INSIDE: AUSA/PKSOI Panel Discussion Prelude

Peace & Stability
Operations
Training and
Education Workshop

PSOTEW

Preparing Leaders to
Thrive in a
Complex World
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director’s Corner</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSA Precursor Event - Peace and Stability</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOTEW Background and Introduction</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup 1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup 2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup 3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup 4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup 5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup 6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Modern History of Civil Affairs and it's Necessary Reforms</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Review on the Structure and Function of UN Integrated Mission</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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PEACE & STABILITY
OPERATING IN A COMPLEX WORLD

an AUSA panel discussion presented by
THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE
AT THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) hosted a roundtable discussion at the AUSA Conference and Event Center on September 12th 2016 on ‘Peace and Stability: Operating in a Complex World’. The event opening with a keynote address on the current status of Peace and Stability Operations, which was then followed by two panels addressing pertinent issues and challenges for the Peace and Stability Operations (PSO) community in achieving U.S National objectives.

Peace and Stability operations are a critical part of the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) mission. Promoting stability in a volatile strategic environment remains one of our nation’s top concerns. Influencing local actors and countering violent extremism requires the full range of DoD’s capabilities integrated with the other instruments of national power. Stabilization is not an activity the U.S. military may do, but is an activity the U.S. military is doing and will continue to do. With this realization, a look at the essential elements of Peace and Stability operations exhibits clear requirements and demands that shape the joint force and the Army as the primary land component force provider.

Current Status of Peace and Stability Operations

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (SHA) under the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD)(P), Anne Witkowsky provided the keynote, which addressed some of the comments from former Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Carter from the September 2016 Peacekeeping (PK) ministerial meeting in London. PSO is at a challenging moment in this rapidly changing security environment. While the world overall has become more prosperous and dynamic, producing many economic, military, political, social and technological opportunities, all of these changes created challenges and crises as well. SecDef Carter addressed this dynamic in five challenges at the PK ministerial meeting:

1) taking a strong and balanced approach to deterring Russian aggression, while leaving the door open to work with Russia where our interests align;
2) building a principled and inclusive security network in the Asia-Pacific region;
3) strengthening our deterrent and defense forces in the face of North Korean provocations;
4) checking Iranian aggression in the gulf;
5) and continuing to counter and defeat terrorism in particular accelerating the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The challenges posed by ISIL illustrates well the potential for local insurrections to grow into global threats. The factors of instability are well known, such as threats from violent extremist organizations and random acts of violence, civil unrest, and inter and intra ethnic conflict. These threats cost the lives of innocent civilians, threaten the stability of the state, and sometimes brings about state failure. It is still of paramount importance for DoD to address the challenge of bringing peace and stability to fragile nations. For peace to last in both pre- and post-conflict phases of peace operations and effective stabilization activities, conflict prevention and capacity building strategies are essential to deter new conflict. Herein lies the opportunity for positive change. Conflict deterrence and prevention is an opportunity DoD really should not miss in order to ensure the success of peace and stability operations.

Peacekeeping Operations have changed over the last 20 years with 98% of the UN missions operating under Chapter 7 mandates. Often these missions start out in ongoing conflict with harsh physical environments, like Mali, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, while other missions face a growing terrorist threat, such as in Mali. All missions are now mandated to protect civilians, while also recognizing that sexual exploitation and abuse is a major challenge to Peace Operations that significantly undermines the credibility of a mission.

Stabilization is conducted in highly complex environments, such as US extended engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Lebanon and Ukraine. OSD(P) SHA is in the final adjudication phase of a Stability policy review, which highlights the requirement to preserve expandable capabilities for conducting large-scale, long-duration stabilization efforts in Phase 4. This review emphasizes the optimization of DoD’s defense support to stabilization, synchronizing defense activities to support or reinforce civilian stabilization efforts in designated fragile and conflict-affected areas outside the US. Lessons Learned from the past 15 years in Afghanistan and Iraq are being compiled into a format translatable into current complex and small-footprint operations in places like Syria and Iraq’s fight against the ISIL. OSD(P) SHA is completing a biennial assessment, which is conducted from a Combatant Command (COCOM) perspective, as to whether the COCOM is afforded the appropriate resources, talent and processes to conduct stabilization activities. The assessment looks at DoD’s roles and responsibilities, and identifying core stabilization tasks. The well-established lanes in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations provides an effective framework for developing these roles, especially when in support of another agency, such as USAID or State. DoD has a responsibility to share views, expertise and liberal planning capabilities with the IA, even when not solicited, as only in this manner will true IA coordination occur.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (SHA) under the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD(P)), Anne Witkowsky provided the keynote, which addressed some of the comments from former Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Carter from the September 2016 Peacekeeping (PK) ministerial meeting in London.

DASD Witkowsky closed with a few observations and recommendations from her tenure. First, fragile states and transregional threats make partnerships imperative for PSO, and these challenges can only be effectively address in partnership with international, interagency, and non-governmental entities. Secondly, the USG needs a more holistic, strategic and selective approach in applying resources, especially DoD in light of the inferred false narrative that resource constraints have narrowed DoD’s options to choose only kinetic and readiness activities or stabilization, as both are required to succeed. DoD has a collective stabilization hangover, creating a reluctance to even say the word, which foments a lack of real interagency (IA) collaboration for steady state planning, which could lead to overlooked future conflict regions, since no dedicated effort for stabilization exists to assist Washington-level planners in forecasting potential operational environments, as well as understanding resource availability for such a stabilization event. DoD has great partners in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) at State and USAID, but IA connectivity, despite our collegiality, has still not achieved an acceptable level of maturation. No one at the COCOM level owns stabilization, and although the Embassy’s country team works well on steady state security cooperation, there is no intimate knowledge of stabilization related issues. The current complex stabilization environments require highly flexible organizational structures to assist in the application of more adaptive authorities in a comprehensive way. DoD needs to clarify its roles and responsibilities, as the phased approach to military operations is challenged by the new world dynamic in which stabilization does not necessarily follow combat operations, such as the case in Syria. Stability end states need to be defined from the outset. Funding and authorities remains a perennial DoD challenge for stabilization activities. DoD should research whether a congressionally approved, stand-alone authority would facilitate cooperation and coordination with USAID and DoS to buttress IA synchronization efforts during a crisis requiring quick responses. In the meantime, DoD and the IA should creatively cobble these disparate resources and authorities in the best manner possible. In closing, stabilization efforts pay dividends, whether in stemming the spread of violence, maintaining a hard won piece, or preventing conflict from erupting.

Stability

The first panel considered Stability Operations opportunities, and was composed of representatives from the U.S Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, the RAND Corporation and the Army G-3/5/7 staff. Each panel member briefly addressed their organization’s role in stability, then opened for questions.

One challenge to IA collaboration is non-standard definitions, for example, USAID considers Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief to be synonymous, equating to a complex, officially declared natural disaster, man-made or otherwise. In DoD terminology, Humanitarian Assistance can mean development, transition or stabilization. USAID has separate activities that focus on long term development, transition and stabilization. From a definitional standpoint, “Stabilization” lacks distinction as well, and has come to encapsulate Counter Terrorism, Defense Institutional Building and tackling Transnational Organized Crime. The term needs to be streamlined and re-focused on the true intent and meaning of Stabilization among all IA members.

Three USAID initiatives were highlighted as unique applications of stabilization concepts. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTTI) created an inventive program with no USAID branding and embedded staffs within the various FATA agencies, posing as FATA representatives. The program expanded to Karachi, with a campaign slogan of ‘I am Karachi’, which aimed to bring people of different races and ethnicities and political parties together. As part of the campaign, they launched a nationwide effort of a cartoon called the Burqa Avenger. The cartoon went on to win prestigious international awards and was seen as a great effort at providing girls a role model they could relate to. The second initiative in Agadez, Niger, aimed at bringing different tribes and comm-
-unities together. Interestingly, just as the money for this project was about to run out, DoD provided additional funding as it was impressed by the initiative. The last initiative was in a remote area of eastern Mali, and used local partners to bring fractured communities together.

Measuring impact of stabilization activities is quite challenging, such as proving the negative impact of programs, or determining if money spent on stabilization actually deterred enemy elements. There are metrics and frameworks that try and measure deterrence, but impact is still illusive, which is a challenge because Congress will always be interested in the impact of stabilization expenditures. Institutionalizing an effective relationship between DOD and USAID will require daily collaboration, which must then be imparted onto Congress to show the utility of collaborative stabilization efforts, especially with regard to relaxing authorities to allow such interaction to occur more freely.

Much can be learned through researching history, as there is a very large body of experience to be drawn from. A vast number of studies have focused on assessments, which can provide many valuable lessons that can be applied to current situations. Vietnam and the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development structure, commonly referred to as CORDS, provides an illustrative example for unity of effort and Unity of Command. Unity of Command arose as a challenge most recently in Iraq. History addresses the role USAID and the country team enacted to pull the US effort together into a combined program in Mindanao. The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) program is a lesser studied area that has produced many reasonable stability recommendations, such as focusing on collecting the raw materials to ensure an accurate assessment can be made of programs, while also developing the most accurate metrics. Gathering and sharing the right information is fundamental to learning from our past experiences. The community has been working towards definitive, rigorous answers for successful and not successful stability practices, as well as the best assessment practices.

Multiple assessments show that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US tended to prioritize combat over the Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission of building new institutions. One exception was the effort to raise the Afghan local police, as an attempt to define a culturally appropriate model for local security. The US has largely prioritized tooth over tail in institutional development, and still has not developed an effective police training model, which has always been second in priority to building military institutions. The Philippine history makes a case to posit that SFA is most effective when coupled with providing operational assistance in the field to the training unit, as this provides an opportunity for advisors to accompany a real world mission and observe the effectiveness of the training. Through direct observation of operations, advisors can revise training program, while also providing long term mentoring.

Mapping out stabilization priorities is vital. Civil Security, Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Infrastructure, and essential services all need to be done with the same efficiency as security force assistance. A more refined framework for collaboration with defined roles between NGOs, IOs and the military is essential for the success of SFA missions.

Stabilization is very much a political endeavor in which DoS is directly involved in diplomacy. However, DoD and USAID need to manage the middle ground with management and oversight from state. DoS manages the middle ground through policy discussion as in Yemen, dialogue and engagement, spoiler management, and convening partners, such as the Europeans in Africa. A three dimensional model of the operational space to guide collaborative operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels is vital for stabilization efforts. If military operations are not immediately followed by stabilization efforts, a hole is created for the reoccurrence of instability and conflict. The structure of the Army needs to be optimized to enhance IA coordination, which is actually functioning well in the field. The dynamics of military operations are now different as there is no cold start now, since there is usually some sort of USG presence already present and active in the field. The US Army is unifying efforts and focusing on integrating soft power as a war fighting function.

**Peacekeeping**

The second panel addressed Peace Operations opportunities, and consisted of panel members from OSD(P) SHA, DoS’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Joint Staff J-5’s Global Policy and Partnerships Division, the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and a previous staff officer for the UN mission in Southern Sudan. This panel followed the same construct as the stability panel.

The strategic environment of peacekeeping operations has changed, and the UN is not designed to conduct the robust peacekeeping missions currently being undertaken in South Sudan and Central African Republic. There were 50,000 new pledges to support peacekeeping operations, which may have been facilitated by the US and the UN signing a logistical agreement, which drove down costs for the UN. UN missions serve a good strategic purpose and actually benefit the US military, in that the more available UN troops, the better the understanding
of the environment. The success of the UN missions in Haiti and Liberia benefitted greatly from the USG efforts, and such mission are likely to grow in the future.

The UN and US have a quasi-symbiotic relationship in Peacekeeping missions as both elements need each other as each brings unique capabilities and experience to a Peacekeeping mission. Modern day peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex covering a range of activities from stabilization, state building, counter insurgency and counter terrorism to Responsibility 2 Protect, all of which require different expertise, but peacekeepers are tasked with carrying them all out. The UN continues to broaden the base of peace operations.

Cohesion increases the opportunity for success in missions, which was underscored by General Dempsey’s words stressing the importance of “standing together”. US military presence on UN peacekeeping missions is a show of political force, which enhances the credibility and capabilities of the UN force. The incorporation of US military on UN missions would also embolden mission participants, leading to greater efficiency. The US military would benefit from participation in UN missions by testing deployment readiness, honing skills, and gaining valuable leadership experience. A US military presence would also provide an opportunity to interact with new partner nations, which may not have occurred otherwise.

US involvement in UN missions will likely be small contingents. The three options for the USG to take in the face of a crisis are: do nothing, do everything or work with partners. Somalia is an example of doing nothing, as DoD was forced to change their tactics to deal with the Al-Shabbab threat. The complexity of peacekeeping missions is such that every mission needs to be looked at differently. Present day peacekeeping are unlike previous post-conflict operations and more resemble stabilization operations today. Any peacekeeping operation with US military involvement, always results in a more capable Host Nation military force, creating a more reliable partner in the future.

The state of affairs in South Sudan is problematic, but not unsolvable. The greatest challenge to the peacekeeping mission is a difference between the language of the charter and the actual capacity of the mission. The rebels and involved groups have good massing power, and the involved groups are not only the government and opposition, but the militias and the tribes as well. Because the individual South Sudanese’s allegiance is to the sub tribe and the tribe first, any concept of nationalism is a secondary motivator. The UN peacekeeping forces are not adequately supported, and bad weather and poor infrastructure often makes the mission logistically immobile. Recounting the terrible atrocities common in South Sudan, peace will not be on the horizon anytime soon. Enhanced political engagement is necessary to increase the mission’s effectiveness. Gender inequality and race discrimination are major hindrances to mission progress. In order to resolve the conflict, the mission must gain a greater understanding of the local culture, and as a result the people, so mission objectives will align with local expectations and desires, increasing the potential for Host Nation popular support.

