


The Utility of Landpower in Addressing Emerging Security Challenges

by

Colonel F. Wayne Brewster II
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2014

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Landpower will continue to remain an integral part of the Joint Force to meet new 21st century challenges and contribute to protecting U.S. national interests. The future operational environment places a premium on agility and interoperability. The anticipated A2AD challenges require cross-domain synergy to achieve national objectives. Land forces play considerable roles in this environment due to their comparative advantage in shaping the operational environment through human interaction and facilitating access. Mission command is a critical enabler of the agility requirement to achieve this synergy and respond to a dynamic operational environment, and land forces have embraced mission command as a foundational tenet. There is a natural tendency to reduce land forces in the quest to reap a “peace dividend” after protracted wars. We must temper this impulse by clearly articulating the role, value, and associated risks of Landpower in the future operational environment.

The Utility of Landpower in Addressing Emerging Security Challenges

Yes, we will welcome your partnership to come in. We know the neighborhood. We will introduce you to folks. But always remember one thing. Your ability to shape and prevent is a direct reflection of your ability to compel.

—Lieutenant General David Morrison
Chief of the Australian Army¹

Our nation is at a strategic juncture to shape the Joint Force for the future after more than a decade of fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Given recent conflicts and experiences, it is understandable that the United States (U.S.) military will undertake significant reduction and change as our country recalibrates while these conflicts come to a close. The results of these adjustments range from decreasing Service end strengths or resources to discerning future threats our nation might face in the 21st century. Landpower will remain a key instrument to realize our national strategic objectives based on its unique capabilities to meet the challenges of the dynamic global security environment. This paper explores how Landpower will contribute to the Joint Force in achieving the nation's strategic goals with other Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) entities in an increasingly contested access environment.

Landpower will be instrumental in the 21st century security challenges because it continues to embody a philosophy of mission command and a cognitive process to successfully operate in challenging environments characterized by wicked problems.² It is not focused on a single adversary, but the complex nature of the anticipated and rapidly changing security conditions. Cultural interaction stimulates and influences the environment. Cultures are sophisticated, vastly different, and extremely complex as they

are a product of human interaction over many generations. Routine observations and dealings with them improve our appreciation and insights on how they tend to respond to the environment or make decisions.³

Landpower's ability to understand the environment and build relationships through persistent engagement facilitates building partner capacity in areas prior to a crisis. The human exchanges develop trust with internal and external actors, and enable operating with added precision should conflicts arise. Routine interactions also contribute to improved working relationships and interoperability with our JIIM partners. These facets are all predicated, however, on the maintenance of the requisite capacity and capabilities to deal with anticipated crises or contingencies.

Critical aspects to achieving national strategic goals include maintaining a global presence and preserving the ability to project power. Our national presence and military power projection capabilities facilitate access across all domains as we seek to protect core interests and shape the global environment. The *Joint Operational Access Concept* (JOAC), published in 2012, describes how the Joint Force will seek to maintain freedom of action within the global commons.⁴ Access to the global commons is vital to our national interests, and Landpower has a significant role in the successful application of this concept.

The Army, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provide the means to project land forces onto hostile territory when required. Tasks range from conducting forcible entry into an area followed by subsequent land operations to overcoming prepared defenses or land based threats that endanger the Joint Force or its supporting lines of communication. Land forces can also establish or

safeguard forward bases that facilitate U.S. power projection and sustainment of the Joint Force over large distances.

However, perhaps the most significant role of land forces is that of a shaping effort to positively influence the conditions in an environment prior to hostilities. This proactive attempt to ameliorate conditions through human interaction in advance of a crisis is especially important in the complex and dynamic security conditions that exist in the 21st century. Two broad categories that contribute toward Landpower shaping regional conditions are bolstering the defense of our allies in order to deter aggression, and promoting regional security and stability through security cooperation.⁵ Both categories require a sustained effort with timely adjustments given the dynamic nature of the environment.

Strategic Environment

The anticipated future operating environment is one often characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and rapid change. The world has become increasingly interconnected. Crises or contingencies in a particular location reverberate globally and can negatively impact other states or regions. Technological diffusion and advances in the communications realm have increased the transparency of state actions as events are now on display for the world to view, often in real time. Such connections also permit populations to view and seek the economic prosperity enjoyed by other nations. The quest for material wealth or international influence is driving an increasingly intense resource competition across the global commons. This drive for improved standing and greater prosperity is affecting cultural demographics as well.

