A Case Study in Strategic Moral Leadership: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 1927-1945

by

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United States Army War College
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What is the cost to a leader, both personally and professionally, in exercising a calling of strategic moral leadership to one's nation or to the world? This has profound implications for any military force, an institution of the state that U.S. Army Chaplains contend is subject to the rule of God, allowing Soldiers and Families who serve in it to be one with another in God while serving an institution dedicated to war. Understanding the process of strategic moral leader development can aid the Army in developing moral leaders in support of landpower across the career spectrum. The life and witness of Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer provide an excellent case study for this task. His move from trained academic and spiritual leader to active conspirator and subversive with fellow Abwehr participants against the Third Reich will be the focus of this project. We will conclude by delineating how the costly process of exercising strategic spiritual leadership can be prepared for, but still requires extensive moral courage to enact, both privately and publicly.

Public Theology, World War II

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Abstract

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What is the cost to a leader, both personally and professionally, in exercising a calling of strategic moral leadership to one’s nation or to the world? This has profound implications for any military force, an institution of the state that U.S. Army Chaplains contend is subject to the rule of God, allowing Soldiers and Families who serve in it to be one with another in God while serving an institution dedicated to war. Understanding the process of strategic moral leader development can aid the Army in developing moral leaders in support of landpower across the career spectrum. The life and witness of Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer provide an excellent case study for this task. His move from trained academic and spiritual leader to active conspirator and subversive with fellow Abwehr participants against the Third Reich will be the focus of this project. We will conclude by delineating how the costly process of exercising strategic spiritual leadership can be prepared for, but still requires extensive moral courage to enact, both privately and publicly.
A Case Study in Strategic Moral Leadership: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 1927-1945

Only the person who combines simplicity with wisdom can endure. But what is simplicity? What is wisdom? How do the two become one? A person is simple who in the confusion, the distortion, and the inversion of all concepts keeps in sight only the single truth of God...The single-minded person does not also cast glances at the world while standing next to God and therefore is able, free and unconstrained, to see the reality of the world. Thus simplicity becomes wisdom...Only that person is wise who sees in reality God.

—Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer¹

What is the cost, both personally and professionally, of living out a calling of strategic moral leadership to one’s nation and perhaps the world? That is the central question undergirding this strategy research project. Over the past twelve years, the United States Army has focused sharply on its shortcomings in leader development for landpower in defense of the nation.² Developing leaders is vital to the profession of arms, for as John Mattox states, “…only officers of firm moral character can discharge adequately their professional obligations to the nation and to the subordinates they are called to lead.”³ There are inconsistencies in the Army’s moral leader development process—whereas the Army has competing visions of how morality informs character, how it guides ethical action,⁴ and how to inculcate morality into leaders.⁵ Moreover, as a subset of moral leader development, a whole series of arguments and counter-arguments persist on the role of the Army Chaplaincy in this process. Some discussants want to include spirituality in the Army’s understanding of moral leader development,⁶ others vociferously argue against this; some want religion to be a component of spirituality,⁷ others stridently and uncritically counter this, often accepting the false assumption that doing so would cross a metaphorical wall separating church from state.⁸
Confusion is seen clearly in the very public ethical failings of both soldiers and key Army leaders during the past twelve years of persistent conflict (though moral failure is a persistent risk to the force). Reports of soldier abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, dereliction of graves at Arlington National Cemetery, and war crimes like those committed by Staff Sergeant Robert Bales, have marred the Army’s reputation. Its principal client is the American public, who Samuel Huntington contends owns a monopoly on national security. Moral failures of Army general officers have understandably captured public attention and generated outrage toward perceived or actual moral shortcomings in the United States Army; there are similar accounts in sister services. If the moral foundation of our institution is cracked, then these “ethical spaces” in the Army Professional Ethic require assessment, repair, and strengthening. As Arthur Danto states, “the military must relearn its ‘moral codes,’ for …nothing could be more corrupting than perpetual war.” To counter such corruption, Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin Dempsey ordered appointment of a general-officer ethics “czar” and directed a services-wide review of ethics training for the force.

What role should the Army Chaplaincy play in this effort? In the past it has been both included and ignored in professional discourse. The Chaplaincy, however, has three explicit tasks: be the force’s proponent for moral leadership through stewardship of Army doctrine; train soldiers and units in moral leadership and ethical reasoning; and advise commanders in arriving at ethically balanced and just decisions. We cannot lose sight of these tasks--soldiers, families, the Army and the American public rightly demand our continuous moral vigilance and ethical guidance.
How might the Chaplaincy best accomplish these tasks for the Army? To begin, we must define strategic moral leadership. The United States Military Academy concept of leadership as integrating competence and character is foundational. Furthermore, both James H. Burtness and Tom Beauchamp see morality as the public living of one’s ethics and a “social institution” like public obedience to the rule of law. Deborah Rhodes views moral leadership as “…[a] sense of exercising influence in ways that are ethical in means and ends…[which] requires a moral dimension.” While Rhodes details the etymological roots of morals, ethics, virtue and leadership, she doesn’t explicate these. Additionally, Patrick Sweeney and Louis Fry see moral leadership as “…the consistent moral and ethical actions for the purposes of maintaining congruence with one’s own and the organization’s values and beliefs, and to serve the greater good of the community.” Helpful as these descriptions are, however, they fail to proscribe morality for a public, values-based United States Army charged with defending the republic through the controlled application of violence. In sum, the polis needs both morality and moral leadership.

