Leveraging JIIM Partner Capabilities in Support of Steady State Operations

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15. ABSTRACT
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Abstract

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Leveraging JIIM Partner Capabilities in Support of Steady State Operations

We also can’t do this alone... We are going to look for broad and deep contributions, not only across the US Government, but also from other sectors, from NGOs, from think tanks, from the private sector and also from our allies and international partners abroad.

—Michele Flournoy, Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

The approaching termination of combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 will find the United States at a strategic crossroads. This crossroads represents an opportunity. After 13 years, the U.S. will no longer be encumbered by a resource draining war. It also represents a grave challenge, as federal budget reductions and a shift in strategic priorities will lead to tough decisions as to where and how the U.S. will further its national security objectives, especially as they manifest themselves through steady state operations.

The United States achieves the majority of its national security objectives through the execution of steady state operations. These operations represent a whole of government approach, often in conjunction with other Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partners, to promote U.S. interests through military, diplomatic, and developmental engagement. The outcomes of steady state operations are often intangible and hard to measure. Often, only regional stability or an increase in nations assessed as friendly to the U.S. will indicate they are having a positive effect. Conversely, the lack of regional stability, failed states, or states hostile to the U.S. and their immediate neighbors can indicate the lack of presence, or lack of effectiveness of steady state operations.

The 2011 National Security Strategy mentions the promotion of global, regional, or economic stability thirteen times. The draft 2013 National Security Strategy maintains
the emphasis upon global stability and concludes by stating, "Our [the United States'] security and stability is becoming inextricably linked to security and stability elsewhere in the world." Statements from these documents bring to the fore the importance of the United States remaining focused and engaged on conducting steady state operations to promote and sustain security and stability worldwide in accordance with U.S. national interests. As Ms. Flournoy stated above, it cannot be the Department of Defense (DOD) which takes the lead or does this alone. It will take a concerted unified effort between JIIM partners to achieve U.S. national security objectives. This paper will describe how the U.S. government can leverage JIIM partners’ capabilities and activities in steady state operations to achieve unity of effort and further its national security objectives.

It will begin with a description of the current and future strategic environment, and how it can affect the U.S.’s ability to execute effective steady state operations. It will then summarize the various elements of steady state operations, the agencies most involved in conducting them, and the authorities and guidance governing the conduct of steady state operations. Next, will be a detailed analysis of how the U.S. is conducting steady state activities today to determine its ability to effectively plan, coordinate, and execute steady state activities. Finally, the paper will suggest ways to address opportunities or shortcomings in current JIIM structures or processes. Following this roadmap, it is important to first put the conduct of steady state operations into context by describing the strategic environment’s affect upon their conduct.

The Strategic Environment and the Threat-Capabilities Gap

The strategic environment is evolving in a way which could place the U.S.’s capability to meet its steady state mission requirements at a disadvantage. Congress has called for drastic discretionary budget cuts as articulated in the 2011 Budget Control
Act (better known as sequestration) which specifically threatens the readiness, capacity, and operations of all U.S. Government (USG) interagency (IA) partners. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, signed by President Obama on December 26, 2013, postpones the cuts mandated by sequestration. However, it still dramatically reduces IA budgets, especially those of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS). The DOD faces a $75 billion cut to its budget over the next two years and $487 billion over the next ten years while the DOS will lose $4.3 billion compared to its FY13 budget. The result of these cuts is that the military will no longer be sized to conduct large scale or long term stability operations but still retains its global commitments such as homeland defense, strategic deterrence, and building partner capacity. The elimination of the United States’ commitment to large stability operations, Secretary Hagel announced, will affect each service, but particularly the Army (the largest contributor to steady state operations). The Army currently faces a cut of up to 80,000 Soldiers from its active force (to between 440,000 to 450,000), and up to 30,000 Soldiers from the Army National Guard and Reserves.