Seeking a higher standard of living or improved opportunity is resulting in the increased urbanization of several developing areas. Countries like China, India and

others are witnessing massive shifts in populations moving from the rural areas to the cities.⁶ In fact, shifting civilian populations and increasing urbanization are global trends.⁷ This portends a higher likelihood that the U.S. military will conduct future operations among civilian populations, whether in regular or irregular warfare. While interstate conflicts remain possible, anticipated threats will likely include non-state actors that rely on asymmetric capabilities and operate among the population to negate U.S. advantages. The nation's recent experiences in such protracted conflicts conducted amongst populations have contributed to general war weariness. These sentiments include a growing movement towards retrenchment and adjustment of our overseas defensive posture.⁸

Technological innovations and their proliferation afford both state and non-state actors a greater ability to serve as disruptive entities in the global community. The increased lethality of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD)⁹ capabilities poses considerable challenges to the pursuit of our national interests.¹⁰ Fiscal dilemmas at home and abroad necessitate a move to increased efficiency in government and the Military Services. As such, the costs of waging war are becoming increasingly prohibitive in terms of both blood and treasure. Our military must prepare for anticipated security challenges, like A2AD, given the security paradox our country faces.

The complexity of the future operating environment promises non-linear, non-deterministic outcomes in which diverse factors will interact in unexpected ways that generate unforeseen consequences. Armed conflicts are inevitable in such a globally competitive environment. Our challenge is to manage uncertainty rather than diminish it. We must maintain the appropriate capacity and capability in our military, in light of fiscal

quandaries and lack of an identified enemy, to react to crises or contingencies without over commitment to any one in particular. This will mitigate, but not eliminate, some of the negative effects of strategic surprise. The nature of the ambiguous and changing environment necessitates the adoption and cultural inculcation of a doctrine responsive enough to deal with such uncertainty in the anticipated security environment.¹¹

Philosophical Change

Perhaps Sun Tzu, the fabled military theorist, envisioned the appropriate approach when he crafted the maxim “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”¹² Wars were common in his time, and standing armies were extremely expensive to raise and maintain. As such, the ability to shape the environment in advance of crisis was highly regarded. He advocated attacking competitor strategies, plans and alliances in an effort to mitigate risks before they materialized. Waging war was certainly an option for Sun Tzu, and he advocated maintaining a combined arms force with the capability and flexibility to react to unforeseen events. However, influencing the conditions to secure victory without fighting was the most desirable alternative given the costs. While the conditions in his time are not completely analogous to those today, there are some noteworthy similarities for consideration.

The choice to wage war remains a political decision that the military executes in concert with the other instruments of national power in pursuit of a victory which must be defined adequately as well. Protracted wars often negatively affect the morale of the populace and the military, and they can drain the resources of a state. The post conflict period often entails a military draw down to restore fiscal order and a sense of balance in the nation. The impact of large scale loss of human lives frequently engenders subsequent security strategies that favor short military involvement through

technological solutions to attain national objectives with minimal loss of life.¹³ There are inherent dangers with these inclinations, especially when disproportionately paring manpower centric land forces or advocating an overreliance on one element or technology as the prime future solution.

The Military Services cannot accomplish any of our national primary missions or objectives independently. Our short national history is replete with lessons in this regard. There are few instances where a single service could unilaterally deal with a complex security challenge and yield a favorable conclusion. The First Barbary War from 1801 to 1805 offers an early example where one service initially bore the preponderance of the war effort. The U.S. Navy, with some additional diplomatic and material assistance from European partners, achieved limited success in blockading the key city of Tripoli which set conditions towards a favorable outcome. However, the turning point of the undeclared war came when Marines and local mercenaries seized the town of Derna which forced Pasha Karamanli to seek a negotiated settlement.¹⁴ A more recent example of the application of force primarily by a single Service is the air war in Kosovo.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) involvement in Kosovo in 1998 stemmed from the international effort to prevent further human atrocities in Kosovo. The coalition leveraged air power to compel Yugoslavian President Milosevic to withdraw his forces and seek a negotiated settlement. Advocates claim the 78 day air campaign as a watershed event and “unprecedented exercise in the discriminate use of force.”¹⁵ While the application of power did successfully attain the initial limited objectives, it did not solve the long term objectives to secure the victory.¹⁶ Land forces entered after the

bombing campaign in July 1999, and they remain in country today. The U.S. maintains a small active duty Army force contribution to the coalition effort to preserve a safe and secure environment.¹⁷ These vignettes illustrate that while single Service unilateral action can accomplish limited objectives during conflict, it is the combined action of the Joint Force and whole-of-government that contributes to accomplishing the overarching political objectives.