Using these as starting points, I define strategic moral leadership as the consistent exercise of servant character and competence through principled ethical ends, ways and means that serve not only the greater good of one’s organization but also one’s nation and the world. This definition combines strands of deontology, teleology and biblical thought, and offers a “way ahead” to explore the burden of exercising strategic moral leadership. Inverting that task as a question, it becomes: What is the cost to a leader, both personally and professionally, of exercising a calling of strategic moral leadership?
Such a question deserves a considered response. Exercising strategic moral leadership develops along a continuum with three principal phases: 1) development of foundational spiritual and moral values; 2) negotiation of those values in the context of moral challenge; 3) and resolution and execution of those values in principled ethical action (the context of which may be in opposition to, tension with, or resulting from one's foundational spiritual and moral values). Strategic moral leaders who influence their nation and the world emerge from such a journey. Value-neutrality is not an option for the effective strategic moral leader, for as Nigel Biggar states, “public morality must become a rightly ordered love.”19 “Agere sequitur esse” (“Doing follows upon being”);20 with reflection and intention, one must allow spiritual and moral development to become value-laden from the first.

Two aspects of strategic moral leader development deserve further comment. First, this transformation is primarily internal to the leader and, though it is shaped by external circumstances, in the end is the leader’s responsibility. Second, understanding this transformation can be a powerful organizational tool for developing strategic moral leaders across the career spectrum. If the Army and Army Chaplaincy establish a well-conceived, directed program for such moral leader development, then leaders would be better prepared to exercise their calling in the profession of arms. As General Sir John Hackett stated, "The pattern of professional education in the services is progressive…”21 and so can be organizationally directed. To reemphasize, while the individual undergoes this institutional development, the final integration is the responsibility of the leader alone.22 Principled, consistency of action in both character and competence is
the aim, for as General Sir James Glover states, “A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war.”

To best illustrate this process, Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s role in the Wehrmacht Abwehr conspiracy provides a relevant case study. Bonhoeffer was a true strategic moral leader: he began as an academic theologian in 1927; yet died on a Nazi gallows on April 9, 1945 in the Flossenbürg concentration camp, just a day before American forces would liberate it. He and his co-conspirators in a plot to kill Adolf Hitler were executed on Heinrich Himmler’s orders, both for their treason and to keep Bonhoeffer from influencing post-war Germany. Regarding Bonhoeffer’s death, Andrew Chandler says that, “His life was a moral human drama, a tragedy of righteousness.” Despite Himmler’s intent, Bonhoeffer’s collected articles, lectures, letters and books now fill sixteen published volumes, and his major works Discipleship, Ethics, and Letters and Papers from Prison are some of the most widely-read theological books in print. To recognize his continuing impact, the Cathedral of Westminster Abbey in 1998 added statues of ten modern Christian martyrs that included Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Bishop Oscar Romero, and Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer to its façade.

Yet how did this unknown academic theologian attain such global stature? Dietrich Bonhoeffer's life illustrates the transformation of a strategic moral leader through the three phases: the development of foundational spiritual and moral beliefs; negotiation of those beliefs in the context of moral challenge; and resolution and execution of those beliefs in ethical action. We turn now to examine how Bonhoeffer's journey illustrates this process.
Foundational Beliefs

Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology began with his doctoral dissertation *Sanctorum Communio*, accepted by the University of Berlin in 1927 when he was only 21 years old. In this work—a theological examination of the sociological nature of the church, the Body of Christ—Bonhoeffer expresses four foundational theological concepts which guide the church:

1) its real yet mysterious presence in the world;
2) its witness about Christ through preaching, worship and the sacraments;
3) its subtle demarcation of the state through articulating God's reign; and finally,
4) its power to suffer for another and thus, like Christ, to vicariously represent Him for that other.

Clifford Green and Stanley Hauerwas both note that from 1927-1933, Bonhoeffer’s major ideas about the church guided the remainder of his career in public theology.

