions varied greatly depending on insurgent strength in the provinces. Gradually, it became clear the insurgency was both organized and durable, which defines a *noninternational armed conflict* under international humanitarian law that de facto allows greater use of force against lawful targets. However, broader human rights concerns, stemming from international human rights law, continued to be of great concern—the insurgency was unevenly spread, meaning parts of Afghanistan were at peace (operating under regular, Afghan criminal law) and human rights issues were at the heart of the political debate over the purpose of the war.11

The unsettled politics of political and operational purpose directly impacted the speed with which NATO military authorities could define and organize the proportional use of force, which happened slowly and was consistently a focal point of criticism. Initial efforts were made in 2006 and 2007 when ISAF’s campaign had spread to the entire territory of Afghanistan and had encountered the full force of the insurgency. At this point, in mid-2007, the UN mission began tracking civilian casualties and issuing Protection of Civilians reports. General Dan K. McNeill, commander, ISAF, issued the first tactical directive to limit civilian casualties; yet, he earned the nickname Bomber McNeill due to the tendency of the campaign to fall back on excessive air power.12

In 2009, General Stanley A. McChrystal, as commander of ISAF, placed civilian protection at the heart of his tactical directive, only to ignite a debate on the appropriateness, or danger to troops, of “courageous restraint.” McChrystal’s successor, General David H. Petraeus replaced “restraint” with the “disciplined use of force” as ISAF slowly, but surely, built a sophisticated framework for “tracking” and “mitigating” civilian casualties.13 Petraeus’s approach failed to resolve the problem, and civilian casualties actually increased from 2010 to 2011.14 Thus, in mid-2012, General John R. Allen simply banned the bombing of civilian homes under any circumstance except self-defense.15

Political ownership of the international effort to assist the rebuilding of Afghanistan’s government was likewise a point of contention. Formally, the United Nations hosted the Bonn Conference (2001)

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11 Germany had a big footprint in Afghanistan but did not recognize a state of war (noninternational armed conflict) until November 2009. The United States argued from the outset that war in ungoverned spaces involved a mix of international humanitarian and international human rights law. Other allies, such as Canada, were attuned to human rights law but resisted including it in the stability operation. Christian Schaller, “Military Operations in Afghanistan and International Humanitarian Law,” SWP Comments 7 (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2010), 1–7; and Stephen Pomper, “Human Right Obligations, Armed Conflict and Afghanistan,” 525–542 in *The War in Afghanistan: A Legal Analysis*, ed. Michael N. Schmitt (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009).


that resulted in Afghanistan’s interim government and which invited the ISAF mission on a UN mandate. 16 Moreover, at the request of the Afghan government, in March 2002 the United Nations organized its local mission in Afghanistan to lead the international civilian effort to build Afghan sovereignty and leadership. 17 Such moves would seem to imply the UN would do most of the international stabilization while ISAF provided security.

As security became the key to the entire campaign, however, and as the UN mission, the Afghan government, and other civilian agencies struggled to cohere and to move forward, ISAF easily became the dominant player. All of the organizations embraced the same theory of victory—“unity of effort” or “comprehensive approach”—but, in fact, ISAF was first among equals. This influence caused resentment and discomfort everywhere: the Kabul government and the UN mission felt they should be in the lead, and NATO governments did not want to be responsible for governance and development. Hence, they surged a larger military force, but did so to achieve security and to manage the interface to governance and development as opposed to taking charge of governance and development, or inversely, letting the United Nations direct their considerable military forces. 18

Some proponents of “new wars” theory have argued an alliance such as NATO was wholly misplaced in Afghanistan, in part militarizing the conflict, in part tying the hands of the most appropriate regulator of the conflict—the United Nations. 19 Arguments such as these exacerbate the unease political authorities have with embracing an agenda for protecting civilians, which inevitably cause the Alliance to question whether it is de facto buying into a normative agenda that will subordinate it to the United Nations—as in a tightly regulated “regional arrangement” under chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 20 Making NATO the handmaiden of UN doctrine would be devastating to the former’s role as a regional self-defense alliance, offering both Russia and China a greater say in NATO affairs. It also would be seen as a self-abnegation of the political responsibility that comes with being the head of state of a NATO nation.

The tension between what the Alliance is willing to do and what one might normatively expect from it is apparent not only in Afghanistan but also in other theaters, such as Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), where NATO has used armed force to help solve crises and advance good governance. As in Afghanistan, these interventions have generated a debate on the legality and appropriateness of the Alliance’s actions, and as in Afghanistan, the debate is rooted in, and fed by, contrasting interpretations of the primacy of collective defense vis-à-vis collective

20 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2010).
security.\textsuperscript{21} The Alliance can and does accommodate the imperative to use force proportionally—seeking to reduce civilian casualties—but its discomfort with this underlying debate on broad collective security and responsibilities is inherent.

NATO Policy

In spite of this level of operational tension and normative friction, in July 2016 NATO members managed to agree on a policy to protect civilians. The question is, on what terms did this consensus become possible?

First, the policy is anchored in the need to institutionalize a virtuous cycle of “prevention, mitigation, and learning” in regards to civilian casualties, restricting legitimate targets, establishing a culture and an organization of reporting and investigating incidents, and building the capacity to send out investigative teams (preferably on the ground or alternatively via air surveillance). This necessity was NATO’s lesson number one from Afghanistan, and it meant the Alliance had to be trained and ready to guide civilian casualty work going forward. NATO had improvised to protect civilians in Afghanistan and is institutionalizing the capacity to avoid new pains of improvising such protections in future situations.

From a political perspective, three aspects of NATO’s policy stand out. First, the document remains narrowly focused on civilian casualty mitigation. Reducing such losses was the key ISAF focus in Afghanistan, and the NATO policy continues the ambition to protect civilians from physical violence. The Alliance could have gone much further, as far as human security and securing access to clean water, education, and so on, but perhaps a more intuitive emphasis on slightly broader issues of detention, restitution for damaged property or casualties, or unexploded ordnance clearance would have been more appropriate. NATO chose to stick to protection from physical violence but, in a nod to previous considerations, did agree to include the protection of civilians from “others’ actions” and to support “humanitarian action.”\textsuperscript{22} The expanded interest gives the Alliance a stake in a broader context, where the organization is but a node in a larger humanitarian-focused network, but retains the group’s focus on the core business of applying military force for political purpose.

Secondly, the policy is inherently pragmatic. The “Protection of Civilians” opens with a broad commitment to “legal, moral, and political imperatives,” which could imply some sort of legal or normative doctrinal drive, but the ensuing text makes clear that the pragmatic political imperative is the one that really matters. NATO’s highest authority—the North Atlantic Council—is emphasized as the source of NATO mandates; the policy does not prejudice force protection or collective defense obligations; and the Alliance eschews the tricky balance of international humanitarian and human rights law where human rights


\textsuperscript{22} “Protection of Civilians,” NATO, paras. 16–17.
by nature are more restrictive on the use of force. In one instance, the policy makes an apparently bold statement: “NATO recognizes that all feasible measures must be taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate harm to civilians.” But, the key here is the term feasible, which is an implicit reference to the authority of the North Atlantic Council to define for itself how much it can actually do.

Thirdly, the policy is very much an invitation for the Alliance to partner with individual partner nations and international organizations. The policy was published, which is a sign of public diplomacy and partnership. Moreover, the policy is framed in paragraphs one and two with references to wider humanitarian doctrine (on children and armed conflict, women and peace, and sexual and gender-based violence as defined by UN Security Council resolutions), NATO operational partners, and the need for overarching policy. The presence of these elements is the Alliance nodding to the greater human security and human development context. Moreover, NATO partners were actively involved throughout the drafting of the policy, so much so that NATO allies and officials debated at one point on how far non-Alliance actors should be allowed to shape the organization’s policy.

The sum of these political facets is a policy that systematically offers the Alliance input from a wider range of international community actors into efforts to protect civilians, takes note of the legal and normative principles for doing so, and identifies what the Alliance can do at a practical level to reduce the threat of physical violence against civilians. It is, however, also a policy of an alliance that has its own political raison d’être and is not willing to submerge itself fully into a global, humanitarian network. It is a policy characterized more by expediency than by legal or moral doctrine, and as such, a policy that underscores the responsibility of the North Atlantic Council—and no one else—to define what is both necessary and feasible.

The pragmatics are also clear in regard to the instructions for NATO military authorities inherent in the policy. The policy ends with a 10-point plan for delivering on the “Protection of Civilians” ambition, and most of the items describe what International Staff, but especially what military authorities, must now plan to do about strategic communications, exercises, training personnel as well as local forces, capacity building with “requesting nations,” and interoperability with partnership nations. The Alliance’s international staff and military authorities began work on an action plan for the policy following the Warsaw summit, and defense ministers approved it in early 2017.

NATO’s “Protection of Civilians” policy leaves the Alliance in the fairly comfortable position of being politically open and organizationally ready to engage the international community in broader humanitarian operations, while retaining its right to define the scope of its ambitions and its actions. Strong proponents of humanitarian action, however, will find this insufficient and a validation of the criticism leveled against

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23 The policy simply states that humanitarian law and human rights law may be included in NATO’s mandate “as applicable.” “Protection of Civilians,” NATO, paras. 5–7.
24 “Protection of Civilians,” para. 7.
25 Author’s interview with NATO Protection of Civilians official, December 2016.
26 “Protection of Civilians,” NATO, paras. 15–24.
NATO in the Afghan context of the Alliance being inherently focused on its own political and military needs and an inadequate partner in the wider normative drive for human security.

Such criticism will stoke the temptation inside NATO to narrow protection-of-civilian issues to one of managing the proportional use of armed force in war, which essentially would be back to the business of war, not that of managing crises and stabilizing other societies. Thus, Alliance policy is crafted with considerable political and diplomatic skill but is nonetheless marked by an underlying clash of philosophies or visions—is NATO a spoke in the great wheel of UN governance, or is it a political entity that can, at its own discretion, contribute to humanitarian work? If NATO decision-makers choose simply to steer clear of the issue, which could be politically tempting, the unintended consequence would be the erosion of the Alliance's support for the “Protection of Civilians” policy. As we are about see, there are several operational and political reasons why Alliance authorities should consider the current policy a precautionary measure that merits their continued engagement.

Benefits of Pragmatism

The parameters of NATO's protection-of-civilians engagement are quite clear: the Alliance wants to retain political decision-making power and to remain focused primarily on the slice of the humanitarian agenda that is primarily related to civilian casualties. Moreover, NATO's approach to the protection of civilians is inherently operational and pragmatic: the Alliance has a culture and tradition of “doing things”—missions and operations—and rigid legal or moral doctrine cannot be allowed to erode this capacity for action. Still, within these parameters, there is nothing to prevent the Alliance from aligning the protection of civilians and collective defense principles to strengthen its international legitimacy, its command of collective self-defense operations, and its ability to shape partner policy, including partners participating in Alliance-related coalition operations. As a pragmatic alliance, NATO should get on with the task of realizing these benefits.

To gain international legitimacy, the Alliance needs to consider how to move its dialogue with the United Nations forward, which for all its complexity in terms of agencies and organizations remains the focal point for humanitarian debates. The United Nations is in some ways the antithesis to the Alliance—doctrinal where NATO is pragmatic, legalistic where NATO is political. It only complicates matters when, from within the UN Security Council, Russia and China view NATO with suspicion and resist a wider partnership with the Alliance.

For all of these reasons, NATO's formal relationship with the United Nations is strictly limited, in fact confined, to interaction between representatives of the two secretariats along lines defined by the 2008 Joint Declaration signed not by Alliance and UN member nations but by NATO and UN secretary generals. Today, the Alliance knows something the UN needs to know—in particular, how to train and certify forces
for operations and how to run intelligence-led operations. In the UN system, there is recognition of these needs, just as there is recognition that it needs to clarify how its doctrine on “the responsibility to protect” is compatible with the use of military force. To prepare for a sustained and enhanced dialogue with the United Nations on these issues, all of which will reflect positively on NATO’s political and operational legitimacy, the Alliance should not let the “Protection of Civilians” policy abate but engage it as a diplomatic leveler.

In terms of collective defense, the traditional argument is that such action is inherently legitimate according to the UN Charter, and NATO can therefore make such plans along tried and tested lines—the proportional and discriminatory use of force as defined by humanitarian law. This argument is also precisely what the Alliance is applying in its plans to anticipate and to deter Russian aggression. Still, there is a case for reform. When planning, military authorities calculate collateral damage estimates containing some sort of noncombatant casualty cutoff value that determines the level and intensity of strikes. The military method for doing so may be tried and tested, but as the authors of an insightful study suggest, Afghanistan and other recent conflicts clearly indicate the underlying algorithms “can benefit from a wider range of inputs.” This logic applies irrespective of whether the forces are preparing for war (collective defense) or crisis management (protection-of-civilians missions). The logic should lead decision-makers to reform and to modernize the command organization and culture in terms of its inherent readiness to monitor, to track, and to analyze civilian harm on the battlefield. This challenge of reform applies at the collective NATO level and at the state level for national command organizations.

Finally, there are clear benefits in terms of the Alliance’s partner policy. In part, the policy applies to those partners that experience hybrid threats, such as Ukraine, where Russia is exerting a variety of threats from direct physical assault (i.e., the annexation of Crimea) to support for insurgents and political and social destabilization. NATO’s main support to Ukraine has hitherto consisted of trust funds that channel voluntary financial contributions for building specific nonlethal capabilities such as command and control, logistics, and cybersecurity. The Alliance and Ukraine are putting a brave face on this support, upgrading it to a so-called comprehensive assistance package, but it remains diverse, limited, and indirect. Should the Alliance garner the political desire to go one step further—for instance, by offering lethal assistance (i.e., arms supplies)—the stakes would increase. In this instance, solid policies and procedures for guaranteeing, to the greatest extent possible, Ukraine

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27 The United Nations traditionally does not certify forces for its operations; however, NATO always does. The United Nations runs missions simply by mandate, but recent experience, especially in Mali, calls for a more active, intelligence-based approach to certain operations, which NATO has plenty of experience in doing.


30 Ibid.

31 NATO, Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine (Brussels: NATO, 2016).
would employ its arms in line with a clear and ambitious protection-of-civilians policy would be critical to have in place. Otherwise, the mission’s “legal, moral, and political imperatives”—to borrow from NATO’s own policy—would be jeopardy.

Partners can also be operational, of course. Irrespective of whether the Alliance is commanding an operation such as Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011) or supporting efforts such as the Global Coalition against Da’esh in Syria and Iraq, the core of NATO nations, including the United States, find themselves cooperating with a network of diverse partners. Using its partnership toolbox and regional cooperation initiatives to standardize military procedures, enable joint training, and maintain political channels, the Alliance has, in fact, become a hub for developing and maintaining such coalitions, in effect, serving as a multilateral framework of support for US grand strategy in the Middle East and North Africa. The Alliance’s tools and procedures can ensure NATO allies and their operational partners, wherever they come from, see eye-to-eye on the need to restrain the use of force in coalition operations.

The Global Coalition is a case in point. Strictly speaking, the coalition states are fighting a war of self-defense (at the request of the Iraqi government) against a widely unpopular enemy (the Islamic State, or Da’esh), but the usual rules of war need not apply because the human suffering that allows Da’esh to take root is at the heart of the campaign. In addition, the enemy easily conceals itself among civilians in this theater, and the Coalition tracks casualties mainly by air surveillance, as the ground footprint is much lighter than in Afghanistan. The Coalition, thus, faces a hybrid protection of civilians-focused self-defense mission that is exceptionally challenging in its own way but still similar to efforts in Afghanistan. The need for precautionary policy in this regard has not diminished, and NATO can help partners prepare their political-military command chain for it.

**Conclusion**

The Alliance was driven via ISAF to develop a civilian casualty doctrine and tracking and mitigation organization that promised to maintain the link between the use of force and political purpose, just as it sought to build links to development and governance via a comprehensive approach. After Afghanistan, NATO allies drew lessons for a protection-of-civilians policy, promising de facto not to forget but rather to improve; however, this promise is now at risk. Russia has pushed collective defense back to the top of the agenda. To introduce human rights law on a battlefield is to expose oneself to both real and manipulated criticism intended to undermine the legitimacy of and support for the operation, and the Alliance and the United Nations are tied into a clash of political visions that tempt NATO and UN policymakers respectively to pull back and to get on with their business. NATO’s “Protection of Civilians” policy remains an invitation to cooperate but also contains this bottom line: the Alliance will support the wider human and collective security agenda but not in any measure that infringes on its ability to function as a collective defense alliance.
Without question NATO’s “Protection of Civilians” policy will not appease all critics of the role collective defense organizations get to play within the global community of security management—of NATO’s role in the UN system. These critics can be found in the wider debate as well as within UN agencies and in the UN Security Council. To the extent they gain voice, these detractors will reinforce the impression in NATO that the Alliance did right in demarcating itself from the politics of global organization. The heart of the matter is, therefore, not bureaucratic complications but political and normative differences—can and should a collective defense alliance such as NATO shape global humanitarian action? This article has argued that the stakes—in terms of diplomatic legitimacy, command organization and culture, and partnership policy—are too high for the Alliance to pull back from humanitarian action to focus on its regional defense and deterrence role.

NATO can take concrete steps to bridge the gap: to counter the tendency to make this a defense ministerial item of low priority, it can ensure that the North Atlantic Council, in foreign minister format, regularly reviews the “Protection of Civilians” policy, just as it regularly addresses NATO-UN relations at summits of heads of state and government. The council may also counter the current plan to make actions protecting civilians merely one of many activities for the military chain of command. The Alliance can ensure that its International Staff retains the capacity to develop overarching policy ideas, a capacity it is currently losing. The Alliance is right to steer clear of the normative pitfalls in the underlying human security debate that would rob the Alliance of its ability to act, to actually do things. But, as outlined in this article, there is ample reason to get on with the pragmatics of bringing to life key crisis management lessons of NATO's campaigns.
ABSTRACT: This article provides historical background for policymakers facing the complex international concern of mass migration. By examining prior American interventions and identifying existing policies that support military responses, planners can begin to develop effective solutions for the current crisis.

In 2016, President Donald Trump addressed the topic of Europe’s mass migration crisis: “If you do not treat the situation competently and firmly, yes, it is the end of Europe.” These words of caution highlight the growing seriousness of the problem. In 2015, more than 1 million refugees and migrants flooded the southern border of Europe, with another 2.6 million seeking refuge in Turkey. By the end of 2016, the European Union reported an additional 500,000 illegal border crossings while Turkey struggled to manage 3.5 million displaced civilians from neighboring war-torn states. For comparison, Italy and Greece received over 1 million migrants and refugees by sea in 2015, and over 300,000 in the first nine months of 2016. Compounding this challenge, members of criminal and terrorist organizations have embedded themselves in, and recruited from, vulnerable migrant and refugee populations.

Although the United States supports the European community with diplomatic and economic aid, the cumulative impact of migration threatens to destabilize several member states within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To achieve strategic objectives for a strong and resilient security posture within the Alliance, US leaders should consider employing limited military means to address the problem of mass migration in Europe.

This article argues the US military should support an overarching grand strategy to assist European allies facing the complex problem of mass migration. While current US policy has emphasized the use of diplomatic and economic support for affected nations, there has been
little discussion concerning the use of the military arm of national power to help address this ongoing crisis. Yet, the examples of World War II Europe (1944–45), Bosnia (1992–95), and Kosovo (1999), highlight the historical value of applying US military leadership, planning, and resourcing as part of a holistic international humanitarian response.

Several key assumptions underpin our argument for increasing US military involvement to support the civilian response to mass migration. First, violence and economic hardship in the Middle East and Africa will continue to drive irregular migration flows into NATO member states, which will outpace the response capacity of European governments and conventional humanitarian relief actors. Second, Islamic State activity will spike in Europe as the terrorist organization seeks soft targets to detract attention from strategic losses in Syria and Iraq. Third, terror and criminal organizations will persist in leveraging the migration crisis through displaced civilian populations. Fourth, European allies will become increasingly hostile toward migrants and refugees due to real and perceived economic and security threats. Finally, domestic pressure will cause political leaders within the affected nations to look for options beyond civilian response activities.

**European Security Environment**

The recent surge of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa has placed an enormous strain on the economic, security, and political stability of several states. The inflows create opportunities for international terrorists to aim weapons of mass migration toward Europe by embedding members among the displaced populations traveling from war-torn regions of the world. Germany confirmed 340 cases of Islamic extremists recruiting within refugee centers and Europol reported 300 cases of similar efforts.

The European Union’s efforts since 1999 to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, also known as Frontex, have failed to address several gaps in immigration security and control, including legal obstacles that prevent law enforcement collaboration to determine identities of suspected smugglers. Since 2015, migrant-related terror activity in Europe has spiked, damaging the public’s sense of domestic safety and injuring an already fragile economy. The resulting distrust

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is captured in recent opinion polls, where 55 percent of Greeks and 60 percent of Italians believe refugees increase the likelihood of domestic terrorism. Similarly, 72 percent of Greeks and 65 percent of Italians claim refugees will take domestic jobs and benefits from national citizens. These perceptions have affected European elections, as the subject of mass migration moves to the forefront of international discourse. The political—as well as economic, social, and security—winds in Europe have changed, causing many elected officials to explore options previously ignored.

Medical concerns also surround the migration crisis, as displaced populations historically carry a disproportionate percentage of infectious diseases, such as human immunodeficiency virus, and hepatitis. In fact, 21 percent of tuberculosis cases in 2007 came from non-EU migrants. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control recently stated migrants and refugees have overwhelmed the capacity of several health service providers, creating gaps in medical treatment and records management along Europe’s southern border. This challenge has raised concerns from European citizens who question the government’s ability to protect the health and safety of the domestic population.

Impact of Mass Migration

Turkey, Greece, and Italy represent three NATO member states where migration has affected stability. American military planners should contemplate options to support Allied efforts for coping with the security, economic, and political challenges that have emerged. The following information and analysis provides an overview of some of the challenges, opportunities, and risks that face each nation.

Turkey

Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan are the points of origin for nearly half of all refugees who crossed Europe’s borders in 2015. In March 2016, the European Union announced an agreement with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to curb the massive flow of migrants traveling north through Turkey. This pact contained the following key provisions: the European Union would pay Turkey 6 billion Euros to hold approximately 3.5 million refugees and migrants; the European Union would accelerate consideration for Turkey’s membership; Greece could redirect migrants to Turkey; and Turkey would be required to

14 Ibid.
16 Tony Barnett et al., Migrant Health: Background Note to the “CDC Report on Migration and Infectious Diseases in the EU” (Stockholm: European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2009).
17 Flavia Riccardo et al., Handbook on Using the ECDC Preparedness Checklist Tool to Strengthen Preparedness against Communicable Disease Outbreaks at Migrant Reception/Detention Centres (Stockholm: European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2016).
prevent further irregular migration to the EU.\textsuperscript{20} The agreement has significantly reduced flows, for now, but with uneven implementation, the future prospects of the provisions are uncertain. How long the Turkish government can sustain the added weight of humanitarian responsibility remains unknown, as unemployment reached 12.1 percent in November 2016, and the estimated cost to support migrants exceeds $500 million per month as of February 2017.\textsuperscript{21} Unfortunately, President Erdogan continues to threaten European leaders with another flow of migrants and refugees in an effort to bolster domestic popularity and leverage further concessions from the European Union.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{Greece}

Greece is another NATO ally hit hard by the effects of mass migration. In 2015, more than 850,000 migrants and refugees illegally entered Greece, most traveling through Turkey and across the Mediterranean Sea.\textsuperscript{23} Many migrants either continued northward or returned to Turkey, but over 62,000 remain in hastily constructed holding areas.\textsuperscript{24} Geography also plays an important role in mass migration to Greece, as this nation serves as a gateway into the rest of Europe under the Schengen Agreement within the Treaty of Amsterdam. Through the agreement, residents may travel visa-free across 26 European nations.\textsuperscript{25} This pact benefits economic trade, but it also adds a degree of complexity for Greece when dealing with security responsibilities for migrants and refugees. Nonetheless, Greece greatly benefited from the agreement between the European Union and Turkey, as migrant numbers dropped by 79 percent from 2015 to 2016, from 67,000 refugees in January 2016 and 3,500 during August of the same year.\textsuperscript{26}

\textit{Italy}

According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, Italy also grapples with the complex problem of mass migration. Prior to the Arab Spring and the collapse of Muammar Gadhafi’s regime, Italy enjoyed a controversial agreement with Libya that kept migration from North Africa within politically acceptable limits. This agreement, under the auspices of colonial reparation, allowed the Italian coast guard to return migrants to Libya in exchange for annual payments of roughly $5 billion US dollars. The arrangement proved to be effective, as Italy received just 7,300 migrants from North Africa in 2010. However, following the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
  \item \textsuperscript{24} “Fewer Migrants,” Frontex.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, \textit{The Foreign Policy of the European Union} (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 233–34; and “Schengen Area Countries List,” Schengen Visa Info, October 20, 2016, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/.
\end{itemize}
upheaval in Libya in 2011, migration jumped to 30,000 and exceeded 100,000 per year by 2014.\textsuperscript{27}

Unfortunately, the recent agreement with Turkey did not reduce migration to Italy; in fact, numbers increased from 150,000 in 2015 to over 180,000 in 2016.\textsuperscript{28} A key problem also involves the risk of drowning while crossing the central Mediterranean. The United Nations reported the mortality rate for migrants traveling from North Africa to Italy is 1:42, and that over 4,100 migrants drowned while attempting to reach Europe in the span of just 12 months.\textsuperscript{29} Even with these tragic statistics, tension between Italian citizens and migrants over the perceived negative effects to citizen safety and economic security has contributed to such behavior, including explosions set off by 300 migrants near Turin, Italy, in 2016.\textsuperscript{30}

History of US Military Support

US military leadership, planning, and resourcing has helped curb the destabilizing effects of displaced populations in Europe during World War II, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and US military capability can just as effectively address today’s problem of mass migration. All three examples have similarities to the current crisis that are based on geographic location, forced migration, and ambiguity of the role the US military should have during mass migration crises. Nonetheless, several differences are evident, including the reasons for mass migration, the size of the displaced populations, the migrants’ demographics, and the improvements in international and nongovernmental organizations’ response capabilities. Notably, the following case studies involve migrants mostly displaced from within Europe’s borders, while the current crisis involves migrants and refugees traveling to Europe from the Middle East and Africa.

