INSIDE: Migrants on the Sea by PKSOI's Navy CDR Danny King
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Migrants on the Sea: A Personal Story

by PKSOI Navy Commander Danny King
Introduction

During my first six months assigned to PKSOI, the pace has been fast and furious. The PKSOI team continuously takes on a myriad of challenges impacting everything from Women Peace and Security (WPS), Protection of Civilians (POC) to how climate change will impact national and global security in the years to come. But, the one challenge of dealing with “migrants at sea” has been the most compelling to me. I had the unique honor this year to be asked by the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, to be a 2016 evaluator for the Secretary of the Navy 2016 Captain Edward F. Ney food service award program. I was truly humbled to get the opportunity to evaluate the Navy’s submarine force, also known as the nation’s “silent service.” In addition, I evaluated the small ashore food service operations. Ironically, a few of these evaluations took me to locations around the world where I saw firsthand the impact migration can have on peace, stability, protection of civilians, and the choice between life or death. I met a few migrants, who were going through the vetting and administrative process at a migrant camp in the Mediterranean (Italy), and were willing to share their personal stories. By virtue of still being alive, their journey has been successful thus far, but thousands of migrants were less fortunate in 2016. I wanted to share my unique experience with others to highlight an ongoing and increasing operational and humanitarian challenge for the United States and international community, with the hope of finding a humane resolution to resolve this challenge and save lives. We have to better understand what influences migrants to make this life or death decision to take to the sea. What is the international community’s ethical responsibility to assist migrants at sea? Ethics at Sea runs deep, in that it is the moral responsibility of all mariners, both U.S. and international to assist other mariners stranded at sea.

During my first Ney food service evaluation in October 2016, I was onboard an afloat unit moored at Souda Bay, Greece. By chance, the USS CARNEY (DDG 64), forward deployed to Rota, Spain, pulled in briefly to Souda for logistics support affording me the opportunity to meet with the ship’s Supply Officer LT James Conklin. The USS Carney aided in the rescue of 97 migrants in July 2016, and we discussed lessons learned from their heroic and courageous rescue. LT Conklin described the events of that day as the USS Carney encountered a migrant boat in distress and provided aid until the SOS Mediterranean (an independent European humanitarian association focusing on sea rescue) arrived to take the migrants to safety. Prior to the arrival of the SOS Mediterranean, the crew of the Carney was doing what Americans are most known for and that is providing assistance and compassion to save lives and make life throughout the world a little better. A drafted instruction and more information in reference to the CARNEY’s experience can be found by going to: Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons, and going to the PKSOI SOLLIMS Sampler table of contents and clicking on Annex B (PKSOI’s CDR King Visits USS Carney, page 54).

My follow on travels took me to a location in the Mediterranean close to Augusta, Sicily, a port where numerous migrants have arrived dead and alive. Migrant maritime traffic has slowed for now due to the cold winter weather, but the above picture depicts a group of empty coffins left behind at one of the processing stations. For many reasons, this visit was the most heartfelt, as I am reminded of the Apostle Paul’s journey through this part of the world around two thousand years ago. I knew for certain that I had to share my experience with others. At the Augusta port, I journeyed to the outside fence line of a migrant camp deeper inland at Sicily. At the time, the camp was home to 3,500 migrants, 350 of which were children, all from various parts of the African continent (Libya, Ghana, Ethiopia, Eritrea), as well as Syria. There I met Muhammad (no last name given) from Ghana. His story of desire, hope, promise, and faith in the face of grave danger was amazing to hear (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvROnywulgY). In addition, I met a trio of migrants from Libya. Muhammed and Ahmed
were brothers, and they were accompanied by their cousin, also named Muhammad. Ahmed is confined to a wheelchair. He was seriously injured at some point either during or prior to the journey. Ahmed told me he was in a car accident, but a few of the scars around his neck area told a different story appearing more like scars from a weapon. One thing that was clear was Muhammed’s love and support for his brother, as he ensured his safety and survival throughout their journey across the Mediterranean. All three desire to make it to Switzerland one day. Like the gentleman from Ghana their story is another story of desire, hope, promise, and faith (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XprHo-TnY80&t=23s).

During my departure from Sicily, I ironically met a couple of ladies at the airport who were working at a United Nations stand. They were raising public awareness and financial support for the current migrant challenges in the Mediterranean. I applaud their humanitarian efforts, but this may not be enough to quell the surge of migrants or enhance the migrant camp conditions. Admittedly, in the case of the USS CARNEY, we are living in a world of unknowns in that, we are dealing with mass migrant scenarios for the first time. As the operational pace in the Mediterranean and other strategic locations around the globe continues to accelerate and become more contested, all mariners must adhere to their moral and ethical responsibilities at sea. All mariners can learn from the crew of the Carney’s experience and lead by example. We all must continue to work together to develop lessons learned, share information, revise/update policy regularly, and put in place a framework that utilizes the entire international community to save lives and resolve complex problems.

Finally, “Bravo Zulu” (“well done”) to the crew of the Carney for doing the right thing by taking a break from their operational schedule to treat all 97 migrants with the upmost dignity and respect. They were true Ambassadors of the U.S. and international community. The humanitarian actions taken by the Commanding Officer and crew of the USS CARNEY are true testaments to the moral fiber of the United States Navy. In addition, they ensured the rescue was recorded, publicized, and developed lessons learned to share with others. A great first step in saving lives and reminding the international community of the significant challenges migrants at sea pose to regional stability and peace.

About the author: After graduating from the U.S. Army War College class of 2016, CDR Danny King joined the staff at PKSOI. He is the Senior Navy Advisor for PKSOI, Joint Integrator, and leads the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-7) Irregular Warfare-Security Force Assistance (IW-SFA) working group for PKSOI. PKSOI promotes the collaborative development and integration of peace and stability capabilities across the services, whole of government, NATO, and UN partners to enable the success of peace and stability missions.
Top Ten Challenges of North Korea’s Collapse: Key Stabilization Tasks

by Dr. Michael Spangler
Introduction

North Korea’s hereditary rulers have been on “death watch” for decades, with many pundits regularly predicting the demise of the “Kim Family Regime.” Recent collapse scenarios are based on two potentially inter-related events: first, the sudden death of Kim Jong-eun, the 32-year-old Supreme Leader (so far in reasonably good health but without a male heir) and second, the emergence of alternative power centers either within the secretive Kim family clan itself or among key security organizations. In turn, these power elites ultimately clash and break up the brittle, centralized regime. Anticipating a new territorial partition driven by internal groups aligning with either China or the South Korean/Western alliance, this “internal collapse” school plays down the hoary theme of Korean “reunification.” Instead, the camp predicts the formal demarcation line between North and South Korea may ultimately be pushed north of the Demilitarized Zone where it has existed since 1953.

Korean Unification

Reunification of, by, and for the long-divided Korean people has been a basic assumption of Korean studies for most of the past sixty years. It was reaffirmed by North and South Korean leaders at a summit held in Pyongyang in June 2000. At that time, North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung declared:

1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.
2. For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.

Unfortunately, these goals remain aspirational and deny the long history of foreign influences on the Korean peninsula. Few concrete achievements have been recorded to date that would prevent the emergence of a new major power rivalry on the Korean peninsula, one that carves out spheres of influence for China and the South Korean/Western alliance.

Whither China after a North Korean Collapse?

China seems genuinely conflicted about Korean unification. Removing North Korean nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula as a result of unification would eliminate a major threat underpinning the U.S.-South Korea-Japan military alliance. Weakening the alliance would, in turn, allay Chinese fears of encirclement by the U.S. and its allies. In addition, unification would likely relieve China from supplying the bulk of foreign aid to North Korea since the breakdown in Six-Party Talks in 2009. China might also be tempted to reinvigorate those talks, pursuing both denuclearization and unification, to burnish its status as a senior statesman above regional power-brokering and to draw attention away from its actions in the South and East China Seas.

On the other hand, China has long relied on North Korea as a buffer state to protect its northeastern flank. If the U.S. were to rebalance its military forces elsewhere in East Asia while enabling a unified Korea to deploy the latest ballistic missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense - THAAD), China would be left with fewer offensive options and only Russia as a potential defense partner. On balance, China may have concluded that it is better to leave the North Korean card on the table in some form following the possible collapse of the Kim Family franchise. As the Chinese proverb goes, “Kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.” In other words, China may have calculated its national security risks are more manageable if Korean unification is sacrificed in order to prevent a resurgent, stronger Korea from joining the U.S. and other potential adversaries.

Indeed, Chinese support of recent UN Security Council economic sanctions against North Korea do not necessarily portend a widening break in Sino-North Korean relations. The sanctions actually permit China considerable discretion in how much pressure to apply against its neighbor. China could also take its foot off the sanctions brake if it assesses that the U.S. will go ahead with THAAD introduction in South Korea in 2017. China can explain its volte face by reasserting its prior claim that sanctions are ineffective in deterring North Korean weapons programs while deepening the tribulations of the long-suffering North Korean people. China, therefore, appears to be in denial about the leverage it can, and does, exert on North Korea.