Yet Germany in that era was descending into social chaos, so how did Bonhoeffer refine this corpus amidst rising Nazi tyranny? Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists rose to federal power on January 30, 1933 in the *Machtergreifung*. Just two days later, Bonhoeffer publically addressed the dangerous cult of personality that Hitler employed to consolidate his power in the famed radio address, “The Younger Generation's Altered View of the Concept of the Führer,” which was cut off prior to its completion. In this address, Bonhoeffer foresaw the danger of a body politic blindly following a polarizing leader out of anarchy and inchoately punctuated his remarks with two critical terms: penultimate and ultimate authority. Following Christ’s admonition to “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s” (Luke 20:25), Bonhoeffer asserted that the Christian citizen must remain wary of
confusing loyalties between church and state. He was not stating, however, that
Berliners should refrain from giving loyalty to Hitler, which would have conflicted with
Bonhoeffer’s bourgeois sensibilities and brought disrepute to his well-respected family.
Rather, he sought to recast the issue of what allegiances the Christian owes in both this
life and the life to come. He captured this resolution not as a conflict but as a duty;
each Christian must wisely discern where to give secondary, penultimate allegiance and
where to give primary and ultimate allegiance. After noting the inter-relationship
between individual, leader and community as a sociological reality, Bonhoeffer framed
the theological issue:

From where can the individual take this right vis-à-vis the office? Nowhere else than there where he sees that the office is the penultimate authority
with respect to an ultimate unutterable authority, with respect to the
authority of God. And from this authority the individual truly knows himself
to be an individual. It is to God that the individual is responsible. And this
individuality of standing before God, this submission to the ultimate
authority, is destroyed when the authority of a leader or an office is seen
as the ultimate authority.

For Bonhoeffer, the Christian citizen can rightly provide penultimate allegiance to
the state but must always be aware that such loyalty, following the cult of the leader, is
potentially compromising. Only God demands and deserves the Christian citizen’s
ultimate allegiance (Roman 14:10; 2 Corinthians 5:10; Hebrew 9:27). As Ralf
Wüstenberg notes, for Bonhoeffer these terms conveyed a pastoral theology for the
church “that describe events both theologically and in terms of political reality.”

Indeed, the epigraph for this paper from *Ethics* illustrates that for Bonhoeffer the
balance of right human-divine relationship remains the decisive basis for all moral action
in public life, particularly in relationship to one’s state. Only by maintaining ultimate
fidelity to God can one serve both state and humanity in true freedom. This idea from
Sanctorum Communio of Christus als Gemeinde existierend ("Christ being present for others)," was further developed in Bonhoeffer's second dissertation, Act and Being. It is the church alone that, acting in Christ’s stead and power, exercises its social role as God’s vessel for revelation to and hope for humanity. He wrote, "In faith people understand themselves as in the church of Christ in their new being, in an existential reality that was not included in their deepest potentiality. They see their existence to be founded solely by the word of the person of Christ. They live in God's sight and in no other way."40

For Bonhoeffer, this reality is then causal to all human relationships and social structures, including church and state. In his later thinking, this will demarcate the state through the proclamation of the Gospel, and so limit its power under the ultimate authority of God.41 He asserts in his Ethics:

The 'restraining power' (das Aufhaltende—the Gospel articulated through the church) is the force that is made effective within history by God's rule of the world, which sets limits to evil. The 'restrainer' (der Aufhaltende—the state itself) is not God and is not without guilt, but God uses it to protect the world from disintegration.42

Note, however, that Bonhoeffer framed this as a continuation of Martin Luther's “two kingdoms” ideal and, in doing so, amplified his own Staatsidee.43

Negotiation of Ideals in Conflict

Accordingly, the church is: the manifestation in the world of the Body of Christ; its witness about Christ through preaching, worship and the sacraments; its demarcation of the state through its articulation of God's reign, particularly through penultimate and ultimate authority; and finally, a vessel to suffer for another in Christ and to vicariously represent Him in action for that other. These are some of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's seminal concepts about the nature of Christian citizens and their relationships to God, church
and state. Yet as the Kirchenkampf, or German Church Struggle against Nazism grew beginning with seminal events such as the Barmen Synod of 1934, how did Bonhoeffer face the issue of German social complicity? To be sure, many German Christians not only yielded to but also wholeheartedly supported the Nazi ideological and political program. This social phenomenon has been adequately analyzed by scholars more able than us and need not be covered here. What is of note is Bonhoeffer’s theological response to this reality.

From 1933-1945, there was considerable social pressure in Germany to remain silent in the face of Nazism. Why? As Claude Foster writes, “One of the answers must be fear: fear for one’s life and for the security of one’s family. The warning heard throughout Germany was ‘keep quiet or else you too will end up in a concentration camp.’” Many citizens rationalized this as an internalization of faith—a private matter without public import—further emphasizing obedience as only a social duty. Bonhoeffer, in his famed treatise Discipleship, however, turned this argument on its head. For him, this pressure for social conformity was best expressed as a paradox of truths continually in tension. As he stated, “The concept of a situation in which faith is possible is only a description of the reality contained in the following two statements, both of which are equally true: only the believers obey, and only the obedient believe (italics in original translation).” Moreover, this cannot be adjudicated by personal standards of response to call; it can only be actualized by moral action free from self justification, an expression of “cheap grace.” He summarized, "As Jesus’ concrete call and simple obedience have their own irrevocable meaning…Wherever simple obedience is
fundamentally eliminated, there again the costly grace of Jesus’ call has become the cheap grace of self justification.”

