National Intelligence Reform: An Organizational Alignment Analysis

by

Lieutenant Colonel David Lineback
United States Air Force Reserve

United States Army War College
Class of 2014

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
14. ABSTRACT
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the nation demanded answers. What did we know? What did we miss? Could we have prevented the attacks? The 9/11 Commission determined that the attacks might have been prevented had the Intelligence Community (IC) connected the dots. The commission recommended reforms to integrate the IC and improve information sharing. The resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was heralded as the most significant reform of the nation’s IC since the National Security Act of 1947. Nearly a decade since the IRTPA’s passage, critics claim the IC remains fundamentally unreformed. Using an organizational analysis tool known as the McKinsey 7-S Model, this paper explains why reform has not been achieved. The model analyzes the alignment of seven key organizational elements—strategy, structure, systems, staffing, skills, style, and shared values—to evaluate the IC’s effectiveness. Using this analysis, this paper offers 12 recommendations to improve the IC’s alignment and integrate it into an effective enterprise capable of meeting 21st-century challenges in a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous environment.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
7-S Model, Intelligence Community, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 9/11 Commission
National Intelligence Reform: An Organizational Alignment Analysis

by

Lieutenant Colonel David Lineback
United States Air Force Reserve

Honorable James R. Locher III
Department of National Security and Strategy
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the nation demanded answers. What did we know? What did we miss? Could we have prevented the attacks? The 9/11 Commission determined that the attacks might have been prevented had the Intelligence Community (IC) connected the dots. The commission recommended reforms to integrate the IC and improve information sharing. The resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was heralded as the most significant reform of the nation’s IC since the National Security Act of 1947. Nearly a decade since the IRTPA’s passage, critics claim the IC remains fundamentally unrefomed. Using an organizational analysis tool known as the McKinsey 7-S Model, this paper explains why reform has not been achieved. The model analyzes the alignment of seven key organizational elements—strategy, structure, systems, staffing, skills, style, and shared values—to evaluate the IC’s effectiveness. Using this analysis, this paper offers 12 recommendations to improve the IC’s alignment and integrate it into an effective enterprise capable of meeting 21st-century challenges in a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous environment.
National Intelligence Reform: An Organizational Alignment Analysis

The central conclusion is one that I share: America’s intelligence community needs fundamental change to enable us to successfully confront the threats of the 21st century.

—President George W. Bush¹

On December 7, 2004—63 years to the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor—the House of Representatives passed S.2845, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), by a vote of 336-75. Ten days later, President George W. Bush signed the act into law, thus ending a five-month debate over the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations to reform the nation’s Intelligence Community (IC). President Bush called the IRTPA “the most dramatic reform of our nation’s intelligence capabilities since President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947.”²

Nearly a decade since its passage, however, critics claim, "While the community has improved in response to the call for intelligence reform, it remains fundamentally unreformed.”³

Many blame the lack of reform on the compromises to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations made during the congressional conference to reconcile the House and Senate versions of the IRTPA. These compromises ultimately weakened the commission’s intended authorities for the newly created position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The commission viewed restructuring the IC under the full authority of the DNI as key to reform. Although only 29 of 567 pages of the 9/11 Commission Report addressed organizational restructure, the House and Senate focused reform on this issue.⁴ They did not give the same attention to reforming other key elements of organizational effectiveness. Organizational research has demonstrated restructuring alone will not successfully achieve reform, suggesting, “A single blunt instrument—like
structure—is unlikely to prove the master tool that can change organizations with best effect."5

Using an organizational analysis tool known as the McKinsey 7-S Model to analyze the IC, this paper explains why it has not been reformed and offers 12 recommendations to improve the IC’s alignment and integrate it into an effective enterprise. Developed in the late 1970s by a team of management consultants from McKinsey & Company and professors from the Harvard and Stanford Business Schools, the 7-S analysis tool identifies the best way to organize and manage firms. The team’s research identified that an ideal organization has seven key interrelated elements aligned with its environment. These elements consist of the following:

- **Strategy** – alignment of resources and capabilities for achieving objectives
- **Structure** – arrangements for dividing and coordinating work
- **Systems** – management processes, procedures, and measurements
- **Staffing** – incentives and attributes of personnel, including needed qualifications and professional development
- **Skills** – core competencies, defined as necessary capabilities and attributes of the organization
- **Style** – leadership attitudes and behavior, organizational culture
- **Shared values** – agreed vision, mission/purpose, and principles

