

Strategy Research Project

Leveraging the National Guard to Build Partner Capacity

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

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The National Guard State Partnership Program, Regionally Aligned Forces, and “Smart Power” Teams are all tools that can be used to efficiently and effectively build partner capacity. Each method has strengths that should be maintained, weaknesses that need to be addressed, and risks that require mitigation. However, real security cooperation synergies will be realized when the three methods are coordinated to leverage the already existing long-term partner relationships, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge.

Leveraging the National Guard to Build Partner Capacity

The capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more than, the fighting the United States does itself.

—Robert Gates¹

Key to the United States' strategy for the 21st Century is building the capacity of our international partners' in the areas of security, resiliency, and governance. This investment in our partners is a global shaping operation and a hedge against future conflict. Alternatively, building partner capacity could also be viewed in the spirit of Liddell Hart as an 'indirect approach' to containing violent extremist organizations. A secure and resilient country that observes the rule of law is unlikely to descend into chaos and become a failed state. Or, to use an old adage, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. The Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), in conjunction with the U.S. Ambassadors, are charged with inoculating their region with theater security cooperation to build their partners' capacity. In some Combatant Commands' areas of responsibility, the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has been the primary outside provider of theater security cooperation for the last decade.² Now through the forthcoming Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, specific National Guard units will also be mobilized and trained to support a CCDR's Theater Campaign Plan on a one-year rotational basis.³ Another means, currently being used in Afghanistan, to build partner capacity is "Smart Power" teams, which utilize the civilian skill sets inherent in the National Guard to solve specific problems.⁴ The State Partnership Program, Regionally Aligned Forces, and "Smart Power" teams are all tools that can be used to efficiently and effectively conduct security cooperation. Each

method has strengths that should be maintained, weaknesses that need to be addressed, and risks that require mitigation. However, real security cooperation synergies will be realized when the three methods are coordinated to leverage already existing long-term partner relationships, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge.

Building Partner Capacity

Building partner capacity supports several enduring American interests as outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy including; 1) the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners, 2) respect for universal values around the world, and 3) an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.⁵ The U.S. Secretary of Defense highlighted the strategic objective of increased foreign partnership capacity stating, “Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership...whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives...”⁶

Building partner capacity (BPC) is a “Whole of Government” effort to improve a foreign partner’s security, governance, economy, essential services, and resilience.⁷ Originally added to the Pentagon vocabulary in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, building partner capacity was initially focused solely on the development of the Iraqi and Afghani armies and the corresponding implementation of counterinsurgency operations. But with President Obama moving the nation off of a decade-long war footing, foreign partner capacity has matured into a strategic objective in which “these dimensions of U.S. defense strategy have never been more important.”⁸ A RAND study of 29 cases over the last 20 years indicate U.S. BPC efforts have been mostly successful when 1)

the capacity being built is mutually beneficial for both the U.S. and the partner country, 2) the training fits both the partner's basic capability and its capacity to learn new skills, and 3) the partner invests some of their own resources to sustain their increased capacity.⁹ The best results were achieved when the partner country also had a strong economy, good governance, and broadly shared security interests with the United States. In exchange for this capacity assistance, the U.S. expects to receive reasonable cooperation from their foreign partners on operational access, intelligence sharing, regional stability, and international diplomacy.

The Army shapes the security environment to diminish regional tensions, enhance stability, and contribute to the security of the homeland.¹⁰ Security cooperation is the strategic 'ways' used by the Army to shape the security environment and build partner capacity. Joint Publication 3-22 defines security cooperation as, "All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation."¹¹ The Army Chief of Staff, in his 2013 CSA Strategic priorities, emphasized the importance of a regionally engaged Army that, "(1) Provides task organized forces for direct support of CCDRs, and 2) Shapes theaters to influence the security environment, build trust, develop relationships, and gain access through multilateral exercises, mil-to-mil engagements, and coalition training."¹²

Security cooperation is crucial for helping a CCDR to execute their Theater Campaign Plan and shape the operating environment. So much so, that at a recent Army Security Cooperation Workshop, the Army G3 emphatically placed security

cooperation squarely in the wheelhouse of operations, stating, “Security Cooperation should be considered ‘3’ business.”¹³ Also stressed by numerous workshop speakers was the mantra, “It’s a Phase 0 World.” This phrase not only demonstrates the newly found importance that the Army is placing on shaping; but also highlights the fundamental difference between security cooperation (Phase 0) and stability operations (Phase 4). Security cooperation is a strategic military tool intended to be used during times of relative peace in an effort to prevent conflict. As an economy of force measure, security cooperation is estimated to save four dollars for every one dollar spent.¹⁴

Security cooperation includes security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense and development, and security sector assistance.




