Preventing Local Security Forces from Threatening the State

by

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Abstract

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Successful counter insurgency operations require the development of local security forces to police and secure the population. These forces play a crucial role in “holding and building” an area after conventional forces have cleared an area of major resistance forces. The actions taken during the initial organization and recruitment of the force are crucial to ensure the success of the local security forces into the future.
Preventing Local Security Forces from Threatening the State

There are many examples of counterinsurgency and stabilization operations that have succeeded and failed. The results of these examples are directly tied to the development of local security forces. The success or failure of stabilization often defines the concept of victory associated with the earlier military action. Understanding the lessons of these operations enables the future military leader to ensure one of the many requirements for success in this transition from military success to true victory.

The development of local security forces into police with the task to secure the population plays a crucial role in “holding and building” of a country after conventional forces have cleared an area of major resistance forces, or are attempting to stabilize a country after its defeat. The past 13 years have shown that the United States (U.S.) must understand how to design and develop these forces to ensure the successful transition to civil control.

This paper will explore this subject through three case studies. The first will explore the U.S.’s development of the Philippine Constabulary. This will be followed by a case study of the Columbian paramilitary forces. The final case study will examine the U.S.’s use of local security forces in Cuba. The paper will close with an examination of strategic lessons that can be distilled to ensure the success of local security forces and the maintenance of state control over these armed groups.

The decisions made during the initial organization and recruitment of the force are crucial to ensure the success of the local security forces into the future. This paper will demonstrate that the selection of the leadership, recruitment of the personnel, and employment of the force are vital to ensuring the success of the local security forces. A clear understanding of what needs to be created is the most important decision.
will ensure the development of successful local security force, and secure one of the requirements for winning the peace.

The Philippines Constabulary

The United States gained possession of its first overseas possession, the Philippines, as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1898.¹ The administration of this colony required stability in the rural areas and control of the local population. This case study will explore the U.S.’s use of local security forces to pacify the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. The history of the U.S.’s first foray into colonial possession and the use of local security forces to control this colony is largely a story of success.

The Philippine Insurrection that followed the US military victory in 1898 led the Colonial Commission, the U.S.’s civilian led government for the administration of the Philippines, to develop two types of local forces to support the U.S. Army’s operations. The Philippine Scouts were formed in 1899 and served as an extension of the U.S. Army. The Philippine Constables were formed in 1901 and served as a militarized police force. This case study will focus on the Philippine Constables who more closely resemble the type of local security force that this paper analyzes.²

The history of the Philippine rebellion against the United States’ colonial rule occurred in three overlapping phases. The first phase lasted from 1899 to roughly 1902 and consisted of U.S. Army actions against an organized Philippine resistance army led by Emilio Aguinaldo. These actions resembled conventional military operations with formations up to the regimental level used by both forces. After the defeat of Aguinaldo and his capture in 1901, the organized Philippine resistance army broke apart and used more classic guerrilla tactics. The second phase of the rebellion focused on the defeat
and pacification of these guerillas and saw the first use of the Philippine Constables. This phase lasted until approximately 1902. The final phase of the Philippine rebellion consisted of the resistance to U.S. control of a religious sect based around the Pulahan tribe that lasted until 1907 and Muslim, Moro, resistance that lasted until 1916.

The Philippine Constabulary was specifically designed to conduct operations in what is now considered the “hold and build” phase of counter insurgency operations. Any major resistance movement required the use of the U.S. Army to destroy the backbone of the resistance. This was then followed by the Philippine Constabulary to maintain peace and capture the remnants of the shattered resistance forces. The Philippines Commission’s understood the capabilities and limitations of the Philippine Constabulary and ensured that they were applied as the right tool for the right problem.

The Philippine Constabulary was formed to relieve the U.S. Army of the need to police rural regions and maintain control. The Philippine Commission passed Act 175 in 1901 to establish the Philippine Constabulary. To ensure the proficiency of the force it was led by handpicked U.S. officers. The use of U.S. Army leadership ensured the loyalty of the Philippine Constabulary and eased many of the fears of arming and training locals who could become future guerillas. Additionally, this provided experienced and battle hardened leadership to the fledgling force. Finally, the Philippine Constabulary leadership was quick to relieve officers that failed to perform to expectations.