These seven elements—called the seven S’s—contribute to an organization’s effectiveness. Research revealed, in order to be effective, an organization must have a high degree of internal alignment between these seven S’s and each must be consistent with and reinforced by the others.6
Intelligence Community – Origin and Reform Efforts

The IC consists of 17 separate organizations. Besides the Office of the DNI (ODNI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 15 of the offices and agencies are components of 6 different executive departments:

- Justice – National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Office of National Security Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Agency
- Homeland Security – Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence component of the Coast Guard
- State – Bureau of Intelligence and Research
- Energy – Office of Intelligence
- Treasury – Office of Intelligence and Analysis

The IC had an annual budget of approximately $55 billion in 2012. Budget-wise, if the IC were a cabinet department, it would be the fourth largest behind only Defense, Health and Human Services, and Education.

National Security Act of 1947

The formal creation of the CIA by the National Security Act of 1947 laid the foundation for the IC’s current structure and systems. The IC was framed in the context of having just fought World War II and not wanting a repeat of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. President Truman believed the attack might have been prevented “if there
had been something like coordination of information in the government." To this end, he created an independent central agency—originally called the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)—to accomplish the “synthesis of departmental intelligence on the strategic and national policy level.”

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) would lead the CIG and report to a committee of cabinet secretaries to ensure “no one department could unduly influence the type of intelligence produced.” The DCI took charge of the foreign overseas clandestine activities from the State Department and assumed authority to coordinate those activities he did not directly control. The DCI’s mission was to provide strategic threat warning and coordinate clandestine activities outside of the United States.

In order to get their support for the creation of the CIG, President Truman compromised with the War and Navy Departments and FBI to organize the IC as a “loose confederation of agencies with no strong direction from either civilian or military decision makers.” He stipulated, “Existing intelligence agencies shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence.” This compromise divided foreign and domestic intelligence efforts and created the integration and collaboration challenges the IC faces today.

Reform Efforts – 1950s to 2001

The National Security Act of 1947 gave the DCI the job of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies. However, the act “provided no language compelling these various agencies to cooperate. The DCI had no levers—no general budget authority, no overall intelligence personnel authority, no exclusive access to the president—to force interagency collaboration.” To address these perceived weaknesses, proposals to reform the IC started soon after the act’s
passage. A majority of the reform efforts called for a National Intelligence Director separate from the head of the CIA in order to provide more centralized control over the IC while improving intelligence coordination and collaboration efforts among the disparate organizations.

As early as 1949, the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report found the DCI could not effectively manage the entire IC while running the CIA. The Second Hoover Commission’s Report of 1955 found the DCI needed to devote more attention to the “broad, overall direction of the Agency and the coordination of the entire intelligence effort” and spend less time on the daily management of the CIA. The Schlesinger Report of 1971 called for a central manager “to plan and rationalize intelligence collection and evaluate its product, both within the Defense Department and across the intelligence community.” The report suggested this central manager could be anything from coordinator to a full-fledged DNI responsible for controlling the budgets and personnel of the entire IC. Since this report, the need for a central director of the IC has been a recurring theme in almost every intelligence reform study, to include the Church Committee Report of 1976 which recommended the DCI should focus on “community affairs and relinquish direct supervision of CIA to a deputy.”

The Scowcroft Report of 2001 cited the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act unification of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines under the Secretary of Defense as a model for uniting all of the intelligence agencies under a single intelligence chief. This report recommended major restructuring of the IC by moving the combat-support agencies (NSA, NGA, and NRO) out of the Department of Defense (DOD). Vice President Dick Cheney immediately criticized these proposals, saying, “You are just rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic, nothing useful will come of it, I will oppose it.”21 As a direct result of this report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pulled the defense intelligence agencies more tightly under his control in order to mitigate the risk of losing them in a potential reorganization of the IC.22 The report also recommended creating a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to “effectively collect, analyze, and disseminate all terrorism-related foreign intelligence, whether gathered domestically or abroad.”23

Two basic views concerning who should control the IC emerged through reform proposals since 1947. One view advocated for a civilian, strategic, or national IC that would be CIA- or Langley-controlled. A second view advocated for a defense or military IC that is DOD- or Pentagon-controlled.24 The questions of who should be in charge—DCI or DNI—and who should be in control—DNI, CIA or DOD—dominated the IC reform proposals that framed the IRTPA.