Case Study 1: World War II Europe

The care and repatriation of millions of displaced persons was a monumental challenge during the most devastating war in European history. After Eisenhower took command in January 1944, refugees and displaced persons were treated as a command responsibility, and military units cared for and controlled the refugee camps and installations.\textsuperscript{31} Planning cells were tasked with managing and monitoring support for migration and refugee operations from 1944 through 1945, and their guidance regarding unaccompanied children was adopted with minor changes by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.\textsuperscript{32} Despite the lack of clear political direction from US and Allied officials, Eisenhower initiated an effort that would eventually

\textsuperscript{27} “Refugees/Migrants,” UNHCR.
\textsuperscript{28} Steve Scherer, “Record 2016 Pushes Migrant Arrivals in Italy Over Half Million,” Reuters, December 30, 2016; and Frontex, “Fewer Migrants.”
\textsuperscript{29} “Since Alan Kurdi drowned,” UNHCR.
\textsuperscript{30} Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “Tensions Run High in Rome’s Suburbs as Italy Struggles with Migration Crisis,” Guardian, July 26, 2015; and Oli Smith, “Migrant Centre Explosions: Violence between Locals and Migrants Shuts Down Italian City,” Express, November 25, 2016.
provide humanitarian aid for more than 6.7 million displaced refugees and migrants during and after the war.\(^{33}\)

These efforts were possible because Eisenhower agreed with Field Marshal Moltke’s statement that plans may amount to nothing, but the process of planning is invaluable.\(^{34}\) Proudfoot explained the Allies had no plan for managing mass migration in 1943, or at least no comprehensive plan that addressed the complexities of displaced populations on the battlefields of Italy. Eisenhower directed his staff to form a Displaced Persons Branch to integrate the lessons learned in Italy as part of contingency planning for the Normandy invasion, Operation Overlord. These plans were finalized and published just two days prior to the invasion and their implementation played a pivotal role in mitigating the suffering of displaced civilians across Europe. A key component of the plans included tailored guidance to account for disparate regional challenges—for example, one appendix focused on migration issues in France, while another addressed refugee contingencies in Belgium. Finally, the migration plans helped inform resource decisions, such as Allied trucks to transport food, supplies, and displaced persons and allocation of military personnel for construction, plumbing, sanitation, and security services for each refugee support center.\(^{35}\)

From 1944 through 1945, Allied planners were faced with the challenge of balancing limited means to address a growing number of wartime requirements.\(^{36}\) In one instance, Proudfoot explains, the Supreme Headquarters directed US Civil Affairs units in Italy to feed and to transport migrants on the battlefield, but the units did not have the authority to task the necessary logistical capabilities for their assigned mission. The planners corrected this problem through military-operated support centers across Europe that provided subsistence, lodging, sanitation, medical, educational, and security services for refugees and migrants. The headquarters also assigned combat support capabilities—such as personnel from civil affairs, military police, medical, and transportation units—to operate the centers.

When Germany surrendered in May 1945, Allied forces had provided humanitarian aid to over 2 million displaced civilians. By September of that same year, the number had grown to almost 7 million.\(^{37}\) Law Number 1, which established the principle of “non-discrimination on the grounds of race, creed nationality, or political opinion” likely contributed to the American’s successful refugee mission.\(^{38}\) Thus, the headquarters later facilitated training missions for the newly established United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to transfer the humanitarian mission from military to civilian control.\(^{39}\)

\(^{33}\) Proudfoot, *European Refugees*, 159.


Case Study 2: Bosnia

The problem of forced migration in Europe reemerged in the 1990s, after the European Commission recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992 and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992, and the United Nations and the European community failed to facilitate peace within the Republic of Yugoslavia. As the communist regime crumbled, ethnic fighting began among Muslim Bosnians, Serbian, and Croatian populations, who comprised 44 percent, 31 percent, and 17 percent of the population, respectively. Because of the violence, the United Nation’s peacekeeping forces in Bosnia were unable to provide humanitarian relief to thousands of displaced civilians. Between 1992 and 1995, an estimated 97,000 people were killed during the Balkan conflict and over 2.3 million civilians were driven from their homes. This disruption caused significant concern for NATO officials due to the negative impact on the security posture of member states in the region, and the US military responded once again.

US military leaders arrived late to the Bosnian conflict, mainly because senior military and political leaders viewed the situation as a European problem. Warren Zimmermann, former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, blamed America’s reluctance on the “Vietnam syndrome,” while General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned against committing forces in the Balkans without a clear political end state. However, heightened media attention on the escalating violence in Bosnia, coupled with the United Nations’ inability to stabilize the region, pressured Washington to accept a more prominent leadership role.

Once NATO agreed to the UN request for military assistance, US military leadership took center stage and provided much needed direction and motivation to enforce the terms of peace agreed to under the Dayton Accords. In November 1995, US General George A. Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander, visited the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ headquarters for a personal assessment of the humanitarian situation in Bosnia. He also directed NATO staff to develop detailed plans, including a time-phased repatriation effort, to best support peace objectives outlined by the United Nations Security Council. Finally, to show his commitment to the success of this operation, Joulwan proposed a collocated command group consisting of NATO and United Nations’ personnel.

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45 Robert F. Baumann, “From UNPROFOR to IFOR,” in *Armed Peacekeepers*, 38.
47 Woehrel, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*.
49 Ibid., 106–7.
50 Ibid.
As in World War II, US military planning played a critical role in supporting the problem of mass migration in Europe. Similar to Eisenhower’s planning team, Joulwan’s staff sprang into action within the Supreme Headquarters. These planners led the development of what would become Operation Joint Endeavor, and provided guidance to the NATO-led peacekeeping force that would enter Bosnia in December 1995 and transfer the mission to the European Union in 2004. Furthermore, US Army Europe and V Corps planners also played a significant role in developing a detailed campaign plan that included a large sustainment force capable of supporting the complexities of an international humanitarian effort under the terms of the Dayton Accords.

Resourcing US military forces in Bosnia became a point of contention within American domestic politics in the 1990s. Many leaders worried about becoming involved in a European affair with no vital US interests, while others warned of joining an effort that had no clear exit strategy. However, heightened media attention in the summer of 1995 caused US officials to act by employing military means to help stabilize Bosnia and provide much needed humanitarian relief to millions of displaced civilians.

By September 1995, US ground forces in Europe began training for peacekeeping operations, and by late December, American military units entered the war-torn region of Bosnia as part of a NATO-led peace Implementation Force. Resourcing this operation extended past American political projections, as US forces continued to deploy to Bosnia from December 1995 through 2004, until being replaced by forces from the European Union. For all the challenges surrounding logistical and security demands in the Balkans, US military resourcing proved to be a critical component of a holistic international response to the largest forced migration crisis in Europe since the end of World War II.

Case Study 3: Kosovo

In 1999, Europe witnessed yet another large-scale forced migration event. Like Bosnia, Kosovo’s migration crisis was a product of failed diplomatic talks between members of the international community and Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic. Most of the disagreements centered on the Yugoslavia’s response to Kosovar separatists. Fearing another Bosnia scenario, the international community quickly intervened to pressure Milosevic to accept a cease-fire agreement between the Serbs and Kosovars.

However, as reports of genocide reached the international community, the UN Security Council authorized a NATO air campaign against Serb military targets to begin in March 1999. Milosevic responded by forcing more than 800,000 Kosovars to flee their homes for the safety...
of bordering nations. The ensuing migration undermined the security posture of several bordering nations and placed enormous strain on allied resolve—for example, 100,000 refugees flowed into Macedonia, creating a domestic political crisis that required international intervention. Meanwhile, another 100,000 Kosovars fled to Albania and 27,000 to Montenegro. The international community would once again turn to the US military for much needed leadership, planning, and resourcing to help address the problem of forced migration in Europe.

US General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, answered the international community’s call for a leader who would provide the purpose, direction, and motivation necessary to address the growing crisis in Kosovo. Early in the conflict, Clark warned politicians in Washington that NATO bombings would become a race against time since Milosevic would likely increase violence against the Kosovars in response to NATO air strikes. Unfortunately, Clark did not communicate this warning to leaders within the United Nations, who were surprised by the tens of thousands of migrants who overwhelmed the small refugee camps located in Albania and Macedonia. This communication failure contrasted sharply with the partnership experienced during the Bosnia conflict, and seems odd given the repeated warnings by Milosevic concerning his political weapon of choice in Kosovo.

Although US military leaders miscalculated the size and scope of forced migration in Kosovo, they moved quickly with NATO allies to plan a detailed crisis response effort for the economic and political strain on flailing border states. Specifically, Supreme Headquarters planners faced several synchronization challenges that included late-arriving logistical requests from the United Nations, as well as accusations of encroachment into the oversight responsibilities of UN humanitarian officials. Simultaneously, military planners juggled several domestic political concerns within the affected border states—for example, the Macedonian government viewed Kosovar refugees as a security threat and officially opposed the NATO air campaign, which they believed caused a spike in migration activity.

In contrast, Albania was generally supportive of NATO military operations and openly received Kosovar refugees because of their shared ethnicity. Fortunately for the Alliance and the international community, Milosevic sued for peace within a matter of months, allowing military leaders to turn their attention to developing plans for a NATO-led peacekeeping force shaped by the previous campaign in neighboring Bosnia.

The US military played a pivotal role in the Alliance’s ability to resource a well-organized humanitarian operation, especially along

60 Ibid., 132.
61 Ibid., 154–55.
62 Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 144.
63 Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration, 151.
64 Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 145.
66 Ibid., 149–50 and 166–67.
67 Ogata, Turbulent Decade, 147–51.
68 Ibid., 146
69 Ibid., 143.
the Macedonian and Albanian borders. Sadako Ogata, the UN’s high commissioner for refugees, admitted that NATO forces provided a more efficient system of support to migrants than did her own organization.70 During this crisis, the Alliance’s leaders wisely chose to tap the enormous potential of military logistical capabilities that provided 4,600 tons of food and water, 2,600 tons of tents, and 1,600 tons of medical supplies to affected nations between March and June of 1999.71

Analysis of American Efforts

In each case study, US military leadership served as a pillar and catalyst for effectively addressing the migration crisis. Although Eisenhower, Joulwan, and Clark each faced disparate challenges, they recognized the destabilizing effects that refugees and migrants had on the security posture of the affected nation-states. All three military leaders served as the commander of allied forces in Europe, which provided the organizational structure and command authority necessary to oversee a multifaceted, international operation. Two of the three leaders seized the initiative by studying the impact of migration on security and stability operations and by directing planning teams to develop and coordinate a holistic, integrated response. However, different levels of success resulted from variations in leadership style and the authorities that each leader had in committing the necessary resources.

US military planning served as the second pillar for success, highlighting the importance of communicating the commander’s intent and synchronizing logistical requirements associated with the complex demands of mass migration. Each planning group factored a range of geographic and ethnic considerations into their analysis and dispersed limited resources across long lines of communication to achieve their stated objective. Of the three staffs, the planners during World War II arguably faced the most difficult task of fighting Axis powers in Europe while simultaneously providing humanitarian support for over 6 million refugees.

Nevertheless, each of the planning teams faced its own set of unique challenges—for example, the planners in 1995 operated under a severely compressed timeline for developing the right-sized peacekeeping force in Bosnia, while those in 1999 focused on hasty expansion of refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania. In 1945, planners developed training programs for UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration personnel to assume civilian control of the migrant crisis, while the military focused on enforcing security zones of separation between warring ethnic groups to set the conditions for UN aid to the Balkans. Ultimately, each planning staff succeeded in developing the flexible guidance necessary to communicate the commanders’ intent while synchronizing humanitarian relief for millions of displaced civilians.

US military resourcing, especially logistical resourcing, serves as the third pillar of success for addressing mass migration in Europe. All three case studies demonstrated a weakness in nonmilitary response efforts to cope adequately with the massive logistical requirements.

70 Ibid., 151.
Military planners’ recognition of resourcing mistakes made during operations in Italy greatly influenced Allied humanitarian efforts following Operation Overlord. Close coordination between the military leadership and members of the UN helped establish clear lines of responsibilities for distributing humanitarian aid within designated safe zones. And, the willingness of military planners to offset the logistical shortcomings of several humanitarian organizations in Kosovo helped stabilize the populace and allow for an orderly transition from military to civilian oversight.

Recommendations

Based upon a complex set of challenges surrounding Europe’s problem of mass migration, senior leaders should consider employing US military leadership, planning, and resourcing to strengthen the security posture of NATO. To this end, the US European Command publicly announced its intention to work with US interagency partners, while monitoring the refugee crisis. However, there has been little concrete progress on addressing the existing gaps in European response efforts, or in designing integrated civil-military contingency plans for a future spike in mass migration.

Military leaders must seize the initiative to strengthen the security posture of NATO. Recently, a senior US military leader explained that limited assets must be focused on the mission of deterring Russia, while the European Union addresses the migrant crisis. Although this is a reasonable position, considering the high-risk threat of a revanchist Russia, historical case studies highlight the value of employing US military capabilities to counter the destabilizing effects of forced migration. It is also worth considering that humanitarian and deterrence missions in Europe are not mutually exclusive, but rather interdependent and essential for achieving a strong and resilient NATO alliance. Metaphorically speaking, it is important to keep a sharp eye on the opponent’s queen during a chess match, but it may be the lowly pawn that creates a checkmate. The decision to apply US military means to the problem of mass migration is certainly a political one. However, developing options and contingency plans to address likely security threats is the role and responsibility of military leaders.

The US European Command should consider establishing a planning team focused on studying the problem of mass migration in Europe. Once established, this planning cell should develop a range of options in coordination with host nation officials, the United Nations, and other humanitarian organizations. Under most circumstances, the US military would not lead humanitarian relief operations, but bilateral or multilateral planning efforts could bridge the civil-military divide and enable government and nongovernment agencies to understand unique military capabilities. More importantly, these planning efforts increase the probability of saving lives while simultaneously stabilizing the security posture of several European allies. Multilateral planning is a low-cost, high-payoff activity which would increase understanding.


73 Interview with military leader, September 29, 2016.
and readiness without detracting from a necessary focus on more
conventional deterrence activities.

Putting plans into action requires resourcing, and there are several limited ways that the US European Command could approach this challenge now, which would establish a baseline for larger-scale contingency operations should the need arise. Congress already funds combatant commanders to perform humanitarian operations through the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid appropriation. The annual requests for such funding could include estimates for supporting mass migration contingencies. Planners could also leverage the capabilities of reserve forces through the use of Active Duty for Operational Support funding. This option would allow military leaders to keep active component units focused on deterring Russia, while simultaneously building individual and unit readiness in the reserve components through operational employment overseas. Finally, planners should consider including requests for specified capabilities as part of their annual integrated priority list to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the program objective memorandum.

The following recommendations for providing US military support to Turkey, Greece, and Italy are based on a net assessment of several gaps in existing capabilities. These recommendations should not be considered comprehensive, but rather serve as a starting point for further research, analysis, and bilateral and multilateral planning. It is worth noting that in February 2016, NATO sent a maritime group to patrol and report suspected migrant smuggling activity in the Aegean Sea as part of a security request for assistance from Turkey, Greece, and Germany. NATO forces also contributed maritime forces for Operation Sea Guardian in November 2016 to support the European Union’s antimigrant smuggling efforts in the central Mediterranean Sea. The following information highlights the value of providing additional support capability.

Turkey would likely benefit from targeted US military support to address issues of protection, health services, and infrastructure development in support of the 3.5 million refugees and migrants located within its borders. The US Army Corps of Engineers could, for example, help train Turkish military and civilian agencies in constructing temporary aid stations, schools, and sanitation facilities, using construction materials paid with funds from the existing agreement between the European Union and Turkey. In addition, US military physicians could provide technical training and support to help prevent the spread of communicable disease and treat the growing number of women and children with health-related issues. Once a resolution is established in Syria and Iraq, civil affairs experts could assist the Turkish government in developing repatriation plans for future implementation. Regardless

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75 Ibid.
76 US Army Europe, civil affairs operations officer, email message to author, December 8, 2016.
77 Ibid.
79 Cetingulec, “Refugee Influx.”
80 Trump, “Remarks by President.”
of the support package developed, US military planners should consider a range of options to help prevent Turkey from becoming an increasingly autocratic and unstable member of NATO.

Greece could benefit from US military training and assistance for improved security screening activities. In 2015, several terrorists entered Greece claiming to be migrants, but they later conducted deadly bombings in Paris and Brussels. Increased intelligence support and coordination could reduce the risk of future attacks against NATO member states. US military engineers could also assist with infrastructure development to improve hastily constructed holding areas that currently contain over 62,000 refugees. Targeted US military medical support could also help curb the spread of communicable disease in the region, while reducing the government’s reliance on the success or failure of the fragile agreement with Turkey.

Finally, although Italy has relatively stable economic and security positions in Europe, the Italian government could benefit from US military means. Training opportunities and support packages could include maritime rescue capabilities to reduce the staggering number of migrants lost at sea. Unmanned aerial reconnaissance support could assist Frontex efforts to develop appropriate security responses by identifying high-risk watercraft crossing the central Mediterranean and identifying suspected smuggling activities. The US military’s medical expertise in gynecology, obstetrics, and pediatrics could prove helpful to the more than 59,000 refugee women and children already located in Italy. Finally, civil affairs personnel could play a role in managing administrative functions and communication efforts within large refugee holding areas.

**Conclusion**

US political leaders should consider employing military leadership, planning, and resourcing to achieve the strategic objective of a strong and resilient security posture in NATO. Although the United States continues to assist allies and partners by providing billions of dollars in aid, there is no substitute for applying all of the elements of national power when dealing with the complex challenges of mass migration. Options for action or inaction include intersecting lines of risk within the larger question of European security. The case can be made that too much, or too little, involvement could interfere with long-term US interests; however, it seems prudent to develop options for senior leaders to consider as part of a comprehensive strategic assessment of the migrant challenge in Europe. In the end, the United States must do what it has always done in response to a crisis that involves its European allies—America must lead.
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ABSTRACT: This article explores the individual, situational, and system roles influencing the 2011 incident in which a small unit of US Marine scout snipers urinated on three Taliban corpses. Without absolving individual responsibility, the authors emphasize a strong command climate is the most important influence behind ethical and professional behavior.

In the waning days of 2011, the leaders of 3d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, could justifiably reflect with pride on the unit’s accomplishments during the past year. Tasked with a key role in the largest, most austere area of operations in northern Helmand province, the commanding officer instituted a comprehensive ethical warrior program into every aspect of operations and through each phase of training, combat operations, and post-deployment recovery.

During the seven-month deployment, 3/2 garnered high praise for its innovative tactics and for the exploits of its successful scout sniper platoon. The Commandant and the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps subsequently hosted a congratulatory breakfast for the scout sniper platoon. The battalion even garnered national attention and praise when actress Mila Kunis attended its post-deployment Marine Corps Birthday Ball in November 2011.

With the loss of six marines and one US Navy corpsman, the deployment had been challenging and difficult. But, the battalion had returned triumphantly with its honor clean. Little did it suspect, twelve days into the new year, a 39-second video clip posted on YouTube would forever transform the legacy of that deployment. The video showed four marines from the unit urinating on the bodies of a few Taliban fighters.

This article explores the professional and ethical dimensions of the four marines’ actions and focuses on why the event happened. The main objective is to understand whether this unit of marines fully grasped the ethical implications of its behavior.

We analyze the urination incident by adopting the ethical decision-making typology of outcomes developed by Ann Tenbrunsel and Kristin Smith-Crowe. Their typology “distinguishing between the process that produced the decision (moral or amoral decision-making) and the decision that resulted (ethical or unethical), produces four different outcomes—intended ethicality, unintended ethicality,
intended unethicality, and unintended unethicality.” Tenbrunsel and
Smith-Crowe explained “the moral decision-making that follows from
moral awareness can result in unethical decisions as well as ethical
ones; likewise, the amoral decision-making that follows from moral
unawareness can lead to ethical decisions as well as unethical ones.”
Thus, the incident potentially falls into the categories of intended
unethicality, and more likely, unintended unethicality.

Our research indicates the marines associated with the incident
accepted the behavior as normal: urinating on dead enemies was not a
desecration, or a war crime, but a strong victory statement made against
an extremely cruel enemy. In the moment, it is questionable whether the
marines clearly perceived the unethical dimension of what they were
doing. To the extent their behavior had become normal—a victory
statement—such behavior also became unintentional. Thus, it is very
likely the action occurred in a condition of ethical blindness. At least one
marine came to regret his action, which is consistent with a temporary
inability to see the ethical dimension of such behavior. Several marines,
however, showed no regrets for their roles, which leads to the belief
that they intentionally engaged in unethical behavior. It can be argued
their perceptions of the conditions in which they operated, no longer
filtered by a healthy command climate, removed ethical thinking from
their decision-making. Thus, their conduct would be consistent with
unintended unethicality.

To understand what led these experienced and high-performing
marines to engage in such unethical and unprofessional actions, we
explore three main elements significant to explaining human behavior.
First, we focus on the individual to understand whether these marines
exhibited or had different characteristics from other marines and,
therefore, might have been more inclined to engage in unethical behavior.
Second, on the situation to evaluate whether these marines operated
in an exceptional environment, which contributed to their unethical
behavior. Third, on the system, the organization they belonged to, to
evaluate whether it failed to promote ethical behavior and actually might
have encouraged unethical behavior. We posit the consequential element
of this system to be the command climate.

Unethical behavior is the result of several elements failing. Indeed,
a functioning and resilient system should be able to prevent unethical
behavior. Yet the following analysis provides strong evidence that the
command climate in which these marines operated over a number of
months had degraded to a dangerous level. This finding does not excuse
the behavior of the individual marines nor absolve them of responsibility
for their actions.

Our objective is to provide an opportunity to reflect on the role of
the command climate, or the system, to determine the behavior of unit
members and to ensure it is prepared for difficult challenges, particularly
in highly stressful situations such as combat. More important, this article
emphasizes the pivotal role commanders play in shaping command

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We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,” Academy of Management Annals 2, no. 1 (2008): 553,
doi:10.1080/19416520802211677.

3 Ibid., 554.
climate. Particular attention is given to the problematic phenomenon that well-meaning leaders might unintentionally create conditions leading to unethical behavior.

Outstanding Platoon

The marines of the sniper platoon were extremely experienced; several of them were tactically savvy and adaptable thinkers. Many had seen combat in its ugliest face. For those who had separated, their sense of brotherhood and service caused them to return to the Marine Corps and to volunteer for deployment. Marines have unique and special motivations and bonding that are often even stronger for a tight-knit unit such as the scout snipers.

The scout sniper platoon of 3/2 was shaped mostly by its platoon leader, Staff Sergeant Joseph W. Chamblin. Chamblin joined the platoon in late summer 2010 believing he would be the platoon sergeant. He had been a marine for 15 years, 10 of which as a sniper. He had deployed on missions abroad several times and already had seen combat in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result of the battalion struggling to fill all of the officer billets while preparing for the deployment to Afghanistan, and likely because the commanding officer wanted an experienced sniper in charge of the platoon rather than a young junior officer, Chamblin was selected to take command of the platoon.

The immediate challenge was to prepare the platoon for the deployment to Afghanistan. Chamblin remembered: “Unfortunately, the starting point wasn’t good. The Platoon’s reputation wasn’t stellar in the Battalion or the sniper community. When I arrived, the platoon had fourteen men and only one school trained scout/sniper or HOG [Hunter of Gunmen].”

A few years earlier, while a scout sniper instructor in Quantico, Virginia, Chamblin had plenty of opportunities to meet, train, and develop many experienced, outstanding, and committed marines. In his new role as platoon commander, Chamblin asked some of them to join the platoon. Sergeant Robert W. Richards—a marine since 2007 who had completed a tour of duty in Garmsir, Afghanistan, with 1/6—accepted. Other marines respected Richards, and he understood the most effective way to employ snipers. During the battle of Marjah (Operation Moshtarak) in February 2010, Richards was seriously wounded by an improvised explosive device (IED). His psychological wounds matched his physical wounds; he qualified for 100 percent disability. Yet Richards recovered from the physical wounds and coped with the psychological ones. Once removed from limited duty status, he returned to the Marines. Initially Richards was supposed to mentor the less experienced snipers. Yet, the more time he spent with the scout sniper platoon, the clearer it became in his mind that he needed, but also wanted, to deploy with them. He became the leader of Team 4.