The Military Services learned over time that the combination of military and intergovernmental capabilities across multiple domains vastly increases effectiveness toward desired outcomes. The Department of Defense (DOD) now seeks a cultural mindset of *cross-domain synergy*¹⁸ to establish a new norm of interdependence between the Services in light of fiscal challenges and the dynamic security environment.¹⁹ The Army, Marines, and U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) must embrace the current conditions and conceptual shift in order to serve as organizations that contribute to the anticipated challenges of the Joint Force across all domains.

General Odierno, General Amos and Admiral McRaven set the tone of interdependence early with their collective work entitled “Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills.”²⁰ While some critics contend that the paper, and the establishment of the Office of Strategic Landpower, stems from looming budget fights and the new Air-Sea Battle Concept, the document serves to stimulate dialogue regarding how Landpower can best provide capabilities to the nation in a time of austerity and complex operating environments.²¹ Although the consensus achieved between the three parties remains rather broad at this initial stage, the importance lies in the continued cooperation between the stakeholders.²² This cooperation meets General Dempsey’s

intent to push the services towards collaboration and interdependence.²³ Continued dialogue by the participants will arguably derive new ideas and concepts to deal with challenging conditions.

Landpower faces a unique situation with the dynamism of the anticipated security environment and fiscal uncertainty. While the requirements across the range of military operations might remain similar to recent experiences, the means to execute them will be different and the concepts to accomplish assigned tasks will resultantly change.²⁴ The JOAC articulates the anticipated challenges with access to the global commons and the ability to project power in support of our national interests. Success depends on shaping favorable conditions for access prior to potential conflict through military and interagency efforts. These efforts range from forward basing and prepositioned equipment stocks to conducting theater security cooperation events.²⁵ The challenge is determining what concept, policy, system or technology best serves to facilitate such shaping efforts.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) expressed that the greatest enabler to effectively function and succeed in a volatile, complex, and competitive environments is the ethos of mission command.²⁶ Although the concept is not new, General Dempsey elevated it to a prominent position within joint doctrine to create a shared view of how military forces will operate in the global security environment.²⁷ Technological innovations facilitate maintaining a competitive advantage and are a significant capability. However, an essential element of the Joint Force's effort to assure allies, deter aggression, and promote regional stability through security cooperation is

the inculcation of a cultural mindset to shape conditions through persistent human engagement.

The Joint Force philosophy of mission command is the foundation for the Services to successfully operate in the future environment “because it empowers individuals to exercise judgment in how they carry out their assigned tasks.”²⁸ It exhorts military members to leverage critical and creative thinking skills to solve complex problems in dynamic environments. The Joint Force will fail to achieve the desired synergy if the Services are not bound by a common purpose and understanding of the environment, strategy, and philosophy.

The Army and Marine Corps have similarly made the philosophy of mission command the underpinning of their doctrine to foster service cultures that maintain freedom of action and rapidly exploit situations to create favorable conditions for the Joint Force. While military-to-military engagements are not solely resident in the land domain, Soldiers, Marines, and SOF are the best mechanism to shape conditions and build partner capacity via routine engagement. The land force centric nature of most potential partner militaries creates opportunities for building relationships. The Army recognizes the opportunities and views inculcation of mission command so critical to adapting and influencing conditions in environments that General Odierno prioritized leader development above all other service objectives.²⁹

Admiral McRaven and USSOCOM are embarked upon a similar venture as they promote the “human domain” as a critical aspect when leveraging relationships and persistent engagement to build networks and shape conditions prior to conflict. SOF lists one of their “truths” as “humans are more important than hardware.”³⁰ The

respective senior leaders for the Army and Marine Corps share in this view. They echo the appreciation for the importance of understanding the social sciences of warfare in addition to the physical sciences.³¹ Given the anticipated complexity and ambiguity of the dynamic security environment, Landpower doctrine is evolving to one predicated on an ethos or philosophy that focuses on the ability to operate in uncertain conditions rather than against a known threat.³²