While initially led by U.S. officers, the Philippine Constabulary forces were locally recruited which provided many benefits to the Constables. Recruiting local forces to man the Philippine Constabulary enabled the use of the local population to fight the
guerillas. On numerous occasions, the Philippine Constabulary used locally volunteered forces to establish external cordons to support the elimination of guerilla forces. This often took the form of arming and stationing local volunteers to form an exterior cordon. The local nature of the Philippine Constabulary also improved the amount and quality of intelligence that the Constabulary received to identify and detain guerilla leaders.¹⁰

The local recruitment of the Philippine Constabulary was in direct contrast to how the Spanish had administered the rural regions. The Spanish capitalized on tribal conflict to recruit security forces from opposing power bases to ensure their loyalty to Spain and strike fear in the population that the externally recruited forces were policing. The U.S. chose a different path and used the local connections of Philippine Constables to empower and enlist the local population to support the stabilization of the islands.¹¹ This is best demonstrated by the use of over 500 local volunteers who supported 38 days of operations to defeat Antonio Coloche and secure the Sorsogon Province.¹²

The responsibility to recruit members of the Philippine Constabulary was left to the local commander. As proof of loyalty, the recruits were required to provide two written letters supporting their loyalty. However, the ultimate decision to hire a Constable resided with the local leaders who were incentivized to recruit loyal members to their force. The decentralization of authority to the local commanders, whose best interest was supported by recruiting loyal Constables, enabled them to use their best judgment and discretion in the recruitment of the force they led.¹³

The loyalty of local security forces was an issue for the U.S. senior leaders. This led to initial restrictions on the arming of the force and restrictions on their autonomy.¹⁴ However, these fears proved unfounded. The U.S. officers who led the Philippine
Constabulary routinely remarked about the loyalty and dedication of the Constables who served under them.\textsuperscript{15} This anecdotal evidence if further backed by the fact that only two Constables deserted in the first year of the organizations existence.\textsuperscript{16} The loyalty of the Philippine Constabulary was further proved when members of the force years later served as the core of resistance organizations against Japanese control during World War II.\textsuperscript{17} Using local recruits and delegating the recruitment responsibility to the local level ensured that the members of the Philippine Constabulary were loyal and dedicated to the goals of the Colonial Commission.

The senior U.S. leadership of the Philippine Constabulary, Captain Harry T. Allen, envisioned the force as a long-term solution to security in the colony. This impacted all aspects of what we now call the DOTMLPF\textsuperscript{18} structure of the force. This is most evident in the training and education of Philippine members of the Constabulary. The Constabulary Academy was established in 1904. Initially it trained U.S. officers and began training Filipinos to assume the positions of officers in the Constabulary in 1914. Throughout its existence, the course expanded from three months to three years and was considered the West Point of the Philippines.\textsuperscript{19} The Constabulary leadership’s dedication to the professionalization of the force enabled the transition of leadership within the Philippine Constabulary to local Filipinos.

U.S. entry into World War I in 1917 had a dramatic influence on the Philippine Constabulary. The majority of U.S. officers in the Philippine Constabulary resigned and joined the regular U.S. Army to fight in the Great War. This left a void in leadership that the Filipinos were ready to fill. The Filipino leaders were trained by the Academy and professionalized by their service under the prior leadership. The selection of General
Rafael Crame, a Filipino, to become Chief of the Constabulary completed the transition of Philippine Constabulary from a U.S. led institution to a professional organization run and led by the local community.  

The Philippine Constabulary routinely used the local population as a force multiplier in their execution of security operations. The connection that locally recruited members of the force, as discussed earlier, was the key to enabling this support. The intelligence provided by community members was invaluable, but just as importantly was the manpower. The local population was routinely recruited, armed, trained, and led by Constables to support their efforts against numerically superior guerilla forces. The local population would provide the manpower intensive cordon that would trap guerilla and cut them off from food and supplies. This technique allowed a relatively small number of Constables to either starve out a superior force or trap them so that when a clearing action occurred the guerillas could not slip away.

The Philippine Constabulary is a success story. The force was conceived for the execution of a specific mission. The force was then used for that mission and supported the U.S. Army for operations that exceeded their capabilities. The early selection of the leadership of the force and the recruitment of the Constables ensured the future success of the organization. Finally, the investment in the education and training of the force ensured that the Philippine constabulary was ready to transition from U.S. leadership to Filipino leadership and become a self-sustaining force.