The Tumen River Valley and Below

In a post-collapse North Korea, China seems best able to influence the provinces near its border, including the Tumen River valley, due to (1) its widespread economic dominance in the area, (2) its overriding interest in maintaining a security buffer and exploiting the region’s rich mineral resources and eastern seaports close to Russia, and (3) the large number of North Korean officials and refugees that could assist the Chinese in setting up a pro-Chinese governmental system. South Korea, assuming substantial international aid, is likely to make inroads into setting up a rival system in the southern part of the country, quickly attracting most of the North Korean populace, particularly the malnourished, poor, and deprived segments of society.
Key Stabilization Tasks

Assuming this post-collapse scenario plays out as a new major power rivalry, it will be critical for South Korea and its key allies to work out a division of labor and areas of responsibility with China (and possibly Russia) preferably through the United Nations Security Council but more likely via a Six-Party Talks framework. South Korea and the United States will need to offer hard transactional trade-offs that provide adequate security assurances to China in return for its acquiescence on unification. For emerging North Korean leaders, the socio-economic weight of South Korean and international aid, coupled with co-equal integration, may be enough to bring in most, if not all of North Korea. The international focus group in concert with whatever North Korean authorities quickly emerge will face several key stabilization challenges in security, humanitarian assistance, justice, economic infrastructure, and governance. Key stabilization tasks in order of priority include:

Near Term

1. Weapons security. China is best situated to win the race to control North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Most of these facilities are closer to China and the relevant North Korean military units may be more disposed to China than others such as South Korea, the U.S., Russia, and, most certainly, Japan. Since both geography and political links appear to put China at point on this stabilization task, multi-party talks should seek agreement with China on the rules of engagement with North Korean Army units in the event of a Kim collapse, the procedures for reporting and securing the weapons, and the verification of their final disposition. In this regard, China may actually prefer to work with the U.S. rather than risk South Korea “inheriting” North Korea’s weapons. Ultimately, all parties should commit to implementing a denuclearized Korean peninsula, a long-standing goal of the International Community.

2. Humanitarian aid. North Korea’s collapse will confront South Korea and international actors with the world’s greatest humanitarian disaster. More than half of North Korea’s total 25-million population is estimated to suffer from malnutrition. A third of North Korean children under five evince substandard growth, particularly in rural areas. Chronic diarrhea is the leading cause of infant death due to inadequate sanitation. Shipments of food, medicine and potable water will demand a large-scale logistics plan and contributions from the International Community.

3. Displaced population camps. North Korea’s most vulnerable populations are likely to migrate south where they will expect to find not only badly needed humanitarian aid but also the provision of medical help, housing, and education services. This will require the rapid installation of displaced person camps.

4. Peacekeeping and Policing. North Korean territory may initially host a number of internal conflict groups that are attempting to seize financial assets, armories, supply depots, and ports. Many of these military and security units may strongly resist South Korean or Western soldiers. Multi-party talks will need to carve out areas of responsibility for the international actors involved and establish relocation procedures to separate conflict groups and facilitate peacekeeping and policing actions by foreign troops. In particular, the talks must reach quick agreement on the disarmament and/or demobilization of artillery units close to the border with South Korea.

5. Export inspections. In the immediate aftermath of a collapse, international actors will need to maintain and tighten vigilance on North Korean export shipments. These shipments may contain nuclear materials or financial assets that rogue elements are seeking to remove from the country.

Medium Term

6. Governance. The United Nations Security Council or, short of that, key Six-Party Talks countries should attempt to foster the formation of a transitional governmental system aiming to avoid repartition of the country. Such a system, pursued in the wake of the collapse of the Kim Family franchise, has daunting odds stacked against it because it assumes diverse segments of North Korean society will find greater accountability and transparency.

7. Rule of Law and Police. Long before any formal ratification of an inter-Korean justice system (preferably under a unified constitutional arrangement), new North Korean leaders will need to consider a partnership with international policing units to enforce order. As these talks unfold with emerging North Korean leaders, South Korea and the U.S. will have a strong interest in promoting a law enforcement partnership that is consistent with the principle of a unified Korea. North Korean officials and troops involved
in running the Kim Family Regime’s notorious prison camps for political dissidents—jailing up to one percent of North Korea’s population—may seek sanctuary or anonymity to avoid possible public retaliation against them or Korean-style Nuremberg trials. The effective demobilization and reintegration of these and other North Korean security organizations into a transitional system may hinge on fore-going trials for “crimes against humanity” in favor of “truth and reconciliation” hearings. These hearings would require only public attestation of internment practices rather than entail any judicial punishments as long as camp prisoners were not killed.

Long Term

8. Economic Development and Security Sector Reform. The International Aid group should not spend large sums quickly or press for foreign leases to exploit North Korea’s natural resources. Such actions contribute directly to waste and largely unsustainable projects or else engender popular animosity due to the perception of foreign exploitation. Instead, economic efforts to boost investment in key sectors should take their lead from transitional governmental bodies. Security sector reform in North Korea essentially means downsizing its bloated army, more than double that of South Korea. A new transitional governmental system will need to transform the world’s fourth largest standing army, numbering about 1 million (and 7.7 million reservists). Over the longer term, converting North Korea’s warriors into productive citizens will require greater economic development. With the North Korean security apparatus no longer soaking up to one third of the country’s gross domestic product, those finances could be diverted to more productive uses.

9. Immigration policies. Unlike the Berlin Wall, the Demilitarized Zone may not come down overnight simply because of its size and the number of people that could flood over the border. Over a three- to five-year period, South Korea will likely work to resolve the thorny issue of how to offer interested North Koreans the opportunity to relocate and reside permanently in South Korea. Many divided families may be quickly reunited based on previous contacts. However, the great majority of North Koreans will require considerable long-term investments in housing, medical care, and job retraining, coupled with the establishment of trust between both long-divided peoples. At present, many South Koreans remain wary about the behavior of North Koreans, widely seen as deprived and isolated, and uncertain of South Korea’s ability to fund “Korean reunification.”

10. Cultural assimilation. Even if China is supportive of a reunified Korea and international donors assist South Korea in funding the huge developmental and immigration needs of North Koreans, the North Korean population is still likely to require one to two generations to assimilate into a unified Korean culture that accepts them with greater trust, inclusiveness, and acceptance.

Whether brought on by a sudden regime decapitation, a serious pandemic, or a nuclear accident, North Korea’s collapse demands multi-party attention in light of the WMD stakes involved, the array of daunting tasks requiring urgent attention, and the overriding need to foster greater international cooperation. China may calculate that multi-party talks on these issues, once grasped by the North Korean side, risk provoking hostile acts against South Korea that would require proportionate responses. But China should realize that the North Korean leader, heading the only 21st-century authoritarian dynasty, sets up far more serious challenges for the world in the event of his demise.
KABUL, Afghanistan (Dec. 18, 2016) — Financial management employees from multiple Ministry of Defense offices trained with financial advisors from Headquarters Resolute Support. The one-day financial management seminar is part of Resolute Support’s train, advise, and assist mission, and gave Afghan MoD employees the opportunity to meet with advisors from the Multi-Year Budgeting and Execution of Programs office, known as EF-1 FAST, for mentorship and training. The seminar covered budget programming and analysis, gender integration and anti-corruption reform methods such as the Afghan personnel and pay systems and enterprise resource planning.
**What is Corruption?**

Transparency International, a global civil society organization leading the fight against corruption, defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” However, ISAF defines corruption as the abuse or misuse of positions of power for personal gain, while the World Bank’s definition is “the abuse of public office for private gain.” These definitions cover a wide range of activity, so it is important to understand the specific actions that might fall under this umbrella. Corruption can be separated into three categories – grand, systemic and petty. In order to grasp the methodology behind mitigating corruption, it is imperative to have a firm understanding of corruption itself.

Corruption that occurs at the government level is often termed as institutionalized or systemic corruption. Institutional corruption is widespread or systemic practices that undermine the integrity of an institution or public trust in an institution. In such an environment, government leaders and private citizens who are connected at high political levels can maintain control over resources and levers of power through their abuse of entrusted authority.

Corrupt governments often have a history of unqualified appointees, poor judicial processes, suspect policing practices, and inconsistent application of laws and taxation, all leading to illegitimacy of the government. Corruption is the manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers in order to sustain personal power, status, and wealth. Government officials leverage their positions, regulations and connections for profit by diverting revenue, purchasing positions, colluding in narcotics trafficking, and taking kickbacks. These acts can have lasting effects on political structures and the system’s overall legitimacy, resulting in the manipulation of policies, institutions, rules of procedure and financial planning.

Grand corruption occurs when senior public officials in the government accrue massive personal wealth through unprincipled and illicit means. Grand corruption is committed at high levels of government, where leaders are able to distort policies for personal gain. It can take the form of bribe payments, kickbacks, embezzlement, and theft of state assets. Directing a lucrative government contract to a favored company is a form of grand corruption, often referred to as political corruption. Grand corruption prevents the state from functioning with the pure intent of serving the public good, and it creates a distrust of government officials among the people.

Petty corruption deals with corruption that occurs quite frequently between low and mid-level government officials. Often seen as a bribe, petty corruption can be accepting a small payment for a service that should be free. For example, paying a customs official to let you across the border, or paying off a local law enforcement officer to avoid prosecution for a minor offense. Petty corruption is not normally viewed as harmful, but can create an obstacle to receiving basic public goods and services.