**Way Forward**

Many of the considerations and concepts incepted at the AUSA round table helped shape the thematic discussions and topics in the PSOTEW WGs, specifically those dealing with “Identifying characteristics of sustainable stability curricula”, “Transitional Public Security”, “Training for Senior Leaders in an Advisory Role”, and the less apparent application of Responsibility to Protect, which encompasses “Women Peace and Security”. The findings from the 2017 PSOTEW will subsequently drive discussions at the 2017 AUSA round table discussion entitled “AFRICOM: 10 years in the making as a model for Stability Activities”, which will be held 18 September from 0900-1645 at AUSA. This panel discussion will address whole-of-government progress in the PEO environment with a focus on AFRICOM. To kick off the discussion, PKSOI will present their findings from a U.S. Army War College Integrated Research Project (IRP) on improving a whole of government approach to crisis using AFRICOM as a case study. A panel of experts will use the IRP findings as a template for comparison with some of the emerging challenges within the AFRICOM theater, while applying a whole-of-government approach to fulfilling national interests. A second panel will apply the principles from the IRP project to a Lake Chad Basin case study to determine whether they would alter the existing strategy for that region. A third panel will explore the opportunities and challenges that await AFRICOM and its partners in the coming decade and beyond.

Abdullah Rumman from Pakistan is an intern at PKSOI at USAWC in Carlisle, PA. He is entering his sophomore year at Dickinson College, where he is majoring in International Studies with a focus on International Development. He hopes to work of an International or Non-Governmental Organization in the future.
Intro & Background

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) of the US Army War College facilitated the eleventh Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW) from April 5-7, 2017 at the Montgomery County Campus of Johns Hopkins University. The workshop is for trainers, educators, practitioners and actors relevant in Peace and Stability Operations (PSO) from around the world. The forum provides an opportunity for participants to share best practices and work through identified challenges while building community relationships, sharing tools and methodologies, and increasing awareness among stakeholders. Senior leaders in the PSO community address emerging challenges to set the stage for workgroups led by subject matter experts. At the conclusion of the workshop, the workgroups present solutions to a senior leader panel to receive direction on which initiatives to pursue or modify from a training and education perspective, and to establish the way forward for the coming year.

Concept & Objectives

The workshop brings together civil and military leaders, trainers, educators and practitioners from American and International Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations, civilian and military training centers, and academic institutions to collectively produce materials. The materials produced are expected to comprehensively and cohesively address the issues facing Peace and Stability Operations globally. In this process, the existing organizational doctrine is enhanced based on the latest lessons learned and industry trends. The goals for the workshop are:

- to produce products that can be used to train and educate the joint force and international partners on peace and stability operations (doctrine/exercises/lessons learned, etc.)
- to provide a forum that addresses the equities of the community of practice (governmental and non-governmental agencies) and its activities;
- to foster collaboration between the joint professional military education and academic communities;
- to inform and support senior leaders, to monitor progress, and to provide feedback on the recommendations over the next year.

These goals ensure that future challenges in the complex and ever changing operational environment are addressed and resolved.

This PSOTEW consisted of six workgroups (WG) that address a specific PSO challenge. Certain experts are targeted for inclusion in each WG, and the remainder of the personnel self-select according to their areas of interest, while ensuring representation of diverse backgrounds. A facilitator is assigned to each WG as it tackles problems facing PSO the community of interest. The WG details follow:

WG 1: Guiding Principles review and broader applicability

Between 2007 and 2010, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and PKSOI, along with other partners co-authored three seminal manuals to inform the stabilization space. These publications include: the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), and the Guide to Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations. Two case studies were used to assess the need for substantive revisions to existing principles for stabilization and reconstruction. The deliverables were: an assessment of the applicability of the publications in light of...
the case studies, and draft recommendations for additions and removals based on specific environments.

**WG 2: Intelligence to Counter Transnational Organized Crime as a Driver of Conflict and Instability**

WG 2 attempted to develop a methodology to identify observable activities common to criminal groups to enable mitigation strategy development when combined with social network analysis, geospatial analysis and other analytic techniques. The result was a new analytic model called the Basic Activities Identification Template (BAIT).

WG2 members were tasked with using the BAIT to observe activities of a number of violent groups and help identify mitigation strategies from the findings. The deliverables included an expert-tested analytical model for identifying activities of all types of violent groups and a training manual and process for analysts to identify destabilizers’ activities on which are based effective mitigation strategies.

**WG 3: Identify characteristics of sustainable stability curricula for a pan-agency audience by examining past successes and failures, discussing future policy shifts, and sharing best practices in planning**

As the US approach towards stabilization is shifting from large footprint, long-duration efforts to selective small-footprint, short-duration strategies, the education and training approaches must also adapt. This WG discussed current and anticipated stabilization challenges and factors for success in order to identify the Knowledge, Skills and Abilities (KSA) for future stabilization curricula.

The objectives of this WG were to enhance shared understanding of sustainable stability; identify the core components of stabilization training applicable across audiences; develop a list of tools for use in stabilization training, such as exercises, case studies, knowledge, skills, and abilities; and outline next steps for design and implementation of curricula.

The deliverables were a summary of key competencies and gaps, baseline recommended case studies and exercises, and a proposed way ahead with stakeholders to continue collaboration.

**WG 4: Transitional Public Security – The USG response**

DOD Directive 3000.05 (DRAFT) Stabilization recognizes the primary stabilization sector responsibility as civil security. JP 3.07 includes Transitional Public Security (TPS) as a primary task of the military as it transitions to host nation or other competent authority. Yet within DoD, there is a lack of consistency within the DOD in understanding what it means and thus creating inconsistent publications and training and educational efforts.

The WG 4 objective was to consider TPS in light of policy, and determine a cogent and consistent DOD approach that is complementary to interagency partners’ efforts. The deliverables were to develop a clear understanding of TPS; identify the necessary KSAs to conduct TPS; integrate TPS efforts into broader interagency police reform and stability policing efforts; and outline an ideal TPS Program of Instruction.


The USG is deeply committed to the participation of women in advancing peace and security throughout the world. Consistent with this commitment, in December 2011, the inaugural US National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) was released to help chart a course for the USG to advance women’s inclusion in conflict and insecurity mitigation. In 2016, the NAP was updated to identify areas that call for new or renewed focus. WG 5 will propose congruent updates to DoD WPS implementation guidelines with the goal of reinforcing the USG commitment to the foundational principle that states, "societies are more peaceful and prosperous when women are empowered to realize their full potential through full and equal rights and opportunity."

The WG produced specific recommendations for updating the core requirements of the DOD WPS implementation guide to replace the 2013 guidance. The WG also proposed a way ahead with stakeholder leads and a summary of the WG discussion.

**WG 6: Training for Senior Leaders Going into an Advisory Role - Is there a training & education gap?**

WG 6 reviewed the alignment of the troop to task mission within the Executive-Generating-Operating function (EGO) construct as a guide. The workgroup then examined whether the creation of minimum training requirements or a critical examination of the Security Cooperation (SC)/Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission and end state will enhance senior leader training and education and ultimately the conduct of missions. To determine the appropriate training & education requirement for senior leaders, the workgroup sought alignment in: 1) a clear U.S. diplomatic, development, defense mission/ endstate; 2) a clear troop-to-task review of the mission to
determine the required capability and capacity for U.S. defense efforts; and 3) a clear review of interagency/interational support that may inform whether U.S. defense efforts are ineffective or redundant.

The WG reviewed a Case Study (or scenario) to determine potential gaps in endstate, planning or execution. The WG provided recommendations for senior leader identification, training and guidance within the EGO function construct. The deliverables were a proposed SC/SFA framework to understand interagency coordination gaps; a recommended structure, policy, procedure for SC/SFA implementation; and training and education advising requirements for implementation by particular senior leaders and organizations.

Stability Policy Update

Colonel (COL) Aaron Reisinger opened the conference with a stability policy update. COL Reisinger is a former strategist within the Stability and Humanitarian Affairs office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

COL Reisinger acknowledged DoD has an existing hangover with stability operations largely due to the current policy statement DoDI 3000.05, which his office is responsible for. In the policy statement, Stabilization is defined too broadly and focuses too much on large scale, long duration and very expensive engagements. History shows that combat and stabilization activities occur concurrently and can be conducted on a very small scale, both with or without DoD. Victory will be temporary in any combat operations without the consolidation of gains through stability activities. Despite the five key aspects of a sustainable stabilization framework (security, military support, public order, provision of immediate needs, and support economic and governmental stability), stabilization still does not have an agreed upon, across-the-board framework. Without a clearly articulated definition of stability as a way to achieve national security objectives in policy and concept documents, the service components cannot develop specific capabilities to meet the stabilization needs. The policy statement needs to further refine the core capabilities necessary for the joint force to conduct stability activities.

The new policy statement will limit Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) to a single line, in order to bifurcate FHA from stabilization, so that FHA is seen as a needs-based activity, while stabilization is a political-based activity. This change does not undermine DoD’s legal and moral perspective to provide for the immediate needs of a population as an occupying force. Another policy concern was that Security and Rule of Law definitions were confusing. Security will remain a terrain-based activity providing internal and border security, so people and goods can move freely throughout the country. Security Activities are DoD’s primary function, and foster a sufficiently peaceful environment, allowing for the conduct of all other stability tasks. Where as, Rule of law predominantly is military support to Public Order, known as Transitional Public Security (TPS). TPS entails not only basic protection of civilians and property, but also the introduction of large-scale, policing, judiciary and corrections system development.

Pointing out the challenges within the USG machinery, DOD’s transfer of mission authority to the State Department is often less than efficient. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is making strides to create greater efficiency in this process. During the question and answer phase, topics such as interagency problems and a lack of across the board coordination were broached. Isolating objectives is vital in stabilization efforts and policy development. These objectives need to be drawn in accordance with internal and external interests, while leveraging external experts to help solve current challenges facing PSO.

Keynote Speaker

This year’s keynote speaker was Patrick Dulin, who serves as the executive director of the Mission Support Directorate, Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Dulin’s portfolio includes Performance Based Logistics and Management Support. Mr. Dulin pointing out that Operational Contract Support (OCS) is a highly valuable tool for ensuring the synchronization of contracts. Problems will arise if OCS is not conducted effectively, even with a thorough contract oversight mechanism. To illustrate this, in Kyrgyzstan, despite implemented
oversight mechanisms, contract synchronization was absent, which led to numerous problems.

OCS specifically offers DOD support to all branches of the USG. But for OCS to be an effective tool, the entire process must be coordinated between all involved branches of the government. Coordinating OCS activities across all agencies is an enormous challenge.

Afghanistan was a prime example of the challenges of coordinating OCS across multiple agencies, not only in regard to US to US contracts, but also coalition and local security contracts as well. The contractual objective in Afghanistan was the procurement of Afghan security. Even though immediate operational input was achieved in the war era, after Karzai departed office, Ghani’s refusal of contracts led to operational problems. Foreign Vendor Vetting aims to mitigate threat by identifying potential illicit groups and personnel in the vetting process. The problem this poses in many cases is that the locals are only told to refuse the offer of a specific vendor, often without specific reason, which not only creates mistrust, but also makes the locals feel like the US is simply dictating its will.

Clearly defined priorities greatly facilitates operational merit, as was noted during hurricane Matthew in the Caribbean, where the foremost priority was rebuilding infrastructure. Operation United Assistance (OUA), which was AFRICOM’s response to the Ebola outbreak, was an entirely different OCS dynamic, which ended faster than estimates because of a more benign and less hostile environment. This dynamic occurred because the entire operation was largely civilian contractor-led with a limited military support package, giving the entire operation a more friendly appearance. This made the local population more willing to engage and lowered barriers.

Flexible, commercial support contracts are essential for successfully achieving objectives in Crisis Response and Stability Operations.

Out Brief Panels

During the final day of the PSOTEW, the WG leaders briefed a panel of selected senior leaders on their group’s efforts, conclusions, and recommendations. The out briefs allowed the panel members to ask questions and provide immediate feedback to the WG leads. At the same time, these interactions elicited further questions and discussion from the entire audience. The dialogue created during the out briefs is one of the key components to learning that occurs during the PSOTEW. The panel members are invited based on their areas of expertise nesting with the focus of the working groups. This year’s panel members were: Mr. Mark Swayne (Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs), Mr. Patrick Dulin (Executive Director of the Mission Support Directorate, Defense Logistics Agency), BG David Glaser (Commanding General, U.S. Army Corrections Command, and Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command), BG William B. Mason III (Deputy Commanding General Director, Institute for Military Support to Governance).

The PSOTEW concluded with observations and guidance from Mr. Mark Swayne and closing remarks by COL Greg Dewitt, the PKSOI Director. While Mr. Swayne lauded the efforts of all participants, he focused his guidance on those groups that he felt had moved their efforts far enough forward for his office to provide support for continued work. Those groups were WG3 Identify characteristics of sustainable stability curricula, WG4 Transitional Public Security and WG5 Women, Peace, and Security. COL Dewitt recognized the members of the Outbrief panel for taking time from their schedules to provide insights to the PSOTEW efforts, and then challenged the audience to move forward with Mr. Swayne’s guidance, while also providing critical feedback to increase the 2018 effectiveness!