Bonhoeffer further spoke in *Discipleship of Christ* drawing all believers into an unbroken web of relationships that forms the “community of the Crucified.” For the believer, there is always a need of the Christ and His *sanctorum communio*; living authentically in isolation from other believers is a logical impossibility. Moreover, the call of discipleship as cast in the Sermon on the Mount is decisive and unremitting, and its demand of total obedience is proscriptive for all within the body of faith and cannot be abrogated. The way of such discipleship, in accordance with the life of Jesus, is necessarily a call of self-denial through daily taking up one’s cross (Luke 9:23-24).

There is no possibility in Bonhoeffer’s conception for such a call to be internalized so that it is invisible to the world; such would be the definitive example of cheap grace. Genuine discipleship is rather an externalized life of obedient, costly grace which is always visible to the world. This is the essence of witness and inspires the *sanctorum communio* to its praxis of public theology. While it is true that later in life Bonhoeffer considered his theological thoughts within *Discipleship* to be somewhat immature, they retain a sense of power in their unrelenting demand for obedience to the name, character, and public example of Jesus Christ. Bonhoeffer would learn through events that his calling would be to live out that which he wrote.

Resolution and Ethical Action

It was such an impetus, done in “free and responsible action,” that compelled Dietrich Bonhoeffer to attempt subversion of the Third Reich. From 1934-1939 certainly, Bonhoeffer retained hope that the ecumenical Christian community within Germany and abroad would support the *Kirchenkampf*. He also became firmly
convinced that a primary purpose of the church as the Body of Christ was to live together as a *koinoneia* fellowship, or genuine Christian community. He believed that such communities should integrate into local culture and effect social change from the inside out. Thus for Bonhoeffer Christians should achieve unification first in a confessional framework, and then express this in active public life and work. Though neither the Confessing Church nor the international ecumenical movement ever achieved such oneness, Bonhoeffer never veered from the belief that the church must work toward this standard. 54 To his thinking, this would be an antidote for uncritical cultural subservience to and coercion by the Nazi state.

For Bonhoeffer, this theological ideal for Christian community emerged as an opportunity when the Confessing Church asked him to lead a new seminary to train pastors for ordination and appointment to vacant parishes not recognized by the *Reich Bishof*. From its founding at Finkenwalde, Pomerania in the summer of 1935, the Pastor’s Seminary was always under the pressures to find legitimacy with the Confessing Church and survive state scrutiny. Bonhoeffer as its leader sought to fuse theological education to spiritual development of candidates for ministry (this became the basis for his classic *Life Together*). Moreover, this was to be a paragon for other such communities. As Geoffrey Kelly and F. Burton Nelson state, "He intended to share this experience with others…that it might serve as a model for forming moral leaders and for the creation of new forms of community throughout Germany."55 The *Gestapo*, however, closed the seminary in mid-October 1937.

Nazi racial ideology dominated German national conscience, fueled by collective fears even in the *Landeskirche*—Lutheran and Reformed Protestant denominations—
about the threats of socialism and communism. Though anti-Semitism existed in German culture, Nazi implementation of the Final Solution had not crystallized. Still, in the 1930s both Bonhoeffer and fellow theologian Karl Barth foresaw the social implications of the racial ideology of Blut und Volk. Starting with the Barmen Synod, they “…were virtually alone in acknowledging the problem of anti-Semitism in the church during this timeframe.” As Ferdinand Schlingensiepen writes of Bonhoeffer, “He was standing before his church and demanding that it develop a political conscience and take determined action.” While it may be tempting to hold Bonhoeffer as one who during the Holocaust unswervingly gave himself to the salvation of German Jews, the historical record does not support such a claim. However, as Eberhard Bethge comments on Bonhoeffer’s earliest ideas about die Judenfrage, or “the Jewish question”. “Until 1933 (and even afterwards) Bonhoeffer did not consider himself to be called to rethink and to reconstruct the thousand-years old problem of Jewish-Christian relations…Suddenly he saw himself confronted with a practical question: what should happen now and how should we think, guess and judge after a racial ideological movement had unexpectedly started to steer the wheels of the state?”

Thus Bonhoeffer grew more convinced that his theological beliefs and role as a moral leader provided less ambiguity in whether to act against Nazi tyranny. He formally addressed the rights of Jewish Christians in his July 1933 essay "The Church and the Jewish Question," written in response to the passing of the first of the Aryan Paragraphs on April 1st of that year. Like many German Protestants of conscience, Bonhoeffer was principally concerned about how these laws would impact church polity, particularly the exclusion from the sacraments of baptized Christians of Jewish descent. In this essay
Bonhoeffer foresaw the effect of the state's assumption of churchly authority on individual citizens, or “victims” as he named them. He essentially saw beyond the immediate circumstance to the broader issues at stake for Christians across Germany and beyond.