Residing in the background of the DOD and DOS budget challenges is an international environment that remains as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous as ever. Al-Qaida and its affiliates remain active and violent extremists remain a threat to U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the homeland. The diffusion of destructive technologies gives these extremists the capability to pose a catastrophic threat to the nation and its allies. Traditional state actors also pose a threat to the U.S. and its allies. Some, such as North Korea or Iran, possess the potential, through weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) or other means, to dramatically destabilize the regions around
them. Others, such as China and Russia are beginning to exert their influence on their peripheries of their borders, to the detriment of their neighbors, and U.S. national interests. The Middle East and North Africa remain a region of instability as state after state contends with or yields to pressure from its citizens for better governance. African nations, central and sub-Saharan in particular, struggle to develop secure and stable institutions, with many states suffering from bloody ethnic and religious violence, civil war, corruption, and the growing menace of violent religious extremism. Intertwined with these actors and regions of instability are the emerging threats of cyber-attack and cyber-espionage, the growing power and reach of transnational organized crime, and competition for dwindling natural resources. Together or separately, these threats pose a challenge to regional stability and U.S. national interests worldwide.

The budget cuts to DOD and imminent degradation of U.S. military power, particularly the Army, coupled with the DOS budget cuts and cuts to other IA partners will create a gap in the means required for U.S. to meet the above global threats and stability challenges. One would assume that the end of combat and stability operations in Afghanistan would allow a shifting of resources to meet global steady state requirements (as described in the DOD issued Guidance for Employment of the Force, or GEF), but the budget reductions will eliminate that peace dividend. In addition, the termination of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan could also lead to the deterioration of DOD, DOS, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) cooperation, which was hard earned through trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan, as each organization looks to protect its own interests and mission. The risks created by the imbalance of means to support the ways to meet U.S. strategic ends will demand
closer cooperation between USG IA partners. They will have to devise novel approaches, new efficiencies, better prioritization, and smarter partnering to meet steady state operations requirements in this increasing challenging strategic environment. Understanding the strategic environment's impact on steady state operations is a key first step. The next step is understanding what exactly steady state operations are, and who is responsible for planning and executing them.

Steady State Operations – Many Components, Many Actors

When one thinks of steady state operations, several terms come to mind: Phase 0, stability operations, shaping operations, and engagement activities to name a few. Often these terms are used interchangeably. Before going further, it is important to clarify what steady state operations are. According to Joint Publication 5-0, steady state operations are a Combatant Command (CCMD) function,

designed to support ongoing operations, prepare to defeat potential adversaries, succeed in a wide range of contingencies, build the capacity of partner nations, and, in conjunction with the other instruments of national power, promote stability in key regions and support other broad national goals.\(^{10}\)

Steady state activities form one aspect of the CCMD theater campaign plan (TCP), along with theater contingency plans. They encompass shaping activities, to include the phase 0 shaping activities of contingency plans,\(^{11}\) as well as "ongoing operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities."\(^{12}\) Of the preceding activities, engagement and security cooperation are most prominent and perhaps possess a greater long-term impact. Military personnel conduct engagement activities in peacetime to build bonds with multinational partners and strengthen multinational operations in order to ensure military access and regional understanding. These activities can include bi- or multinational
training or exercises, security assistance, joint combined exchange training, and counterdrug operations. Security cooperation activities concentrate on building relationships with foreign militaries and their institutions to promote U.S. interests while concurrently building partner capabilities and ensuring U.S. peacetime and contingency access to the partner country. Steady state operations also form a major component of peacetime and post-conflict stability operations. Stability operations are USG interagency activities conducted outside the U.S. to maintain or restore the infrastructure and institutions of a civil society and provide humanitarian relief. Steady state military support to these activities falls under nation assistance (NA) operations which, support the [host nation] by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. NA programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), building partnership capacity, and military civic action (MCA).

The activities described above comprise the military’s contribution to steady state operations. In accordance with the GEF and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), CCMDs will develop a TCP and contingency plans that focus on specific countries or regions within their areas of responsibility (AOR). But there are other USG and non-USG actors in the operational environment who are important contributors in steady state operations, and can positively influence USG efforts to shape the environment through steady state operations.