5 Ibid., 113.
By the fall of 2010, the platoon had gone through intensive training. Out of the 39 marines and 2 sailors, “twenty-three of the Marines were school trained HOGs, and the others were hand selected, exceptional infantrymen.” In addition to completing tactical training, all 3/2 units were directed to incorporate ethics instruction in every aspect of training, and to conduct two hours of focused ethical instruction every week. Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Christopher G. Dixon, a veteran of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, understood the demanding uncertainties of a dispersed, counterinsurgency environment. In his view, the mission required the marines of 3/2 to be ethical warriors, “to show restraint in the use of force and sometimes accept tactical risk, in order to protect the people and to support our strategic goals.”

The battalion’s ethical warrior program sought “to develop high-performing individuals and small units who are morally, psychologically, and emotionally resilient in order to operate, live and thrive on an austere battlefield defined by fog, friction and severe stress.” Small unit discussions and ethical decision games were conducted. An ethical warrior reading list was posted to the battalion’s shared drive. The program continued during combat operations in Afghanistan. Significantly, prior to and following each mission, small-team leaders were to address and debrief potential or encountered ethical dilemmas, making the “harder-right” a matter of “muscle-memory.” Finally, the program helped post-deployment marines develop resilience and minimize post-traumatic stress. The marines of 3/2 probably completed more ethics training than other units who had deployed to either Afghanistan or Iraq. Moreover, the ethics training concept, which focused on small group discussions led by leaders in the platoon and in smaller units, was sound.

Early in 2011, the battalion relieved 1/8, in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, a widely-recognized Taliban stronghold. Historically, bloody fighting between the International Security Assistance Force troops and the Taliban occurred in Helmand. Despite the great commitment of resources and lives, the province remained very unstable and volatile. The Musa Qala and Now Zad districts, where the battalion was deployed, were particularly dangerous, hotly contested areas. Chamblin deployed one sniper team to Now Zad, nicknamed Apocalypse Now Zad, and the rest of the platoon to Musa Qala.

The marine snipers proved to be extremely effective from the start, killing a significant number of Taliban. The enemy called them “ghosts” as they were able to hit hard and remain unseen. The most innovative tactic adopted by the snipers put them in a leading role with the support of a tank unit. In a few months the snipers’ accomplishments were known and acknowledged beyond the battalion. Three months into the

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7 Chamblin, 116.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
12 Chamblin, 130.
deployment, the platoon had more than 70 confirmed kills. Chamblin wrote, “the command couldn’t have been more pleased with our work and results.”

Major General John A. Toolan, the commanding officer of II Marine Expeditionary Force and the commander of Regional Command Southwest in Afghanistan, did not miss the excellent performance of the tanks and snipers that resulted in 50 kills in 10 days, noting the likelihood of individuals with “upwards of 100 kills.” Toolan even visited with the platoon to congratulate them on their successes.

Towards the end of the deployment, while the marines of the scout sniper platoon were waiting to return to the United States, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps General James F. Amos—who was on a visit to Afghanistan with Sergeant Major Micheal P. Barrett, the sergeant major of the Marine Corps—decided to have breakfast with the platoon. The platoon’s achievement had been acknowledged by many at different levels, but to have the Commandant do so in person was extremely flattering. The snipers received challenge coins from the Commandant and words of praise. Chamblin wrote, the Commandant and the Sergeant Major “specifically requested to sit down with my platoon. . . . walked around, talked to [platoon members], congratulated them. . . . shook everyone’s hand, gave them a coin and told them they had done a great job. It meant a lot.”

“Piss on these assholes.”

The urination incident took place less than five months after the scout sniper platoon had deployed to Afghanistan. They had become extremely experienced in the region and had acquired a solid understanding of the enemy and its activities. Over several weeks of monitoring an area near the small village of Sandalah, where the Taliban presence was heavy and their activity particularly intense, the platoon identified several valuable targets; they focused on a Taliban command cell.

Seventeen marines, mainly from Team 4, left Patrol Base (PB) 7171 in the early hours of July 27, 2011, to take position close to the village. Pushing into a territory the battalion rarely had ventured in before, the patrol covered a few miles while avoiding IEDs and several Taliban observation points. They arrived in place at five o’clock in the morning. A little after seven, the scout snipers engaged the enemy, killing twelve and suffering no casualties. Then they received the order from their command to retrieve a few of the closest Taliban bodies. Chamblin strongly opposed the request, which he considered to be “completely unfitting for a sniper mission.” Yet as the fight subsided, the snipers

13 Ibid., 143.
14 Ibid.
17 Chamblin, 182–84; and Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Command Investigation into the Alleged Desecration of Corpses by U.S. Marines in Afghanistan (Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 2012), 26–28.
18 Chamblin, 188.
sent two Afghans with a wheelbarrow to transport the bodies to a temporary compound.

Standing there in a brief silence, knowing the men laying dead [at] our feet were responsible for inflicting pain and misery on our fellow Marines, I felt a surge of anger deep in my bones. They had taken the life of a man whom I considered a brother. They’d also gathered his mutilated body parts and hung them in a tree for us to find. I stood burning inside. Someone jokingly said, “Piss on these assholes!” The joke died almost instantly, and we couldn’t help ourselves. Hell, urinating on them still showed more respect for their dead than they showed of ours.19

### Intention of the Individual

When watching the infamous short video of the incident, the marines appear as if they did what they intended to do. Whether they truly understood the nature of their actions, however, is unclear. Considering their experience and training, they should have known their behavior was unethical and unprofessional. Their conduct, therefore, might be considered intended unethicality. Yet, analysis reveals the possibility that, when they decided to urinate on the dead enemies, the marines’ ability to see the ethical dimension of the action was significantly compromised or, more likely, completely absent. They were ethically blind.

During his court martial, Staff Sergeant Edward W. Deptola, the platoon sergeant, expressed regret for not stopping the other marines from urinating on the enemy bodies. Deptola said, “I was in a position to stop it and I did not. . . . I should have spoken up on the spot.”20 When Lieutenant Colonel Nicole Hudspeth, the judge advocate, questioned Deptola’s motive, he said: “I have no excuse, no reason, ma’am . . . it was not the correct way to handle a human casualty.”21 It is unclear whether Deptola regretted not intervening during the incident or condoning the marines’ behavior. Yet, Chamblin wrote, “Later, when asked why we did it, Dep [Deptola] said it best. ‘Killing these assholes was not enough’.”22

Neither Chamblin nor Richards showed remorse for the incident. But, what they said helps us understand their behavior. In their minds, urinating on dead enemies did not constitute desecration, or a war crime, rather it was a strong victory statement. They had vanquished a brutal enemy. Chamblin explained,

> I didn’t see anything wrong with it. I would do it again. It wasn’t like we had some random Afghans laying there. They were insurgents, they had weapons and they were trying to kill us. The same guys were making IEDs and trying to kill Marines. If they could get over here, they would cut off the heads of everybody in this room right now. That’s how they are. And you know what? I won that day. They didn’t.23

At least two factors that influenced the behavior of this small team are revealed by the events surrounding the incident. For the first time into the deployment, they had been asked to bring corpses to the battalion command post. Such a task is unusual for a sniper unit; indeed,
Chamblin unsuccessfully pushed back on his chain of command. Yet, the command’s request put them in close contact with the enemy bodies.

After the incident and before leaving the area, the unit had two locals load the dead enemies on top of a tank. Despite the fact that body bags, required by regulations, should have been available, they were not used. According to Chamblin, once all the equipment was loaded and the dead bodies were placed on the tank, they decided to ride back to the base on the tank. It became a victory parade that Chamblin remembered proudly.

Displaying the dead insurgents atop the tanks sent a strong message to the enemy and the locals. We were the lions, the victors. Riding on top of the tanks, despite the stench of stinking bodies, felt great, how the Mongols must have felt riding their horses after a hard fought battle. . . . We were welcomed back to the Battalion Command post like conquering heroes.24

A growing body of research into ethical behavior and decision-making, clearly indicates that individuals confronted with ethical choices have a tendency to behave in a significantly less rational way than expected, or not rationally at all.25 Often their decisions are in direct conflict with their values and their training.26 Looking at decisions and behaviors from outside a situation, others easily and clearly see the ethical dimension and implications; yet such clarity for those immersed in the situation might be compromised.

Guido Palazzo noted “(un)ethical decision making is less rational and deliberate but more intuitive and automatic. As a consequence, the ethical dimension of a decision is not necessarily visible to the decision maker. People may behave unethically without being aware of it—they may even be convinced that they are doing the right thing.”27 Thus, when an individual becomes unable to see the ethical dimension of the decision-making process, a state of ethical blindness develops.

Shaped by combat, servicemembers might tend to act upon unit-defined, socially-approved behaviors.28 Taking place over several months, a process of ethical fading likely was encouraged, unintentionally although irresponsibly, by the more senior leaders of the organization, who were distracted by the excellent outcomes of the scout sniper platoon. In the deployment workups, battalion leaders already noted an independent spirit as the sniper platoon failed to observe the standards of the other marines. A few months into the deployment, battalion leaders could see the snipers’ behavior was departing from the Marine Corps’s sound ethical and professional standards. Captain Rudyard S. Olmstead, Kilo Company’s commander, noted the scout sniper platoon displayed a poor level of discipline in the way they wore the uniform, and when superiors addressed the issue, the scout snipers simply disregarded it. Olmstead

24 Chamblin, 192–93.
explained, “we ultimately kind of gave up and said, ‘Well, they’re doing
great stuff outside the wire.’”

**Impact of the Situation**

To understand an individual’s unethical behavior, it is important
to explore where the behavior took place, the situation in which the
conduct occurred, and how the individual perceived and constructed
the situation as an individual and within a group. The situation can be
very powerful and have great influence on individual behavior. Palazzo
explained “some situations are so powerful that they elicit a specific
behavior in many people, independently of intentions, level of moral
developments, values or reasoning.” Indeed, leaders should always
consider how the environment in which they operate could trigger
unethical behavior without their intention.

Philip Zimbardo, a social psychologist who has undertaken
ground-breaking studies on the impact the situation has on individuals,
stressed the key to understanding unethical behavior is not to consider
immediately the individuals responsible as bad apples, which is a clearly
biased approach. Often they might well be “good apples” operating in a
powerful, very dangerous, highly stressful, “bad barrel.” In a situation
permeated by strong, powerful forces, it is possible for individuals to
lose their ability to see the difference between right and wrong and the
application of such judgments.

The scout sniper platoon deployed and operated in a situation of
great physical and psychological stress. The loss of several marines who
were part of, or close to someone within, the very tight-knit sniper
organization made an already demanding situation significantly worse.
On June 3, Sergeant Mark Bradley, the assistant team leader for Team
2, was fatally injured by an IED. Corporal Steven Bradley, a sniper
with Team 4, escorted his brother to Bethesda, where Mark died on
June 16. On June 11, Lance Corporal Aaron Hill, a sniper with Team 3,
accompanied the body of his brother—Lance Corporal Jason Hill, 3/4,
who was killed by small arms fire just a few miles from where the scout
sniper platoon was operating—back to the United States.

**Role of Command Climate**

The behavior of the marines on July 27 can only partially be
explained as dispositional, situational, or a combination of both. The
individual marines responsible for urinating on the dead enemies were
distinguished servicemembers who had performed extremely well in
previous deployments and had demonstrated their proficiency. Several
US Marine units had deployed in similar or even worse environments,
suffered a higher number of casualties and inflicted major blows on the
Taliban over a number of years. Yet, marines in these situations did not
engage in unethical or unprofessional behavior. Therefore, to understand

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30 Palazzo, 329.
31 Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 20.
why this small unit behaved in such an unethical and unprofessional manner, the role of the system—the command climate—in failing to discourage the behavior must be considered.  

According to Zimbardo, “systems matter the most” because they “provide the institutional support, authority, and resources that allow situations to operate as they do.” Zimbardo emphasized the negative side of systems, yet when inspired and regulated by ethical and professionally sound principles, systems play an important role in preventing members of an organization operating in a stressful powerful situation to engage in unethical behavior. Moreover, leaders—whose responsibility, and commitment, is to make sure that systems are inspired by “norms, morals, and ethics”—might unintentionally become victims of a powerful situation. As a result they might compromise their ability to “regulate/control and shape” the system to be as effective as possible at interacting with the situation while providing strong motivations and clear guidance for individuals to behave ethically and professionally.

While conducting the Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo even fell victim to this dangerous dynamic. The fictitious prison system he devised included his leadership role as the warden; however, the organization degraded from the first night shift. Hazing, initiated by a group of student-guards on a group of student-inmates, escalated in a matter of days.

Zimbardo acknowledged the student-inmates were quickly subjected to forms of punishment that made them suffer, which was unacceptable and unethical for a scientific experiment. Yet, he failed to see how quickly the ethical dimension of the experiment was degrading. Zimbardo was so absorbed by the experiment and the progression of behavior that he lost the ability to recognize the unethical and unprofessional conditions for both the student-guards and student-inmates. His ability to provide the system with positive inputs was compromised as he became distracted by the “encouraging” results of the experiment.

If Zimbardo and his team continued to focus on the amazing and unexpected evolution of human behavior, it is very unlikely that they would have stopped the experiment. Even when prison inmate 8612 had a nervous breakdown, when “things begin to turn sexual” during the fourth day, and when a student-inmate broke down every night thereafter, Zimbardo failed to comprehend the experiment was out of control. Dr. Craig W. Haney, a researcher who participated in the experiment, remembers the breakdowns “were scary to see, were upsetting to us, they were unexpected, they were very clearly the real thing...we had not built in time to step back and to look at what was happening...We were caught up in the events that were taking place.”

Despite indications that the experiment was corrupted by major unethical behavior that impacted the student-inmates, and despite

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33 On page 234 of “Ethical Fading,” Tenbrunsel and Messick stress “one set of variables that leads to unethical behavior are the environmental or contextual cues that exist in an organization. Organizations should thus identify the structural, institutional, and systematic factors that promote unethical behavior.”

34 Zimbardo, 226.


36 Ibid.
the fact that Zimbardo and his team should have known that such behavior was unacceptable for a scientific experiment, they carried on. Arguably this was a case of unintended unethicality. The experiment likely would have continued for the planned two-week period, possibly with terrible, yet unintended consequences if Christina Maslach, an assistant professor of psychology at University of California Berkeley and romantic acquaintance of Zimbardo, had not visited the “Stanford Prison” five days into the study. Arguably this was a case of unintended unethicality. The experiment likely would have continued for the planned two-week period, possibly with terrible, yet unintended consequences if Christina Maslach, an assistant professor of psychology at University of California Berkeley and romantic acquaintance of Zimbardo, had not visited the “Stanford Prison” five days into the study. She was shocked by the “madhouse,” but even more surprised that “Phil seemed to be so different from the man [she] thought [she] knew, someone who loves students and cares for them in ways that were already legendary at the university. He was not the same man that [she] had come to love.”

Zimbardo the experimenter successfully created a situation in which role-playing students behaved in ways that stimulated his scientific interest and validated several of his assumptions. Zimbardo the warden failed to regulate the system to prevent degradation. His main focus was on the experiment—his mission—which distracted him from his responsibility to protect the mental and physical wellbeing of the students. Zimbardo had fallen into the leader’s trap, and Maslach came to his rescue. After a tense argument, Zimbardo—alerted to the fact that he had become a victim of his own experiment—decided to call it off.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Doty and Major Joe Gelineau stressed the role played by command climate in preventing or encouraging unethical behavior: “Historically, there are examples of questionable command climates resulting in behaviors that are not in tune with our professional military ethic or a result of character-based leadership.” According to a previous field manual, Army Leadership, “an organization’s climate is the way its members feel about their organization. Climate comes from people’s shared perceptions and attitudes, what they believe about the day-to-day functioning of their outfit. These things have a great impact on their motivation and the trust they feel for their team and their leaders.” The role leaders play in shaping and maintaining a healthy command climate is pivotal: “The members’ collective sense of the organization—its organizational climate—is directly attributable to the leader’s values, skills, and actions. As an Army leader, you establish the climate of your organization, no matter how small it is or how large.” Doty and Gelineau rightly noted

Command climate is set at the battalion level. Although brigade-and-above commanders will establish a command climate, it is at the battalion level where the most profound and effective influence occurs. Battalion-level commanders . . . most closely “touch” and influence soldiers’ attitudes and behaviors. Counterinsurgency operations, which are often decentralized at company- and platoon-level operations, highlight the importance of battalion commanders establishing and enforcing—by their presence (“leadership by walking around”)—a moral/ethical command climate.

38 Ibid., 216–17.
41 Ibid.
Company commanders and platoon leaders are at the execution level of the battalion commander’s command climate. . . . Most importantly, if a battalion level commander does not set and enforce a command climate, subclimates will be established by leaders in the unit [emphasis by the author]. Subordinate leaders within the unit with referent and expert power (charisma) will establish subcultures that may or may not be what the unit commander desires. Setting a moral/ethical command climate must be an intentional process by commanders and is a requirement to maintain the moral high ground in this era of persistent conflict.\footnote{Ibid., 24.}

The initiatives taken by 3/2’s commanding officer before the deployment, and in particular the design and implementation of the ethics training program focused on the professional and moral actions of small unit leaders, indicated a strong commitment to a healthy command climate. Yet after the battalion deployed to Afghanistan, the overall strength of the command climate eroded, probably unintentionally and over a number of months. The \textit{Command Investigation into the Alleged Desecration of Corpses by U.S. Marines in Afghanistan} noted a “high turnover rate in the chain of command. Turnover of key leadership billets within Kilo Company, immediately before and during deployment in Afghanistan, contributed to an environment where necessary discipline standards were lacking. Team 4, Scout Sniper Platoon 3/2 operated from PB 7171, considered to be the base with the worst discipline standard in [Regimental Combat Team]-8’s area of operations.”\footnote{MCCDC, \textit{Command Investigation}, 53–54.} The investigation also noted Kilo Company discipline issues ranged from the state of police to accountability. Specifically, PB 7171 was found to have: (1) marines not wearing [personal protective equipment], in dirty uniforms, without haircuts, and not shaving; (2) unsanitary conditions and ammunition on the deck; (3) insufficient patrol orders being issued, fighting positions without range cards or identified primary directions of fire, and marines not conducting appropriate drills and inspections.\footnote{Ibid., 24}

These concerns were brought to the attention of the 3/2 leadership while division and marine expeditionary force leaders praised body counts, open roads, and increased market activity to validate the success of the surge. The tactical success gave the command a sense that everything was under control. Yet, General John F. Kelly stressed that 3/2 was “loose in the way it did business” and “a lot of people doing great things but general confusion in how people were organized for combat.”\footnote{“Marine 4-Star.”}

\textbf{Consequences of a Slippery Slope}

Often, ethical and professional blunders such as the urination incident are viewed and treated as isolated events. Indeed, at this time there is no known evidence of similar behavior from other Marine units who deployed in Afghanistan. All of those units fought a tough enemy while displaying honorable behavior. Yet, the urination incident, although specific to the unit, is not isolated: it belongs to a broader context.
For the scout sniper platoon, it is quite clear that many indicators of a healthy system—the unit culture, discipline, obedience, and cohesion of the command climate—were compromised. It also appears that the frame—the filter through which the scout snipers perceived their situation—had become particularly rigid. They had moved into an “us-them” frame, in which “us” were only the members of the platoon and “them” were not only the enemy but also fellow marines who did not approve of the snipers’ conduct. In his book, Chamblin often was less than pleased, and at times very frustrated, with anyone who tried to address the scout sniper discipline issues and who disapproved of their behavior.46

Thus, under a rigid frame and a deteriorated unit subclimate, urinating on the dead enemy bodies likely revealed more about the overall state of the platoon rather than a momentary lapse of judgment (for which many of the involved marines have yet to show any sign of remorse). The incident indicated the unit’s command climate had reached a dangerous level and worse behavior might have been very likely. The unit’s constant transgressions and breach in discipline were not properly addressed and were ultimately tolerated by the chain of command. Though likely unintentional, this dynamic created a dangerous slippery slope.

For a number of reasons, leaders might not enforce a unit’s standards. Leaders might want to give their subordinates a break, they might not want to be perceived as too tough, and perhaps, they might even sympathize with perceptions of micromanagement. Such approaches hide dangerous dynamics and make it difficult to see more serious unit infractions.

Lieutenant General William R. Peers, the senior Army officer who investigated the My Lai incident, provided much wisdom and enlightening reflections on the role leaders play in preventing war crimes, which retain great validity today. Some of Peer’s leadership requirements for a counterinsurgency environment, include:

A commander must be constantly alert to changes in the attitude and temperament of his men and the units to which they belong. Ground combat in a counterinsurgency environment may develop frustration and bitterness which manifest themselves in acts quite apart from that which would normally be expected. Accordingly, commanders must be quick to spot such changes and to take appropriate corrective action.47

Bazerman and Tenbrunsel emphasized “if we find minor infractions acceptable, research suggests, we are likely to accept increasingly major infractions as long as each violation is only incrementally more serious than the preceding one.”48 Kelly clearly identified such an issue: “It’s a slippery slope to urinating on corpses, to raping women, to murdering kids.”49 This analysis is a strong professional reminder of how dangerous

46 In the final pages of his book, Chamblin wrote that after the incident had been revealed “the only group of people that stood by my men and me, was our fellow scout/snipers, a Brotherhood of shared pain. These men went out of their way to help and defend us, with one exception, Sergeant Major Michael [sic] Barrett, then Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps. Sergeant Major Barrett was a former Scout/Sniper Instructor and as it turns out, Uncle Tom extraordinaire! What a piece of shit” (212).
49 “Marine 4-Star.”
and costly tolerating behavior that gradually departs from accepted standards can be. If the unit deployment had been longer than seven months, it is possible the marines would not have engaged in the type of war crimes Kelly mentioned. Yet it is also true that the unit would have been more inclined to engage in such behaviors than other units with a strong command climate.

Conclusions

The urination incident is an extremely insightful case that provides valuable understanding on why members of an organization might engage in unethical and unprofessional behavior and the pivotal role that the command climate plays in determining such a behavior.

Before the deployment to Afghanistan, the marines of the 3/2 scout sniper platoon certainly would have been considered above average, but more likely outstanding. They had the experience, the time-in-service, the commitment, and the desire to serve that are typical of solid marines. The situation into which the unit deployed was extremely powerful, yet it was no different from the situation in which thousands of other marines operated ethically and professionally.

Notably, the battalion commander was genuinely committed to preparing his marines for the difficult ethical challenges of a counterinsurgency environment. He wanted his marines to be able to make sound ethical choices while operating among civilians. In many respects, Dixon was an innovative thinker who invested a significant amount of time in ethics instruction when other commanders would have valued other areas of tactical training.

Yet, despite the best of intentions, 3/2’s leaders became distracted by the achievements of the scout sniper platoon as they became associated with the overall success of the battalion. This mindset probably detracted from the necessity of enforcing and maintaining sound marine standards with the scout sniper platoon.

Commanders might find reprimanding a supporting unit or organization uncomfortable, and to a certain extent challenging, especially when such a unit is instrumental to the success of the larger organization. Leaders might become inclined to condone and accept minor infractions of the standard, which are mistakenly perceived as harmless, for fear of compromising the enthusiasm of a successful unit. The danger is for leaders to compliment immediate, visible, positive results that enable the success of the entire organization while underestimating the long-term, latent, negative consequences of unethical and unprofessional behavior within supporting units. Allowing the command climate to depart gradually from institutional standards can incite a dangerous process whose outcome is the slippery slope. As then-Commandant of the Marine Corps General James F. Amos wrote: “There is a disturbingly frequent correlation between Marines who act poorly and units with poor climate.”

Our analysis of the 3/2 scout sniper platoon indicates the command climate plays an important, if not the most important, role in preventing unethical and unprofessional behavior. The command climate is like

50 General James Amos, white letter, “Command Climate,” May 9, 2013, Washington, DC.
a double-edged sword: it has the potential to discourage and prevent unethical and unprofessional behavior, or indeed, it might encourage unethical and unprofessional behavior. Clearly, there might be cases in which units with a strong command climate might experience members engaging in unethical and unprofessional behavior; conversely, units with a weak or degraded command climate might experience a difficult deployment without instances of inappropriate behavior.

What should be acknowledged, however, is that units with a resilient command climate will be better prepared to deal with stressful deployments and situations while also being significantly less likely to have members of the organization engaging in unethical behavior. The command climate serves as a filter between the situation and the individual and is regulated by organizational leaders; the more effective the filter is, the better the behavior of the individuals.

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WAR AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION

Third-Force Influences: Hollywood’s War Films

John Chapin, Marissa Mendoza-Burcham, and Mari Pierce

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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the role of movie images in influencing the public’s perceptions of servicemembers. The implications of these findings are relevant to policymakers responsible for balancing servicemembers’ needs with public perceptions.