In the face of state tyranny, Bonhoeffer detailed three possible responses for the church: 1) make the state responsible for its actions; 2) unconditionally serve the victims of the state's actions; 3) and failing these, to "throw oneself into the spoke and seize/stop the wheel itself," [authors' translation of the word picture contained in Bonhoeffer's original German phrase, „dem Rad selbst in die Speichen zu fallen]." He asserted in the second thesis in the essay, "The church cannot allow the state to prescribe for it the way it treats its members. A baptized Jew is a member of our church." Moreover, linking theological ethics to moral action, Bonhoeffer wrote as the principal author of the Bethel Confession, "The Christians who are of Gentile descent must be prepared to expose themselves to persecution before they are ready to betray in even a single case, voluntarily or under compulsion, the church's fellowship with Jewish Christians that is instituted in Word and sacrament." But the situation advanced. By September 1935, when the National Socialists passed the last of the Aryan Paragraphs through the Reich Party Convention of Freedom in Nuremburg, the Jewish Question was increasingly an issue for German churches. These laws, specifically "The Reich Citizens Law" and "The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor" with their subsequent amendments, isolated German Jews both politically and socially. For Bonhoeffer and other Confessing Church leaders, the rub of these laws was that they portended an existential
threat to all German Christians, not just those of even partial Jewish ancestry.\textsuperscript{68} As Victoria Barnett notes, now “…what to do about Jewish Christians became one of the most sensitive questions in the opposition.”\textsuperscript{69} For Bonhoeffer, this was a usurpation by the state of church authority, one which the state had no right to under his concept of the “orders of preservation” and which violated God’s ultimate authority. As James Rudin notes, “Bonhoeffer clearly believed, from a firm Christian foundation, that baptism means full membership in the church, and no state has the right to change that belief.”\textsuperscript{70} As Bonhoeffer famously wrote of how the faithful should respond, “Only he who cries out for the Jews may sing Gregorian chants.”\textsuperscript{71}

So Bonhoeffer decided a new way was necessary. He would now actively work against the Third Reich as the only action that could provide him moral and ethical consonance. Though his resistance often excites popular conceptions of Bonhoeffer as a martyr, it often frustrates scholars as contrary to his earlier pacifist ideals and positions on militarism and nationalism.\textsuperscript{72} However, as Gerhard Leibholz summarizes, „Für Bonhoeffer war Hitler der Antichrist, der Zerstörer des Lebens und seiner Grundwerte…” (“For Bonhoeffer, Hitler was the Antichrist, the destroyer of life and its fundamental values…”).\textsuperscript{73} Leibholz’s observation indicates that Bonhoeffer had, as early as 1938, when he contacted the \textit{Abwehr} conspirators through his brother-in-law Major Hans von Dohnanyi, decided to subvert the Nazi regime. He confirmed this by returning from America and a safe academic position in July 1939, writing Reinhold Niebuhr, “Christians in Germany will face the terrible alternative of either willing the defeat of their nation in order that Christian civilization may survive, or willing the victory of their nation
and thereby destroying our civilization. I know which of these alternatives I must choose; but I cannot make that choice in security.”

The history of the general conspiracy movement is now well-documented with Harold Deutsch as one of its most accurate recorders. Deutsch particularly localizes the primary conspiracies in the Third Reich within the general officer corps, especially through connections to the Vatican. How did Bonhoeffer become active in these high-level plots? Outside Germany, he had seen ecumenical Christians in Geneva, London, and America spirit Jews from Germany, but now concluded such actions were insufficient. So he joined Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, General Major Hans Oster, Dohnanyi and others in the conspiracy. We must note that Bonhoeffer also applied to the Wehrmacht for appointment as an Army Chaplain, a move not without potential for ideological role conflicts, but also a potential way ahead. Perhaps because of his earlier work at Barmen and Finkenwalde, the Wehrmacht Feld Bischof turned Bonhoeffer down for appointment, despite the lobbying of close family friends.

Sabine Dramm wrote the definitive treatment of Bonhoeffer’s time as a V-mann (a German contraction of the compound word Vertrauensmann). This term is difficult to translate but approximately means someone less than a full-fledged spy or active agent and more an informant; someone who passes along observations as he has cause but without direct appointment by the agency to whom he reports. Dramm notes:

And what he had to offer was considerable: diverse experiences abroad and reliable personal contacts with prominent clergy in foreign countries that were not at war with Germany or were at best neutral. Above all, he had a considerable reputation as a man faithful to the Confessing Church, and was an incontrovertibly reputable emissary of an anti-Hitler fronde or faction that was struggling to win credibility or trust.
As the conditions were set, Bonhoeffer fully engaged in the conspiracy. While it may be easy to focus on Bonhoeffer’s tie to the 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler (he was arrested in April 1943 during a conflict between the SS and Abwehr over control of intelligence to the Oberkommando des Heeres, or High Command), Bonhoeffer’s real crime occurred on May 30, 1942 in Sigtuna, Sweden. There Bonhoeffer used his ties as a V-mann to travel north and meet leading ecumenical churchmen from Allied countries, including his friend and confidant Bishop George Bell of Chichester, England. In his prior travels and life in England, Bonhoeffer met Bishop Bell and impressed him, such that the two maintained a lengthy correspondence over ecumenical issues in Germany and abroad. However, what Bonhoeffer did at Sigtuna brought to their friendship a new request for complicity, for he offered Bell the names of his co-conspirators as well as a request: should they succeed in removing Hitler and the Third Reich fall, would the Allies specifically recognize the conspiracy as the legitimate voice for Germany and negotiate a peace with them? Of this action, Bell later wrote, “He was one of the first as well as one of the bravest witnesses against idolatry. He understood what he chose, when he chose resistance.”