Most significant among the non-DOD USG IA entities are DOS and USAID. DOS operates an embassy in practically every country on earth and the U.S. Ambassador is the President’s representative. He/she is ultimately responsible for all steady state
operations occurring in his or her country. The Ambassador exercises authority over all USG IA (Departments of Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury, and the Drug Enforcement Agency, to name a few) assets in the country, with the exception of U.S. armed forces operating under CCDR authority. In addition to fostering good diplomatic relations, providing foreign assistance, and coordinating IA programs in individual countries and regions, DOS oversees a number of security cooperation programs through Title 22 of the U.S. Code. These programs include foreign military financing, foreign military sales, international military education and training, and peacekeeping operations, all of which complement DOD security cooperation activities.

USAID forms the third part of the USG "defense, diplomacy, development" (3D) triad. USAID is the lead agency for planning and executing development programs world-wide and is currently involved in development activities in over 100 countries. USAID operates independent from DOS. However, it receives guidance and budget from and coordinates with DOS. USAID programs include food security, economic growth, promoting good governance and democratic processes, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response. All are vital in ensuring or promoting stability during steady state operations. USAID accomplishes much of its initiatives through partnering with host nation institutions and the numerous local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the region or country. USAID is the de facto interlocutor between the NGOs and other USG agencies.

NGOs represent another sector operating in countries or regions of interest to the U.S. The United Nations (UN) coined the term "non-governmental organization" in Article 71 of the UN Charter, which originally sought to classify societal actors engaging
within the UN’s scope of influence. Although today many NGOs may operate outside of the UN system, Article 71 provides a guideline for NGOs to operate under the criteria of "international standing," "independent governance," and "geographical affiliation." Today, NGOs are commonly referred to as not-for-profit organizations seeking to advance their objectives through adroit employment of their capabilities to influence governmental and international organizations (e.g. UN agencies) in support of their initiatives and concerns. They are diverse organizations in every aspect: local to international focus, broad versus narrow scope of services, bare bones staffing and resources versus robustly staffed and resourced, persistent presence versus temporary (crisis-driven) presence. They all have one thing in common. They are all focused on providing a service to alleviate suffering, assist the poor, provide social services, or stimulate community development in developing countries. They possess capabilities that make them attractive and worthwhile partners in furthering U.S. development and stability interests worldwide.

The UN is another significant organization operating alongside U.S. steady state efforts. Specifically, the UN Development Program (UNDP), UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provide significant capabilities in support of steady state goals. The UN may also be involved in post conflict states, particularly through UN peacekeeping missions and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) efforts.

Other countries development agencies also contribute to development and stability operations in countries of interest to the U.S. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the French Development Agency (AFD), Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Sweden’s International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) are just a few on a large list of national aid agencies operating in various capacities worldwide.

NGOs, UN agencies, and the plethora of foreign government-administered development agencies operate by their own guidelines, restrictions, and national caveats. The U.S. IA partners are also guided by a number of universal and agency-specific guidance and authorities described below.

Steady State Operations Guidance and Authorities

Several documents govern the conduct of U.S. steady state operations. The overarching guidance is the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) which specifically links domestic security and stability to security and stability elsewhere in the world and states the U.S. must "encourage stability, foster economic growth, promote democratic values and protect global strategic interests." While these words can mean many things to many people, the emphasis on stability and the promotion of economic growth and democratic values mandates a whole of government approach to support steady state operations.

Relevant DOD Policy Guidance

From the NSS, policy guidance diverges between the defense and development sectors. The 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS), the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provide policy guidance for the U.S. Armed Forces. The 2011 NMS provides clear guidance to the CCDRs to 1) partner with other government agencies in pursuing security cooperation activities and security sector assistance with a wider range of partners, 2) prepare for
full spectrum contingencies to support U.S. diplomatic and development efforts, and 3) partner with and support USAID or other government agencies in response in humanitarian crisis.  

The recently released 2014 QDR builds on the 2011 NSS, the 2011 NMS, and the 2012 DSG and reflects the realities of the resource constrained environment the DOD now faces. In the QDR, the second pillar calls for the DOD to "build security globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges." To support this pillar, the DOD will rotationally deploy or forward station armed forces to engage with partner countries and allies to reassure regional allies, deepen defense relationships, promote regional stability, and build partner capacity. Also significant, in the wake of the experiences in Iraq, and Afghanistan, is the statement that the military "will no longer be sized to conduct large scale, prolonged stability operations." This statement indicates a retrenchment of sorts from joint doctrine's emphasis on stability operations as a core mission, both in the phasing construct as phase 4 of an operation, and in its holistic influence on steady state operations.