Figure 1: Nesting of Security Cooperation Terms¹⁵

Security assistance programs are focused on the transfer of defense items and services to foreign governments, training and education for foreign military personnel,

and military construction in support of a partner's military establishments. The Department of the Army executes these security assistance programs under Title 22 in conjunction with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Department of State. Security assistance should not be confused with security force assistance.

Security force assistance includes all DoD activities related to the organizing, training, advising, equipping, and assessing of foreign security forces from the tactical to the ministerial level. Security force assistance activities are conducted primarily to build the capacity of foreign partners to defend against internal and external stability threats. However, in certain cases, DoD may also conduct security force assistance to help partners contribute to multinational missions or train and advise another country's security forces—such as Colombia.

To properly support the foreign partner, planners must consider their internal defense and development measures. Figure 1 lists these activities as support to civil sector capacity and capability building. These are the full range of measures taken by the partner to promote its economic growth and protect itself from lawlessness, insurgency, and terrorism. Internal defense and development is a preventive strategy focused on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that meet the needs of the society.¹⁶ With its inherent civilian skill sets and government connections, the National Guard, in unified action with the Chief of Mission, is uniquely positioned within DoD to help build a partner's civil sector capacity and capability.

State Partnership Program

The National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) is a DoD security cooperation organization that takes a unique approach to building partner capacity.

Each state is permanently aligned with a specific country making for long-term relationships and the building of trust between the organizations. The SPP evolved from a USEUCOM program originally developed in 1992 as a way to minimize instability and encourage democracy in the newly independent Eastern European countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. National Guard Soldiers were eventually given lead in this capacity building effort in response to the partner governments' interests in developing reserve-centric forces. It was also thought that National Guard Soldiers would be viewed as less threatening than active component Soldiers, and therefore would calm Russian concerns about the perceived expansion of U.S. influence into their former buffer states.

The State Partnership Program footprint has expanded significantly since its inception to include 63 military-to-military partnerships all across the globe with presence in every Geographical Combatant Command (see figure 2).




Figure 2: State Partnerships in each Geographical Combatant Command¹⁷

The under resourced CCMDs, especially USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM, have signaled that they would like to see more partnerships developed in their areas of responsibility. GEN Ham, USAFRICOM Commander, recently stated, “The National Guard will remain a vital part of our strategy in Africa...and I’m hoping for two more SPP partnerships in the near-term and another two within a couple of years.”¹⁸ In addition to filling unmet security cooperation needs in underserved combatant commands, SPP military-to-military partnerships should be pursued with the regionally significant countries of Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, and Mexico. In order to establish a new SPP partnership, the country must send an official request to its respective ambassador. If approved, the request is forwarded to the CCDR. If endorsed by the CCDR, the request is routed to the National Guard Bureau and out to the states. All interested State Adjutants General submit proposals, which highlight similarities between the state and the partnership country. Proposals are reviewed at many levels and the Chief National Guard Bureau forwards the recommended nominee to the CCDR and partner country’s U.S. embassy for final approval. Figure 3 illustrates the approval process.




Figure 3: Process for Establishing New SPP Partnerships.¹⁹

Mission command is inherent in the State Partnership Program with the National Guard Bureau providing the framework and program goals and the individual states liaising directly with their partner countries, the Chiefs of Mission, and the CCDRs to

plan and execute security cooperation activities. The State Partnership Program goals as defined by the National Guard Bureau's International Affairs Division are:

- Goal 1: Build Partnership Capacity to Deter, Prevent, and Prepare — activities designed to build nation's or region's preventative capabilities to dissuade/avert attack or prepare for natural/man-made disasters, emphasizing civil-military and interagency cooperation. Examples include anti-terrorism, anti-coercion, disaster preparation, border/environs security, and transnational crime deterrence.
- Goal 2: Build Partnership Capacity to Respond and Recover — activities designed to build nation's responsive capabilities to respond and recover from attacks or natural/man-made disasters, emphasizing civil-military and interagency cooperation. Examples include anti-terrorism, anti-coercion, disaster preparation, border/environs security, and transnational crime deterrence.
- Goal 3: Support Partners' Defense Reform and Professional Development — activities designed to assist nations in transforming defense structures and personnel to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Examples include coalition operations, civil-military and interagency cooperation, civilian control of the military, reserve components, and officer/NCO professional development.
- Goal 4: Enable and Facilitate Enduring Broad-Spectrum Security Relationship — activities designed to build a nation's capabilities to

cooperate and collaborate regionally and globally on a wide range of security and socio-political issues in support of the Department of State and other lead agencies. Examples include regional peace/stability, health, education, culture, economic, environment, and agricultural cooperation.²⁰

SPP missions are required to support both the Chief of Mission's Integrated Country Strategy and the CCDR's Theater Campaign Plan. In addition, National Guard Bureau must approve the mission if it is being funded using NGB funds. Missions are also practically driven by a myriad of statutory authorities and restrictions. SPP missions seek to leverage unique National Guard skill sets and long-term relationships including:

- Subject Matter Expert Exchanges — National Guard personnel with specialized expertise share their knowledge with partner nation personnel. For example, the Montana National Guard and FEMA discussed disaster response including incident response, incident command system, and urban search and rescue with their Kyrgyzstan counterparts.
- Capability Familiarizations — These include demonstrations of certain Army or Air Guard National Guard capabilities. For example, Pennsylvania National Guard assisted Lithuania in establishing an NCO Academy, by bringing them over to observe their own NCO Academy in action.

- Senior Leader Visits — General officers from the state maintain close relationships with their country partners, and make periodic visits.
- Operational Mentorships and Liaison Teams — A small cell of National Guard personnel will embed themselves in their partner countries deployed forces in order to support multinational operations such as OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR).²¹ Fourteen SPP nations have conducted co-deployments with their National Guard partners since 2008.²² States also work closely with their partners to develop deployable United Nations Peacekeeping (UN PKO) capabilities. 44 SPP countries have provided upwards of 35,000 UN Peacekeepers.²³ For example, the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Defense, working with the Montana National Guard, is slated to bring a deployable UN PKO Level II Field Hospital online in 2015.

Because of their dual federal-state mission, National Guard Soldiers are required to be skilled in both their military specialty as well as support to civilian authorities. The ten core competencies for the National Guard state mission include:

- Disaster response and mitigation.
- Defense support to civilian authorities.
- Consequence management and installation protection.
- Response to a chemical, biological, nuclear, or explosives (CBRNE) event.
- Border and port security and cooperation with civilian law enforcement.

- Search and rescue.
- Medicine.
- Counter-drug and counter-narcotics activities.
- Public affairs.
- Employer support and family support for reserve forces.

The majority of states also have generating forces and special programs that can be leveraged for building partner capacity. State Regional Training Institutes (RTI) support both State and TRADOC training requirements. RTIs typically offer Officer Candidate School (OCS), certain Military Occupational Specialty Training (MOS-T), and recertification training. In fact, under the new One Army School System they are slated to become the primary provider of MOS-T for all components of the Army. Many state RTIs also conduct Non-Commissioned Officer Education (NCOES) for all components of the Army. The National Guard RTIs are held to the same TRADOC Enterprise Standards as the active component schoolhouses, and are expected to provide professional, competent, and realistic training. Many states also sponsor the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe Program, which is specially designed to turn around the lives of at-risk high school dropouts. A recent RAND study highlighted the efficacy of the Youth ChalleNGe program citing an estimated societal return on investment of 166 percent.²⁴ State National Guards also support their local law enforcement officials with full-time counterdrug operations. Much of this National Guard expertise can be harnessed to build partner capacity. By way of example, The Pennsylvania National Guard was key in the development of the Lithuania NCO Academy, which was modeled after the Pennsylvania NCO Academy.²⁵ In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Tunisian

military leaned on their SPP partner, Wyoming, to help them teach democratic values to their youth. The Wyoming Guard used their Youth ChalleNGe model as a starting point for the Tunisian youth program they helped to develop.²⁶