Colombian Paramilitaries

The use of local security forces in Colombia in the late 20th Century is a marked contrast to the manner in which the United States employed Constables in the Philippines. The way in which Colombian local security forces, known as paramilitaries,
were selected and ultimately employed resulted in what would become a threat to the central government. This case study will show how these local forces were recruited to fight against insurgent groups, and then analyze how they transformed into forces threatening to the central Columbian government.

Colombia’s history throughout the 20th Century has consisted of continuous insecurity and political instability due to economic inequality and a lack of development in the rural regions of the county. The formation of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) in 1965 and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) in 1966 mark the starting point for this case study.23 Regional security issues including frequent infiltration by Marxist groups attempting to foment revolutionary ideologies in the agrarian populace along with weapons and support from Cuba and the Soviet Union contributed to Colombia’s problems.

The Colombian security forces began to organize and conduct operations to defeat these organizations. Additionally, the Colombian government’s fear of the formal establishment of these revolutionary organizations resulted in the development of national policies specifically intended to defeat the FARC and ELN. Decree 1290, passed in 1965, allowed the military to try suspected rebels with minimal oversight or rights for the accused. More important was the passage of Decree 3398 in 1968, which was later converted to permanent legislation as Law 48. This law provided the legal foundation for the creation of paramilitary organizations and provided for the Executive Branch of the Colombian government to create civil patrols that the military armed and trained.24
The paramilitary organizations did not play a significant role in Colombia’s fight against leftist guerillas until the 1980s. These were initially organized to provide intelligence and reported to the military. In this role, they remained limited in size and offensive capabilities. As guerilla tactics and narco-terrorism began to evolve, so too did the nature and allegiance of the paramilitary organizations. The most dramatic creation was the “Death to Kidnappers” (Muerte a Secuestradores, MAS) group in 1981.

MAS was formed by the infamous Medellin drug Cartel in response to the kidnapping of Martha Nieves Ochoa, a relative of Medellin Cartel members by M-19, a leftist rebellion group. Other wealthy members of Colombian society who sought protection from guerilla “war-taxes” spread this model throughout the country and purchased this type of militia/protective organization. The official sanctioning of the Colombian elite backed paramilitaries occurred first in the Puerto Boyaca region when Captain Oscar de Jesus Echanidia, the military prefect of Puerto Boyaca, convened a meeting of business men, ranchers, and U.S. oil industry leaders. This meeting resulted in the creation of a paramilitary force to provide protection to key infrastructure and cleanse the area of subversives. The business owners in cooperation with the drug traffickers and foreign business investors armed and sustained these paramilitary forces, intending to defeat revolutionary guerillas. This support ensured stability for business interests under the name of MAS.

The development of business-supported paramilitaries, by both legal entities and narco-trafficers, transferred the control of the paramilitary forces from the government to other actors. Because they shared a common enemy in the leftist guerilla organizations,
the military routinely cooperated with and enabled the MAS paramilitaries. Beyond empowering these paramilitary forces, the Colombian military members often took an active role in the leadership of these organizations. This is best illustrated by a 1983 Colombian Prosecutor General’s report that identified 59 members of the Colombian military as members of MAS.28

MAS continued to grow and transition throughout the 1980s. The development of the Association of Peasants and Ranchers of the Middle Magdalena (Asociacion Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio, ACDEGAM) is an example of this transformation. The public face of MAS frequently issued anti-communist propaganda and publicly campaigned for the legalization of such militia organizations. MAS continued to develop as a truly independent force within Colombia taking a major step in this direction by enhancing their relationships and cooperating with drug traffickers and their affiliate paramilitaries and by exchanging protection of drug production infrastructure for financial support of these organizations. This was backed by ACDEGAM’s attempts to put a positive face on the actions of the paramilitary organizations and achieve legal status.29

MAS, and paramilitary organizations similar to it, continued to receive support from the official security apparatus of Colombia while often times working in direct conflict with government objectives and strategies. FARC signed a cease-fire with the government of Colombia in 1984 and was in the midst of negotiating a transition toward a legitimate political party when MAS specifically targeted FARC negotiators. Despite this, Colombian security forces continued furthering their relationship since MAS represented a force that fought the same enemy. This ‘enemy of my enemy’ posture
blinded Colombian leadership to the threat that the independent paramilitary forces had become.\textsuperscript{30}

