Joint Basing’s Effectiveness, Efficiency and Future

by

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14. ABSTRACT

The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report Recommendation #146 called for the creation of 12 joint bases by September 15, 2011. The Department of Defense (DoD) executed the recommendation in accordance with the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on January 22, 2008. This paper examines how this guidance shaped the formation and operation of the joint bases today. This research project also examines what effectiveness and efficiencies were expected and realized, and a root cause analysis of why they were or where not achieved. Finally, the implications on and strategic options for the future of Joint Basing in the Department of Defense are considered.
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Abstract

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The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report Recommendation #146 called for the creation of 12 joint bases by September 15, 2011. The Department of Defense (DoD) executed the recommendation in accordance with the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on January 22, 2008. This paper examines how this guidance shaped the formation and operation of the joint bases today. This research project also examines what effectiveness and efficiencies were expected and realized, and a root cause analysis of why they were or where not achieved. Finally, the implications on and strategic options for the future of Joint Basing in the Department of Defense are considered.
Joint Basing’s Effectiveness, Efficiency and Future

The creation of a joint base is complex. The commander must merge diverse, Service-specific financial systems, management structures, operating procedures, and staff, so as to jointly manage functions ranging from facilities sustainment to mail delivery to the provision of family support services. Considering the size of many of our installations, such a consolidation is equivalent to the merger of two corporations. As with corporate mergers, moreover, the cultural differences are often the hardest to bridge.

—Dr. Dorothy Robyn
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 was the largest of all the BRACs with more recommendations considered than all of the previous BRACs. As Dr. Robyn stated, “The focus of the 2005 BRAC round was on aligning our infrastructure with our military strategy so as to maximize war fighting capacity and efficiency.” Her statement was consistent with prior congressional testimony that, “The Department [of Defense] is using this opportunity to create the conditions for more consistent and effective delivery of installation support.” Since BRAC 2005 and the creation of Joint Bases had a dual purpose of maximizing both effectiveness and efficiency we will examine both areas. To begin, an applicable framework is necessary to analyze the evidence and observations of what happened, and compare them with the stated goals of Joint Basing of what was supposed to happen.

Root Cause Framework

The framework used in this study to analyze Joint Basing originates from Six Sigma practices. Six Sigma processes involve five phases known as Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control (DMAIC). The phases are further defined as:

- Define the Problem and what customers require,
- Measure the defects and process operation,
- Analyze the data and discover causes of the problem, and
- Improve the process to remove cause of the defects and Control the process to make sure defects do not occur.\(^5\)

This paper focuses primarily on the analyze phase which is associated with root cause analysis, but in so doing highlights several design flaws and missing controls that contribute to Joint Basing’s current issues. Additionally, strategic options to improve Joint Basing are offered.

In Six Sigma processes, Root Cause Analysis consists of three phases:

1) Exploring – investigating the data and/or process with an open mind, just to see what you can learn,

2) Generating hypotheses about causes – using your new-found knowledge to identify the most likely causes of defects, and

3) Verifying or eliminating causes: Using data, experimentation, or further process analysis to verify which of the potential causes significantly contribute to the problem.\(^6\)

The scope of this study is intentionally limited to the Explain and Generate Phases using the “Five Whys” [Table 1] to conduct the analysis.

The Five Whys is a technique used in the Analyze phase of the Six Sigma DMAIC (Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control) methodology. It is a great Six Sigma tool that does not involve data segmentation, hypothesis testing, regression or other advanced statistical tools, and in many cases can be completed without a data collection plan. By repeatedly asking the question “Why” (five is a good rule of thumb), you can peel away the layers of symptoms which can lead to the root cause of a problem.\(^7\)
Table 1. Five Why Questions to Analyze Joint Basing

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<th>Why has Joint Basing Not Been as Efficient as Originally Estimated?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Why has Joint Basing Not Been as Effective as Envisioned?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Why did Joint Basing’s Cost Elevate Beyond the Estimated Levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.a.</td>
<td>Why is Joint Basing Efficiency Difficult to Estimate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.a.</td>
<td>Why did the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (JBI(G) not require the creation of Joint organizational structures?</td>
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A relations diagram is then presented as to visually depict the interrelation of causes developed through answers to the Five Whys. This diagram will assist in examining Joint Basing’s shortfalls “to help a team identify the drivers (root causes) of a complex problem.”

Why has Joint Basing Not Been as Efficient as Originally Estimated?

According to the BRAC 2005 Commission Final Report the justification for Joint Basing was:

Because these installations share a common boundary with minimal distance between the major facilities or are in near proximity, there is significant opportunity to reduce duplication of efforts with resulting reduction of overall manpower and facility requirements capable of generating savings, which will be realized by paring unnecessary management personnel and achieving greater efficiencies through economies of scale.