The State Partnership Program has significant value in the eyes of the U.S. military and State Department leaders that have grown to rely on it as a cost-effective builder of partner capacity. The total estimated cost of the SPP in fiscal year 2011 was only \$13.2 million.²⁷ Yet in a 2010 survey of Ambassadors in the European Command operational area, six said SPP is their most significant program, fourteen said SPP is a significant program that adequately supports their objectives, and one said SPP is adequate but would like to see increased engagements.²⁸ In a recent U.S. Government Accountability Report all six CCMDs stated that the SPP “supports their missions and objectives, including promoting stability and security cooperation and assisting with building partner capacity.”²⁹ The report went on to say that three of the six combatant commands specifically mentioned that the National Guard was uniquely suited, due to their civilian and military skill sets, to build the capacity of partner countries. The most recent and concrete indicator of the State Partnership Program’s effectiveness comes in the form of the fourteen SPP International Security Assistance Force co-deployments conducted since 2008.³⁰

Recently, concerns have been raised in regards to the accountability of the State Partnership Program both in terms of activity tracking and funding data.³¹ The activity tracking discrepancies can largely be attributed to three causes: insufficient DoD guidance, lack of National Guard Bureau (NGB) formal SPP policy, and, the need for a global database that tracks all DoD security cooperation and security assistance

activities. The activity accountability problem should be solved with the Secretary of Defense's upcoming requirement for all DoD security cooperation to be input into the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS), beginning in fiscal year 2015. The NGB should mirror this G-TSCMIS database requirement in updated SPP policy.

The funding data discrepancies found in the GAO report can partly be attributed to the lack of a global database, but are more likely the symptoms of a much more complex issue—the confusing labyrinth of funding authorities and mechanisms that may be used for resourcing SPP activities. When queried, four combatant commands and 20 SPP Coordinators all cited funding as a nearly constant problem.³² There are ten different Title 10 authorities, three separate National Defense Authorization Act authorities, and three distinct Title 22 authorities that can all be used to authorize SPP activities. These authorities can flow funds through at least ten different funding mechanisms. This variety of authorities and funding mechanisms certainly creates security cooperation opportunities. However, it also sows confusion, especially for State Partnership Program Coordinators, some of which are not trained on fiscal law. Also, each funding authority has specific requirements and restrictions in order for the funding to be legal, and the authorities cannot be simultaneously used for the same activity. The near impossibility to conduct security cooperation activities simultaneously with partner country civilians, reserve forces, and regular forces is an impediment for training focused on disaster response and defense support to civilian authorities—the two most significant National Guard core competencies. Recent laws and the resulting confusing DoD guidance have put the SPP's ability to engage with partner country civilians in

doubt. When stakeholders were asked what the largest challenge was to the SPP, all expressed concern about the ability to conduct and fund activities that include civilians.³³ Without clear direction and authorities, many states will continue to forego civilian engagement and with it, the comprehensive security cooperation activities that need a whole of government approach such as emergency preparedness, incident command, and disaster response.

SPP Recommendations

The State Partnership Program should be codified under Title 32, United States Code. The law should define the purpose of the SPP and make funds appropriated to the DoD, including funds appropriated for the Air and Army National Guard, available for costs incurred by the program, both inside and outside the U.S. The law should require that both the concerned CCDR and the partner country Chief of Mission jointly approve the SPP activities prior to execution. Activities that build partner capacity in the areas of defense, security, and the ten National Guard core competencies should be authorized and funding be made available for the participation of both military and civilians involved in these activities. Any U.S. or foreign civilian should be eligible to participate, and be funded, by the SPP if they are considered germane for the planned security cooperation activities.

The National Guard Bureau should partner with the Army in their efforts to develop a security cooperation strategy, which both operationalizes and institutionalizes security cooperation. National Guard security cooperation should be integrated into the Strategic Planning System including Joint requirements (Campaign Plan), force development (Joint Training Plan), and readiness reporting (DRRS).³⁴ This effort can be used to support resourcing and measure readiness on Joint Mission Essential Tasks

that apply to the State Partnership Program. In essence, it brings the SPP in out of the cold and integrates it with all DoD security cooperation.