9/11 Commission and IRTPA

The 9/11 Commission highlighted one major lesson from the 9/11 terrorist attacks: agencies within the U.S. Government failed to share information internally and with each other because of “incompetence, real or perceived legal barriers, or bureaucratic rivalry.”25 The commission found the biggest impediment to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots was the resistance to information sharing. It recommended a new, government-wide approach.26 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted, “When you think about the implications of 9/11, the biggest intelligence gap was between domestic intelligence and foreign intelligence. It actually wasn’t that the CIA didn’t coordinate with the NSA, it was that the CIA did not coordinate with the FBI.”27
The commission—like a majority of reform proponents during the previous 50 years—concluded the IC needed a DNI separate from the Director of the CIA to integrate it in a manner similar to the integration of the Armed Forces under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. That act unified the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines in combat under a combatant commander who reported to an empowered Secretary of Defense. The commission correlated elements of the IC to the combatant commands. The commission’s version of the DNI would be neither Langley- nor Pentagon-centered. Instead, the DNI would be independent and have the authority to create intelligence centers, drawing upon professionals organized, trained, and equipped by their respective intelligence agencies. Secretary Rice favored the idea of a DNI because she had seen the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act: “I was favorable to the better unification of the intelligence mission through an intelligence advisor to the president, a singular person, like a DNI, paralleling the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.”

Similar to the Scowcroft Report, the 9/11 Commission recommended the creation of NCTC to assume a role in planning the government’s response to terrorist threats. 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow “cribbed directly from the Joint Staff manual” to ensure NCTC’s planning mission would mirror the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NCTC would serve as “the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence processed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism.” The NCTC would also “conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies.”
During the congressional conference to reconcile House and Senate versions of the IRTPA, the debate centered on how much authority would be given to the new DNI. Two separate views emerged. The Senate saw the IC needing a powerful DNI to integrate it into an effective enterprise, concerned with who is in charge, while the House sought to preserve the balance of authorities between the DNI and the executive departments that own 15 of the 17 offices and agencies, concerned with who has control. Congress was divided on the risks of breaking the IC while the nation was fighting two wars: “It was an article of faith to the Senate that intelligence was already broken, whereas the House feared a solution in search of a problem might break what already worked.”

During the negotiations, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) and Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee sought to maximize the power of the DNI by “trying to balance the need for a strong DNI against what was possible.” Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, fought to ensure “the prerogatives of the cabinet secretaries could not be trumped by the DNI.” Hunter wanted to ensure the warfighter on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq had the intelligence support he needed. In his view, removing authorities from the Secretary of Defense would hamper this support.

As a compromise, “chain-of-command language” was added to preserve the ability of cabinet secretaries, especially the Secretary of Defense, to manage their own department’s intelligence organizations. The language read, “Nothing in this Act or amendments made by this Act shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the
authority of (1) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; or (2) the principal officers of the executive departments as heads of their respective departments.”

Although necessary to overcome the impasse, this language weakened the DNI’s potential authorities. Elements within the IC have cited this language to resist the DNI’s efforts to implement IRTPA reforms.

The resulting IRTPA compromises established a Senate-confirmed DNI separate from the Director of the CIA. The DNI’s authorities included the following:

- Develop and determine an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program based on budget proposals provided by the heads of agencies and organizations of the IC and their respective department heads
- Ensure the effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
- Establish objectives and priorities for the IC and manage and direct tasking of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence
- Develop personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint operation and facilitate staffing of IC management functions (in consultation with the heads of the other agencies or elements of the IC)
- Recommend to the President nominees for Principal Deputy DNI and Director of the CIA
- Exercise the right to concur or be consulted in the appointment or the recommendation for the nomination of heads of the other intelligence agencies residing in other departments
Establish national intelligence centers to address intelligence priorities, such as regional issues

Develop a comprehensive education, recruitment, and training plan, and establish an integrated framework that brings together the IC’s educational components to promote joint education and training.\(^4\)

Seeking to leverage the joint-duty success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the IRTPA offered, “Policies to facilitate the rotation of personnel should seek to duplicate within the intelligence community the joint officer management policies established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.”\(^4\) The IRTPA also established NCTC in ODNI to conduct strategic operational planning, to include defining the mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and assignment of roles and responsibilities.\(^4\)

**Analysis of Reform Efforts**

The IC approached IRTPA reforms with cognitive dissonance, believing no significant change would actually occur. Sixty years of experience with IC reform efforts reinforced this attitude.\(^4\) At least 14 IC studies have been conducted over the years and despite each recommending reforms, few resulted in significant changes. Only the Dulles Report (1949), Schlesinger Report (1971), Church Committee Report (1976), and 9/11 Commission Report (2004) achieved any substantial change.\(^4\) The “defensive psychological crouch” the community took after the WMD Commission Report in March 2005 further reduced the IRTPA’s chances of success.\(^4\) The report recognized the
difficulties of achieving reform, citing the IC’s “almost perfect record of resisting external recommendations.”