In executing BRAC 2005, the focus “was on aligning our infrastructure with our military strategy so as to maximize war fighting capacity and efficiency.” It appears that efficiency was a secondary concern from the beginning. Attributed to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright, “The identification of cost savings is secondary to maintaining operational capabilities.” According to the DoD Basing Director Peter Potochny, the mergers into joint bases “are giving the organizations time to operate together and then [we] will look for efficiencies.” Such statements indicate the goal was to gain efficiencies over time. It is clear that the priority of goals
were to enhance operational capabilities, improve effectiveness, and then gain efficiencies. The predictions of considerable savings seemed not only feasible, but a clear opportunity to achieve budget efficiencies. When BRAC 2005 created the Joint Basing initiative, the DoD predicted that it would achieve a cost savings of $2.3 billion over a period of 20 years.\textsuperscript{13}

It is unclear and debatable today on how much Joint Basing has and will actually save. A key reference point does, however, exist to help ascertain whether Joint Basing will achieve the stated efficiency goal of $2.3 billion over 20 years. In a 2010 Air War College research paper, Jeffrey McNeely estimated that instead of saving the taxpayers money it would actually cost considerable more than expected. He based his findings on his own manpower analysis using the memorandum of agreements (MOAs) from all 12 joint bases and the expected manpower increases necessary to manage the joint bases and achieve the standards required to implement the new Common Output Levels of Service (COLS). McNeely estimated Joint Basing's cost would be an additional $2.6 billion over the same 20-year period.\textsuperscript{14} The 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, "Showed that the 20-year savings estimate had fallen [from DoD’s estimate] by nearly 90 percent to about $249 million."\textsuperscript{15} The range of estimated cost savings--from $2.3 billion to $243 million--demonstrates that determining efficiency is not as objective as one might think. The two estimates share several common findings. They are: manpower models applied did not represent reality, new organizations developed to manage joint bases increased manpower requirements, and COLS higher standard drove higher costs.
Why Did Joint Basing’s Cost Elevate Beyond the Estimated Levels?

Controls

The process used by DoD to implement Joint Basing developed a thorough plan to account for the majority of anticipated issues, but the process failed to implement controls in several critical areas that had direct impact on the estimated cost savings.

One key area was personnel where,

The saving proposed under Recommendation 146 included 1,153 military and 968 civilian positions. There were few reductions in Base Operating Support (BOS) funding not associated [with] the manpower reductions. The vast majority of the Joint-Basing savings would be accomplished through these manpower reductions, taken completely from Supported units.\(^{16}\)

The issue is twofold. First, the estimates were made with models and formulas from DoD and not from manpower analysis submitted by transforming installations and units\(^{17}\). Second, DoD did not apply controls to limit the manpower requirements developed during MOA development. Without specified controls, supporting Components designated as the lead Service for the new joint bases increased their manpower requirements rather than reducing them as expected. This was in violation of the JBIG and subsequent updates which state manpower levels “are expected to come from and not exceed existing manpower resources at the current installations.”\(^{18}\)

Common Output Level Standards (COLS)

The Senior Joint Base Working Group (SJBWG) approved COLS to assuage Service Component concerns that the supporting Component would provide substandard support to its tenant units. By design joint base COLS established:

a consistent frame of reference for defining outputs, performance metrics, and cost drivers for installation support functions across Military Service lines. The predictable resourcing requirements resulting from these
“common output level standards” will promote more consistent programming and budgetary decisions.\textsuperscript{19}

The SJBWG made the decision to allay concerns by supported Services that the lead Service would not provide adequate base support by adopting the highest service frequency and delivery standards. The SJBWG is the senior working group that consists of Service level leads for Joint Bases. It is the senior of a series of nested groups, summits and councils. The hierarchy that rises from tactical to strategic level bodies is: Joint Base Partnership Council, Intermediate Command Summit, Senior Installation Management Group and finally the SJBWG.\textsuperscript{20} “Significantly, in every case the SJBWG opted for the highest standard used by any of the Services as the COL standard for Joint Bases.”\textsuperscript{21} In 2010, the Navy estimated the DoD-mandated COLS costs for Joint Bases were higher than Navy COLs by $20.7 million per year above the program of record (POR)--a five to eight percent increase above the POR.\textsuperscript{22} The outcome of COLS is standardized services and metrics, but increased costs and reduced Service Component fiscal flexibility.