DoD should formally centralize oversight of the State Partnership Program at the National Guard Bureau and require them to publish a comprehensive policy outlining responsibilities, training requirements, and overall procedures. This policy should not be so prescriptive as to crush the states' initiative, which has been one of the hallmarks of the SPP's success. Rather the policy should update the SPP goals, big picture procedures, and measures of programmatic performance, keeping in mind that each combatant command has specific procedures for the conduct of security cooperation in their area of operations. Policy should also outline the factors that the National Guard Bureau will take into account in the assigning of specific states to partner countries, including the leveraging of their existing state-centric ethnic communities for their relevant language and cultural skills.

Prior to the approval of an SPP event, it should be linked to show how it supports the goals and objectives developed during U.S. unilateral planning and the bilateral objectives agreed upon between the U.S. and the partner nation. At the conclusion of each security cooperation event, SPP Coordinators should be required to complete and forward an after action review to their country team, input the event into the G-TSCMIS database, and update a link diagram detailing the relationships that were developed or reinforced during their visit. This relationship tracker should be maintained throughout the SPP partnership and used to leverage long-term relationships for future SPP activities.

The National Guard Bureau also needs to improve SPP personnel management and professional development policies. The State Partnership Program Coordinator should not be seen as a 'holding slot' by the states. The officer in that position must be well trained and committed for several years in order for the SPP to be successful. That requires room for promotion and potentially a career path. The ultimate solution is a fulltime functional SPP career path that starts as a field grade officer, similar to the Foreign Area Officer.³⁵ The required training for SPP Coordinators should be expanded to include fiscal law, especially as it relates to security cooperation. Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAO) should be placed in each of the SPP country's U.S. Embassies — currently 45 of 63 countries have BAOs stationed there. The Senior Guard Advisors at each of the combatant commands should be required to represent the SPP and preferably be posted at the combatant command's Security Cooperation desk – J3/5/7.

The National Guard Bureau should also develop an SPP evaluation tool that is focused on program elements and measures of performance including 1) the support of the CCDR's Country Plan and Chief of Mission's Integrated Country Strategy; 2) all activities input into the G-TSCMIS; 3) quality AARs submitted to the Army service component command, CCMD, and Chief of Mission in their required format; 4) new and reinforced relationships tracked internally to the state; 5) training and qualifications of the SPP Coordinator; and 6) a fiscal audit conducted for proper utilization of funds. Despite the recommendation of the GAO report,³⁶ measures of effectiveness are not realistic or helpful for the SPP as the security cooperation activities are not frequent enough and they are geographically dispersed across 63 countries. Instead, the combatant commands, in conjunction with the Chief of Mission, should assess each

Country Plans adequacy by using measures of effectiveness and inputs from each of the security cooperation activities conducted.³⁷ These measures of effectiveness already exist in the combatant command's Theater Security Plan and are called Security Cooperation Desired Outcomes (SCDO). SCDOs are tangible or behavioral desired outcomes resulting from security cooperation events. The SCDOs are country-specific and are aligned under the Security Cooperation Strategic Tasks in the individual Country Security Cooperation Plans. The combatant commands should provide feedback to the SPP Coordinator on the progress their partner country is making as measured by the SCDOs.

National Guard Bureau should work with the Department of State to allow foreign military personnel to attend the state's Regional Training Institutes for formal military education under Title 22 funding. Regional Training Institute cadre can also be leveraged as mobile engagement teams to familiarize SPP partners with specific MOS-T skills. As an example, the Montana National Guard, using RTI medical instructors, continues to conduct Advanced Field Medicine Information Exchanges with their Kyrgyz counterparts to assist them in establishing a program similar to the U.S. 68W Emergency Medical Technician course.

The Army Officer Professional Military Education system should also be used to reinforce long-term relationships between SPP states and their partner countries. The National Guard Advisors at both the Command and General Staff Officer Course and the United States Army War College should ensure that the SPP partners are placed in the same seminar.

