Emotional Intelligence: The Military’s Tool for National Security Effectiveness

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Class of 2014

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Abstract

Title: Emotional Intelligence: The Military’s Tool for National Security Effectiveness

Report Date: 15 April 2014
Page Count: 35
Word Count: 5469

Key Terms: Collaboration, JPME Review, Empathy, Self-Regulation, Self-Awareness, National Security System Reform

Classification: Unclassified

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The [2010 National Security Strategy] recognized that we faced a world in transition; that we needed to reposition the United States to shape that transition effectively to meet our interests, and that, to be effective, a whole-of-government approach was necessary.

–President Barack Obama¹

As stated by the President and further emphasized by both military and civil leaders alike, unified action is critical to achieve U.S. national security objectives. In countering state on state aggression, the military could act in relative isolation with respect to the other instruments of national power. A lesson learned late from the past decade of conflict is that even during conflict, the synergistic effect of multiple government and private agencies is required to achieve success. This is goal is implied in joint doctrine:

The ability of the United States to advance its national interests is dependent on the effectiveness of the United States Government (USG) in employing the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. The appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council (NSC) direction, normally coordinate these instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic).²

Despite direction from the National Security Council (NSC) to the departments of the executive branch tasked with pursuing security objectives, the United States’ performance in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom shows that the United States Government (USG) has not been effective in employing the instruments of national power. Although the NSC may coordinate the instruments, this has not translated to unified action in execution for the strategic actions of the government.

Professionals both within and outside the U.S. Government have called for structural, developmental, and process changes in order to achieve unified action effects at the strategic level.³ Yet these aspects of government have remained relatively
static since the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947. This is at odds with the strategic environment, which has undergone dramatic changes since passage of the NSA. Several comprehensive studies, such as the Program for National Security Reform (PNSR), advocate for substantive structural change to increase the effectiveness of U.S. policy making and implementation. Although many stakeholders agree in principle to the recommendations, few have been implemented. In lieu of top-down driven organizational restructuring to resolve this incompatibility between the organization and environment, how can the military increase its collaborative capacity to maximize "Strategic Unified Action"?

True unified action at this level of government requires a particular skill set of the people who have impact on strategic affairs. The military flag officers and their SES counterparts in the other agencies have typically refined these skills over time. What is missing from the equation is the collaborative capacity of these leaders' staffs to execute an enduring "whole of government" approach to solving strategic issues. The application of the "whole of government" and "whole of nation" approach has been episodic in practice, the forcing function being the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and the anticipated withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, military staffs may let these hard-earned interagency relationships wither. Instead, the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands need to seize this opportunity to understand, document, and incorporate into PME those skills that enable unified action.

In 1980, the failed Operation Eagle Claw eventually led to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The inability of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to
conduct an integrated, or joint, mission spurred congressional direction to mandate procurement, training, and developmental changes to ensure the viability of future joint operations. Military culture now embodies the concept of joint operations. Among other things, the Goldwater-Nichols Act directed a significant change in command relationships and mandated personnel policies. Subsequently, a corresponding change in mind-set and culture occurred.

Generationally, the vast majority of the current U.S. military knows nothing but this joint world of Goldwater-Nichols. It is time for the armed forces to take the intellectual leap and apply the same mind-set of integration and collaboration when dealing with interagency partners in the USG. This leap requires a special set of leadership skills that are not typically espoused in the military. Rather than a dependence on a hierarchy that ensures unity of command, the unity of effort demanded by unified action requires Emotional Intelligence (EI). Emotional intelligence encompasses the competencies of self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, and relationship management.\(^5\) Per the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) joint instruction, these competencies are not emphasized until the flag level.\(^6\) The OPMEP is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) instruction which provides direction for officer PME and JPME. The document explicitly directs topics of emphasis for each curriculum. As officers as early as the O-4/O-5 level have significant interaction with their counterparts outside the military on issues of strategic importance, these competencies need to be introduced and developed much earlier in an officer's career. Long-term development of these skills will help foster
strong relationships which can enhance the integration of those agencies charged with ensuring the nation's security at the strategic level.

