

PRAGUE, NATO, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

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FOREWORD

The issue of NATO enlargement is a crucial element of the European security agenda. Most of the analyses that have been done on NATO enlargement focus on the relative merits of enlargement for the Alliance. Others concentrate on the viewpoint of individual NATO members' interests. Few examine the perspectives of the possible applicants to NATO. Yet 1996 is the year in which the dialogue on Europe begins to shift from examining the "how and why" of enlargement to the "who and when" of this issue.

One of the most likely candidates for future membership in NATO is the Czech Republic. Inasmuch as the debate over this issue is engaging chancelleries all over the United States and Europe, it is necessary to understand how the prospective members view European security issues, what they hope to gain from membership, and how their interests and security relationships mesh with NATO's.

In this report Dr. Stephen Blank examines Czech policy. His purpose is not to determine whether the United States or any other members should support or oppose NATO enlargement. Instead, he seeks to analyze Czech views and inform our audience as to their meaning and importance for both the Czech Republic and the other NATO members. In this fashion, Dr. Blank's report continues our efforts to stimulate thought and reflection on current security issues affecting the Army and the United States. Accordingly, the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study and welcomes your comments and reactions.

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SUMMARY

The Czech Republic's security policy priority is the soonest possible entry into full NATO membership. Prague thereby hopes to achieve primarily political and psychological goals of self-identification and acceptance as a member of the West, not Central or Eastern Europe. Czech officials do not seek membership out of a sense of military danger or threat, though they do worry about Russia's apparently revived neo-imperial outlook. Politically the Czech Republic wants security integration with the most successful alliance in Europe, a lasting and durable transatlantic security guarantee so it is not alone with Germany in Central Europe, and an opportunity to reorient its policies away from the other neighboring states in Central Europe.

Thus, Czech policy is unilateralist to a high degree. Prague eschews virtually all forms of regional cooperation except where it might help foster NATO membership. It has avoided anything other than a free trade zone with Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, virtually disdains the latter in public, and Czech officials express highly uncomplimentary views about Polish policy. Prague also seems unconcerned, or at least relatively unconcerned about the security destiny of Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the Balkans if it gets into NATO. Thus its provincialist, if not nationalist, policies, do come into conflict with the spirit of NATO's and the United States' professed ambition to engineer, over time, a pan-European security settlement. Nor does its aversion to cooperation with its neighbors bode well for a Czech state that is located in Central and Eastern Europe, policymakers' preferences notwithstanding.

Prague also apparently is banking too much on Western commitments to come to the area's and to its rescue in the event of a crisis, even though much official sentiment in Europe and even in the United States is averse to any kind of involvement there. The sad record of European and U.S. inability to act effectively in Yugoslavia for 4 years would seem to indicate the need for a security policy that has other cards to play than just NATO membership. Similarly Prague's entry into the EU will not be as smooth as it wishes since EU's statist and highly centralized orientation is at odds with the nationalist and unilateralist policies of the present Czech government led by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. Clearly many serious issues connected with the Czech Republic's entry into NATO have yet to be fully realized and resolved. For these reasons Czech security policy is subject to serious criticisms and may not suffice to defend the country's vital interests.

PRAGUE, NATO, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Introduction.

This monograph examines Czech security policies as Czech practitioners see and present them, and then assesses whether these policies advance Czech security. The author's purpose is not to argue for or against Czech membership in NATO and/or the EU. Those topics are already under public discussion. Rather the author presents Prague's views of its security goals, attempts to understand whether current Czech policy adequately serves the Czech Republic's interests, and analyzes the likely results of Czech policy.

Today the fundamental question and first priority for Prague is obtaining membership in an enlarged NATO. NATO enlargement has been Europe's most urgent security question since NATO committed itself in principle at its 1994 Brussels summit. Though NATO enlargement has triggered strong Russian objections and an intense Western debate, the discussion in the United States is mainly about whether enlargement serves U.S. and NATO interests, and Russia's role vis-a-vis NATO. Whether NATO membership serves the candidates' interests or what they want from NATO is rarely discussed in the U.S. public arena. This lacuna in the debate serves neither NATO nor the candidates for membership. Furthermore, it obscures issues that must be faced if potential members are to contribute to European security.

Since some analysts single out the Czech Republic as the state that should enter NATO first, Prague's motives and policies merit examination.¹ Precisely because many, including Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, claim the Czech Republic is Central Europe's most 'reformed' state (an assessment open to question, e.g., by comparison with Estonia), and therefore is allegedly the most ready to join NATO, this assessment of Czech policy should offer a particularly revealing perspective on current issues.²

Czech security policy amalgamates diverse formative factors. Among the most prominent formative factors are the Republic's location in Europe, its history (i.e., the memory of German or Russian occupation), and the psychological processes of cultural self-identification. A coherent and unified Czech policy has arisen out of the interaction of these factors.

The geographical consequences of Czechoslovakia's 1993 split into Czech and Slovak republics have decisively shaped Czech policies. That split severed direct Czech contiguity with any member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At least two states lie between it and Russia, its greatest potential threat. Russia's distance, economic prostration, and military decline

preclude a direct military threat to the Czech Republic for a long time. Czech policymakers recognize that current borders define the most benign threat environment in Czech history.³

Furthermore, by cutting Slovakia loose, Prague gave up its most backward and unprofitable region while enhancing its ability to integrate with Western Europe. The government has exploited its new borders to orient itself economically and politically even more toward Germany, the Czech Republic's leading trade partner and foreign investor.⁴ But this split has reduced Czech interest in Slovakia and Central Europe.⁵ Czech officials deny being part of Central or Eastern Europe (though the map, culture, and history say otherwise). Instead they insist that the Czech Republic is a vital part of Western European civilization and wants to defend it, even forcibly. Therefore Prague is ready for and deserves NATO membership.⁶ NATO membership is essential to ratify Czech self-identification as a Western European nationality that rejects being in Central and Eastern Europe. Hence NATO membership is supposed to satisfy a symbolic, psychological need for such self-identification.⁷

This psychological aspect imparts a contradictory quality to Prague's desire to join NATO. Czech officials maintain that their state contributes to Western civilization, but that neighboring states are at best only partly civilized.⁸ This response is typically Central European since Hungary and Poland assert the exact same motive for entering NATO and their public opinion is often not very complimentary to neighbors further east and south.⁹ This cultural self-identification also leads Prague to repudiate interest in Central and Eastern Europe or regional cooperation programs there. Interviews with key officials show a surprising indifference to, if not disdain for, their neighbors' concerns even though their policies frequently parallel Czech ones.

Precisely because of this attitude, Czech policy focuses on the West, especially Germany and the United States, and has, through 1995, rejected calls for regional integration. Klaus has called the Visegrad organization of Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia that was formed in 1990 an artificial one that the West foisted on Prague to keep it out of the West and he has obstructed any political or military cooperation under its auspices.¹⁰ Unilateralism, not regional cooperation, has been Prague's regional policy. Czech policies are, in their own way, nationalistic.

Prague also has no fear of a Russian military offensive. Since it feels no threat, the Czech Republic's motives for joining NATO are political and are tied to its self-identification project as a Western state. Yet this project also denigrates Russia's claim to be a major European power and defines it as somehow "other." Therefore, paradoxically, Russia, even when weak, is

defined as a threat which must be countered by NATO membership.¹¹

NATO Membership as the Key Czech Priority.