Due to its role during America’s long wars and its effect on perceptions of US military prestige, the entertainment media can be considered one of the third forces—“organizations that can influence the outcome of armed combat.” 1 This article explains the ability of combat films to influence civilian and military perceptions of servicemembers and veterans. By understanding Hollywood’s depictions of servicemembers in combat and veterans at home, military leaders can respond better to media-influenced perceptions of military institutions and the people who provide our nation’s defense.

The film American Sniper, based on the autobiography of Chris Kyle, a veteran US Navy Seal sniper with 160 officially confirmed kills during four tours in the Iraq War, serves as a fulcrum for this article.2 Although the book and film were criticized for inaccuracies, the film was nominated for several Academy Awards, and Kyle’s murder by Eddie Ray Routh accelerated the notoriety of both productions. The mutually generated interest in the film and the trial presented a unique opportunity to study not only civilian perceptions of servicemembers portrayed in Hollywood movies but also the potential impact on jurors’ perceptions of “Routh,” a former Marine with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) who was depicted in the film prior to the trial.3

Hollywood’s War Films

The Oxford Dictionary of Film Studies defines a combat film as one that features “scenes of combat that are dramatically central and that determine the fate of the film’s principal characters.” 4 Such films may include home-front dramas, veterans’ stories, service comedies, basic training films, spy films, prisoner-of-war movies, and partisan films. While the American Civil War and international conflicts may be included,

2 Jason Hall, Chris Kyle, Scott McEwen, and Jim DeFelice, American Sniper, directed by Clint Eastwood (Warner Brothers, 2014).
3 A defense of not guilty by reason of insanity was mounted based on the defendant’s PTSD. The Texas jury found Routh guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. See Mike Spies, “Inside the Tortured Mind of Eddie Ray Routh, the Man Who Killed American Sniper Chris Kyle,” Newsweek, November 23, 2015.
the genre is usually associated with representations of twentieth-century wars. Edison Company films of the Spanish-American War are said to be the first war films. *Wings* (1927), a World War I film named Best Picture at the first Academy Awards ceremony in 1928, is an early example of an antiwar movie. America's Office of War Information exercised a great deal of control over scripts during World War II, resulting in prowar propaganda films that came to characterize the combat genre.

Despite some cynical Vietnam-era films in the 1960s and 1970s, such as *The Deer Hunter* and *Apocalypse Now*, the pro-American, prowar conventions established during World War II largely remain. Films such as *First Blood* and subsequent titles in the Rambo series provided audiences with a revisionist version of Vietnam. Contemporary films—such as *The Hurt Locker*, *American Sniper*, and *Brothers*—shift the focus from the squad or platoon perspective of World War II combat films to the impact of the Iraq War on the individual soldier, both during the war and upon returning home.

*Saving Private Ryan* and *The Thin Red Line* ushered in the current era of the genre, in which advancements in digital cinematography and computer graphics technology offer audiences increasingly dramatic and violent images of combat. The films use visual realism to disguise heightened moral assertions: should soldiers be proud or devastated about killing the enemy? Some critics assert films like *Saving Private Ryan* and *Black Hawk Down* are based on contrived plots, relying on combat sequences more like those from action movies, rather than realistic depictions of twenty-first century combat. Unlike combat films of the 1980s—such as *Platoon* and *Hamburger Hill*, which were lauded for their realism—contemporary films set in Afghanistan and Iraq are more entertainment than history. The visual style of the new Hollywood combat film presents a realistic and graphic image of combat, but does not present a true story. Such films appear to be founded in realism, while actually reinforcing common myths of heroism and war.

A 2011 book about contemporary war films argues these realistic looking fictions offer audiences a cast of ordinary folks they can relate to in extraordinary circumstances. Frequently, soldiers are depicted as

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8 Mark Boal, *The Hurt Locker*, directed by Kathryn Bigelow (Voltage Pictures et al., 2008); and David Benioff, Susanne Bier, and Anders Thomas Jensen, *Brothers*, directed by Jim Sheridan (Lionsgate et al., 2009).


10 Mark Bowden and Ken Nolan, *Black Hawk Down*, directed by Ridley Scott (Revolution Studios, Jerry Bruckheimer Films, and Scott Free Productions, 2001); and Gates, “Fighting the Good Fight.”


12 Gates, “Fighting the Good Fight.”
War and Social Perception

Chapin, Mendoza-Burcham, and Pierce 81

uneducated grunts, not always clear on why they are fighting, but fighting for survival and from a sense of patriotism. This article explores the relationship between servicemembers’ perceptions of the realism of combat films, civilians’ perceptions of the same, and the impact of those perceptions on real servicemembers. This is known as the phenomenon of third-person perception.

**Third-Person Perception**

In lay terms, third-person perception (TPP) is the belief that media messages influence others more than oneself. The concept was introduced more than 30 years ago regarding a service unit consisting of mostly African American troops and white officers on Iwo Jima island. The Japanese dropped propaganda leaflets over the island encouraging the “colored soldiers” to stop risking their lives for the white men. Despite no evidence that the leaflets had an impact on their intended audience, the troops were withdrawn. The example was interpreted to illustrate how people act on their perceptions of media influence rather than on reality. Dozens of studies have documented the phenomenon across a variety of contexts. Some contexts, such as press coverage, advertising, and pornography have received a great deal of attention. Given the origins of the theory, it is surprising to note there have been no published studies on TPP regarding contemporary warfare until this exploration.

While no previous studies of TPP regard depictions of servicemembers, a few studies have focused on film. In 2006, a small study of college students found reverse TPP, or first-person perception, regarding the documentary *An Inconvenient Truth*. Participants believed they were more likely than their peers to be influenced by the film. First-person perception was related to the willingness to promote the film and to make personal changes toward a more sustainable lifestyle. These behavioral effects and attitudinal changes are referred to in the literature as third-person effects, which are important when documenting TPP because people act on their perceptions. First-person perception tends to emerge when participants believe it is good to be influenced; TPP emerges when media influence is perceived to be bad. A study of adults in Singapore, for instance, found participants believed they were less influenced than others by films with homosexual content. An earlier study of college students documented TPP regarding alcohol

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15 Baker, *Toxic Genre*.
content in films. While the TPP literature on film remains small, a larger body of literature on television consistently documents similar findings. Participants believe others are more influenced by television content unless that content is perceived to be positive.

Analysis and Findings

After the release of *American Sniper* and during jury selection for Routh's trial, this study examined servicemembers' perceptions of how Hollywood films depict servicemembers and veterans and how those depictions shape civilian perceptions and attitudes. Participants were recruited through email listservs and social media. Two large mid-Atlantic universities shared a link to an online survey with veterans and students currently serving in the military. Veterans of Foreign War posts in the same regions were also asked to share the link. Participants were asked to complete the survey and share the link with colleagues who have any type of military service. A smaller control group of civilians was collected in a similar way from the same universities.

Demographics

Servicemembers participating in the study were 23 to 76 years old with a mean age of 36.2 years; civilians, 23 to 56 years old with a mean age of 27.4 years. Seventy-seven percent of servicemembers and sixty-five percent of civilians participating in the study were male. The majority racial groups of both types of participants was similar: whites comprised 84 percent of servicemembers and 87 percent of civilians; blacks 5 percent for both groups. Hispanics (5 percent) and Asians (2 percent), however, only participated in the servicemember group. Four percent of servicemember participants and 8 percent of civilian participants identified as mixed or other racial backgrounds.

Military Experience

Servicemembers gained their experience over 1 to 30 years, with 10.2 years being the group's mean length of service. Veterans' end of service dates ranged from 1978 to 2015, with a mean of 2009. Forty-eight percent of servicemembers experienced as many as nine combat deployments lasting up to 50 months—an average of 1.6 deployments lasting 14.7 months. Servicemembers participating in the study attained the following ranks: officer (25.6 percent), warrant officer (3.6 percent), and enlisted (69.6 percent). Sixty-two percent of servicemembers served on active duty and fourteen percent in reserve components. Individuals affiliated with the US Air Force comprised 35.7 percent of the servicemember group; Army, 30.4 percent; Navy, 3.6 percent; Marine Corps 21.4 percent; Coast Guard 0 percent; and National Guard 7.9 percent.

Method

Researchers asked qualitative, open-ended questions to gain insight into participant perceptions of Hollywood combat films. Queries asked for names of three combat films participants believed to be inaccurate.

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20 Shen et al., “Social Comparison.”
portrayals of war, soldiers, and veterans and three films believed to be accurate. Additional questions revealed inaccuracies or accuracies about the films. Then, participants were asked about common misperceptions regarding servicemembers and veterans that may have been influenced by combat films.

Quantitative measures established participant levels of third-person perception in relation to the influence of *American Sniper* on civilian jurors for the Routh trial. If participants had seen *American Sniper*, they were asked to rate the accuracy of the film as well as the accuracy of other Hollywood combat films. Participants were provided with a statement about Routh's military experience and PTSD. Then researchers asked participants how likely they would be to accept a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity if they were a juror. Scores of 0, not very likely, and 6, very likely were assigned.

After these questions were administered, the demographic information noted above was collected. Civilians were also asked if they had a close family member or friend with military experience that significantly influenced their perceptions. Answers from participants who responded “yes” to this item were excluded from analysis.

Researchers used IBM SPSS software for the statistical analysis. T-tests and correlations were used for hypothesis testing. To analyze the qualitative research questions, responses were grouped into categories and direct quotes were documented. Two military servicemembers provided insight and analysis based on independent reviews of the qualitative data.

**Findings**

*Do servicemembers believe depictions of war, soldiers, and veterans in Hollywood movies are accurate?* Servicemembers rated the accuracy of Hollywood’s depictions from 1, not at all accurate, to 6, very accurate, with a mean of 4.0 and standard deviation of 1.1. The accuracy of *American Sniper* was rated higher, with a mean of 4.7 and standard deviation of 1.3. For perspective, this equates to a D rating for the accuracy of most Hollywood combat films and a C+ for *American Sniper*.

When asked to name up to three titles for inaccuracy, participants listed 37 combat films. Out of those productions named by more than 2 percent of participants, servicemembers identified *Hurt Locker* (25 percent), *Top Gun* (6 percent), *A Few Good Men* (5 percent), *American Sniper* (5 percent), *Brothers* (4 percent), and *Jarhead* (4 percent). Civilians chose *American Sniper* (35 percent) and *Jarhead* (14 percent). Notably, nearly a third of servicemembers did not name films, specifically saying they did not or could not watch combat films after serving. A few explained they only named older films such as *Top Gun* and *A Few Good Men* because they enjoyed the film as an adolescents, but could not watch them now.

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21 Davison, “Third-Person Effect.”

22 Jim Cash, Jack Epps Jr., Ehud Yonay, and Warren Skaaren, *Top Gun*, directed by Tony Scott (Paramount Pictures and Don Simpson/Jerry Bruckheimer Films, 1986); and Aaron Sorkin, *A Few Good Men*, directed by Rob Reiner (Columbia Pictures Corporation and Castle Rock Entertainment, 1992). One participant specifically said these films influenced his decision to enlist, but he soon learned their stories were nothing like the reality of military life.
The inclusion of The Hurt Locker on the list of inaccurate films is startling because it also earned more than $15 million in the US box office and the 2009 Academy Award for Best Picture. Moreover, 25 percent of servicemembers’ responses recognized its inaccuracies while military consultants likewise dismissed the production as fiction.

When asked to name accurate films, 30 percent of participants wrote in “none” or “almost none” instead of suggesting titles. Of participants who listed films, 22 titles were perceived to be accurate, but few were listed by more than one person. Lone Survivor, Black Hawk Down, and Jarhead were frequently listed with comments about accurate depictions of military life, solitude, and why people fight.23 Many qualified their comments with “but” statements such as “Black Hawk Down captures the brotherhood of military service, but the battles are exaggerated and unrealistic.”

Which aspects of combat films do servicemembers find to be the most accurate and least accurate? In terms of inaccuracies, the smallest details are often the most irritating. Uniforms were the clear leader (20 percent). Film characters wearing hats indoors, not wearing hats outdoors, and uniforms not matching characters’ ranks were commonly cited. Similarly, small details were often mentioned about weapons capabilities and handling, as well as limitless supplies of ammunition. Servicemembers mentioned that everyone in the movies seems to be not only expert marksmen but also experts in multiple areas such as explosives and tactics. Battles orchestrated by Hollywood were often described as more dramatic than those in real life: soldiers were too macho, and situations and circumstances were exaggerated to keep audiences on the edge of their seats. Specifically, depictions of soldiers were described as exaggerations: macho mavericks disregarded rank and authority in ways that would never be seen in real life, and enlisted men were depicted as ignorant, uneducated racists.

When asked about the details combat films get right, 20 percent of servicemembers who responded said “nothing” or “almost nothing.” The only aspect many agreed on was the comradery or brotherhood of the people who serve together, especially in combat. Some say military life is captured well, especially the boredom of waiting and the depiction of gallows humor. Servicemembers also say their service takes a toll on their family lives; 9 percent say Hollywood accurately captures the struggle.

How much influence do servicemembers believe inaccurate combat films have on civilians’ perceptions of soldiers and veterans? Servicemembers commonly respond civilians perceive everyone is broken: “Everybody has PTSD, is crazy, or has a screw loose; we’re all ticking time bombs.” Likewise, there are misperceptions that soldiers are bloodthirsty alcoholics, addicted to killing, and devoid of human emotions. These associations are likely related to misperceptions that all servicemembers have participated in combat missions and killed people. Enlisted servicemembers believe Hollywood portrays them as uneducated racists who joined the military.

23 Peter Berg, Marcus Luttrell, and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor, directed by Peter Berg (Film 44 et al., 2013); and William Broyles Jr. and Anthony Swofford, Jarhead, directed by Sam Mendes (Universal Pictures, Red Wagon Entertainment, Neal Street Productions, and Motion Picture KAPPA Produktionsgesellschaft, 2005).
because they were not smart enough to get into college, and who returned home broken and potentially dangerous.

*How do perceptions differ among servicemembers and civilians?* In some cases, the differences between the perceptions of servicemembers and civilians are marked. Servicemembers struggled to identify accurate films whereas civilians named only nine films inaccurate; only three titles were named more than once. Both feature films civilians considered accurate were deemed inaccurate by servicemembers. *Restrepo*, mentioned by 12 percent of civilians, was actually a documentary that aired on HBO. 24 Two misperceptions influenced by films were recognized by both servicemembers and civilians: all servicemembers have been in combat and killed people, and soldiers are bloodthirsty adrenaline junkies addicted to killing.

The most interesting point of disagreement is PTSD. Servicemembers cited the misperception that everyone is broken, everyone has PTSD mostly. Among civilians, 16 percent also believe PTSD is overrepresented, but 11 percent believe the misconception is that soldiers come home fine, with no PTSD, and seamlessly reunite with their families. Eleven percent of civilians also believe the depiction of heroes fighting for a just cause is the biggest misconception.

Civilians believe Hollywood combat films, at their best, illustrate the pointlessness of war through the internal struggles of enlisted men and women. They balance patriotism and love of control with simple acts of kindness in war, showing not all Muslims are terrorists and not all American soldiers are racists. Civilians believe Hollywood's version of combat, at worst, presents realistic battles in historically inaccurate contexts that simplify global politics and glorify American heroes.

Conversely, servicemembers assert battle scenes are inaccurate: the average engagement is brief; 20 minutes of engagement are followed by an hour or more wondering if it is over, if it is safe to move. Military participants say *Lone Survivor* captures this well, arguing there is no time for politics or context during combat. All that matters is that the person to your left, the person to your right, and you go home safely.

**Servicemembers’ Third-Person Perception and the Trial of Eddie Ray Routh**

While everyone exhibits TPP, it was more pronounced in this study among servicemembers than civilians. This finding matters because people act on their perceptions not reality. The trial of Eddie Ray Routh provides a perfect example.

Servicemembers were mostly unwilling to accept the proposed defense of not guilty by reason of insanity; in fact, 40 percent indicated they would definitely not accept it. Only 6 percent said they would be very likely to accept the defense. Civilians were less extreme, with 11 percent definitely not accepting the defense and 11 percent very likely to accept it. Consistent with the literature, participants who exhibited higher levels of TPP were more likely to presume the defendant guilty. Thus, the trial represents a microcosm of public opinion and an excellent

example of media influence—American Sniper proclaimed Routh guilty prior to jury selection.

**Conclusion**

Media depictions can be a powerful third force that not only motivates young men and women to serve their country but also sways public support for lengthy military engagements. Public relations battles at home affect more than just public opinion; it impacts recruiting, retention, and morale, as well as policy. Similar to the previous example of the perceived impact of leaflets on minority servicemembers on Iwo Jima, this study—the first of its kind—measures TPP regarding the perceived impact of Hollywood combat films on civilians’ perceptions of servicemembers and veterans. The study documented TPP and third-person effect—the presumption of guilt or innocence of a defendant in a high-profile, real-life murder case depicted in a popular film.

From the many differences in perceptions of servicemembers and civilians, the most likely explanation for the verdict differing among the research groups is related to PTSD. Films like Brothers and American Sniper portray veterans struggling to reunite with loved ones. Brothers paints a hopeless picture of a doomed marriage that escalates to violence. American Sniper shows a rocky start, followed by process of healing cut short by another veteran suffering from PTSD killing his would-be mentor. Servicemembers find both films unrealistic and say the myth of the broken soldier with PTSD is Hollywood’s latest legacy. Civilians are torn: some agree PTSD is overemphasized in combat films and others argue happy reunions with well-adjusted veterans are the myth. Civilians’ willingness to accept and servicemembers definitive rejection of Routh’s PTSD defense underscores the different perceptions. Alternatively, military consultants suggest servicemembers are quick to support one another and would not accept the defense because they would not want the killer of one of their contemporary heroes to go free.

Many veterans and servicemembers of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars say 1980s films like Top Gun and A Few Good Men influenced their decision to serve, but quickly assessed the productions to be inaccurate at best. While military participants recognized contemporary combat films capture the brotherhood of soldiers, most of them are discontent with being depicted as uneducated, ignorant, bloodthirsty racists in need of counseling for PTSD. Civilians, on the other hand, see the films as accurately portraying the sights and sounds of war while simplifying why America sends men and women to fight in the first place.

**Implications for Strategic Communications**

To understand how third forces such as the media can influence servicemembers’ morale as well as garner public support for extended wars, commanders must be aware of portrayals of servicemembers and combat in Hollywood films. Common myths and misperceptions must be addressed not only within the Department of Defense but also in the Department of Veterans Affairs. Public affairs offices can be create and distribute national messaging strategies to dispel myths. Encouraging film screenings and discussions within the military and initiating external media campaigns focusing on the accuracy of film depictions,
War and Social Perception

Chapin, Mendoza-Burcham, and Pierce

87

misconceptions about PTSD, and perceptions of “broken” veterans can shape public opinion.

One technique called “Message of the Day” could be used to initiate social change. The Defense Department and the Department of Veterans Affairs could adopt a communications strategy that presents a unified message about the inaccuracies of Hollywood films. The messages might start with “it’s not like the movies” and provide a detail such as “we care about our community.” The message needs to be repeated, particularly when addressing policy and budget issues. The message can be reinforced through public speaking events and targeted social media campaigns such as #NotLikeTheMovies.

As the message gains traction, it is important to address the common myths about PTSD specifically. Critical incidents, especially those occurring stateside, get a lot of traction. Credible spokespeople must be prepared to respond to media requests with accurate information about PTSD, explain what it looks like, and provide realistic estimates of its prevalence. Such events also need to be followed by positive stories about successful veterans from all walks of life. The public as well as the military community deserve to know men and women who served their country are not broken.

The best tool to shape opinion through Hollywood films is film. Pentagon support for combat films dates back to the 1920s. The most successful of these were The Green Berets, Top Gun, and Black Hawk Down. The Green Berets was a prowar film starring John Wayne made to counterbalance Vietnam War protests. The film did not hold up over time because of the simplistic viewpoint, but it drew an audience and generated discussion during its run in theaters. Top Gun was produced with the full support of the Navy, including fighter jets and aircraft carriers. The popularity of the film increased recruitment by 400 percent. Servicemembers in the study mentioned Top Gun as a film that encouraged them to enlist or that contributed to their positive perceptions about the military. Black Hawk Down, also frequently named in the current study, provided a quick, symbolic response to September 11, 2001, and continues to inspire.

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Army Expansibility

Expanding Brigade Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?

Esli T. Pitts

ABSTRACT: Given our poor track record of predicting the nature of the wars that have transpired since Vietnam, this article describes a model for transitioning the current Army into a force that might be needed in the event of a great power war.

In a world where America, its allies, and its partners do not maintain large standing armies, our potential enemies still believe in maximizing military strength. In March 2016, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the “distinct challenge to our national security” posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, who continue “invest[ing] in military capabilities that reduce our competitive advantage.” Much of this investment is in the form of modernized conventional warfighting capabilities. In February 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed “when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right.” He then warned of the challenge of justifying the expense of a larger force given the decreasing likelihood of a “head-on clash of large mechanized armies.” Contrast this statement with Secretary Rumsfeld, who famously observed that countries go to war with the armies they have, not the armies they need.

This article considers how, in the event of a great-power war such as the one Gates discounted, the United States might transition from the Army it has, to the one it might need, by doubling the building blocks of Army units, brigade combat teams (BCTs), with particular focus on armored BCTs. The article discusses key training requirements and offers recommendations for simplifying Army expansion, should it become necessary.

Despite several historical examples of Army expansion since World War II, doubling the number of BCTs is complex and without modern parallel. Within current infrastructure, the Army could double the number of trained BCTs, but to do so rapidly would be extremely challenging. Unless the Army significantly changes end-strength and training capacity in the generating force, imposes stop-loss, assumes

1 Hearing on the Department of Defense Budget Posture, Before the Senate Armed Service Committee, 114th Cong. (March 17, 2016) (posture statement of General Joseph Dunford Jr., US Marine Corps, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
2 Robert M. Gates (speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, February 25, 2011).
3 Ibid.
5 The goal of doubling the Army’s BCTs was chosen arbitrarily; some scenarios would require more, some less.
significant risk with inexperienced leadership, and increases stocks of ready equipment, the ability to generate trained brigades will be limited to a largely sequential and time-consuming process.

Training an Expanding Army

In January 2016, the Congressionally mandated National Commission on the Future of the Army warned “significant reductions in the size of the generating force put the ability to expand the Army at risk.” The Commission noted that there was no link between the size of the generating force, any anticipated Total Army Analysis need for an expandable Army, nor a requirement for the generating force to support expansibility. In other words, the lynchpin of expansibility is insufficient, and there is no plan to address it.

The Army must, therefore, consider its goals carefully and align the Total Army Analysis process to right-sizing the generating force—even if the goal is not to double brigades but to reach a specified planned capability. The Army grew by 16,000 soldiers in Fiscal Year 2017 through a combination of increased recruiting and higher retention of senior soldiers. Some portion of that growth may go into the generating force, but the damage caused by the recent loss of trained leadership who could support future expansibility is already done.

The Fiscal Year 2017 Modified Table of Organization and Equipment adopted a triangular brigade structure for the armored BCT (4,184 soldiers) with three maneuver battalions and a cavalry squadron. Each of the maneuver battalions has a headquarters company and three line companies. Two of the battalions are tank-heavy and one is infantry-heavy. The cavalry squadron is comprised of a headquarters, three reconnaissance troops, and a tank troop. About 35 percent of the brigade combat team (1,479 soldiers) are so-called trigger-pullers, including 355 tankers, 340 scouts, and 667 infantry, and 117 armor or infantry officers. The remaining soldiers in the brigade require a similar training process, but analyzing it is outside the parameters of this article.

Doubling the Army’s armored BCTs would require the Army to train a high volume of soldiers. With attrition at 12–14 percent during initial entry and 12 percent during unit training, 15 new armored brigade combat teams would require about 27,700 tankers, scouts, and infantry. The remaining infantry and Stryker brigades could require roughly 100,000 more soldiers. Despite the seeming simplicity, the following approaches entail a high degree of friction.

A modern BCT is much more complicated than a brigade of the early 2000s. Likewise, training and education requirements are much more

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7 Ibid.
8 Tom Vanden Brook, “Army To Spend $300 Million on Bonuses and Ads To Get 6,000 More Recruits,” USA Today, February 12, 2017.
9 FMS-Web (1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, and subordinate units).
10 Ibid.
11 Given ongoing force structure changes, including adding additional infantry battalions to overseas infantry brigade combat teams, the number of 100,000 is more of an informed estimate than based on Force Management System’s specific data.
demanding. Missions and operating environments can also be more complex, and unit cohesion and proficiency can take years to develop fully.\(^{12}\) Despite these factors and the specialized training required for large subsets of the Army, the following model, derived from historical examples, can serve as a starting point for producing new brigades.\(^{13}\) In this model, the Army identifies the manning requirements, establishes dates, or aimpoints, for forming the new brigade and schedules institutional training to prepare new recruits and cadre to join soldiers who already meet those requirements at the unit’s formation. This theoretical capacity is subject to filling initial training courses, procuring required equipment, and assembling cadres of mid- and senior-grade leaders to reach the aimpoint.