This paper will start with an overview of the strategic environment, which reveals the need for unified action. Next is an overview and evaluation of two suggested operational approaches to achieve unified action using Galbraith's Star Model of organizational effectiveness. Given that large scale reform suggested by the PNSR is unlikely at this time and the processes advocated by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) are insufficient to gain effectiveness, the model highlights the "People" aspect as critical to greater efficacy in the strategic interagency environment. Other scholarly research and experiential feedback reinforces the belief that key leadership attributes embodied in emotional intelligence can increase the collaborative capacity of an organization. Nevertheless, the military needs to shape its leaders now for enduring interagency collaboration to better cope with the changing strategic environment.

The Strategic Environment

"Can we meet the demand for better decisionmaking and the integration of all instruments of power (political, economic, and informational) to solve the multidimensional challenges ahead?" General Zinni posed this question back in July 2001; world events did not pause or slow down to let senior leaders develop an organizational strategy to address the issues presented by General Zinni. Thirteen years later the USG is still struggling to meet this pressing demand. The current security environment is complicated by the effects of globalization, the need to address a wide spectrum of threats, and a reduced USG budget that affects military force structure. As military activities are not confined to readily discernible stop and start points in worldwide engagement, continuous IA
collaboration is critical to unified action with respect to effective pursuit of national security objectives.

General Zinni described the challenges facing the United States back in 2001 as "multidimensional". Now, these multidimensional challenges occur in an environment that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous or "VUCA". Overall, VUCA describes an environment which has the potential for rapid change with futures that are unknown and difficult to anticipate due to the intertwined relationships among stakeholders. The complexity of the strategic environment is staggering - rarely do policy makers encounter linear relationships between USG action and effect on national security. Each characteristic of the environment has many inputs, and likewise, affects other environmental characteristics.

Globalization has contributed to this environmental change. Advances in technology and economic trade as part of globalization have had two important impacts on the types of threats the United States has and will encounter. One, geography is not as limiting to interpersonal interaction. Like-minded people are able to create virtual communities over the internet. The migration of peoples to mega-cities in developing countries has further isolated individuals from local ties. The availability of internet communities reinforces this isolation from societal norms and increases vulnerability to Al Qaeda and similar ideologies. Two, technologies allow for the massing of funds and resources to which only governments had the capacity for in the past. Not all groups, such as NGOs, use this power in a malevolent fashion. But for those groups which have grievances with the United States, this massing of funds and resources allows for non state-sanctioned violence which threatens national security interests. New types of
adversaries rise from these conditions, which the United States has struggled to employ its elements of national power against.\textsuperscript{12} As such, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) addresses a wide spectrum of threats and directs an "approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats using a combination of economic, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, development and military tools.\textsuperscript{13}

Other factors exacerbating the VUCA environment for the USG are the declining defense budget and reduction in military force structure. In the previous resource rich environment the armed forces enjoyed, leaders could develop autonomous, yet perhaps redundant, capabilities that seemed to compensate for ineffective or unwieldy IA relationships. As budgets shrink, those redundancies will be sacrificed for the military's core tasks. The risk mitigation in this case is creating partnerships among agencies to utilize different core capabilities.

Additionally, the reduced end-strength drives a strategy which places more emphasis on the armed force's effort to shape the environment as a means to deter adversaries from using military force. In that shaping and engagement generally takes place outside a declared war zone, the military will find itself operating in parallel with the Department of State and other USG agencies in their "area of operation". Therefore, declining budgets and force structure reductions make unified action imperative to achieve national security objectives. The QDR advocates for this as "regional and global trends in the security environment, coupled with increasing fiscal austerity, will make it imperative that the United States adapt more quickly than it has in the past and pursue more innovative approaches and partnerships in order to sustain its global leadership

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role." Unfortunately, history shows that in periods of downsizing, organizations lean to more bureaucratic actions which tend to focus on internal processes.15