Regionally Aligned Forces

In an effort to better support the needs of CCDRs and the Army, GEN Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, has initiated the regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept. Regional alignment supports the CSA's FY2014 Strategic Priorities of 1) Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World; 2) A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army; and 3) A Ready and Modern Army.³⁸ Regional alignment provides the optimum forces to CCDRs to accomplish their specific tasks. Desert Storm validated the mastery of decisive action tasks as the key to dominance on the conventional battlefield. Ten plus years in Iraq and Afghanistan taught us the importance of relationships and understanding the culture and values of the country if we are to achieve long-term success. By linking the capabilities of the Active, Reserve, and Guard components with region-specific training, the Army is able to deliver forces to the CCDR that are well trained, scalable, and prepared to execute any mission,

Army Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) are defined as 1) those units assigned (COCOM) or allocated (OPCON) to combatant commands, and 2) service-retained units that are regionally aligned with combatant commands. Regionally aligned formations will largely consist of Brigade Combat Teams, Functional and Multi-functional Brigades, Theater enablers, Division headquarters, and Corp headquarters. The capabilities are drawn from the Total Force with the majority of Guard units being in the service-retained, CCMD aligned category.

Utilizing Army National Guard units to support CCDRs in the Regionally Aligned Forces concept is acceptable and reasonable. The investments made in modernizing the Guard over the past decade into an operational force have developed Soldiers and units with capabilities that mirror the active component. Thirteen years of conflict and

intensive investment have increased the Army National Guard's operational readiness to historically unprecedented levels. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated, "As we draw down from these wars, we need to keep the Guard and Reserve operational and gaining experience. This is the best investment we've made over these last 10 years."³⁹ Almost half of all current Army National Guard Soldiers are combat veterans and Army Guard retention for FY2013 was 99%.⁴⁰ Since 9/11, over 510,000 Guard Soldiers have deployed in support of contingency operations, and over 115,000 of them have deployed more than once.⁴¹ In terms of theater security cooperation, in FY2012 alone, the Army Guard resourced more than 350,000 duty days in support of CCMD exercises focusing on building partnerships, security force assistance, and security cooperation. Overall, the Army National Guard supplied 60 percent of the Soldiers requested by the Army to support military exercises around the world.⁴²

The Regional Alignment of the Army National Guard is feasible, and we currently have the means to achieve this strategy. The Army Guard is currently authorized 358,200 Citizen Soldiers and comprises 32 percent of the Total Army Force.⁴³ Major combat formations include 8 division headquarters, 28 BCTs, 48 multi-functional brigades (combat aviation, surveillance, and sustainment brigades), and 48 functional support brigades (military police, engineer, and regional support). All of these Army National Guard formations are eligible for regional alignment.

The 60-month Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) will be used to generate National Guard forces for regional alignment. During the training stage of their ARFORGEN cycle (years 2-4), National Guard units will focus primarily on Decisive Action training in accordance with their standardized mission essential task list (METL)

and specific CCMD requirements. The Decisive Action training will culminate in a Maneuver Combat Training Center (MCTC) rotation and result in Brigade/Battalion mission command proficiency and Battalion maneuver and live fire proficiency. At the conclusion of their MCTC rotation, the National Guard unit will transition to Language, Regional Expertise, and Cultural (LREC) Training to prepare for their specific missions in their aligned region. During their available year (year 5), regionally aligned National Guard units will be prepared to fully support their CCMD for all assigned missions, whether Major Combat Operations with the entire BCT as part of a joint task force (most dangerous), battalion or company security operations as a contingency security force, or Theater Security Cooperation with small tailored teams (most likely).

The risk associated with incorporating the National Guard into the RAF concept is decreased Soldier retention and recruiting. This recruiting and retention risk is inherent in any large-scale operational use of the National Guard — especially during peacetime. The National Guard Soldier is at the center of a complex, adaptive system that includes family, friends, employer, National Guard unit, the Army, other employers, potential recruits, Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). Adverse interactions or information, in regards to the National Guard, along any of the pathways has the potential to negatively impact recruiting, civilian job environment, or future employment opportunities (Figure 4).




Figure 4: National Guard Soldier System⁴⁴

RAF Recommendations

A long-term operational National Guard needs more complete and predictable support of families and employers. At the unit level, the RAF Commander should take families and employers into consideration when task-organizing teams to deploy and conduct security cooperation missions for their assigned CCMD. These considerations are especially important during the task organization of longer-term forward-positioned contingency security forces, such as AFRICOM's East Africa Response Force in Djibouti. At the Army level, a RAND survey did not indicate an employer preference for