Institutional training involves basic and specialized instruction for large cohorts of recruits and leaders. Assuming brigades are formed on a sequential and consistent timeline, trained soldiers can also be provided on a predictable schedule with limited difficulty. The more rapidly brigades must be built, however, the more the current infrastructure will be challenged. Moreover, a significant amount of centralized management will be required to balance education with tactical or technical skills during expansion efforts.

A key consideration, the total quantity of soldiers required, varies based upon the assumption that a stop-loss will accompany any event that leads to doubling the force. Therefore, unless the Army is in active combat, the primary problem is filling the ranks of new units, not replacing combat losses or soldiers whose term of service has expired.

A 25 percent overage for training would offset historical rates of attrition during both initial training and after forming brigades. But, this allocation does not consider replacing significant combat losses. Were it necessary, the training requirement would rapidly consume not only the overage but also a potentially high percentage of training capacity. Accounting only for attrition during training, an armored BCT would require the following enlisted soldiers (E1–E4): 186 tankers, 229 scouts, and 413 infantry. Sergeant (E5) requirements would include 87 tankers, 52 scouts, and 135 infantry. With overage, the brigade would require 1,035 junior enlisted soldiers and 343 sergeants.

### Training Brigades

The armor training brigade at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia, conducts One Station Unit Training (OSUT) for both tankers and scouts.\(^{14}\) The training lasts roughly 16 weeks for either skill and currently produces 1,440 tankers per year after 12.7 percent attrition and 2,340 scouts after 14.1 percent attrition.\(^{15}\) Additional capacity, added in the summer of 2017, should increase the total graduates per year to 1,920 tankers and 2,748 scouts.\(^{16}\) Given modest

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12 Hornick, Burkhart, and Shunk, “Rightsizing the Army,” 43.
14 The armor training brigade includes one armor battalion and one cavalry squadron.
15 Armored brigade commander, email messages to author, February 13–14, 2017.
16 Ibid.
additional resources, the existing brigade infrastructure could support three additional companies to train such soldiers. The infantry training brigade graduates 12,900 infantry per year after a typical attrition of 14 percent. With classes filled to normal capacity, the brigade could graduate 19,300 infantry per year; however, it could produce 21,100 graduates under surge conditions.

Given overage and current rates of attrition, the Maneuver Center of Excellence would be required to start training for 342 tankers, 352 scouts, and 685 infantry to fill one armored BCT. At current rates of throughput, Fort Benning could train sufficient tankers for 1.23 armored BCTs, enough scouts for 1.4 armored BCTs, and enough infantry for 4.15 armored BCTs per quarter. Should the Army return the two mechanized infantry companies it removed from the armored BCT structure in 2017, it could only generate 3.1 armored BCTs per quarter. This rate builds 1.7 infantry BCTs per quarter. Should additional replacement requirements be necessary due to combat losses, the Army could either activate the existing surge capacity at Fort Benning or use the National Guard’s system of Regional Training Institutes to train additional soldiers.

Newly-formed brigades will not have the time or skills to train soldiers on many essential tasks, such as drivers’ licensing, job-specific skills, and combat lifesaver training, which are usually left to a new soldier’s first unit. To form BCTs rapidly, OSUT could be lengthened; thereby, economies of scale and experienced instructors could be leveraged to conduct such training prior to soldiers arriving at newly-formed BCTs.

Noncommissioned Officers

A sufficient quantity of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) would not likely be available to fill more than 1 or 2 armored BCTs per quarter. Accordingly, manning the NCO ranks in brigades requires multiple solutions such as training potential leaders identified during initial training, cross-leveling experience from existing brigades, recalling experienced leaders to active duty, and employing contractors or other nondeployable leaders in the generating force.

Sergeants. Sergeants serve as fire-team leaders and vehicle gunners while providing first-level leadership in their platoons. An armored BCT requires 87 tanker, 52 scout, and 135 infantry sergeants with an overage totaling 343 sergeants.

One primary source of sergeants would be reminiscent of the Vietnam War’s Noncommissioned Officer Candidate’s Course, which produced sergeants from soldiers who demonstrated promise during basic training. One model involves sending the top 25 percent of each graduating OSUT class immediately to a modified Basic Leader Course. This course would focus, first, on small unit leadership, followed by several weeks of training specific to the soldier’s field and rank, including tactics, maintenance, and gunnery. These new NCOs would

17 Ibid.
18 G-3 Training staff member, Maneuver Center of Excellence, email messages to the author, February 22 and February 27, 2017.
19 Ibid.
20 Required percentages differ significantly depending on the needs of armor, scout, and infantry organizations, combined with the unknown variable of how many other sources are providing soldiers to train as sergeants.
be effectively prepared for leadership and receive a different brigade assignment than their peers from initial training. While most of these NCOs would join the newly-forming brigades, some would also report to existing units to allow experienced NCOs to cross-level to the new brigades.

**Midgrade and Senior NCOs.** The biggest personnel challenge of generating brigade combat teams is filling midgrade and senior NCO ranks with experienced leaders while maintaining existing brigades and meeting the requirements of the generating force. An armored BCT requires 42 tanker, 47 scout, and 80 infantry staff sergeants with an average total of 211. The distribution of sergeants first class equates to 23 tankers, 12 scouts, and 26 infantry, an average total of 76. Master sergeants and command sergeants major fill 17 tanker or scout billets and 13 infantry slots with an average total of 38. Given the performance of midgrade NCOs during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite deferring NCO education, the Army might accept the risk of rapid promotion in a cross-leveling strategy, which might also favor technical or tactical training over leadership courses.21 Nevertheless, the Master Gunner’s School is an essential course to ensure the master gunners within the armored BCT are indeed combat vehicle weapons systems experts.22

**Officers**

The unique roles, responsibilities, and training requirements for, as well as the smaller numbers of, officers means every effort should be made for them to complete all professional military education and training requirements to support the brigade’s aimpoint.

**Lieutenants.** Except for the two-year option for Cadet Initial Entry Training through the Reserve Officer Training Corps, there is no way to accelerate commissioning through a university. Therefore, Officer Candidate School will be the primary source for lieutenants—1,080 graduates per year—for the first two to four years of an Army expansion effort.23 With five months’ notice, the school could expand its courses and increase the number of graduates to 3,200 officers.24 The Army National Guard also has substantial officer-training capacity.25

After initial training, all lieutenants would attend the armor or infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course, which is the minimum training required to lead a platoon. In 19 weeks, these courses respectively graduate 480 and 1,440 officers per year with additional capacities of 840 and

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21 Some examples of alternate training include Ranger School, the Tank Commander Certification Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Mortar Leaders Course, Mechanized Leaders Course, Stryker Leaders Course, and Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer Course.

22 The authorization is for a master gunner at each tank and infantry company, plus tank and Bradley master gunners at both the battalion and brigade levels. The squadron is authorized one master gunner at the squadron level and one for the tank company, but a Bradley master gunner is not authorized at the troop level. For more details, see FMS-Web (1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, and subordinate units; accessed February 18, 2017).


24 Battalion commander, email.

25 Essentially every state and some territories conduct Officer Candidate School at their Regional Training Institute. Most states currently conduct 2–3 small classes of 10–20 students per year. For one example, see “Officer Candidate School: Apply: OCS Program Dates,” Alabama National Guard, December 19, 2016, http://al.ng.mil/ALABAMA/Careers/OCS/Pages/OCS_Apply.aspx.
2,200 students. A new armored BCT would require, with overage, 76 junior lieutenants—33 armor officers filling armor or cavalry billets, 19 infantry officers, and 9 more from either branch. A secondary manning requirement for 51 junior lieutenants would be created per brigade to replace senior lieutenants or newly-promoted captains assigned to the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course during the expansion. The combined output of the armor and infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course are sufficient to fill three armored BCTs per quarter.

Most new officers attend unit-specific training such as the Army Reconnaissance Course, Bradley Leaders Course, Stryker Leaders Course, Airborne School, Ranger School, or the Mortar Leader Course after completing the Basic Officer Leadership Course. Thus, training for a new infantry or armor officer lasts 9–12 months.27 Despite the need to build brigades and the risks associated with selecting scout or mortar platoon leaders prior to their arrival at the unit, new lieutenants must continue to receive this training before they are assigned to their brigades as such opportunities after arriving will be limited. Other positions, such as executive officer, require more experience and should be filled from existing brigades.

Captains. The 51 senior lieutenants or newly promoted captains required to man a new armored BCT would include 15 armor, 12 infantry, and 14 officers from either branch. The secondary manning requirement would replace 15 senior captains departing their brigades to attend the Command and General Staff College. During the last decade, unit commanders have typically hesitated to send their senior lieutenants to the Captain’s Career Course; however, immediate completion of this program would be essential to building new brigades. With the majority of captains stabilized, the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, which currently achieves 800 graduates per year, can build 2.75 new armored BCTs per quarter while allowing for attrition.28 The primary concern arises from the resultant loss of experience among captains who will serve as company commanders or fill battalion and brigade staffs. Sequentially building new armored BCTs mitigates such loss by spreading it over time and across units.

Majors. Unlike the other officer grades, there is a large population of senior captains and majors serving in nonessential positions such as graduate school students, instructors, or other broadening assignments. Each brigade would require 10 armor or infantry majors to be trained and assigned as the operations and executive officers in the brigade and its four maneuver battalions. Typically, such officers are graduates of the one-year resident Command and General Staff College program or the fourteen-week Intermediate Level Education. Subject to training requirements, these officers could rapidly fill the required billets in a new brigade.

Closed during World War I to ensure officers were available for the war, the Command and General Staff College continued training during World War II, graduating more than 19,000 staff officers in 27

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26 Battalion commander, Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course, email message to author, December 16, 2016.
27 Cavalry squadron commander, email message to author, December 7, 2016.
28 G-3 Training staff member, email.
shortened staff courses that closely resembled the current Intermediate Level Education timeline. By shortening the resident program and conducting multiple iterations per year, enough field grade officers could be trained to form leadership cohorts for the new armored BCTs.

Commanders. The typically low selection rate for command at the battalion and brigade levels leaves a significant population of available high-quality lieutenant colonels and colonels. In the first year of expansion, alternates from the most recent command select lists could be selected for the authorizations of one colonel to command each brigade and four lieutenant colonels to lead the maneuver battalions. In subsequent years, the command select list would align with Manning requirements. The increased number of commands could impact the ability to fill senior staff positions at and above the corps level, but this deficiency could be offset by deferring retirements.

The Army already conducts a general Pre-Command Course at Fort Leavenworth and a Maneuver Pre-Command Course at Fort Benning. By combining both courses at Fort Leavenworth and scheduling them in conjunction with Intermediate Level Education cohorts scheduled for the same new brigades, the Army could incorporate some basic planning exercises into the course while simultaneously building the command teams for each brigade.

The Army retains significant training capacity in the states’ Regional Training Institutes, many of which currently possess armor, cavalry, and infantry military occupational specialty qualification and NCO education programs. If this capacity was unnecessary, the institutes could disband and either support building the cadre for new armored BCTs or replace leaders in the generating force who could then fill armored BCT positions.

Brigade Combat Team

On the identified activation date, trained soldiers and leaders would converge on a designated location, whether the infrastructure of a deployed armored BCT, a recently deactivated one, or a mobilization force generation installation capable of housing and supporting the entire brigade’s training regimen. The first five brigades might be partially equipped from the five Army prepositioned stock fleets or from existing units’ idle stay-behind equipment. Subsequent brigades would have to wait for new equipment to be procured.

Two potential sources of cadre exist around which to build brigades. First, the Army has six combined arms training brigades with the mission of training and mobilizing the Army National Guard. Combined arms training brigades, consist of commanders and rudimentary staffs at

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30 A typical example of a state’s capability is the Pennsylvania Army National Guard’s 166th Regiment, which currently offers military occupational specialty qualification for armor, scouts, and infantry as well as the Basic Leadership Course for NCOs. See “166th Regiment,” Pennsylvania Army National Guard, November 6, 2017, http://www.pngpa.gov/army_national_guard/166th_regiment/Pages/default.aspx.

31 Mobilization Force Generation Installations have varying capacity in training areas and housing. As of 2015, there are only three such installations capable of housing more than 4,000 soldiers at the same time: Fort Stewart, Georgia; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; and Camp Shelby, Mississippi. For more details, see “White Paper: CATB to ABCT Conversion.”
the battalion and brigade levels, and company training teams with a team chief and a cadre of NCOs. In the event that the National Guard’s brigades are already mobilized, those training brigades could form the nucleus of the first five armored BCTs. Using the training brigades would allow time to identify, train, and assemble soldiers, junior NCOs, and officers, as well as the entire cavalry squadron, to form the next brigades. The 1st Army conducted a feasibility study of this concept in 2015, concluding it would be possible.\(^\text{32}\) Secondly, in similar fashion, the Army is currently planning to form six security force assistance brigades. Like the combined arms training brigades, these brigades consist of a cadre of leaders and staff, without a full complement of enlisted soldiers and junior NCOs, around which a brigade combat team might be formed.

**Training Model**

A 37-week battalion training model that concentrates on combined arms maneuver in a contemporary operating environment and culminates in a combat training center exercise, would enable newly-formed armored BCTs to achieve initial proficiency in brigade maneuver.\(^\text{33}\) Because the training progression would require four maneuver battalions to rotate through key training resources, particularly live-fire ranges, a minimum of 40 weeks would be required to sequence all four units through the training. The following schedule for each battalion rotation also includes “white space” for retraining and equipment maintenance. The model does not provide for training in stability operations or other nonessential skills.

During Week 1, soldiers initiate administrative inprocessing, draw their equipment, and start to build teams. The next five weeks include individual and basic collective task training, and also a two-week leader training program and command post exercise. Week 7 involves a situational training exercise on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear scenarios, which is followed by crew drills and maneuver at the fire team and squad levels in Week 8. Week 9 is allocated for unit needs, while Weeks 10 and 11 focus on tactical training and platoon battle drills. Week 12 is another week of white space for recovery or additional training.

Weeks 13–16 include fire team and squad live fire exercises and crew qualification on all stabilized and unstabilized systems, culminating in platoon gunnery table XII. Another week of unit recovery or retraining time occurs before the company-level situational training exercises during Weeks 18 and 19; a company-level live-fire exercise and battalion-level fire coordination exercise happen during Week 20. Another unplanned training period is available in Week 21. Weeks 22 and 23 include a battalion command post exercise followed by battalion situational training exercises. Finally, while soldiers recover and prepare unit equipment for deployment to a combat training center, unit leaders participate in an armored BCT command post exercise that occurs during Week 24.

\(^{32}\) “CATB to ABCT Conversion.”

\(^{33}\) This training model is informed primarily by my professional opinion as a combined arms battalion commander for two years, as well as a task force senior maneuver trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany, for two years.
At this point, the unit has another week to prepare for the combat training center deployment, which occurs during Week 26. Training at the center—which might be the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, or a similar local training area, if necessary—lasts through Week 30. The unit returns to its home station during Week 31 and conducts recovery, retraining, and semiannual or annual services on vehicles and equipment through Week 34. The unit conducts block leave during Weeks 35 and 36 and becomes operationally capable in Week 37.

While the required training time is fixed, the total time required to grow new brigades will vary based on such factors as mobilizing the Army National Guard, vacating the mobilization force generation installations, forward-deploying units to the Army prepositioned stock fleet, building complete equipment sets, and initiating a steady flow of new soldiers, as well as locating, transferring, and training initial unit cadre.

Even building the first brigades around the experienced and intact combined arms training brigades from 1st Army would require augmentation with the entire cavalry squadron and with staff sergeants from either the generating force or the existing brigades. Officer billets could be filled by courses already underway. For the first brigades to form, the force would be dependent upon whether a Basic Leadership Course for sergeants was underway and how far along the various OSUT courses might be in training. A fully-trained enlisted force might not be available for four to six months. Moreover, the assembled force would require about nine more months of training to be minimally ready. Subsequently formed brigades would be more limited by the ability to generate a cadre of experienced midgrade leaders once the flow of enlisted and junior NCOs was established. Once prepositioned equipment was issued, the rate of forming armored brigades would be wholly dependent upon procuring additional matériel.

Risks

Although individual armored BCT’s can be built rapidly, there is risk in doing so. Primarily, the entire force would lack experience. Existing brigades would not only release many of their most experienced leaders, but would also acquire inexperienced replacements. New brigades would receive some experienced cadre, but many of those soldiers would likely be inexperienced in their new billets or ranks.

A recent study described the practice of keeping a small Army that is rapidly expansible in a time of war as “a flawed approach.” The primary reason 30 months are required to build a brigade combat team is for experience. Currently, soldiers at the unit level average five years in service, while historically, draftees and volunteers alike spent two years in service. Considering the increasingly complex battlefield and equipment, there is no replacement for experience. Nevertheless, this proposal would generate brigades with experience measured in months, not years.

35 Ibid.
The junior leaders from the Vietnam War were a mass-produced expedient to face the pressing needs of that war. They were not trained to be professional and long-serving leaders, but a short-term source of combat leadership. While they did lead well on the battlefield, they lacked the ability to provide mature leadership in garrison. The young sergeants, in particular, were trained to be “good enough to win the war” but were given almost no instruction in discipline or garrison leadership. Recall the lesson in the Army’s previous attempt to build more effective and cohesive units that continued to train together as Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training units; when average leaders were placed under time constraints and high pressure to form a unit rapidly based on inexperienced soldiers, “vertical” cohesion actually suffered.

Historically, when the Army expands, it is also forced to lower standards for recruitment and retention. Struggling with recruitment during the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army reduced standards to allow up to four percent of recruits in Category IV of the Armed Forces, the lowest aptitude category, to enter the service. Currently, only 71 percent of American youth meet standards for service, and the trend is getting worse. Lowering these standards creates both discipline and performance problems. Disciplinary problems will be worsened by the fact that most soldiers’ first line supervisors will be inexperienced junior sergeants barely months ahead of those they are leading. One of many examples of the risks posed to performance by lower quality soldiers is stark. Given the same training as tank gunners, soldiers categorized as IIIA (scoring in the 50th to 64th percentile on the Armed Force Qualification Test) scored 34 percent better on the test than did soldiers categorized as IV (scoring in the 10th to 30th percentile).

The last risk is to mission success. While it is mathematically possible to push the right numbers of soldiers through training, promote them, assign them a billet, and propel them through a modicum of training, they still lack the proficiency and lethality gained only through multiple iterations in diverse conditions associated with day and night operations in inclement weather and during chemical conditions. Failing to train soldiers for proficiency, particularly when combined with the performance of lower-quality recruits, is disastrous.

Recommendations

Although the Army may not decide to double the number of brigade combat teams right now, multiple brigade combat teams may need to be added as part of a future Army expansion. For that reason, the Army should consider the following recommendations:

38 Anna Badkhen, “Army Relaxes Its Standards To Fill Ranks / Critics Say Push To Meet Quotas May Let Unstable Recruits Join Up,” SFGate (San Francisco), July 11, 2006.
Link the generating force to the Total Army Analysis process. Codify a minimum number of brigade combat teams to be supported immediately from the generating force. Grow the generating force to support expansibility.

Assign battle roster identification numbers to the expansible force. Add a designation for expansible battalion and brigade commanders on the Command Select List as a category separate from principals or alternates. Build the expansible force’s battle roster to the extent possible, including coding soldiers in the generating force to specific duty positions in the expansible brigades. Compare the generating force’s capacity against battle-rostered cadre and identify manning solutions for any shortfalls.

Formally task the combined arms training brigades and security force assistance brigades with a wartime mission as the cadre of expansible brigades.

Assess current and surge capacity at active and reserve component schools against expansibility goals with, and without, stop-loss in effect. Assess all centers of excellence and state regional training institutes. Capture costs and infrastructure requirements to generate excess training capacity at incremental increases of 10, 25, and 50 percent.

Adjust personnel policies to support expansibility. Enable recalling experienced soldiers who have not met their individual ready reserve commitment or who have retired. Assign battle-roster numbers for those soldiers. Code these soldiers to specific duty positions in the expansible brigades. Encourage national, state, or local programs focused on the health and fitness of America’s youth.

Maintain prepositioned BCT equipment sets consistent with Total Army Analysis goals. Reset sufficient combat vehicles in depots or long-term storage. Procure and store all equipment necessary to equip sufficient brigade combat teams. Build additional Army prepositioned stock capability in both armored and Stryker Brigades.

The Army’s 2013 Strategic Guidance reads: “The Army must preserve options for the future by retaining the capacity to expand and provide the capabilities needed for future challenges.” Clearly, the Army identified the risks assumed by cutting the force structure, particularly in the generating force. Given fiscal realities, however, the Army is currently operating at the edge of efficiency—sufficient capacity to maintain the Army we have, but not the one we might need.

Secretary Gates may be right when he says we have seen the last major combat involving large mechanized formations; then again, he also said our record of predicting future war is perfect—we have always been wrong! Regardless, should America identify the need for a large Army, we will not have the luxury of time. It is, therefore, in the Army’s—and the nation’s—best interests to minimize the time required to build brigade combat teams.

For the US Army to expand rapidly, its leaders will have to make critical decisions on organizational and matériel requirements. However, a recent research effort at the US Army War College reveals that some equipment, such as air defense artillery and aviation assets, will be difficult to procure quickly. This challenge is due to the manufacturing requirements of American and allied industries, and it is significant enough to require the Army to reexamine some of its expectations about rapid expansion. For instance, 10 years would be needed to produce theater ballistic defense equipment and ammunition, eight years for aviation assets such as attack helicopters, and three years for armored units such as the M2 Bradley fighting vehicles and armored breaching vehicles.

Admittedly, the Army could use prepositioned stocks to overcome some of its matériel challenges. Likewise, older equipment from the depots could be issued, newer equipment from commercial markets could be purchased, or the Army could adjust the quantities it requires. But, these solutions will not provide the Army with everything it needs; nor would they provide it with the most capable equipment for fighting another great power.

Analytical Framework and Findings

The benchmark for this study was doubling the Army within a 36-month time frame. While any number of scenarios would not require that level of effort, many would. Regardless, the benchmark helped identify a number of stress points within the matériel production system that the Army should address. In addition, the following assumptions were made. First, financial aspects of production are relaxed. Second, acquisitions and contracting allow for open competition and sole-source contracting. Third, maintenance and sustainment are initially conducted by contractors and later transitioned to Army personnel. Fourth, space for facilities or training is sufficient. Fifth, American acquisitions are prioritized by the State Department, which would include stopping production for foreign military sales and delaying new agreements during expansion. Sixth, equipment from Army prepositioned stock is

1 This study was carried out by an integrated team of faculty and students who examined the US Army’s ability to expand quickly to fight a great-power war.
harvested as soon as possible and refilled later. Lastly, outdated equipment solutions are accepted by the Army until new matériel becomes available.

The study’s principal finding was that American industry would struggle to build and to field enough theater ballistic defense, aviation, mechanized infantry, and other matériel to meet the benchmark described above. Therefore, to acquire the raw materials needed to produce Army equipment during an expansion effort, the Department of Defense should develop and publish a plan similar to the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939. The pre-World War II mobilization plan that synchronized production schedules of different equipment, for example, was published by the Army in early 1938, nearly four years before Pearl Harbor, updated the next year, and modified throughout the war.

Under the guidance of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the government redirected some factory output prior to World War II. In addition, lend-lease agreements enabled the United States to support Allied efforts to thwart Axis powers while preparing for the nation’s possible involvement. In 1942, the War Production Board was established to take control of and manage the requirements process. By 1944, the Victory Program had produced 185,000 planes and 120,000 tanks. Despite a slow start, the proactive measures that national leaders began in 1939 laid the groundwork for industry structure and for raw materials to be postured correctly before war was declared in December 1941. In sum, the nation took three years to produce the equipment the Army needed for combat operations in a two-front war. Without Roosevelt’s foresight, an additional two years, or more, might have been needed to produce the same amount of equipment.

Notably, today’s Army already has lethal units with mostly modernized equipment and a robust funding and acquisition system. Unfortunately, the manufacturing base for large equipment is small, and the competition with foreign companies is great. Today’s systems and the tools to produce them are more complex, which requires more time and skill than has been needed previously.

The Army is also challenged by an industry preference for funding new technology but then producing only enough for deployable units to use. In practice, this approach creates a small number of well-equipped units and a large number of ill-equipped units. From the industry point of view, producing a small amount of equipment for ten years is preferable to producing a large amount of equipment for three years. Thus, to fight a major war, the Army’s leadership must communicate a sense of urgency to industry leaders about how much and how soon the equipment is needed.

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3 1938 Protective Mobilization Plan; 1939 Protective Mobilization Plan; and Kreidberg and Henry, Military Mobilization, 479–82.
5 Mobilization, 16–18.
6 Interview with resourcing division chief, January 25, 2017. For operational security purposes, names and other interview details have been removed.
The new plan that the Defense Department develops, therefore, should articulate the intent to mine or to purchase raw materials such as aluminum, copper, steel, tungsten, and other rare-earth materials. Since the United States is the world’s fourth largest producer of copper and steel as well as the sixth largest producer of aluminum, acquiring these resources should be manageable. Although the United States does not mine or produce tungsten, it could likely purchase that material from Canada, the world’s third largest producer.