\textbf{Why is Joint Basing Efficiency Difficult to Estimate?}

As a business practice, DoD does not measure avoided costs. But the majority of savings envisioned by Joint Basing are just that. In her 2012 testimony Dr. Robyn reminds the House Armed Services Committee that “the savings from BRAC are avoided costs, however. The Department’s accounting system, like that of private firms, does not track avoided costs.”\textsuperscript{23} From a process stand point, DoD is arguing that the estimates of cost savings made to partially justify Joint Base were just that--estimates, and that it cannot evaluate achieving those estimated saving after implementation.
Estimating Joint Basing’s cost savings is further complicated by the “new fiscal realities” that DoD began operating under beginning with Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. “New fiscal realities” is the overarching expression used by leadership within the DoD to describe the current period of significant fiscal reductions enacted by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) as a forcing function to reduce federal government expenditures, deficit, and debt. The “new fiscal realities” began prior to the BCA in anticipation of the reduced DoD budgets and continue to describe its current fiscal environment.

According to the Army Program Manager for Joint Basing, “It’s hard to delineate if a reduction [in cost] is due to efficiency or lack of funding.” An update brief from Joint Base Langley Eustis (JBLE) highlights one of the impacts. In FY 2012 and beyond “Joint base funding is no longer exempt from corporate structure reductions--driving significant budget concerns to JBLE.” For JBLE this represented a 17 percent budget reduction and an approximately $470 million loss of buying power from FY 2011. Prior to FY 2012, DoD fenced COLS’ funding and mandated 100% funding to ensure a successful implementation.

Another impact of “new fiscal realities” was on manning levels. An example is the 2011 Army budget decision requiring between 10,000 and 11,000 civilian workforce reductions. The decrease in Installation Management Command (IMCOM) alone amounted to about 7,000 of those position reductions. This significantly affected Joint Basing specifically at Joint Base Lewis McChord and Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall. All of the Service Components were affected similarly. The impact is that joint bases cost less to operate not because of efficiencies, but directed manpower reductions. It also directly affected the ability to achieve COLS and provide installation services. One
should consider the difference between DoD’s estimated $2.3 billion savings, McNeeley’s estimated $2.6 billion increase, and the GAO report’s $249 million savings; the elevated Manning levels and COLS increases predicted by McNeeley did not come to fruition because DoD was forced to reduce its civilian manpower and COLS funding levels. These two cases provide glimpses into the complications associated with assessing Joint Basing’s efficiency.

BRAC 2005 and subsequent guidance lacked efficiency goals other than cost savings. Another obstacle in measuring efficiency as well as effectiveness is the lack of meaningful DoD metrics for Joint Basing. The primary metric DoD currently evaluates is COLS execution with the percentage met for the standards as the measured criteria. The change in COLS percentages met is also evaluated over time to determine trends. Additionally, the manpower and budget available to execute COLS is measured by FY dollars obligated compared to the baseline and for manpower assigned compared to the baseline. The issue is that these are neither measures of efficiency or effectiveness of Joint Basing as a whole; they address only part of Joint Basing—COLS.

As previously discussed COLS was newly developed for Joint Basing and adopted the highest standards so it does not represent conditions prior to Joint Basing and is not comparable to standards on non-joint bases. The data being collected and evaluated is able to demonstrate only if COLS are being met. Because of funding constraints, the stated SJBWG “goal is to meet COLS with less manpower.”27 This guidance creates an unofficial efficiency goal, whereas if the same COLS continue to be met or improve with less people and less money, Joint Basing is obviously becoming more efficient - at least in regards to COLS. If this happens the question will remain--
why is Joint Basing becoming more efficient? The DoD needs to develop metrics and a method that specifically measures the efficiency and effectiveness of Joint Basing. In a 2012 report GAO found, “DoD does not have a reliable method of collecting information on the net costs or estimated savings, and efficiencies, specifically resulting from joint basing and excluding other influences on the bases’ budget.”

The DoD, GAO, Congress, and anyone evaluating Joint Basing must realize that assumptions used to estimate the $2.3 billion in savings were flawed. Thus, continuing to use the original benchmark as a reference point is also flawed as it is irrelevant what DOD predicted as cost saving in 2005. It is important to continue to implement best practices and drive efficiencies to achieve the greatest savings possible while maintaining or enhancing war fighting capacity as part of the overall BRAC 2005 goals.

Why has Joint Basing Not Been as Effective as Envisioned?

In 2010, Deputy DoD Director for Joint Basing Colonel Addison stated joint bases in the Continental United States (CONUS) are an opportunity to operate jointly similar to those in operational areas. He stated, “The joint base is a test bed for joint installation standards and organizations, and another way for services to learn from each other to improve their own operations both at home and abroad.” The Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JBMDL) Deputy Commander in 2011 said, “The logic is, if we can train together, if we can fight together, why can’t we run a base together.”