The transformation and expansion of the paramilitary organizations from a tool of the Colombian security forces to an organization that threatened the state was finally recognized in 1989. Colombian President Virgilio Barco identified the paramilitary organizations for what they were and declared them as terrorist organizations. Officers within the Colombian military who were identified as sympathizers or collaborators with these paramilitaries were dismissed and a special police force to combat the opposing forces was created. These actions were backed by a repeal of Law 48 and the passage of Decree 1194, which established criminal penalties for civilians and members of the military who recruited, trained, or supported paramilitaries.\textsuperscript{31} These actions removed the legal support for paramilitary organizations but had little effect on their activities as exemplified by the case of the Middle Magdalena valley where the Colombian military continued to provide support and conducted joint operations with paramilitary organizations.\textsuperscript{32}

The 1990s saw the various paramilitary organizations coalesce under the umbrella of the United Self Defense Groups of Colombia (ACU). The ACU was a combination of MAS, the Peasant Self-Defense Groups of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU) and various other paramilitary organizations, none of which held any legal status within Colombia.\textsuperscript{33} Nonetheless, these organizations continued to coordinate their actions with the Colombian security forces and received their financing from the drug trafficking organizations of the country.\textsuperscript{34}
The 2000s would see the end of the ACU and the prominence of paramilitary organizations, but neither their existence nor their threat to state control of the countryside. Between 2003 and 2006 Colombian President Álvaro Uribe oversaw the demobilization of 31,671 AUC paramilitaries. These actions dismantled the infrastructure of the AUC but proved unsuccessful at eliminating the existence of locally armed security forces. Many of the mid-level leaders of the AUC have re-established themselves with armed groups to provide security to local drug dealers and other local power brokers in exchange for money. The Colombian government’s monopoly on the use of violence remains challenged by the existence of paramilitary organizations.

Colombian paramilitary organizations have consistently followed one of two models for organization. The first model involved the formation of local intelligence organizations and was used during the initial fight against leftist organizations in the 1960s. These organizations were closely tied to the military and controlled by them. By the 1980s this modality evolved, when local businessmen, drug traffickers and other power brokers began forming their own armed security forces using them to provide protection against leftist guerilla taxes or influence. While these forces were not controlled by the military, the two shared in coordination of efforts against a common enemy.

As with the organization of the paramilitary forces, the leadership of these groups transferred from state security forces to whoever had the money. The 1980s saw the emergence of drug cartel led paramilitary organizations. Both Pablo Escobar and his infamous family and the Medellin drug Cartel formed their own paramilitary organizations. This meant that leadership of the paramilitary forces passed from the
state to other interests. Although some Colombian security forces collaborated with these paramilitary organizations, they did not actually control them; in fact, these forces belonged to the leader who paid for them.  

The state security forces no longer controlled the paramilitaries but continued to coordinate their actions with them against the common enemy in FARC, ELN, and M-19. This resulted in an environment where the ‘enemy of my enemy is my ally.’ Documentation of Colombian military and police collaboration with paramilitary organizations is numerous and widespread. The 59 members of the Colombian Army who were identified as members of MAS earlier in this case study best demonstrates this.  

Colombia’s response to a leftist insurgency was the development of local security forces with the state initially controlling these forces. However, as time passed the conflict became more difficult to manage, and the control was allowed to pass to whoever was willing to fight the common enemy. The Colombian government’s decision to collude with anyone who would enter the fight against leftist guerillas resulted in innumerable armed groups, and irregular forces fueled by drug money, that remain outside the state’s control to this day.  

The Cuban Rural Guard  

Like the Philippines, the U.S. found itself in possession of another foreign colony when it freed Cuba from Spanish rule in 1898. However, in contrast to the Philippines, the Teller Amendment stipulated that the U.S. would possess no long-term colonial designs on the country. The U.S. did retain a responsibility for providing security throughout the country and recognized the value of local forces, thus developing the Rural Guard to fill this role. This force was initially effective but its small size and
dependence on U.S. backing prevented the organization from experiencing long-term success. The politicization of the force after the second U.S. intervention ultimately proved the Rural Guard’s downfall. This case study will cover the history of the Rural Guard, their organization, leadership, the recruitment of the force, and conclude with a discussion of the politicization of the force and their assimilation into the Cuban Army.