deployment frequency vs. length — i.e. frequent and short deployments or infrequent and long deployments.⁴⁵ However, both the mobilization process and USERRA should be improved for employers to include 1) the early-on sending of a standard DOD advance notice of mobilization to employers with specific dates; 2) an upfront appeals process for employers to prove hardship and request relief; 3) possible compensation for employers of mobilizing Soldiers in the form of government subsidized replacement assistance, payroll tax rebates, or government contracting preferences; and 4) make provisions for the employer to contact the Soldier during absence — especially early on in the mobilization.⁴⁶ DoD ESGR should also expand communication with employers to include 1) targeted information to employers that have recently received a DoD mobilization notice; 2) establish employer peer networks for the sharing of best practices amongst like companies, and 3) partner with the Small Business Administration and the local Chamber of Commerce to educate smaller companies on USERRA and available employer support.⁴⁷

“Smart Power” Teams

Too often military might is seen as a cure-all for resolving today’s security challenges when they really require a mix of the elements of national power. Brute force should not be thought of as a substitute for intelligent and deliberate use of national power. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently stated, “...the United States military will remain an essential tool of American power and foreign policy, but one that must be used wisely, precisely, and judiciously. Most of the pressing security challenges...cannot and will not be resolved by only military strength”⁴⁸ It’s hubris to believe that the use of military “hard power” is the sole solution for increasing stability in

a region. Alternatively, it requires an investment in the civilian skills necessary to help build or rebuild the infrastructure of an unstable country. These civilian skills are often called “soft power.”⁴⁹ In highly unstable regions and ungoverned spaces, military “hard power” is required to be used in conjunction with infrastructure development. This wise and judicious use of both is termed “Smart Power”.⁵⁰

The U.S. is currently employing “soft power” on a limited basis in Afghanistan through the employment of the Department of State’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The mostly non-permissive environment of Afghanistan makes civilian service on these PRTs very difficult and not sustainable for the long run. The PRTs rely on the military to provide them with security and force protection. Due to personnel shortfalls and lack of an expeditionary capability, these PRTs also lack many of the civilian experts needed from the Justice, Interior, Health, and Education Departments. When the environment is too hazardous to expect a long-term commitment of civilian expertise, a “Smart Power” approach is called for. The National Guard is tailor made for this type of civil-military mission.

Many National Guard units deployed to Iraq as maneuver forces created their own informal ad-hoc Smart Power teams to address specific infrastructure issues in their area of operations. As an example, at various times my National Guard Combined Arms Battalion fielded teams to train and consult with Iraqis on medical, police, agriculture, road construction, and market issues during our OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM III deployment in 2004 – 2005.

CENTCOM is currently formally leveraging the Smart Power of the National Guard through the use of Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs). During stability

operations in Afghanistan, the US Department of Agriculture and the US Agency for International Development have been unable to meet the tremendous demand for assistance in revamping the agricultural sector. In light of this capacity gap, CJTF-A, the National Guard Bureau, and the US Embassy in Afghanistan jointly developed the Agribusiness Development Team — a concept that had already proven its worth in Central America over the last 20 years.⁵¹ The ADTs provide their own security as well as professional expertise in agronomy, irrigation, pest control, horticulture, veterinary medicine, and civil engineering.⁵² To date, 49 ADTs (2,995 personnel) have worked in seven provinces and participated in 680 projects generating in excess of \$42 million in revenue for the people of Afghanistan.⁵³ Positive measures of effectiveness include increases in the harvest of apples, grapes, pomegranates, cherries, almonds, wheat, corn, alfalfa, and saffron.⁵⁴

The ADTs are joint National Guard teams hailing from primarily agricultural states and are composed of 58 – 70 Service Members. The ADTs are not organic units—but are formed ad-hoc from National Guard members in existing units across the state. Unfortunately, this cross leveling degrades the overall readiness of the losing units and hinders the long-term sustainability of the concept.⁵⁵ A standard ADT organization is illustrated in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Agribusiness Development Team Task Organization⁵⁶

The Agribusiness Development Team concept has shown that it is a feasible, acceptable, and suitable strategy for helping to rebuild the agricultural portion of Afghanistan's infrastructure. Now, at the twilight of the Afghanistan campaign, the question is: can the broader concept of Smart Power teams be expanded to include more states, more expertise, and targeted support to combatant commands globally? There are three general approaches to operationalizing Smart Power teams in the National Guard.