**Efforts to Combat Corruption – Anti v. Counter**

In order to build a stable political system, it is imperative to both root out the weeds of corruption, and to ensure that the political system is not easily susceptible to future illicit compromises. The first step in the fight against corruption is to understand the cultural or regional perceived definition of an acceptable level of corruption, as opposed to those corrupt activities which are deemed prosecutorial. In Afghanistan for example, there is a widespread distrust of the central government, which is often blamed for systemic corruption. Afghan National Security Advisor Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta said “corruption is not just a problem for the system of governance in Afghanistan; it is the system of governance.” The average Afghan, except when it involves government officials or those outside of the local area, sees petty corruption as pervasive, accepted, and arguably even encouraged.

This effort to understand how corruption is defined and the distinct political situation within a country can be seen as anti-corruption. Anti-corruption is a defensive action to develop leaders, organizations and institutions that operate to serve the people and resist corruption. It involves building trust and legitimacy among the people, creating an airtight political system that both makes it difficult for corruption to take place and establishes a system of review and accountability to deter corrupt activities. The U.S. Department of State made anti-corruption a national security priority and works across the globe to prevent graft, promote accountability, and empower reformers.

On the other hand, counter-corruption can be seen as taking offensive action against corruption. It involves identifying those involved in corrupt activities, and attempting to change their behavior or remove them from positions of power. Corruption can be combatted and neutralized by ensuring the transparency of financial processes, following leads on potentially corrupt political figures, and providing the proper training to government officials to identify and report illicit activities. However, a political system or organization can fall back into corrupt practices at any time, if specific programs are not instituted that emphasize transparency, accountability and self-reporting. Even with a strong basis anti-corruption practices in place, without structures in place to constantly review, and modify behavior...
or punish those involved in corruption, the system will become increasingly illegitimate.

While it is widely recognized that corruption is detrimental to the health of a political system, the economy, or an organization, there is no clear course of action. Currently, the U.S. government, along with many others, do not have a universal framework for building a corruption-free system or identifying corruption. So, when the U.S., in any capacity, is involved in state building activates, such as providing financial aid, it is difficult to ensure that there is limited opportunity for corruption to hinder its efforts. Therefore, it is essential that the U.S. and the international community come to consensus on a standard definition of corruption, and a general set of guideline and best practices for both anti- and counter-corruption efforts.

Case Studies

The following is a series of case studies that exemplify the importance of building a corruption definition, acknowledging corruption in both the public and private sectors, and a suggestion for anti-corruption training.

1. ACT: A New Game-Based Methodology for Anti-Corruption Training

Corruption does not discriminate. It can negatively affect anyone, from government workers to corporate employees; from those with strong morals to those we would normally consider "the bad guys." Petruzzi and Amicucci argue that corruption is a psychological problem that impedes economic and social evolution. According to the researchers, corrupt practices are often unconscious, the individual does not realize their actions are illicit, but something that is justified and out of their control. Nor are these actors usually those we would perceive as "criminals," but those who are upstanding citizens and respected members of their community. Any individual, when faced with a morally difficult question, can succumb to rationalization and socialization of the dilemma, leading to corrupt behavior. Therefore, in an attempt to weed out corruption, it is imperative that anti-corruption training be mandatory for all personnel.

In order to prevent corruption in both public and private sectors, training must be used to "spread ethical values and principles of ethically and legally appropriate behavior." A new understanding of correct behavior can be instilled by disseminating knowledge of law and regulations, as well as highlighting processes and activities that enable corruption. For example through training and simulations, personnel who may have been prone to corrupt behavior would learn to identify inappropriate practices and behavior that could lead to corruption. In this way, the individual can modify those processes and specific behavior to deter corruption and increase accountability and transparency. However, this adoption cannot be coercive. That's where gaming and experiential learning comes in to play. Gaming does not trigger a person's defenses, but still allows them to exercise "free will" in a controlled way. In a simulation, they will be able to make free choices and experience the positive or negative impacts that follow, while learning the most appropriate actions for the situation. Upon completion of the training, they will have developed an innate framework for making uncorrupt decisions that will overpower the mind's desire to rationalize inappropriate behaviors.

As Petruzzi and Amicucci argue, when developing any plan to stop or prevent corruption from degenerating an organization, it is important to consider human psychology. What behaviors, lines of thinking, and rationalization process can lead to corrupt behavior, and how can we re-wire the brain to avoid them? Based on this research, gaming is an effective way of changing cognitive processes without leading the trainees to feel targeted or accused. A morally correct organization may evolve if simulations are implemented as recurrent training for all organizational personnel, taking into account cultural differences and implementation over time.

2. SIGAR: U.S. Anti-Corruption Efforts: A Strategic Plan and Mechanisms to Track Progress Are Needed in Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan

A major aspect of nation-building is providing funds to help that nation secure its borders, build reliable agencies, eradicate public health issues, and more. Over the years, the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in assistance to Afghanistan to help rebuild the war-torn country into a democratic society, which furthers U.S. policy, as well as national and regional differences. However, the U.S. government, at the time of this report, did not have a "comprehensive anti-corruption strategy that (1) clearly linked specific program goals and objectives to the U.S. strategic goals and objectives for combating corruption in Afghanistan, (2) aligned necessary interagency resources to achieve those strategic goals and objectives, and (3) described the performance measures that will be used to assess the efficacy of anti-corruption activities and their outcomes against strategic objectives." Furthermore, corruption is a widespread problem in Afghanistan, where "more than two-thirds of Afghans view corruption as a major problem in their government." While Afghan culture accepts petty corruption, which is not usually a threat to governance, it perceives grand corruption as a threat to good governance. However, it is an impossible task to identify all corrupt practices, petty or grand. As a result, the funding allotted for reconstructing Afghanistan, was more often than not improperly used.
Recognizing this problem, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul began working on its own to counter Afghanistan’s rampant corruption. They established a working group, comprised of the Anti-Corruption Capacity Building, the Kabul Bank, and Borders. In lieu of a specific U.S. Government mission, they focused on “building Afghan government institutional capacity, improving financial regulation and public financial management, and enhancing revenue generation.”

However, there is no clear method of tracking the working group’s long-term progress, making it difficult to determine if the U.S.’s strategic goals and objectives were actually achieved. This document recommends that the Secretary of State, in an effort to improve the U.S.’s anti- and counter-corruption practices, should “develop...a comprehensive, coordinated strategy” and “develop an updated operational plan for the implementation of the anti-corruption goals and objectives that outlines benchmarks and timelines for the accomplishment of these goals.”

By creating a more specific strategy that includes a way of measuring progress, U.S. agencies would be tasked with rooting out corruption and operating more efficiently. Based on my research, they should have a clear framework for establishing oversight mechanisms and organizations that can identify corruption, set up a plan to counter it, and create better transparency and accountability. Without specific goals and standards to meet, the objectives of the working group may change over time or become less targeted. It is likely that corruption will continue to persist in the face of weak and unorganized efforts, but with a clear goal, it can be mitigated step by step. It is imperative that those U.S. government organizations tasked with countering corruption, measure their progress by creating broad, uniform goals.

3. Turning a Blind Eye to Bribery: Explaining Failures to Comply with the International Anti-Corruption Regime

A common perception exists that democracies, especially those with highly transparent processes, are more compliant with international anti-corruption agreements. It is argued that these democracies have a high occurrence of “moral suasion and socialization,” as well as “foreign and domestic interests favoring compliance.”

However, Gilbert and Sharman argue that attaining such ideals is a relatively long-term view. In the short-term, these highly transparent democracies have an incentive to “prioritize the national economic interest in the form of jobs and export earnings, while minimizing bad publicity.” While many politicians in a democratic process openly support international anti-corruption initiatives, it does not necessarily mean that they themselves carry out the spirit of these agreements. In fact, because of the electoral process, they have a high incentive to employ whatever means necessary to stay in power, and to sweep any evidence of scandal under the rug.

Creating international coalitions to counter-corruption are not as effective as one might believe. While coalitions encourage member countries to stop corrupt behaviors and to hold others accountable, if only to create a more-equal playing field, it is not evident they have taken a hard stance on corruption within their own borders. In fact, it seems that these countries will go to great lengths to hide corruption, in order to keep the international systems functioning. So, when establishing a system to counter-corruption or prevent corruption from taken hold in a new structure, it is important to pay close attention to domestic policies, rather than international ones. While a system of mutual accountability is mildly successful, in order to ensure complete success, a healthy system of domestic accountability must also exist.

4. The Limitations of Neoliberal Logic in the Anti-Corruption Industry: Lessons from Papua New Guinea

It is commonly perceived that anti-corruption organizations primarily focus on the public sector, ensuring that those meant to serve the general public are functioning in that interest. However, anti-corruption organizations should also have interest in working within the private sector. In today’s “neoliberal world,” “non-state actors” often have “great power and influence” and play a large role in “corrupt transactions.” While a country’s government may have a strong anti-corruption framework, if their businesses are engaged in corrupt activity, it can delegitimize the entire system. For example, prior to the Great Recession, the big banks on Wall Street created a ponzi-like scheme to repackage low-grade loans into groups of AAA quality Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), which were sold to investors across the globe. When these risky loans eventually defaulted, the U.S. financial system collapsed, which spiraled into faraway economies. Since the Great Recession, the U.S. and its financial sector have lost the respect and trust of many. Therefore, it is imperative that governments create an economic sphere that limits the opportunity for corruption. Economies with high instances of government intervention have been shown to foster more corrupt transactions between public officials and private businesses.