Further guidance to the DOD comes from Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23 (Security Sector Reform) and DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05. PPD 23 provides guidance for the DOD and applicable IA partners to build partner security forces capacity, promote good governance and adherence to the rule of law, foster partner support for U.S. national interests, and strengthen multinational collective security arrangements and organizations. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations, released in 2009, provides guidance to the DOD on its role as the supporting agency to other USG
agencies in stability operations, with the caveat to lead stability missions in non-
permissive environments until conditions permit transfer of the lead to other USG
agencies.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Relevant DOS/USAID Guidance}

The George W. Bush administration National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 44
was the genesis of DOS primacy for planning, coordinating, and executing
reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) assistance to countries either at risk of or
recovering from conflict or civil strife. As a reaction to mismanaged efforts by the DOD
in the opening years of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, NSPD 44 directed all applicable
interagency partners, including the DOD, as dictated by DOD Directive 3000.05 (now
superseded by DODI 3000.05), as supporting agencies/departments for R&S
assistance. In addition to addressing post-conflict concerns for R&S, NSPD 44 also
specifically directed DOS and IA partners to identify at risk states and develop
contingency plans to address the sources of instability. This explicitly includes
coordinating with the DOD to integrate these plans into CCMD contingency plans when
applicable.\textsuperscript{34}

The Obama administration’s Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 6, released in
2010, complements NSPD 44 by clarifying and providing new guidance to global
development activities. PPD 6 recognizes,

that development is vital to U.S. national security and is a strategic,
economic, and moral imperative for the United States. It calls for the
elevation of development as a core pillar of American power and charts a
course for development, diplomacy and defense to mutually reinforce and
complement one another in an integrated comprehensive approach to
national security.\textsuperscript{35}
PPD 6 was groundbreaking in providing a clear vision for focusing on economic growth and democratic governance, investing in innovations to solve complex development challenges. It placed greater emphasis on developing sustainable capacity for partners to provide basic services, developing strategies to address stabilization and post crisis situations, and holding partners accountable for development results. It directed the inclusion of the director of USAID in applicable National Security Council meetings and established an Interagency Policy Committee on Global Development. It also required DOS to conduct and publish a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).36

NSPD 44 and PPD 6 may form the foundation for IA cooperation in R&S activities and global development but it is the QDDR which brings them together to provide true strategic policy guidance to the DOS and USAID. The 2010 QDDR is a comprehensive document providing a vision for enhancing DOS and USAID capacity, capabilities, efficiencies, and accountability to meet global diplomatic and development challenges.

The QDDR describes the importance of DOS and USAID “civilian power” as an equal peer to military power and contains two (of four) sections that are directly applicable to and supportive of steady state operations. The first section addresses efforts to increase the capacity of USAID and restore it as the leading global development agency, create efficiencies and innovations with the current business model, and promote accountability and transparency in its operations.37 The second section describes how DOS and USAID will prevent and respond to crises and conflicts in fragile states by delineating responsibility for DOS and USAID between political and
security crises and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) crises respectively. It also seeks to create efficiencies in the field through increased partner nations' capabilities to respond to HA/DR situations as well as build partner capacity in the security and justice sectors.\textsuperscript{38}

It is clear that steady state operations are complex activities guided by a myriad of governmental and non-governmental agencies whose interests may, but not necessarily, align. From the U.S.'s perspective the real challenge is ensuring its lead government agencies, the DOD, DOS, and USAID are organized to facilitate a whole of government approach to conducting steady state operations. The next section will provide an overview of the current state of IA organization, planning, and operations at the national, regional, and country level.

The Current State of JIIM Integration and Cooperation

JIIM integration and cooperation in the conduct of steady state operations exists from the national policy level through the operational/regional level down to the operations in the field, with varying degrees of effectiveness. Each level has its own coordination mechanisms. Some are formal, some are ad hoc, and each JIIM member, be they USG IA, NGOs, or partner nations, possesses distinct capabilities and capacities to plan and execute their operations. They also have their limitations.