Understanding the Problem

Joint doctrine explains unified action as that which "synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies…to achieve unity of effort."16 This definition does not go far enough to describe the interagency relationship required for sustained success. "Coordination" is the "harmonious functioning of parts for effective results; helping each other but not changing the basic way of doing business."17 In turn, "Interagency Coordination" is not a strong enough tool to use in a VUCA environment. Per Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, "Interagency Coordination is the cooperation and communication that occurs between departments and agencies of the USG, including DOD, to accomplish an objective."18 The connotation of "coordination" is one of episodic instances, rather than enduring acts to achieve unified action. In contrast, "collaboration" is "to work jointly with others on a common goal that is beyond what any one person or group can accomplish alone."19 "Collaborative Capacity, or “the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in pursuit of a collective outcome” more aptly describes the relationship needed.20 The current environment demands more than status quo approaches, or mere coordination.

Ironically, the same doctrine that advocates for interagency coordination may be cognitively constraining military members from doing so on an enduring basis at the strategic level. The stated goal of Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, is to "guide interorganizational coordination
during joint operations among engaged stakeholders." This implies an operationally-bounded timeframe for these activities to take place, which doctrine neatly packages in Annex V of an OPLAN. Successful battlefield commanders, such as Generals Petraeus and McChrystal, adapted this construct to develop campaign plans that were fully integrated via a collaborative process with their Chief of Mission counterparts. The approaches Generals Petraeus and McChrystal took represent the lessons learned that the Department of Defense must institutionalize to deal with the future environment. These efforts should not be constrained to the operational/campaign level. At the strategic level of the USG, all interactions are civil-military in nature!

To an even greater extent than General Zinni perceived in 2001, the complexity of current problems creates a requirement to use the instruments of power in a way that is different and more effective than in the past. The National Security Staff (NSS) is increasingly finding itself in “collaborative settings which are populated by problems where neither the problem nor the solution is definable." This collaborative setting needs to extend to the mindset of the staffs which will develop the strategies and plans driven by NSC policy. The range of options available for execution to improve USG interagency collaboration is endless, but two recommendations illustrate the plausible actions. Using the Star Model to frame the categories of organizational responsibilities it is apparent that the military must focus on providing the relevant skills to carry out effective collaboration.

Operational Approach

Organizational design theory provides a solid foundation for the interagency playbook. The theory offers a way to frame and explain organizational relationships so that leaders can adjust internal policies to be more effective in their environment. The
Star Model, developed by Jay Galbraith, identifies key "design policies that are controllable by management and can influence employee behavior." This section will give a brief overview of two published operational approaches for interagency collaboration and list pros and cons to each per the Star Model. While the two approaches are useful in understanding the scope of the problem, one is too ambitious to enact in whole and the other does not address skills critical for success. The Star Model illuminates the specific design policy that military leaders have the ability to change to increase the effectiveness of the system, (interagency collaboration), in a manner applicable to the current environment.

The Star Model groups design policies into different categories, helping leaders establish an organization in which all elements are poised to support its goals within the environment. These design policies are intended to influence the behavior of the people within the organization and consist of Strategy, Structure, Processes, Rewards, and People.26

![Image of the Star Model]

Figure 1, The Star Model

Strategy provides the direction for the organization, while Structure policies dictate where power and authority are placed. Processes determine how information is
transferred, generally whether by vertical or horizontal means. Reward policies are meant to motivate people towards a particular behavior.\textsuperscript{28} Finally, People policies, "in the appropriate combinations – produce the talent required by the strategy and structure of the organization, generating the skills and mind-sets necessary to implement the chosen direction."\textsuperscript{29}

The elements of the national security system fit into the Star Model. The President provides direction via strategy and power via the use of the National Security Council and associated structure of the Interagency Policy Committees, Deputies' Committee, and Principals' Committee.\textsuperscript{30} Information from each agency is transferred mainly in a horizontal manner by loosely defined processes, then horizontally to the next higher power level and eventually up to the President to inform strategy.\textsuperscript{31} The system generates motivation by appealing to the selfless service aspect of most government employees in these endeavors. Of course, the people are comprised of professionals who carry out the work and sustain the whole.