Therefore, a free market and economic privatization are the means to a corruption-free private sector. Anti-corruption organizations should work with the public sector to encourage free market reforms, and to increase transparency on all ends. By giving businesses a free space to operate, with only necessary regulations, there is less need for them to offer kickbacks and bribes to public officials. Furthermore, a free market will likely lead to a better economic climate, creating more prosperity in general. Anti-corruption organizations should guide both the public and private sector, reducing entanglement and creating...
a system where each can operate within the most transparency and accountability.

**Conclusion**

It is imperative for the U.S. to establish a clear definition of what constitutes corruption, as well as a baseline method for both anti-corruption and counter-corruption practices. There should be a well laid-out description of petty, systemic, and grand corruption, and what actions constitute each of them. However, this is not to say these guidelines need to be very rigid. In fact, they should be the opposite. These definitions, especially with regards to the impact of corruption, should be broad umbrellas because the degrees of corruption that are acceptable in a society vary from culture to culture. In addition to defining corruption itself, as proposed above, there needs to be a concrete definition of both counter- and anti-corruption. Currently, the two terms are used interchangeably, to the detriment of those involved in stopping the spread of corruption.

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**Notes:**

6. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
Modern Odyssey: UN Peacekeeping and Conflict Termination Efforts in Cyprus

by PKSOI's Ryan McCannell
The Cyprus Conflict: Multiple Dimensions of Strife

Cyprus's unique history and geography are at the root of the island's past conflict, its ongoing stalemate, and the basis of its potential political reconciliation. Its strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean – adjacent to Asia Minor and the Levant, with maritime access to Europe and Africa – has made Cyprus a critical possession for successive empires in the region from the Bronze Age to the Cold War. Most notably, during the past thousand years, the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires heavily influenced the island through their successive cultural dominance and colonization, leading to an ethnically mixed population of Greek and Turkish descent. In 1878, the Ottoman sultan ceded Cyprus to the British Empire, which established naval bases to guard the Suez Canal, project power in the Middle East during the slow decline of the Ottoman Empire. These bases also served as a critical staging ground for military action in WWI and WWII. A census conducted in 1946 under British rule recorded that Greek Cypriots represented about 80 percent of the population, with Turkish Cypriots about 17 percent, and the remainder from other ethnic groups.

The emergence of an independent Kingdom (later Republic) of Greece in 1830, the establishment of a secular Turkish Republic in 1922, and the gradual decline of British influence in the region during the 20th century set the stage for tensions between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. After the Second World War, as Greek Cypriots campaigned for enosis (union) with the Greek mainland, Turks gained support from British colonial authorities to establish an independent Republic of Cyprus as "a bi-communal state with equitable representation of the two prominent communities." A set of three treaties among Great Britain, Greece and Turkey complemented and attempted to strengthen this bi-communal constitutional arrangement. These agreements had four objectives: they prevented a political union between Great Briton and either Greece or Turkey; they maintained several military installations as sovereign British territory; they provided the three signatories with the right to maintain a set number of military forces on the island; and they committed those countries to intervene as necessary to defend the bi-communal constitution. The nature of these interlocking treaties hinted at the broader tensions present between ancient rivals Greece and Turkey, despite efforts to enlist both countries as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), alongside Great Britain and the United States, during the Cold War. Thus, true to its long history, the Republic of Cyprus achieved independence in 1960 in the shadow of both regional and global antagonism.

The U.N. Establishes a Durable Presence

Just three years later, in late 1963, the fragile constitutional compromise governing Cyprus fell apart: Greek Cypriot leaders attempted to force through reforms that would dilute the power of the Turkish Cypriot community. The following year, as political tensions spilled over into violence, the U.N. Security Council voted to establish UNFICYP with a mandate consistent with Chapter VI of the U.N Charter, to "prevent a recurrence of fighting, contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and contribute to a return to normal conditions." In addition to UNFICYP, the U.N. secretary-general appointed a personal representative and staff alongside the peacekeeping mission to provide the world body's "Good Offices" – a durable effort to forge a political solution to unite the divided island. For a decade, the Good Offices representatives toiled fruitlessly to resolve the constitutional impasse while UNFICYP kept the two communities from igniting a civil war. However, in 1974, an attempted coup d'état against Greek Cypriot government officials led to violence that triggered an invasion of northern Cyprus by Turkey, ostensibly justified under the aforementioned security treaties. This invasion in turn prompted the massive displacement of tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots from Turkish-held areas, as well as the retributive displacement of Turkish Cypriots from other areas of the island to the Turkish-held side. During the weeks that followed, as Cyprus's civilian government returned to power following the failed coup, U.N. representatives succeeded in brokering a ceasefire while ensuring the peaceful passage of displaced persons amidst the chaos. The UNFICYP website describes the resulting shift in the peace operation's mission:...
“After the hostilities of 1974, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions expanding UNFICYP’s mandate. The changes included supervising the de facto ceasefire that came into effect on 16 August 1974, and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of Cyprus National Guard and of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces…. Following reports every June and December of the Secretary-General to the Security Council about the status of the Cyprus conflict and UNFICYP, the Council has consistently renewed the mandate.”

Over the years, the Security Council has further expanded UNFICYP’s mandate several times, giving the mission the authority to govern the use of farmlands and other properties inside the buffer zone, maintain checkpoints, and host both formal peace talks and localized peacebuilding meetings in UN-controlled facilities. Although incidents of violence in and along the buffer zone have been rare in recent years, even this relatively calm peace operation has not been without incident: “since 1964, almost 180 U.N. personnel have lost their lives while serving in UNFICYP.”

While some observers have criticized the U.N. for political bias toward the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus – a U.N. member state – and for failing to bring the Cyprus conflict to a decisive end, UNFICYP has managed to achieve its gradually expanding mandate, decade after decade, despite declining personnel and financial resources. In addition to enforcing a decades-long ceasefire, the peacekeeping force governs a 180km-long buffer zone, contributes to the normalization of trade relations and economic growth, and facilitates the delivery of humanitarian assistance to minority communities on both sides of the island’s political and ethnic divide. Most importantly, the presence of UNFICYP creates an atmosphere of watchful peace necessary for the U.N.’s good offices effort to encourage political reconciliation.

Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Multiple Dimensions of Opportunity?

Since Cyprus’s political and cultural divisions stem from global, regional, and local disputes, the eventual reunification of the island will require a confluence of interests in all three arenas. Fortunately, recent trends look promising for Cyprus. On the world stage, a newly aggressive Russia, and the simultaneous turmoil in Iraq and Syria, have reaffirmed the value of the NATO alliance in general – and specifically, Turkey’s interests in maintaining closer ties with the West. Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has played a critical role in advancing the sovereignty of Cyprus. The island’s 2004 EU accession
bolstered its political and economic power in relation to Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{20} Whether by accident or design, Cyprus holds the key to the eventual inclusion of Turkey into the EU, while Greece’s profound economic problems underscore the importance of Cyprus’s sympathetic, but distinct, voice within the institution.\textsuperscript{21} During the long lull in fighting on Cyprus, tempers have cooled between Greece and Turkey, while more immediate concerns – such as the current refugee crisis affecting the region – bolster cooperation between these two erstwhile foes.\textsuperscript{22}

Among the island’s own communities, a new generation of leaders have emerged on both sides of the divide, just as the benefits of EU membership and the recent discovery of substantial offshore oil and gas deposits provide incentives for resolving the conflict.\textsuperscript{23} While the Cyprus problem has foiled negotiators many times in the past, the current confluence of interests and opportunities indicates that the time may be ripe for a long-awaited settlement. If Cyprus’s reunification comes to pass, it will reaffirm the value of the U.N.’s enduring, patient commitment to peacebuilding as an alternative to violence and a tool for conflict resolution.

What Cyprus Can Teach U.S. Foreign Policy Makers

As a durable settlement appears increasingly likely, the decades-long Cyprus experience presents a counterpoint to recent examples of U.S.-led, combat-oriented efforts to resolve complicated disputes among feuding communities in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In those conflicts, U.S. policy makers and planners intended to intervene briefly, achieve victory on the battlefield, develop a workable governing coalition, and depart, without adequate planning for the stability operations and long occupations that typically follow contemporary international conflicts. – and which, in fact, came to pass. In this context, Cyprus embodies the lengthy, frustrating gap between the cessation of hostilities on the battlefield on the one hand, and the achievement of durable peace on the other – a distinction that U.S. policy makers rarely acknowledge, and which U.S. military doctrine tends to gloss over.