Organizational Structure

If one purpose of Joint Basing was to train as we fight, why did the JBIG not require the creation of joint organizational structures? The JBIG did authorize this possibility, but the execution was limited in the extent the new organizations integrated joint billets. A joint billet is a position filled in the supporting Component’s organizational
structure coded and filled by a service-member from the supported Component. A comparison of joint doctrine and the JBIG is helpful. Joint doctrine is very informative and clear about planning to establish a Joint Task Force:

To effectively transition a single-Service organization from its routine Service--related missions to that of a [Joint Task Force Headquarters] JTF HQ. Key to this process is creating a joint manning document (JMD) that will define the organization and provide the basis for tasking the individual augmentee (IA) requirements necessary to staff the JTF HQ. The commander, joint task force (CJTF), in concert with the supported establishing commander’s staff, develops and organizes a draft JTF JMD that will be forwarded for the establishing commander’s validation and approval. This document provides the base line for JTF HQ staffing and is used for . . . base support, and a host of other services and functions. The staffing requirements associated with the JTF HQ are organized based on specific mission requirements.31 (Note: The 2006 version JP 1-0 was used to compare doctrine at the time of joint base amalgamation)

The process used to create the new base operations organizational structure did involve the base commanders and staffs in accordance with doctrine, but limited the extent that JMDs were developed. The equivalent of JMD positions in the JBIG are Joint Base Integrated (JBI) billets:

Established and filled by military personnel from the supported Component(s) throughout the Joint Base Command structure, as designated in the MOA between the supporting and supported Components. Each Joint Base will establish certain leadership position(s) to include Deputy [Joint Base Commander(s)] JBC(s) to the Joint Base organization, as JBI billets.32

The JBMDL Commander noted that “[o]perating with two deputies in his organizational structure--one Army and one Navy--is a new concept . . ., but it has a lot of advantages and potential.”33 Merely assigning a Deputy from the supported Component does not make it joint. The JBIG did not limit the JBI billets solely to the deputy position; however in execution it did not go much deeper than that. According to an Air Force official from JBLE “our structure was the most palatable org[anizational]
structure we could establish at the time.”

The palatability refers to the compromise required by the joint collaborative process when developing the MOAs at the joint base level. This is an example of Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow’s model of governmental politics. Where, “Policy is not chosen as a solution to a problem but as a result of compromise, conflict and confusion among officials with diverse interests and unequal influence.”

Additional JBIG policies prevented the integration of additional JBI billets into the new organizational structure by stating, “Once the Joint Base organization is fully implemented, all civilian personnel authorizations providing Installation Support will become part of the supporting Component’s Joint Base Command under the supporting Component’s civilian personnel management system.” If joint doctrine was followed civilian employees would not have been transferred to the supporting Component. While there may have been administrative justifications for the implementation guidance, the decision to transfer civilian employees minimized jointness.

The next JBIG policy that adversely impacted jointness was the creation of Embedded Military Units (EMUs). An EMU is “... an organized unit ... of the supported Component available for Joint Base Installation Support while remaining under the command and control of the supported Component.” While the supporting Components were established as lead agencies, military manpower remained in separate organizations to reduce the impact of Total Obligation Authority on the supporting Component, facilitate training requirements, and provide flexibility. This does not comply with joint doctrine where the creation of a Joint Headquarters fills personnel requirement shortfalls with service-members from the other Components for the
purpose of achieving its joint mission. This opportunity to add joint capabilities was lost due to the JBIG’s restrictions. The outcomes of JBIG policies and their execution at the joint base level are organizational structures that are not joint. The lack of jointness in the base operating unit structure accentuated the cultural differences that exist between the Components.

Driving the Change Necessary to Achieve the Vision of Joint Basing

Communicating the Change Vision

In *Leading Change*, John Kotter articulates an eight-stage change process to overcome the inherent inertia or resistance to change of any organizational culture. Kotter’s conventional wisdom and experience offer, “That major change will not happen easily.” The eight stages are:

- Establishing a Sense of Urgency,
- Creating the Guiding Coalition,
- Developing a Vision and Strategy,
- Communicating the Change Vision,
- Empowering Broad-based Action,
- Generating Short-term Wins,
- Consolidating Gains, and
- Producing More Change and Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture.

This paper could have focused entirely on Kotter’s model to address any and all of Joint Basing’s successes and shortcomings, but for the purpose of this analysis the “Communicating the Change Vision” stage is most applicable to determine potential root causes of Joint Basing’s diminished effectiveness. The “Communicating the Change
Vision” stage has two elements: “using every vehicle possible to constantly communicate the new vision and strategies,” and “having the guiding coalition role model the behavior expected of employees.” DoD efforts to establish joint bases appear to have fallen short in both elements.