The essential nature of war has not changed, but the character and characteristics of war are rapidly changing.³³ The highlighted philosophical changes in respective service/organizational cultures are a mechanism to codify and sustain the essential attributes honed during years of war while operating under challenging conditions in rapidly changing environments. These adaptations are an insightful recognition of how our leaders envision the interconnected nature of operations and conditions under which land forces will operate in the future. Mission command serves as the driver for change to shape land forces for 21st century challenges. These doctrinal modifications are already influencing how the Army, Marines and SOF plan to develop, organize, employ, and sustain their forces.

Opportunities

Land forces are balancing capabilities across the Joint Force to meet anticipated challenges, as well as undertaking a series of initiatives to develop and test concepts that will generate opportunities for our senior leaders. Commanders across all echelons serve as the drivers of this adaptive change. The Army recently modified its force generation model to meet Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) requirements while assuming risk given the adoption of a tiered readiness model for units. The Army Contingency Force Package (CFP) is a complementary small combat

ready force pool of 7 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to mitigate risk against war plans and emerging requirements.³⁴ All forces, however, will align to specific combatant commands under a new initiative towards shaping regional security environments by creating favorable conditions through persistent engagements and security cooperation events.

An even more aggressive Army effort is the Pacific Pathways strategy to leverage Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) to PACOM as a “capable force that can respond to a variety of contingencies rapidly.”³⁵ General Vincent Brooks, the commander of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), intends to “put in motion a pathway of activity into multiple countries for extended periods of time, linking a series of events and exercises on a variety of topics.”³⁶ His intended concept will commit a roughly 700 Soldier force with maritime expeditionary enablers against existing exercises in the region. In theory, this will save on aerial transit costs and extend the engagement duration with host nation forces. More importantly, the force package provides the combatant commander with additional options should a crisis arise in the region during their circuit. The downside of the strategy is that it contributes to a perception that the Army is attempting to duplicate Marine Corps roles in an effort to remain relevant.

Some critics dubbed the initiative as “copyright infringement” and a condition of the Army’s grasp to secure their equities in the ongoing DOD budget contest.³⁷ General John Paxton, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, countered such critics by commenting that “there is plenty of turf for both the Marine Corps and the Army to cover.”³⁸ He went on to assert that those who have spent time in the Pacific know “there’s not enough of us to go around.”³⁹ His statements reflect a spirit of collaboration

and sense of shared responsibilities developed over the years of fighting side by side in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Senior Landpower leaders understand the national priorities and what our civilian leaders require from their military in the complex future environments. Aside from creating additional strategic options and helping to shape a particular region, the continued work also energizes more routine interaction among entities to draft and test concepts that improve interoperability within the Joint Force and our partners. While a particular initiative may ultimately prove infeasible in application, the journey to jointly explore alternatives and seek new solutions and working relationships will arguably contribute to a more capable force. Such an approach can also contribute to building trust and garnering an improved shared understanding between the parties involved. Some recent efforts by the Marine Corps illustrate how they are adapting to create options for our senior leaders.

The Marine Corps plans to reposition its forces, in a conjoint effort, by dispersing 4 Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) across the Pacific to increase strategic flexibility to Northeast and Southeast Asia.⁴⁰ They are also shifting an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) from the Atlantic to the Pacific to improve lift and maneuver capabilities for Marine forces. Most importantly, the Marines intend to increase military engagements for the PACOM Commander to develop and refine expeditionary defense capabilities in our allies and partners.⁴¹

Similarly, USSOCOM is adjusting capabilities to improve their effectiveness. The SECDEF recently reassigned the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) to USSOCOM to increase and enhance SOF capabilities to Geographical Combatant

Commanders (GCC). SOF empowerment initiatives include increasing their presence in Washington, DC to better advise civilian leaders and interact with interagency partners. Admiral McRaven also seeks to establish Regional SOF Coordination Centers (RSCCs) at several locations around the globe. Their role will be to promote multinational collaboration, education, and training with partner nations to build internal host capacity.⁴²

The noted endeavors are an effort to secure the peace by instilling an ethos in land forces that guides conduct towards improving ally and partner capabilities, reassuring allies, and deterring aggression. Developing a better understanding and enhanced trust through routine interaction are essential elements that form strong relationships and shape conditions. While they can favorably influence human behavior and environments, such actions do not guarantee the totality of success.