US political and military leaders alike tend to pay inadequate attention to the post-conflict stabilization period, focusing instead on deterrence and especially the active combat phase of conflict, upon which American military culture and doctrine tend to fixate. U.S. involvement in post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding remain difficult objectives around which to mobilize American public opinion and military culture, yet they are vital to bridging the gap between war and lasting peace. In the words of military strategist J. Boone Bartholomées, “The United States is developing a reputation much like Germany had in the 20th century of being tactically and operationally superb but strategically inept. Often stated as a tendency to win the war but lose the peace... we simply do not really understand what victory is and how it happens. Worse, we do not have the necessary intellectual framework to think about the problem.”\textsuperscript{24}

This poignant description reflects the fact that virtually every recent military conflict in which the United States has become embroiled also requires lengthy and costly commitments that resemble peace operations. As compared to the decades-long U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula, its posture during the Cold War, and in discrete, time-honored commitments in areas such as Kosovo and Sinai, the U.N.’s modest international investments in such activities over the years in Cyprus may eventually prove to be more durable, successful, and cost-effective in the long run.

Furthermore, the potential resolution of the Cyprus conflict demonstrates how the U.N. and other regional organizations are able to use non-military elements of power to broker a lasting settlement, albeit over an extended time horizon. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. has long provided funding, legal authorization, diplomatic support, and civilian personnel to the international effort to resolve the Cyprus conflict. However, peace operations remain a niche capability within the standard U.S. foreign policy toolkit. To the extent that the United States military forces will no longer be sized to conduct extended stability operations, as expressed in recent Defense Strategic Guidance,\textsuperscript{25} alternatives such as U.N. peace operations provide other viable operations. However, for such efforts to succeed, U.S. civilian and military policy makers, when planning for post-conflict periods, must make a concerted effort to engage with international partners, under the aegis of the U.N. These imperatives underscore the importance of President Obama’s September 2015 policy update on U.S. participation in U.N. peace operations.\textsuperscript{26} It remains to be seen whether Obama’s successors will attach the same importance to peace operations in their policy toolkit.

Conclusion

The decades-long conflict in Cyprus stems from its history as a crossroads among cultures, continents, and empires. With the third-longest-serving U.N. peace operation, UNFICYP, continuing its efforts to prevent violence and return the country to the “normal conditions” foreseen in its 1964 mandate, Cyprus embodies both the challenges and the possibilities of international conflict resolution. As new economic and political relationships change the calculations for Cypriots and their often fractious neighbors, communities on both sides of the divided island regard the future with renewed optimism. For the
U.N., the resolution of Cyprus’s age-old tensions would provoke reflection about the significant changes to peace operations in recent decades, as well as underscoring the value of strategic patience in world affairs. Within that context, even a nation as mighty as the United States can learn valuable lessons from Cyprus’s long and complicated road to peace – a peace that remains elusive almost half a century after the threat of war first drew the world to its doorstep.

Notes:

5 Ibid., 22-23.
6 Ibid., 21.
7 Ibid., 21.
8 Olga Campbell-Thomson, “Pride and Prejudice: The Failure of U.N. Peace Brokering Efforts in Cyprus,” Perceptions 19, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 59-60. In effect, the “bi-communal” constitution distributed political offices and municipal governments among the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities while enshrining their mutual right to exist and claim common citizenship and political rights. Turkish Cypriots resisted efforts to classify their community as a minority, while Greek Cypriots only grudgingly accepted a number of checks and balances that provided constitution protections and political powers for Turkish Cypriots. This brittle set of “least-bad” compromises recalls efforts in other multi-ethnic countries, such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Rwanda, to use constitutional tinkering to balance competing interests in post-colonial settings.
9 Papolovyiou and Kentas, 24-25.
13 Ibid. Although not technically peace enforcement, UNFICYP’s tactical responses to the events of 1974 foreshadowed elements of the protection-of-civilians mandates of future U.N. peace operations.
14 Ibid.
15 Campbell-Thomson, 63.
16 Rubenstein, 32.
17 Since 2004, the UNFICYP force size has been capped at 860 peacekeepers, out of a total of 1,100 total personnel. Its budget for the 2014-2015 financial year was just over $58 million, of which the Government of Cyprus pays one-third of the costs. UNFICYP Homepage, http://unficyp.unmissions.org.
18 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 World Economic Forum, “Davos 2016: Reuniting Cyprus,” YouTube video file. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7hg0Yls1No&feature=youtu.be, accessed May 28, 2016. This brief video features remarks from the current Special Advisor to the U.N. secretary-general, Hon. Espen Barth Eide of Norway, as well as Cyprus Republic President Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Derviç Eroglu. To clarify, Turkish Cypriots theoretically enjoy all the rights and privileges of EU membership, but the declaration of a “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” recognized only by Turkey, complicate these claims. The reunification of Cyprus would thus provide substantial economic benefits to Turkish Cypriots – a powerful incentive in favor of normalization.
A Trend of U.S. Long-Term Commitment in Post-Conflict Conditions
1898 - 2015

by Charles R. Budris
Introduction

This historical study is meant to outline the commitment of United States (US) forces in post-conflict and non-conflict environments. This is done not only to highlight the overall length of post-conflict and non-conflict commitments, but also the disparity in time between the conflict and post-conflict or non-conflict phases of military interventions. For the purposes of this study, conflict phases are defined as the application of armed force (either troops or bombing operations) authorized and conducted under the command of either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or US forces.

Authorization to use force and/or direct military engagement was chosen as the point at which military involvement began. Hostilities lasting less than three continuous weeks were not considered conflict phases, as stabilization activities sometimes involve limited kinetic operations. The end of the conflict phase is defined as the point at which the US, NATO or the United Nations (UN) officially declared a ceasefire or the cessation of hostilities, or when no major armed engagements occurred for approximately one year.

The US commitment in post-conflict or non-conflict situations was defined as the beginning of stabilization activities either after the conclusion of the conflict phase or if no combat took place. For an operation to be considered a US commitment, a continuous presence of US or NATO forces involved in reconstruction and/or stabilization efforts was required. Additionally, reconstruction and stabilization efforts undertaken by United Nations forces were included only if they were included significant contingents of US troops.

US forces on permanent or semi-permanent bases in countries that have experienced US occupations, such as Japan and Germany, are not included in this study as continuous, long-term commitments. Korea is the exception to this standard because the US still maintains operational control over a large portion of South Korean forces. For clarity of viewing, the duration of conflict, post-conflict and non-conflict operations have been rounded to the nearest year.

Several key findings include the concept that accomplishing military objectives may not lead to political end states or even necessarily the termination of military operations in support of
policy goals. Success in post-conflict stability activities requires a continued and additional level of military effort beyond combat to consolidate gains and to realize and sustain the desired political outcome in dynamic post-conflict conditions. History shows that U.S. forces continue to operate well after the cessation of combat activities, from months to years, and their presence enables the other elements of national power.

The following section highlights the event that started and ended each phase of US commitment to a particular intervention.

Syria: 2014 – Present (2016). The conflict phase in Syria began with President Obama’s declaration on 10 September 2014 that the United States was going to commence airstrikes against Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIL) targets in the country.1 These airstrikes have continued as of July 2016.2

Iraq: 2003 – Present (2016). The first conflict phase in Iraq began in March of 2013 with the US-led invasion of the country and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime.3 This conflict phase was declared concluded in 2003 when President Bush gave his “mission accomplished” speech, but combat troops continued to conduct sustained kinetic operations until the last combat brigade was withdrawn from the country in August of 2010.4 US troops remaining in the country then settled into a stabilization role, marking the beginning of the first post-conflict phase in Iraq.5 In 2014, this post-conflict phase concluded when Iraq was declared a war-zone once more because of resurgence Sunni forces (including the Islamic state). This marked the beginning of the second conflict phase.6 As of July 2016, this conflict phase continues.7

Afghanistan: 2001 – Present (2016). The initial conflict phase began in September of 2001, when President George W. Bush signed into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking the US on 11 September 2001. This resolution was later used to justify military intervention in Afghanistan.8 This initial conflict phase concluded in May of 2003 when Donald Rumsfeld declared an end to “major combat” in Afghanistan and the transition of US troops to a stabilization and reconstruction role. This marked the beginning of the first post-conflict phase.9 This first post-conflict phase concluded in February of 2009 when Obama deployed 17,000 additional combat troops to the country to conduct sustained kinetic operations against terrorist elements, marking the beginning of the second conflict phase.10 This second conflict phase concluded in May of 2014 with President Obama’s announcement of the withdrawal of US combat troops from Afghanistan and the transition of the remaining international and US forces into reconstruction and stabilization roles, commencing the second post-conflict phase.11 This post-conflict phase concluded in 2015 when Taliban-affiliated forces stepped up attacks, forcing the US to delay troop withdrawals and step up the tempo of kinetic operations against the Taliban. These operations continue as of July 2016.12

Kosovo: 1999 – Present (2016). The conflict phase in Kosovo began when NATO forces were authorized to conduct airstrikes in March of 1999, and this conflict phase concluded in June of 1999 with the cessation of this airstrike campaign. The post-conflict phase began with stabilization efforts in June 1999, when NATO authorized the deployment of troops as per UNSC 1244 under the campaign name of the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR).13 KFOR is still active as of July 2016, with a troop strength of approximately 4,600.14

Bosnia: 1995 – 2004. The conflict phase in Bosnia began with NATO airstrikes in May of 1995, and ended in December 1995 with the signing of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.15 The post-conflict phase began with the deployment of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia in December 1995. IFOR was replaced by NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996.16 SFOR was replaced in December 2004 by EUFOR, which had a greatly reduced US force and economic commitment.17 This essentially ended US direct involvement in post-conflict stabilization efforts in the country.