Perception is reality, and a large portion of Joint Basing’s perceived failure stems from the lack of public statements, articles, and publications about its progress. This is evident in both the quantity and quality of the statements made in the articles written about Joint Basing. The majority of open source documents available for research were published during the implementation phase between 2006 and 2011. A simple summary of these statements is: 1) Joint bases will enhance DoD’s war fighting functions and jointness, and 2) The implementation while not without difficulties has been successful and has remained on schedule and promises to produce efficiencies. Why is there absence of coverage after 2011? A skeptic might assume that after years of positive coverage of Joint Basing’s implementation and predictions of its benefits, Joint Basing has not been successful. If the cost savings and other benefits have not materialized, the best communications strategy is to limit publications that could advertise the shortcomings.

The “guiding coalition” has not demonstrated its embrace or commitment to DoD’s transformation goals from BRAC 2005 and vision of jointness from Joint Basing. Two uniformed senior leaders essential to the success of Joint Basing have undermined the initiative by publicly questioning its value. In 2010, the Chief of Staff Air Force of the Air Force (CSAF), General Swartz stated, “The bottom line is there are some significant issues with joint bases, and over time you will see no more, that’s for sure. The question
is whether we will see less.”¹⁴¹ This statement may seem prescient, since DoD has not created any additional Joint Bases, it was also premature. When the CSAF made his statement, Phase I of the Joint Basing initiative had not even met its final implementation deadline of October 1, 2010.

The next senior leader’s public criticism of Joint Basing occurred three years later, this time by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in October 2013. General Odierno questioned the success of Joint Basing by saying, “. . . we have to sit down and take a look at it [Joint Basing], and are we truly reaping the benefits that we thought we would and what is the cost to our families and to our other programs that we have on the installations.”¹⁴² The CSA’s comments are not as blunt or negative as the former CSAF’s, but they may have a similar effect. Two of the military’s senior general officers, or members of the “guiding coalition” are patterning negative attitudes towards Joint Basing instead of reinforcing the DoD vision. Unless DoD conducts significant communications synchronization to “communicate the change vision” of Joint Basing, a negative perception can remain and continue to be an obstacle to its future success.

Embedding and Reinforcing Change

In his book Organizational Culture and Leadership, Edgar Schein describes embedding and reinforcing mechanism that are tools for leaders to use in affecting lasting organizational culture and climate change. The embedding mechanisms are:

1) what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis;
2) how leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises;
3) how leaders allocate resources;
4) deliberate role modeling, teaching and coaching;
5) how leaders allocate rewards and status; and
6) how leaders recruit, select, promote and excommunicate.\textsuperscript{43}

For the purpose of this paper the first four embedding tools help describe why DoD is not achieving the desired organizational change and therefore not achieving the desired effectiveness either. The lack of Joint Basing specific metrics and the difficulties in measuring Joint Basing’s efficiency have been discussed previously in this paper. Without metrics it is difficult to execute Joint Basing to achieve the desired end state because leadership lacks situational awareness. No example of a specific crisis occurring regarding Joint Basing exists. There is, however, recognition by DoD and specifically the SJBWG that Joint Basing must begin demonstrating greater efficiencies. The intent of a January 2014 SJBWG briefing to: “Reinforce the need to realize savings from Installation Support efficiencies at Joint Bases and identify barriers to implementing more efficient practices” illustrates this acknowledgement.\textsuperscript{44} DoD decided to intentionally allow time for Joint Basing to demonstrate efficiencies, but in so doing it is possible that it also portrayed a lack of urgency or priority. Initially, DoD allocated more budgetary resources towards Joint Basing demonstrating prioritization and importance, but in FY 2012 that visible budget priority that could embed change was minimized due to the BCA impacts. The role modeling issues have been previously discussed by applying Kotter’s “Communicating the Change Vision” stage. DoD has not applied the appropriate embedding mechanisms to affect the desired organizational change.

The reinforcing mechanisms are;

1) organizational design and structure;

2) organizational systems and procedures;
3) rites and rituals of the organization;
4) design of physical space, facades, and buildings;
5) stories about important events and people; and
6) formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds and charters.45

The issues with the lack of joint organizational design and structure at joint bases as a root cause have been discussed. The previous application of Kotter’s “Communicating the Change Vision” stage highlights the lack of important stories and the lack of formal statements. These factors have contributed to a lack of reinforcing change.