It is impossible to understate how treasonous was Bonhoeffer’s act. Ferdinand Schlingensiepen sees Sigtuna for its theological significance between Bonhoeffer, Bell and the ecumenical participants. Sabine Dramm captures the strategic significance in seeking assurances of Allied support. Eberhard Bethge focuses on the October 1944 interest of the Gestapo and subsequent disagreements with Jørgen Glenthøj over the Zossen Files. However, these views do not sufficiently capture how the Third Reich saw it: a blatant attempt to subvert the Nazi state with a direct request for support from
an enemy combatant in a declared war. While each of these respected authors intimates that this is what Bonhoeffer did, only Bishop Bell captured Sigtuna’s gravity, for Bonhoeffer committed treason punishable by death. 88 Perhaps Dramm comes closest to the meeting’s significance as she summarizes, “Sigtuna contains in miniature all the elements of his existence as an agent of the conspiracy, and apart from its historical importance, it can be seen as the quintessence of Bonhoeffer’s activity in resistance.” 89 Taking Bonhoeffer’s offer back to England’s Home Secretary, Anthony Eden, Bell forwarded the communiqué. The British Government, however, wanted tangible proof of the conspiracy’s ability to overthrow the Third Reich. 90 Nonetheless, Kenneth Slack captures Sigtuna’s effect, for those hanged on the scaffold at Himmler’s order "…corresponded with the list the Bonhoeffer had given Bell at Sigtuna." 91

Implication for the Army Chaplaincy

Dietrich Bonhoeffer employed morality in ethical action in a way that excites, mystifies and challenges, but which must be viewed in its historical context. He embodied strategic moral leader development along a continuum with three principal phases: 1) development of foundational spiritual and moral beliefs; 2) negotiation of those beliefs amidst moral challenge; and 3) resolution of those beliefs in ethical action. Ultimately, Bonhoeffer illustrates a type of sanctity, for despite the cost to himself, he embodied moral and ethical congruence in thought, word and deed. Over the course of events he became a strategic moral leader who shaped both Germany and the world through the living of his Christian theology, despite persecution, prison, and even death. Having paid such a price, how might Bonhoeffer’s journey guide the United States Army and Army Chaplaincy in our contemporary task to develop strategic moral leaders for the profession of arms?
First, the Army does not have a standard definition of strategic moral leader development; that proposed in this paper may be a starting point. Second, since the force further has no framework for developing strategic moral leaders, the three phases outlined above may also be a descriptive model (rather than a proscriptive program). Third, the Army Chaplaincy may coordinate revision of Department of the Army Pamphlet 165-17, *Moral Leadership for the Army*, throughout the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and with the Center for the Army Professional Ethic (CAPE). While CAPE is contributing to the Army’s self-understanding as a profession, the Army Chaplaincy as the proponent for moral leadership must synchronize new doctrine with current Army training and leader development efforts. Fourth, TRADOC may design service school programs-of-instruction in strategic moral leader development based on case studies of both military and non-military role models (e.g., not only Dietrich Bonhoeffer but also the Reverend Dr. King Jr., former South African President Nelson Mandela, Bishop Desmond Tutu, dissident author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Mother Teresa, and Nobel Peace Prize Recipients Aung San Suu Kyi and Muhammad Yunus, etc.). There is no shortage of figures worthy of study, reflection and emulation, particularly in an increasingly globalized world that demands whole-of-government and whole-of-nation solution sets to complex security challenges. Fifth and finally, senior service college faculty writing, teaching and conference leadership may augment this force-wide effort.

Renewing strategic moral leader development across the United States Army is not limited to these initial suggestions, but they signal the force that this process is critical to mission success and national security. As we develop strategic moral leaders
today, the witness of those like Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer can inform, guide and inspire new moral and ethical leaders to help us face tomorrow in confidence and hope.

Endnotes


5 Cf. Patrick Sweeney, Jeffrey E. Rhodes, and Bruce Boling, "Spiritual Fitness: A Key Component of Total Force Fitness," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 66 (3rd Quarter 2012): 35-41, who relate the joint staff's emergent taxonomy of Total Force Fitness (TFF) along the eight domains of physical, medical, environmental, social (including family), behavioral, spiritual, psychological, and nutritional health. However, they note that this only comes as a result of a "...10-year war on terror (that) has stressed our forces and families to the point where members are bending and swaying under the pressures of multiple deployments and separation from family and friends."