Abdullah Rumman from Pakistan is an intern at PKSOI at USAWC in Carlisle, PA. He is entering his sophomore year at Dickinson College, where he is majoring in International Studies with a focus on International Development. He hopes to work of an International or Non-Governmental Organization in the future.
Background:

The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Guiding Principles), published in 2009, was the first effort to consolidate experiences and lessons for civilians engaged in peacebuilding missions. TheGuiding Principles was informed by institutional documents from bilateral and multilateral donors, who participated in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions. Inputs from over 2000 documents from donors revealed a high level of convergence on key principles, which are distilled out into this publication. As a result, the Guiding Principles was able to translate the concept of the comprehensive approach to stabilization and reconstruction into concrete considerations, illustrated by empirical examples. The resulting publication underscored the intersection of functional fields of assistance through a number of cross-cutting principles and highlighted the challenges of managing trade-offs between short-term and long-term objectives as well as conflicting objectives.

Developed by the United States Institute of Peace and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), the manual offers two important contributions: 1) a comprehensive set of shared principles and 2) a shared strategic framework. The “Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction” is based on a validated construct of common End States, Cross-Cutting Principles, Necessary Conditions and Major Approaches. Although it has never been officially cleared or adopted by any one contributor to guide its actions, it has been widely used in the United States and overseas. Since 2001, civilian and military actors have been required to operate together through all stages of the conflict cycle to a degree unheard of since post World War II reconstruction. Nevertheless, this interaction is only likely to increase, even as resources diminish, underscoring the importance of improving common understanding, effective communication, and when desirable, collaboration.

Therefore, the leaders of this working group wanted to assess the relevance and utility of the Guiding Principles for contemporary S&R missions of today, and to examine its applicability to missions located in other parts of the conflict spectrum.

Working Group Objectives:

The working group had three objectives:

- To evaluate the utility of the Guiding Principles to S&R missions in the current operating environment;
- To identify sections of the Guiding Principles requiring revision: what should be those revisions, what additions and deletions are appropriate to current challenges; and a potentially more useful/absorbable format of publication;
- To test the applicability of the Guiding Principles beyond S&R missions to a Transition case like Somalia.

Working Group Deliberations:

Beth Cole, USIP lead author presented the genesis and purpose of the Guiding Principles. COL James Schultze (PKSOI) followed with the practitioner survey findings on the continued relevance of the Guiding Principles. These two presentations were meant to launch WG discussions.

Working group participants initially discussed the continued relevance of the Guiding Principles to contemporary S&R missions. Specifically, they debated the time frame, scope, terminology and empirical evidence.
Participants then examined the applicability of the Guiding Principles to a transition case—Somalia. The Somalia case was provided as a read-ahead to participants. The case highlighted a number of inflection points that influence contemporary and future developments in Somalia with a focus on the forthcoming drawdown and end to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Conclusions:

The group agreed that the Guiding Principles are still valuable, but would benefit from updating. Recommendations for revisions that emerged from working group discussions include:

- Add an Executive Summary to reflect the document’s utility to practitioners and policy makers.
- Revise terminology; e.g. from “Stable Governance” to “Viable Governance,” “Cross-cutting Principles” to “Overarching Principles.”
- Emphasize “Overarching Principles” as the point of departure for planning each functional area in the document.
- Examine utility and implications of combining Rule of Law and Stable Governance.
- Change the title to “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Recovery” to reflect a more realistic scope and time frame; and address a common critique that the original document was more applicable to “nation building” – a currently pejorative term.
- Review other concepts for possible inclusion; such as, resilience, corruption, countering violent extremism.
- Review the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and Sustainable Development Goals for complementary concepts.
- Add case studies and vignettes to enhance concepts.
- Integrating components of the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) publication into the Guiding Principles.
- Explore other publication formats than the hard copy textbook – e.g. E-book, App, etc.

Next steps:

A number of possible next steps were identified by the group:

- Assess the value and cost of merging Guiding Principles and MPICE.
- Continued outreach to those interested in participating in revising the Guiding Principles.
This Working Group (inaugurated in 2016) was formed to address two developments within the United Nations (UN) Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). First, UNDPKO acknowledged the growing evidence of the detrimental effect of transnational organized crime (TOC) on peace and stability. Second, the UN also initiated parallel efforts to integrate intelligence methods and better information sharing practices at the mission level.

The work group opened with a review of the results from the 2016 working group, which established that all transnational violent extremist groups engage in some degree of criminal activity for funding, and that by assessing observable activities in the peacekeeping mission environment, rather than analyzing ideological traits, peacekeeping missions can develop strategies to mitigate these malign actors in the operating environment.

To this end, two objectives were set for 2017: 1) Assess the value of the Basic Activities Indicators Template (BAIT) as an analytic model for identifying characteristics of transnational organized crime groups in conflict areas 2) Evaluate the quality of the training method and manual for using BAIT.

Recent research has underscored the fact that UN mission analysts typically receive limited technical and analytical skills training. With that in mind, the working group focused on ensuring all content in the analytic template was as clear and unambiguous as possible. To validate the model, the working group moderator went through a practical demonstration of BAIT. As illustrated in Figure 1, the template is built on an MS Excel spreadsheet, coded with drop-down menus, and populated with items from which an analyst in the field would select pertaining to observed criminal organization operating within that environment. These fields are generally grouped into categories relating to the group’s Objectives and Activities, Use of Violence, Locations and Associations, and whether and how it engages in Alternative Governance.

The bulk of the group’s time was spent debating terms in the Excel template in order to ensure activities and attributes of a given group would be captured appropriately. This led to debates on the precise wording and nuance in understanding the exactly meaning of each term.

This process led to six key recommendations for implementing the BAIT model, the first four centered on improving the model itself and the last two on training for the employment of the model. The WG participants realized the terms chosen for the model may not have the same meaning for UNDPKO personnel. In order to develop effective training for field-based analysts, the UN should create a detailed lexicon for the BAIT model based on existing UN doctrine and policy language in order to achieve a shared understanding at all levels and across all missions. The bulk of the BAIT training model will likely focus on the effective use of this lexicon.

WG participants also noted the model lacked two crucial analytic elements: time and space. To overcome the first, a time and date stamp will need to be included in the model to ensure the periodicity of the information is always easy to discern, while also enabling longitudinal analysis.

The BAIT model must also identify specific locations or regions in which the organizational activities occurred, so higher echelon analysts can better geolocate activities. Geospatial analysis and mapping tools may be rudimentary or disparate at the UN mission level, making the sharing of data difficult and a common geospatial operating picture nearly impossible. Therefore, locational information can be augmented at higher levels of analysis, but it is essential that it is captured within the initial data entry phase by the field analyst in in the BAIT construct to ensure the integrity of the analysis.
The group also kept in mind that what is most important to the mission team is what is directly affecting its immediate area. The BAIT assessments should be of the local subgroup of the transnational criminal organization and its activities conducted in the mission environment. The assessment should not focus on the organizations illicit activities around the world, although an overview dossier would be useful to ensure a contextual grasp of its activities and capabilities.

Uncertain what precisely the local conditions will be for those who collect the indicators needed to populate the BAIT template, the group recommended that the UN ensure flexibility and a usable format considering the method most applicable for use in the field, which could be as sophisticated as a smartphone application, or as simple as a printed hardcopy checklist.

As noted, much discussion centered on the development and delivery of effective training for employing the BAIT template. Among these considerations was the need to establish a common understanding of the TOC threat to the achievement of the mission mandate; without this critical contextual component, analysts may not fully appreciate why they are collecting this information or conducting assessments. It will also be critical that training includes baseline computer and Excel skills to ensure intended users have the technical capability to appropriately employ the tool.

The BAIT model requires a clear understanding of the entire analytic process from operational reporting to information analysis at all levels. Processes are differentiated by user levels, such as collectors in the field, as opposed to analysts at the mission level, who will predominantly populate the template and ensure its integrity. The next level of user will be the Joint Operations Center (JOC) analyst, who will conduct more robust analysis and develop additional assessments and products using its outputs. A final level will occur at UN mission analysis, where they will generate new requirements, while also using the data in the template and from assessments to inform tactical, operational and strategic decisions.

The 2017 WG was fortunate to be comprised of a diverse set of participants from across the U.S. defense, peacekeeping, academic and nongovernmental communities, each offering a unique perspective. PKSOI is grateful for all of their participation and support in developing this tool, as well as validating its utility, especially in its improved form, thanks to their insights.

Going forward, the group agreed to continue the conversation through regular email updates and discussions through the next PSOTEW, as PKSOI works with the UN and other potential users to endeavor to implement all this deep thought and hard work on behalf of the goals of peace and stabilization.
Introduction

Over the last several months, there has been intense dialogue between the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (often referred to as the 3-Ds), about how best to learn from past stabilization efforts in order to prepare for future challenges. This dialogue has thus far resulted in the joint transition paper “Sustainable Stability: A Feasible Future for U.S. Stabilization Efforts,” a tabletop exercise, Pocket Aces, and continues to generate discussion between and within the three agencies. While critical guidance, such as the revision of DoD Directive 3000.05 Stability Operations policy is not yet complete, these agencies’ training communities have a critical need to understand current thinking on stabilization, in order to adapt our efforts accordingly and provide the best possible preparation for those who will be deploying to carry out US government policies and programs. This WG provided a forum for the training community to listen in on the conversation and begin to grapple with the implications of a new approach to stabilization.

The United States approach to stabilization continues to shift away from comprehensive, whole-of-government/whole-of-society, large-footprint, long-duration intervention, toward highly focused, selective engagements. These new engagement conditions emphasize the primacy of political solutions in tandem with interim security measures, while leveraging partnerships with local institutions and international counterparts, during critical windows of time. As policy, doctrine, and extant practice shift, education and training approaches must keep pace. This WG discussed current and anticipated stabilization challenges and factors for success in light of the coming shift in policy, in order to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for future stabilization curricula.

Objectives of Work Group 3

There were four objectives: 1) enhance shared understanding of sustainable stability; 2) identify key audiences and core components of stabilization training applicable across the community; 3) develop a list of learning objectives and tools for use in stabilization training, such as exercises, case studies, and KSAs; and 4) outline next steps for design and implementation of curricula.

What WG 3 Discussed

The work group began with a 3-D panel of representatives from State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, and OSD(P) SHA, to set the stage for the discussion. Panelists described lessons from their agency and current thinking about how the USG should approach stabilization. They elaborated on the roles proposed in the Transition Paper, and highlighted key principles for focusing efforts in the future. State leads, DOD supports, and USAID implements US stabilization efforts.

Aditi Gorur’s definition of stabilization captured a core principle of the approach: “supporting the transfer of territorial control from spoilers to legitimate authorities.” Above all, stabilization requires a prioritized and focused response based on a firm assessment of the conflict at hand. The three primary and consistent issues to address in stabilization efforts are political consolidation, security, and humanitarian assistance. Any other priorities must be justified based on context. This does not diminish the importance of other considerations, but makes a distinction between institution-building and the immediate need to establish stability in which longer-term stabilization efforts can proceed.

After setting the groundwork, the working group broke into small groups to examine four historical case studies in light of the concepts proposed in the 3-D panel discussion. Those case studies were East Timor (1999-2002), Liberia (2003-2005), El Salvador (1980-1992), and Colombia (1998-2011).

The groups addressed the following questions for each case study:

- To what extent did international intervention efforts focus on intervening during a window of instability?
- How was the political crisis addressed? Was political consolidation a priority?
- How did local and international stakeholders work in partnership?
- What other stabilization issues were prioritized?
- What were the main gaps?
- Were they able to transition from an “acute” stabilization crisis to more “sustainable stability”?

The groups discussed these questions and provided insights into how these principles can be applied in future stabilization efforts.
After discussion of the case studies, the WG participated in two table top exercises (TTX), in which participants were asked to develop stabilization strategies consistent with the 3D approach, and then identify training and education requirements to equip people for this approach. The TTX scenarios focused on North Korea and Mosul, Iraq.

In debriefing, the groups were asked to address the following questions:

- How did you address the political problem at the core of your case study?
- What did you prioritize to be addressed during the “acute” phase of stabilization? What did you intentionally not prioritize?
- How did you use partnerships in your strategy?
- How did you address the question of transitioning from acute to sustainable stabilization?
- Did you identify any necessary USG necessary structures to support your approach?

Finally the group addressed the training and education implications.

- Will the training audience (i.e. those working on stabilization moving forward) be different under this approach? If so, how?
- What are key KSAs that need to be emphasized to equip people to carry out this approach?
- What tools are most needed to prepare people for the new approach and challenges?
- What training gaps did you identify as you developed the strategy?

**What are the tangible takeaways?**

While the approach to stabilization is changing, the existing knowledge, lessons and training on stabilization remain relevant; the causes of instability have not changed. However, the emphasis in how to address instability has changed, and needs to be reflected in our curricula.