The first problem faced by the U.S. after the conclusion of the Spanish American War was the disbanding of the Cuban rebel army. The U.S. regarded any remnant of a rebel force as the greatest threat to the U.S. administration of the island. This issue was settled when the U.S. paid every member of the Cuban rebel army $75 to deactivate and de-mobilize the force. The de-mobilization of the 30,000-man rebel army removed them as a threat but failed to take into account employment for the former army members and failed to address the issue of security on the island.42

Brigadier General Leonard Wood assumed the role of military Governor of the island in 1899 and his initiatives and directives shaped all aspects of Cuba until the island was returned to an elected government in 1902.43 One of Wood’s first steps was the consolidation of the fifteen various rural constabularies into a single organization called the Rural Guard. This force was a horse mounted rural constabulary designed to provide mobile patrols to control banditry throughout the island. It consisted primarily of members of the old Cuban rebel army and was led by former insurgent leaders.44 The Rural Guard was highly effective at providing security and by 1900 had successfully secured control of the island removing the threat of banditry that had plagued Cuba since 1880.45
Liberal opposition to the elected government of Cuba and their boycott of the 1906 re-election of Estrada Palma resulted in the failure of the Cuban government and another U.S. intervention. This U.S. intervention ultimately led to the transition of the Cuban government to Liberal leadership and the creation of a Cuban Army that was highly politicized. After winning the 1908 election, the Liberals established a Cuban army with U.S. approval. The Rural Guard was placed under control of the Cuban Army with the apolitical leader, General Rodriguez, replaced by a Liberal crony, José de Jesus Monteagudo. The result was that the leadership of the Rural Guard was purged of officers who did not support the Liberal agenda and the force became the de-facto cavalry arm of the Cuban army.46

Leonard Wood designed the Rural Guard to serve as a local police force responsible for securing Cuba. The force consisted of small mounted detachments of approximately 12 men who filled 244 posts by 1905. While the force was not capable of conducting traditional military company-sized operations, it was specifically designed for and suitable to fill a policing role. It proved successful but failed as a national level security force.47

The failure to develop a striking force to support the widely scattered Rural Guard posts proved a fatal flaw in the design of the organization. Liberal forces formed insurgent resistance groups because of the contested 1906 elections. The Rural Guard with its small size proved completely incapable of confronting these insurgents and routinely lost any armed engagements that occurred. The U.S. military had provided the Rural Guard support prior to the U.S. withdrawal in 1902, which had been the key to the Rural Guards early success.48 This shortcoming was later addressed with the creation
of a 100-man force at the provincial capitol after the 1906 U.S. intervention, but political realities over the next two years prevented this action from having any meaningful effect.\textsuperscript{49}

Military Governor Wood made a point of recruiting from the rebel leadership to form the backbone of the Rural Guard’s officers during its creation. These leaders were backed by U.S. advisors who were directly involved in the daily supervision of Rural Guard operations and recruitment. This resulted in the removal of potential resistance to U.S. control of the island. Additionally, Wood made it a priority to recruit apolitical leadership for the force. His desire to recruit “professional” leaders for the force was consistent with his desire to develop an apolitical security force that remained outside the political squabbles of the various groups vying for power in Cuba.\textsuperscript{50}

Like the officers, the members of the Rural Guard were largely recruited from the former rebel army. This served several purposes. Recruiting former insurgents provided an employment opportunity for a potentially destabilizing force. The U.S. advisors to the Rural Guard were deeply involved in the recruitment of the force and exerted total control over the hiring of members of the Rural Guard. Just as in the case of the Philippines, enlisted men were often required to provide two letters attesting to their standing in the community and faithfulness from landholders to gain admittance to the Rural Guard. This ensured that the force remained reliably under U.S. control and was directed toward an apolitical role during their initial development.\textsuperscript{51}

The politicization of the Rural Guard was an issue from its inception. Brigadier General Wood was largely successful in preventing this from occurring during the forces’ formative years. However, the role that the Rural Guard played in overseeing the
1906 elections called the organization’s apolitical status into question. The Rural Guard was implicated in suppression of Liberal voting and ballot manipulation.\textsuperscript{52}