The alpha and omega of Czech policy is the earliest possible entry into NATO. While Prague also very much wants to join the EU, membership in NATO is clearly the first priority. Official opinion believes that joining NATO first is easier because it requires less institutional restructuring and economic progress than does joining the EU.¹² An equally likely reason is that it is harder than expected to overcome the objections that key West European economic lobbies have toward EU expansion and to conform to EU's highly standardized procedures, especially during a time of recession and weak Western governments. Successful opposition from Western governments and lobbies, e.g., agricultural interests, to the EU's rapid expansion into Central Europe became more disillusioning compared to NATO's more forthcoming approach to Czech concerns.¹³ Meanwhile NATO's receptivity stimulated a concerted Czech-Hungarian-Polish diplomatic campaign for membership.¹⁴ These states may also hope that NATO membership will eventually help them join the EU.¹⁵

This concerted action is the exception to Prague's normal policy that has shunned regional cooperation. Precisely because it is an exception, it reflects the priority goal of gaining NATO membership. NATO membership is the only defense issue where regional cooperation has been achieved. And it was only due to Western, especially U.S., pressure that Prague began cooperating with Warsaw and Budapest on a regional air defense network. Prague's neighbors and Washington regard such military-political cooperation as a precondition for joining NATO.¹⁶ Prague's earlier resistance to regional military cooperation had led some Czech analysts to argue that the government shunned military and other forms of regional cooperation with Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary lest Poland dominate regional military cooperation and make Prague follow its agenda. Moreover, the Czech army had also resisted regional cooperation because it believes in territorial defense, (presumably against Russia or any other attacker) not coalition warfare.¹⁷ Therefore Prague sought to wrest control of the regional security agenda and to limit regional cooperation to issues of trade and economics where it believed it had the advantage over Poland.

However Prague failed to achieve a privileged position on the issue of NATO membership without regional defense cooperation and had to yield to NATO's pressure for Central European air defense cooperation. This outcome illustrated the lesson that any viable regional security cooperation must parallel or derive from a preceding economic-political accord. Otherwise, if Central European states cannot cooperate, unity may well be imposed from

outside. According to the *Study on NATO Enlargement* of September 1995, NATO will not accept Central European states unless and until they can work together in economics as well as defense. In its opening paragraph this study stated that NATO sees security, "as a broad concept embracing political and economic, as well as defense, components." This concept of security should be the basis for the new security architecture built by a gradual process of integration and cooperation among European states and security institutions. Indeed NATO enlargement is supposed to foster the habit of mutual cooperation among members.¹⁸ While this study does not reflect NATO's final word, it does reveal NATO's current views on the complex of issues involved in NATO enlargement as of late 1995. Thus, any divergence between the Study's position and Prague's policy of eschewing regional cooperation should arouse concern in Brussels and Prague.

The prevalence of such attitudes about economic and political cooperation have, until now, inhibited the security cooperation needed to get into NATO. As a result, the fact that Warsaw and Prague shared concerns about Russian policies did not suffice to foster their fullest mutual regional cooperation. Instead, the race to join NATO became very competitive, a factor which The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program unfortunately and unintentionally abets.¹⁹ Since each state works out its own plan of activities for PfP, and since the military aspects of the PfP program are more fully developed than civilian aspects are, governments cooperate with each other principally via NATO's Partnership Coordinating Cell at SHAPE in Mons. Therefore, diplomatic (but not military) cooperation among the Visegrad states to join NATO shows that the intensity of their commitment to NATO overrides Prague's dislike of regional cooperation. Indeed, Czech officials even professed their willingness to accept with satisfaction Poland's membership first, if that meant NATO's subsequent commitment to Prague.²⁰

The Czech Republic and Russia.

Czech concerns about Russia are not tied to any currently visible military threat. Its motives for joining NATO are psychological and political, relating to inclusion in the West. Likewise its concerns about Russia are political in nature. Prague fears Russia's profound instability which could, in time, lead to volatile and threatening policies. Russia's most recent call to unite the CIS in a military-political alliance if NATO expands, talk of a new aggressive military doctrine, and invasion of Chechnya in 1994 stimulate anxieties about the stability of Russian policy. Therefore Prague sees NATO as a factor stabilizing Europe's status quo by projecting democracy and security eastward.²¹ While this argument has a military element of defense against future threats, projecting democracy abroad is basically a

lengthy political process.

Therefore, Prague maintains that joining NATO is not a radical and divisive policy. Rather, NATO expansion defends today's order against Russian unpredictability. Russian policies since 1993 have shown Prague that Moscow cannot be relied on to honor treaties, like the OSCE's 1994 Budapest accords that Russia violated in Chechnya. Russian policies also persuaded some officials that Moscow wants a free hand in Europe.²²

Fear of Russian instability pervades Central Europe and takes two concrete forms of anxieties for the future. The first is that an imperial Russian policy returns and reunites the CIS. If Prague and/or its neighbors are outside of any European security system, they fear being left in "limbo," or a "grey zone," where they would allegedly gravitate to Russia's sphere of influence. Indeed, Czech President Vaclav Havel believes that the Czech Republic already is in such a vacuum and must join NATO sooner rather than later, if the situation is not to deteriorate further. Those employing this metaphor of the vacuum see it as a generic threat that covers the absence of a security guarantee and the prospects of pan-regional breakdowns of the socio-political order.²³ But this sense of being in a vacuum is not one of any impending military threat as such. Officials fear that if Russia revives and expands its influence or territory, Czech freedom in foreign and defense policy would be limited. Though the Czech Republic sees itself as a Western state, it would again have to look East.

The second fear is that Russia will descend into a permanent crisis and war whose repercussions would threaten Central Europe. Prague resolutely wants to avoid those outcomes: large-scale refugee migrations, energy cutoffs to which the Czech Republic is vulnerable (something that weighs heavily on many officials), crime, or actual war. At the same time, Russia's potential (but not currently impending) military threat that lurks behind these scenarios is always present in the calculations of Central European states.²⁴

Prague also regards Russian protests about NATO enlargement as an unacceptable attempt to establish Moscow's veto power or "*droit de regard*" (right of supervision) over the region.²⁵ Though Russia professes no imperial aims, Prague regards Russia's design for Europe as an unworkable, excessively self-interested one that leaves Europe's security architecture dangerously open for an uncertain future.²⁶ Russia's potential reactions to NATO's expansion that Russian spokesmen have advanced do not allay Czech fears. These reactions include revocation of Russia's treaty with Poland, the CFE and START II treaties; Russian alliances with all the CIS states; and Moscow's adoption of a generally revisionist posture in Europe.²⁷ Such statements only increase fears that Moscow wants to leave Europe's security open to obtain a future

sphere of influence while remaining Europe's greatest military power.²⁸ Since Czech elites worry that the West will yield to Moscow, they are determined to be part of the West, believing that this will save Prague from any such deal, and allow them to turn their back on South and East Europe. At the same time, Prague's attitude only reinforces Moscow's suspicions concerning Prague's pro-Western policies and refusal to begin a substantive dialogue with it.²⁹

Nevertheless, Prague's concerns over Russian reactions to NATO's expansion and the impasse that seems to be building between Russia and NATO are well-founded.³⁰ President Boris Yeltsin's national security advisor, Yuri Baturin, and former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev have said that there are no compensations that could induce Moscow to accept NATO expansion, which, they maintain, will divide Europe.³¹ But many Czech officials strongly reject Moscow's objections that NATO enlargement will divide Europe. They say Europe is already divided, welcome that division, and claim Russia is on the other side of the line from Prague.³² Czech officials want NATO membership to reinforce that division, clarify matters, and to confirm their cognitive map of Europe. They view the European status quo that they wish to preserve as being an already divided one.