Schein’s model does not guarantee success, but it does increase its likelihood. At issue, is that it is not completely clear what leaders in the DoD hierarchy and in what organizations should shoulder the responsibility of driving the change necessary to guarantee the success of Joint Basing. DoD leaders, which is a very broad group, have not applied the necessary leadership tools to embed and reinforce Joint Basing’s vision and the organizational change required to achieve it. The application of Schein’s model leads to another question. Who is in charge of Joint Basing? The answer is complicated. While there is a central Joint Basing staff proponent in Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Joint Basing policy, it is not a command and control headquarters. The Service Components are responsible for the operation and management of the 12 joint bases, but no Joint Basing headquarters exists. This lack of a central Joint Basing command structure is at the center of the issues identified using Schein’s model.

Whose responsibility is it to apply the mechanisms of change? Is it the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Under
Secretary of Defense for Installations and the Environment, the Component Chiefs or Secretaries, the Component Installation Management leadership or the SJBWG and subordinate groups and councils? The answer is that under the current structure they all have Joint Basing responsibilities but none of them has full authority over Joint Basing as a whole except the SECDEF who has many other priorities that prevent him from being personally involved with Joint Basing on a daily basis.

Service Culture

The CSA General Odierno highlights another factor for the effectiveness of Joint Basing—culture. “[T]here is a differing culture between the Services. There’s a difference in what we think we should have and there’s a difference in what they think we should have and there’s a difference in what they think they should and have and what we think they should have.”46 Dr. Robyn alluded to the same issue of culture in her quote in the epilogue. The BRAC commission identified culture as an issue from the very beginning stating, “. . . [Service] communities argued that the ‘clash of cultures’ and service-specific interests would impair installation management by a different service.”47 In his 2013 Strategy Research Project, Colonel Galbraith argues that Joint Basing’s newness is the primary factor with the absence of a joint culture; “Joint Basing is a fairly new concept, roughly three years old, and has not formed a pattern of traditions to form its culture.”48 The real issue is that Joint Basing suffered from flawed implementation guidance. Every joint base is structured around the lead Service Component’s organizations and culture and thereby resists becoming a joint organization itself. This resistance prevented the creation of a new joint base culture. In 2008 former Air Force Secretary Wynne questioned the decision to transfer Hickam and Anderson Air Force
Bases to Navy control arguing, “The Air Force has a very different concept of operations . . . in managing its bases.”

**Lead Services**

In his 2009 testimony before Congress, Secretary Arny stated “Unlike previous BRAC actions where the customer base was eliminated due to excess or surplus capacity, with Joint Basing the customer base remains largely unchanged.” While correct, the statement overlooks a significant change, one that remains at the center of the real and perceived issues with Joint Basing. While the customer base did not change, the organization providing the customer service did. The supporting or lead Component is now responsible for providing base operating services across the entire Joint Base. DoD designated the Air Force as the lead for six, the Navy as the lead for four, and the Army as the lead for two joint bases. Accordingly, “The JBIG sought to establish some rules of engagement by directing that the lead Service’s organization, procedures, processes, and systems be used to operate the joint base.” The JBIG attempts to account for Service Component cultural differences and conflicts by directing that transition of delivery of installation support to the supporting Component is “in no way is intended to impact command and control of mission functions, heritage, heraldry, or operating activity of the affected Component(s).” This guidance focuses on enabling joint tenant units’ war fighting capacity and not on base operating support expectations of jointness. The implication is that the supported Component should become acculturated to the way the supporting Components provide installation support and services.

Key to overcoming cultural difference is communication. Further examples from JBLE highlight the importance of communication in resolving supporting and supported
Component issues. A recent information paper focused on resolving concerns at JBLE provides such insight. The paper recommends reinstituting the Joint Base Partnership Council, clarifying authorities between the Joint Base Commander and the supported Senior Commander, creating a handbook to clarify roles and responsibilities, and a recommendation to create an OSD webpage for joint base best practices.\textsuperscript{53} The Cost and Performance Visibility Framework (CPVF) is a primary means for supported Components to provide feedback on the quality of service delivery. The purpose of the CPVF is “to collect and report joint base Installation Support performance data against the terms in the MOAs and the JB-COLs.”\textsuperscript{54} The CPVF is therefore not a true measure of Joint Basing’s efficiency and effectiveness--only of COLs and the execution of the 12 separate MOAs for the individual joint bases. On JBLE, the supported Component was not taking advantage of the opportunity the CPVF provides.\textsuperscript{55}

Another issue discussed was Army Restoration and Modernization funding. Under Joint Basing the supporting Component’s responsibility is to sustain the facilities at the Q rating at the time of transfer, but Eustis required facility improvements beyond that level.\textsuperscript{56} A “Q rating” is a facility condition code used to depict the quality status of real property. The perception was that JBLE was failing to adequately support its senior Army tenant. The reality is that Restoration and Maintenance was outside the scope of Joint Basing and the JBC’s authority to solve.