Despite creating a weakened DNI, the IRTPA did consolidate some key authorities under the new position. The act tasked the DNI to manage the planning, policy, and budgets of the community across the full range of intelligence, foreign and domestic, thus finally bridging the foreign-domestic divide compromise struck in the original National Security Act of 1947. DNI John “Mike” McConnell spoke about the potential range of authorities the IRTPA could have given the DNI over the IC:

The first is overseer, probably the weakest form. Second would be a coordinator; third, an integrator; and fourth, a director, someone who actually directs all of the community’s intelligence activities. I currently have the title of director, but the authorities created in statute and executive order put me more in the middle of that range of options – coordinator and integrator, rather than director with directive authority. This is because of the 16 agencies that make up this community, 15 of them work for a cabinet secretary in his or her department.

A senior staffer on the WMD Commission saw the DNI that emerged in the compromised IRTPA as flawed, describing the position as “not weak enough to be a coordinator, not strong enough to be a Secretary of Intelligence.” Putting a positive spin on the compromise, Executive Director Zelikow believed over time the DNI could accumulate even more authority, just as the Secretary of Defense had done through the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

President Bush attempted to augment the weakened DNI authorities via executive order as he was leaving office in 2008, giving the DNI the ability to fire intelligence agency heads with concurrence of the respective cabinet secretary. Additionally, the executive order improved the DNI’s budget authority by stating the DNI will oversee and direct the implementation and execution of the intelligence
appropriation. Finally, the executive order reduced the potential impact of the chain-of-command language by making cabinet secretaries the only ones who could claim their authorities were being abrogated. 

Organizational Alignment Analysis

Despite the structural reform mandated by the IRTPA, critics claim the IC remains fundamentally unreformed. Applying an organizational alignment analysis using the 7-S Model explains why. The McKinsey & Company research team observed, “Diagnosing and solving organizational problems means looking not merely to structural reorganization for answers but to a framework that includes structure and several related factors.”

Organizations are systems consisting of interrelated elements. As organizations mature, they develop and evolve their own unique behaviors, personalities, and unwritten rules about what is or is not acceptable. These, along with the organization’s unique functions and tasks, structure, rewards, and control systems ultimately shape the organization’s culture and shared values.

As organizations grow, they naturally separate into departments, typically by function. As they separate, the members of each department become specialists in their jobs while they develop unique styles, processes, attitudes, and behaviors. Each department develops different relationships, reward systems, and control procedures. Eventually these departments develop their own unique culture and shared values that are different from the other departments within the organization. These naturally developed differences, while critical to the success of each department, will likely lead to conflict during attempts to integrate. The departments must be integrated, however, if the organization is to be effective. The challenge is to align each department’s key
elements with the organization’s overall purpose, while resolving the conflicts resulting from naturally developed departmental differences.\textsuperscript{55}

One underlying theory of the 7-S Model is simple: in order to effectively integrate separate departments and resolve the naturally developed conflicts, the key elements of the organization must be aligned. The seven S’s—strategy, structure, systems, staffing, skills, style, and shared values—must be consistent with and reinforce each other. When the different parts of an organization are poorly aligned, the organization will likely experience problems and perform below its potential. Using the 7-S Model to diagnose these problems involves analyzing how well each of the seven S’s fit together.\textsuperscript{56}

There are several factors that influence an organization’s effectiveness and its ability to reform. Since all of the S’s are interrelated, each element must be addressed and each will likely need to be changed. Failing to address each element will likely result in a less effective organization. Most analysts agree that of the seven S’s, the first three (called hard S’s)—strategy, structure, and systems—are easier to change than the remaining four (called soft S’s)—staffing, skills, style, and shared values. While these soft S’s may take longer to institutionalize, research shows organizations that pay equal attention to both hard and soft S’s are likely to be more effective.\textsuperscript{57}

Since the IC operates in an external environment filled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA), it is vital to align the IC’s key organizational elements.\textsuperscript{58} Each of the offices and agencies within the IC must integrate, collaborate, and share information effectively to be able to connect the dots in order to meet 21st-century challenges. Applying the 7-S Model analysis to the IC reveals its key elements are not aligned.
Strategy

Strategy refers to the actions an organization takes to align its resources and capabilities for achieving objectives. It includes defining the organization’s key strategic priorities. The 2002 Joint Inquiry conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence confirmed the IC needed radical change. The inquiry reported the DCI had failed to integrate resources from across the IC against al Qa’ida, which “suggests a fragmented intelligence community that was operating without a comprehensive strategy for combating the threat posed by Bin Ladin, and a DCI without the ability to enforce consistent priorities at all levels throughout the community.”