The second U.S. intervention in 1906 saw the immediate implementation of corrective actions to correct this problem. General Rodriguez, the leader of the Rural Guard, passed General Order number 28 on March 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1907, which made the participation in political activities by Rural Guard members an offense punishable by Court Martial. Guard detachments were also switched between their posts to remove any of the community’s underlying resentment arising from the actions of Rural Guard members during elections. These measures along with renewed supervision and support from U.S. military advisors quickly addressed the problem within the Rural Guard.\textsuperscript{53} Despite their best efforts, the rise of the Liberal government in 1908 resulted in a downward spiral. The creation of the Cuban Army, and the resulting leadership changes to all of the security organizations relegated the Rural Guard to a subservient role in the Cuban Army that became highly politicized and beholden to the Liberal leadership of the country.\textsuperscript{54}

The initial successes of Wood’s concept of the Rural Guard were noteworthy, however, the quick U.S. withdrawal and the loss of U.S. military support doomed the force to failure. The force’s small size and the lack of a large striking arm resulted in the Rural Guard proving incapable of confronting insurgent forces after the 1906 election. The politicization of the force and their placement under the Cuban Army resulted in a change to their mission and ultimately their absorption as a part of the Cuban Army and a move away from their policing function.
Strategic Lessons

The three case studies highlight several key decisions that can occur during the formation of local security forces that have lasting impacts on the effectiveness of the force and its accountability to the national leadership. These decisions fall under three broad categories: the leadership of the local security force, the recruitment and selection of members of the local security force, and the employment of the local security force.

**Leadership of the Local Security Force**

The selection for leadership of the local security forces is an important decision. The use of U.S. officers to directly lead in the Philippines and indirectly as advisors in Cuba was the key decision that ensured the loyalty of the force. The use of U.S. officers in leadership roles ensured that the local security forces were selected and developed with a clear intention in mind. Additionally, U.S. leaders did not possess competing agendas that were at odds with the government in power.\(^5\)

Colombia provides a completely different result. The Colombian leadership did not attempt to control the leadership of the paramilitaries. This resulted in numerous right wing, commercial or economically driven figures, developing their own local security forces whose loyalty was directed toward their financial backers without regard to the interests of the national government. This in turn led to the development of organizations that eventually targeted Colombian leaders who sought to curb the freedom and autonomy of paramilitary organizations. The paramilitaries ultimately owed their loyalty to the business and narco-business Cartels who financed their activities instead of the Colombian government.\(^6\)
The second key to ensuring the proper development of the local security force’s capability and loyalty is the investment in training and education. Unique among the three case studies is the development of the Philippine Constabulary Academy. This school evolved from a three-month course for U.S. leadership to an institution worthy of being known as the “West Point of the Philippines.” More importantly, the future leadership of the Philippines Constabulary was formed upon this foundation. The school played a pivotal role in enabling the transition of the Philippine Constabulary from direct U.S. leadership to a self-sustaining Filipino organization.57

Recruitment of the Force

Similar to the selection of the local security forces leadership, the recruitment of the force must be tied directly to the ruling establishment. As with the selection of the leadership, the Philippine and Cuban case studies provide examples of success. Local U.S. leaders or advisors were allowed near autonomy in the recruitment of the members of the force they were responsible to lead or advise. This meant that the person who best understood the situation on the ground, and would be responsible for conduct of the mission, was responsible for recruitment of the force.58

The loyalty of the force was further reinforced by a requirement for validation from local leaders in the Philippine and Cuban examples. In both instances, the enlistees were routinely required to provide two letters from respected citizens to gain entry into the force. This served two purposes. First, it ensured that the personnel enlisting possessed a solid moral background. More importantly, it ensured local endorsement of the personnel serving in the force. The requirement for local leaders to endorse the recruits ensured that they enjoyed legitimacy in the execution of their police
duties. This was a force endorsed by local community and not one imposed by an external force.\textsuperscript{59}