Other Motives for Joining NATO.

Czech officials also offer more concrete political motives for joining NATO. Naturally they want to join Europe's most successful alliance and value NATO as a force for Europe's democratic integration.³³ More importantly, they earnestly desire firm affiliation with a transatlantic European security system.³⁴ This desire pertains to their fears of being left in a limbo subject to later Russian influence and also stems from the general Central European belief that an active, leading, and committed U.S. role in Europe is essential for regional security as a check to Germany and Russia. If Washington renounces this role, then the next best or least bad alternative for Central European states becomes trilateral association through the WEU with France and Germany to forge some restraints on German power.³⁵ But to date, this alternative has not been particularly effective, and in any case even France is moving back into NATO's military structures. Accordingly, despite the Czech Republic's close economic ties with Germany, Czech officials want to avoid undue political and military dependence on Germany or be in its sphere of influence (their term). If Poland were to precede the Czech Republic into NATO, then, Czech officials fear, the Czech Republic would fall into such a sphere of influence because it would not be formally in the Western, i.e., U.S., security zone.³⁶ Therefore, despite public professions of unconcern over who gets into NATO first, Czech officials quite clearly state that they want to precede

Poland. This attitude also displays the substantial distrust of Poland and Polish aims that pervades Klaus' government and the obstacles to regional cooperation.³⁷ Having ruled out regional security cooperation, Prague has only one card to play against its fear of German (or Russian) domination, and that is rapid entry into NATO. A strategy that leaves a government with only one option runs great risks. NATO remains Prague's only stated option.

Prague deems a U.S. commitment to Czech defense as essential to free the Czech Republic from any lingering concern about states to the East not in NATO or about Germany and Russia. But Czech success then depends on strong U.S. support for its inclusion in NATO. Since NATO is the main instrument through which U.S. leadership in Europe is articulated and implemented, for Washington, NATO must be as vibrant and authoritative as possible. If it is true that NATO's vitality depends on expanding into Central Europe, as Former Secretary-General of NATO Willy Claes argued, then U.S. interest in keeping its leadership role in European security is directly tied to NATO's enlargement.³⁸ Therefore Prague's need for a U.S. commitment via NATO would then mesh with U.S. interests. But Claes' postulate remains unproven and is certainly a matter of dispute in many European capitals. Nor is it universally agreed in the United States that NATO must expand or decline or that otherwise Central European security would diminish. Prague may well be staking its only card on an unproven political logic that commands insufficient support in the West.

On the other hand, if Prague were to pursue a policy which lessened the priority of joining NATO and elevated concern for joining the EU and/or strengthening regional cooperation through the Visegrad process, this might be taken abroad as a sign of *relative* indifference to integration through NATO. And that perception might have supported those who argue for a very slow process of NATO expansion by seeming to confirm their contention that there is no threat and that applicants are not wholehearted enough in their commitment to the Atlantic alliance. Ultimately, Czech policy is driven by the fact that it is a small state in a security environment that, however benign it is now, others created and defined. While Prague may be making the wrong choice, or staking everything on a single choice, it is not as if Prague had the luxury of many alternatives to choose from.

A Critique of Czech Views on NATO Enlargement.

Even so, Czech security perspectives can be criticized on several points. Defense Secretary William Perry and the NATO *Study on Enlargement* have indicated that some states will enter NATO, but others might not. In any case the process will be gradual.

However, if some states are in and others are out and have no prospect of joining, then Europe will be divided into those having collective defense obligations and commitments via NATO and those not having them.³⁹ If the Czech Republic is one of those states that does not get into NATO first, it then has no viable security strategy or at least has not articulated one. Or if Slovakia is outside NATO, it, like other such states, will then be in a kind of limbo. Since such non-NATO states will still crave security, they may well join other regional blocs or groupings and thereby revive a system of spheres of influence, or of rival blocs that could easily be hostile to Czech interests. And indeed there are signs of second thoughts in Slovakia about NATO and about moving away from Russia.

This possibility of a division of Europe into rival blocs or spheres of influence is particularly visible in the Balkans due to Yugoslavia's wars which have had devastating implications for Europe's general security, especially for its smaller states. The Supreme Commander of Sweden's Armed Forces, General Owe Wiktorin, observed,

As a result of Bosnia and other armed conflicts we have come to accept war on European territory. The message is, in particular for a small nation, that if you do not take care of your security no one else may care.⁴⁰

Prominent European figures confirm Wiktorin's observations. In 1993, Dieter Mahncke, Deputy Director of the Planning Staff of Germany's Defense Ministry, wrote that the term "European security" means, first, security for *Western Europe*, and second, some type of European security system that "does not exclude conflicts, even a war as in the former Yugoslavia, but makes sure that whatever conflicts occur do not destabilise Europe to the extent of threatening *West European* security." Only in third place as a priority is there interest in extending the Western security regime into Central and Eastern Europe to project stability eastward and thereby achieve the more important goal of Western stability and security.⁴¹ Thus, guarantees to the contrary notwithstanding, small European states in Central and Eastern Europe can count on nobody. Ultimately they are alone. The behavior of the belligerents in Yugoslavia showed the consequences when states in a crisis adopt unilateral policies because they are outside a European security architecture.⁴² Even though President Clinton and his officials have said that they will not divide Europe and that the U.S. goal is a pan-European solution over time, European security today is, in practice, divisible.⁴³

Surprisingly, these questions, the problems raised by the Balkan wars, and the consequences of NATO enlargement do not unduly trouble Czech policymakers.⁴⁴ This unconcern reflects the shortcomings in Prague's belief that it can safely eschew regional

cooperation yet obtain security guarantees. This belief may well be unfounded as an examination of regional security issues can indicate. Regional cooperation across Central Europe involves many issues: the future destiny of Ukraine, especially if NATO does expand, Balkan integration with Western security structures, and, of course, the nature of any future Russian role in European security.

Many Czech officials maintained that Ukraine is or should be "Finlandized," i.e., part of Moscow's sphere.⁴⁵ Indeed Kiev was unhappy about its ties to Prague.⁴⁶ Czech officials claimed Ukraine's failure to reform economically in 1992-94 had cost it even the chance to achieve Finland's Cold War status. Now it was reduced to fighting for its survival. By mid-1995, however, these officials had become desperately anxious to salvage that or any form of an independent Ukraine. They had now begun to understand that Prague's and Central European security as a whole greatly depend on the security and independence of Ukraine. Their *cri de coeur* hides the fact that in 1992-94 Prague steadfastly refused Polish calls for joint efforts to help sustain Ukrainian independence.⁴⁷ But it explains why Prague changed course in the spring of 1995 and hosted Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in a successful effort to improve relations.⁴⁸ Perhaps Czech officials have begun to grasp the costs of regional aloofness to Prague.