Relations Diagram Summary

Answers derived from the Five Whys are presented here in a relations diagram (Figure 1)] to discern interrelations. The diagram begins at the top with inaccurate assumptions and inappropriate models made during BRAC 2005 that caused over-estimated savings and led to the creation of the JBIG with inherent structural problems.
in Joint Basing. Attempts to assuage Service Component concerns of base operating service standards dropping to the “lowest common denominator” led to the adoption of COLS which in turn drove manpower and cost increases as did lack of controls in the JBIG.⁵⁷

The DoD decision to provide overarching guidance during the development phase of joint bases, only “gave us [base commanders] a generic framework for creating all 12 joint bases.”⁵⁸ This led to the creation of 12 individual joint bases where base commanders sought local solutions, without controls to limit manpower and cost increases. Service Component cultures have been a factor in developing and implementing Joint Basing since the very beginning of the process and affected its outcome significantly. The culture differences, inadequate communication synchronization, and negative perceptions have precluded the commitment of Joint Basing in the force. These considerations were greatly influenced by a major change in the strategic environment with the reduction of fiscal resources. Together, all of these factors led to the creation of Joint Basing not in keeping with the BRAC Commission and the DoD vision.
Figure 1. Joint Basing Root Cause Relation Diagram Strategic Options

If general policy in the JBIG was flawed, then the product of the process will be flawed as well. The options below are based on the root cause analysis and personal experiences as a former Garrison Commander. These are macro-level options that require additional research, analysis and development. They are meant to generate discussion to aid in potential reforms with the goal to achieve the effectiveness and efficiency that Joint Basing envisioned.

**Cancel Joint Basing**

There are plenty of proponents of this option. Both the CSA and former CSAF have indicated that Joint Basing has failed or needs revaluation. Department of Defense adopted Joint Basing for valid reasons and the basic logic behind Joint Basing is sound. According to OSD Deputy Director of Basing Colonel Perham, “Joint bases are viewed as national assets . . . They are unique and therefore receive a lot of attention . . . Joint Basing is here to stay.”\(^9\) Canceling Joint Basing is not a suitable option because it does not achieve the desired ends of BRAC 2005. It is also not a solution internal to DoD.
Canceling some or all of Joint Basing will require modifying BRAC law. Congress will likely expect DoD to make a concerted effort to solve Joint Basing’s issues internally first before considering a modification to the law.

**Implement GAO Recommendations**

Department of Defense disagreed with the GAO proposal to create measurable goals linked to achieving savings and efficiency because “DoD stated that establishing such a plan and targets would restrict the authority of local commanders.” Joint Basing, “Requires flexibility in implementation guidance for local requirements.” To individuals who have never served in the military this seems like an excuse, but DoD needs to assess the environment and understand that the current situation requires additional controls. Subordinate commanders are asking for it, “. . . joint base officials told GAO that they desire additional guidance about how to achieve cost savings and efficiencies.” The U.S. Government’s fiscal situation also necessitates it. According to the GAO Joint Basing is beginning to demonstrate some cost savings, but is it enough? Based on Congress’ continued interest in Joint Basing--that is doubtful.

The 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2713 requires “the Under Secretary to report on the 2005 base closure and realignment Joint Basing initiative.” Top-down and bottom-up processes are needed that provide joint base commanders with the flexibility to implement cost savings based on their staff’s analysis and uniqueness of their communities’ requirements and resources. Typically the savings garnered at the base level will not bring about the degree of savings expected under BRAC 2005 or necessitated under sequestration. At the individual installation level the magnitude of cost savings feasible from efficiency measures range in the tens of thousands to millions of dollars. Department of Defense needs savings in the hundreds
of millions or billions of dollars to achieve the fiscal reductions necessary to bring the federal budget and debt into desirable thresholds.

In the current period of constrained resources, it is necessary for DoD to provide centralized guidance for what community services can and will no longer be provided. Joint Base Commanders and Installation Commanders alike need the support from OSD and the Services to communicate to the joint force which services are no longer feasible in a more austere fiscal environment. If Joint Basing is to act as a “Stepping stone to CDIS (Common Delivery of Installation Support) and joint installation management” then centralized guidance and controls must be applied. If not, DoD will continue to have 12 separate joint bases that are neither truly joint nor uniform in meeting installation support functions.

“Drive Jointness Deeper”: Create a Joint IMCOM or Joint Basing Headquarters

Secretary Rumsfeld had a vision of the transformation that BRAC 2005 and Joint Basing could bring, “. . . BRAC 2005 can make an even more profound contribution to transforming the Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy.” Defense strategy changes and evolves according to the current and future threat assessment and resourcing. Joint Basing must also change and evolve to account for the fiscal and security environmental changes, and implement the lessons learned from the Joint Basing experiment to date.