Professionals working within the national security system recognize the need to at least refine the ability of government agencies to develop and execute effective security policy and strategy. Some seek to radically redefine the relationships between those agencies. One benchmark study, the Project for National Security Reform gives a multitude of recommendations which calls for change in the structural, organizational, and personnel systems of the United States' government agencies.\textsuperscript{32} Classifying the national security system as "failing", the Project for National Security Reform studies the national security system and makes sweeping recommendations to affect "modernizing the currently antiquated national security system for 21st century challenges."\textsuperscript{33} The
commission's 2008 report cites that for 106 case studies of situations which required action by the national security system, there is an increasing trend towards the production of failed policy and strategy.\textsuperscript{34} Even when a sound policy or strategy is put forth, the implementation remains "problematic".\textsuperscript{35} This group of over 80 professionals with extensive experience in government presented seven areas for reform to include: Strategic Direction, Structure, Processes, Resources, Human Capitol, Decision Support, and Congressional Oversight. A follow-on report, Turning Ideas into Action, produced in 2009, outlined an implementation plan for these reform areas and associated actions.\textsuperscript{36} The commission disbanded in 2011 with a few of the recommendations set into motion, but nothing near the scope addressed in the aforementioned reports. The Chairman of the commission, Mr. James Locher III, stated, "two principal factors blocked needed changes: denial about the seriousness of shortcomings in the national security system and the lack of political will to fix these shortcomings."\textsuperscript{37} In summary, the PNSR requires massive top-down directed executive branch changes and is dependent on the legislative branch of the government to also reform to a certain extent. Three years after the end of this project, neither branch shows substantial interest in full scale implementation of the PNSR recommendations.

In another effort, the Government Accountability Office completed several studies looking at improving interagency collaboration and suggested several mechanisms for implementation. The GAO also recognized the need for "coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency" - including collaboration - to achieve meaningful results when dealing with complex issues.\textsuperscript{38} As such, it completed over 300 studies between 2005 and 2012 addressing collaboration issues among USG agencies. Two of the studies
concentrate on identifying key practices and considerations for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms.\textsuperscript{39} A 2012 study, based on literary research, identifies key mechanisms and associated issues to increase the effectiveness of collaboration. While the PNSR suggests change in all sectors of the Star Model, the 2012 GAO report focuses on the how power is assigned in working groups and bridging agencies’ cultures to achieve the desired outcome – essentially the processes part of the Star Model.\textsuperscript{40} The report briefly mentions the requirement to have people with the right skills for collaboration, but does not identify what those skills are.\textsuperscript{41}

While both reform efforts address all points of the Star Model, large change to the strategy, structure, and process areas will not occur without top-down direction from the President and Congress. The PNSR recommends changes to these areas, but the means to do so lie outside the scope of the Department of Defense or any one agency. Arguably, there are many different strategies, structures, and processes which may work in the current environment. Some proclaim that although burdensome, the current national security structure is not broken, but a reflection of the tensions and checks and balances that need to take place within our society.\textsuperscript{42} The point of this research is not to analyze the appropriateness of the proposed changes for direction, structure, and processes, but to identify areas of opportunity.

If some categories will remain somewhat static due to lack of political will, the Star Model reveals there is still an area for change. The military has span of control over the People bin to create the skills and mindsets of its members to succeed in the National Security System area of operation. As stewards of the military profession, leaders must capitalize on Chairman Dempsey’s Mission Command authority and invest
in human capital to successfully operate at the strategic level in a collaborative environment.\textsuperscript{43}

Collaboration Competencies – Emotional Intelligence

Galbraith contends that personnel policies should be geared to producing the skills that the strategy and structure demand.\textsuperscript{44} In that the strategy and structure of the NSS demands collaboration to achieve unified action, what are the skills necessary to succeed in this specific "star"? Studies of leaders operating in these types of environments which rely on collaborative efforts show that successful leaders use a common set of ideas to guide their actions.\textsuperscript{45} Daniel Goleman gathered these ideas into a concept called emotional intelligence. The elements of emotional intelligence complement and reinforce the skills essential for collaboration. The efficacy of the elements of EI in effective collaboration can be assessed using the Star Model.\textsuperscript{46}