The IRTPA authorized the DNI to establish objectives and priorities for the IC and manage and direct tasking of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence with the goal of unifying the efforts of the IC. DNI John Negroponte started the process and developed a national intelligence strategy to prioritize what information to collect and analyze. Efforts to improve the alignment of the IC’s resources and capabilities continue under current DNI James Clapper. Two of the ODNI’s eight goals address its strategy: set strategic direction and priorities for national intelligence resources and capabilities, and develop and implement unifying intelligence strategies across regional and functional portfolios. Although the DNI has produced a comprehensive strategy and articulated strategic priorities, these initiatives have not yet achieved the desired unity of effort throughout the enterprise.

Structure

Structure refers to the arrangements for dividing and coordinating work. It is the way in which tasks and people are specialized and divided, and authority is distributed.
Structure focuses attention on what needs to be done. In addition, reporting relationships in an organization often indicate which departments have the most power and influence. As previously described, a significant challenge to effective structure is how to balance the need for specialization within a specific department with the need for integration of each department into an effective enterprise.63

The efforts on the IC’s structural reform focused on the creation of the independent DNI and his authorities. During the IRTPA congressional conference, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman maintained the IC needed structural reform similar to what occurred in DOD “because of the principles that underlay Goldwater-Nichols: that good people cannot overcome bad structure on a consistent basis, and that the aim of structural reform is to clarify responsibility, authority, and accountability.”64

Senators Arlen Spector (R-PA), Richard Shelby (R-AL), and Pat Roberts (R-KS) strongly believed the DNI “must have day-to-day operational control of all elements of the intelligence community performing national missions.”65 Generals James Clapper, then Director of NGA, and Michael Hayden, Director of NSA, were concerned the DNI would have too little authority. Hayden recalled,

There was a real danger of Congress creating a leader of the intelligence community who truly had less power than the DCIs had historically been able to weld. We both agreed that this could be disastrous and argued for legislative language that would codify a robust role for the DNI—even over those big national collection agencies inside the Defense Department, namely the NSA, the NGA, and the NRO.66

The chain-of-command language inserted into the IRTPA had unintended consequences on reform efforts. The language effectively created a loophole for the offices and agencies in the executive departments to resist unwanted reforms. The
claim that reforms could undermine a secretary’s authorities has been used to undermining the DNI’s efforts to align elements within the enterprise. DOD and the Justice Department utilized this loophole. CIA also used this language when its lawyers stated the agency did not work for the DNI, claiming, “The DNI did not have the same day-to-day operational oversight that a cabinet secretary has over a department.”

Advocates of a strong DNI believed that what kept the DCI from integrating the IC would keep the DNI from integrating it, as well. Yet even a DNI with departmental secretary authorities would be unable to integrate the IC without attempting to align each of its S’s. ODNI Principal Deputy Director and Chief Strategist Patrick Neary observed, “The notion the DNI and the ODNI could drive intelligence reform was flawed.” He believed the DNI “developed under a DCI construct and was optimized for coordinating the community to work together when the community chose to do so” and was not designed or capable of integrating the IC.

The WMD Commission recommended the DNI organize around missions—similar to the combatant commands in DOD. To pursue integration, DNI Negroponte followed through on the WMD Commission’s recommendation by creating mission managers, choosing six to serve as “traffic cops, coordinating analysis, briefing the White House, and tasking spies on what to target.” These mission managers, and later national intelligence managers, perform integration functions similar to combatant commanders.

Advocates for creating a separate Department of Intelligence emerged during the IRTPA debate. They called for consolidating all of the offices and agencies within the IC under a single executive department, headed by a Secretary of Intelligence. Generals
Clapper and Hayden favored “something akin to a Department of Intelligence.” Both generals saw a future where NSA, NGA, and NRO could be “outside the Pentagon and directly under the DNI.” Although creating a Department of Intelligence might have merit, the reorganization could cause major disruptions that would far exceed the synergy that might be obtained. As previously mentioned, there are enormous benefits achieved by departmentalization. The respective departments heavily influence the skills and specialization of the separate intelligence offices and agencies. Removing them from these departments would essentially tear them from their cultural foundation and cause major disruptions in mission effectiveness. Even the 9/11 Commission did not consider creating a separate Department of Intelligence, as they wanted to “minimize the type of disruption they saw in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security”.