Prague's previous disdain for its neighbors hardly went over well in Kiev. But Ukraine is not the only state with which Prague should have been concerned. Russian, Baltic, and Ukrainian sources clearly state that NATO's expansion will encounter an even more determined Russian drive toward military-political union with Ukraine and the CIS and against the Baltic states.⁴⁹ Baltic diplomats, too, fear this outcome if NATO embraces Poland, but not them.⁵⁰ Blithe talk of Finlandization suggests that Prague seemed not to care or realize how much Czech membership in NATO places Baltic, Belarussian, Moldovan (since Russia now wants permanent bases in Moldova against the prospect of NATO expansion), and Ukrainian security at risk. And if those states are at risk, what then happens to Czech security? Any strong Russian effort to deepen Europe's division along the CIS frontier can easily remilitarize and repolarize Europe, an outcome that surely would lessen Czech security.

That does not even raise the issue of Balkan security if only Visegrad members enter NATO. Balkan states clearly regard their claims to membership as equal to Warsaw's and Prague's and stress that if they are left out Europe will be divided. Bulgaria and Romania demand an equal opportunity to enter NATO should they conform to its demands.⁵¹ Indeed, some NATO members support their desires. Greek Defense Minister Yerasimos Arsenis told Bulgarian National Television that Greece, as a member of NATO and the WEU, wants Bulgaria and Romania to join NATO and the EU and not have

NATO end at Hungary's border.⁵²

However, Czech officials discount Balkan desires to enter NATO and the possibility that NATO enlargement without the Balkan states will redivide Europe. Thus, they see little connection between their membership in NATO and the security dilemmas of Central and Eastern Europe. Recent policy rejected regional cooperation, showed noticeable disdain for Prague's immediate neighbors, not to mention states further away like Romania or Ukraine, and aroused unfavorable commentary in Poland and Hungary.⁵³ But Czech obduracy has so weakened the prospects for regional cooperation that Poland and Hungary can only foster limited regional economic collaboration.⁵⁴ This reaction then strengthened Prague's own conviction that unilateralism is right. Prague's unilateralism extends the spirit of nationalism, even provincialism, that characterized policy leading to the breakup with Slovakia and that now pervades the region as states compete to get into NATO and the EU first.⁵⁵ Thus Prague fails to consider factors that must concern NATO. While Prague does not have to think for NATO, it should see Czech security within a broader framework. NATO finds enlargement vexing because its obligations are broader than Prague's rather narrow view of European security. Nobody benefits if Europe's new dividing line is along the Bug River, with the CIS and the Baltic states on the wrong side of that divide. Central European security will then be much more militarily threatened than is now the case. Russia and its satellites will undergo a much greater militarization of security thinking and policy. And the West will have lost the golden opportunity of 1989-92.

Indeed, one of the most disturbing aspects of Prague's thinking about NATO and European security is the easy acceptance of Europe's bifurcation. The desire to enter NATO is founded on the untested premise of being in a security vacuum or grey zone even though there is no compelling threat. This notion of being in a vacuum itself rests on the premise that Europe is already divided or must be divided into blocs and Russia simultaneously be contained for Europe to achieve security. This outlook raises fundamental and difficult problems for NATO whose leaders publicly maintain that they are not anti-Russian or interested in a new containment. Few Czech officials seem to realize that the ideas of Europe's division into rival blocs and a tamed Russia are fundamentally contradictory. Dividing Europe into rival blocs, each with its own owner, means that Russia is untamed and a hegemon in its sphere, i.e., the CIS. And since that sphere borders on Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, they and the Czech Republic will face the direct threat of a remilitarized European security agenda in an environment where they have vastly less security than they now do.

Nor has Prague evidently noted that this concept of European

security by rival blocs contradicts U.S. and NATO policy expressed by President Clinton and NATO at its Brussels summit in 1994.⁵⁶ NATO's current expansion plan officially espouses a creation over time of a pan-European system, through individual memberships and the inducement to non-members to join.⁵⁷ This Wilsonian objective is incompatible with Prague's premises of an already divided Europe, and something will have to give. NATO's leading members are unwilling to start a new European cold war for Prague's sake and, thereby, bear the onus of a future division of Europe. While it is true that ultimately only Russia can isolate itself, neither German nor U.S. policy should seek to push Russia towards that choice because those two states will then bear the brunt of the ensuing recriminations and of defending NATO's policies.

This would be a particularly dangerous outcome for it is hardly clear that NATO's 16 legislatures, including the U.S. Congress, will admit new members and extend their treaty commitments anytime soon.⁵⁸ Even if one sees Europe's hesitation as an abdication of political will, Prague and other capitals must reckon with it now rather than later and rethink their regional posture. Equally important, if and when NATO expands, the persistence of open anti-Russian attitudes will confirm the Russian military and government in their view that a hostile military alliance is moving towards Russia's borders. If they respond by major military moves, as Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev has threatened, NATO could well have to reply by equivalent military responses which would not be cheap. While nobody has begun to add up those potential costs, one Pentagon official gave Charles Kupchan, formerly of the National Security Council, an estimate of tens of billions to build military infrastructure in Central Europe should that become necessary.⁵⁹

Ultimately, a state's national security policy must comprise more than just entering NATO. Therefore Prague's objective of entering NATO can coincide with Washington's stated pan-European vision, only if NATO membership is accessible at about the same time to the greatest possible number of states. Only if it enters with other neighboring states can Prague avoid having to worry about regional cooperation and security because all the other regional actors will have achieved a guarantee of their security. If some states in the Czech Republic's neighborhood remain out of NATO, even if it is a member, the regional security picture will remain clouded.

Unfortunately Prague does not accept this analysis and is banking on only a limited number of states joining NATO anytime soon. Apparently Prague believes it has a U.S. guarantee of its future admission to NATO that the Balkan states do not have. Similarly, Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Defense Minister Volker Ruehe appear to believe Poland can join NATO and finish its negotiations for entry into the EU by the year 2000.⁶⁰ As a result

of the fear that NATO will not take all applicants, Bulgaria and Slovakia now have second thoughts about NATO. Russia has tried to exploit those doubts for its ends in Slovakia and has tried to forge an Athens-Sofia-Belgrade triangle against Turkey and possibly Romania.⁶¹

Regional Cooperation and Czech Policy.

Czech views on regional cooperation among the Visegrad states are closely tied to its view on membership in the EU and other major European security issues: Yugoslavia, Russia, etc. Economic and political integration into an EU committed to a single economic currency and Common Foreign and Security Policy might be the single strongest factor for Prague's future security and integration into Western Europe. Czech membership in the EU is also important because it increasingly appears that Prague's prospects here are tied to its success in joining NATO. Chancellor Kohl and his Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, and, more recently, the NATO Enlargement Study have frequently stated that membership in NATO should parallel membership in the EU, although not rigidly as both processes are autonomous ones.⁶² Similarly, France's Balladur initiative of 1993-95 to induce Central European states to sign bilateral treaties guaranteeing each other's borders and minority rights as a precondition for entry into the EU also gained strength. The Hungarian-Slovak treaty of March 1995 that former French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur helped bring to life showed this.⁶³ French and German policies might impose greater regional collaboration or other conditions upon Prague as a condition of its entry into NATO and/or EU. Therefore, cooperation among Visegrad states should be a key issue for Czech security policy.