Emotional intelligence involves the components of self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill. The associated hallmarks of each component are listed in Figure 2.
Some of the components and hallmarks are not very different from the leadership tools taught to military members, such as trustworthiness and organizational commitment. But the majority of the EI competencies that have to do with self-awareness, empathy, and self-regulation are not developed or assessed in officers early in a career as a means to develop into a better leader. To a certain degree, the military hierarchy and standardization compensates for the other components. For example, empathy within a military unit may not seem necessary to build and retain talent, because the rank structure and personnel policies are so pervasive. Some commanders do not think they have to self-regulate emotions or disruptive impulses because the hierarchy demands that subordinates follow that commander regardless of their emotional behavior. To a certain extent, the measure of success in the military at the O-3 and O-4 command levels is not in how the commander accomplishes the mission, but
that the mission is accomplished. This behavior has been documented in the Army’s investigation of toxic leadership.⁴⁸

As officers ascend through rank, their professional environment becomes more of a network of organizations and success is more dependent on relationships. As such, "leadership in interorganisational [sic] networks differs significantly from leadership in individual organisations [sic] in that networks cannot direct the planned endeavors of other network organisations [sic] via fiat."⁴⁹ Thus, military organizations have reserved teaching the ideas which are conducive to succeeding in interagency collaboration to their more senior officers. Some officers have refined these capabilities on their own, while others cannot adapt and do not advance.

Turning back to the Star Model, each component "makes a unique contribution to interorganizational collaboration - either contributing to successful interagency collaboration or creating barriers to it.⁵⁰ Specific to the people point, the drivers for collaboration include: "appreciation of others' perspectives, competencies for collaboration, trust, and commitment and motivation."⁵¹ The barriers are a lack of competency, combined with arrogance, hostility, and animosity. Each of these drivers can be traced back to a component or hallmark of emotional intelligence, whereas the lack of an emotional intelligence competency leads to described barriers of arrogance, hostility, and animosity.⁵² Not only do the components of EI create the space for collaboration, they are antidotes to the barriers which impede a person's ability to collaborate.

Self-awareness is the understanding of one's own "emotions, strengths, weaknesses, needs and drives."⁵³ As one becomes familiar with these internal core
aspects, he/she is better able to anticipate how he/she may react in certain situations. Those who are self-aware understand how their feelings affect their performance and those around them. As arrogance, hostility, and animosity are barriers to collaboration, it is important to be aware of any tendencies towards these barriers. Self-awareness forms the basis for the other EI competencies of empathy and self-regulation which contribute to building collaborative capacity.

The EI competency of empathy directly correlates to the ability to appreciate others’ perspectives. Empathy is the thoughtful consideration of others’ feelings during the decision making process. To appreciate others’ perspectives means to sense and understand the culture, attitude, and feelings which contribute to how that person will act in certain situations. Perspective can be seen as the resultant of feelings and environment for which everyone differs slightly. Realizing these differences via empathy allows for people to work with the differences, rather than try fighting them. This allows for collaborative space for productive decision making.

Self-regulation is critical to instill trust in and motivate others in a collaborative environment. It is the ability to manage the impact of individual emotions on a situation. It is impossible to quash the biological impulses that create emotions, but successful leaders have the ability to manage their emotions. Anticipating the impact of emotions on one’s behavior allows for a true suspension of judgment when confronted with new information or dealing with other organizations. Those who are able to self-regulate are able to develop "an environment of trust and fairness…where politics and infighting are sharply reduced and productivity is high." As important as stifling negative emotions, motivation is the mobilization of positive emotions to push others to achieve goals.
The environment and strategic direction has changed to where officers need to have these emotional intelligence skills at an earlier stage in their professional development for two reasons. One, the structure and processes of the military organization can no longer shield the lower echelons from the VUCA environment. This is true at the tactical level, for example, with Provincial Reconstruction Teams. "A good leader can bring together a number of personnel from various departments to work on a central problem, especially, if he/she understands the personalities of team members, the culture of each department, the political ideologies within, client expectations, and objectives of the mission." 58