President Obama's Presidential Policy Directive 1 (PPD-1) established the National Security Council (NSC) System for his administration. This PDD describes the IA partners and processes for IA coordination for national security policy matters.\textsuperscript{39} While the processes and committee meetings outlined in PPD-1 seem clear, they belie the assumed efficiencies in the NSC's structure and authorities over the NSC IA members.
The NSC is envisioned as the body charged with synthesizing foreign policy and national security strategy with procedures to efficiently oversee steady state IA operations. Unfortunately, this is not the case. It is understaffed and unprepared to manage steady state operations and can also be frequently overwhelmed in crisis events. The NSC staff is sometimes unable to influence its IA members and is often unable to mediate disagreements between them. Further complicating established NSC processes intended to facilitate effective steady state operation planning and coordination are agency/department interests, personalities, and available resources which may run counter to NSC guidance and interests. This lack of capability at the NSC level to effectively influence the USG IA members in steady state operations trickles down to lower echelons.

There are, however, three IA planning mechanisms at the national level used to promote IA integration and input into planning for steady state operations, particularly between the DOD, DOS, and USAID (also known as the 3D's). The first is the DOS Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations' (CSO) integrated planning process. The CSO is the DOS bureau responsible for planning for crisis response, stabilization operations, and conflict transformation. Its planning processes produce recommendations which could influence other IA planning products, particularly DOD TCPs, Country Team Integrated Country Strategies (ICS's), and USAID Country Development Cooperation plans. Its Principles of the USG Planning Framework are intended to ensure the USG is working towards common objectives, avoids duplication of effort, identifies and manages gaps in planning, and coordinates USG efforts with non-USG entities. The second is the DOD's Promote Cooperation (PC) program,
which is an interagency collaboration forum sanctioned by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Through workshops and facilitated events, hosted by the Joint Staff J-5, the PC program provides a venue for IA partners to influence JSCP directed plan development, and foster IA collaboration and eventual joint plan integration. The 3D Planning Group (3DPG) is the third planning mechanism. 3DPG is a USAID forum for promoting dialog and strengthening planning efforts between the DOD, DOS, and USAID. It acts as both a working group and a steering committee for senior leaders in each agency.

These IA planning and coordination approaches provide a starting point for the synchronization of steady state activities across the 3Ds, but several institutional limitations effect their efficiency. The most persistent is a structural weakness in the USG system as it pertains to coordination for steady state missions. This structural weakness has several underlying factors: 1) department-centric organizations with a tendency to "stovepipe" information and decisions through their own chains of command, 2) insufficient resources and personnel to support what is seen by some IA partners as a focus on non-core missions, and 3) personnel who lack the training and experience to effectively represent their agency in IA environments. Compounding the above is the lack of a mandatory NSC-led comprehensive multi-level IA framework directing IA communication and planning coordination, resulting in inconsistent IA communication and collaboration in planning. Without institutionalized approaches or reforms to promote IA collaboration and communication, the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of IA coordination mechanisms mentioned above remains heavily dependent upon the commitment of the IA leadership.
Many of these deficiencies carry down to the regional level as well, where disparities between IA partners' budgets and capabilities become evident. Here the DOD reigns supreme, with robustly staffed and resourced regional CCMDs responsible for planning and executing steady state operations in support of their TCPs. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the DOD's IA partners. Some, such as DOS and USAID possess regional bureaus, but they are maintained at, and operate from, their respective home offices in Washington, DC. Other IA partners have no international regional offices at all. Recently, DOS and USAID have attempted to increase top-down planning guidance similar to DOD's approach (CCMD TCPs).