The IRTPA significantly reformed the IC’s structure, and these reforms have improved its structural alignment. However, the DNI’s authorities are insufficient to facilitate further reforms. Additionally, the roles of functional and geographic mission managers are not sufficiently articulated and supported.

Systems

Systems are the management processes, procedures, and measurements—formal and informal—an organization uses to manage itself on a daily basis. This element includes performance measurement, planning, budgeting and resource allocation systems, information systems and distribution systems.

The IRTPA gave the DNI authority to develop and determine an annual budget for the IC. These reforms have been effective in improving the effective central execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities. The
process also has provided greater transparency to the National Intelligence Program budget. Declassification of the budget unlocked “the concealment of the intelligence budget inside the Pentagon budget and, with it, control by the defense appropriations subcommittee and the Pentagon.” The WMD Commission recommended overhauling information sharing systems, creating a performance system to create jointness and build a modern workforce, and providing a variety of officers to help the DNI accomplish his work.80

While the IRTPA provided the DNI with the authority to overhaul these systems, efforts to improve the alignment of the IC’s management processes and procedures continue under DNI Clapper. In fact, one of ODNI’s eight goals is to align management practices to best serve the IC.81 To date, ODNI’s efforts to improve management and planning processes remain incomplete.

**Staffing**

Staffing refers to the attributes of the organization’s personnel, including their qualifications and the incentives for professional development. Staffing is the organization’s approach to how it develops, trains, integrates and manages the careers of its people.82 The 2002 Joint Inquiry concluded, “Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was neither well organized nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the United States.”83

The IRTPA gave the DNI the authority to develop personnel policies and programs to enhance the capacity for joint operation, develop a comprehensive education and training plan, and establish an integrated framework that promotes jointness. The desired results have yet to be achieved, at least in ODNI, according to
Deputy Director Neary, “The ODNI has never been staffed, trained, or organized to be the ‘Joint Staff’ for intelligence.”

Jointness was the key to the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms in DOD, and the IRTPA hoped to achieve this same success in the IC. DNI McConnell oversaw the creation of a joint-duty program to facilitate rotations of IC personnel to positions outside their home agency to foster a sense of joint mission, and joint qualification is now a prerequisite for the IC’s most senior positions. According to Deputy Director Neary, however, “Joint duty as it is being implemented in the intelligence community will not generate significant behavioral change because many intelligence officers are being shielded from the requirement as they will become joint qualified without ever serving outside of their home agencies.” If leadership continues to allow members to circumnavigate the intent of joint-duty exposure, an IC culture that “emphasizes enterprise mission accomplishment over agency performance” will not be achieved, and integration of the enterprise will be impeded.

Skills

Skills represent the organization’s distinctive capabilities and attributes and the its ability to cultivate and develop them as core competences. These skills represent both opportunities and constraints. If new skills are required to compete in new environments, old skills may need to be unlearned in order to be more effective.

In the past, the IC has not exhibited the skills required for successful interagency operations. The offices and agencies have lacked proficiency in cross-boundary collaboration and integrated planning. By necessity, the IC has compartmentalized intelligence and limited information sharing on a need-to-know basis, in order to protect the intelligence source. The challenge is to find the balance between protecting the
intelligence source and sharing information in order to connect the dots. The IRTPA’s primary goal was to reform the IC to facilitate information sharing and collaboration.

The IC Information Sharing Executive in ODNI is attempting to improve information sharing and safeguarding activities by establishing information sharing priorities. These priorities include determining the appropriate mechanisms for developing information sharing, enhancing the capabilities to correlate large amounts of information, enhancing the capabilities to easily and quickly search and access information, and incorporating information sharing into training programs.89 These are critical to reforming the IC's organizational skills. Yet, collaboration efforts remain weak and information-sharing mechanisms are not sufficiently established.