6 As above, so Sweeny, Rhodes and Boling define spirituality as "...the continuous journey people take to discover and develop their human spirit. It is the process of searching for the sacred in one’s life; discovering who one is; finding meaning and purpose; establishing interconnectedness with others and, if one so believes, with the divine; and charting a path to create a life worth living." Moreover, the distinction between this and religion is that "...they are two distinct concepts. Spirituality is both a process and path people use to discover their inner selves and develop their human spirit. Religion refers to institutions that propose and promote specified belief systems." However, note that these concepts come from the field of behavioral psychology and betray a lack of theological understanding about both of these terms. For instance, lost in both their definition and distinction is a comparison of either immanence or transcendence (of both the Divine to humanity and vice versa) or of religion as a sociological institution which can (and in many non-western societies) does order all of human culture.


9 For a fine review of the challenges for tactical Soldiers of ethical decision-making in irregular warfare, see Tony Pfaff, *Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 4. Pfaff particularly contextualizes this as a conflict for the Soldier of balancing ends, ways, and means in ambiguous circumstances and one that "...will require individual Soldiers and their leaders to be sensitive to local conditions at the time and the particulars of their mission, their organization, and the civilians in their area of operations."


14 Cf. The Chief of Chaplains Strategic Roadmap: Connecting Faith, Service, and Mission (Washington, DC: HQDA, OCCH, 2012), 9, where “Advise Commanders—Morals, Ethics, Impact of Religion on Operations” is listed as a Supporting Function of the Operational Objective of “Serve Soldiers, Families, the Army and the Nation.” Problematically, however,
neither morals or ethics are defined in the document; neither are they in the branch's manual on moral leadership, DA PAM 165-16, Moral Leadership/Values Stages of the Family Life Cycle (Washington, DC: HQDA, OCCH, 30 October 1987), now under revision. Finally, see the legal basis for the Army Chaplaincy as the proponent for moral leadership training in the Army in AR 165-1, Army Chaplain Corps Activities (Washington, DC: HQDA, OCCH, December 9, 2009).

15 Don M. Snider, “Developing Leaders of Character at West Point,” in Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet Prayer, eds. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Sisters, OR: Jerico, LLC, 2007), 30-46.


22 In response to the Army Profession Campaign of 2010, the Center for the Army Professional Ethic was established and began to synchronize efforts and collate products to guide the force in training moral leader development. This culminated in 2012 in a sustained program of instruction aimed at understanding the Army as a profession, and for the Army Chaplaincy as a part of the whole. Note, however, that the CAPE's definition of “The Army Ethic,” so "the collection of values, beliefs, ideals, and principles held by the Army Profession and embedded in its culture" is descriptive rather than prescriptive. Essentially, the current definition only seeks to capture the polyglot of ethical sources which inform the force (EX: the Constitution, the Oath of Office, the Warrior Creed, etc.) without making one definition normative for the same. See The Army Profession Pamphlet (West Point, NY: Center for the Army Professional Ethic, October 2012) as well as associated training materials.

23 General Sir James Glover, “A Soldier and His Conscience,” as quoted in The Queen’s Commission: A Junior Officer’s Guide (London: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, April 2006), 29, http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/RMAS_Queens_Commission_Jnr_Offr_guide.pdf (accessed January 8, 2014). Though we cite General Glover’s corollary it is based on Aristotelian ethics, as he states: “A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war. Character is a habit. The daily choice of right or wrong. It is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed in war.” Note that we concur with General
Glover’s dictum but accept as paradigmatic the Augustinian notion that it is character which informs action first rather than the other way round.


32 This compound word, still used by Germans today to note this historical event, translates literally as “power grab.”


37 Ibid.
Ralph K. Wüstenberg, Bonhoeffer and Beyond: Promoting a Dialogue between Religion and Politics (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang GmbH, 2008), 72.

Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 211.

Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, 134.


There is a difference with the English translation of ‘the ordering power’ in the final sentence and Bonhoeffer’s early distinction between ‘orders of creation’ and ‘orders of preservation’. He is here linking the function of the state to the latter concept, thus assigning the state a role of preserving the conditions for the Gospel to be preached in the world. Note also that this concept is Bonhoeffer’s theological assessment at the end of an extended historical survey of the concept of freedom from antiquity through Greece, Rome, the medieval Papacy, the Reformation (both German and Genevan expressions), and separately the French and American Revolutions. Bonhoeffer’s challenge is to link any notion of genuine political freedom to a spiritual freedom which can only be found, for him, in the power of the resurrected Christ. See Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, 103-133 and for the specific quotation, 131.

There is an essential unity in Bonhoeffer’s ideas of church and state from the beginning of his career to his death. As Ruth Zerner states, “Acknowledging this essential unity in Bonhoeffer’s view of the nature and character of the state does not mean one overlooks his increasingly intense focus on Christ…But this accelerated Christological concentration as related to the nature of the state, is more a matter of tone or shading than fundamental re-orientation. Cf. Ruth Zerner, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Views on the State and History,” Paper presented at the Bonhoeffer Consultation of the American Academy of Religion Meeting (Washington, DC: October 26, 1974), 8.