As a means to bridge this regional planning and coordination gap, many IA partners provide permanent liaisons and/or planners to the CCMDs and today each geographical CCMD has embedded partners from applicable agencies, albeit with mixed results. AFRICOM, for instance, originally envisioned that 25% of the headquarters would consist of IA partners. At its peak in 2011, IA representation comprised only 2% of the headquarters staff, just 38 people, and as of 2013 it had just over 20. The other CCMDs do not have a consistent structure and have differing representation from IA partners and different intents for their utilization. AFRICOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM organize their IA partners into a single J-9 directorate while CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and the functional CCMDs rely on interagency engagement groups or task forces. Some, such as AFRICOM, integrate IA partners into the other J-staffs, acting both as a liaison for their parent organizations and as embedded staff members. Others, such as PACOM and SOUTHCOM, kept their IA representatives in the J9 directorates. The IA contributions to the CCMDs make a
difference but are affected by a dwindling federal budget, which effects IA staffing, and thus their ability to support the CCMD staffs.\textsuperscript{52} Another problem is the perception (and perhaps reality) among IA personnel sent to work with the CCMD staffs that their posting to a CCMD is not a career enhancing position, and may even be a detriment to their career progression.\textsuperscript{53}

A more efficient state of IA integration and coordination occurs at the country level, where the execution of steady state activities occurs. Here, it is the embassy country team, led by the Ambassador or Chief of Mission (COM), which provides the mechanism bringing together each IA representative and coordinating their actions into the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). The ICS builds upon guidance from the joint DOS and USAID Joint Regional Strategies (JRS), produced every three years by the DOS and USAID regional bureaus. The JRS provides general parameters to guide country level planning and outlines the regional context, goals and priorities, management considerations impacting regional goals, and resource priorities.\textsuperscript{54}

The ICS integrates "country-level planning processes and efforts into a single, multi-year, overarching strategy that encapsulates U.S. government policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them."\textsuperscript{55} The county level is also where country team IA partners can collaborate and coordinate with not only the host nation but other nations’ development agencies, UN agencies, NGOs, and private sector companies conducting steady state operations in the country.

While the country teams, guided by their ICSs, are generally capable organizations with a clear focus, they do have challenges. The success of the country
team can often depend on the varying degrees to which the Ambassadors can lead and influence ICS planning and execution amongst the IA representatives, whose parent agency’s goals may not align with the embassy's goals.⁵⁶

Country team steady state operations coordination with the CCMDs can also be problematic. DOS and USAID place greater emphasis upon the ICS as opposed to the JRS while the DOD places greater emphasis upon theater-level planning. This can result in misunderstandings between CCMD staffs towards DOS and USAID regional goals (in spite of the JRS) while country teams may have difficulty understanding DOD activities at their level.⁵⁷

Resources, especially personnel, will define effectiveness of IA coordination in steady state operations. In many cases, the DOD staff in the country team is much smaller when compared to that of USAID, DOD's primary partner in steady state operations at the country level. This leads to an often overworked DOD country team staff having to prioritize its efforts with its IA partners in ways which may hinder steady state operations cooperation.⁵⁸ The same possibility for overburdened DOD staffs can apply to the CCMD staffs themselves. With many countries in their AORs, country team requests for DOD support in steady state operations could overwhelm any staff section.

Finally, there is the issue of communications between the CCMDs and the country teams, although it is just as applicable at the national level. First, there is the human element, where IA partners (particularly, DOD and DOS/USAID) speak to different audiences in different ways. The potential exists for IA partners to deliver unsynchronized or contradictory messages which could adversely affect intended and unintended audiences. The other element resides on the technical side in the
interoperability of technical communications systems, particularly classified information networks. Current classified information systems between DOD and DOS/USAID and other IA partners are often nonexistent or incompatible, and much of the work done by non-DOD IA partners is either classified or sensitive but unclassified. This also infers that DOD's over-classification of information not only leads to difficulties in effectively coordinating development activities with its AI partners but also with UN agencies and NGOs.

Opportunities to Enhance JIIM Integration and Cooperation

In spite of the challenges faced by the USG IA partners, a combination of ingenuity, force of will, relationship building, and persistence has enabled them to support the majority of U.S. national security interests. But the institutional structure and limitations of the USG remain. Increasing fiscal uncertainty and the approaching end of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan could severely degrade IA cooperation and collaboration in the future. It is vital that USG IA partners and U.S. allies to work together to devise innovative ways to cooperate in the planning and execution of steady state operations.