Two, the strategic impact is that the problems having to do with national security require a deep collaborative capacity. It is not enough that strategic leaders themselves demonstrate a high level of EI. "The staffs that support these strategic leaders, at least down to the Lieutenant Colonel/O-5 level, should also be able to think strategically in order to properly support their senior leaders." 59 Not only should the staffs think strategically, but they need to be effective in collaboration to enable their senior leaders to be valued members in any collaborative body dealing with strategic issues. The organizational capacity for collaboration rests upon these individual collaborative capabilities and "include the attitudes, skills, knowledge, and behaviors of individual organizational members." 60 Examples of desired behavior are “conflict management skills, willingness to engage in shared decision-making, respect for the expertise of those in other organizations, and knowledge and understanding of how other organizations work.” 61 These skills require the foundation of emotional intelligence and
results in a service mentality, one that is focused on the consumer of services, i.e. the President, rather than to an individual military service or organization.62

The PNSR states that, "Changes in organization, authority, and human capital are thus the basis for the most profound transformational effects, ultimately contributing to a new culture that is focused on integration and higher-level goals."63 In his 2012 White Paper on Joint Education, General Dempsey calls for a review of joint education to ensure the development of “agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision and critical thinking skills necessary to keep pace with the changing strategic environment.”64 An analysis of the guidance for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) shows a gap between what the environment demands and what the current system provides.

Developing Collaborative Competencies

Joint doctrine indirectly espouses the need for elements of EI to obtain unified action. In order to build personal relationships to "inspire trust and confidence" to obtain unified action, members must have "interpersonal communication skills that emphasize consultation, persuasion, compromise, and consensus".65 However, analysis of the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) shows that the attributes that doctrine describes and what attributes the current PME system teaches are not in line. The OPMEP is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) instruction which provides direction for officer PME and JPME. The OPMEP explicitly directs topics of emphasis for each school and the timing of such. The guidance is summarized in a graphic entitled, "Officer Professional Military Education Continuum" which lists these focus areas per the different stages in an officer’s career.66
The topics listed in the continuum and expounded on in the annexes focus on cognitive knowledge of material having to do with doctrine and strategy. Of the eleven lists of required topics for PME across the continuum, only two areas list something other than a doctrine or strategy topic. Intermediate-level College (ILC) is to "Develop analytical capabilities and creative thought" and flag level PME will provide "Strategic leader development".67

That does not mean that leadership aspects are left out of the OPMEP completely. Most of the annexes have a section which addresses the type of leadership relevant to that stage in an officer's career. But even direction given in the annex falls short of delivering the emphasis needed. For example, the objective given for O-4 joint leadership is to "comprehend the skills needed to lead a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational task force in accomplishing operational-level missions across the range of military operations, to include traditional and irregular warfare."68 As the 'comprehend' level of learning is to "grasp the meaning of the information",69 upon ILC graduation an officer will not necessarily have the EI skills needed to be effective in any collaborative interagency effort.

In general, the guidance given in the OPMEP for Service and Joint Professional Military Education programs does not demand the full realm of education necessary to be effective in a collaborative environment. In that O-4s on the service and joint staffs have the opportunity to work on projects with strategic implications with interagency partners, the Officer Professional Military Education Continuum and associated learning areas and objectives must address EI concepts and interagency issues earlier and to a higher learning level in an officer's career. The OPMEP categorizes the verbs used to
describe the learning objectives as either cognitive or affective.\textsuperscript{70} The cognitive domain has to do with knowledge while the affective domain has to do with emotional areas.\textsuperscript{71} To the detriment of the military’s collaborative capacity, the preponderance of direction for all levels of JPME rests in development of the technical skills and knowledge in the cognitive domain rather than the affective domain.\textsuperscript{72} The key is to not only have a grasp of how the national security system works, but have a set of skills in the affective domain which allow military officers to operate effectively in that environment.