Somalia: 1992 – 1995. In December 1992, a marine expeditionary force was deployed to Somalia to conduct stabilization operations, marking the beginning of a non-conflict stabilization phase. This force was retroactively authorized by UNSC Resolution 794 and named OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. In March 1993, the UN passed Resolution 814, which militarized the mandate and called for peacemaking efforts. This marked the conclusion of the non-conflict phase and marked the beginning of a conflict phase, with US troops aggressively implementing and enforcing the resolution. The Black Hawk Down incident occurred in October 1993, ending robust direct US military kinetic actions in Somalia. This marked the beginning of a post-conflict phase. By March 1995, the US had withdrawn all forces remaining in the country.18

Panama: 1989 – 1994. In December 1989, US forces invaded Panama in OPERATION JUST CAUSE in an attempt to bring General Noriega to justice on charges of drug trafficking and human rights abuses, which was the inception of the conflict phase. The conflict phase concluded with the cessation of open warfare and end of Operation JUST CAUSE in January 1990, giving rise to Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY and a post-conflict phase. In September 1994, US forces were withdrawn from Panama.19
Grenada: 1983. In October 1983, US special operations forces entered Grenada and commenced kinetic operations. Additional US forces deployed to the island later in the year. In December of 1983, MG Jack Farris disestablished his command and transferred control of the military forces to the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF). With the departure of US forces, there were no further kinetic operations involving the US, concluding the conflict phase.20

Beirut: 1982 – 1984. In August 1982, the Lebanese government requested the deployment of US forces to assist in the evacuation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and to help end factional fighting. This marked the beginning of a non-conflict phase. US forces withdrew in February 1984.21

Sinai: 1982 – Present (2016). In March of 1982, 670 officers and men of the United States 1st Battalion 505th Airborne Infantry Regiment landed in Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). This force was authorized under Annex I of the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, as it was deployed in lieu of the UN force called for in this treaty. This marked the beginning of the non-conflict phase. The MFO is still deployed in Sinai, and the US supplies a large contingent of troops to the mission and continues to expand its commitment. There was never any significant combat, so this has been exclusively a non-conflict operation.22

El Salvador: 1980 – 1992. In late 1980, President Carter authorized American assistance to the government of El Salvador to forestall a communist rebel takeover of the country. US Forces acted as military advisors and focused on governmental reform, but did not assist directly in combat. In light of this, this has been considered a non-conflict operation. The US ended direct involvement in El Salvador after the government negotiated an end to the insurgency in 1992.23

Vietnam: 1964 – 1975. In August 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution accused North Vietnam of “open aggression” on the high seas and authorized the United States to take “all measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” This marked the official US entrance into declared combat operations in the war and therefore the beginning of the conflict phase.24 In March of 1973, two months after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, the last US combat troops departed South Vietnam. This marked the end of America’s declared conflict phase in Vietnam. Although roughly 7,000 Department of Defense civilian employees remained in Vietnam and continued to assist South Vietnamese forces in combating the forces of the North, March of 1973 is considered to be the beginning of the post-conflict stabilization phase.25 By April 1975, the last Americans in South Vietnam were airlifted out of the country as Saigon fell to the communist forces of the North, marking the end of post-conflict stabilization efforts.26

Taiwan: 1950 – 1953. In June 1950, President Truman dispatched the 7th fleet to the straits of Taiwan to ensure the neutrality of Formosa and prevent aggression by either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of China (ROC). This marked the beginning of the non-conflict phase of US involvement. The “neutralization” order underpinning the 7th fleet’s presence in Taiwan expired in February 1953, bringing an end to US involvement in this operation.27

Korea: 1950 – Present (2016). On 7 July 1950 the United Nations Security Council issues Resolution 84, which called on the international community to furnish assistance to South Korea to aid in the repelling of a North Korean invasion. This force was to be under the command of the United States and so marked the beginning of the conflict phase.28 On 27 July 1953 an armistice was declared between the UN, North Korea and China.29 All forces soon withdrew to the cease-fire line, and this marked the beginning of the post-conflict stabilization phase. US forces remain in South Korea to the present day, and maintain operational control of a large portion of South Korea’s forces.

Japan: 1941 – 1952. In December of 1941, Japan attacked the US fleet at Pearl Harbor and war was soon declared. This marked the beginning of the conflict phase, which ended with Japan’s official surrender aboard the Battleship Missouri in September of 1945. This marked the beginning of post-conflict stabilization operations, as US troops occupied Japan. In 1952, the last occupying American military forces departed Japan.30 As a side note, this study excludes US forces permanently based in Japan from the timeline.

Germany: 1941 – 1955. Germany declared war on the United States in December 1941, marking the beginning of the conflict phase. Germany signed an unconditional surrender at Allied headquarters in Reims, France in May of 1945, marking the end of the conflict phase. The four victorious powers then divided Germany into four zones and decided to pursue a policy of demilitarization, denazification, decentralization, and democratization.31 This marked the beginning of the post-conflict stabilization phase. In May of 1955, the allies concluded their military occupation of West Germany and recognized West Germany as a member of the western alliance against the Soviet Union.32 This marked the end of the post-conflict stabilization phase.

Italy: 1941 – 1947. Italy declared war on the United States in December of 1941, marking the beginning of the conflict phase.
In September of 1943, General Pietro Badoglio of Italy offered a conditional surrender to the Allies, and this marked the beginning of the post-conflict stabilization phase as allied troops began to commence stabilization activities when not in combat with German forces in German-occupied areas of the country. The last US occupation forces departed Italy in 1947.

Nicaragua: 1926 – 1934. In 1926, US forces returned to Nicaragua to quell rebellions that had risen following US withdrawal in 1925. This marked the beginning of the conflict phase. Augusto Cesar Sandino then waged a guerrilla war against US forces in Nicaragua until 1934, when the US withdrew after over 500 skirmishes with Sandino’s forces. This marked the end of US military involvement in the country.

Russia: 1918-1920. In July 1918, US forces were authorized to deploy to Siberia and Northern Russia under the command of General Graves. This deployment was undertaken with the stated goal of enforcing neutrality in the struggle between Red and White forces by protecting the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Because there was no sustained combat that US troops participated in, this intervention is categorized as a non-conflict intervention. US Forces were recalled in 1920, marking the end of the non-conflict phase.


Haiti: 1915 – 1919. In July 1915, 330 United States marines landed in Port Au Prince and took control of the Haitian capital to prevent the nation from descending into anarchy. This marked the beginning of the non-conflict phase. In August 1919, peasants rebelled against the abuses of the American-backed Gendarmerie security apparatus. US troops participated in putting down the revolt, marking the beginning of the conflict phase of this operation. The revolt was finally quelled in 1921, and US forces moved back into a post-conflict stabilization role. In 1934, US forces withdrew from Haiti while retaining economic connections under President Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy.

China: 1900 – 1902. In 1900 the “Boxers” burned several railroad stations near Peking to protest foreign influence in China, and the empress requested assistance. US Marines landed in China on 31 May 1900, resulting in the establishment of a military government in Peking. This marked the beginning of the non-conflict stabilization phase. In 1902, the Dowager Empress returned to re-administer Peking, marking the end of intense US involvement in stabilization operations.

The Philippines: 1898 – 1935. A state of war was declared to exist between Spain and the United States on 21 April 1898. This marked the beginning of the conflict phase. On 1 May, Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Despite America gaining control of the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris, indigenous Filipinos led by Emilio Aguinaldo rose up in revolt in February of 1899 against their new colonial master. This war continued until July of 1902, when President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed general amnesty and declared that the conflict was over. In July of 1902, the United States began to administer the Philippines under a military government, marking the beginning of the post-conflict stabilization phase. In 1935, the US government made good on the Jones Act and allowed the Philippines to become an autonomous commonwealth with self-rule.

Cuba: 1898 – 1901. In April of 1898, President McKinley ended his resistance to declaring war and asked Congress for authorization to deploy troops to Cuba to end the civil war there. This marked the beginning of the conflict phase. A blockade was enacted and troop mobilization began. United States troops officially landed in Cuba in June of 1898. Hostilities ended with the signing of the Protocol of Peace between the United States and Spain in August of 1898. The post-conflict stabilization phase began with the imposition of a military government run by US forces in August of 1898. Major General Leonard Wood served as military governor of Cuba until political power was returned to Cuban nationals in 1902.

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China Ignores the UN Arbitration Ruling: Where do we go from here?

by Amanda Custer
The Hague's ruling on the Philippine's case against China's actions in the South China Sea was released on Tuesday, July 12th 2016. Chinese President Xi Jinping immediately rejected the China-boycotted proceedings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which ruled that China's historic territorial claims have no legal standing. To neighboring countries with claims to the contested islands, this ruling addresses economic opportunity and sovereign rights. For the United States and close allies in the region, the potential insecurity from these actions needs to be examined with a focus on military and strategic security concerns.