IA reform should begin at the national level, starting with the NSC. In 2008, the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) identified the national security system as being incapable of dealing with the challenges of the contemporary security environment, and proposed a complete reform of the 1947 National Security Act. The majority of the recommendations in the PSNR were acknowledge as aspirational, and wholly dependent upon presidential and/or congressional action. However, the recommendations can bring about IA efficiencies at the national level, if the political will exists to implement them. To date, neither Congress nor the President has acted on
these proposals. In order to plan and execute effective steady state operations, the President should work with Congress to implement the following suggestions as part of an incremental change to the NSC system. The President should establish permanent Interagency teams to take the daily management of IA issues from the National Security Council Staff and, in case of crisis, establish Interagency Crisis Task Forces when crisis situations exceed the capabilities of the standing IA Teams. The next recommendation is to establish a National Security Professional Corps (NSPC), which would "create a cadre of national security professionals trained for interagency assignments." The NSPC would be comprised of personnel from existing national security-focused agencies who would agree to a detail from their parent agency to serve in national security interagency positions at the national, regional level, and country level. The NSPC system would "1) impose some common requirements, 2) develop and reinforce a common culture for national security work based on collaboration and interagency assignments, and 3) create a cadre of national security professionals who could move more easily among the agencies and into positions requiring interagency experience." The final recommendation is for the creation of a collaborative information sharing architecture and a common security classification and access system across the national security system. This would go a long way in helping IA partners develop a common view of the environment. Although the PNSR recommended numerous other changes, implementing these recommendations will lay the groundwork for enhanced IA partnering and integration at the national and institutional level.

Below the NCS level there are other methods to enhance IA coordination. The 3D planning mechanisms mentioned earlier, DOD's Promote Cooperation, DOS's
Principles of the USG Planning Framework, and USAID’s 3D Planning Group all provide excellent venues to coordinate at the national level, but they are all informal, not mandatory and meet with varying degrees of effectiveness. A recommendation is for a Presidential Policy Directive mandating IA partners use these forums as the means to coordinate planning efforts and for the agencies chairing the forums to codify procedures for their conduct and meeting frequency.

At the regional level perhaps the greatest IA coordination opportunity exists between the CCMDs, the DOS and USAID regional bureaus. The current system of CCMDs coordinating directly with DOS embassy county teams can be cumbersome and lead to overwhelming both embassy country teams and CCMD staffs. A recommendation to address this is to redirect CCMD staff coordination to the DOS and USAID regional bureaus. Likewise, country team staffs would use their applicable regional bureaus as a conduit for coordination with the CCMDs. One significant barrier to implementing CCMD to DOS regional bureau coordination is that this proposal bypasses the DOD Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff and the DOS Under-Secretary for Political Affairs (the office over the regional bureaus). Each have a stake and interest in the decisions and coordination made at the regional level. The Joint Planning and Execution System TCP and contingency plan in-progress review (IPR) requirements would mitigate DOD unawareness. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3141.01E dictates that TCP IPRs describe how interagency planning can achieve desired theater end states. CCMDs can include in the IPRs a request to work directly with regional bureaus for steady state TCP activity coordination. DOS and DOD can further abate these fears through memoranda of agreement between the
agencies providing detailed guidance to subordinate elements pertaining to decision making restrictions and reporting requirements. There are two other potential problems: overwhelming the regional bureaus and creating another level of bureaucracy between the country teams and the CCMDs in the planning and execution of steady state operations. A way to address these potential challenges is for DOS and USAID to move personnel to the bureaus or, in the event they do not possess sufficient manpower to do so, for DOD to increase the number of liaisons it provides to these organizations, placing them in the regional bureaus as augmentation. As for the interface between the CCMDs and embassy country teams, the regional bureaus can manage requests for information from the CCMDs and participate in the initial planning and coordination efforts, while keeping the country teams updated, and then pass the CCMDs to the country teams for direct coordination as the operations or initiatives near execution.