- Restricted to ARFORGEN available RAF units: RAF units will be used to form ad-hoc Smart Power teams to solve specific infrastructure problems in their aligned CCMD joint area of operations during their ARFORGEN available year.

- SPP aligned: A Smart Power team is formed within one state to conduct a specific SPP event that supports the CCDR's Theater Security Cooperation Plan and the US Embassy's Integrated Country Strategy for their partner country.
- Nation-wide, NGB sponsored: Smart Power becomes a centrally administered Guard-wide program managed by the NGB G3 through the Chief, Security Cooperation. NGB would act as a clearinghouse for mission requests from the CCMDs, coordinate with the states for mission lead, and contact specifically skilled Service Members to volunteer.

Smart Power Recommendations

In order to mitigate the readiness risk associated with ad hoc formation of teams, the long-term sustainable implementation of the Smart Power concept requires the creation of small Smart Power unit structures in each participating state. This necessitates that the Army and Air Force authorize joint, flexible structure with the associated table of distribution and allowances (TDA). Because of the current fiscal austerity, there would most likely not be a subsequent increase in end strength, and the Smart Power TDA requirements would have to be taken out of existing TDA structure in the affected state. More than enough of the manning requirements for a Smart Power team TDA could be obtained through already existing Troop Command TDAs in most states.

All three Smart Power operational approaches require a database with detailed information on each Service Member's civilian skills and education. The existing National Guard Civilian Employment Information (CEI) database does not have enough

detail in regards to skills. The state-based approaches only require that the databases be statewide. If the Smart Power concept is expanded to a nationwide NGB administered program, the database will need to be expanded to the entire Guard force. Once entered in the database, Service Members with high value civilian skill sets should be paid a bonus similar to jump pay for paratroopers. These Service Members should also be managed carefully to prevent over use and subsequent burnout.

Potential Synergies

The most obvious synergy to be gained from the coordination of the Regionally Aligned Forces concept with the State Partnership Program is the development and furtherance of long-term relationships. GEN Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified to Congress that, "Relationships matter more than ever."⁵⁷ Army National Guard units should be habitually aligned to the CCMDs where their SPP partners are located. This permanent RAF and SPP linkage should be prioritized for states that have an already existing high-functioning relationship with their partner countries. This habitual RAF assignment requires early on coordination between the Army, NGB, and the States. Through the years, many National Guard SPP personnel will increase in rank in parallel with their foreign military partners, further leveraging their relationships with each subsequent RAF deployment and potentially further increasing U.S. access. In addition, a permanent CCMD alignment coupled with the Guard's high retention rate means Soldiers have the potential to experience multiple RAF deployments to the same region. Each subsequent deployment and its associated train-up should equate to increased unit proficiency on specific Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) skills. These LREC skills also have the potential to disseminate throughout the entire state as the National Guard leaders progress through

their career assignments. Once habitually aligned, Army National Guard units will have direct liaison authority with their CCMD, and should coordinate early on with them so that a surge of security cooperation events can be planned in their SPP country during the unit's available RAF year.

Another way to achieve security cooperation synergy is to utilize the previously recommended Smart Power unit structure as the nexus for the State Partnership Program. The State Partnership Program Coordinator would be dual-hatted as the full-time Operations Officer for the joint Smart Power team. Service Members assigned to the Smart Power/SPP unit should routinely train on LREC for their SPP partner country, unless they receive a Smart Power mission to a different region. Soldiers and Airmen should be tested for their language proficiency using the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and qualifying team members should be paid the Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus (FLPB).

As we near the end of America's longest war and a period of record-breaking natural disasters, the National Guard is emerging at a historical level of proven operational readiness. The Army and Air National Guard are uniquely qualified to reach out and partner with other countries. The National Guard's mission is very similar to the majority of the nations' militaries that we engage with, in that we both have to be ready to rapidly respond to both civilian and military challenges. Security cooperation and more broadly building partner capacity for both security threats and natural disasters are key ways the National Guard can support the combatant commands. The State Partnership Program, Regionally Aligned Forces, and "Smart Power" teams are all tools that can be used to efficiently and effectively conduct security cooperation. Each

method has strengths that should be maintained, weaknesses that need to be addressed, and risks that require mitigation. However, real security cooperation synergies will be realized when the three methods are coordinated to leverage already existing long-term partner relationships, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge.

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