The following training priorities were recommended:

1. **Analysis.** Skill in assessment, analysis, and Center of Gravity identification is paramount to prioritize and sequence the US Governmental response.
2. **“How do we make a deal?”** Understanding who holds power and is perceived as legitimate is critical in seeking political solutions. Those engaged in stabilization efforts need to know the range of viable political formulas that can support stability.
3. **Prioritize to make difficult decisions.** Prioritization is the most significant characteristic distinguishing sustainable stability from prior approaches. Training must get beyond ranking the relative importance of the “essential” tasks of stabilization in our planning processes, and make the tough choices about what not to do. Training audiences should be given tools and taught decision-making processes to prioritize in a manner which makes the most efficient use of limited resources, matches tailored responses to specific problems, and leverages partners to the maximum extent practicable.
4. **Culture Shift – Share Information!** Information sharing with our partners (interagency, host country, NGOs, bilateral, and multilateral) is a key to success in stabilization environments, but bureaucratic cultures tend towards stove-piping and over-classifying information. Solutions to some of these challenges exist, but the knowledge and products are not being adequately propagated and communicated to the community of interest. Information management in future USG interventions need to provide for a shared operating picture, which can adapt as the lead shifts throughout the intervention.
5. **Complexity.** Stabilization is inherently complex; we must equip our training audiences with better tools to grapple with it, and cultivate an environment open to experimentation and risk-taking that is grounded in sound analysis.

**What is the road ahead?**

State’s CSO and PKSOI encourage all those engaged in stabilization-related training to post their curriculum, syllabi, and references on PKSOI’s Blackboard site at the USAWC, particularly those related to the above identified training priorities. This platform can serve as the hub for an enduring and expanding stabilization community of interest, and assist with interagency collaboration, focusing not only on designing new courses, but also establishing longer-term channels for collaboration, education, and training.

Representatives from the working group committed to work toward injecting stabilization elements into all DOD exercises, case studies, and developing professional military education material. PKSO and CSO will collaborate to develop new training modules focused on the findings of this WG.

**Notes:**

Transitional Public Security (TPS) is the military forces' establishment, promotion, restoration, and maintenance of public order. The purpose of TPS is to protect the civilian population from violence when the rule of law has broken down or no longer exists. Public order is a condition in which there is an absence of widespread criminal and political violence. Without public order, people cannot conduct their daily lives without fear of violence. TPS sets the conditions that allow public order management to transition from military to civilian implementation.

TPS bridges the gap between short-term requirements and long-term development goals as it focuses on addressing the immediate challenges to maintaining public order by leveraging the planning expertise of civilian development actors. These civilian planners ensure immediate needs are consistent with long-term development and that military forces "do no harm" to partner capacity goals and legitimacy. Because many transitional public security tasks are often done by police in more secure environments, early interventions will "set the tone" for future police organizational structures, staffing, policies, and tactics. Thus, police expertise is critical in the earliest days of intervention to allow for a more seamless transition from military to civilian actors.

Transitional Public Security is a doctrinal concept and impending policy recognizes it as being the primary stability role of military forces. In this light, our working group looked at how we might develop a cogent and consistent Department of Defense approach that is complementary to Joint, Interorganizational, Multinational (JIM) partners' efforts.

LTG McMaster graciously let us borrow COL Robert Dillon, TRADOC ARCIC, to lead Group 4 as COL Dillon has a wealth of expertise and experience in policing and stability operations, while also addressing the stability policing gap in his own academic pursuits. The work group consisted of personnel from State (INL, CSO), JCISFA, SIGAR, TRADOC, HQDA PMG, 351st CA CMD, PKSOI, 4th Infantry Division, Safer-world, and JCM/UNCG.

The participants received an overview of TPS construct and previously completed products and tasks to level the knowledge gap for everyone. The work group was then divided into three sub-groups that looked at TPS strategies and tactics in order to consolidate operational gains; define the breadth of key TPS stakeholders; and identify doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, personnel, facilities, policy (DOTMLPF-P) considerations.

Mr. Keith Smith, JD (JCISFA), Mr. Scott Braderman (PKSOI), and Dr. Karen Finkenbinder (PKSOI) were subgroup leaders. Additionally, several planners (operational and strategic) permeated the sub-WGs, as invaluable resource! A guided brainstorming technique called “starbursting” was used to arrive at each group’s recommendations. This technique is known for gaining everyone’s participation and for bringing out issues that may not otherwise be known. The technique engenders participation – as evidenced by many lively and heartfelt exchanges!

Discussions were as followed:

**Strategic Gap.** An overall absence of concepts, policies and strategies for post conflict environments has created a strategic gap in consolidating political and military gains.

**Multiple Stakeholders create complexity.** These complex stability environments require multiple actors to establish basic levels of security and safety, requiring an iterative process to, as fast as feasibly possible, move out of military dominated control and transition to sustainable civil policing and safety.
Lack of unity of effort prevents effective employment of TPS capabilities. There is inadequate unity of effort across the JIM community to fill the strategic gap.

As a result of the various discussions, we derived the following recommendations/way ahead:

- **Policy:** A review of the TPS policy statement in 3000.05 highlighted the need to:
  - Include “consolidation of gains” in the TPS effects paragraph
  - Designate a proponent for TPS development: Joint – OSD, Service (executive agent) – Army

- **Concept to integrate capabilities.** A central idea and expanded understanding of TPS, which returns an operational environment to relative normalcy. This concept must include:
  - Expanded definition and discussion about the meaning of the term transition
  - Emphasis on building confidence and legitimacy of host nation competence, capability, capacity
  - Concurrence of TPS activities enabling sustainable security outcomes and stability

- **Strategy for unified action.** Following concept development, create a strategy that includes:
  - Defined roles, professional credentials and stakeholder responsibilities
  - Articulates who is doing what to whom, where and when
  - Drivers of collaboration, planning, executing
  - Links and synchronization between USG and NATO stability policing and strategy

- **Entrepreneurial approach to JIM partnering.** Create MOUs to identify and establish JIM working group key steps, transitions, key stakeholders and trip wires for the entire process in order to provide flexibility at different echelons.

As a result of comments and observations from the senior panel, others that attended, as well as from policy makers, PKSOI is working with JIM partners to develop a JIM working group in addition to an internal DOD working group. Similarly, PKSOI is in the process of contracting a strategist to develop a comprehensive strategy for unified TPS action in coordination with the JIM working group, with specific attention to those organizations who have responsibilities for police reform.
Introduction

With the ink barely dry on an Army memorandum appointing PKSOI as the Army lead for Women Peace and Security (WPS), PSOTEW brought forth the perfect venue to advance WPS issues. This was the first time WPS was addressed as a working group in 11 PSOTEWs.

The working group brought together an experienced and energetic array of participants from academia, civil society, and government representatives to advance DOD Joint Staff (JS) planning and integration of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) efforts. Participants hailed from the UN, the USG’s Department of State, OSD-SHA, JS J5/J7, USAID, AFRICOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), National Defense University NDU, PKSOI, and the USAF Air Advisor Academy, as well as civil society representatives from USIP, Inclusive Security, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI), and other committed WPS SMEs.

The USG is deeply committed to the participation of women in advancing peace and security throughout the world. Consistent with this commitment, in December 2011 the inaugural US National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS was released to help chart a course for the USG to advance women’s inclusion in conflict and insecurity mitigation. In 2016, the NAP was updated to identify areas that call for new or renewed focus. The following five pillars are the core tenets of the NAP and DOD objectives:

1. **National Integration and Institutionalization**: institute a gender sensitive approach to defense/stability related work in complex environments
2. **Participation in Peace Processes and Decision-Making**: improve participation of women at all levels of decision-making, peace negotiations, security initiatives, and conflict prevention
3. **Protection from Violence**: strengthen DOD efforts to prevent and protect women and children from harm, exploitation, sexual abuse, and gender based violence
4. **Conflict Prevention**: promote women’s roles in conflict prevention and improve conflict early warning response systems through integration of a gender perspective
5. **Access to Relief and Recovery**: always consider gender perspectives in recovery and reconciliation processes, as well as other components of the host nation’s (re)development

WG 5 Objectives

The purpose of WG 5 was to develop a comprehensive approach to education and training regarding WPS impacts on peace and stability operations. We were grateful to have partner organizations lead the work on our breakout sessions. The specific objectives and conveners of the WG sessions were as follows:

- Develop or contribute to a milestone plan for updating the DOD Implementation Guide on WPS (Joint Staff J5)
- Conduct a review and reconcile WPS Terminology at the Strategic and Operational Levels (Joint Staff J5)
- Review the framework of the Commander’s Handbook to Gender Dynamics in Military Operations (PKSOI)
- Conduct a review (stock take) on available training courses on WPS; investigate updating JKO (Joint Staff J7)

The outcomes from each of these sessions are highlighted below. More specific and detailed information can be requested from PKSOI points of contact.

WG 5 Deliverables

**DOD Implementation Plan Framework**

With the updated NAP, the WG concluded that congruent updates to the DOD implementation guidelines on WPS should be linked to the 2016 NAP. There was consensus on a proposed framework for updating the guidelines as developed during the WG session. The WG emphasized the importance of incorporating reporting processes and communications strategies into the DOD Implementation Plan, while agreeing on the need to further developed metrics that align with the reporting process.

**WPS Terminology**

The WG conducted a thorough review of relevant terminology and concepts drawn from official USG, NATO and UN resources. When necessary and available, NATO and UN definitions supplemented USG versions. These accepted terms
will be incorporated into the Commander’s Guide to Gender Dynamics in Military Operations. WG participants expressed a willingness to use the presented definitions as universal reference points. In education and training settings, vignettes or examples will be included to contextualize the terminology.

Some examples of accepted terminology from a variety of government and international organization sources are as follows:

**USG Terminology**

**Gender:** The socially constructed set of roles, rights, responsibilities, entitlements, and behaviors associated with being a woman or a man in societies. The social definitions of what it means to be masculine or feminine, and negative consequences for not adhering to those expectations, vary among cultures, change over time, and often intersect with other factors such as age, class, disability, ethnicity, race, religion, and sexual orientation.

**NATO Terminology**

**Gender Mainstreaming:** The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres, so that women and men benefit equally without perpetuating inequality. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.

**UN Terminology**

**Gender Advisor:** Responsible person for coordinating and guiding UN military peacekeeping components implementation of Security Council mandates on women, peace and security.

**WPS Training/Resource Availability**

Although it is agreed that there is a lack of awareness of WPS meaning and application on a broad scale, this session resulted in the identification of many WPS/gender mainstreaming training courses and educational resources. A core issue that arose surrounded the need for faculty development/education on WPS to encourage the integration of the topic into many levels of education and training. Perhaps the most ambitious idea to address this issue was the development of a US Gender Advisor Course. A more viable near-term option was identified via the integration of 1-2 slides/modules into key training courses across DOD/USG. Furthermore, it was agreed that the existing JKO Gender Awareness course should be incorporated into pre-deployment exercises and orientation/on-boarding of appropriate audiences.

WG 5 Way Ahead

The core takeaways focused on the identification of gaps that challenge the viability of the WPS agenda. While a lack of funding for WPS has not prevented the community from a certain level of success, current efforts are ad hoc and unresourced, thus challenging to sustain. A recommended resourcing solution is to create a DoD Instruction (DODI), allowing for resources to address gaps in sustainment, such as potentially creating a structure Gender Advisors and Focal points. Acting OSD(P) SHA DASD, Mark Swayne agreed a DODI was necessary and forthcoming to assist with these issues. DASD Swayne wanted to right-size the scope and scale of WPS training throughout DoD, while being specific and realistic about gender advisor billets to ensure the right people trained at the right time.
WG 5 also included robust discussions of best practices for the capture and dissemination of WPS Lessons Learned. One of the key approaches agreed upon by the group was the importance of including vignettes and scenarios when giving instruction on WPS.1 Utilization of PKSOI’s Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) and NDU’s Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN) should become resource repositories for WPS Lessons Learned, as they allow for cross-linkage to other entities, thus increasing visibility, networking, and reference availability.

WPS would benefit greatly from a communication strategy to ensure general awareness throughout DOD. Education and training must be available from strategic to operational to tactical levels. Success will require key leader support/championing of the WPS agenda to make substantive and sustainable gains in mainstreaming gender perspectives and WPS awareness.

Monthly DOD WPS videoteleconferences aided WG 5’s success, and will continue to be a venue to sustain these efforts. The inclusion of our non-DOD partners led to substantive and productive follow on meetings. WG 5 will continue to engage on WPS issues and plans, as a prelude to the 2018 PSOTEW.

Notes:

1 The following Sample Training Scenario, taken from "WPS: A Case for Increasing Awareness of the Gender Perspective", is available in full at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/conferences/wjtc14/working-groups/itl/wjtsc14_genderawareness.pdf
Introduction

For a third year in a row, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) had the privilege to host a PSOTEW working group (WG) with this year’s WG 6 topic, “Training for Senior Leaders Going into an Advisory Role – Is there a training & education gap?” As US military efforts in Afghanistan extend beyond 16 years, the WG considered whether our training and education efforts to prepare senior level advisors could be refined, and if so, what adjustments should be made. Harnessing the theme for PSOTEW 2017, “Preparing Leaders to Thrive in a Complex World,” the group considered the issue against the backdrop of two recent events that would bring greater scrutiny to US advising efforts. First, President Trump’s inauguration comments seemed to cast a shadow upon security cooperation efforts that depleted resources for domestic policy and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 that demonstrated increasing Congressional oversight. As the Administration and Congress monitors US government and military advising efforts more closely, the question is whether a proposed solution should simply include more training, or be more institutional in nature.