China's stated reason for opposing other countries' regional claims on the South China Sea is based on their 'nine-dash line' that give little clear claim to the control of the surrounding small islets and reefs. This reason is what was specifically rejected by the Court. So, it is possible that the historic claim is the extent of China's ambitions and objectives in the region. From a regional and strategic perspective though, even if this reason were true, it does not explain the building of new islands and fortifications throughout the South China Sea. Thus, it is worthwhile to explore other plausible reasons for China's actions, their impact on the situation, and potential responses from regional partners and the US. A range of responses can be developed from this analysis. Having a range of options available will give the US the flexibility to respond differently depending on the actions or reactions of China and others in the region.

The competing claims of the South China Sea are of direct economic concern to the US for many reasons, the most significant being the importance of this body of water for world trade. The South China Sea is important because more than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through its waters, and a third of all maritime traffic worldwide. Drastic consequences could evolve for global trade if China were to have fundamentally unobstructed control of the region and chose to use that power.

In a similar economic light is the contested ownership over the resources in these waters, with each country laying overlapping claims. This is an area in which The Hague ruling plays an explicit and key role.
On the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the defined rights of a coastal state within their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A country’s EEZ is defined under Article 57 of the convention as extensions of defined territorial rights extending from a coastal state’s shoreline or natural offshore islands up to 200 nautical miles. This radius gives coastal countries rights to conserve natural resources, explore, and exploit this marine territory. However, the EEZs do not provide for interfering with shipping or trade. Under China’s historic “nine dash line” claim, they have territory within the boundaries of other country’s EEZs. The ruling of The Hague in theory solves this issue, telling China that their claims are excessive. However, there is little evidence to indicate China has any intention of backing down on their territorial aggression and imposition of their claim.

China’s possession of this excess territory, specifically within other countries EEZ, is certainly detrimental to surrounding nations that might benefit and profit from these resources for their economies. But the economic gain they stand to win does not explain the lengths to which China is willing to go to keep their access and power. By being uncompromising with their territorial exploits, China has put a lot of countries on the defensive by shadowing vessels with either their Navy or Maritime Militia, and has interfered with flights by the US military and other countries. This state of conflict has led to strained and unstable interactions between different nation’s military and trade vessels, and could be a prelude to hostile harassment turning into a tangible confrontation.

Due to the strained circumstances under which countries are trying to go about peaceful economic navigation of these waters, the US should continue to deploy Freedom of Navigation (FON) missions. There is some level of inherent risk in doing this because the US and China have had many tense interactions over the past few years when carrying out FON missions, that could potentially turned into one side using military force against the other. But the benefits of the US, as well as our allies in the region, being free to conduct their economic activities free of provocation outweighs the costs of not having freely traversable international waters.

Not only is the South China Sea a vital body of water for global trade and commerce, but also as this battle for control continues, light is being shed on the bigger security threats that are not immediately apparent. Despite this small victory of getting legal backing from a multilateral institution such as the UN against these controversial China claims, there is still a great amount of work to be done in order to secure freedom of navigation rights and economic rights of the other countries in the region.

One way that China is gradually working to drive out all opposing forces in the region is through their build up of a “Maritime Militia,” a nominally unofficial marine force tasked with patrolling the area and interfering with other shipping. China uses the maritime militia is to police the seas around the roughly 1,170 hectares (1hectare= 2.471 acres or 10,000 square meters) of land that they have reclaimed in the South China Sea. China also uses this Maritime Militia as a way to continue on their path of expanding control and making Freedom of Navigation missions harder for the US, all while making their actions plausibly deniable to the international public eye.

Something that has not been inherently clear are the underlying potential security vulnerabilities to the US and regional allies that lie within the waters of the South China Sea. The South China Sea possesses a myriad of military advantages for the Chinese, if China were able to traverse these waters without scrutiny. These advantages have the potential for creating disparities in the US’s defensive capabilities and their ability to collect protective intelligence on China’s maneuver forces. The US needs to evaluate these potential threats to our national security, and develop strategies and responses for various Chinese escalation and provocation measures.

China, having complete control of the South China Sea, poses a threat to the US’ ability to aid our ally, Taiwan. With the South China Sea being to the south of Taiwan it is strategically important that the US has unimpeded access should a direct invasion ever occur. Over the years, China has made various threats to take Taiwan by force, particularly when Taiwan has become too ‘independent minded’. US support to Taiwan is a delicate balancing act. Should China have the ability to deny US Navy operations in the South China Sea through the deployment of its own forces, it would impact the balance of power and the strategy for the relief of Taiwan should the need arise.

Strategically, control over the South China Sea also gives China the capability to more easily position sea based nuclear deterrents within striking range of the United States. If China were to have unmonitored use of these waters, they would be able to traverse the South China Sea and into the Pacific mostly undetected. Two years ago, China deployed their Jin-Class ballistic missile submarines, capable of carrying 12 JL-2 nuclear missiles. Even if China’s primary objective is economic control, the ability to move their submarines with impunity is a direct consequence of tight control of these waters. The implication that China could covertly position nuclear equipped submarines within strike range of US shores should be of great security concern to the United States.

A crucial construct of the United Nations (UN) Convention
Having international backing on the assertion that China’s claims are disproportionate is beneficial to the US and countries in the region. This newly founded legitimacy to the grievances of the Philippines and other states does not afford an easy solution given the fragile nature of interactions in the South China Sea. Backing down, or losing focus on the South China Sea following this verdict would send the wrong message given that China has chosen to ignore The Hague’s ruling. First, the US should continue employing peaceful tactics that quietly stand up to China’s overbearing actions. This means that the US should continue Freedom of Navigation patrols and aerial patrols, all in the face of, or in spite of, harassment by China military or paramilitary (Maritime Militia) activity. This will demonstrate continuity and resolve in standing up for the basic international principles (UNCLOS) that China signed onto, and principles that the US stands for.

Furthermore, based on these same principles, the US should also expand military cooperation with the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and other smaller countries around the South China Sea. Two wildcards in this dispute going forward are the Philippines and Russia. The Philippines experienced a change in leadership since they filed their claim with The Hague and the announced ruling. The new president, Rodrigo Duterte, has critically changed the tone of communications between the US and the Philippines in regards to the South China Sea and other foreign relations issues. In addition to making provocative remarks about cutting ties with the US, he has expressed his desire to ingratiate the Chinese and even the Russians. If Russia’s interests were aligned with both the Philippines and China, the US would face even higher risks when challenging the contested sovereignty. This does not negate our other allies in the region, but it appears that relationships within the South China Sea have shifted, and that the US will have to take this into account when making strategy for how to proceed.

China’s escalating ambitions require close examination by the US in order to determine how to proceed. Encroachment on allies’ economic rights and freedom of the seas requires a set of correlating US regional and strategic policy given the level of escalation the situation reaches. These US policies and actions, perhaps with graded intensity and tempo, can address a range of the scenarios that will play out over the time. The US must closely consider China’s interests and objectives in each potential provocation and escalation, and define a strategy and action that correlates to and mitigates any potential impact of China’s actions. In this manner, the US can adapt and respond to the ever-evolving climate in the South China Sea.

Notes:

3 Ibid.
Zimbabwe on the Brink of Disaster...As Usual

by Kayley Morrison
Introduction

Zimbabwe is highly likely to become increasingly unstable in the next 18-24 months before elections can be held in 2018, due to a need for sweeping political, electoral, and economic reforms that are unlikely under President Robert Mugabe’s decades-long corrupt rule. Instability is likely to increase dramatically as political opposition movement activities and protests of worsening economic conditions undermine nonagenarian Mugabe’s weakening grip on power.

Discussion:

The president of Zimbabwe since 1980, 92-year-old Robert Mugabe has a history of seizing and maintaining power through violence and corruption. His Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) party has engaged in especially rampant corruption in the previous two election cycles. In 2008, Mugabe lost the first round of elections to Morgan Tsvangirai, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) candidate. In order to ensure that he won the second round, Mugabe implemented a military-led strategy in which thousands of voters were beaten and independent officials were driven out of the election administration. In 2013, Zanu-PF used massive electoral fraud to ensure victory, with an estimated one million invalid names on the electoral roll, including many deceased voters.

Zimbabwe faces substantial economic issues, the foundational problem being a cash shortage. July 2016 marks the second straight month that the cashless Zimbabwe government has been forced to delay payments for civil servants, including doctors, teachers, nurses, and the military. The government has also implemented strict limits on the amount of cash that citizens can withdraw from banks. Further exacerbating the economic crisis is a severe drought in in Zimbabwe, the former breadbasket of Africa, which is the worst in decades.

#ThisFlag protest movement began in April 2016 led by Pastor Evan Mawarire and mainly comprised of unemployed young men. A labor boycott or “stay-away day” was organized for 6 July via WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter using the hashtag #ZimShutDown. By staying away from Harare and other cities, Zimbabweans effectively closed down businesses, shops, and schools.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has voiced support for the protest movement in Zimbabwe. On 13 July, COSATU’s international relations secretary released a statement that “Cosatu [sic] urges the people of Zimbabwe to continue with the struggle and not to watch idly while the government tramples upon the rights of workers and ordinary citizens. Such coordinated mass action is the only language that unresponsive regimes understand.” This statement is significant because COSATU broke from the narrative of the African National Congress (ANC), COSATU’s ally and the ruling party in South Africa. The ANC had condemned the protest movement and labelled it as “sponsored elements seeking regime change.”