Visegrad members are concerting their diplomacy for entry into NATO. Klaus, however, strongly opposes anything other than cooperation through the Central European Free Trade Association. Thus, the Czech Republic refused to proceed towards greater regional political or defense cooperation through the Visegrad association. Despite their complaints about Czech attitudes, Hungary and Poland have had to concede that Visegrad is no longer particularly useful.⁶⁴

Klaus has espoused a dogmatic, even nationalist, outlook. He rejects regional cooperation and attacks the notion that European integration should take place by first strengthening the EU's integration mechanisms among existing members rather than by taking in new members. Klaus wants the Czech Republic to enter the EU as soon as possible and with a minimum sacrifice of its economic sovereignty, and his views have become state ideology. Had EU rushed to expand, his thinking about EU's priority might well have become state policy. Unfortunately the EU's hesitation

and dilatoriness in expanding has forced Prague to reorient itself towards NATO in the hope of entering there first. Still, Klaus views with suspicion any externally directed bureaucratic organization, like the EU in its present structure, that would coordinate Czech and European policy from an external center. He often invokes the Soviet experience as justification.⁶⁵

Arguably forces larger than Czech policy undid Visegrad's prospects, e.g, the breakup of the USSR, the long time it took for Russia to negotiate treaties with Visegrad states, and the failure of mass migration from the USSR to materialize.⁶⁶ Czechoslovakia's breakup also put Slovakia into a tense relationship with Hungary over the issue of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, because the newly independent Slovakia continues to aggravate Slovak-Hungarian relations by playing the nationalist card against those minorities and jabbing at Budapest. This Slovak-Hungarian tension would have impeded regional cohesion without Czech help.⁶⁷ Likewise, although the Visegrad members had stated their intention to integrate with Europe in 1991, they feared that the West would view any regional organization as either a barrier to integration or as a kind of holding pen for them making further European integration unnecessary.⁶⁸ Therefore there never was any serious talk of defense cooperation. Klaus' charges that a new Visegrad bureaucracy was coming to pass were spurious. The three states had already rejected that option. His charges that the West artificially imposed the Visegrad formula to stall these states' entry into the West are also oversimplified.⁶⁹ This charge ignores the regional motivation of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in 1990-91 as they confronted the Soviet Union and imputes an excessive single-mindedness and clarity to Western policy.

The net result is that the disparity in aims among the four members (Slovakia became a member when it became a state in 1993) has undone prospects for Central European integration. The four states' diverging interests have also made it harder for the members to obtain fair and equal terms from the EU, and impeded their pursuit of regional security. Slovakia faces substantial Russian pressure to move East, and Ukraine's entry into Europe has been greatly complicated by the breakdown of the Visegrad consensus of 1991.⁷⁰ The biggest loser was Poland who staked much on regional cooperation as a means to build up pressure for integration with the West and as a desirable end in itself.⁷¹ But neither can one discern what Prague has gained by weakening Visegrad's cohesion. Even though no Visegrad state wants to be held up by "the slowest ship in the convoy," Prague still charges the members with that desire.⁷² Furthermore, because it was difficult, if not impossible, to obtain regional military cooperation, NATO had to impose pressure on them from outside as the aforementioned example of regional air defense indicates.⁷³ Certainly the absence of meaningful political cooperation among Visegrad members will inhibit their political and military

cooperation if and when they join NATO and add to NATO's difficulties in Central Europe.

Czech Policies towards the EU.

If political reassurance, economic-political integration, and economic reconstruction are Central Europe's key goals from NATO membership, then membership in the EU will suffice. Furthermore, it will provide an equally durable and lasting day-to-day form of integration as would NATO membership. Integration in the EU points toward a Europe without borders and where military issues take a decidedly second place on the agenda. Russia has supported the EU's extension to its borders with Finnish membership and does not oppose the EU's extension into Poland and the other Visegrad states. Arguably, Russia misperceives the gravitational pull that the EU would exert upon the CIS' western members and the Baltic states.⁷⁴ But if peace can be preserved, the EU, in peacetime, could much more effectively block Russian hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe than NATO will because of the EU's tendencies towards a borderless Europe.

Prague has also displayed its preference for a "Europe des patries" (a Europe of fatherlands), i.e., an EU where sovereign nation-states, rather than the supra-national bureaucracy operating out of Brussels, are the prime policymakers. Precisely because Klaus' government has made so much propaganda of Czech nationalism and singularity for being the best, most advanced reform state in the area, and given Klaus' dogmatic free market outlook, Prague's view of European integration is decidedly unilateralist and nationalist. Thus the Czech Republic favors limited power for EU headquarters in Brussels and a 'two-tier' or even multi-tiered and broadened EU.⁷⁵

Prague's view could cause problems with France, which has supported a deepening of the EU even as it expands. France almost certainly opposes Klaus' version of Europe since an EU with minimal infringements upon national sovereignty would make it harder for the EU to be a vehicle for limiting or channeling German power in Europe, France's essential strategic goal for many years. Since Prague also does not want to be "in a German sphere," it is unfortunate that it differs so fundamentally with France on European integration. Certainly Klaus disparaged the Slovak-Hungarian treaty stemming from Balladur's initiative precisely because the EU pressed for it.⁷⁶ Worse yet, Klaus' opposition to any EU movement to implement the Maastricht accords and ultimately achieve a single European currency could delay, if not injure, prospects for joining either the EU and/or NATO soon, since Helmut Kohl and NATO openly espouse a process whereby membership in NATO runs parallel to the much longer process for EU.⁷⁷ To the degree that Prague's position on the EU is contrary to the EU's

requirements, membership in NATO could also be delayed.

Entry into the EU, though necessary and essential, will force Prague to face the contradictions inherent in a nationalist policy whose main objective paradoxically is European integration and the marginalization of the East. It will also cause problems with Germany whose view of a future EU is not Gaullist or Thatcherite, but one where the Deutschmark is the anchor of the European economy. And if German and NATO statements about the need for parallel membership in EU and NATO reflect official policy, Prague must yield much freedom of maneuver and violate basic tenets of Klaus' program to join either or both institutions.

Assessing Czech Policy.

Prague's NATO, regional cooperation, and EU policies could lead to a dead end. Prague seeks to exploit a favorable location to turn its back on Central and Eastern Europe and fight historic dangers which grip its imagination, i.e., Russian occupation or hegemony. Few Czech officials worry that NATO expansion might lead Russia to try to restore a military-political union with Ukraine, though Russian opposition politicians like Grigory Yavlinsky, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Yeltsin, Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma and Foreign Minister Gennadiy Udovenko have openly stated this could or would happen.⁷⁸ That would constitute the greatest imaginable threat to both the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Instead Czech policy before 1995 seems to have written off Kiev.⁷⁹

Rivalry with or unconcern for Poland, or Slovakia, or Hungary, and the Balkan states in or out of NATO can only weaken Czech security. Brussels' sense that Prague is playing a lone hand and is interested in using NATO to avoid its regional responsibilities has already led to pressure on Prague to cooperate regionally. NATO will not admit "security consumers."⁸⁰

Similarly Prague's lack of interest in the implications of Yugoslavia's crises is troubling. Contrary to Czech officials, many analysts argue that Yugoslavia, until the 1995 Paris Peace Treaty, showed NATO and the EU's difficulties in forging a functioning consensus and marrying force with diplomacy to defend a legitimate Balkan or European order.⁸¹ This failure is troubling because it suggests that in future crises it will take a long time for the West to forge an appropriate consensus. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that the 16 legislatures and governments that must ratify Czech admission to NATO, including the U.S. Congress, will do so.⁸² A security policy that counts only on NATO membership and spurns regional cooperation could isolate Prague from both its neighbors and NATO.