Another regional opportunity, especially in the case of EUCOM and AFRICOM, is to leverage the capabilities of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners’ militaries. Following the fall of the Soviet Union many NATO partners allowed their militaries to atrophy, but some, such as the Italian and German Armies have actually increased their capabilities to conduct stability operations in permissive environments.\textsuperscript{66} Even though other NATO nations are configured to conduct major combat operations, a possible future for NATO militaries is to become more involved in steady state stability and peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{67} This effort by allies could complement U.S. steady state operations in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, especially with security cooperation activities. Similar opportunities exist for closer cooperation with Australia,
New Zealand, U.S. Treaty (ANZUS) partners in the Asia-Pacific region and, as they build capacity, African Union (AU) partners in Africa.

At the country level there are also opportunities to increase IA coordination and leverage other JIIM partners. First, there needs to be a stronger tie between DOD security cooperation activities and USAID development activities. USAID’s development efforts continue to build upon the close coordination with its IA partners, local, regional, and international NGOs, the UN, and its sister development agencies. But USAID’s cooperation with the DOD elements and activities is suboptimal in some regards. In many countries where USAID operates there is no sustained DOD security cooperation staff present at the Embassy with whom to develop and maintain effective coordination and working relationships. Given that permanent assignment of additional DOD personnel to an embassy may not be possible, an option is to use small, persistent, rotational (for a minimum of four months) contingents of officers and NCOs to provide the security cooperation interface with the embassy team. Alongside of these security cooperation liaison teams (or in lieu of them) the U.S. Army can provide rotational active and reserve component civil affairs teams to maintain a permanent presence at the embassy. This presence would complement planning and executing events to build partner capacity such as military-civic action projects (horizontal and vertical engineering) and humanitarian-civic action operations (medical, dental, veterinary civil action programs). These operations would provide opportunities for construction engineer and medical, dental, and veterinary units from the active and reserve components from each service to perform their assigned missions while complimenting USAID development activities.
As it implements its regionally aligned forces (RAF) program, the U.S. Army is particularly well situated to meet these requirements. In addition to the purely liaison and development capabilities the Army can provide, the RAF initiative can become a centerpiece for sustained military-to-military engagements and exercises with a greater number of partners across the geographic CCMDs. The RAF concept can complement an already well-developed Army National Guard (ARNG) State Partnership program, a security cooperation program which currently partners state ARNG units with 69 countries worldwide. The Army can further extend this program to additional countries by expanding it to Army Reserve Readiness Commands as well, which could provide a sustainment-focused aspect to building partner capacity in the partner nation militaries.

Conclusion

For the foreseeable future, the United States will face a national security environment which experts believe will be more volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and dangerous, with ever dwindling resources. This will require United States Government interagency partners to devise innovative ways to enhance communication, coordination, and collaboration to work together and achieve unity of effort in the conduct of steady state operations. Relying primarily on the structure and capabilities of the "3D" agencies, DOD, DOS, and USAID, in conjunction with other IA partners, the United States possesses the capability to efficiently and effectively plan and implement a coherent and cohesive national security strategy. This strategy will impart guidance which will form the heart of integrated joint regional strategies, which then drive integrated country strategies for the execution of steady state operations.

In order to plan and execute steady state operations effectively, the USG IA partners must understand their strategic, operational, and tactical environments, the
actors involved in steady state operations and the authorities and guidance which govern them. In lieu of true reform at the National Security Council level, the USG IA partners must use, and enhance, the existing coordination mechanisms at the national level to create efficiencies at the regional and country levels. These efforts will help close the gaps in steady state operation planning and execution. Whenever possible, IA partners will need to leverage the capabilities of non-governmental and international organizations and multinational partners, where interests align with the goal of using their capabilities to complement USG steady state activities.

Many of these challenges are being addressed today. By breaking down the institutional information and decision-making stovepipes and striving to change the culture of parochialism in favor realizing the goodness of integrated and energetic interagency coordination and cooperation at all levels, the U.S. will achieve unity of effort in planning and executing steady state operations.

Endnotes

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9 Andrea Baumann, "Silver Bullet or Time Suck? Revisiting the Role of Interagency Coordination in Complex Operations," *Prism* 3, no. 3 (June 2012): 34.


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