**Style**

Style refers to the leadership attitudes and behaviors and organizational culture. It impacts the norms people follow and how they work and interact with each other. Style reflects how work actually gets done in an organization and refers to the overall patterns of behavior of its members, to include their feelings and emotions. Culture includes the small, symbolic acts that reflect or shape the style of the organization.90 To achieve effective integration, leaders must consider the feelings and emotions connected with the achievement of organizational integration and collaboration.91 Leaders cannot articulate a desired organizational culture, nor can they quickly change it. Organizational culture will change only after the group’s behavior changes, the new behavior produces some group benefit over time, and the group sees the connection between the new behavior and its benefit.92
If leaders understand the strength and attributes of their organization’s culture, they can manage change more effectively. The Organizational Cultural Profile (OCP) is a tool that helps leaders understand cultural attributes. The OCP ascribes culture with seven distinct values: innovative, aggressive, outcome-oriented, stable, people-oriented, team-oriented, and detail-oriented. Organizations with a majority of its members sharing similar values tend to have strong cultures. Organizations with strong cultures are difficult to change and tend to resist efforts to merge or integrate with other organizations. The IC’s offices and agencies have naturally developed their own unique cultures, and these cultures exhibit the OCP attributes of strong, stable cultures that are predictable, rule-oriented, bureaucratic and resistant to change.  

DNI Clapper explained the difficulties of changing the IC due to “cultural things, sociological factors that can’t be legislatively mandated.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates agreed, believing, “You can’t change the mores of a sixty-year institution automatically. These large bureaucratic moves take time (decades usually) to play out.” John Kotter in *Leading Change* suggests, “Cultural change comes at the end of transformation, not the beginning.”

Leadership attitudes within the IC have reinforced existing culture and hampered reform efforts. Deputy Director Neary claimed, “The failure of leadership at several levels to hold intelligence officers accountable for their performance and behavior . . . was the final nail in the coffin” of IRTPA reforms. CIA Director Leon Panetta’s statement during his confirmation hearing that he did not work for the DNI reaffirmed CIA’s independent culture and reinforced what has been described as “agency gospel.” Considering these strong, change-resistant cultures, it is not surprising that
the IC’s culture is not yet aligned across the enterprise. If the IC’s other key elements are aligned, cultural change will eventually occur. To encourage change, the DNI must reinforce innovative, mission-oriented, and team-oriented behaviors across the enterprise.

Shared Values

Shared values are the organization’s agreed-upon vision, mission/purpose, and principles. Unlike cultural behavior, shared values can be articulated and changed more quickly. Shared values refer to the set of ideas that give purpose and meaning to the organization’s work. They highlight what is important to the organization and serve as guiding concepts that provide stability during organizational turbulence. Peter Senge in *The Fifth Dimension* described shared vision as “a force of impressive power . . . [that] creates a sense of commonality that permeates the organization and gives coherence to diverse activities.” According to Senge, shared vision “inspires people to work toward an organization’s larger purpose.” Kotter observed shared values “play a key role in producing useful change by helping to direct, align, and inspire” people. He offered, “Vision facilitates major changes or reforms by motivating action that is not necessarily in people’s short-term self-interests” and it helps align and coordinate their actions efficiently.

Creating shared values across the enterprise is the most critical task to ensure effective integration. Kotter noted, “Until new behaviors are rooted in social norms and shared values, they are always subject to degradation as soon as the pressures associated with a change effort are removed.” Senge characterized shared vision as “the first step in allowing people who mistrusted each other to begin to work together” as
it creates a common identity that can foster long-term commitment to the organization’s goals.¹⁰³

Deputy Director Neary claimed, “The ODNI became the fulcrum of competing notions to reform with an inability to clearly articulate the ODNI’s mission. The lack of a clearly defined ODNI mission and, by association, the management model to integrate the community was the single biggest impediment to reform.”¹⁰⁴ The DNI has attempted to clearly articulate the IC’s vision and mission. The IC’s current vision is “a nation made more secure because of a fully integrated Intelligence Community.” Its mission is “lead intelligence integration [and] forge an Intelligence Community that delivers the most insightful intelligence possible.”¹⁰⁵ These vision and mission statements lack inspiration and will not compel a sense of shared purpose across the IC. The DNI must develop a shared vision exhibiting the force of impressive power that, according to Senge, aligns and inspires the entire enterprise.

Recommendations for Effective Reform

Kotter wrote, “The typical 20th-century organization has not operated well in a rapidly changing environment. Structure, systems, practices, and culture have often been more of a drag on change than a facilitator. If environmental volatility continues to increase . . . the standard organization of the 20th century will likely become a dinosaur.”¹⁰⁶ To avoid this fate, 12 recommendations are submitted to improve the alignment of the IC’s key organizational elements. The DNI must accomplish these recommendations to integrate the IC into an effective enterprise capable of meeting 21st-century challenges in a VUCA environment.