China produces most rare-earth materials. Thus, purchasing those materials could be problematic during future conflicts. Other nations are attempting to produce more of these materials, but progress is slow. The Defense Logistics Agency manages stockpiles and contracts for strategic minerals distributed to industry. Public law also allows defense requirements a higher precedence than commercial needs. The Department of Defense only monitors rare-earth materials, however, and has no plan to direct the acquisition of raw materials, internally or from foreign nations, nor to coordinate material distribution to American industry.

Albeit with some equipment shortages, the full support of the government, and unlimited funding, the Army would be able to build quickly Stryker and light BCTs, field artillery, engineer, transportation, and other support units. However, as further analysis demonstrates, numerous challenges exist that prevent theater ballistic air defense units, combat aviation brigades, and armored BCTs from being doubled as quickly as other units.

Air Defense Units

Industry could not double the quantity of missile units within three years. To expand from 15 to 30 Patriot battalions, the Army would need 360 more MIM-104 launchers. Current production for this weapon is designated for foreign military sales, and the M903 launching station upgrades, scheduled through 2024, do not include producing new units. Due to the manufacturing time for subcomponents, one battalion could be fielded within five years. A 30-month start-up would be required to add facility space and vendors. Even after prioritizing US needs over foreign military sales, the program manager would need a minimum of ten years to equip 15 more Patriot battalions.

7 Interview with deputy maneuver division chief, December 6, 2016; interview with mission command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017; and email message to author, March 29, 2017.
9 Email message to the author, March 29, 2017.
11 Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
12 Interview with Patriot deputy system synchronization officer, March 7, 2017.
13 Interview with Patriot deputy system synchronization officer, March 29, 2017.
14 Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
Patriot missiles would be even more difficult to double. To obtain the 3,000 additional missiles, the Army would immediately have to start stockpiling the missiles required to prosecute any anticipated major war immediately. The vendor would need 18 months to produce the first 10 missiles before being able to sustain production of 10 missiles per month, with a surge capability of 30 missiles per month for one year.\footnote{15 Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.} At this rate, the vendor would need about ten years to meet the required expansion quantity of Patriots. The Army could hire another vendor, but development and testing of the new missile would require about five years.\footnote{16 Interview with Patriot system synchronization officer, March 20, 2017.} If the testing was successful, the secondary vendor could decrease the missile time line to eight years.

An Army plan to double terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) missile batteries from 8 to 16 would also fall critically short within three years. Equipment production for these batteries is scheduled to end near the end of 2018. If a pending foreign military sale reopens the production line, the Army’s purchase of this equipment will be more affordable. Once reopened, the first battery would take three years to produce. Sustained manufacturing would then produce one to two batteries per year.\footnote{17 Interview with THAAD system synchronization officer, January 27, 2017.} At this rate, the Army would have 16 batteries in about seven years.

Ammunition production is more difficult. The combat load of a THAAD battery is 48 missiles. At current rates of production, the Army plans to acquire 60 percent of the missiles required for seven batteries by 2017.\footnote{18 Interview with THAAD system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.} Fourteen batteries could therefore be fielded, trained, and deployed by the end of 2021. Obviously, this goal could be met more quickly with additional vendors developing and producing other munitions with the same capabilities.

Given the increased demand for short-range air defense capability during 2017, the Army is reassessing how much additional capacity is required.\footnote{19 Interview with Joint theater air and missile defense system synchronization officer, March 8, 2017.} As a planning factor, the Force Management Directorate supports one such battalion per division, a growth from 9 to 36 battalions.\footnote{20 Interview with deputy division chief, December 6, 2016.} These units could be built with new technology, under the best of circumstances, within four years. The Army also plans to place the FIM 92 Stinger short-range, man-portable, air-defense weapon system in BCTs by the end of 2017 for the first time since 2004 and add Avengers to Army prepositioned stock.

\textit{Combat Aviation Brigades}

American industry would be challenged to build the aircraft necessary to double the existing 21 combat aviation brigades. These combat units require 137 aircraft each, a total of more than 2,800 aircraft. Additional aircraft would be needed for the generating force training at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The organizational plan increases the attack capability by adding Apaches, while decreasing the assault
and medical evacuation capability by subtracting UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, consistent with the vision from Army leadership.²¹

My number one need is for combat aviation. . . . the biggest gap in our capabilities. . . . Everybody knows that the Army is designed to fight with our aviation. So, the Army is trying to figure out a way to do it whether it is rotational aviation, [or] rotational troops. . . . Combat aviation is critical.²²

Building Army aviation is extremely time consuming. For each airframe, the vendor needs 12 to 18 months to reach maximum production capacity, to corner the market, and to procure steel and titanium. Even more challenging is the need to hire and train skilled laborers to manufacture the complex gearboxes, engines, and drivetrain components. Opening additional production lines would not help in the short term, and building a new facility or retooling an existing facility would take at least 24 to 36 months. New locations would gradually reach maximum production capacity in four years under the best circumstances.²³

The Army currently has 734 Apache attack helicopter airframes for an expansion requirement of 42 combat action brigades and for the training base at Fort Rucker. The airframes would take a minimum of nine years to produce at a rate of 110 aircraft per year with a start-up requirement of three years.²⁴ Maximum capacity would occur during the fifth year, and the rate cannot be increased due to the physical constraints of the production line. The limitations associated with subcomponent suppliers, such as the alloys for the compound blade and the time required to test tolerances and specifications, could be accelerated with unlimited funding, but not significantly.²⁵ At this rate, 672 aircraft could be produced in eight years. With two additional facilities, production could reach maximum capacity in five years, 330 aircraft could be produced during the seventh year, and the required aircraft would be available in nine years.²⁶

The quantity of Black Hawk assault helicopters would be extremely difficult to double within three years, but could be achieved in six. The Army currently has enough Black Hawks for every expeditionary combat aviation brigade capable of assault and for those capable of attack and assault. To increase to 42 combat action brigades and meet the increased training requirements, the Army will require an additional 700 aircraft.²⁷

The current production pace of UH-60Ms to replace the existing Black Hawk models should be sustainable through 2028.²⁸ The 30-year life cycle of the older UH-60As cannot be extended since the deteriorating airframes are unsafe. The facility could build enough Black Hawks in 36 months to equip four combat aviation brigades. With unlimited

²³ Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017.
²⁴ Interview with attack aviation system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.
²⁵ Interview with aviation systems coordinator, March 29, 2017.
²⁶ Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, March 10, 2017.
²⁷ Powell, 50–51.
²⁸ Interview with assault aviation system synchronization officer, December 7, 2016.
funding, two more facilities could be built to reach the required aircraft goal during the sixth year.²⁹

The quantity of CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift cargo helicopters for 42 combat action brigades plus the aircraft needed for training requirements could be met within five years. The Army currently has two production lines capable of producing 200 aircraft in just over four years.³⁰

Unmanned aerial systems, such as Gray Eagle and Shadow, provide commanders with battlefield reconnaissance. But, building enough for 42 combat aviation brigades cannot be done within three years. The program manager for Gray Eagles is still fielding the system to the Army. If required today, the vendor would need eight years to reach the additional 300 systems required for expansion. If prioritized, the Army could receive expansion quantity for Gray Eagle within six years.³¹ Similarly, the Army would not have enough Shadow systems within three years. The Shadow project fielded 416 systems to the Army before production stopped in 2010. An Army expansion already underway would increase the required number of Shadows to nearly 1,000 systems. Assuming a 24 month start-up, the vendor could produce enough Shadows within five years.³²

Armored Brigade Combat Teams
Due to the variety of armored vehicles, armored BCTs are the third most difficult matériel requirement to address for an expansion. Fortunately, the Army has 15 manned and 5 unmanned sets of equipment available. Nine manned armored BCTs are in the active component; five are in the Army National Guard and one rotational set is in Korea. The Army possesses enough equipment for three armored BCTs in Army prepositioned stocks. Other sets of equipment are under production. Thus, to expand from 15 to 30 armored BCTs, 10 additional sets of equipment will be needed.³³ Alternatively, the Army could issue less up-to-date equipment from depots.

Army Matériel Command owns older equipment that could be refurbished and fielded faster than new equipment could be produced. Most of the excess equipment stored at the depots would support maneuver and fires brigades as well as combat service support units. Such equipment could support two armored BCTs of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and M113 armored personnel carriers; three battalions each of M270 multiple launch rocket systems, M142 high mobility artillery rocket systems, and M119 105mm howitzers; six battalions of Avenger missile systems; and most of the medium- and heavy-cargo and fuel trucks to support those organizations.³⁴ Depending on the personnel and training time lines, the older equipment could expand the training base or undergo modernization. Moreover, if such equipment is fielded to the first expansion units, it could be replaced at a later date.

²⁹ Interview with ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017, and March 10, 2017.
³⁰ Interview with heavy lift system synchronization officer, January 11, 2017; and interview with ASA (ALT) staff, February 16, 2017.
³¹ Interview with unmanned aerial systems coordinator, March 7, 2017.
³² Ibid.
³³ Interview with force development staff, December 7, 2016, and January 10, 2017.
³⁴ Interview with Army Matériel Command liaison, March 29, 2017.
The most critical pieces of equipment for armored BCTs are Bradleys and M1 Abrams tanks. Other necessary armored vehicles include the M109 Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, the M88 Hercules recovery vehicle, and the M1 assault breacher vehicle. The BCTs will also have the new armored multi-purpose vehicles, which replace the aged M113 armored personnel carrier and share the same chassis as the Bradley. Therefore, expanding the Army by 10 armored BCTs will require building 870 tanks and 2,670 Bradley chassis.35

The shared chassis poses a challenge. Raw materials for aluminum plate armor and other key components as well as available facility space constrain production to no more than 2 armored BCTs per year with an 18-month lead time. If additional facilities are used, enough chassis could be produced within six years.36 Alternately, the Bradleys could be built and fielded before transitioning production to the armored multi-purpose vehicles. In both scenarios, the Army must coordinate aluminum procurement with the Defense Logistics Agency. Under these conditions, the Army could achieve expansion requirements within 48 months.

The Army can successfully double its tank battalions by modernizing current inventory. Nearly 2,000 M1A1 Abrams tank hulls can be refurbished before engines, transmissions, and turrets are added. After 12–18 months, this pipeline can produce enough tanks per month, to enable the Army to meet tank requirements within 30–36 months.

The upgraded Paladins would require four years to expand from 15 to 30 battalions in the active component and from 10 to 20 battalions in Guard echelons above the brigade level. Current production of the modernized howitzer systems can be expanded to meet requirements37

The desired quantity of Hercules systems can be obtained within 24 months by refurbishing current inventory.38 Notably, by ceasing conversions of A1s to A2s, space can be freed to accommodate the increased demand for the other armored vehicles.39 Expanding armored breaching vehicles would take seven years, even though the current rate of production will field enough vehicles for each armored BCT by 2022.40

**Stryker Brigade Combat Teams**

Stryker platform production could, with new facilities, be expanded to equip the force with sufficient vehicles in four years. This rate of production is enough to fill five of the nine expansion Stryker BCTs within the 36-month goal. Although expanding Stryker facilities could increase the rate of production, which would require a 24-month start-up time just to complement Stryker vehicle production, the expansion goal would still take 48 months to achieve.41

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35 Interview with deputy maneuver division chief, December 6, 2016.
36 Interview with Program Executive Office Special Project staff, January 26, 2016.
37 Interview with cannon system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and March 7, 2017.
39 Interview with Special Project Office staff, February 28, 2017.
40 Interview with Mobility Branch chief, March 7, 2017.
41 Interview with action officer, February 28, 2017.
Field Artillery Units

As part of the field artillery expansion, the M270 multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), the most lethal field artillery system, would increase sufficiently in three years with no new production.\(^{42}\) Army Matériel Command has three available battalions of equipment, so the expansion requirement would be five battalions. The production line for this equipment was closed in 2005, but older versions of the module can be modernized.\(^{43}\) The Army can procure the lighter high mobility rocket system (HIMARS) within four years. HIMARS battalions would expand from 17 to 34 and require 272 more systems. Using one battalion’s worth of unmanned systems in prepositioned stock and several owned by Army Matériel Command, the vendor can produce and field enough of these rocket systems in the next four years to fill the expansion requirements.

The cannon expansion of M777 155mm howitzers and M119s will take three years.\(^{44}\) The quantity of M777s would grow from 7 to 14 battalions in echelons above the division level and increase by 32 batteries within the Stryker and infantry BCTs. Production of these weapons, at a rate of 16 per month, ended in 2011; new production of M777s requires a two-year start-up.\(^{45}\) M119s would expand from 64 to 128 batteries within infantry BCTs, but some of the 105mm howitzers are in prepositioned stock and Army Matériel Command owns more of these weapons as part of a conversion project. Assuming an 18-month start-up, M119s could reach the expansion target.\(^{46}\)

The Army’s new field artillery radar, the AN/TPQ-53 Quick Reaction Capable Radar, will take four years to field. The vendor is currently distributing 2 Q53 radars per BCT to replace the older Q36 and Q37 radar systems. Increasing by 172 more radar systems would take a total of seven years. The Army could mitigate the shortage of counterfire systems by retaining some of the older systems. With no funding constraints, the manufacturer could also more than double the production rate within 18 months of a decision to expand.\(^{47}\) The AN/TPQ-50 lightweight counter mortar radar could increase by the required 314 systems in five years.\(^{48}\) The Army could decrease this time line if it reduced the number of systems for each BCT from 4 to 2. With unlimited funding, the vendor could also increase production to 16 systems per month.\(^{49}\)

Engineer Units

Requirements for bridging equipment, which the Army is currently short of, and earth moving equipment could be met respectively within five and two years. Unlimited funding could increase Joint Assault Bridge output to meet the fielding schedule to armored units by 2022 and restart production of the Rapidly Emplaced Bridging System production to field two bridging assets for the expanded maneuver brigades within five

\(^{42}\) Interview with rocket system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and March 6, 2017.
\(^{43}\) Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
\(^{44}\) Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, December 6, 2016, and January 25, 2017.
\(^{45}\) Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, January 25, 2017.
\(^{46}\) Interview with rocket systems synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
\(^{47}\) Interview with product manager, January 26, 2017.
\(^{48}\) Interview with radar system synchronization officer, December 6, 2016.
\(^{49}\) Interview with product manager, January 26, 2017.
years. The Army can purchase earth moving equipment quickly from commercial vendors, who can produce enough bulldozers, excavators, and other horizontal construction equipment requirements within two years. Additionally, increasing route clearance platoons to protect maneuver forces could be completed within four years. After depleting equipment in Army prepositioned stocks, new vendors, with an 18–24 month start-up, could deliver the required quantities of Buffaloes, Huskys, and Medium Mine Protected Vehicles.

Supporting Equipment

Communications Equipment. The challenge of communications equipment—such as radios, mission command systems, and the Joint Battle Command Platform—occurs not from production, which should be complete within 36 months, but integrated fielding of this equipment with the platforms described above. In fact, given enough funding, industry would be able to produce radios faster than the Army could train Soldiers. Expanding units while maintaining similar communications equipment and modernization levels, however, would be a struggle. This aspect would force prioritized fielding to deploying units, causing combatant commanders to lower communications standards, as well as focus expansion on maintaining minimal compatibility without latency throughout the force. As mission command systems are computer based, the required technologies, such as laptops and software, are easily procurable in expansion quantities.

Although the vehicle mounting hardware for the Joint Battle Command-Platform requires extensive time to install on combat vehicles and aircraft, expansion could follow the Blue Force Tracking model—the Army would synchronize procurement with unit deployment. Requirements might be adjusted by limiting systems to key unit leaders such as platoon leaders. In this scenario, no two deploying units would look alike or have the same density. Moreover, 2017 plan revisions decrease quantity of platforms by 25,000 to improve fielding velocity and decrease training time by 24 hours to allow reserve units to train soldiers during one weekend drill. The Army would try to maintain modernization levels within deployment windows to avoid interoperability challenges. Modernization is anticipated to take eight years for the existing BCTs, but the Army could decrease this schedule to three years by synchronizing unit availability with resources.

Transportation Equipment. The final large, high-density equipment for the Army are trucks and trailers. Light (80,000), medium (50,000), and heavy (10,000) trucks, with cargo and fuel capability would take about five years to complete with a production rate of 20,000 trucks per year after an 18-month start-up period. This time line could be shortened by allowing more commercial trucks, similar to Mine Resistant Ambush

50 Interview with Mobility Branch chief, March 7, 2017.
51 Interview with mobility support system synchronization officer, March 7, 2017.
52 Interview with protection system synchronization officer, January 25, 2017.
53 Interview with radio system synchronization officer, March 8, 2017.
54 Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
55 Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, March 8, 2017.
56 Interview with mission command system synchronization officer, January 26, 2017.
57 Interview with Transportation Branch chief, March 20, 2017.
Protected vehicles, or changing American industry to a wartime posture such as World War II. Either of these options would decrease the production schedule to three years.

Conclusion

For the Army to respond quickly to a great-power threat, leaders must complete the critical tasks of approving the organizational and matériel plans far in advance. World War II experience clearly demonstrates the benefits of early plans to expand the Army and its required equipment. American industry produced vast amounts of equipment in the 30 months between Pearl Harbor and the amphibious assault at Normandy. A detailed organizational plan for expanding deployable units would influence a detailed matériel plan that could be used to coordinate with American industry.

Such a collaborative effort will provide vendors with time to develop their own plans for equipment production as well as allow the Army to identify the raw materials, space, manpower, and energy needed for mass production. Synchronization with other organizational plans such as personnel, training, facilities, sustainment, and ammunition not discussed here could also occur. Estimates and plans for organization and matériel should then be updated based upon the evolving adversarial threats, industry capabilities, and other influences, even during expansion.

Assuming unlimited funding and some optimistic circumstances, equipment projections for tanks, howitzers, and other major equipment are favorable; however, shortages in theater ballistic defense, aviation, and armored units are anticipated. Steps to mitigate these deficiencies include adding vendors who can develop and produce other versions of theater ballistic defense weapons and attack aviation aircraft, leveraging Army prepositioned stock, incorporating older equipment on-hand, and purchasing new commercial equipment. In order to mitigate major transportation equipment shortages, Army leadership could change the organizational plan by decreasing units or equipment quantities as well as deploy units into battle with shortages.
Tough Sell: Fighting the Media War in Iraq

By Tom Basile

Reviewed by James P. Farwell, National Security Expert; Associate Fellow, Department of War Studies, Kings College, London, and author of Persuasion and Power (Georgetown University Press, 2012)

Tom Basile’s Tough Sell: Fighting the Media War in Iraq is really two books. The first two-thirds of the book offers invaluable insights on the first two years of the Second Persian Gulf War, relating Basile’s first-hand experiences on the ground in Baghdad as a key player in the strategy communication shop of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The final third is a polemic defending the decision made by the administration of US President George W. Bush to fight the war—a war even Bush has questioned.

Basile’s conceptual discussion about everything from strategic communication to ground realities make the book worth reading. Many challenges confront a military-civilian force attempting to establish and maintain message discipline and consistency. The cultures are competitive and finding the right balance is tough. Civilians tend to be more flexible, while the military decision-making process is bureaucratic. Soldiers are permitted to speak to the press. In Basile’s view, military personnel can get the facts wrong, make assertions that lack context, and inadvertently undercut the mission. His analysis of these challenges is incisive.

Basile, is extremely critical of the media coverage of US efforts in the Iraq War. He believes most of the press assigned to cover the war knew nothing, made inadequate attempts to get the facts, and had a strong anti-US bias. Perhaps. But “Rule 101” in media training presumes the press knows little or nothing about a topic. This lack of knowledge by the media is a continuing challenge for strategic communicators everywhere. The lesson is communication strategies in a conflict zone should anticipate and plan for the possibility—and in the author’s view, the probability—that the media will spotlight small problems and ignore major successes.

Some of the problems the author and others in the Coalition Provisional Authority experienced when dealing with the media emanated from the blowback occurring when the Authority revealed Bush’s rationale for going to war—eliminating Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction—came up short. That challenge eviscerated Bush’s credibility on the war, and affected war reporting on the ground, as journalists began questioning what the United States government was doing and how well. Basile’s detailed account of forging and executing a communication strategy offers powerful lessons for strategic communicators operating in foreign cultures, especially in nations ruled by dictators. Hussein had hollowed out Iraq. The coalition had to help Iraqis rebuild everything—from hospitals and sewage treatment plants to a new police force—from scratch.
Basile argues that in surmounting such a stiff challenge, Paul Bremer, the chief executive authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and his team got a lot done with scant credit from the media for their work. Basile also challenges top journalists like Rajiv Chandrasekaran, whose *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone* (2006) was highly critical of the Authority. Smart people often interpret events very differently. Basile shows the need to hear all sides of the argument.

Basile goes too far, though, in identifying a need to define words like “win” and “success” a game aimed at managing expectations. Successful strategy—whether communication, military, or political—requires defining a desired outcome or end state from which follow strategy, operations, plans, tactics, and metrics. In early 2003, General David Petraeus famously told journalist Rick Atkinson: “Tell me how this ends.” Linda Robinson wrote a fine book using this quote, *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq* (2008). Petraeus was correct.

Basile’s view that Bremer correctly disbanded the Iraq Army will surely spark discussion. George Packer, in *The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq* (2005), and others, citing military sources, argue the decision was a debacle that led directly to the current problems. Any book like this will ignite debates at all levels.

Basile merits high credit for his patriotic service and his thought-provoking book that provides keen insights into what it takes to make strategic communication in war zones a success and into the obstacles to good strategic communication. *Tough Sell* is highly recommended.
comprehensive account of events. For all of these reasons academic military historians generally consider “real” history impossible for at least 20–25 years after the events took place.

In *Counter Jihad* Brian Glyn Williams is deliberately attempting to split the difference between the “first draft” of history and pure history itself. In effect his book is a serious attempt to write a “second draft of history.” In this it appears he has done solid work, as far as it can be done at this point. As an individual, Williams is in a somewhat curious position, but one that places him well in undertaking such a work. An academic (a professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts) he understands the rigorous requirements that must apply to any serious work of academic scholarship. As a former contract employee of the CIA, tasked with tracking suicide bombers in Afghanistan in 2007, he understands both the military culture and the environment of war at several levels. As a professor who believes in being a teacher not just being an academic confined to mere research he also had a personal motivation: many of his students today were grade school children on September 11, 2001 and have no real idea of what happened through much of the first decade of this century.

It is worth quoting his stated objective in part: “My aim is to shine a retrospective light on the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria in order to ‘historicize’ the disparate events once collectively known as the War on Terror. The objective is to weave all these disjointed stories together into one accessible narrative that tells us how we got to the point where ISIS conquered an area in the Middle East larger than Britain or Israel with eight million people living under its rule.”

In this Williams has made quite a good start. There are, of course, gaps that may leave some dissatisfied. These, like all works, are as much a product of the person writing the book as they are of the perceptions of the readers.

Williams’ personal experiences in Afghanistan came in no small part from his experience as an expert on Islamic culture and history but also as a product of one of his earlier books, a biography on Afghan leader Abdul Rashid Dostum. It is perhaps as a result of this that his coverage of Iraq is less in-depth than some might like. The run-up to the war in Iraq is explained in detail, most especially the politically motivated manipulation and deliberate misreading of Iraqi capabilities in NBC issues and blatant lies regarding ties between al-Qaeda and Iraq. But post-Invasion Iraq, essentially the core of the war there between 2004–10, is glossed over in just 52 pages. Though I would also suggest that this may be at least a little understandable since a real study would require a book some 1,000 pages longer at least. (For this we shall have to wait for the Center of Military History to produce the Tan Books.)

All in all, the book holds up well. Not as detailed as works such as Tom Ricks’ *Fiasco*, nor as lightweight as some other brief accounts of either war. For the specifics of military campaigns or battles during our longest wars one should look elsewhere. But if you are trying to find a decent single-source narrative of how we got here, *Counter Jihad* accomplishes much of its stated intent, to present a concise single source “second draft” of history.
Los Zetas Inc.
By Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

The author of Los Zetas Inc.: Criminal Corporations, Energy, and Civil War in Mexico, Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, is an associate professor at the University of Texas, Rio Grande Valley in Brownsville. In late 2006, her family was threatened with extortion by the Zetas and was forced to flee their farmlands, resulting in her moving from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to resettle over the border in the United States in August 2009. Derived from her family’s harrowing experience with the Zetas firsthand—which undoubtedly influenced her ensuing academic research interests—a number of arguments are put forth in this work. Her propositions include “the recent violent conflict in Mexico has its origins in a new criminal model introduced by the Zetas” and the main hypothesis “that this new criminal model and government reactions to it mostly benefit transnational corporate capital” both licit and illicit alike (3, 5).

To address these arguments, a new theoretical framework—drawing upon business administration perceptions—was developed that discusses the Zetas transitioning “from a freewheeling criminal organization to a ‘business,’ albeit one that produces revenue for its stakeholders through illicit activities and the violence that it uses to intimidate both its competitors and adversaries” (5). This sets the stage for exploring the Zetas militarization, responding governmental security strategy militarization, ensuing societal militarization, and the resulting impacts on the hydrocarbon industry and energy sector reform.