Challenges

Our land forces appear to be wrestling with how to tailor the size, organization, and missions of forces originally built for the Cold War.⁴³ While land forces rightfully sought the initial task of cementing the physical and psychological lessons learned from our recent conflicts into their respective doctrines, they have yet to adequately articulate the concepts for employment in the future. The land forces have addressed capstone doctrinal publications to define the new philosophical importance given uncertainty and lack of a monolithic enemy. However, they have not fully aligned their concepts or publications to account for the advent of uncertainty as the principle adversary in regard to organization, manning, equipping and a host of other employment facets. Shortfalls in this regard contribute to an ambiguous narrative tinged with a new shaping flavor without the appropriate details to communicate effectively internally and externally.

The nebulous narrative negatively impacts Landpower senior leaders in their role as advisors to Congress and other civilian leaders on the ability to execute policy and the associated challenges, opportunities, and risks. The lack of refined concepts and doctrine, at this juncture, also impedes making effective arguments on how to maintain and seek the appropriate capabilities and capacity to enact directed policy. General Dempsy makes the point in his assessment of risk in the recent 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that we must innovate and find new ways to defend the nation since we have directed ends and declining resources.⁴⁴ Land forces must continue the internal dialogue while including the Air Force and Navy to ensure they understand how Landpower intends to complement the other service efforts in pursuance of national objectives. This will enable our military leaders to speak with one voice in dialogue with our various stakeholders. Land forces face other challenges besides refining the doctrine to shape the services and improving our communication with stakeholders. We cannot forget that technological advancements pose significant physical challenges to the Joint Force, especially in the arena of operational access.

Although warfare remains predominantly a human endeavor, technological advancements continue to impact human activities across the various domains. Landpower is significantly dependent on the Navy and Air Force to enable power projection through the air and maritime domains. Low cost technological advancements in missiles and mines pose challenges as nations and non-state actors can deny access to the land, sea and maritime domains. Land forces remain dependent on the Air Force and Navy for both operational access and close support depending on the terrain and operational environment.

Similar technological developments in the space and cyber domains present equally challenging situations. Offensive space operations by an adversary against our satellite constellations could degrade U.S. military abilities to gather intelligence, communicate across the Joint Force, or target enemy forces. While such national space capabilities are not widely proliferated due to the high cost of entry, similar offensive and defensive capabilities executed in the cyber domain could attain detrimental effects. Cyber-attacks can impair command and control, degrade systems and disrupt operations. The technological barriers to entry to conduct such operations are very low and they are relatively inexpensive to generate.

Another quandary that will confront Landpower will be the issue of sovereignty. Non-state actors in failing states present a particular challenge. Land forces operating in sovereign or failing states against groups of non-uniformed extremists increases the complexity of operations. This complexity continues to compound as the urbanization of the world continues to create larger cities where non-state actors can blend in with the population.

Landpower's ability to rapidly project power is symbiotically linked to the other Services and contingent on the enabling aspects of the space and cyber domains. The Marine Corps is best suited to crisis response given their expeditionary nature and relationship with the Navy. The Army and SOF are rapidly deployable for an enduring crisis or global contingencies based on the threat. Collectively, land forces must improve Joint Force interoperability and develop the requisite mechanisms with the Services to effectively integrate with the Joint Force, allies and partners. This is crucial in light of the anticipation of denied access and disruptions to our core capabilities to

command and control forces. In addition to the agility enabled by mission command to adapt to the environment, the principle element Landpower maintains to mitigate some of this risk remains its ability to shape conditions prior to any potential conflict.

General Odierno articulated that “[s]haping is an enduring, daily requirement and is emerging as a core competency.”⁴⁵ Land forces conducting engagements, cooperation exercises, or humanitarian efforts can favorably alter security environments through routine interaction. Shaping necessitates routine relations but does not connote undertaking a large commitment of forces. Engagements can positively build partner capacity, and continued interaction contributes to better understanding for each side, mutual trust, and improvements in interoperability. Achieving more effective interoperability is extremely important as multi-national operations are now more common than unilateral endeavors.