General Dempsey has not publically published guidance specifically referencing Joint Basing, but his vision for jointness is clear. In his February 2012 strategic directive, he directs an imperative to “drive Jointness deeper, sooner in capability development, operational planning, and leader development. Identify and reduce, but not eliminate overlapping capabilities across Services.” The reduction of overlapping capabilities
was one of the primary objectives of Joint Basing. In his second term strategic direction as the CJCS, he continues to address undertaking “reforms that drive jointness further.” To abide by the strategic direction of the CJCS, DoD should follow his overarching intent of driving jointness further. This implies correcting the lack of joint organizational structures in Joint Basing and overcoming the Service cultural obstacles to both ensure the success of Joint Basing and make it a more truly joint initiative. This option could be implemented at the base level, headquarters level, or both.

At the policy level, DoD should update the JBIG to make all or most positions involved in providing installation support JBI billets. At this point it would be impractical to convert civilians back to their original Component affiliation, but the military personnel could be integrated into a joint organization with JBI or JMD positions. The EMUs should be abolished and incorporated into a truly joint organization. The Service-specific training requirements could be provided with Training Readiness Oversight affiliations with appropriate tenant units to ensure that service-members assigned to joint base organizations do not experience degradation in their individual training readiness. As pointed out by the former Air Force Secretary, each Service Component manages installations differently. To achieve the full vision of Joint Basing, it must be standardized at the enterprise level to the greatest extent possible. This could be achieved by creating a Joint Installation Management Command, agency, or similar structure.

**Joint Military Communities**

A potential alternative to Joint Basing is the Joint Military Community construct that exists in the Kaiserslautern Military Community (KMC). The KMC is the largest U.S. military complex outside of CONUS with approximately 60,000 Americans living in and
around Kaiserslautern, Germany. The KMC is comprised of Ramstein Airbase commanded by the 86th Airlift Wing Commanding General and U.S. Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz commanded by an O-6/Colonel Garrison Commander. The collocated air base and garrison are mutually supportive of each other and all community services are available to all tenants regardless of Service affiliation. Anecdotal benefits achieved in the KMC are: removal of internal access control points, security fences and guard forces; joint Force Protection measures and uniform guidelines; partnering on Morale, Welfare and Recreation functions to reduce redundancy, associated costs and increase profits; and bundling of service contracts, especially utilities to achieve economies of scale.

The KMC joint relationship is governed by local MOAs and Inter-service Support Agreements (ISAs). The United States Army Europe (USAREUR) and United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) Commanding Generals directed the formation of the KMC General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) with the primary purpose of updating the MOAs and ISAs. The GOSC is supported by subordinate working groups composed of Emergency Services, Community Services, and Real Property/Housing which are the central governing bodies that facilitate the Joint Military Community interactions. A similar structure already exists under Joint Basing. The major difference however, is that conflicts have been resolved internally with the GOSC or its working groups with limited involvement necessary from USAFE or USAREUR. The Joint Military Community construct facilitates achieving the intent of Joint Basing, while eliminating many of the factors that have caused conflicts under Joint Basing. Components must
work together both out of necessity and common self-interest, while retaining autonomy and recognizing that a majority of their interests are linked.

Conclusion

The question remains, “Will we gain efficiencies and save dollars? The verdict is still out. There is no doubt, however, that the opportunities are there.” The purpose of this paper was to determine the prevailing underlying causes of Joint Basing’s shortcomings by providing a synthesis of evidence and previous observations dating as far back as the initial BRAC 2005 commission report. The identification of the primary root causes (using Six Sigma techniques) and interrelation between the root causes offers an understanding of the Joint Basing shortfalls. The primary reason Joint Basing continues to struggle is that a valid concept’s implementation was flawed from the beginning. Specifically, the decision to transfer bases to a lead Service without establishing a truly joint headquarters in accordance with prevailing joint doctrine has allowed Service cultures to remain obstacles to success. Additional post implementation factors have also contributed: negative perceptions, poor communications synchronization, lack of embedding and reinforcing mechanisms for change, and lack of metrics and controls are among these. This analysis is offered to assist in making a decision that will facilitate DoD achieving its vision of Joint Basing.

Endnotes


6 Ibid., 200.


24 Vincent D. Navarre, e-mail message to author, March 12, 2014.


26 Ibid.


33 Miles, “New Jersey Base Realizes Joint Benefits.”

34 Lorraine W. Jones, e-mail message to author, March 11, 2014.


37 Ibid., 4.


39 Ibid., 21.

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46 McGarry, “Army Considers Ending Joint Basing.”


50 Arny, Statement of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), 8.


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Herbert, “The Joint Base Dispute.”


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