Women have also been active in demonstrations against Mugabe. On 16 July, hundreds of women gathered in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second largest city, and beat pots and pans in a march called the #BeatThePot campaign. The march was organized by MDC, whose vice president Thokozani Khupe stated, “These pots that we are beating are no longer cooking anything at home this is why we brought them to say we no longer have anything to cook. We are starving.”

The relatively successful demonstrations on 6 July and 16 July indicate that the opposition is gaining momentum in Zimbabwe. Mugabe will be 94 when the next presidential election is in 2018 leaving the campaign essentially as a contest between opposition groups. If Mugabe is indeed the Zanu-PF candidate in 2018, the opposition candidate that will likely pose the greatest challenge to him is Joice Mujuru, Mugabe’s former vice president from 2004 to 2014.

After being removed from the vice presidency in 2014 amid allegations that she was plotting to kill Mugabe, Mujuru created her own political party known as Zimbabwe People First (ZPF). A major component of Mujuru’s platform is her commitment to repairing relations with the West in order to assist with economic recovery in Zimbabwe. This is a far cry from Mugabe’s Look East Policy which was implemented following sanctions imposed by the West on senior Zanu-PF leaders. The Look East Policy has resulted in deals with China and Belarus that have yet to benefit the Zimbabwean economy and have made Zimbabwe ineligible for funding from the US, European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

A statement made by the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association on 21 July gave the opposition further momentum. The veterans made a break with Mugabe for the first time by stating, “We note, with concern, shock and dismay, the systematic entrenchment of dictatorial tendencies, personified by the president and his cohorts, which have slowly devoured the value of the liberation struggle.” The Veterans Association added that it would no longer support Mugabe’s political campaigns as it had with votes, funding and intimidation of opposition and voters in the past. Mugabe responded
by denouncing the veterans as traitors and vowing to put them on trial.\(^\text{23}\)

Mujuru declared her support for the veterans’ statement and said that there is now a need for unity in order to defeat Mugabe and Zanu-PF. In the event that Mugabe dies prior to the 2018 election, members of Zanu-PF\(^\text{24}\) are positioning for either Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa or Mugabe’s wife, Grace Mugabe, to succeed him.\(^\text{25}\)

Mujuru has already garnered significant national support, suggesting that a ZPF coalition with MDC with Mujuru as a strong candidate leading into the 2018 election, regardless of whether or not Mugabe remains in the contest.\(^\text{26}\)

Kayley Morrison interned with PKSOI in Summer 2016, assisting in developing a new analytic method for assessing transnational organized crime and in drafting a white paper on the method and a monograph on intelligence sharing in UN peacekeeping mission environments. She wrote this quick-turnaround forecast of Zimbabwe through December 2017 as a reference for PKSOI’s SOLLIMS knowledge base <add link>. She will graduate in 2017 with a BA in Intelligence Studies from Mercyhurst University.

Notes:

2. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwel1
24. https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2016/07/24/mujuru-backs-war-veterans/
This SOLLIMS Sampler [Special Edition] comes at a critical moment as global forcible displacement reaches an all-time high, surpassing levels post-WWII, and as violent conflicts driving displacement continue without abate, echoing in war-ravaged Aleppo. While Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) often result from conflict, if the needs of both displaced people and host communities are not addressed, displacement itself may produce further instability. This publication specifically examines lessons from Syria’s ongoing refugee crisis in the Middle East and Europe, drawing on insights from prior situations of displacement to inform response to current crises. click here to download SOLLIMS Sampler
For the fourth year in a row, PKSOI participated in the Regional Cooperation (RC) exercise that trains a multinational brigade in a simulated peacekeeping environment. The event has been held in rotating locations since 2001.

U.S. Central Command hosted this year’s exercise (RC16) from September 16-29, at Camp Edwards in Massachusetts. Pakistan served as the lead nation. Next year’s exercise will be held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

The purpose of the exercise is to promote cooperation and joint combined capabilities among U.S., Central and South Asian (CASA) States and other participating nations. The goal is threefold: 1) to achieve enhanced regional security and stability; 2) to develop professional regional defense forces with the capability to participate in international peace operations; and 3) to enable effective information sharing in a multinational environment.
Pakistan Army Brigadier General Imtaiz Shahid served as the peacekeeping mission commander and was deeply involved in the year-long planning process. This is no surprise as Pakistan is consistently a major troop contributing country to United Nations (UN) missions, and has been since 1960. The primary themes for the exercise included a number of critical elements common to conflict-ridden areas. The first of these was to establish a safe and secure environment, inclusive of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan for fighting forces.

Other major themes that challenged the training audience included illegal border crossings and the trafficking of people and arms, protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, internally displaced people and refugees, prevention of sexual violence and gender issues, military support to governance and civil control, support to local elections, developing an effective information campaign, and transitioning security to local law enforcement.

Critical to the long-term stability of any country in conflict is the establishment of a safe and secure environment, a sustainable economy, stable governance, social well-being, and rule of law. Key to all of these activities is unity of effort which is complicated by a multinational force composition overlaid onto an already chaotic and violent environment. This can be nearly impossible due to a myriad of languages, incompatible technologies, incongruous doctrine and varied levels of organizational capability in a single mission team.

According to the scenario, the fictional country of Sotho struggles to evolve into a stable, democratic country. Sotho is plagued by unrest, violence, and lawlessness from a corrupt government, rebel forces, and criminal elements. The deployment of the UN Force Intervention Brigade presents an opportunity to move toward a stable society and government based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Only through the diligent efforts of UN civilian and military personnel will the Security Council mandate of protecting civilians, investigating human rights violations, supporting humanitarian assistance, and implementing the cessation of hostilities agreement be achieved.

PKSOI Stability Operations Division Chief Colonel Raymond “Boz” Bossert served as the UN Senior Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the peacekeeping and stabilization mission in Sotho.

Colonel Bossert was also part of the team that spent months developing a realistic stabilization scenario that challenged the training audience and met established learning objectives.

COL Bossert noted that, “This year’s planning remained well ahead of schedule and was much more detailed than in the past. Many of the lessons learned in the planning and execution from last year were effectively addressed. The attention to detail that lead country Pakistan put into the process exemplified and motivated all the other country delegations, to include the newest members from Kyrgyzstan, to make the most of this unique experience.”
Since August 2015, Dr. Karen Finkenbinder has served as the U.S. Professor of Peacekeeping to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense Peacekeeping Center to support PACOM, GPOI and Vietnam Country Team efforts. In residence for a year, she now conducts quarterly visits. In December 2016, PKSOI’s Director, Colonel Gregory Dewitt visited the center to see how much has been accomplished and to further reassure the Center that PKSOI will continue to provide advice and support. The Office for Defense Cooperation (ODC) Vietnam Chief, LTC Thang (Jacky) Ly accompanied them. COL Dewitt presented Sr. Colonel Canh a peace pipe and COL Canh presented PKSOI a plaque in honor of the Center to Center relationship. Also while in Vietnam, COL Dewitt, Dr. Finkenbinder, COL Ton (Defense Attache) and LTC Ly visited the new Peacekeeping Center Campus and saw the progress of the GPOI-funded Training and Auditorium, scheduled to be completed by the summer of 2017.
PKSOI Support to Training and Education

PKSOI Supports NATO Protection of Civilians Concept Development Workshop

7-9 February 2017 - PKSOI’s John Winegardner and Lt. Col. Andreas Hesselscherdt participate in the NATO Protection of Civilians Concept Development Workshop at the United Kingdom Defense Academy in Shrivenham England. The first of three workshops focused on the first PoC concept Mitigating Harm and experiment planning. The workshop also served as a networking platform for the subject matter experts working with these topics and forms a community of interest.

PKSOI provides instructional support to the U.S. Military Observer Group (USMOG)

6 February 2017 - PKSOI’s Professor Dwight Raymond partnered with the US Military Observer Group (USMOG) providing classes on peace operations to US military personnel preparing to deploy to the Mission des Nations Unies au Mali - MINUSMA UN Mission in Mali. The personnel will serve as advisors and staff personnel in MINUSMA and help fulfill the US pledge to double its UN personnel contributions at the 2015 Presidential summit on peacekeeping.

PKSOI provides instruction at the Peace Support Training Centre, Addis Ababa Ethiopia

8-12 November 2016 - PKSOI’s Professor Dwight Raymond and Lt. Col. Norihisa Urakami provided classroom instruction and subject matter expertise on the topic of Protection of Civilians including PoC Overview, PoC Mandates and Tasks, and case study practical exercises as part of a 2-week course on Conflict Management at the Ethiopian Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Any comments?

Please let us know

The next quarterly journal will feature articles from the April 2017 PSOTEW workshop titled: Preparing Leaders to Thrive in a Complex World

Please provide your comments / remarks / thoughts / articles / proposals to help us improve the value of the PKSOI Journal. If you would like to contribute an article to the next Peace & Stability Journal, please send an email to Mr. Chris Browne at usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.pksoiresearchandpublications@mail.mil

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