Risks

One of the most significant risks to the Joint Force is failing to inculcate the philosophy of mission command within each of the services. The lack of adoption of the philosophy will have negative effects on building trust and gaining a shared understanding of the problems we collectively face. It will likely also retard the empowerment of subordinates to act in a timely fashion in an unpredictable world. A Joint Force that does not exhibit mutual trust or have a shared vision will inevitably struggle to achieve true interdependence and the enhanced interoperability requisite to achieve cross-domain synergy. The cornerstones of cognitive agility and empowerment are pivotal to executing the joint concepts. They are also critical to improving inter-service and inter-governmental relationships needed to execute unprecedented

coordination across multiple domains to apply combat power and attain the desired synergy.

The Services must begin by creating the proper cultures and trust needed to maximize capabilities from the resources allotted to the Joint Force given the perceived conditions and future threats. The military must not devolve into budget squabbles or protecting fiefdoms. Risk already abounds based on our national fiscal situation. Attaining the desired interdependence and improved interoperability within the Joint Force and our JIIM partners necessitates training under such conditions at a greater frequency than ever before. Paradoxically, corresponding increases in joint training may drive steeper resource requirements to achieve appropriate levels of readiness and training.

We have the broad concepts and strategies for execution, but there are gaps in the manning, organization, training and equipping required to execute them and achieve desired interoperability. As the Joint Force pursues improved interoperability, it will likely find there are material shortcomings that hamper functions and require additional resources to generate the desired interdependence. For instance, the force might collectively discover it does not have the communications architecture or logistical capacity to support the increased burden of multiple self-contained formations operating independently to achieve the cross-domain synergy. These are but a few of the notable efforts that need our current attention and postulation, as we could find that the concepts for employment of the Joint Force place a heavy resource burden that precludes attaining the desired objectives. While these predictions might strengthen the

argument for shaping conditions prior to conflict, the use of military engagements to influence an environment is not without risk either.

While land forces are uniquely capable of positively shaping security environments, they can also unintentionally destabilize them as well. The U.S. must judiciously view U.S engagements from the lens of other states or regions and discern how they will perceive our involvement. The execution of any strategy invariably creates new security dilemmas. Land forces mentoring and supporting a given state's security sector reform or restructuring might have merit, but such actions could be at cross purposes with other actors or objectives in the region.

Operating within the commander's intent is critical to mission command. Landpower must execute any such cooperation activities in concert with the combatant commanders' regional strategies. Members of the elements involved in the engagements must have a common understanding of the tasks they will conduct and the desired/undesired effects to be most effective and prevent destabilizing efforts. Military efforts that fail to nest appropriately with the other instruments of power being applied can have unintended consequences if acted upon in isolation. The increased inclusion of interagency and intergovernmental elements in the shaping process is a necessity. Acting in concert with representatives from the other instruments of power creates added potential to make gains in engagements even more substantive. Nesting with other actors in the U.S. Government (USG) has great potential so long as the land forces understand GCC desired effects, assuming these are also nested properly with national objectives, when acting in such a capacity.

Conclusion

Landpower will continue to remain an integral part of the Joint Force to meet new 21st century challenges and contribute to protecting U.S. national interests. The future operational environment places a premium on agility and interoperability. The anticipated A2AD challenges require cross-domain synergy to achieve national objectives. Land forces play considerable roles in this environment due to their comparative advantage in shaping the operational environment through human interaction and facilitating access. Mission command is a critical enabler of the agility requirement to achieve this synergy and respond to a dynamic operational environment, and land forces have embraced mission command as a foundational tenet. There is a natural tendency to reduce land forces in the quest to reap a “peace dividend” after protracted wars. We must temper this impulse by clearly articulating the role and value of Landpower in the future operational environment. There are risks and challenges which must be addressed, like inculcation of mission command as a foundation across all Services and the cost of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) changes to support interoperability and Service interdependence. While already adapting land forces to the dynamism of anticipated operating environments, continued partnerships between the Army, Marine Corps and USSOCOM with the Joint Force and our other JIIM partners will net critical improvements in our interoperability, interdependence, and unity of effort across the various domains.

Endnotes

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