Issue

To identify a training and education gap for senior leaders, the WG expanded its aperture from the tactical level or operating function of organizational structure to a wider “whole of government” view. Using the Executive-Generating-Operating (EGO) Function construct as a guide, the WG reviewed the alignment of the general advisor mission to determine if there was: 1) a clear US diplomatic, development, defense mission/end state; 2) a clear task review of the mission to determine the required capability and capacity for US defense efforts; and 3) a clear review of interagency/international support that may inform the effectiveness of US defense efforts. By organizing the group’s thinking around these principles, the group began to identify training and education gaps and sought to develop the following products:

- a proposed advisor framework to understand interagency coordination gaps;

Background

In 2016, the Joint Staff J7 Force Development, Vice-Director (Suffolk) Major General John W. Charlton, recommended JCISFA look into the possible training and education gap for senior leader advisors. He noted senior leaders did not seem to receive the preparation necessary to excel readily in advising missions and tasks. JCISFA began a “Deep Dive” project to study the issue, collect engagements within the stakeholder community of advisors, and develop recommendations. The project highlighted the need for institutional-level changes. The seemingly clear solution of additional training replete with specialized classes, from specialized organizations would not resolve the problem. From an institutional perspective, any proposed solution requires more than “just in time” training and leads to the fundamental question of, what is the problem, and are we addressing the problem or the symptom?
Methodology Overview

With 30 WG attendees ranging from academia, DoD policy, US Government civilians, military planners, and partner nation military subject matter experts, JCISFA presented its observations from the deep dive study to assist in developing a shared understanding of the problem. The observations focused on threshold issues of 1) who in the US government is in charge of the advising mission, 2) what missions or tasks are expected of senior level advisors, and 3) how should senior level advisors prepare to perform their specific missions or tasks? The key aspect of the discussion was to demonstrate the tendency for such groups to focus on the tactical and operational function of planning focusing on the perceived “symptoms” of a problem, while paying little attention to the root cause of the problem.

To “break the mold” of institutional military thinking, Nadia Gerspacher from USIP discussed her publication, “Sustainable Capacity Building: Guidelines for Planning and Project Design Communities.” The group benefitted from her discussion on the six conditions for sustainable capacity building and her observations on the advisor mission. DASD Erik Leklam, OSD(P) Security Cooperation (OSD(P) SC), presented his observations as a former Ministry of Defense Advisor in Indonesia. He discussed the root problems in advisor preparation, focusing on not only general advisor skills, but also “tailored design” solutions for each advisor and their specific assignment. DASD Leklam also addressed advisor resourcing and doctrine concerns.

The WG split into two sub-working groups focused on the shared scenario to “Build Capability and Capacity of Border Security and Police forces in an Afghanistan-like country.” Although the Afghanistan and Iraq advising missions are not considered to be representative of the greater advising effort, the scenario provided a basic reference point to focus the group’s efforts on institutional solutions as opposed to addressing discreet or tactical level issues in either region. By separately addressing the security and police force issues, both subgroups focused on their particular advising requirements and “backwards planned” to determine the specific support and supported relationships in required people.

Each sub-WG was to frame their discussion and recommendations using the following questions:

- Does a specified advisor mission or country-specific security/police mission (supported by advisors) affect the training and education pipeline?
- Is their proper alignment of the advisor mission within the EGO Function construct?
- Should there be an organization responsible to determine training and education requirements for senior leader advisors, and if so, why?
- What are the training & education solutions in the following components: 1) mission requirements determination, 2) validation of requirements, 3) notification of requirements, 4) pre-deployment training requirements, 5) on-boarding requirements, and 6) post-deployment Lesson Learned requirements?
- Describe what training and education challenges your small group believes the organizations will encounter while conducting senior leader advising at various levels of government or EGO construct?

Workgroup Recommendations

1. Assign Proponency (Responsibility)

Due to the multitude of US organizations with differing levels of advocacy for advisory missions and a lack of overall responsibility or authority, a joint-level proponent is necessary to direct actions and resources. Otherwise, the advising effort devolves into “random acts of goodness.” A single entity with the responsibility and authority for supervision and coordination of the advising effort would greatly enhance a collaborative environment, while enabling the delegation of responsibility to the lowest levels. In a joint environment, a single entity charged with managing the advisor effort could standardize policy, doctrine, lexicon, and training across the interagency. Such an entity could also standardize training centers with the military and civilian government infrastructure to deconflict funding and personnel resources and mitigate duplication of efforts.

2. Create a Pipeline for Advisor development (Build)

The relatively short period between the identification of a senior level advisor requirement and the deployment time, has resulted in a truncated period to prepare individual’s for their assigned advising effort. To compound this short preparation time, the advisor mission or end state sometimes lacked sufficient clarity to refine the individual’s preparation effort. With a clear and understandable advisor goal, mission or task, the advisor infrastructure could organize itself to prepare future advisors. Expectations for advisors can range from persuading an advisee to take a particular action, to enabling an individual to conduct a certain task, or teaching the utilization of a piece of equipment.

Once a basic mission set has been established, an advisor training pipeline begins at accessions training (e.g. pre-commission-
ing for military). Weighing the risk of creating an “advising” Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) that produces an expertly-skilled advisor short on subject matter expertise (SME), Professional Military Education tiered over a potential advisor’s career progression, could not only identify individuals with the disposition to succeed as advisors, but also encourage a cultural paradigm shift to avoid “just in time” training.

Deviation from training standards runs the risk of devaluing the required training standards, however requirements could be waived for an immediate reporting need. Any training waiver trend could force over reliance on the experience and personality of the incoming advisor. To address this in a systematic manner, former advisors from the US Reserve Forces and civilian government professionals could form an advisor foundation, which could be relied upon to bridge the gaps while new advisors develop their capability and capacity. A concurrent recommendation would be to institutionalize advisor assignment incentives, such as promotion or billet requirements. During the development of potential senior level advisors, promotions become contingent on the completion of training and education requirements, thus avoiding "just in time" training, or the selection of the “most convenient” individual. Furthermore, the failure to complete threshold advisor training would become a barrier to advisor duties or other advancement. While this progression-based training cannot address all aspects of advisor training, it would succeed in identifying those individuals that could succeed at the type of desired advising missions and tasks, while also allowing for focused pre-deployment and on-board training.

3. Standardize E-G-O requirements (demand signal) for linkage to training requirements

An advisory effort does not solely rely on the individual advisor, but on the entire advisor infrastructure. The E-G-O construct is a means for planner to consider the entire advising infrastructure as those respective US Government entities organize, train, and equip their forces. Any advising effort should not be viewed in a vacuum as one discreet effort, but viewed as an integrated effort in the big picture, specifically its support for other efforts, and its required support from higher echelons. The E-G-O construct represents the Executive, Generating, and Operating Functions of any organization, and actually applies at each of level, focusing on discreet activities within the organization. The ability of subordinate or supporting units to effectively align their efforts is hampered without a clear and understandable “top-bottom” advisor mission (or a clear understanding of how the advisor mission supports the regional strategy). The challenge is to determine the requisite amount of mission intent and direction to adequately direct the advisor mission from above, while ensuring that all mission requirements are characterized from the lowest levels as well, such as ensuring systems are sustainable by the host nation.

The advisor planning process, guided by clear mission intent and direction, compels planners to focus towards a horizon where an advisor endstate succeeds at working the US out of their advisor role. All advising actions could then be directed to supporting a partner nation’s systems, which they would be able to sustain on their own without further US intervention, essentially developing a partner nation sustainable system versus an unsustainable US solution. Training and education standards cannot be adequately planned and organized unless advisor mission requirements (demand signal) are properly identified and standardized (at the Operating, Generating, and Executive Functions). Without this complete and multileveled planning view, there is risk in the creation of conjectural training standards vice a systematic advising standard and framework that supports the accomplishment of the advising goal. At the Operating Function of advising, the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Security Cooperation force structure must be organized to properly plan, manage, and implement the advising mission, which should all be based on the partner nation E-G-O advisee requirements. Such a mirrored E-G-O construct will not only better position the GCC to recognize mission requirements, but also the advising responsibilities that could be better addressed by external entities. To ensure US unified action, the advising structure at the GCC should be mirrored and aligned with the Service and Joint Staff headquarters to ensure the planning, management, and implementation of the advising mission is conducted as responsively, but practically, as possible. Such a construct would require intensive coordination, and could result in micromanagement from higher headquarters, thus delegation of responsibility must be pushed to the lowest levels.

Conclusion

With the 2017 National Defense Authorization act and other related efforts, the US advisor mission is headed in the right direction, and positioned to refine the implementation of the advisor mission. With the creation of the Security Cooperation Framework and the Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation program for Security Cooperation. Advising will benefit from the internal review of advising processes and procedures. The forthcoming Security Cooperation Work Force Development program will professionalize the force to recognize the challenges ahead. With this understanding of the operational environment of the advisor mission, the working group put forth fundamental consideration for the advising framework. To address the training and education gap for senior level advisors requires
the identification of a proponent with the responsibility and authority to supervise and coordinate the advisor mission. The E-G-O construct applied across the advisory effort will align advising organizations and mission intent, allowing subordinate elements to organize their training, education, and management frameworks, while also identifying desired advisors in an appropriate time. Such EGO alignment would identify potential supporting and supported missions, and ensure tasks could be methodically planned across the instruments of national power. As this grand advising strategy is understood across the advising or greater foreign policy effort, US entities will be better positioned to pick, choose, and deconflict their efforts.

Notes:

1 This article is based off of the personal observations of Lieutenant Colonel Ceasar M. Achico, USMC, the legal advisor for the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA). He participated in this Working Group effort in collaboration with JCISFA Lesson Learned Chief, LTC James Jenkins.

2 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activity (CCA) that acts through Joint Staff J7, Joint Force Development. JCISFA supports the integration of Security Force Assistance (SFA) capabilities into the current and future Joint Force in order to advance joint warfighting capability.


Introduction:

Since the colonial era, the US military has been called upon to establish secure transitions from military to civilian control and from conflict to peace. However, the term Civil Affairs (CA) and a dedicated capability was not developed until World War II. CA currently brings together nation stabilizing elements to engage partners and reduce conflict. Effectively, CA is a major strategic tool used for the transition from war to peace. However, recent shifts in US foreign, national security, and defense have raised questions about the future of CA. CA has not only been influenced by current US strategic interests, but also by recent CA missions. As a result of more than a “Decade of War,” CA’s focus has shifted almost entirely from strategic capabilities to tactical level missions. This became obvious with the increased demand for CA with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Colonial David Gordon exposed this in his paper, arguing that “the capabilities required to carry out military government were shunned and neglected by the Department of Defense and the Army at large until the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq made it terribly clear that history was repeating itself.” As Gordon has emphasized here, CA, in its current form, does not align with its strategic capabilities outlined in the early 1940s. This is not to say that CA should regress to its mid-20th century model. Instead, CA must be thought anew—redefined to meet the strategic needs of today and tomorrow’s conflicts.
This article addresses the necessary areas of reform to enhance CA implementation of strategic operations. As such, this paper begins with World War II—the catalyst to modern CA operations—to examine the US Army School of Military Government and the occupation of Germany. Following this historical review, the raison d’être of CA is examined to best understand its primary role in mitigating modern conflict. Finally, this article takes an in-depth look into needed reforms, such as a modern military government school and military phases.

The Rise of Modern Military Government

By the 1940s, the American Army had gained a century’s worth of military government and CA experience through control of civilian populations. In every war since the War of 1812, the US military has exercised control over the civil government of occupied territories, such as parts of Mexico, the South during the Civil War, the Philippines, and Cuba. However, while the United States conducted military government operations for nearly all of its past wars, it did so reluctantly. This hesitation stemmed from US fears of projecting an image of imperialism and the US unconstitutional aspects of a military government. However, with heightened tensions in the 1930s and early 1940s, US leaders grew aware of the role that military government operations would assume in conditions of war. History created the need for a conventional standard of CA, one that could establish the US Army duties and responsibilities. In 1940, the US published the Field Manual for CA/military government (FM 27-5) which set the standard for CA/military government: “all powers exercised and responsibilities assumed by the military commander in an occupied or liberated area with respect to the lands, properties, and inhabitants thereof, whether such administration be in enemy, allied, or domestic territory.”

FM 27-5 established the need for CA in occupied territories, as well as the roles and functions of CA officers in the execution of military government. The Army would be responsible for administering future military government operations, but lacked the personnel for such a task. As such, US senior leaders recognized the need for personnel recruitment and training programs. In December 1941, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson approved a plan to train officers for CA, and in May 1942, the School of Military Government (SOMG) began classroom instruction. As such, the curriculum covered government and administration, legal affairs, government finance, money and banking, and other related topics. The Army’s Military Government Division estimated in September 1942 that 6,000 trained officers would be needed worldwide, supplemented with 6,000 recruited from tactical units for occupation duties. To aid in this effort, ten select universities across the country and CA training schools provided necessary training to CA officers. By the last four months of 1943, the Army had secured nearly all of its estimated wartime European requirements.

As CA training institutions churned out specialized officers, the United States and Britain prosecuted the war against the Axis powers in earnest. These efforts created the foundation for the CA missions undertaken during and after World War II. On May 22, 1943, British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan initiated post conflict planning under the codename “Rankin.” This was an occupation plan in the most literal sense: the Allied forces would control spaces and critical access points, particularly as it liberated countries under Axis control and the Axis powers themselves. However, US military officers were apolitical in terms of civil-military relations. As historian Stephen Ambrose pointed out, such apoliticalism was “a deeply ingrained principle” in both Eisenhower and the army officers of his generation. At the same time, CA officers institutionalized governance development initiatives, such as the establishment of democratic structures, the elimination of Fascist-Nazi officials, and the promotion of free speech and elections.