Klaus Scholder notes Bonhoeffer’s attempt to decisively sway this conference and so shape the outcome of the emerging Confessing Church movement. His remains one of the seminal works on the history of the Confessing Church movement; see Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich, Band 1: Vorgeschichte und Zeit der Illusionen 1918-1934 (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin & Wien: Propyläen Verlag, 1977), 610.


Ibid.

Ibid., 213-232. Note that Bonhoeffer expands here on his earlier construct from Sanctorum Communio that the tasks of the church always remain the proclamation of the Word Jesus Christ through preaching, worship and the sacraments.

Renate Wind, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Spoke in the Wheel* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2000), citing Tiemo Rainer Peters, 116. Again, however, this must be understood against Bonhoeffer’s later conceptual struggle in Ethics with freedom and responsibility for the world as redeemed in Jesus Christ.


The essence of Bonhoeffer’s own theological exploration of the communal life of the church came in his classic Life Together. In this work, which again was really a summary integration of both his formal ecclesiological beliefs and his life experiences, Bonhoeffer attempted a new exploration of what it meant for Christians to live in as the sanctorum communio based on the structure of the biblical Psalter (hence the subtitle of the book, The Prayerbook of the Bible). Indeed, as Geoffrey Kelly has stated, "Life Together was hardly a study in abstraction. The reality behind the book was the church in its most palpable, somatic form, the Christian community." See Geoffrey Kelly, “Editor’s Introduction,” in *Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together*, ed. Geoffrey B. Kelly and trans. Daniel W. Bloesch and James H. Burtness (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 6.

Ibid.

Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest against Hitler*, 126.

Ibid., 131.


Ibid., 368.

Ibid.

Bonhoeffer was co-author with Hermann Sasse, Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, Wilhelm Vischer, et. al. However, he was thoroughly disheartened by the final public version, which he considered too theologically diluted to be of value.


Gerlach, *And the Witnesses Were Silent*, 89-93.

Stephen Haynes, following Gerlach, has elsewhere noted how anti-Semitism was virulently present even with the leadership of the Confessing Church, thus Gerlach, *And the Witnesses Were Silent*, 236; Haynes, “Who Needs Enemies? Jews and Judaism in Anti-Nazi Religious Discourse,” *Church History* 71, no. 2 (June 2002): 346.

Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest against Hitler*, 128.

James Rudin, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Jewish Perspective*, Unpublished Paper (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1988), 54. Rudin further comments, “I see Bonhoeffer as a transition figure...Because of the many ambiguities surrounding Bonhoeffer, he has limited impact and influence with the American Jewish community. He is, of course, widely respected for his anti Nazi activities, but he is not looked to as a major thinker in building bridges of mutual respect and understanding between Christians and Jews.”


Victoria Barnett, “Opening Remarks to the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Workgroup,” Presented at the American Academy of Religion, San Diego, CA, November 2007, called this the most vexing issue for contemporary Bonhoeffer scholars. Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography*, 153, however, seems to explain the tension when he notes that after Bonhoeffer befriended the committed pacifist Jean Lasserre while a graduate student in New York, "Lasserre confronted him with an acceptance of Jesus' peace commandment that he had never encountered before. Not that Bonhoeffer immediately became a pacifist--in fact he never did so--but after meeting Lasserre the question of the concrete reply to the biblical injunction of peace and of the concrete steps to be taken against warlike impulses never left him again."


Deutsch as above. Note that while the Canaris conspiracy was principally political, when Canaris, Oster and von Dohnanyi were arrested, their work transferred next door in the Abwehr to General Olbricht and Colonel Klaus Stauffenberg, who made the failed assassination attempt on July 20, 1944. See Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography*, 803.


Ibid., 297; Anklageschrift vom Dietrich Bonhoeffer from the photocopy of the original received from the Historický ústav Armady CR in Prague, Czech Republic [authenticated by Die Gedenkstätte Deutsche Widerstand in Berlin]. Presented by Stephen A. Wise, Esq., New Canaan, CT to the Archives (Union Theological Seminary: New York; December 16, 1997), 1. Dramm as below concludes that the Anklageschrift is critical because, by its dating, it places Bonhoeffer actively in the conspiracy a full year earlier than first thought by scholars.

Schlingensiepen translates the compound word as Verbindungsmann, 245.


Klaus Scholder, *Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich, Band 2: Das Jahr der Ernüchterung 1934 Barmen und Rom.* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1985), 103.


George K. Bell, “Foreword,” in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *The Cost of Discipleship* (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 11 (Bell’s words were penned originally in 1958 for the first edition of this classic work).


87 Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography*, 902-903, 1007-ff. respectively. These files ultimately provided the Third Reich proof of the Abwehr conspirator’s guilt and served as the legal basis for their execution orders.