For example, should a Yugoslav-type crisis break out in the Czech Republic's vicinity, NATO members might have to intervene in the form of a peace operation. Because of prior negative experiences in Somalia and Bosnia, the United States has adopted criteria for participation in future conflicts of this sort that are very stringent. The criteria include: an identifiable threat to peace, clear objectives, an identifiable end to involvement, calculable costs, allied participation, combatants' willingness to agree to a cease-fire, U.S. command in combat missions, and congressional assent.⁸³ The high degree of congressional shyness about supporting the U.S. commitment in NATO's Bosnia operation shows the considerable difficulties any administration might encounter in making future Bosnia-like commitments and the likelihood of congressional pressure to tie its hands.⁸⁴

Yugoslavia's experience also shows that there is a deep inability in Western Europe and the United States to concert their policies in Central and Eastern European crises. A widespread "*pourquoi mourir pour Danzig?*" (Why die for Danzig?--a famous appeasement tract of 1939) outlook pervades the West, as the Balkan crisis and Mahncke's analysis indicate. Yugoslavia is only the most prominent case to date. For instance, in a 1993 interview, Lord Carrington, former British Foreign Minister, referred to "Poland's so-called integrity," a phrase that speaks volumes even if he has since changed his mind.⁸⁵

The risks to Prague and its neighbors, even as members of NATO, will not go away. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of the WEU, reflected a real current of European opinion when he wrote in 1995 that the notion that European security is indivisible is "no longer self-evident. A common response will require far more joint preliminary analysis, consultation, and planning."⁸⁶ Such activity must precede, not react to, the crisis. Yet there is no sign of any ability of the major West European powers to act in concert before a crisis. If European security is divisible and so viewed, and policy is strictly reactive, the response to crises will resemble the less than inspiring Yugoslav example.

Van Eekelen's views about security guarantees for Central and Eastern Europe are even bleaker. Indeed, he confuses NATO's guarantee under Article V of the Washington Treaty of collective defense with a general security guarantee, a common, but misleading error. First, he does not expect any guarantees before the year 2000. Second, his analysis directly contradicts Prague's views on NATO and EU. He noted that Central European states cannot receive security guarantees against Russia, which no longer has common borders with them or threatens them. He states,

The problem then boils down to the question of the comparative relevance of security guarantees to our

present major preoccupation with minority problems and regional instability. Only if there is consultation machinery with reciprocal rights and obligations, will it be possible to find an agreement on security guarantees....The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are best served by a broad, convergent pattern of relations.⁸⁷

His remarks betray the difference in perception between Western and Central Europe. Prague wants precisely a guarantee against Moscow. It will be difficult to resolve that contradiction and to construct the mechanisms that Van Eekelen or Prague call for.

Certainly all these observations indicate the depth of Western difficulty in confronting Central European problems. Therefore, one may argue that Prague has neglected to think through the consequences of its exclusive reliance on NATO, failed to take Yugoslavia's lesson to heart, or thought through its policies that lead to alienation of its neighbors, and Ukraine's marginalization.

There are also alliance issues that are no less consequential and require serious Czech (and allied) thought that has previously been absent. There is no threat today nor is one just over the horizon.⁸⁸ In that case, how can one say that Central Europe is in a grey zone?⁸⁹ And if there is no threat, why is enlargement needed? Ultimately, NATO enlargement comprises, at least to some degree, a military response to European security issues. Furthermore, if Central Europe's membership in NATO divides Europe and creates the grey zone officials purportedly fear, the ensuing nuclear issues and the inevitable military preparation of the theater will only aggravate military tensions in Europe. European security agendas will then focus on and reemphasize military issues. Here, too, the gap in perceptions of European security issues must be bridged.

However, Prague has apparently not thought through these military-strategic consequences of NATO membership or it has rejected them. Czech officials believe Europe is already divided so we might as well accept it and solidify the dividing lines.⁹⁰ Prague's belief that Central Europe faces a vacuum in itself presupposes that Europe is--or should be--organized into hostile and rival blocs. Thus Czech policy and attitudes risk creating renewed spheres of influence in Europe where hostile blocs confront each other and Poland and Slovakia are front-line states. This is not the purpose of Czech policies, or at least it should not be, because Central and Eastern Europe's security will then be diminished, not enhanced.

Central Europe's entry into NATO is entangled in many contradictions. Prague's protestations that it seeks only to

ratify the status quo by entering NATO contradict Central European pessimism about the current status quo being a "grey zone" and about future Russian threats.⁹¹ Either Prague does not grasp the contradictory logic of its position or it is being excessively disingenuous. If Prague wishes only to ratify the status quo, then its claim to be in a "grey zone" where its security is in danger is untenable. Prague obviously cannot wish to ratify being in a grey zone if that is the status quo. If Prague and other states enter NATO soon, that will materially alter Europe's status quo. Such an outcome would have serious consequences for European security and it would again be disingenuous to pretend otherwise.

Conclusions.

One of those unfortunate consequences is that Prague's provincialism and ethnocentrism contribute to and reinforce tendencies to avoid thinking about the truly hard and serious questions inherent in enlarging NATO. These difficult questions apply as equally to military planning as they do to political issues.⁹² And undoubtedly Russian elites would view such activities or anything that could be so perceived with jaundiced eyes.

Nor is Western policy any clearer. Numerous observers cite with dismay the contradictory statements emanating from Washington, European capitals, and Brussels about NATO enlargement which amount to what they call a policy of "continental drift."⁹³ It is also not yet fully clear to legislatures that most applicants for NATO membership will require considerable subsidies for some time to come at a time when legislatures are notoriously resistant to such funding. The absence of means with which to reward prospective members of NATO or the EU also signifies the inability of governments, even when they grasp the magnitude of current challenges, to elicit domestic support to finance (not to mention defend) the transformation to the new world order.⁹⁴ Accordingly, many governments of EU and NATO member states are apparently not yet ready to deal with the transformations they must undergo or to tell their publics what is required of them.⁹⁵

For this reason, it is important for the United States, which has created the PfP program and is the main champion of NATO enlargement, to focus Prague's and other capitals' attention on the importance of mutual cooperation through the PfP process as a prerequisite and training ground for membership. If a key purpose of NATO is to prevent the destructive tendencies visible in the former Yugoslavia towards a renationalization of defense policies, it needs to keep the pressure on Prague to move towards greater cooperation. Failure to move forward along this line in one country would certainly increase other states' temptation to follow suit in the belief that they either have something to gain thereby, or something to lose if they do not do so. The experience

of 1994-95 shows that the PfP process and the prospect of membership does induce governments to espouse greater real cooperation than was ever true before. The IFOR's composition in Bosnia exemplifies this and is widely regarded as a kind of test of the participants' willingness to cooperate as they would have to in NATO. Thus, while each state submits its own individual PfP program, the process as a whole, as led by the NATO cell that runs it, has already begun to shape more cooperative ventures and integrate Central European states into that process. However, in the final analysis, individual governments like Klaus' will have to make the fundamental intellectual and political decision to prefer cooperation with their more or less like-minded neighbors to more unilateral policy preferences.