The book itself contains an introduction, nine chapters, and a conclusion, as well as numerous maps, tables and figures, an abbreviation listing, acknowledgements, five appendices, notes, references, and an index. The work’s chapters are divided into thematic sections titled—The Zetas: Criminal Paramilitaries in a Transnational Business, Mexico’s Drug War: A Modern Civil War, and Los Zetas Incorporated. The work—spanning six years of research and writing—is primarily academic in orientation rather than defense community professional focused. As a result, while exceptionally well crafted—with on the ground research and interviews of over one hundred individuals on both sides of the border and the extensive use of both Spanish and English sources—theoretical discussions, author arguments, and citations woven into it make for a very dense compression of information throughout. Of particular interest is how the work balances its analysis with concerns over pseudo-conspiracy allegations—multinational corporation premeditation vs. political economy structural change—and criminal gang and cartel socio-environmental modification of areas under their suzerain (e.g. regions of narcotics impunity within the state) (215). What is striking in the work is how it reinforces recent scholarship in the defense theorist community related to criminal and plutocratic insurgency constructs—the twin insurgencies mode—as a component of dark (and deviant) globalization studies. Such mutual reinforcement is significant given
the lack of cross-pollination between the new civil wars (academic) and criminal insurgencies (defense) literatures.

Detractions to the work are twofold. An initial one—while relatively minor—pertains to the characterization of the late Dr. George Grayson’s use of “hyperbolic language” in characterizing the Zetas (10). Grayson, a respected academic, was an early researcher on the Zetas who published a number of significant monographs and books including The Executioner’s Men in 2012 (with Samuel Logan). While he indeed gets colorful in his language related to the Zetas sociopathic behaviors in his later work, the sense this reviewer gets is that Correa-Cabrera’s academic sensitivities are more offended by Grayson’s mention of victim castrations and the skinning of their bodies while still alive (which has been an active component of their psychological operations program) than Grayson’s perceived lack of knowledge about the Zetas brutality motivators (10).

The second, larger detraction focuses on her assertion that the Calderon administration’s militarization policy against the cartels “in which the military and federal police were sent to perform the duties of state and local police” was a “radical response” (107, 108). This is an unfair characterization of the Calderon administration’s policies because it had no other choice than to directly bring federal assets into the widening criminal insurgency taking place. The Zetas and the other cartels had by the time of his election penetrated and co-opted entire local and state law enforcement agencies—as well as judicial and political bodies—which resulted in sovereign Mexican territories de facto being lost to what essentially were militarized criminal entities. That Correa-Cabrera does not provide viable alternative suggestions to the Calderon administration’s security policies she criticizes underlies the fact that the “hubris of the academy” permeates some sections of her work.

Still, these detractions do not obscure the fact that the other 99 percent of the work—that is, the overall arguments it presents and information provided in support of them—are first rate. Los Zetas Inc. very much represents an important addition to research on the Zetas cartel as well as that on the narcotic wars viewed from the perspective of the new civil wars literature. It underlines the metastasis of the conflict from purely narcotics trafficking routes and plazas into territorial control of regions with great hydrocarbon wealth as well as that of other natural resources such as timber and iron ore. In summation, this “dark globalization” type work should be treated as an excellent resource on the Zetas, including presenting future trajectories for the group and its factions (e.g. the discussion of four successful business models in the conclusion), highlighting the broader modern civil war-like trends taking place in their areas of influence which include Coahuila and Tamaulipas and related to other cartel resource controlled areas (such as in Michoacán), and identifying who the winners and losers will be from this process. However, the work should not be viewed as providing anything substantive relating to new security policy recommendations meant to combat the Zetas or to counter the effects of the civil wars (e.g. criminal insurgencies—ones that are economically rather than politically driven) presently raging across many regions of Mexico.
Al-Qaeda’s Revenge: The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings

By Fernando Reinares

Reviewed by Audrey Kurth Cronin, Professor of International Security, School of International Service, American University

Al-Qaeda’s Revenge is an excellent, well-sourced monograph analyzing the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks on four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain. The worst terrorist attack on European soil since the 1988 Pan Am 103 Lockerbie bombing, the so-called 3/11 attacks killed 191 people and injured at least 1,800 others. Victims were ordinary laborers, university students, and office professionals, crammed into four packed rush-hour trains headed into the city. This book sheds new light on who perpetrated the attacks, how, why, and what it all means for anti-al-Qaeda efforts. Based mainly on police records, criminal proceedings, and information from the trials of the perpetrators, supplemented by intelligence reports and personal interviews, it is a welcome contribution.

Beyond the tragedy of the victims’ fates, the attacks set off bitter arguments about the West’s counterterrorism strategy against al-Qaeda. Sadly, instead of uniting Spaniards in shared grief, the tragedy polarized domestic politics. As the bombings happened three days before Spanish national elections, sparring electoral parties blamed the actor that benefited them politically. The ruling People’s Party, having bucked domestic public opinion to side with the US and UK in the 2003 Iraq War, publicly tied the bombings (sans evidence) to the Basque separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna. That was blatantly incorrect. The Socialists, opponents of the 2003 war, blamed al-Qaeda for the attacks. They were closer to the mark, and this book explains why.

Through a careful analysis of individuals, cells, and networks, Reinares traces the origins to Pakistan (al-Qaeda) and Morocco (the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group). Al-Qaeda was clearly involved. The book’s enthusiastic foreword from highly respected former Central Intelligence Agency officer Bruce Reidel stresses this fact.

A second debate at the global level was about al-Qaeda’s strategy and its effectiveness. In the aftermath of the bombings, the Spanish Socialists won the election and pulled troops out of the coalition, an apparent cause and effect serving bin Laden’s interests beautifully. Pundits waxed sagaciously about the terrorist leader’s ability to coerce states to withdraw from territorial commitments. Political scientists saw confirmation of their bargaining theory models. Another contribution of this study is its convincing case that these interpretations were wrong. According to Reinares, with the operation underway years before elections were called, the perpetrators couldn’t have known the date in advance (128).

Providing careful, detailed evidence, Reinares shows that the real story predated the 2004 Spanish elections, the 2003 Iraq War, and even the September 11, 2001 attacks. He demonstrates that violent jihadist cells were established in Spain in 1994 (160). The specific decision to carry out the Madrid bombings dated to a December 2001 meeting in Karachi. It was then ratified at a February 2002 meeting of Maghreb jihadist groups in Istanbul. The operational network that carried out
the bombings coalesced before the Iraq War, between March 2002 and summer 2003. So Western observers gave bin Laden too much credit strategically and too little tactically: Reinares shows that this was not a tit-for-tat operation orchestrated by al-Qaeda to sway the Spanish elections.

Third, the attack contributed to public bickering about the true nature of the global al-Qaeda movement and the implications for the US response. Some experts argued that the bombings were mainly “inspired” rather than directed from al-Qaeda central. Others saw central operational leadership calling the shots.

Hewing closely to his sources, Reinares shows that the Madrid bombings had both top-down and bottom-up elements. He argues that a critical clue for understanding al-Qaeda’s role was the weapons employed. Detonating just before 8:00 a.m., 10 Goma-2 Eco dynamite bombs were packed into backpacks and remotely triggered by Mitsubishi Trium cell phones. These particular phones, also used in the 2002 Bali attacks in Indonesia, were al-Qaeda’s “smoking guns” (so to speak), because they were exactly the same phones used for explosions training in an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan (145–46).

But local residents living and radicalized in Spain were also crucial to the operation. The dynamite had been acquired on Spanish territory, provided by a Spanish criminal gang (and its juvenile delinquent stooges). This made the attack unlike the al-Qaeda-sponsored 2003 Casablanca attacks and the 2005 London bombings, which both used TATP (triacetone triperoxide). “Previous kinship, friendship, and neighborhood ties not only facilitated the processes of jihadist radicalization, but also allowed the complete terrorist mobilization of the 3/11 network,” Reinares writes (82).

Al-Qaeda’s Revenge conscientiously analyzes the detailed evidence of a tragic incident that killed hundreds of Spaniards and altered the trajectory of global counterterrorism. Those who counter al-Qaeda should read it.
Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow: Confidential Diplomacy and Détente

By Richard A. Moss

Reviewed by William Thomas Allison, Professor of History, Georgia Southern University

Primarily driven by increased access to various documents from the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, scholarship on the most controversial presidency in American history has reached new intensity, insight, and understanding. An interesting array of scholars—from renowned historians such as Stanley Kutler, Douglas Brinkley, Jeffrey Kimball, and Ken Hughes, to more recent scholars such as Luke Nichter and Richard Moss—have brought both seasoned analysis and fresh eyes to this voluminous mountain of material. From this work, we know so much more about the politics behind Nixon’s Vietnam policy, his covert meddling in the Anna Chennault Affair, and the deeper revelation of the complicated figure of Nixon himself. It is, as they say, the gift that keeps on giving.

Welcome to this rich historiography the exciting work of the aforementioned Richard Moss. An associate research professor in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the United States Naval War College, Moss is one of the foremost students of the Nixon tapes. In Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow, Moss convincingly shows the importance of Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger’s use of back channels, principally with Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Fyodorovich Dobrynin, to Nixon’s Vietnam policy and relations with the Soviet Union and China.

Like much secret diplomacy, Nixon’s use of back channels was far from perfect but suited the needs of the moment. For a president bordering on clinical paranoia, back channels naturally fit Nixon’s complex personality and Kissinger’s sense of self-importance. Diaries, memoirs, National Security Council minutes, and other materials complement the tape transcripts Moss uses to illustrate several cases of use of back channels by Kissinger and Nixon.

Moss examines back channel roles in defusing the Cienfuegos crisis, shaping the American response to the India-Pakistan War of 1965—early talks that became the Strategic Arms Limitation treaties—and, of course, working the US-Soviet-China triangle, especially in relation to Vietnam. All of these cases highlight the crucial importance of the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship. Dobrynin had used back channels with the US government for years before establishing the unofficial line with Kissinger.

For his part, Kissinger wanted a back channel with the Soviets to manage personally discussions he believed too vital to be left to officials he viewed as less-gifted—like Secretary of State William Pierce Rogers. As Moss shows, Kissinger used the channel to slow or
to accelerate negotiations, to clarify messaging, to suggest “linkage of unrelated areas,” and as in the case of Vietnam, alert the Soviets to how the US would respond to a crisis (303). Nixon's response to the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive would have assuredly shocked the Soviets had Kissinger not prepared the ground through the back channel.

The back channel in this case allowed both parties to respond to the invasion as their constituents would expect, providing cover enough to save the Moscow Summit between President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972. Among the more interesting areas Moss discusses is the White House's special investigation unit—the infamous “Plumbers”—originally formed out of genuine concern for unauthorized leaks such as the famous Pentagon Papers. Of course, what was originally convenient but turned more sinister over time, leading to illegal acts that would bring down Nixon's presidency. Moss also briefly explores the curious Moorer-Radford Affair, in which the military basically spied on the Nixon administration. Moss contends that Kissinger's surreptitious use of back channels bred a Nixon-like distrust among the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward Kissinger and the National Security Council (304). Nixon managed to keep the imbroglio hidden to protect the back channel.

Moss shows the risks and rewards of using back channels in the highest levels of international relations. The Kissinger-Dobrynin back channel enabled détente to become a reality. But as productive as the Kissinger-Dobrynin relationship was, it outlived its usefulness once détente was achieved. As Nixon's national security advisor, Kissinger became a savant-like celebrity, and the ability to use back channels was eroded. Once he became secretary of state, Kissinger had to revert to what was in his eyes a bureaucracy-ridden system, the very same one he had so often circumvented and subverted. By that time, however, the back channel no longer served its former useful purpose.

With engaging narrative and impeccable research, Moss has produced an important addition to Nixon historiography. Nixon's Back Channel to Moscow sheds further light on what once had been mysterious and shrouded in shadows. It is an indispensable book for students of the Nixon years and those interested in the cost-benefit of back channel contacts. This book could not be more timely.

The Lincoln Assassination Riddle: Revisiting the Crime of the Nineteenth Century

Edited By Frank J. Williams and Michael Burkhimer

Reviewed by Matthew Pinsker, Associate Professor of History and Pohanka Chair in American Civil War History, Dickinson College

Three American presidents were murdered within the span of 36 years: Abraham Lincoln (1865), James A. Garfield (1881), and William McKinley (1901). During the same period, thousands of African Americans—perhaps tens of thousands—were lynched for trying to exercise their right to vote for such men. Yet, this explosion of political
violence has been obscured in American memory because it occurred after the Civil War, the nation’s bloodiest and most political conflict.

Of course, there is nothing obscure about Lincoln’s murder, yet Frank Williams and Michael Burkheimer, the editors of this lively collection of essays, are surely correct in describing it as *The Lincoln Assassination Riddle*. The complexities behind actor John Wilkes Booth’s conspiracy plot, the frantic investigation launched at Ford’s Theatre on the night of the shooting, the subsequent military prosecution, and even the lingering cultural memory of the tragic event all involve confounding political riddles. There is a sense that solving these riddles can help somehow explain the transition from Civil War to Reconstruction in a fashion that puts the enduring political violence of nineteenth-century American history into a more understandable context.

This book is part of the true crime history series from Kent State University Press. Of all the contributions to this subject—with representative titles in the series such as *Ripperology* (2006) and *Hauptmann’s Ladder* (2014)—this particular volume covers the most significant national event. For once, a true crime subtitle, *Revisiting the Crime of the Nineteenth Century*, is not at all hyperbolic. Lincoln’s assassination was arguably the central crime of American history.

What Williams and Burkheimer have done so admirably here is to present the topic in a way that captures many of its key dimensions. There is plenty of material on the political context of the attack, from a sobering analysis of Booth’s extensive Confederate connections to a learned discussion of how nineteenth-century laws of war applied to the military trial of the conspirators. There is also a precise dissection of Lincoln’s medical condition after the single bullet struck on Friday night, April 14, 1865. In addition, various essayists offer insights into the often-deceptive tactics of the professional actor turned political assassin, and readers will find several useful and compact biographical profiles of the other conspirators. Nonetheless, some of the most moving stories concern the impact of the killing on the Lincoln family and others whose lives were ripped apart by the assassination.

Nothing in this book will surprise hard-core Lincoln assassination buffs, but more casual students will appreciate the latest range of insights from leading minds on the subject presented in a series of short, easy-to-follow chapters. The roster of contributors is truly impressive including notable experts Hugh Boyle, Burrus M. Carnahan, Joan L. Chaconas, Richard W. Etulain, Michael S. Green, Blaine V. Houmes, Michael W. Kauffman, Michael J. Kline, Steven G. Miller, Betty J. Ownsbey, Edward Steers Jr., Thomas R. Turner, Laurie Verge, and Steven J. Wright.

Still, there have been two important recent books on the Lincoln assassination by authors who are not represented. Insights from Terry Alford’s excellent biography, *Fortune’s Fool: The Life of John Wilkes Booth* (2015), and Martha Hodes’s wide-ranging study on the cultural aftermath of the killing, *Mourning Lincoln* (2015), might have added further depth to this collection. Yet, what Williams and Burkheimer have achieved with *The Lincoln Assassination Riddle* is to provide a compact and effective gateway for readers who want to catch up on the range of questions historians have been chasing and trying to answer recently about the most significant political murder in American history.
The Netanyahu Years
By Ben Caspit
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Professor Emeritus, US Army War College

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu is currently struggling to address several scandals of various seriousness, including one which led to the arrest of his former chief of staff on corruption charges. These problems could potentially emerge as a threat to Netanyahu remaining in office, but his personality is always to fight to the last and never give up. Even if the attorney general indicts him, Israeli law does not require him to resign unless he is convicted of a criminal offense. Moreover, no matter how serious his problems become, Bibi has consistently proven himself to be not only a survivor, but also Israel’s most brilliant contemporary politician. Understanding Netanyahu’s politics and policies is therefore vital to understanding Israel, and providing such knowledge is the purpose of Israeli journalist Ben Caspit’s excellent but often unsympathetic new volume on the prime minister.

Netanyahu grew up in a politically conservative family moving between Israel and the United States. Bibi’s father, a dedicated scholar of Jewish history, accepted a position in the United States due his difficulty finding a position in Israel’s mostly liberal academia. Consequently, much of Bibi’s early education occurred in the Philadelphia suburbs, where, he learned to speak perfect English. After graduating from high school, Netanyahu returned to Israel and joined the elite Sayeret Matkal commandos and participated in a variety of dangerous combat operations. Later, he moved back to the United States and graduated with honors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

After various forays into business in the United States, Netanyahu became a public affairs attaché and spokesman for the Israeli embassy in Washington. Bibi performed superbly in this position due to his media friendly personality, and he was later promoted to become Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations. In New York, he again served as an outstanding Israeli spokesman and perhaps more importantly became a fundraising genius, able to charm a wide network of friendly Jewish millionaires and billionaires interested in contributing to projects in Israel.

After service at the United Nations, Netanyahu returned to Israel becoming a Likud party leader, where his American-style media and political talents, “were light years ahead of those of his rivals” (130). After serving in a variety of important posts including deputy foreign minister, Bibi was elected prime minister in 1996. Unfortunately for Netanyahu’s ambitions, he was much better at campaigning than governing, and his tenure lasted only until 1999 when Labor leader Ehud Barak defeated him by a large margin. In the aftermath of the defeat, Ariel Sharon replaced Bibi as head of the Likud. Netanyahu briefly became Sharon’s foreign minister and then finance minister after Likud won the January 2003 election. He eventually led Likud in opposition when Sharon left to form his own very successful political party, Kadima.
Netanyahu again became Prime Minister following the 2009 election. According to Caspit, he entered office with three main political goals beyond strengthening his hold on power. These were to end the Iranian nuclear program, to undermine and destroy the peace process with the Palestinians without being blamed for doing so, and “to survive unharmed the Obama administration, doing his utmost to ensure that it lasted only one term” (245). Caspit suggests that the last goal was particularly important to Netanyahu since he viewed Obama’s chief goal for the Middle East as “to make peace with the Muslim world” (256). He believed Obama had no real affinity for Israel or any serious record of working with pro-Israeli interest groups.

When Obama gave a conciliatory speech in Cairo about US relations with the Islamic world, Caspit describes Netanyahu as watching it with burning anger. Obama also pressured the Israelis to stop building and expanding settlements in the West Bank and thereby empower the peace process. Eventually, Obama and Netanyahu descended into an overwhelming level of distrust that would become “endless mutual loathing” (315). To make matters worse for Netanyahu, Obama had come to power with around 70 percent of the Jewish vote and surrounded himself with liberal Jewish aides whom some of Netanyahu associates described with the slur “self-hating” (281). The crisis became acute in early 2015 when Netanyahu delivered a speech to Congress opposing the Iranian nuclear agreement that Obama claimed as a major achievement of his administration. The speech did nothing to derail the agreement, but instead threatened to harm traditional bipartisan support for Israel. Some Democrats may have even started to view Netanyahu as a new Dick Cheney, someone they would never trust on matters of war and peace.

According to Caspit, Netanyahu turned Iran into an obsession and became thoroughly convinced Iran was an irrational, messianic, and suicidal state that would allow itself to be destroyed by US and Israeli retaliatory strikes in order to annihilate Israel. This viewpoint was not shared by either the Israeli security community or the Obama administration. Caspit maintains that Netanyahu is so certain on this issue that he will not consider divergent views and even regards himself as a modern-day Winston Churchill, opposing Iran when others sought to appease it. Moreover, Caspit also argues Netanyahu, believes he alone has “the historical, intellectual, and mental attributes to bring together all the sane forces in the world to stop the second Holocaust” (178). Netanyahu’s credibility in making such a grandiose claim may nevertheless be partially undercut by his September 2002 testimony before the US Congress in strong support of an invasion of Iraq, to which he saw almost no down side.

In sum, this work is an important, interesting and comprehensive biography but it is also a harsh critique of important Israeli and US policymakers and most especially Netanyahu. Obama, Trump, Sara Netanyahu, and a variety of other US and Israeli politicians are also taken to task on some occasions, but never as harshly as Bibi. Whether or not Netanyahu’s flaws are as profound as Caspit maintains will be for the reader to consider.
War in the Shallows
By John Carrell Sherwood

Reviewed by Martin N. Murphy, Visiting Fellow, Corbett Centre for Maritime Security Studies

War in the Shallows represents, in the author’s own words, “the first comprehensive scholarly attempt to piece together the operational history of the US Navy in South Vietnam” during the so-called American phase between 1965 and 1968. This subject has been covered already by several authors, the best known of which is probably Thomas J. Cutler who served as a naval advisor in Vietnam during 1972 prior to his appointment to the Naval Academy. His history—Brown Water, Black Berets published in 1988—drew on his personal experience supplemented by extensive interviews with others who had served in theater.

The current work is published by the Naval History and Heritage Command. Its predecessor organizations, the Naval History Division and the Naval Historical Center, published two official histories in 1976 and 1986 written, in part, by Edward J. Marolda, Dr. Sherwood’s predecessor as senior historian.

All this Dr. Sherwood makes clear in his preface and acknowledgements. What he has been able to do, however, is to take advantage of material recently released from the Command’s archives—Vietnamese documents and interviews conducted personally with former Viet Cong. He makes no claim to have unearthed new evidence sufficient to force a change in the accepted assessment of how the river and coastal wars were executed nor of the experiences of those who conducted them. This is in no way a revisionist account. Moreover, while it draws general conclusions about the Vietnam riverine conflict, the book stops well before the US withdrawal from South Vietnam and therefore does not touch upon the significant SEALORDS campaign or the hand-over to the Vietnamese. The author admits that together these topics are too large in scope to cover in the current volume and deserve separate book-length treatments.

The approach adopted is to integrate illustrative vignettes of crucial actions into a larger operational history; eschewing, in other words, the often-unsatisfactory editorial practice of isolating “action sequences” into sidebars. Space has also been found to address the humble but essential issues of selection, training, base operations, intelligence and engagement rules that made the US role successful; belatedly so, it must be admitted, in the light of the perspicacity of the 1965 Bucklew Report and the slow implementation of the measures it recommended (27–28).

The book makes no attempt to disguise the shortcomings of South Vietnam’s own forces and the roots of their problems in national (and inevitably service) politics and corruption. Sherwood rightly highlights how these shortcomings often placed US advisors in positions of great
peril and how bravery and dedication of outstanding individuals won the respect of the frontline fighters they were trying to help.

It should therefore be regarded not perhaps as a standard history but as an examination and eventual confirmation of the existing evidence. The author does not make clear when he found deviations from the existing record. It is therefore fair to assume if any were uncovered they were not egregious.

One opportunity that has been missed is to place US riverine operations in two contexts: in the thinking of Westmoreland and subsequently Abrams and their staffs and against the background of lessons learned (or ignored) from French riverine operations during the preceding Indochina War. The author touches upon the latter but only briefly.

Even though French riverine operations took place largely in the Red River delta in the north, where the geographical and meteorological conditions were quite different, the enemy’s tactics were similar to those employed subsequently in the south. For example, it was the French who stood up the precursor to the Mobile Riverine Force, the dinassauts (short for division d’infanterie naval d’assaut), a concept Bernard Fall complimented back-handedly as “one of the few worthwhile contributions of the Indochina War to military knowledge”(6). However, any dismissal of the dinassauts’ achievements (like everything else in the French commitment) cannot ignore they were severely underresourced due to France’s straightened circumstances post-World War II, one thing America’s intervention unquestionably did not lack.

What the author does confirm, however, is two things: first, after decades of what Naval War College professor John Hattendorf described as a focus on the “care and feeding of machines,” officers and bluejackets alike renewed the acquaintanceship with close quarter battle that had been such a large part of the naval service of their predecessors in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. It was not until after World War I that landings and land service had become the preserve of the Marine Corps. The Navy, individually and collectively, adapted to the unexpected demands of this vicious war with courage, imagination, and skill. Second, however brutal and unpredictable the fighting was on the rivers, in the swamps, and around the coasts of Vietnam, coastal and riverine operations retained their essentially naval character.

Wars are often dominated by logistics, and Vietnam was no exception. Naval warfare is predominantly about securing safe access to resources and communications while denying the same to the enemy. The Viet Cong depended on water transport. “Market Time,” the coastal interdiction operation, virtually closed this route, increasing the Communists’ dependence on the Ho Chi Minh trail. The great battle of the rivers was also an interdiction battle. How successful the Navy and its Vietnamese allies were in cutting the movement of material and cadres is hard to quantify, but without doubt, they introduced inefficiencies into the Viet Cong supply chain, which hampered and disrupted their operations. If US policymakers had agreed to use such measures to inject similarly persistent inefficiencies into the Viet Cong’s overland routes, it is conceivable the war’s outcome may have been different.
The United States military has conducted irregular warfare since its inception. Yet, there is no consensus as to whether this legacy is one of triumph or failure. Those with a positive view generally look to either the earliest days when the influence of the country’s first way of war was strong or to the present narrative of a combination of brainy soldiers and fearless special operations forces defeating insurgents and terrorists. Critics focus more on the intervening period, portraying a hidebound officer corps unwilling or unable to adapt to unconventional foes from Native American warriors to Viet Cong guerillas. In this brief monograph published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, David E. Johnson (who has since returned to the RAND Corporation) argues the United States has never been so good nor so bad in practicing irregular warfare as either caricature suggests, but instead has a long tradition of mixed results.