Instruction on emotional intelligence competencies at the FO/GO level is incomplete and late. Education is not development; one must have reflective experiences to apply the competencies naturally.\textsuperscript{73} Connecting with new leadership habits takes discipline and time, usually “three to six months of using all naturally occurring practice opportunities before the new habit comes more naturally than the old.”\textsuperscript{74} Cultivating the skills required for collaboration at an early stage will optimize situations for the near- and long-term. In the coming age of declining manpower, the military needs to cultivate these emotional intelligence skills to create more effective strategies using a whole of government approach. This will only be possible when the officer corps at all levels possess the emotional intelligence skills to engage in effective collaboration with DOD’s interagency partners.

Conclusion

An observed lesson from the past decade of war is that the DIME national instruments of power are not used in a sequential manner or in isolation. Rather, they are used simultaneously but in different capacities to secure national interests in a dynamic environment. Joint doctrine captures this idea loosely and advocates that "the routine interaction of the instruments of national power is fundamental to US activities in
the strategic environment. The military instrument’s role increases relative to the other instruments as the need to compel a potential adversary through force increases."

As seen in OEF and OIF, even when there are ongoing military operations there are simultaneous and complementary actions from the other instruments of power. This same type of integration at the tactical and operational levels needs to be exercised at the strategic levels in the interagency area of operation to achieve unified action. The VUCA environment, further complicated by the effects of globalization, a wide range of threats, and declining budget and reductions in military force structure, demands the synergistic application of U.S. instruments of power. Despite this need, "the United States government’s “interagency community” — including departments, independent agencies, and many other organizations — is one in which the power of a unified whole would be greater than the sum of its parts working separately, unifying the whole has been elusive." The difficulty in producing synergistic effects has endured even since passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which was intended to help integrate national security policies.

While there have been several calls for large-scale reform of the NSS, notably by the Project for National Security Reform, those who have control over the whole system have not taken steps to enact the suggested reforms. Smaller scale changes to procedural efforts of interagency workings suggested by the GAO have not been consistently effective either. In lieu of changes that are directed by outside organizations, the military can increase its collaborative capacity to maximize strategic unified action by developing and assessing emotional intelligence competencies in its officer corps at the O-4 level. By emphasizing such development of the affective domain
at the intermediate service level, officers will be ready participants in the collaborative environment necessary to implement a whole of government approach directed by President Obama.

Endnotes


4 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield.


14 Ibid., 3.

15 Don M. Snyder, “Stewards of the Army Profession: Successes, Failures, and Challenges,” lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, August 30, 2013, cited with permission of Mr. Snyder.


18 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1-0, xv.

19 Health and Human Services, “Coordination, Cooperation & Collaboration.”


22 Ibid., II-8.


26 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 4.


31 Ibid.

32 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield.


34 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, 95.

35 Ibid.


39 Ibid., 3-9.

40 Ibid., 11-17.

41 Ibid., 19.


45 Goleman, Leadership: The Power of Emotional Intelligence, 26-27.


51 Ibid., 260.

52 Ibid.

53 Goleman, Leadership: The Power of Emotional Intelligence, 28.

54 Ibid., 34.

55 Ibid., 30.

56 Ibid., 31.

57 Ibid., 33.

58 Byers, “Sharing the Load: Evaluating Two Civilian and Military Interagency Missions”


61 Ibid.


65 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08, I-12.


67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., E-C-3.

69 Ibid., E-A-1.

70 Ibid.


72 Ibid., E-A-1 – E-A-3. Conclusion attained via analysis of the descriptive verbs listed in the OPMEP that constitute the hierarchy of possible levels of learning. The verbs are used to define the JPME objectives in the appendixes. The OPMEP categorizes the verbs as either cognitive or affective.

73 Snyder, “Stewards of the Army Profession: Successes, Failures, and Challenges.”


75 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, I-4.

77 Ibid.