For now, Prague's threat assessment is based on, indeed haunted by, a memory of past threats and injustices, and by a uniquely self-deceiving ideology that it is not living where the map says it is and, therefore, need not fully cooperate with its neighbors. Thus, officials maintain the Republic is not nationalist when it follows a nationalist, or provincialist policy.⁹⁶ It is not sufficient to argue that Czech concerns are truly universal and that the Czech Republic is a Western European state when history and geography say the opposite.⁹⁷ Officials seem to forget that prewar Czechoslovakia did not find a *modus vivendi* with its neighbors and was consequently isolated even when it had formally binding treaties of alliance. Prague should not repeat that same error.

In the final analysis current Czech policy uniquely but selectively amalgamates history, geography, and a unique kind of self-identification. Although many elites may think so, no successful Czech policy can rest upon a concept of Europe that deprecates Bratislava, Warsaw, Budapest, and the Balkans, and excludes St. Petersburg and Moscow from Europe.⁹⁸ A policy that truly advances Czech and regional security must orient itself to the future, not the past.

Rebuilding European security requires leadership and vision. However, Czech policy, though it professes integration with NATO and the EU, reflects a general renationalization of security policy that largely stems from an internal failure of vision. It is unclear that so insular a policy can give Prague security for it has not done so previously. Moreover, the Western failure in Yugoslavia suggests that Prague might have to face future crises on its own and cannot simply rely on adequate and informed foreign support. Rebuilding European security is a most difficult, frustrating and perplexing challenge. No one knows in advance the right or even the wrong answers. But it is never right for a state to spurn geography and history and pretend that it does not live with its neighbors.

ENDNOTES

1. James W. Morrison, *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments*, McNair Paper No. 40, National Defense University, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1995, pp. 127-128.

2. David B. Ottaway, "Czech Republic Resists Trend to Put Ex-Communists Back in Power," *Washington Post*, May 24, 1994, p. A12, provides a balanced look at the myths and realities of Czech reform.

3. Interviews with Czech officials in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Prague, December 1994.

4. *Open Market Research Institute, Daily Digest*, April 18, 1995, (henceforth *OMRI Daily Digest*); "The New Bohemians," *The Economist*, October 22, 1994, pp. 23-27; Prague, *Radiozurnal Radio Network*, in Czech, December 6, 1994, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Eastern Europe*, (henceforth *FBIS-EEU*), 94-235, December 7, 1994, pp. 19-20; Colin Woodard, "Little Czech Nation Latches Onto a Big Neighbor, Germany," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 23, 1995, p. 6.

5. Prague, *Ekonom*, in Czech, January 11, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-040, March 4, 1995, pp. 1-6, on the long-term economic decline in the mutual relationship with Slovakia; Kosice, *Domino Effekt*, in Slovak, April 6, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-093, May 15, 1995, pp. 12-13; and Jeffrey Simon, "Czechoslovakia's 'Velvet Divorce', Visegrad Cohesion, and European Faultlines," *European Security*, Vol. III, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 483-484.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 485; Warsaw, *PAP*, in Polish, November 25, 1994, *FBIS-EEU*, 94-228, November 25, 1994, pp. 2-3; Prague, *Lidove Noviny*, in Czech, April 27, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-103, May 30, 1995, pp. 13-14; Jane Perlez, "The Fist in the Velvet Glove," *New York Times Magazine*, July 16, 1995, p. 18; Prague, *Rude Pravo*, in Czech, December 21, 1994, *FBIS-EEU*, 94-251, December 30, 1994, p. 9, for an interview with Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec where he openly advances this argument, an argument that appears often in public and private statements of Czech officials. See also President Vaclav Havel's address to the Parliament, Prague, *Radiozurnal Radio Network*, in Czech, October 12, 1993, *FBIS-EEU*, 93-196, October 13, 1993, pp. 3-5. This sentiment also pervaded every interview I conducted with Czech political and military officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense in Prague, December 1994.

7. Vienna, *ORF Television Network*, in German, March 16, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-052, March 17, 1995, where Prime Minister Klaus admits this by saying, "For us NATO membership also possesses a

symbolic significance. It would mark a definitive break with the past. For us, NATO membership would mean that we are definitely a part of the Western world."

8. Interviews in Prague with officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Institute for International Relations; J.F. Brown, *Hopes and Shadows: Eastern Europe After Communism*, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1994, p. 65.

9. Ryszard Zieba, "Poland's Search for Security in the Post-Cold War Europe," paper presented to the International Studies Association convention, Chicago, IL, February 21-25, 1995, pp. 13-21, presents a frank exposition of Polish security concerns in 1994 and an exposition that remarkably parallels Czech views.

10. Milada Anna Vachudova, "The Visegrad Four: No Alternative to Cooperation?," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, Vol. II, No. 34, August 27, 1993, p. 41.

11. Iver B. Neuman, "Russia as Central Europe's Constituting Other," *East European Politics and Society*, Vol. VII, No. 2, Spring, 1993, pp. 349-369.

12. Interviews with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and statements by President Havel, Prague, *Radiozurnal Radio Network*, in Czech, January 18, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-011, January 18, 1995, p. 5; Prague, *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, in Czech, November 3, 1994, *FBIS-EEU*, 94-218, November 10, 1994, p. 4; and for Western confirmation, see EU Trade Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan's statements, Prague, *Hospodarska Noviny*, in Czech, November 23, 1994, *FBIS-EEU*, 94-230, November 30, 1994, pp. 6-7.

13. Michael Mihalka, "The Bumpy Road to Western Europe," *Transition: The Year in Review: 1994, Part 1*, pp. 72-78; Prague, *Denni Telegraf*, in Czech, September 9, 1994, *FBIS-EEU*, 94-181, September 19, 1994, p. 5; Paris, *Liberation*, in French, December 2, 1994, *FBIS-EEU*, 94-233, December 5, 1994, pp. 9-10; Heinrich Schneider, "Current Threat/Risk Scenarios and Responses," *Perspectives*, No. 2, Winter, 1993-1994, pp. 69-71 (*Perspectives* is the journal of the Institute of International Relations in Prague); Frankfurt Am Main, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, in German, April 29, 1993, *FBIS-EEU*, 93-046-S, May 26, 1993, p. 3; Prague, *CTK*, in English, June 18, 1993, *FBIS-EEU*, 93-120, June 24, 1993, p. 7.

14. Interviews with officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Prague; Brendan McNally, "Quest Unites Poland, Czechs," *Defense News*, January 31-February 6, 1994, pp. 1, 20.

15. Interviews with officials of the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs in Prague, December 1994.

16. Prague, *Tyden*, in Czech, August 21, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-189, September 29, 1995, p. 14; Brooks Tigner, "C. European Build Regional Defense Ties," *Defense News*, October 2-8, 1995, pp. 1, 37.

17. Interviews with members of the Institute for International Relations in Prague, December 1994.

18. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Study on NATO Enlarge- ment*, September 28 1995, Paras. 1, 3, from E-Mail transmission.

19. Jeffrey D. Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Stabilizing the East," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 5, Summer, 1994, pp. 42-44; "Central European Security, 1994: Partnership for Peace (PFP)," *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC, No. 1-94, p. 3; Bratislava, *Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network*, in Slovak, November 21, 1993, *FBIS-EEU*, 93-223, November 22, 1993, p. 16; Warsaw, *PAP*, in English, *FBIS-EEU*, 94-230-A, November 30, 1994, pp. 6-7.