Again, the Colombian case study provides a diametrically opposed example. The Colombian paramilitaries owed their loyalty to their paycheck. They were not endorsed by local leaders but by whomever possessed the highest bankroll. This resulted in a force that not only oppressed the community but also held no loyalty to the government. The paramilitaries were, simply put, hired guns who worked with the Colombian government when it was in their interests and against it when the Colombian government threatened their income streams or those of their leaders.\textsuperscript{60}

**Employment of the Force**

The local security forces perform their duties best when they are dispersed into small detachments throughout the country. This enables them to focus on the police function that they best serve to secure the country. These dispersed forces are able to provide local security and ‘mop-up’ insurgent forces after a main striking force has broken the strength of resistance in the area. The focus on policing and local security is vital to ensure that the local security forces are conducting the mission they should.\textsuperscript{61}

However, a conventional striking force to effectively support the government against insurgent activities must back the highly dispersed forces. The Philippines example demonstrated the role of the U.S. Army in breaking the back of insurgent forces that were then controlled by the lighter Philippines Constabulary force. The failure to provide a striking force to back the Rural Guard in Cuba led to their inability to defeat Liberal rebels after the 1906 Cuban election.\textsuperscript{62}

The failure of the Cuban Rural Guard and the dependence of the Philippines Constabulary on the U.S. Army also demonstrate how their design prevented these
organizations from threatening the government. Their dispersed nature and lack of collective actions created forces that could not threaten the government. These forces were incapable of uniting and threatening the government’s existence or monopolizing on violence.

The Colombian paramilitaries were employed in a very different manner. Their focus was on intimidation of the local communities and executions of selected opposition leaders. These skills were easily transferable to threatening governmental leadership as exemplified by cases in which paramilitaries where used to threaten and kill any force within the Colombian government that was seen as a threat to their hold on power.⁶³

Conclusion

Decisions made during the establishment of local security forces are vital to ensure their long-term success and to safeguard against these forces becoming a threat to the government that they are created to protect. The selection of the leadership must be the principal concern, and the first most vital decision. The leaders must possess unquestioned loyalty to the government. These leaders must be empowered to control the recruitment of their force and this force must possess local approval and legitimacy for the execution of the policing duties that they undertake. Finally, the force needs to be focused on policing duties. These duties will naturally result in a force that is small in scale and widely dispersed. For this force to succeed it must be backed by a striking force that is capable of defeating any large-scale opposition or insurgent organizations. Utilizing these principles, a local security force will be effective and loyal to the government that they are designed to support.
Endnotes


4 Millett, Searching for Stability, 8; Brian Linn, Guardians of the Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 34.

5 Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, 6, 394-395.

6 Ibid., 397.

7 Millett, Searching for Stability, 9.

8 Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, 12-14.

9 Ibid., 13.

10 Ibid., 11.

11 Ibid., 45; Millett, Searching for Stability, 11.


13 Ibid., 15-16.

14 Ibid., 14


16 Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, 16.


18 DOTMLPF is a U.S. Department of Defense acronym for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.

19 Elarth, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 135; Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, 399.

20 Coats, The Philippine Constabulary, 398.
21 Ibid., 50.

22 Ibid., 58-63.


25 Stokes, America’s Other War, 66, 72.

26 Ibid., 76; Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 55.

27 Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 55; Stokes, America’s Other War, 76.

28 Stokes, America’s Other War, 76.

29 Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 56-57.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 58.

32 Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 58-59; After the passage of Decree 1194 military members in the Middle Magdalena area continued to patrol with MAS and even distributed pro-paramilitary propaganda. A former paramilitary leader, Luis Antonio Meneses Baez, testified in November 1989 that army intelligence officers continued to meet with paramilitary leaders to discuss ideology and operations planning.

33 Mauricio Romero, Reform and Reaction: Paramilitary Groups in Contemporary Colombia, in, Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation, Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira, eds. (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge) 2003, 196-197.

34 Ibid., 195-197.


36 Ibid., 39.

37 Stokes, America’s Other War, 72-73.

38 Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 56-57

39 Steven Dudley, Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerilla Politics in Colombia (New York, Routledge, 2004), 73-76; Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 56-57

40 Stokes, America’s Other War, 76.


48 Ibid., 62-63.

49 Ibid., 225.


54 Ibid., 238.


56 Stokes, *America’s Other War*, 76.


60 Simons, *Colombia: A Brutal History*, 55; Stokes, *America’s Other War*, 76.