On D-Day (June 6, 1944), codename Talisman replaced Rankin. Talisman sought to disarm German forces in the West, gain strategic areas in Germany, and establish conditions under which “United Nations agencies can assist in the relief and rehabilitation of liberated countries,” effectively serving as a post-WWII occupation plan of Germany.

In an outline plan issued on 10 November 1944, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) described Eclipse as the plans and preparations for operations in Europe in the event of a German surrender. Eclipse defined surrender in two ways: “as an instrument formally signed by a German government or the German High Command, or as a decision to be taken by Eisenhower when the majority of the German forces had capitulated or been overpowered.”

While the surrender aspect of Eclipse was, it was not without flaws. Eclipse provided little information about long-range plans for Germany other than the surrender and internment of German forces, restoration of Public Order, and the distribution of Allied forces throughout Germany. Eclipse had two phases: the first phase called on Allied forces to seize strategic areas within Germany. The second phase stated the deployed forces would establish “firm control . . . [and] carry out the disarmament and disposal of enemy forces . . . [and adjust] dispositions of national forces to coincide ultimately with the national zones of occupation.” Eclipse’s second phase had five objectives: (1) first and foremost was the disarmament and control of the German forces; (2) the enforcement of the terms...
of surrender or the will of SHAEF in the event of no surrender; (3) the establishment of law and order; (4) the beginning of the total disarmament of Germany; and (5) the redistribution of Allied forces into their national zones. 12

Eclipse proved influential in restoring peace and stability to the German people, with early missions occurring at the state and local levels. As the West invaded Germany, military government detachments were left behind to perform CA in urban and rural areas. Germany formally surrendered in Reims on 8 May. 13 As a result, the European CA Division (ECAD) administered military government detachments. Upon entering a town, CA officers posted the theater commander’s proclamation and implemented law and order ordinances to ensure cooperation with local residents. Many towns proved lawless, with a prevalence of looting, sexual assault, and other crimes. Most of the perpetrators were allied soldiers and displaced persons, so military government detachments and soldiers from tactical units had to protect the civilians. CA detachments proved invaluable in stabilizing rear areas by installing government officials, reconstituting police forces, overseeing utilities repair, and reconstituting local economies. 14

Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of military government in Germany was the Nazi question. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, the Soviets, British, and Americans proclaimed their “inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism.” 15 On May 8th, 1945, Germany formally surrendered to the Allies. With this defeat, the Allies zealously implement denazification. All Germans considered for government positions had to complete a highly detailed questionnaire, later submitted to a de-Nazification board. The questionnaire served to identify the hard core Nazis from the average German who joined the party for a livelihood. Inadequately staffed and overwhelmed with questionnaires, the system soon broke down and was discontinued. 16 On the issue of employing former Nazis, the Allies allowed German officials to work so long as they completed a questionnaire and did not actively support the Nazi party. 17 This is because the Allies realized that being a former party member did not mean you shared the same mind as Hitler; in fact, while some subscribed to the Nazi ideology, others joined the party to protect themselves and their family. Ironically, CA officers found it difficult to find competent civil leaders and policemen because the Nazis had selected the most competent people for these positions.

In utilizing and training local German personnel, the US occupation forces managed to address many of Germany’s immediate problems. Employing local Germans and prisoners of war for manual labor provided continuity, and with insufficient numbers of US CA officers, it also proved invaluable in handling the demands of war-torn Germany. Large populations of people had fled bombed and run-downed cities. Thousands turned to undamaged areas seeking food and shelter. Preventing starvation became the first and foremost problem the American military government faced. 18 Per capita consumption had dropped from 1,550 calories per day to 1,000. 19 With the assistance of the German people, the Military Government transported tons of seeds, established farm machinery repair shops, and renewed food protection facilities. SHAEF authorized the early release of thousands of enemy prisoners-of-war for farm labor. 20 These actions, along with the hundreds of thousands of tons of relief provided by the Army remedied the immediate food crisis. Without the assistance of German officials and people, the Army would have proven understaffed and overwhelmed by the challenge of feeding millions of Germans.

While both the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067 (JCS 1067) and the postwar Potsdam agreement stressed decentralization as an essential step in Germany’s rehabilitation, General (GEN) Lucius D. Clay had his own vision of post-war Germany. GEN Clay executed his plans for decentralization with little to no oversight. In particular, he believed that Germany needed to be “[built] from the bottom up,” with local governments at the smallest possible level first, then proceeding to higher levels of administration. 21 This fell in line with the stated policy of military government, which did not seek to govern the German people, but to control and supervise them in governing themselves. 22

The earliest elections took place by the end of January 1946 in Gemeinden—townships with a population less than fifty thousand. In October 1946, GEN Clay directed the German populace to write their own elections codes for local government with one explicit restriction: active Nazi Party members and anyone who joined the Party prior to May 1, 1937, including sympathizers and collaborators, were excluded, resulting in the reemergence of former dominant political parties, such as the Christian Social Union (CSU), The German Communist Party (KPD), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). 23 As elections occurred without incidence throughout the US zone, Germans began electing state assemblies by the summer of 1946. The results of the December 1946 elections for the Bavarian state parliament demonstrated how deeply entrenched federalism became in Bavarian political life. Large parties such as the SPD and CSU dominated, while smaller parties had insufficient numbers to meet the national threshold for representation. In fact, the Bavarian Constitution actually barred the KDP from holding any seats in the Bavarian government because it failed to gain ten percent of the votes in any one electoral district. 24

Bavaria provides a clear example of how bottom-up, decentralized politics shaped the outcome of elections and governance.
Elections in other US-occupied zones followed a very similar pattern, such that by the time the US transferred military government authority to the Federal Republic of Germany, the federal system proved largely in effect. Restriction on parties emerged outside local levels, as evident with the KDP in Bavaria, creating conditions favorable for the dominance of traditional parties in the CSU and SPD. The 1949 adoption of the Basic Law (i.e., the German constitution), with its emphasis on checks and balances, demonstrated West Germany’s transformation into a federal democracy. In just four years, the US Military Government managed to transition its rule over Germany to the German federal government. The speed of this feat demonstrates the effectiveness of the “bottom-up” tactic employed by GEN Clay in achieving the Military Government’s end goal.

Still, this transition did not occur without criticism. As Arthur Kahn pointed out, American occupation prevented true grassroots movements from forming. The rationale being that because urban centers served as the breeding ground for political parties, the decision to start elections in small towns and in the countryside prevented the emergence of new parties. This is why the CSU and SDP dominated elections, as they lacked competition from grassroots movements. A second criticism, by historian Harold Zink, is that the Military Government failed to introduce democratic principles. Zink argued that too much emphasis was placed on “the holding of elections, [and] the framing of constitutions and laws,” with little emphasis on the needs to fill public offices with German politicians with a strong belief in democracy, or in educating Germans on the functions of representative democracy. The two reasons Military Government operated in this manner was: first, democracy was not an unknown concept to Germany, while the US also encouraged democratic principles in educational programs. However, overseeing the full implementation of democracy post-WWII proved a long-range goal requiring a long-lasting occupation, which GEN Clay saw as unworkable. Additionally, the emphasis on government mechanisms allowed GEN Clay to implement federalism and quickly return power to Germans, thereby meeting militarily-focused goals.

The US occupation of Germany reveals the need to consider institutional and bureaucratic processes as much as high-level-policy decision making. More than anything, GEN Clay and his subordinates improvised on lower level topics. Such behavior arose from the gap between strategy at policymaking levels and execution at the operational levels during the occupation. This proved inherent in the military-political divide that characterized US Military Government during WWII. Part of this had
been the mindset of governance, an age-old problem. Normally, all attention is focused on winning the war with little thought given to the peace. For this reason, the occupation’s success did not rest solely on US policymaking. A key factor that determined the occupation’s success was the attitude of the occupied. To the German people, occupation appeared as the only viable means to rebuild their war-torn and starving country. In fact, most Germans welcomed the allies as liberators. In this way, the German people’s willingness to accept occupation proved a critical element in the success of US occupation.

**The Raison D’être of CA**

The US Military Government in Germany demonstrated the effectiveness and importance of CA in rebuilding a war-torn country. However, CA operations during WWII did not come without challenges. For example, insufficient numbers left CA officers rotating among several villages. Not only did CA officers lack sufficient numbers, but vehicles, rations, radios, and medical supplies proved in low supply. Additionally, CA officers had difficulty in communicating with theater headquarters because their reports did not have reporting priority.29

While CA operations proved challenging, officers acted efficiently in each community. First, CA officers established headquarters in town halls. Secondly, the theater commander posted an announcement. Third, CA officers gathered local officials together to set expectations for the townspeople and call for their help. Fourth, they protected banks and cultural institutions. Fifth, they reestablished the police force and their authority. Finally, CA officers assessed the essential needs of the community, such as shelter, food, and water.

These six steps proved vital to reestablishing order in towns and counties impacted by combat operations. War and conflict brought with it the end of normal activities, such as government, economics, and essential services. By restoring facets of life through these six steps, CA officers managed to rebuild local communities.

CA officers focused on restoring the local economy to ensure civilians had access to sustenance, which minimized the dependency on military rations and prevented mass disorder. To expedite this process, innovative CA officers employed tactics to elicit self-help from civilians. For example, some provided temporary salaries to town officials and police until the restoration of full governance. Others paid laborers to clear the streets and bury the dead. Some identified market requirements and provided needed funds to harvest grain, transport grain to mills, and transport flour to bakeries.30

As evident in Germany, CA operations also focused on reforming governance institutions in their design and/or replacing officials. CA officers replaced Fascist officials in Italy and Nazi officials in Germany, discerning between the true believers and those who joined the party for a livelihood. Often, CA officers employed existing government and police officials as an immediate measure, then later replaced them due to incompetence, corruption, and questionable governance ideology.31 In this way, governance reform could prove turbulent, but this process had the added benefit of eliminating any spoilers. Removing employees for questionable behaviors allowed CA officers to eliminate those who acted in opposition to their efforts. As modern history has proven, the raison d’être of CA is its ability to reinstitute governance, security, and economic institutions to unstable and war-torn countries through cooperation with civilians.

Today, CA is still the cornerstone of the US Army’s Stability Operations. As FM 3-57 has made clear, CA has two central missions in modern day conflicts. The primary mission of CA forces is “to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations (ROMO) by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of CA Operations (CAO).” The secondary mission is focused on CA forces support to unified land operations in every environment across the ROMO.32 As CA missions in Panama, Grenada, Iraq, Haiti, and the Balkans have demonstrated, CAO have been influential in our recent history. With present conflicts across the world, CAO will undoubtedly fulfill a significant role in future peacekeeping and stability operations as it has in the past.

**Areas of Reforms for CA Operations**

While CA will take on a vast role in future conflicts, present-day CAO do not come without their flaws. Certain capabilities must be integrated into the CA force to adequately prepare for whatever future CAO must take place. Research indicates the following two reform suggestions will enhance current CA capabilities.

As evident in the educational programs offered during WWII, formal courses for personnel engaged in CA enhances the effectiveness of staff work, coordination, advising capabilities, and CAO implementation. Education for CA officers must cover a wide array of occupations, as many professions are included in the CA staff section in headquarters. SOMG and its partner schools are a useful model for a modern CA educational institution.
There are several reasons to reestablish a SOMG. First, it would provide CA officers and other branches involved in CAO with an educational program to prepare them for their highly specialized roles.

Secondly, CA alone cannot provide all of the necessary nation building expertise. The establishment of a school on civil governance and CAO will provide an opportunity to gain expertise for both military operations and civilian employment. In doing so, officers will be better prepared to serve in niche roles that are not normal military functional skill sets. Civilians with specific expertise could attend SOMG and receive a reserve commission commensurate with their abilities and experience. A final benefit would be that such a school has the potential to present a less expensive option than the current model.

An issue that plagues modern CA is that there are few requirements to be qualified for service in functional specialties. Even when CA personnel possess expertise in a particular field, the required level of expertise may be unaligned with their level of proficiency. As it stands, the CA education system does not provide a sufficiently specialized program of study for any of the areas of expertise to meet the field utilization requirements. The emphasis that the WWII SOMG placed on specialization and knowledge depth created effective officers, which could be modeled today by creating a SOMG with two concentrations. The first portion could be an intensive study of past instances of CAO to discuss best practices from which students would select an area of focused study across a range of topics. This format would afford greater CA officer specialization, such as providing guidance to revitalize a local economy. The second half of the program would focus on simulations for practical employment of the training.

The utilization of contractors is another recommended significant reform, as the reliance on contractors has greatly increased over the last fifteen years. The justification often provided is that contractors are a cost-saving measure, but the numbers reveal otherwise. For example, hired private sector contractors are paid between $600 to $1000 per day. A noncommissioned officer with twenty years of experience costs roughly $150 per day. This salary differential does little to address the relative costs associated with civilian contractors. Many of those contracted are either former military or retired military. So in many cases, the ancillary costs may be borne by the Army itself, through previous expenditures on training and/or retirement on top of the contract itself. Finally, “cost-plus” contracts, in which the contracting company has one-hundred percent of expenses covered, plus its costs, and a two percent profit provided do not minimize costs. When all of these costs are considered, the fees for services can be nearly quadruple what the individual contractor is being paid.