20. Interviews with members of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Prague, December 1994; Prague, *CTK* in English, September 29, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-190-A, October 2, 1995, p. 14.

21. See Havel's speech to NATO on April 28, 1995; Paris, *AFP*, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, *Western Europe* (henceforth *FBIS-WEU*), 95-083, May 1, 1995, p. 1; interviews with officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Prague, and in Washington DC, December 1994, and April 1995, respectively; Berlin, *DDP/ADN*, January 12, 1995, in German and Czech, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-007, January 13, 1995, p. 3; Prague, *Radiozurnal Radio Network*, in Czech, January 10, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-009, January 17, 1995, p. 3; Steven Erlanger, "Pressure on NATO To Expand," *New York Times*, February 9, 1995, p. A10.

22. Andranik Migranyan, "Unequal Partnership," *New York Times*, June 23, 1994, p. A23; Stephen Blank, "Russia and Europe in the Caucasus," paper presented to the International Studies Association convention, Chicago, IL, February 22, 1995.

23. Jonathan Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1994, pp. 122-123.

24. Interviews with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviews with Polish and Czech officials from their

Ministries of Defense, Washington, DC, April 25, 1995; Prague, *Prague Post*, in English, February 8, 1994, *Joint Publications Research Service, Eastern Europe*, (henceforth *JPRS-EEU*), 94-008-S, March 10, 1994, pp. 14-15.

25. Vladimir Baranovsky, "The European Community Seen From Moscow: Rival, Partner, Model?," in Neil Malcolm, ed., *Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation?*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1994, p. 71.

26. Interviews with Foreign and Defense Ministry officials in Prague, December, 1994. Furthermore, by 1996 Russia has not only opposed NATO expansion, but high-level spokesmen regularly threaten that they will abandon the CFE Treaty, START-2, and reunify the CIS if that happens, e.g., "The Bear's Jaws", *The Economist*, April 22, 1995, pp. 54-56.

27. *Ibid.*; *OMRI Daily Digest*, April 2, and April 4, 1995.

28. Interviews with officials from the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs in Prague, December 1994.

29. Moscow, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, in Russian, November 30, 1994, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia, Daily Report*, (henceforth *FBIS-USR*), 94-137, December 20, 1994, pp. 58-59.

30. Ann Devroy and Fred Hiatt, "U.S., Russia Cite Discord at Summit," *Washington Post*, May 11, 1995, p. 1.

31. Moscow, *Moskovskiye Novosti*, in Russian, April 2-9, 1995, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia* (henceforth *FBIS-SOV*), 95-065, April 5, 1995, p. 10.

32. Interviews with officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Prague, December 1994. Indeed, under some conditions some of those interviewed would accept (at that time) a Russian sphere of influence in the CIS because that would clarify matters and create a more definite situation in Europe. Furthermore, this view, that Russia is on the other side of the line and should be left there, a view which disturbs Western chancelleries, is common to analysts throughout Central Europe. This is made clear in Ian Gambles, ed., *A Lasting Peace in Central Europe*, Chaillot Papers No. 20, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the West European Union, 1995, *passim*, where all the Central European authors strongly advocate drawing lines in Europe and dismiss Western fears of doing so.

33. For instance, at recent bilateral talks between the Czech and Russian armies in Moscow, Jaromir Novotny, the head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Defense Ministry, stated that

the Czech side had told the Russians, "We tried to explain that an extension of the stability and democracy zone is an advantage for everybody rather than the opposite." Prague, *Denni Telegraf*, in Czech, April 4, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-067, April 7, 1995, p. 6; Moscow, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* in Russian, February 11, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-046, March 9, 1995, pp. 3-4; and interviews with officials of the Foreign and Defense Ministries in Prague, December 1994.

34. Zieba, pp. 13-21; Prague, *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, in Czech, November 16, 1994, *FBIS-EEU*, 94-226, November 23, 1994, pp. 5-6.

35. Andrzej Karkoszka, "Security Policy and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland," in Jan Geert Siccama and Theo Van Den Doel, eds., *Restructuring Armed Forces in East and West*, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1994, p. 74.

36. Interviews with Czech officials of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs in Prague, December 1994.

37. *Ibid.*; Theresa Hitchens, "Defense Cooperation Confounds Central Europe," *Defense News*, April 26-May 2, 1993, pp. 1, 29; Jane Perlez, "4 Countries in Audition for NATO," *New York Times*, January 11, 1994, p. A3.

38. For Claes' admission, see Oslo, *Aftenposten* in Norwegian, *FBIS-WEU*, 95-016, January 25, 1995, p. 5.

39. Schmitt, p. A6; Paul D'Anieri and Bryan Schmiedeler, "European Security After the Cold War: The Policy of Insulationism?," *European Security*, Vol. II, No. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 357.

40. "The Jane's Interview," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, October 15, 1994, p. 56.

41. Dieter Mahncke, *Parameters of European Security*, Chaillot Papers, No. 10, Paris, Institute for Security Studies of [the] Western European Union, 1993, p. 7 (*italics in the original*).

42. See the speech by Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic to the Petersberg conference of the OSCE, on December 18, 1995, Zagreb, *HINA*, in English, December 18, 1995, *FBIS-EEU*, 95-246-A, December 22, 1995, pp. 6-7. Granic here said that,

The old, and still existing security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic realm, has proved highly ill-adapted to the challenges of the Post-Communist world, and totally inadequate when the countries faced with aggression find themselves in need to protect their sovereignty, territorial integrity, or even bare survival. In such a situation, Croatia--as well as a

number of other small and newly emerged states, which are unfortunately not part of any existing defense and security arrangements--was forced to adopt a specific national security and defense strategy which combines full cooperation with the international community with a strong emphasis on the principle and policy of self-reliance.

Despite the considerable element of special pleading here, he nonetheless voiced a profound and unsettling truth concerning Central and Eastern Europe.

43. D'Anieri and Schmiedeler, pp. 352-357; President William J. Clinton, "The U.S. and Central and Eastern Europe: Forging New Partnerships," Remarks to the Plenary Session of the White House Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, Cleveland, OH, January 13, 1995, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. VI, No. 3, January 16, 1995, pp. 28-30; "Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 1 December, 1994," *NATO Press Service*, December 1, 1994, pp. 3-4.

44. Interviews with Czech officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Prague, December 1994.

45. Interviews with officials of the Czech Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Prague, December 1994, and with Czech officials of the Ministry of Defense, Washington, DC, April 1995.

46. Prague, *Lidove Noviny* in Czech, April 25, 1995, *FBIS-SOV*, 95-081, April 27, 1995, pp. 44-45.

47. Interviews with Polish and Czech officials of their Ministries of Defense, Washington, DC, April, 1995.

48. *FBIS-SOV*, 95-081, April 27, 1995, pp. 44-45.

49. According to Grigory Yavlinsky (who opposes the government), Russia will be compelled to move to such union. Interviews with Finnish Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, December 1994. Yeltsin confirmed this outcome in September 1995 with his Edict No. 940 outlining a comprehensive strategy for economic-military-political union with the CIS subordinating those states to Russia and definitively dividing Europe. Moscow, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, in Russian, September 23, 1995, *FBIS-SOV*, 95-188, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22.

50. Interview with Estonian officials, Washington, DC, January 31, 1995.

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