*Strategy*
• Continue to develop strategic guidance for the all of the offices and agencies in order to align them toward a comprehensive strategy that enforces consistent priorities throughout the enterprise
• Continue to prioritize objectives, refine roles and responsibilities for priority missions, access required capabilities, identify capability gaps, and evaluate risk management criteria

Structure
• Ensure organizational and procedural changes enhance the DNI’s management capabilities
• Continue to develop the mission-oriented organizations under ODNI Mission Managers, strengthening their authorities, stature, and capabilities to integrate the enterprise

Systems
• Establish, resource, staff and maintain a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process

Staffing
• Change the education and training process to produce intelligence professionals with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to enterprise-wide requirements, a genuine interagency perspective, and an improved understanding of the other offices and agencies
• Establish joint intelligence procedures for incentives, promotions, requirements, standards, and assignments to improve the performance of joint duty
Skills

- Continue to develop, prioritize, harmonize and accelerate information sharing, collaboration, and teaming skills across the enterprise

Style

- Continue to align the key organizational elements that preclude the development of effective mechanisms for change and result in the resistance to change in the culture of the offices and agencies within the enterprise
- Formulate a plan to encourage and strengthen the enterprise cultural dimensions to become innovative, outcome-oriented and team-oriented

Shared values

- Articulate and develop a compelling vision: a clear statement of purpose and operating principles that serve to unify the intelligence enterprise
- Change the name of the IC to Intelligence Enterprise to articulate the essence of a fully integrated organization

The Intelligence Enterprise

When discussing reform of the IC, Executive Director Zelikow noted, “Large organizational change in the United States occurs in evolutions, not revolutions.”

Even the successes achieved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act did not occur overnight. That act did not legislate reform by focusing primarily on structure. Instead, it attempted to align all of the organization’s key elements, while incentivizing and rewarding the organizational behaviors that lead to lasting cultural change. Through the initiative and
leadership of individual officers and the institutionalization of joint doctrine, training, and education, tremendous successes have been achieved in joint warfighting.

The conceptual, organizational, and procedural problems currently plaguing the IC are not new. They have been evident since its inception in 1947. Trends in the IC’s organization and procedures are moving in the right direction. Numerous improvements have been made since passage of the IRTPA. Much remains to be done, however, especially in light of severe fiscal constraints. Perhaps the IC’s change-resistant culture represents the greatest challenge to true reform like those achieved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The IC will not realize its full potential until the entire enterprise is aligned and integrated. Strong strategic leadership is needed to get it done.

Endnotes


10Ibid.

11Ibid.

12Ibid., 3-5.

13Ibid., 5.

14Ibid.

15Allen, Blinking Red, Preface.

16Warner and McDonald, US Intelligence Community Reform, 8-11.

17Ibid., 17.

18Ibid., iii.

19Ibid., iv & 29.


21Ibid., 16.

22Ibid.

23Ibid., 13-14.

24Zelikow, “The Evolution of Intelligence Reform,” 2.

25Allen, Blinking Red, 10.

26Ibid.

27Ibid., 18.

28Ibid., 37.

29Ibid., 38-39.

30Ibid., 53.

31Ibid., 41.

32Ibid., 72.

33Ibid.

34Ibid., 100.

35Ibid.
36Ibid., 87.

37Ibid., 95.

38Ibid., 106.

39Ibid., 75.


41Ibid.

42Ibid.

43Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 2.

44Warner and McDonald, US Intelligence Community Reform, iii.

45Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 3.

46Ibid.

47Warner and McDonald, US Intelligence Community Reform, iv.


49Ibid., 156.

50Ibid., 112.

51Ibid., 162.

52Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 1.


55Lawrence and Lorsch, Organization and Environment, 7-12.


57Ibid., 7-8.


Allen, Blinking Red, 16-17.

Ibid., 166-167.


Allen, Blinking Red, 88.

Ibid., 86.

Ibid., 69.

Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 3.

Ibid., 3-4.

Allen, Blinking Red, 64.

Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 3.

Ibid., 6.

Allen, Blinking Red, 156.

Ibid., 159.

Ibid., 168.

Ibid., 67.

Ibid., 69.

Ibid., 35.


Allen, Blinking Red, 16.
84 Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 6.


86 Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 8.

87 Ibid.


90 Ibid., 6.


96 Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 6-7.

97 Ibid., 4.


101 Ibid., 69-70.

102 Ibid., 14.


104 Neary, “Intelligence Reform,” 5.

105 *Office of the Director of National Mission, Vision & Goals Page*.