The SOMG would cut these costs by reducing the dependence on contracting companies, allowing for the military to assign personnel trained in CA at lower costs. This proposed school would provide training and education for the skills currently required to fill the capability gap identified through the use of contractors. This does not suggest that technical support or food services provided by contractors should be eliminated, but that personnel hired to directly impact state building activities in non-permissive environments are more cost-effective if they are government employees. For this reason, the SOMG would provide necessary knowledge and operate as an outlet for government employees to gain skills necessary for nation building.

A second suggestion for reform is focused on reshaping CA operations. Currently Army CA doctrine, training, and structure is imbalanced towards a Phase 4 (Stability) post-conflict reconstruction approach with only recently emerging consideration given to generating strategic effects in Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) complex operations environment. Phase 0 is described as the steady state environment before a conflict begins, which is when potential conflicts can be identified and often mitigated before the break out of armed conflict. Moreover, CA can conduct contingency planning for humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) in regions prone to disasters. CA personnel are beginning to execute Phase 0 mitigation operations, but the force as currently structured is insufficient to take on the challenge. Presently, roughly eighty-four percent of the Army’s CA force is trained to support conventional forces engaged in intense warfare and post-conflict activities. While this will require significant changes in doctrine, training, and structure, these modifications would enhance the Army’s ability to operate in Phase 0 and 1, thus potentially thwarting the need for Phase 2 and 3. Both the Army and National Security Strategy support expanding civil affair’s role in Phase 0. The US Army Functional Concept for Engagement describes the future role of the Army in a “Prevent, Shape and Win” construct, emphasizing the importance of conflict prevention. Incorporating CA forces here makes sense, especially in considering that its linguistic, cultural, and regional expertise is ideally suited for Phase 0 operations. Most significantly, CA can have a large impact on local societies, non-governmental organizations, private sector actors, and the host nation government. Through building such networks, CA officers can set the stage for coordinated unconventional warfare campaigns or irregular warfare campaigns. In this way, CA could prevent conflicts by identifying areas of instability and directing resources towards unstable conditions before destabilization.

Before CA forces can engage in Phase 0, changes must be made to present CA structures. Presently, the absence of a compre-
hensive theory for CA makes planning CAO difficult, resulting in misunderstandings within the Army and the CA community on its purpose. This has led to the perception that CA is only a maneuver enabler or a post-conflict force used to rebuild a nation and transition it to civil authority. A solution to this problem can be found in specifying a clearly defined role for CA.

This can be done by adding Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) to the list of CA core tasks. In Joint Publication 1-02, OPE is defined as the conduct of activities in potential areas of operation, with the intent to prepare and shape the operational environment. CA currently has many core tasks, such as Populace and Resource Control (PRC), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Civil Information Management (CIM), National Assistance (NA), and Support to Civil Administration (SCA). However, none of these tasks clearly convey CA’s actual role in Phase 0. This is concerning when the purpose of CA is to secure a strategic advantage for the United States, prevent future conflicts, and shape the environment for potential operations. Including OPE as a core task far more accurately describes CA engagement operations than NA or SCA do.

Another way to institute CA’s effectiveness in Phase 0 is by incorporating specific tactical skills in CA training. This has the benefit of increasing the survivability and operational effectiveness of CA teams working in Phase 0. For CA officers to effectively contribute to Phase 0 efforts, they must be experienced, highly skilled, language proficient, and regional experts. The current training system does not provide such training. The absence of this has continually resulted in a shortage of qualified CA personnel.

National Guard Special Forces developed a recruitment and training program, which could be adopted to assist in finding the best CA candidates. First, the National Guard removed the Reserve Component training pipeline, and mandated all Special Forces soldiers attend the same Special Forces Qualification (Q) Course. To increase selection success rates, reserve component Special Forces units created training detachments to assess and prepare recruits for the Q course. These programs included preliminary tests to assess recruits, followed by a training program to prepare them for assessment and selection. Many recruits performed very well attaining a 90 percent selection rate at times. Second, the National Guard recruited Special Forces qualified soldiers leaving active duty. These methods have allowed the National Guard to maintain numbers and preparedness through its continuous deployments.

Restructuring CA recruitment and training in these ways is certainly possible. The Army should review these National Guard programs and develop recruitment and training programs that work for their needs. By utilizing similar practices, an active duty training pipeline can be introduced to Army Reserve Component soldiers, thereby boosting the number of CA forces. Doing this will resolve two problems that impair the implementation of Phase 0 operations: numbers and preparedness. Presently there is a personnel shortage within the active Army CA organization which interferes with its ability to effectively staff, let alone expand operations. By revitalizing recruitment and training efforts, the Army will be able to not only resolve this shortage, but can equip its new staff with the skills necessary for Phase 0 support.

Conclusion

The new Army Operating Concept has identified the future operational environment of CA work as complex. By emphasizing CAO in Phase 0, the focus of operations shifts to dealing with unstable conditions before they become a problem, avoiding large scale deployments that can be costly in both human life and resources. This new ambition requires experts who can operate in complex environments and cooperate with civilian and military partners. CA supported Phase 0 become more tenable by recruiting and training units with the proper language, regional expertise, and specialized skills. The CA community’s greatest shortfall in preventing future conflict is education. The CA force can resolve its understaffing and unpreparedness by reestablishing a SOMG and expanding educational efforts. In a resource constrained security environment, the need for regional experts who can operate in complex environments and cooperate with civilian populations has never been more urgent.

PKSOI SME Review by COL Jay Liddick

Mr. Ferry captures some important points in this paper. However, I would like to add clarification on two issues. First, while the U.S. military has grappled with how to deal with “CA related issues” since the colonial era, the U.S. military did not use the term or develop dedicated CA capability until WW II. Thus, Civil Affairs is a relatively new branch in the Army, and it did not become an active duty branch until October 2006. Secondly, the limited amount of active component Civil Affairs capability (five special operations battalions and one general purpose battalion) limits availability of readily available CA teams and companies for persistent GCC phase zero operations. Not addressed in the paper is the fact that the current active component assessment and selection and training
pipeline does produce CA personnel who possess the tactical and technical skills required to be successful in a phase zero environment. Nor does the paper acknowledge that active component CA elements have had and continue to have success in phase zero as part of USSOCOM's Civil Military Engagement (CME) Program of Record (POR). The CA activities conducted under the CME POR provide a model of how CA can be effective in phase zero by working at the nexus of U.S. defense, diplomacy, and development in priority partner countries.

About the Author. Matthew Ferry will graduated from Dickinson College in May 2017. His coursework focused on American History, Arabic, and Education. After graduating, Matthew has accepted a teaching position at a college-accessibility program for urban students in San Francisco. In the future, Matthew aspires to pursue inter-national education development work.

Notes:

2 Holshek and Church, xi.
5 Patterson, 7.
6 Ibid, 8.
7 Ibid, 9-10.
11 Hudson, 164-165.
13 McCreedy, 722
14 Cristen Oehrig, CA in World War II, [Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009], 6
15 McCreedy, 726.
17 Robert S. Weiler, “Eliminating Success During Eclipse II: An Examination of the Decision to Disband the Iraqi Military” (MoMS diss., Marine Corps University, 2009), 12.
18 Hudson, 179.
19 Ziemke, 273.
20 Ziemke, 275.
21 Hudson, 187.
22 Ibid, 188.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, 191.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid, 192.
28 Ibid, 198.
30 Millen, 4.
31 Ibid.
33 Patterson, 15.
34 Ibid, 16.
37 Patterson, 14.
39 Patterson, 15.
41 Ibid, 104.
42 Ibid.
44 Ibid, 108.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
Introduction:

During the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) was unable to stop several humanitarian tragedies, in particular mass atrocities in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on internal analysis and reflection, the UN has made efforts to create related doctrines, policy papers and guidelines to enable effective peace operations for the future. The UN has the unique ability to mount a truly comprehensive response to complex crises and has developed the concept of “Integrated Missions” to maximize the overall impact of its support to countries emerging from conflict. What had been thought of as “multidimensional peacekeeping” in other words is referred to as an Integrated Mission.

The crisis that took place in Juba, South Sudan from 8 – 11 July 2016 saw three days of intense fighting between the Government of South Sudan and opposition parties that resulted in the death of many civilians, to include two peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Another impact of this crisis was the collapse of the fragile peace agreement that had existed between the government of South Sudan and opposition parties.

There had been widespread armed conflict between the Government and anti-government rebels since December 2013, as well as incidents of the obstruction of humanitarian access within parts of Unity, Upper Nile and Western Equatoria States. The situation in Unity State in particular reflected the devastating results of the South Sudanese Government’s systematic attack against its own citizens in order to deny the opposition parties a support base, resulting in massive population displacements and the destruction of livelihoods. The security situation in Western Equatoria State also deteriorated significantly following initial clashes in May and June of 2015, wherein tens of thousands of people were displaced. Concurrently, the period between April and July of 2015 in Upper Nile State was marked by a surge in fighting, with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) regaining control of the state capital in July and lower-scale fighting occurring country-wide. During the crisis, organized killing occurred against the civilian population, all while still under UNMISS purview. Some of these targeting killings specifically targeted IDPs in UN camps. To date, UNMISS has been unable to respond effectively to all these crises.

As the security situation deteriorated, SPLA and anti-government rebels continued to kill their own citizens in spite of a series of UNMISS responses to crisis. As a result, the UN headquarters in New York dispatched an Independent Special Investigation Team (ISIT) to UNMISS in order to verify the exact responses to the crisis.

The ISIT submitted a report (Investigation Report) to the UN Security Council on November 1, 2016 that analyzed UNMISS’s response to armed SPLA anti-government rebel aggression in July 2016. After analyzing the background of UNMISS’s response to the crisis, the Investigation Report reviewed the actions of UNMISS personnel and criticized a lack of leadership on the part of key senior UNMISS officials, as well as the underperforming UN military response to the violence. The Investigation Report criticized the UNMISS confusing command and control structure for emergency response operations, and pointed out a lack of training, preparation and leadership in the mission. However, as a matter of course, the recommen—
implementations of the Investigation Report did not address any more fundamental UNPKO questions. Additionally, the lack of UN military force’s capacity/capability and strategic military assets has already been pointed out in various reports and research papers.4 The Investigation Report acknowledged other challenge to Integrated Missions like UNMISS, such that the command and control of emergency response operations by UNMISS, may be more of an Integrated Mission challenge, then solely a lack of training, preparation and leadership in UNMISS.

The research question addressed in this paper is that there are structural defects in UN Integrated Mission, as those seen in the response to crisis by the UNMISS.5 The Integrated Mission is introduced in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008), called UN Capstone Doctrine. The Integrated Mission means a multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operation, which consist of a civilian component and military force with the objective of ensuring a comprehensive response to complex emergencies. The UN developed the concept to maximize the overall impact of its support to conflict-affected countries.6 This paper focuses on the structure and functions of a UN Integrated Mission, particularly focusing on the overlapping functions of information management, and decentralization of command and control, coordination, as well as a lack of a joint tasking system in the UNMISS.

Overlapping and Decentralization of Functions: Information Management, Command & Control, Coordination, and Tasking

Information Management in Integrated Missions

As mentioned above, An Integrated Mission consists of a civilian component and a military force. There are several information-related organizations contained within the civilian component such as the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), Joint Operation Centre (JOC) and Security Information and Operations Centre (SIOC) - sometimes called the Security Information Centre (SIC). There is also a U-2 Staff Branch in the military headquarters.

Observing the different roles of these entities, the DPKO Policy Directive, Joint Operation Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres defines the JMAC as being responsible for acquiring and integrating information from all mission components in order to develop analytical products, analyze and synthesize information, and prepare and disseminate operational and mission-level assessments to support planning, decision making and implementation of mission mandate.7 The UN guidelines ensures that the JOC collates information from all mission sources and produces integrated reporting on current operations and day-to-day situational reporting.8 The Security Information Centre analyzes security information, and creates security awareness reports in relation to threats against UN personnel, equipment and infrastructure.9 The U-2 Staff Branch of UN Force Headquarters deals with all matters concerning military information and intelligence, while also planning and coordinating military information requirements. The U-2 provides accurate and comprehensive situational awareness to the Force Commander on all matters which could affect the fulfilment of the mission objectives.10 (See Figure-1 next page)

The JMAC and U-2 Staff Branch, are both responsible for information management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information). The JOC collects information from all mission sources and produces integrated reporting on current operation and situation report.11 However, in reality, sources of information for all these organizations are basically the same. Their sources include internal and external actors of the mission (Central and local government officials, UN Country teams, humanitarian organizations, local communities, and regional organizations.).

Within the mission structures, the JMAC, JOC and Force Headquarters collect and analyze strategic and operational information in parallel with their civilian counterparts. However, the JMAC goes further by collecting and analyzing information which may affect the UN mission.12 The Security Information Centre analyzes matters which affect UN personnel, facilities and equipment – of course this information collection and analysis also takes place in the U-2 Staff Branch in Force Headquarters as well. Several duplicative analysis and collection problems should be noted in the information management function.

First, the entities discussed previously each have different areas of interest (UN personnel/facility safety, IDP/civilian protection, threat assessment, etc.), though they share a role in information management. As a result, although each entity is collecting similar information, they do so without coordinating analytic efforts across the broader organizations in the mission. Second, given that these organizations are usually physically arranged in Mission Headquarters, with three centres in the civilian component, plus the U-2 Staff Branch in Force Headquarters; as shown in the Figure-1, the functions of these four entities for information management actually overlap.