Doing What You Know consists of three parts. The first examines irregular warfare from the American Revolution through the Vietnam War; for their length, the overviews of operations in the Philippines (1899–1913) and Vietnam are particularly good. This, however, is a work of policy advocacy rather than history, and so those seeking a comprehensive account will be disappointed. There is no mention of irregular warfare in the Mexican-American War, and little on antebellum frontier campaigns or irregular warfare in the Civil War. Also, there is no discussion of independent Marine Corps operations; the “United States Army and 250 Years of Irregular Warfare” would be a more accurate subtitle.

Yet it is likely that even a fuller historical account would only reinforce Johnson’s theme of continuity. The late nineteenth-century frontier army is often caricatured as too inflexible and hidebound, while the Philippine-American War is regarded as a great success. But Johnson notes many officers served in both places and that contemporaries felt they were applying hard-won knowledge from their frontier experience to colonial counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, one thread of this continuity was a hard-hand mentality expressed in method (e.g. “water cure” interrogations) and in operational approaches, notably the use of “re-concentration” camps and scorched-earth destruction in Batangas Province.

In the second section, which examines “21st Century U.S. COIN,” Johnson notes a break with the more ruthless past; one of the defining characteristics of recent campaigns has been increased “constraints on what are acceptable methods in COIN” (71). Although Johnson attributes this shift to factors outside military control—the 24/7 media cycle and a change in societal values—his narrative suggests the military on the whole willingly accepted the more restrained,
population-centric counterinsurgency approach as expressed in the 2006 edition of *Counterinsurgency* Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Johnson does not claim the military has completely abandoned violence; he notes, for instance, similarities between kill and capture efforts like the Vietnam-era Phoenix Program and the US Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, *Doing What You Know* notes the balance between carrot and stick has tilted dramatically toward the former in comparison to previous eras.

In the final section, Johnson offers two overarching conclusions. The first is that failing to plan for transitions after a major conflict can lead to insurgency. To avoid large-scale irregular warfare, the Army should be ready to fill the postconflict security and governance vacuum. In this regard, Johnson approves of current thinking, citing the discussion of consolidating gains within the Army Operating Concept as a promising start.

In contrast, Johnson’s second conclusion—“large-scale irregular warfare and COIN are a brutal business that requires coercion”—goes against the present organizational grain, which is still shaped by FM 3-24 (82). Johnson advocates a greater willingness to “ruthlessly and violently” pursue and separate the enemy from indigenous support as was the case in earlier successful irregular warfare (85). Unfortunately, the history presented in the first section is too cursory to demonstrate conclusively that earlier hard-hand approaches were necessary for victory. Indeed, the overall record of mixed results suggests complex causal relationships.

Nonetheless, there is a reasonable case for the necessity of coercion. Irregular warfare often occurs within a strategic context in which meeting national policy objectives requires some reordering of deeply ingrained political, social, or economic patterns in a foreign land. Such changes are bound to be resisted by a wide range of actors, from those with a significant vested interest to those who simply resent external influence. The more significant the change—and changes of strategic importance are likely significant—the less benevolence, cultural understanding, and force of argument are likely to be sufficient.

Yet *Doing What You Know* stops short of advocating any particular coercive measure. Indeed, Johnson notes even the uncomfortably coercive edge of seemingly benign projects such as education; a superintendent of the Carlisle Indian School saw education as a means “to kill the Indian in him” (15). Elsewhere, Johnson ominously notes the brutal Sri Lankan campaign against the Tamil Tigers is one of the few examples of a recent counterinsurgency. Perhaps the worst outcome is that Johnson is correct in three of his assertions: the United States will again engage in irregular warfare, irregular warfare requires some degree of “ruthless and brutal” measures, and structural factors within the US and the military have caused a turn away from such measures. If so, then the problem is deeper than military tactics and doctrine and so foretells something even worse than the mixed results of the past.
The editors of *War Neurology*, Laurent Tatu and Julien Bogousslavsky, lament the fact that “war and neurology are two themes that are rarely linked, and war neurology is not a subject in its own right” (vii). While this statement must be caveated since the neurological effects of war on humans and the history of such ailments and their treatment have not escaped consistent attention, the editors are correct that the unification of war and neurology under a single subfield of study has thus far not occurred. As such, “this book intends to lay the foundation” for such a subfield (vii). Commensurate with this goal, Tatu and Bogousslavsky have put together an expansive volume delving into the history and practice of war neurology from antiquity to today.

The book begins with a general overview of the historical development of neurological practice during wartime. The ancient Egyptians were the first to record connections between battle wounds and neurological deficits approximately 5,000 years ago. “It was recognized early that head wounds were especially dangerous,” and in the close-quarter, direct combat of antiquity, “warriors tended to focus on striking their enemies’ heads in order to defeat them” (3, 1). Beyond the head, spinal cord and peripheral nerve damage suffered during combat were also given special attention. As far as mental disorders arising from battle experiences, mentions of “mental stress produced by warfare” are found in ancient literary works, but not more widely (7).

Building on this foundation, *War Neurology* covers advancements in neurological science from the Napoleonic Wars to the campaign in Afghanistan. There is also a chapter on the modern history of neurotoxic weapons, including details on their individual characteristics.

Broadly, *War Neurology* is an illustration of the intimate link between warfare and progress in medical science and practice. It has been noted that “it is paradoxical that through war, a concerted effort to annihilate man, we have learned more and better ways to preserve him” (62). But such a relationship is in fact logical. This is because the devastation of human bodies wrought by war provides “the opportunity of making uncomplicated clinical observations,” which “is rare in civil life” (43). Accordingly, “throughout human history, war and the subsequent need for treatment of war wounds has provided a fecund environment for the development of medicine as a whole. The origin of surgery is particularly rooted in the treatment of injured participants of war and combat,” and the subfield of neurosurgery emerged and rapidly developed as a result of twentieth-century wars (22).

Further cementing the link between war and medical advancement is the fact that personnel are arguably the most important weapons in the arsenal of a military force, and this makes their treatment a critical component of warfighting. Avenues of warrior degradation must be countered in order to maintain military strength and capability most effectively. Neurological impairments are some of the most pernicious
harm suffered by fighting men and women. Sides that are better able to treat and recycle injured personnel gain a meaningful advantage over opponents. As such, “while war influenced the development of medicine, and neurology in particular, medicine also helped to shape the outcomes of wars” (93).

War Neurology provides two excellent examples of this phenomenon. The first is the American Civil War. On top of advantages in funding, equipment, and manpower, Union forces also employed a superior military medical complex to that fielded by the Confederacy. This meant that “a greater proportion of the Union army was healthy than of the opposing Confederate force,” and “it can be argued that the advantages provided by medical science were a significant factor in determining the eventual victory of the Union” (105). The second example is the German military, the Wehrmacht, in World War II. Its remarkable success at the beginning of the conflict was due in part to highly mobile forward-operating medical units and streamlined methods for moving and treating wounded, including specialized neurological units and procedures. These facilitated the Wehrmacht’s quick strike blitzkrieg method of attack and “became viewed as ‘indispensable’ for the war effort” (126).

War and neurology are also connected through the use of neurological knowledge to devise weapons, enhance soldiers, and gain intelligence. War Neurology addresses the first of these areas in a chapter on neurotoxic substances and their effects. The book, however, provides no coverage of the latter two—like the contributions of neurology to research techniques, substances, and devices intended to heighten soldier cognition or induce captives to speak to interrogators—nor the ethical implications of these pursuits. A chapter considering these topics would have been a welcome addition.

That shortcoming notwithstanding, War Neurology offers an engaging, far-reaching examination that successfully lays a foundation for war neurology as a distinct subfield of study. While time will tell if this foundation is built upon, the volume is valuable in its own right and will find an appreciative audience in readers interested in military medicine specifically or seeking to add depth to their understanding of the many facets of war.

How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950

By Seth Johnston

Reviewed by Joel R. Hillison, Professor of National Security Studies, US Army War College

After NATO added its twenty-ninth member state, Montenegro, in July 2017, institutions in Europe remain under significant strain with challenges such as economic weakness in the eurozone, renewed assertiveness from Russia, persistent terrorist attacks, and a wave of “euroscepticism” emboldened by the Brexit. Any of these challenges conceivably could threaten the existence of NATO and the
European Union. To survive, these organizations will need to adapt. *How NATO Adapts* provides useful insights for shaping that adaptation. While organizational adaptation is not always an interesting topic, Seth Johnston does a masterful job of providing pertinent details while avoiding the minutia. His compelling historical analysis illustrates the institution’s adaptations—in terms of mission, organization, size, and strategy—arising from changes in the European and global security environment. Under this approach, institutions such as NATO, are often path dependent, meaning history has significant and lasting impacts on an organization’s trajectory. This book selects cases and identifies critical junctures where changes in the external strategic environment disrupted current institutional paths and presented alternatives to the alliance. Johnston argues in each of these instances that NATO successfully adapted its organization and strategic approach.

The first section of the book, which contains a literature review, will interest international-relations scholars. Policy oriented readers, however, may get hung up in the theoretical discussions. The case studies that follow will interest policymakers and senior members of the defense community.

The chapter on early adaptation is the most enlightening. During this period, the institution was still new and faced existential threats. Discussing the critical juncture of the Korean War, Johnston explains the history of the alliance, its gradual turn to nuclear deterrence, the rearmament of Germany as a member of NATO, and the alternative, but ultimately unsuccessful path, of establishing a European common army: the European Defense Community. The army was an attempt by European states to create their own collective security capability at a time when the United States was distracted by a more global confrontation with the Soviet Union. Although defeated by France—the very country that had proposed its creation—the case study in the European Defense Community provides a useful guide for how the contemporary EU Common Security and Defense Policy might be adapted. The original intent for the Community nested it within the alliance framework, which allowed France and its European allies to influence German rearmament more closely while simultaneously extending the nuclear umbrella to Germany, which had no independent defense capability at the time. While this effort failed, it demonstrated the possibility of greater European military autonomy from the United States and NATO. Brexit has already rekindled talks of a European army. These efforts might not only encourage greater EU burden-sharing for security but also encourage closer ties with non-NATO countries.

The case study of the French withdrawal from the Integrated Control and Command Structure is also insightful. France was leery of further subordination to US dominance and resented increased nuclear cooperation between Britain and the United States. France’s departure enabled the elimination of some outdated organizations within NATO and a more rational command structure created from the military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, the military committee, the Defense Planning Group, and the Nuclear Planning Group—a new NATO Headquarters with all international staff in Brussels. During the French crisis, NATO remained neutral and avoided exacerbating tensions between the United States and France. As a result, France remained
in the alliance, but outside of the military structure allowing needed organizational reforms and strategic adaptations such as the creation of a “two-tiered political structure” and the strategic concept of Flexible Response, to proceed (115). This institutional approach might be useful in dealing with contemporary issues such as an illiberal Turkey. As with France in the 1960s, NATO has the ability to adapt to these challenges without rupturing the alliance.

The later chapters look at the immediate post-Cold War and post-Kosovo adaptations of the alliance. These chapters are also relevant and equally persuasive. While not the primary tool of choice for the United States initially, NATO actively sought a role in Afghanistan and provided needed support to a stretched US military during the surge in Iraq in 2007 and subsequent surge in Afghanistan in 2010. Despite its flaws and limitations, NATO adapted and contributed substantially to these operations.

Overall, Johnston makes a persuasive argument and adds to the literature on path dependence and critical junctures. More important, *How NATO Adapts* provides historical context needed as the United States recommits to deterring Russian aggression and continues to play a role in European security and stability.
Security Forces in African States: Cases and Assessment

By Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb


Editors Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb have presented an interesting assessment tool in their Security Forces in African States: Cases and Assessment. The tool is intended to evaluate “how well security institutions are designed, governed and operated with the institutional mix” (2). The authors note armed forces can be a valuable partner in stabilization, especially in a developing country or one recovering from war, fragility, or natural disaster, but this is not their primary role. Shemella and Tomb focus comprehensively on the security sector from the perspective of effective governance and civil-military relations for attaining “traditional” national and more importantly, human security.

The authors intentionally created an assessment tool that can be presented and used quickly, acknowledging there are other more complex tools to apply and implement. The process is for “government officials, working with key personnel in each security institution (and perhaps international technical partners)” to “generate tables for each . . . security institution” to include armed forces, law enforcement, intelligence services and institutions as necessary. (19–20)

Recommending two levels of assessment to identify qualitatively how a nation distributes resources and roles and provides civilian institutional control over its security sector, Shemella and Tomb identify areas for Level 1 assessment as national branding, national security threat identification, institutional roles vis-à-vis the armed forces and the police, and the strength of the political system prevailing in the state.

The conceptual model of “national branding” is particularly useful and could be deconstructed as an entire chapter or book on its own. The idea of branding typically involves an intentional campaign to present a product or service to a selected audience. In this case, the authors suggest the audience is other governments, who will consider these “brands” as a shorthand to determine their own bilateral and regional strategies and alliances, whether this brand has been developed “deliberately or not.”
## Shemella and Tomb’s Representation of National Branding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warfighter</td>
<td>Initiate conflict with other states. Prevail militarily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender</td>
<td>Repel invasion and obtain assistance from other countries. Defend against transnational threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeper</td>
<td>Organize, train, and deploy armed forces specifically for international peacekeeping missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fireman</td>
<td>Use armed forces to perform any domestic mission that other government institutions cannot be trusted to accomplish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policeman</td>
<td>Use armed forces to enforce laws. Police in support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troublemaker</td>
<td>Allow armed forces to determine when to use coercive force against other states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are a number of obvious challenges associated with qualitative assessment in any context. As the tool is intended to affect policy formulation and implementation, and the method for populating the matrices is based on input from officials inside and outside the target government, participants must be carefully selected and encouraged to provide bias-free inputs as far as possible to safeguard the integrity of the process. This could perhaps be accomplished under an independent inspector general construct to avoid parochial responses.

The authors recommend open discussion among the chosen panel of experts but a better model might be the Delphi Method, in which experts are assigned to respond to a set of questions during the intelligence analysis process. This method is typically repeated in a preset number of rounds with the panelists made aware of each anonymized member’s prior round responses and supporting arguments. It is assumed that the panelists will be informed by their peers’ arguments and coalesce around a very few common responses. These converge into a singular assessment by a moderator selected to lead the process to ensure there is an efficient and valuable final result.

Any such collaborative process has proven merit in combining expert judgments but can have dubious value when such a group is called to assess its own organization and can result in a collection of individual resource- or prestige-based interests at the expense of the collective good. The additional danger with any such converging method requiring
a single final “answer” is degeneration of the process into groupthink, which pares the final result into a “lowest common denominator” response that is often too broad or too simplistic to be of value. The authors do not discuss the process of bias reduction, particularly when assessing nations with histories of corruption and cronyism.

One additional concern for the assessment process is that the Level 2 matrices for armed forces, law enforcement, and intelligence each include a final “outcome” described as the “culmination of efforts listed above.” Once all the outcomes are averaged to determine the Likert score for each, inclusion of this element seems to skew the results, as this item adds an aggregation of those preceding it, potentially reducing the reliability of the score itself.

Shemella and Tomb have applied the tool to ten cases in Africa with a complete set of Level 1 and 2 matrices for Mali. This case indicates that since the 2012 coup and ongoing insurgency, Malian security forces have accepted civilian control and do not pose a threat to the government; however, Mali must develop a formal national security policy with enhanced oversight and appropriate administration, training, and resource allocation to this sector to achieve sustainable national and human security.¹

**Thabo Mbeki and Julius Nyerere**

By Adekeye Adebajo and by Paul Bjerk


The Ohio University series of Short Histories of Africa promises to offer “lively biographies” as concise introductory guides to general African topics. In the case of both volumes reviewed, the series delivers.

Adekeye Adebajo fleetingly compares former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s life and legacy with that of former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, noting the outsized role each played in their country’s move toward postcolonial independence and development but each failed “to deliver the economic kingdom in the end [which] led to the political crucifixion of both prophets” (164). Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere can also be counted among such prophets, as his nation’s independence held such promise but his economic policies had similarly disastrous outcomes.

It is clear that Adebajo admires Mbeki and wishes his story was one of complete success, frequently describing him as “the most important political figure of his generation” both in South Africa and across the continent. Adebajo emphasizes Mbeki’s personal integrity and “total” commitment to end Apartheid through an entire life of service to that cause, but admits that Mbeki’s contentious yet technocratic manner, as

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¹ As the publisher of the volume is the US Naval Post-graduate School, the authors note on page 14 that this institution began educating Malian officers in 2016, while the Army War College began accepting Malian students in its Master’s program in 1998 and has since hosted seven.
well as decades spent in exile and his Western-influenced intellectual
take perspective and polish, alienated him from his own people.

Mbeki tried to enhance independent Africa's self-image through
an African Renaissance that would unite South Africa and the entire
continent, making him a more effective continental leader than a
national one. His legacy is likely to be marked more by his Pan-African
achievements in developing regional communities, particularly the
Southern African Development Community, the Organization of
African States and its successor, the African Union.

Paul Bjerk stresses that Nyerere’s commitment was to a nonviolent,
inclusive transition to independence, which resulted in a statist economy
engendering widespread corruption. Bjerk describes Nyerere's talent for
appealing to his mainly rural constituency in a multinational country
with earthy, universal themes.

Nyerere expanded the concept of “family unity” or Ujamaa to
indicate a Tanzanian and more broadly African identity embracing a
unified diversity with a socialist but classless core, which included use of
Swahili as a national indigenous, noncolonial language. This philosophy
also enabled Nyerere to enact autocratic policies through one-party rule
without fear of dissent and evading Cold War power plays in the context
of a national ethic preserving its interests. The approach also managed
to unite not only those in the territory of Tanganyika, but to incorporate
the islands of Zanzibar into the United Republic of Tanzania.

Bjerk's characterization of Nyerere is a leader wholly devoted to
his people, no matter how unfortunate the outcomes of many policies,
while Mbeki appears devoted to the cause of independence and policy
formulation for its own sake. Nyerere ironically claimed shortly before
independence in 1960: “When hunting there is no problem. . . . Problems
start when the animal has died, that's when the fighting starts” (53).
His claim anticipated that various factions tearing apart the colonial
corpse could destroy the chance for a unified independent country. The
claim also underscores an intrinsic understanding of the thorny issues of
governance with which Adebajo does not imbue Mbeki.

Mbeki is often criticized for maintaining an economic system that
continued to benefit white South Africans and empowering an elite,
educated black class, while Nyerere’s 1967 Arusha Declaration raised
alarm bells about an urban elite gradually overtaking the Tanzanian
government while the rural majority remained exploited and oppressed,
without an internal socialist revolution. As a result, such elites continue
to control the majority of South Africa’s wealth and the rural poor of
Tanzania have remained so.

Nyerere’s devotion to Maoism led to his disastrous “villagization”
program, which forced people to relocate to new farmland in “modern”
villages. The country’s inability to develop a robust industrial base
left Tanzania increasingly reliant on tea and tobacco production to
the detriment of locally-grown food, which had sustained traditional
villages. This resulted in famines, squandering of foreign exchange on
food imports, and an impressive array of illicit trade.

On social issues, Nyerere did expand the reach of health care and
education in Tanzania, with nearly the entire adult population literate
by 1980. Mbeki’s “policy of denial” in the face of Africa’s AIDS crisis is often considered his greatest failure with some critics claiming hundreds of thousands of lives could have been saved had he supported robust programs to make antiretroviral medications accessible.

One of the most interesting messages in both books is the widely held belief that no country could be truly free until all of Africa was free, which motivated African leaders and organizations across the continent to work toward independence, especially after the British relinquished control over India in 1947. These early activities have defined bilateral, regional and continental alliances and enmities to the present day.

In a message for us across time and space, after Tanzania’s successful invasion of aggressor Uganda, Nyerere stated of the resulting occupation, “We don’t want to get too involved in Uganda because we know they’ll end up resenting us. It’s an irony that no matter how careful we are, at the end of the day, they’ll resent our help” (115).

The historical context presented through the lens of key actors provides the broad and human perspective without which African politics cannot be fully understood, especially to Ohio University’s intended audience newly discovering this complex continent.
The study of leadership has become an industry, and researchers and authors have partitioned this broad subject area into several categories such as political, business, and corporate leadership; civic leadership; and military leadership. While some researchers may argue that each type of leadership is unique, it may be that all are cut from the same cloth. Examining parts may provide a better understanding of the whole of collective human interactions to achieve common goals.

The editors of *Negative Leadership: International Perspectives*, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Watola, an associate professor at the US Air Force Academy, and Commander Dave Woycheshin, of the Personnel Selections Branch of the Canadian Armed Forces, have gathered papers from a diverse group of military scholars and practitioners working at professional military education and defense research organizations in multiple nations. These researchers are participants in the annual International Military Leadership Association Workshop (IMLAW) which, since 2006, has resulted in the publication of an edited volume. Wychesin has served as coeditor for three previous volumes. For 2016, the theme is negative leadership—a timely topic given recent interest and scholarship on toxic leadership. (See a review of “Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the US Military” in the Winter 2015–16 issue of *Parameters*).

Comprised of 15 chapters, the book provides international perspectives on the phenomenon of leadership, specifically in the military context. While it is encouraging so much energy is devoted to the subject, it may be disheartening to acknowledge that military leadership, as leadership in the civilian domain, has many facets and presents itself along a continuum of good to bad, including military leaders who range from competent to incompetent and dysfunctional. Leadership may be defined generally as a process to influence others to accomplish tasks or goals. How this process is applied by individuals can have a “dark side” and, hence, a negative impact on followers and organizations. Indeed, each chapter attempts to define the nature of leadership and categorize its manifestations. In doing so, there is overlap among some chapters in the literature reviews of leadership theories, models, and competencies. The commonalities, however, allow for the designation of a cluster of individual and organizational behaviors under the umbrella of negative leadership.

The opening chapters, “Toxic Leadership” and “Why Negative Leadership Matters” provide the foundation and military context, albeit from a predominantly US perspective, for the remaining contributions. The authors cite seminal and emerging research (that have added adjectives such as abusive, destructive, tyrannical, despotic, unethical, and laissez-faire to the lexicon of leadership) and contend that militaries...
are uniquely vulnerable to negative leadership, which emanates from the “toxic triangle” of destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and conducive environments. As Stanford University professor Philip Zimbardo explores in *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (Random House, 2007), readers will ponder whether negative leadership is an either-or proposition of “bad apples” or “bad barrels.”

Subsequent chapters provide case studies and anecdotes of negative leadership that exist within principally democratic national militaries. Chapter 4, “Negative Organizations: Antecedents of Negative Leadership,” posits that attributes generally associated with individuals can be extended and applied as organization-level attitudes and behaviors. Resource scarcity and lack of staff training can result in organizational anorexia. Likewise, organizational greediness can “exact high demands [of] employees” for loyalty, time, and energy (61). Organizational narcissism demonstrated in self-aggrandizement, sense of entitlement, and rationalization can result in failure to meet the needs of stakeholders (59). Such organizational pressures would create an environment (i.e., bad barrel) conducive to generating negative attitudes and behaviors of leaders as well as followers.

Accordingly, Chapters 5, 6, and 9 (written by authors from Sweden, Canada, and New Zealand) explore what makes leaders—innate personality, learned behaviors, or organizational context—bad apples. Chapter 10 from South Africa examines military leader failures caused by incompetence or lack of character, cognitive abilities, professional knowledge and skills, and the ability to influence others. The combination of bad apples and bad barrels results in organizational cynicism, which is explored in Chapter 7 by authors from the US Air Force Academy.

While the chapters provide multiple perspectives of negative leadership, readers would have been better served by a concluding chapter from the editors with their assessment and derived insights. As such, the existing volume is an interesting and informative collection of papers, representative of the IMLAW, but without synthesis. This reviewer ponders questions that were not addressed by the editors. Are the constructs of leadership as presented in the 2004 Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Experiment study useful for the examination of negative leadership? More importantly, are there cultural differences in the perception of negative leadership among militaries?

The IMLAW does offer a valuable forum for military researchers to examine in depth specific topics with implications for military professions. The workshop’s past publications on strategic leadership development (2007), military ethics (2010), and adaptive leadership (2014) are important investigations and presentations of research findings. Accordingly, *Negative Leadership: International Perspectives* is essential reading for anyone who studies and seeks to understand the practice of military leadership. Positive and negative leadership are two sides of the same coin. While the profession of arms seeks to promote positive leadership as the vehicle to serve its stakeholders (i.e., its governments and citizens), the military has the obligation to develop institutional approaches to preclude or militate negative leadership in its ranks.
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Visual Aids: Only include charts, graphs, and photographs when they are essential to clarify or amplify the text. Images must be grayscale, a minimum of 640 x 480 pixels, and submitted in their original file format (.tiff or .jpg). It is not sufficient to submit images embedded in a .doc or .rtf file.

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