The Investigation Report revealed that the UNMISS JOC and SIC were not co-located, as required by UN policy, thus contributing to a fragmented security response.13 However, regardless of whether center and entity with similar functions are situated, their roles in information management will continue to overlap. Regardless of the co-locating of offices, a confusion of information will be expected to happen again.
Command & Control in the Integrated Mission

Within an Integrated Mission, the Force Commander exercises command and control over subordinate military units, while the Civilian Component Lead has command and control authority over all civilian and subordinate military sectors. Looking over the role of each component, the JOC coordinates daily mission activities, including military, governance, civil affairs, human rights, public information and other mission components. During crises, the JOC act as the Mission Crisis Management Centre. The military U-3 Staff Branch deals with all matters concerning military operations to include preparing and coordinating fragmentary orders, warning orders and contingency plans. Also the U-3 Staff Branch establishes the Military Operation Centre (MOC) in the Force Headquarters in order to control and execute operational activities. The UN guidelines indicate that the military component may co-locate its MOC with the JOC to ensure close coordination of daily activities together with the police and security centres. On the civilian side, the primary organization responsible for the security of UN personnel, equipment, and infrastructure is the Chief Security Advisor of the Security Section. (See Figure-2 next page)

The Investigation Report highlighted a confusing arrangement of lines of authority, in combination with a lack of leadership on the ground, contributed to the incidents of poor performance among the military and police contingents. Although these points are correct, as discussed above, information management, and command and control structures in the Integrated Mission has many ‘centres’ with overlapping and duplicating functions and roles. This Integrated Mission structure causes decentralization of command and control lines, thus making it difficult to define clear areas of responsibility, resulting in competing orders and instruction by each component. In the July crisis, the Investigation Report pointed out that despite the UNMISS JOC’s efforts working through the night on plans for launching a quick-reaction force at first light, no team was deployed, highlighting issues within the command & control function.

During crisis response operations, the JOC and Force Headquarters conduct command and control functions differently. From a military perspective, the civilian component should not be able to task military forces and issue orders for military troops without first conducting deliberate coordination with the Force Headquarters. Specifically, the U-3 Staff Branch would need to coordinate the tasking process in the Mission Headquarters. The Investigation Report criticized this process wherein, “... the Force did not operate under unified command, resulting in multiple and sometimes conflicting orders to the troop contingents. Military components also did not operate under a unified command and control structure. The centers responsible for security and safety in fact issued multiple confusing orders to the military force for dealing with the crisis. These conflicting orders occurred due to the decentralized command structure and the competing nature of civilian component and military tasking functions.

The UNMISS Force Commander had no tasking authority for command and control of the military engineering troop and aviation unit (see Figure-2 above), since they are under the com-
mand of the Mission Support element, which is a part of civilian component. Aviation and engineer troops are called mission "enablers", and therefore are controlled by the Chief of Integrated Support Service (ISS) in Mission Support under the current integrated UN peacekeeping mission construct. This arrangement means that the Force Commander must get an approval from the Director of Mission Support (DMS) when the Force needs to use aviation or engineering assets, resulting in a distorted structure given that the Force Commander has no direct command nor authority for all military units in UNMISS.20 Even though communication between Force and DMS appears to be open and workable at UNMISS, it takes an unacceptably long time to get the approval signatures of the head of Mission Support and other different levels of civilian component in order to employ military assets within the UNMISS structure.21

For example, when the military troops in the field requests a helicopter for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) to Force Headquarters, the request would be transferred to the Mission Support Centre and the Integrated Service Support cell to get the necessary signatures on the request from the Director of Mission Support. The request would have to clear this bureaucratic hierarchy in the civilian component, a process that normally takes about 6 hours to launch the helicopter. The civilian components of the Mission Headquarters is neither familiar with, nor knowledgeable about the employment of military aviation assets. The current procedure in Integrated Missions require many steps in the command process between the civilian component and military forces, simply taking too long for decision-making. The structure and functions, roles and tasks of many 'operational centres' in the Integrated Mission have a bureaucratic and inefficient nature. The bottom line is that the Integrated Mission lacks any true ability to respond to an emergency in a timely fashion.

The Investigation Report recommended that the Mission should establish an Integrated Operation Centre (IOC) incorporating all actors under the UN 'umbrella' (military, UN police, UN Security and formed police units) and co-locating them with the UNMISS Headquarters. However hand, the Investigation Report recommends an alternative option that the IOC separates itself from any tasking authority. The question then arises, what does this IOC coordinate, and how does it differ from the JOC? The establishment of an additional 'centre' may cause further inefficiency in command and control in the Integrated Mission. In a crisis, when an order or directive from the civilian component and military Force Headquarters may be competing, there is no one individual or organization designated to make the final decision. UNMISS has demonstrated this shortcoming of the Integrated Mission concept.

Insufficient Coordination in Cluster System in South Sudan

Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations (UN and non-UN) working in the main sectors of humanitarian action, such as the provision of services such as water, shelter, and health (See Figure 3). They are implemented when clear human-
itarian needs exist within a sector, and when there are numerous actors within sectors, and when national authorities need coordinated support. The UN Guidelines stipulate the coordination between humanitarian actors and UNMISS, as well as their participation in the UN Cluster System in South Sudan. However, the existing guidelines in South Sudan discourage the co-location of military and humanitarian actors during complex emergency situations in order to avoid the military’s influences over humanitarian actors. In South Sudan, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the JOC act as the primary focal point for information exchange between the humanitarian community and UNMISS in the Cluster System. (see Figure-3 below).

The Cluster is responsible for consulting with cluster members to determine the level of inclusion of UNMISS personnel in cluster meetings and processes. Certain UNMISS components or sections regularly engage with the humanitarian cluster. It is, however, the prerogative of the Cluster as to whether or not UNMISS will be invited to participate in any specific meeting. For instance, observing the management activities in Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites, some sources site that the cooperation and coordination between these mechanisms was secured through the camp management cluster, daily coordination meetings, and a humanitarian coordinator, who acted like a ‘firewall’, so that there was no direct interaction between humanitarian and military actors. This firewall would hinder effective civil-military coordination, in fact causing a lack of prompt information sharing, and acting as an obstacle to effective coordination in the response to crisis in July.

The Cluster System was originally intended to provide quick response to emergency situations. However, due to a detailed coordination procedure in the Cluster System in South Sudan, immediate response crises is impossible. When a humanitarian agency makes a request to UNMISS for the use of military assets (e.g. armed escort, air/ground transportation, engineering capability, etc.), all requests are channeled through OCHA to the JOC, and the JOC forwards the requests on to the military headquarters U-9 Staff Branch. This means there is no direct coordination channel between humanitarian actors and UNMISS Forces. UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) guideline range from co-existence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. The UN-CMCoord is the system of interaction involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations, and/or the local civilian population to achieve respective objectives.

Observing the UNMISS and Cluster System in South Sudan, humanitarian actors and UNMISS Forces should have distinct functions and roles in civil-military relation. Actors working in the same area should have closer coordination to realize a rapid response to an emergency situation. In this context, civil-military coordination and cooperation between the Cluster System, Mission Headquarters and Force Headquarters in South Sudan would be inefficient, thus the UN-CMCoord concept does not function accordingly.
The lack of a ‘Joint Tasking System’.

The fundamental problem of inadequate command and control processes in UNMISS is a systemic issue that arises from the tasking process used in UN Integrated Mission. This problem was caused due to the lack of a ‘joint tasking system’.

A successful example of the UN’s joint tasking process/mechanisms can be seen in the implementation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) after the earthquake in 2010. In January 2010, the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC) was established in MINUSTAH Headquarters for the first time in UNPKO history. In fact, the JOTC of MINUSTAH facilitated coordination with international forces, and functioned as a central hub for tactical planning. Since then, the JOTC has become the key operations center providing a centralized entry point for humanitarian partners to request assistance from MINUSTAH, while also coordinating planning for MINUSTAH logistical and tactical support to the humanitarian actors. The JOTC created an operational plan for UN Forces using information collection efforts from external actors. The JOTC conducted an operational assessment, and then prioritized tasks to meet mission objectives. This institutional response was effective in restoring security, providing for recovery, and delivering humanitarian assistance immediately after the major disaster event.28

Some may offer the objection that the situation in Haiti was a response to a natural disaster. However, the processes of collecting information, conducting a needs assessment, prioritizing efforts, and providing protection to other military assets responding to the crisis are all similar in nature to responding to a civil disturbance. The JOTC gathers information and needs from various actors such as the local government, UN Country Teams (UNCT), and humanitarian organizations, then prioritizes them, and converts them into specific tasks for the UN Mission. A series of these processes is managed by the joint tasking system.

In UNMISS, as Figure-2 highlights, the JOC receive a request from the Cluster in OCHA, and then the JOC transfers it to U-9 Staff Branch. As such, the request cannot be assessed as feasible within the capability of military forces until received by the U-9 Staff Branch. The current processes for humanitarian actors to request support must clear many coordination steps before reaching the U-9 Staff Branch. This coordination flows to determine priority and feasibility of a requests from the civilian component by the military Force Headquarters greatly delays the decision making process. This indicates that the joint tasking civil-military integrated tasking system does not exist in UNMISS. A single, joint/integrated tasking entity should be established rather than having many centers with similar authorities. The MINUSTAH JOTC showed that the joint tasking system would be more practical and realistic for the fulfillment of mandates in an Integrated Mission like UNMISS.

The current mandates of UNPKOs are general in nature and lack specificity. Consider the mandate of “Protection of Civilians”, wherein the Security Council resolution directs UNPKOs “to create conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance” and “to protect UN personnel, international and national humanitarian actors, or civilians”29. The implementation challenge becomes which group will perform these activities, while deconflicting areas of authority, such task may include the establishment of Early Warning System in specific areas, setting up of humanitarian corridors, defining demilitarized and non-combat zones, implementation of measures to prevent aggression at PoC sites (security infrastructure such as fences, ditches, and shelters). Translating the mandates into specific tasks on the ground is necessary for success.

Conclusion

This paper reviewed the Integrated Mission using UNMISS as a case study. The case study focused on UNMISS structure and function, and identified challenges to the success of Integrated Mission. This paper reviewed the structure and function on information management, command and control, coordination, and tasking in UNMISS. The central challenges to Integrated Mission success are the overlapping responsibilities and decentralization of the function of information management, command and control, coordination, and the lack of the joint tasking system in the mission.

In regard to the information management, four similar information entities exist in the Integrated Mission: JMAC, JOC, SIC, and the U-2 Staff Branch. These entities are redundant, as they all reside in the Mission and conduct similar information activities. Furthermore, there is competition between JOC and Force Headquarters concerning Command and Control and tasking authority over the UN Force, causing inefficient command and control over the Mission’s operation. As such, UNMISS was unable to respond to emergencies. In addition, because the Force Commander has no authority to directly command all military units, this command structure hinders the readiness of UN Force.

The Cluster System approach in South Sudan is inefficient in the context of civil-military coordination and cooperation according to the UN-CMCoord concept. Instituting a cluster coordinator to function as a firewall causes a shortfall in communication and information sharing between UNMISS Forces.
and the civilian component, especially humanitarian organizations. The primary function of the Cluster System is for efficient and timely response to emergencies. However, the current system in South Sudan loses its ability to rapidly and efficiently respond to emergencies. One suggestion is to implement a joint tasking system in UNMISS, as validated by its effective use by the MINUSTAH JOTC.

In order to implement some of these drastically enhanced structures and functions into the UNMISS, the concept of Integrated Mission should be reviewed to identify structural and functional improvements. The reform and streamlined structure of the Integrated Mission concept is necessary in order to realize efficient function, particularly in the areas of information management, command and control, coordination between civilian actors and military force, and a truly integrated joint tasking system. The immediate challenges that UNMISS faces is dealing with recurrent violence and following humanitarian crisis. The reform to build an enhanced Mission structure will be an immediate challenge for UNMISS and UNHQs in New York to achieve more effective responses to crisis situations, and eventually support a lasting settlement.

Notes:

2 Letter dated 1 November 2016 from Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2016/924, paras.9-13.
3 Ibid., para.7.
4 The mission has one soldier per 100 km, almost three times less peacekeepers compared to the territory of the next comparable UN mission. S/2015/446-A/70/95, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People, June 16, 2015, pp. 47-48.; and See Letter dated 1 November 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2016/924, para. 17.
5 The integrated mission means multidimensional peacekeeping operation. These terms are used properly as an administrative term and operational term in UN doctrines and guidelines.
8 United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook, DPKO/DFS, November 2014, p.15
9 Ibid, p.17.
11 Ibid, p.15.
13 S/2016/924, November 1, 2016, para. 8.
17 S/2016/924, November 1, 2016, paras. 7-9.
18 Ibid, para.13.
19 Ibid, para.8-9.
20 This command and control structure is common standard in other UN peacekeeping missions.
22 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach
26 UN Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (DG ECHO) in Brussels on 10 March 2008, p.16
27 DPKO, Civil-Military Coordination Policy, para.8
28 Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010: Situation, Challenges and Outlook, United Nation Office in Haiti (UNOH), 2010, p.10. See also, Fact Sheet – Earthquake Activities
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